Perspectives on Performance Based Financing within the GAVI Alliance Peter Hansen Clermont-Ferrand, 11 May 2011 Performance Based Financing (PBF) within the GAVI Alliance Operates on two main levels: Between GAVI and national government (‘aid’): Immunisation Services Support (ISS) Between national government and lower levels, civil society and communities (‘financing’): Health Systems Strengthening Future directions Grant monitoring framework Health Systems Funding Platform Incentives for Routine Immunisation Strengthening (IRIS) Clermont-Ferrand 11 May 2011 1 Draft Grant Monitoring Framework Clermont-Ferrand 11 May 2011 2 Health Systems Funding Platform ‘Financing’ – platform to be used to finance PBF initiatives within many countries, based on national health strategies ‘Aid’ – options/modalities are in development Options to be explored to deliver all cash based programmes within GAVI through platform Clermont-Ferrand 11 May 2011 3 IRIS Objectives Increase routine immunisation coverage Increase equity in immunisation coverage Structure National governments submit applications to GAVI Must specify detailed plan describing how incentives would be pushed down to lower levels of the system Clermont-Ferrand 11 May 2011 4 IRIS Builds on ISS design and lessons learned Key Changes Incentives distributed to lower levels of system Portion of grant “fixed” (process measures) and portion “at risk” (outcome measures) each year Performance payments linked to coverage (and possibly equity) rather than number of children immunised Enhanced and independent validation of results, linked to WHO/UNICEF estimates Clermont-Ferrand 11 May 2011 5 Payments under IRIS – hypothetical example Clermont-Ferrand 11 May 2011 6 What has worked in using PBF within GAVI? PBF has helped catalyse achievement of better results in many countries Positive feedback from countries Clarity, flexibility, autonomy, ownership, encourages innovation, low transaction costs and reporting burden Reduced transaction costs at global level Leaner model means more money to finance results at country level ISS pathfinder effect Clermont-Ferrand 11 May 2011 7 Lessons learned If incentives are wrong, potential to distort behaviour Be explicit about theory of change and put it to the test Actively identify and document unintended consequences Need to ensure appropriate balance between: Data integrity, country ownership and capacity strengthening Quantitative rules and responsiveness to context Predictability and results orientation Rewarding good performance and addressing needs of low performers Clermont-Ferrand 11 May 2011 8 Clermont-Ferrand 11 May 2011 9