CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS
FORCE LEVELS
OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT
► TWO
TO THREE ARGS FORWARD
DEPLOYED
 ONE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN /
ARABIAN GULF-INDIAN OCEAN AREA
 ONE OR TWO IN THE WESTERN
PACIFIC AREA.
 ONE ARG/MEU IS FORWARD BASED IN
SASEBO AND OKINAWA JAPAN.
Amphibious flexibility is the greatest
strategic asset that a sea power
possesses.
BHLiddell Hart
CRITICALITIES
► TRANSITION
FROM SEA TO LAND, INVOLVING
NAVAL, GROUND AND AIR FORCES MOST
DIFFICULT.
► COMMANDS AND CONTROL OF MULTI- SERVICE,
MULTI ENVIRONMENT ACTIVITIES COMPLEX
► CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN RESTRICTED
WATERS INCREASES VULNERABILITY TO HOSTILE
ATTACK, PARTICULARLY DURING EARLY PHASES
WHEN SUPPORT OF OWN HEAVY WEAPONS NOT
AVAILABLE
RECENT EMPLOYMENT
► FRENCH
AND THEN US FORCES FOR OVER 25
YEARS IN INDOCHINA
► ANGLO-FRENCH ASSAULT IN SUEZ,
► FALKLANDS CONFLICT
► US LANDINGS IN GRENADA
► COALITION LANDINGS DURING GULF WAR IN
1992
► AUSTRALIAN LANDINGS IN EAST TIMOR
► US/ALLIES OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
► INTRODUCED
SINCE EARLY DAYS OF INCEPTION
OF INDIAN NAVY
► RECOMMENDATION TO POSSESS A SMALL
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CAPABLE OF
PROTECTING INDIA’S REGIONAL INTERESTS
SUGGESTED IN 1946 WHEN INDEPEDENCE ON
HORIZON.
► CURRENT CAPABILITY BRIGADE MINUS
INDIAN NAVAL HISTORY
► LST
INS MAGAR, OF W W II VINTAGE ACQUIRED
IN 1949
► APPROVAL ACCORDED IN 1958 TO ESTABLISH A
PRESENCE IN A& N ISLANDS
► POST INDO CHINA WAR DEBACLE RESIDENT
NAVAL OFFICER WAS APPOINTED IN PORT BLAIR.
► INCREASED INDONESIAN INTRUSIONS IN
NICOBAR ISLANDS IN 1965
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
► ORDER
PLACED FOR TWO LST (M) FROM RUSSIA
IN 1965
► INDONESIAN THREAT AND INDONESIAN – PAK
BONDING OF 1965
► BOTCHED UP AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AT COX’S
BAZAAR IN OPERATION BEAVER AS A PART OF
1971 OPERATIONS .
► LESSONS HOISTED IN IMPORTANCE OF
AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS ESTABLISHED
AMPHIBIOUS OPS OF INDIAN NAVY
► SRI
LANKA IN 1988, SOMALIA IN 1995,
► CYCLONE RELIEF IN SAURASHTRA IN 1998
/ORISSA IN 2000.
► AS A ‘FORCE IN BEING’ ON WEST COAST’
DURING OP PARAKARAM.
► PAKISTAN DIVERTED ONE DIVISION FROM
LAND BORDERS TO MAKRAN COAST.
SCOPE
► CURRENT
TRENDS IN US NAVY, ROYAL
NAVY, PLA NAVY AND AUSTRALIAN
NAVY
► FOCUSED ATTENTION ON ‘SHIP TO
SHORE MOVEMENT’
► TASKS OF INDIAN NAVY
► ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT FORCES
► DEFINING CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS
FORCE FOR INDIAN NAVY
ROLES OF US NAVY
► SEA
CONTROL
► MARITIME SUPREMACY
► POWER PROJECTION
► STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
► FORWARD NAVAL PRESENCE
► STRATEGIC SEALIFT
ORGANISATION
► AMPHIBIOUS
TASK FORCE (ATF)
► RANGE FROM A SINGLE AMPHIBIOUS READY
GROUP/MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL
OPERATIONS CAPABLE) [ARG/MEU (SOC)], TO A
LARGER ORGANIZATION CAPABLE OF EMPLOYING
A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (MEB) OR
EVEN A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
ROLES/ TASKS
►
MAINLAND OPERATIONS
 MAKRAN COAST
 BANGLADESH
ASSAULT LANDINGS TO RETAKE LOST
TERRITORY.
► AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS
► TACTICAL DECEPTION.
►
ROLES/ TASKS
►DEFENCE
OF ISLAND
TERRITORIES -1197 ISLANDS
 POACHING, SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING
OF WOMEN AND GUN RUNNING
 PENETRATION BYOF FUNDAMENTALIST
IN LAKSWADWEEP ISLANDS WITH THE
PREDOMINANTLY MINORITY
POPULATION
 AIRPORT/PORT/ KEY FACILITY
SEIZURE
OUT OF AREA CONTIGENCIES
►IN
SUPPORT OF UN
/COALITION OPERATIONS
►EVACUATION
►SHOW
OF CIVILIANS
OF FORCE/
REINFORCEMENT
OTHER TASKS
►CONDUCT
LANDINGS IN SUPPORT
OF WITHDRAWING TROOPS
►LIMITED OFFENSIVE ATTACK
►HOSTAGE RECOVERY.
►GAS AND OIL PLATFORM
OPERATIONS.
►HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS
FORCES
► SHIP
TO SHORE MOVEMENT
 LST(L), LST(M) AND LCUs LACK
SPEED
 CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT VERTICAL
ENVELOPMENT MINIMAL.
 HARD BEACHING TO DISCHARGE
ARMOUR
 VULNERABLE
ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR
RAISING MARINES?
► MOUNTAIN
BRIGADE MINUS OF THE INDIAN
ARMY IS DESIGNATED AS THE AMPHIBIOUS
BRIGADE.
► BASED IN PORT BLAIR UNDER ANC
► BATTALIONS CHANGED/ REPLACED EVERY TWO
YEARS ON A STAGGERED BASIS
► ANOTHER BRIGADE IS KEPT STAND BY ON THE
MAINLAND TO AUGMENT THE PORT BLAIR
BRIGADE SHOULD THE NEED ARISE.
LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS
SHIPS
► LIMITED
STAND OFF CAPABILTY 1-2
NM
► LCAS/GEMINIS VULNERABLE IN SURF
ZONE
► LIMITED SITES FOR HARD BEACHING
BY LST(L)
► UNDERLOADING OF ENGINES
LIMITATIONS - AAV
► AMPHIBIOUS
ASSAULT VEHICLE-BMP
AND BDR FROM MECHANIZED
INFANTARY
► INADEQUATE SEA KEEPING ABILITY
► VULNERABLE IN SURF ZONE
► LIMITED OTH CAPABILTY
► GUN TOO LIGHT
► CG HOVERCRAFT – LCAC?
ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR
RAISING MARINES?
► STRETCHED
ARMY - OP PARAKRAM, THE
AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE MOBILIZED TO
THE WESTERN COMMAND.
► THE TWO YEARLY CHANGES EFFECTS
TRAINING.
► TIME FOR CHANGE OVER BY THE TIME,
INCOMING BATTALION GOES THROUGH
THE TRAINING AND BECOMES
PROFICIENT
►
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING
► NEED
YEAR-ROUND TRAINING.
► TRAINING SEASONAL- WEATHER
DEPENDENT
► HIGH SKILLS- NEGOTIATION OF
‘SURF ZONE’ BY BMPS OR LCA
► MUSTERING VARIED ASSETS OF
COMPONENTS DIFFICULT.
► NEED FOR DEDICATED AMPHIBIOUS
SCHOOL.
INTELLIGENCE
►
►
►
►
►
►
MOST CRITICAL
AIR RECONNAISSANCE BY ARC, IAF,
IN, CG RESOURCES INCLUDING UAV
SATELLITE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES LIKE RAW,
IB , DIA AND SBS/NAVAL LIAISON
TEAMS
SUBMARINE RECONNAISSANCE
SIGNIT AND COMINT
COMMAND CONTROL AND
COMMUNICATIONS
►SUCCESS
DEPENDENT ON C3
►‘LESSONS LEARNT ‘ FILES OF
AMPHEXES
►INABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL
SERVICES TO EXCHANGE
INFORMATION LATERALLY
OPS- MAKRAN COAST
►
►
►
►
►
►
►
FAVORABLE SEA/ AIR SITUATION
ROA OF FLEET AIR DEFENCE
PAKISTANI SURVEILLANCE
FALKLAND’S CAMPAIGN
LOW SPEED- AMPHIBIOUS UNITS- A
CONSTRAINT
RAIDS, DECEPTION, OR OPENING A
NEW FRONT FOR ONGOING LAND
OPERATIONS
HIGH WASTAGE
NAVAL GROWN MARINES ?
IS IT THE ANSWER
CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
► TREND-
MODERN AMPHIBIOUS
FORCES
► TASKS
► MARITIME INTERESTS GULF TO
MALACCA.
► BRIGADE STRENGTH
CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
► TWO
LPD CAPABLE OF CARRYING FOUR
LCACS/ LCUS
► THREE LSL (L) WITH IMPROVED SPEED
AND SHIP SIDE MEXEFLOTES
► DETERMINE- LST (M) / LCUs AS PER A
BRIGADE LEVEL TABLE
► MODERN MEDIUM LIFT HEPTR (10 TONS)
FOOD FOR THOUGHT
►VIRAAT-
EX HERMES- HELO
CARRIER
►OPERATE HEAVY/ATTACK HELOS
OF IAF
►PLAN AN EXERCISE IN A&N ?