Knowledge structure in curriculum and pedagogy:
continuity or dichotomy?
Jeanne Gamble
University of Cape Town
Paper presented at the
Knowledge and Curriculum in Higher Education
Symposium
7 – 8 November 2012
Abstract
In the concluding section of Basil Bernstein’s early seminal paper
‘On the Classification and Framing of Educational Knowledge’, he
explains that the paper explored the concept of ‘boundary’ and
that the analysis focussed upon the structuring of transmitted
educational knowledge (1975, 110).
Though his last work shifted the focus from classification and
framing to knowledge structure, as related to the formalisation
and growth of disciplines, the Durkheimian emphasis on
boundary was maintained through all phases of his work.
This paper considers why it is important to both curriculum and
pedagogy to retain Bernstein’s emphasis on boundary.
“Aren’t we all progressivists at heart?”
(Joe Muller, in a class many years ago)
The nature of modern science
Zilsel (2000) traces the birth of modern science to the period
1300 to 1600 and the emergence of early capitalism in
Europe. Zilsel distinguishes three strata of intellectual
activity. Logical training was reserved for upper-class scholars
(professors and humanistic literati as two distinctive strata)
while experimentation, causal interest and quantitative
method were the domain of lower-class artisans. Science was
born, he argues, when the progress of technology weakened
social prejudice against manual labour and the experimental
method was adopted by rationally trained scholars to
position deductive and inductive methods of investigation
in a collateral relationship
Neither Durkheim nor Bernstein considers boundaries to be
immutable. Durkheim argues that the placing in a relationship of
orders sacred and profane is a delicate operation which requires
a complex initiation (Durkheim, 1912/1995, 38).
• .Atkinson (1985, 143) argues that, like Mary Douglas, Bernstein’s
constructs are ‘continuous rather than dichotomous’.
• Although Bernstein differentiated strongly between restricted
and elaborated codes, ‘he was well aware that a number of
different dimensions of meaning were involved and that the
overall pattern was one of gradience, not discrete categories’
(Halliday, 1995, 140).
•More recently, Karl Maton has used legitimation codes and the
constructs of semantic gravity/semantic density to argue for
‘reconceptualising forms of discourse, knowledge structure,
curriculum structure and learning on a continuum rather than as
dichotomous ideal types’ (Maton, 2009, 55)
So, why are we wanting to making the move from dichotomy
(or boundary) to continuum?
I want to argue that it is because we are trying to work with the
notion of knowledge structure in curriculum terms. In order to
do so, we need to transpose the language of hierarchy and
generalisation to curriculum
Let us just remind ourselves that in ‘vertical discourse’ BB creates
a language to describe growth in disciplinary knowledge
• Hierarchy is established though attempts to create very
general propositions and theories, which integrate knowledge
at lower levels and in this way shows underlying uniformities
across an expanding range of apparently different phenomena
(verticality - Muller 2007)
• Hierarchy and generalisation are deemed constitutive
features of knowledge structure (Shalem & Slonimsky, 2010).
What language does BB make available for talking about
curriculum?
• In his early language of description, the basic structure of
curriculum was given by the strength of the classificatory
relation: collection code & integrated code (1975, 90).
• In the ‘pedagogic device’ the formulation of pedagogic
discourse (ID/RD) at the level of recontextualising rule raises
the language of framing to the level of curriculum – i.e.
selection, sequencing pacing, criteria for evaluation as well
as hierarchical rules or teacher-pupil relations now operate at
the level of curriculum as well as at the level of pedagogic
practice.
Distinction between macro- framing at the level of curriculum
and micro- framing at the level of classroom practice (Reeves
2010).
This language for describing curriculum structure is similar to the
language emanating from the ‘opportunity to learn’ (OTL)
literature which identifies curriculum structure with concepts
such as content coverage by cognitive demand, content
exposure, curriculum pacing, curriculum coherence (Reeves &
Muller 2005; Schmidt, Hsing Chi Wang & McKnight, 2008; Reeves
2010).
It is the prescription for levels of cognitive demand that is
important here as this carries a notion of hierarchy, which
brings brings Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives (1956)
and what is called the Revised Taxonomy (2001) into play.
A taxonomy creates a hierarchical classification system with
subsumption of lower levels into higher levels
Kratwohl describes the logic of the taxonomy as follows:
The original Taxonomy provided carefully developed definitions
for each of the six major categories in the cognitive domain.
The categories were ordered from simple to complex and from
concrete to abstract. Further, it was assumed that the original
Taxonomy represented a cumulative hierarchy; that is, mastery
of each simpler category was prerequisite to mastery of the next
more complex one (Kratwohl, 2002, 212-213).
Structure of the Original Bloom’s Taxonomy
(Bloom, Engelhart, Furst, Hill & Krathwohl, 1956)
1.0 Knowledge
1.10 Knowledge of specifics
2.0 Comprehension
2.1 Translation
1.11 Knowledge of terminology
2.2 Interpretation
1.12 Knowledge of specific facts
2.3 Extrapolation
1.20 Knowledge of ways and means of
dealing with specifics
3.0 Application
4.0 Analysis
1.21 Knowledge of conventions
4.1 Analysis of elements
1.22 Knowledge of trends and sequences
4.2 Analysis of relationships
1.23 Knowledge of classifications and
categories
4.3 Analysis of organizational principles
1.24 Knowledge of criteria
5.0 Synthesis
1.25 Knowledge of methodology
5.1 Production of a unique communication
1.30 Knowledge of universals and
abstractions in a
5.2 Production of a plan, or proposed set of
operations
REVISED TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES
(Anderson, Krathwohl (Eds.), 2001)
Structure of the Knowledge Dimension
Structure of the Cognitive Process Dim.
A. Factual Knowledge – The basic elements that 1.0 Remember – Retrieving relevant
students must know to be acquainted with a knowledge from long-term memory.
discipline or solve problems in it.
B. Conceptual Knowledge – The interrelationships
among the basic elements within a larger structure
that enable them to function together
C.
D.
2.0 Understand – Determining the meaning
of instructional messages, including oral,
written, and graphic communication.
Procedural Knowledge – How to do something; 3.0 Apply – Carrying out or using a
methods of inquiry, and criteria for using skills, procedure in a given situation.
algorithms, techniques, and methods.
4.0 Analyze – Breaking material into its
constituent parts and detecting how the
parts relate to one another and to an
Metacognitive Knowledge – Knowledge of overall structure or purpose.
In one fell swoop this allows for the transposition of hierarchy in
knowledge-building to hierarchy in curriculum structure.
Even though Reeves (2012) has shown that there are different
levels of difficulty between questions which align to a particular
type of cognitive demand’ and that a question that tests specific
knowledge can actually be more difficult than a multi-step,
multiple-concept question, the idea of a continuum of cognitive
complexity is seductive in terms of its implicit assumption of
logical continuity and/or cumulative links between the various
categories or types.
2 Dangers:
• genericism (general cognitive attributes)
• A way of ranking assessment items becomes a general theory
of pedagogy
In order to find another solution we turn to Halliday’s languagebased theory or learning and the post-Vygotskian work of Vasili
Davydov..
A model of human semiotic development (Halliday, 1993, 111).
(protolanguage) - generalisation - abstractness - metaphor
(8)
(18)
• Synoptic/dynamic complementarity
(21)
… the underlying assumption is that they do not follow in a
direct sequence. Abstraction does not develop out of
generalisation as they are fundamentally different processes.
What then is the teaching process towards
symbolic abstraction?.
For this we move to post-Vygotskian research
related to Vygotsky’s distinction between
‘spontaneous‘ or everyday concepts and
‘scientific’ or theoretical concepts. Both are
concepts, in the sense of being an idea about a
class of objects at a general level, but they have
different ontogenetic or developmental
pathways.
Daniels (2008, 18) relates the instructional approach of theorists
such as Davydov to Bernstein’s distinction between horizontal
and vertical discourse.
Davydov and his colleagues are critical of both traditional and
guided discovery forms of classroom practice (more commonly
known as constructivism).
At the core of this argument we find a strong distinction
between empirical and theoretical generalisation as entirely
independent processes.
‘Ascent from the abstract to the concrete’
‘Discovery and mastery of the abstract and universal precedes
mastery of the concrete and particular, and the concept itself
as a certain method of activity serves as a means of ascending
from the abstract to the concrete’ (Davidov, 1990 174).
The assertion is that empirical generalisation is accomplished as
a result of comparison and singling out the general (similar)
properties of the phenomena being compared. This is an
important form of generalisation, but Davydov argues that
‘numerous facts testify that the initial generalisations obtained
by the students according to the scheme “from the bottom up”
in themselves often do not provide for movement “from the top
down,” from the general to the particular’ (Davydov, 1990, 11;
emphasis added).
This is so because the transition from general concepts to
particular operations functions as ‘an entirely independent
process’ (12). For Davydov a scientific concept reflects what is
‘essentially general’.
‘Such a theoretical derivation is accomplished by a twoway movement from the general to the particular and
from the particular to the general - generalization and
theoretical cognition are interrelated. Here one must
make a clear-cut distinction between the process of
empirically “suggesting” the externally general and the
process of theoretically deriving certain theses on the
basis of the essentially general’ (Dayvydov, 1990, 91,
emphasis added).
Drawing such a distinction does not mean that
concrete objects are discarded. On the contrary, he
argues that ‘genuine mastery of abstract knowledge
occurs in proportion to its enrichment with
concrete-sensory content’ (12). With regard to
students’ life-worlds, he argues:
‘Of course, this experience should be used in
instruction, but only through a substantial
reconstruction within a form of scientific
knowledge that is qualitatively special and new for
the student, which in no way corresponds, and
cannot correspond, to simple life experience’
(Davydov, 1990. 40; original emphasis).
In the teaching of academic subjects, the key task for
students is to identify the ‘primary general relationship’
and to make the discovery ‘that this relationship is
manifest in many other particular relationships found in
the given material’ (cited in Engeström, 2005, 164-165).
‘To make such a generalisation means to discover a
principle, a necessary connection of the individual
phenomena within a certain whole, the law of
formation of that whole’
(as cited in Tuomi-Gröhn & Engeström, 2007, 29).
Here is the defining feature of knowledge structure the necessary connection between ‘parts and the
whole’
N apples were in a bowl on the table. R people entered the room and
each took an apple. How many apples remained? Children first analyze
the structure of the problem, identifying it as a part-whole structure,
with N as the whole and R as a part. They schematize the quantitative
relations expressed in the problem as follows:
N
R
?
Since they know the whole and are trying to find a part, they know the
missing part must be the difference between the whole and the known
part, i.e. N – R (Schmittau, 2005, 19).
Continued:
Schmittau goes on to show that later, when these students are confronted
with numerical designations instead of symbols, they apply the same
symbolic logic. For example:
‘There were seven books on the shelf. Nine children entered the library and
each placed a book on the shelf. How many books are now on the shelf?’
In this problem the students are able to recognise that both numbers are now
parts and that the whole must be greater than the parts in order for this
problem to have a solution.
Schmittau argues that ‘because they have a theoretical orientation to the
problem structure, they can analyze the relationships between the
quantities … without any numerical designations to provide them with cues’
(2005, 19).
So what does this say about pedagogy related to the
transmission of knowledge structure?
To have the recognition rule for a given problem or case is to be
able to recognise the relational whole of which the problem or
case is a part. The teacher’s task is to model, in some form, the
relational whole or its proxy. Whatever there is of conceptuality
in terms of low or high verticality must be put up front – so to
speak. Not to do so may give students access to the capacity to
reason empirically but not to the capacity to reason
theoretically. Once principles or rules are stated, students can
often apply these to given problems but, what they cannot do, is
to recognise the general principle inherent in a particular case or
problem. Misrecognition of this kind keeps students trapped in
the world of particular orders of meaning.
Logically, the interpretation that follows is that whatever the
level of verticality, it is theoretical generalisation that constitutes
the boundary between horizontal and vertical discourse.
If this is so and if we take the point that abstractedness (for
Halliday) and theoretical generalisation (for Davydov) are
separate from and different to empirical generalisation, then we
can see why it is so crucial to recognise the directionality of
pedagogies that privilege knowledge structure to give access to
‘powerful knowledge’.
And that is why the argument has been that we need to retain a
strong notion of boundary in our framing of our educational
work, even as we work towards a stronger understanding of
continua
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