E UR OPE A N G O V ERNA NC E A ND
D E C ISI O N M A K I N G
Roberto Castaldi
Roberto.castaldi@sssup.it
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Advanced Studies - Pisa
Director Centro Studi, documentazione e formazione
VXOO¶8QLRQH Europea (CESUE)
Vice-editor Perspectives on Federalism (www.onfederalism.eu) and Bibliographical Bulletin on
Federalism (www.federalism-bulletin.eu)
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Our aims today
„A
look at the evolution of the
European governance analysed
from the main integration theories.
„ Grasping their insights and
weaknesses.
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Methodological premise on
academic disciplines
„
„
„
„
„
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constitutional and comparative law; IR and comparative
politics; history, economics, sociology, philosophy. Each
one with its own agenda.
Philosophy: European integration final goal, European
people and citizenship, democratic deficit, Charter of
Rights, normative debate.
Law: what is the EU, the role of law and of the ECJ.
Political science: EU institutions and political system,
IR: EU compared with other forms of cooperation, actors
and dynamics of European integration.
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Grand theories
Grand theories revolved around 3 issues:
„ What is the EEC-EC-EU?
„ How does European integration proceed?
What is its dynamics? What are the main
actors?
„ Where does European integration lead?
What is its possible, probable, desirable
final destinatation?
„
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Three main grand theories
1)
2)
3)
Realism, confederalism or intergovernmentalism
Federalism
Neo-functionalism
All start as normative theories
They evolve analytically along the process
Need to look at them from a theoretical and
historical perspective
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Realism,, confederalism,
(then intergovernmentalism)
1. Integration is a sophisticated form of international
cooperation.
2. EEC-EC-EU is a sophisticated international organization.
3. Within integration power remains in member states: they
are the owners of the treaties. The dynamics, goals and
speed of the process are decided by member states.
4. Integration cannot bring the overcoming of national
sovereignty.
Initially successful: UK, The Hague Congress and the
Council of Europe
Critique: so why bother inventing the concept of ³integration´
if ³cooperation´is enough? At least monetary sovereignty is
now European.
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Federalism (costitutionalism) at the beginning
(Spinelli)
1. Nation states are the past, and can be overcomed.
2. International systems change from the European to
the world state system implies the need for a
federated Europe.
3. The Communities are confederal, because they do not
imply a real transfer of power and sovereignty.
4. Need for the European people to decide through a
European constituent procedure (assembly).
5. The ultimate goal of integration is a political union
through a federation.
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Neo-functionalism (Haas, Monnet)
1. The Communitier are pre-federal supranational
organizations: more than international organization
but less then a federal state (Schuman Declatation).
2. Impossible a federation now. Sectorial integration
will produce shifts of interests and loyalties.
3. Integration efficiency will bring extension of sectors
involved through the spill-over effect, up to political
union.
4. Crucial role of Communities supranational
institutions, especially the Commission, as drivers
and engine of integration.
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
6LQWHVLGHOOHSULQFLSDOLWHRULHGHOO¶LQWHJUD]LRQHULIHULWHDO
livello super-sistemico
Teoria
Realismo
Inter-governmentalism
/¶8(q
Oganizzazione
internazionale
Modello
decisionale
rafforzare
intergovernativo
A ttori
principali
governi nazionali
/¶8(GHYH
essere
Come
ar rivarci
Organizzazione
internazionale
con De Gaulle
(neutralizzare
elementi
federali dei
Trattati)
Neofunzionalismo
Organizzazione
sovranazionale
tecnocratico
(prima)
comunitario (poi)
Alta Autorità
(sovranaz.)
Commissione e
governi
Federazione
europea (origine)
Polity sui generis
o Federazione di
Stati sovrani
(ora)
spill-over
w la
Commissione
F ederalismo
Organizzazione
sovranazionale
pre-federale
comunitario
rafforzare PE
democratico)
(sfruttare deficit
democratico)
Popolo europeo
(prima)
Crisi-iniziativaleadership*
(poi)
Stato federale
Federazione
europea o
costituente
europea (inizio)
gradualismo
costituzionale +
processo
costituente
(poi)(elezione,
moneta, governo)
Unification, integration,
construction
50s-60s debate over supranationality and integration.
Integration z cooperation.
End of 60s Albertini distinguishes 3 concepts:
- unification: historical process of uniting Europe
- integration: transfer of sectors or competences
- construction: transfer of powers through the
creation of institutions and decision-making
procedures
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Historical development and
theoretical evolution 1950-1958
SchumanDeclaration ĺ(&6&
Monnet designs pre-federal institutions: High Authority (then
Commissione), ParliamentaryAssembly, Council of
ministers, Court of Justice.
Same model for EDC and EPC. In 1954 they collapsed.
Relaunch through EEC and Euratom.
Federalists lost their chance.
Realists happy: high politics vs low politics.
Neo-functionalist very happy: spill-over, polical union not
ripe (Haas 1958).
Some intergovernmentalist start from 1957 to avoid the issue
(Milward and Moravcsik).
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Historical development and
theoretical evolution 1958-1966
Smooth EEC transitory period. At the end introduction
of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council.
Empty chair crisis ĺ Luxemburg Compromise.
First wave of theoretical revision.
Realists very happy: impossible to give out national veto
and sovereignty.
Neo-functionalist retreat: not just spill-over but also rollback; and recognition of role of national governments
(Haas, Lindberg, Schmitter).
Federalists out of the game.
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Federalist theoretical revision
- Negative integration vs positive integration
(Pinder);
-crisis-initiative-leadership
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times it can produce the conditions when federation
is possible, but not necessarily they are exploited
-costitutional gradualism (Albertini = Monnet +
Spinelli): European election, European currency,
European government - Exploit democratic deficit
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
The ECJ role
ECJ jurispudence establishes fundamental principles
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-Implied powers
- Prevalence of EU law
-Autonomy of Eu legal order
Member states agree because of unanimity (Weiler)
Main grand theories did not pay enough attention.
Still Hamilton had foreseen it for the USA.
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
T he 70s: a controversial period
1971 Dollar inconvertibility: Bretton Woods collapse.
1972 Monetary Union project
1973 Oil Shock
What governance for Europe?
The European Council as the transitory government
The direct election of the European Parliament
The European Monetary System
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Realists
Nothing is happening for realists: JCMS XXI, 1982, 12special issue 1982:
Hoffmann Stanley, Reflections on the Nation-State in
Western Europe Today; Weiler Joseph, Community,
Member States and European Integration: Is the Law
Relevant?,pp. 39-56.
Wallace William, Europe as a Confederation: the
Community and the Nation-State; Tsoukalis Loukas,
Looking into the Crystal Ball , pp. 229-244.
and the
book The limits of European integration, Taylor 1983,
Little for neo-functionalists too.
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
For federalists
Very important period
„ Direct election of E.P
„ Monetary union on the agenda, even if only
EMS achieved.
„ EP approves WKH³6SLQHOOLdraft Treaty´
national governments reject it but
compelled to relaunch ± IGC majority rule,
then Single European Act; single market in
1992.
„
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Second wave of theoretical revision
Neo-IXQFWLRQDOLVWVLW¶VWKHVSLOO-over comeback, long
live the Commission (Delors).
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single currency.
Realists: ok, but governments are leading anyway (not
the EP), ICG results explained by converging
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Liberal Intergovernmentalism = not simply realism, a
refined and more effective version of classical realism).
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
3. A ndrew 0RUDYFVLN¶V L iberal Intergovernmentalism
Vedi tavole I.1, I.2, I.3, e I.4, tratte da M oravcsik 1998: 24, 28, 54, 69
T able I.1 International cooperation: A rationalist framewor k ( M oravcsik 1998, 24)
Stages of negotiations
National Preference
Formation
Interstate Bargaining
Institutional C hoice
A lternative
independent
variables underlying
each stage
What is the source of
underlying
national preferences?
Given national preferences,
what explains the
efficiency and istributional
outcomes of interstate
bargaining?
Given substantive
agreement, what explains
the transfer of sovereignty
to international
institutions?
Economic interests or
Geopolitical interests?
Asymmetrical
interdependence or
Supranational
entrepreneurship?
Federalist ideology or
Centralised echnocratic
management or More
credible commitment?
Underlying
national
Preferences
Agreements
on substance
Choice to delegate or pool
decision-making
in international institutions
O bserved outcomes
at each state
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
T able I.2 National preference formation: T heories and
H ypoteses (Moravcsik 1998, 28)
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
T able I.3 Interstate bargaining: T heories and hypoteses
(Moravcsik 1998, 54)
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
T able I.4 Institutional choice: T heories and H ypoteses
(Moravcsik 1998, 69)
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Integration vs contruction
A relevant theoretical issue: substantive bargains priority , that is
to say distributive choices prevailing over institutional ones: in
other words, the integration-construction relationship in the
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subtler. Reason why Moravcsik gives little importance to
federalists, except for institutional choices (crucial ones for
federalists).
Validation of the federalist hypothesis implied by Moravcsik on
the Single Act and QMV, and implied by Thatcher in her book.
Pattern 2: summary of the theories
Focus on players and on ability to explain change and
development.
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Focus on players and differences among
theories
Process increasing complexity fosters more limited theories
and debates:
‡ Comitology
‡ Susbidiarity, + the Europe of the Regions, the Committee
of the Regions.
‡ European political system, European Parliament
‡ Constitution.
+ Constant topics: deepening-enlargement.
‡ Democratic deficit and European demos.
In the meantime, after the Single Act, 80% is Community
legislation: democratic deficit
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
Democratic deficit of EU
governance
Realists: nonexistent, if anything
more unanimity.
Functionalists: output legitimacy.
Federalists: more E.P and QMV
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa
4. Sintesi delle visioni del deficit democratico (liberamente tratta
da W eiler 1995).
Roberto Castaldi
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa