Overview of Competition Law and Policy in
Kenya
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• The Working Group on Government
Expenditure proposed the need for a market driven economy which was later echoed in the Sessional Paper no. 1 of
1986.
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Overview of Competition Law and Policy in
Kenya: Legislative history
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Legislative History continuation
• This mooted the need for a legislation to curb RTP’s and abuse of dominance, hence the current Restrictive Trade
Practices, Monopolies and Price Control
Act, Cap.504 of the Laws of Kenya.
• The Law was promulgated in 1988 and operationalized in 1989.
Overview of Competition Law and Policy in
Kenya: Legislative history
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Objectives
• Regulate market conduct through prohibiting restrictive trade practices and abuse of dominance (predatory behaviors).
• Regulate market structure through regulation of horizontal mergers and acquisitions as well as unwarranted concentration of economic power
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Overview of Competition Law and Policy in
Kenya: Objectives
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The Act is divided into six Parts
Part I- Preliminary
Part II- Provisions Relating to Restrictive Trade
Practices
Part III- Control of Monopolies and
Concentration of Economic Power
Part IV- Provisions Relating to the Control and Display of Prices
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Overview of Competition Law and Policy in
Kenya: Parts
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Cont.
Part V- Establishment of the Restrictive Trade
Practices Tribunal
Part VI- Miscellaneous Provisions
Note: Part IV of the Act is redundant but was retained because of the opposition of liberalization from some constituents. It also indicates that the current Act is transitory.
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Overview of Competition Law and
Policy in Kenya: Parts
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Implementing Institutions.
Monopolies and Prices Department
(Commissioner)
Minister for Finance
Restrictive Trade Practices Tribunal
(RTPT)
The High Court of Kenya
Overview of Competition Law and Policy in
Kenya: Institutions
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Implementation approach
RTP’s are investigated by the
Commissioner, orders are issued by the
Minister.
Concentration of market power, order to investigate any sector is given by the
Minister to the Commissioner.
Application for mergers & acquisitions is made to the Minister through the
Commissioner.
Overview of Competition Law and Policy in
Kenya: Implementation
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RTP’s
• Imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
• Fine not exceeding Ksh. 100,000
• Both.
Unwarranted concentration of economic power.
• Disposal of interest on condition that this should not create an inefficient units.
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Overview of Competition Law and
Policy in Kenya: Sanctions & Penalties
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Mergers and Takeovers
• Imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years,
• A fine not exceeding Ksh. 200,000 or
• Both
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Overview of Competition Law and
Policy in Kenya:Sanctions and Penalties
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Weaknesses of current Law
Lack of autonomy.
Difficulties in implementation process (RTP’s).
Mergers:
there is no thresholds,
no time limit,
The Minister is not required to give reasons for rejecting a merger,
The Act covers horizontal mergers only
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Overview of Competition Law and
Policy in Kenya: Weaknesses
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Contin.
No fee is charged to file a merger.
Lack of harmony between Cap 504 and other
Sectoral laws.
Lack of power to conduct dawn raids.
The Act does not cover consumer welfare issues.
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Overview of Competition Law and
Policy in Kenya: Weaknesses
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The Competition Bill, 2009
• The Bill is awaiting Second Reading.
• The Bill, among others intends to set up an autonomous Authority.
• The Bill intends to separate the three main functions of: o Policy formulation :Minister o Management: The Board and o Implementation: Authority
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Contin.
The Bill intends to mitigate the weaknesses of current Law by:
Creating an autonomous Competition Authority,
Enhancing sanctions hence making them more deterrent .
Granting the Director General authority to hire private investigators.
14 4/17/2020 2:40:58 PM The Competition Bill, 2009
Contin.
Granting power to search and seizure during investigations,
Providing for exemptions.
Granting the Authority power to process all types of mergers.
Setting time limit for processing a merger,
Requiring the Authority to give reasons for approving or rejecting a merger,
Granting the Authority power to charge fees.
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Contin.
The Bill contains provisions on Consumer Welfare
Part on Price Control was removed.
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Benefits of regional interaction.
• Information sharing on competition matters.
• Broadening of knowledge and experience in competition field.
• Strengthening interaction leading to positive comity.
• Offers an opportunity for benchmarking.
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Cases Investigated
1. ACQUISITION OF CHEVRON KENYA LTD. BY TOTAL
KENYA LTD.
Total Kenya Ltd. Applied for a merger with
Chevron Kenya Ltd.
Relevant market
Product market was defined as importation and distribution of petroleum products.
Geographic market was defined as national but further broken down into major roads in the whole country.
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Case:TOTAL KENYA LTD. AND
CHEVRON KENYA LTD.
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Contin.
Analysis
The market with 29 players was found to be highly concentrated where five multinationals controlled 84.07%.
Post-merger CR5 was 87.41
Premerger HHI was 1627.36 and a post merger HHI of 2069.485
There exist high entry barriers and the only credible mode of entry can be through acquisition of existing retail network.
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Case:TOTAL KENYA LTD. &
CHEVRON KENYA LTD.
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Contin.
Assets with competition concerns were:
– Retail outlets
– Intoplanes facilities at airports
– Loading arms
– Depots
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Case:TOTAL KENYA LTD. &
CHEVRON KENYA LTD.
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Contin.
Conclusion
If approved the merger would create competition concerns.
Recommendation
The Commission therefore recommended that the acquisition be approved on condition that some of the Chevron’s retail outlets, intoplane facilities, loading arms and shares in lubricant plants be sold to other interested buyers.
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Case: TOTAL KENYA LTD. &
CHEVRON KENYA LTD.
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Contin.
2. MERGER BETWEEN SPINKNIT DAIRY LTD.
AND BROOKSIDE DAIRY LTD.
Relevant Market
Product market was defined as processed milk products while geographical market was national.
Brookside Dairy intended to acquire 100% of the issued share capital of SpinKnit Dairy Ltd.
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Case: BROOKSIDE DAIRY &
SPINKNIT DAIRY
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Cases Investigated continuation
Analysis
There are many small players (some regional), with consumers exhibiting loyalty to these regional dairies. There is however, one large
Government parastatal Kenya Co-operative
Creameries (KCC) with a market share of 35% which is also the sole producer of powdered milk.
Risk of manipulation of domestic prices in terms of collusion to fix prices is non existant because
KCC is a government parastatal.
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Case: BROOKSIDE DAIRY &
SPINKNIT DAIRY
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Contin.
Entry barriers are fairly low and it is therefore difficult for the resultant firm to abuse its
The transaction was expected to increase job opportunities both directly and indirectly.
The two firms intended to combine resources to set up a milk drying plant which would be expensive for either of the firms.
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Case: BROOKSIDE DAIRY &
SPINKNIT DAIRY
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Contin.
Conclusions
The proposed transaction would boost export potential.
This consolidation would equip Kenyan firms to compete with imports.
It would also enhance competition and efficiency.
The resultant firm would be large enough to compete with market leader (KCC) challenging its monopoly in processing powdered milk.
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Case: BROOKSIDE DAIRY &
SPINKNIT DAIRY
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Cases Investigated continua
Recommendations
The Commission recommended that the transaction be approved unconditionally.
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Case: BROOKSIDE DAIRY &
SPINKNIT DAIRY
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End
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Overview of Competition Law and
Policy in Kenya
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