GENOCIDE PREVENTION: The
Role of Bystanders in Rwanda,
Srebrenica and Darfur
Studium Generale, Maastricht
University, 16 October 2012
Fred Grünfeld
1
•
University of Maastricht, Faculty of Law, Department
International Law, Maastricht Centre of Human Rights
and University College Maastricht.
• University of Utrecht, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for
Conflict Studies, School of Human Rights Research.
• Chair of Pioom, Interdisciplinary Projects for the Study
of Root Causes of Human Rights Violations, on the
Causes of Gross Human Rights Violations
• Financially supported by the Horstman Foundation,
Leader in the Dutch Resistance movement during the
Second World War.
2
OUTLINE
• 1. What is Genocide ?
• 2. What/who is the Bystander ?
• 3. Failure of Bystanders in Rwanda, Srebrenica
and Darfur.
• 4. Faces of Genocide – Survivors (Film 20
minutes)
• 5. Conclusions: Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur,
Syria.
3
Levels of GHRV
Scale 1: no political repression, rule of law
Scale 2: some political activists face imprisonment (few affected)
Scale 3: detention without trial takes place, arbitrary arrests, political
imprisonment and murders
Scale 4: severe repression by murder, torture and disappearances for
political opponents, but violence still mainly against political opinion
Scale 5: whole population faces the most severe repression, no limits
on the means to pursue personal/ideological goals
Conflict Intensity
High-Intensity Conflict: armed conflict causing more
than 1000 deaths per year
Low-Intensity Conflict: armed conflict causing
between 100-1000 deaths per year
Violent Political Conflict: armed conflict causing less
than 100 deaths per year
Gross Human Rights Violations
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Genocide
Crimes against Humanity
War Crimes (IHL)
Disappearances
Torture
Ethnic Cleansing
Widespread and systematic rape (now
recognized as a ‘weapon of war’; also
punishable as Genocide following decisions at
the ICTR)
Legal Distinctions
Genocide:
…any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
• Killing;
• Causing serious bodily or mental harm;
• Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction;
• Imposing measures intended to prevent births;
• Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
(Article 6 Rome Statute)
Destruction
• Genocide is the deliberate destruction of a
specific group
• Destruction because of their birth, their
existence, their being
• Not because of their views, opinions or
actions
9
Raphael Lemkin 1900-1959
• GENOS means in Greek ‘race’ or ‘tribe’
• CIDE means in Latin ‘killing’
• Churchill: Crimes without a name
• Crime of all Crimes, the most serious
10
Deliberate annihilation
• Genocide is the deliberate, planned and
systematic annihilation of a specific group
of people:
– SPECIFIC GROUP
– BY THE STATE
– WITH INTENT
Politicide refers to political opponents
(democide both but excluding war)
11
definitions of genocide
•
"a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to
destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the
perpetrator." Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn
•
"the mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings ... under conditions of the
essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims." Israel Charny
•
"sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity
directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction
of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by
the victim." Helen Fein
•
"the promotion and execution of policies by a state or its agents which result in the
deaths of a substantial portion of a group ...[when] the victimized groups are defined
primarily in terms of their communal characteristics, i.e., ethnicity, religion or
nationality." Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr
•
“Genocide is not extreme war or conflict; it is extreme exclusion. Exclusion may
start with name-calling, but may end with a group of people being excluded from a
society to the point where they are destroyed.” James M. Smith
12
GENOCIDE CONVENTION
•
•
•
•
•
Article 3:
The following acts shall be punishable:
( a ) Genocide;
( b ) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
( c ) Direct and public incitement to commit
genocide;
• ( d ) Attempt to commit genocide;
• ( e ) Complicity in genocide.
13
Five stages of Repression by
Hilberg
1. Shutting off the supply of information for
all outsiders
2. Restricting participation to those with
knowledge
3. Prohibiting criticism by outsiders
4. Absence of public talk of process of
repression and destruction
5. Killings but using euphimism (final
solution, auf Transport nach Osten)
14
Seven stages by Lecomte
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1. definition of the target group
2. registration of the victims
3. designation of the victims
4. confiscation of goods
5. exclusion from working activities
6. systematic isolation
7. mass extermination
All stages in the Holocaust and in Rwanda
15
Holocaust Studies and Genocide
Studies
•
•
•
•
•
•
Un-precendented and Total
Exterminalist anti-semitism
As paradigme
Repeated but also in part
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
Victim oriented or perspective of
perpetrator and bystander included of
societal transformation (Weimar, 30s)
16
Eight Stages of Genocide by
Stanton
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Classification – us and them
Symbolization – yellow star of David
Dehumanization – hate radio
Organization – special army units
Polarization – silencing the moderate
Preparation – separation of the victims
Extermination – mass killing, genocide
Denial – cover up evidence
17
Denial of Genocide
• Armenian Genocide
• Nowadays Politics
• More than 90 years ago
18
Genocides in Rwanda,
Srebrenica, Darfur
Why did the international bystanders fail to act to
prevent or to stop the genocides in Rwanda,
Srebrenica and Darfur?
In what way would the international bystander
have been able to act with the available
instruments?
Why were all the warnings not translated into
action or, more precisely, what are the reasons
for non-action or the ineffectiveness of the action
that was undertaken?
19
The Atrocity Triangle
C Bystanders
A Perpetrators
B Victims
20
Each case
• 1. WARNINGS
• 2. INSTRUMENTS
• 3. DECISION-MAKING
21
Rwanda Deaths
800000
700000
Res. 918
Res. 929
600000
casualties
500000
400000
300000
Res. 912
200000
100000
1000-5000
0
6 April '94
21 April '94
13 April '94
17 May '94
22 June '94
22
Srebrenica Deaths
9000
end of Genocide
8000
Dutchbat leaves
Srebrenica
7000
Deaths
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
Start of attack
on Srebrenica
1000
0
6 July 1995
Start of Genocide
Fall of Srebrenica
12 July 1995
11 July 1995
17 July 1995
21 July 1995
23
24
25
26
27
Darfur deaths
250000
Late march '04
Res. 1591 (sanctions)
Res. 1593 (ICC)
150000
100000
30 July '04
Res. 1556
15 Nov '04
Res. 1574
50000
11 June '04
Res. 1547
18 Sept '04
Res. 1564
time
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casualties
200000
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DARFUR
Darfur Deaths
350000
300000
Res. 1706 UNMIS
Res. 1672 Targeted sanctions
Deaths
250000
Res. 1769
UNAMID
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
February 2003
Res. 1778
MINURCAT
EUFORTCHAD/RCA
Res. 1591 commission to
prepare sanctions
Res. 1593 ICC
Res. 1556
arms embargo
non state actors
Res. 1547
condemnation
2004
Res. 1574
No more sanctions
Res. 1564
Com.Inq.
2005
11 June
late March
30 July 15 Nov
18 Sept
2006
25 April
2007
31 August
2008
25 sept.
31 July
29
DEATH TOLL
• Rwanda 1994 800,000 in 100 days =
8,000 a day
• Srebrenica 1995 8,000 in 5 days = 1,600 a
day
• Darfur 2003-2010 300,000 in 2555 days =
117 a day
30
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
1: Before
Prevent
2: During
React
3: After
Rebuild
31
EARLY WARNING
32
NEVER AGAIN
• EARLY WARNING DOES NOT LEAD
AUTOMATICALLY TO EARLY ACTION
OR ANY ACTION
• AT THE MOMENT WHEN DECISIONS
ARE MADE, PREVIOUS NEVER AGAINS
ARE FORGOTTEN
33
WARNINGS + INSTRUMENTS
IN RWANDA, SREBRENICA AND IN
DARFUR:
• WARMINGS WERE AVAILABLE
• INSTRUMENTS WERE AVAILABLE
• THIRD PARTIES (BYSTANDERS)
COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE
GENOCIDE
34
The Atrocity Triangle
C Bystanders
A Perpetrators
B Victims
35
The bystander:the third party that
will not act or that will not attempt
to act in solidarity with the victims
of gross human rights violations.
AFTERWARD FOUR ROLES:
PERPETRATORS AND VICTIMS
COLLABORATORS AND RESCUERS IN THE END
36
DVD
• The Faces of Genocide 20 minutes
MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON
Warning IN RWANDA 1.
• HATE PROPAGANDA PRIOR TO GENOCIDE PUNISHED AS
INCENTIVE TO GENOCIDE
• WEAKER MANDATE UNAMIR THAN NEEDED BECAUSE OF
FEASABILITY
• OUTSPOKEN RELIABLE EARLY WARNINGS NOT FORWARDED
TO SC
• ANY DECISION-MAKING BY SC WAS PRECLUDED
‘the withholding of this information from the members of the
security council by the un bureaucracy precluded any security
council decision in this field’.
38
AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS IN
RWANDA 2.
• THE OPTION TO LINK THE EVACUATION
FORCE WITH UNAMIR WAS NOT
CONSIDERED IN ANY WESTERN CAPITAL
OR AT THE UN.
• RIZA – UN TOP OFFICIAL - WAS NOT
PREPARED ON APRIL 14 TO PROPOSE AN
ENFORCEMENT POWER TO SC (DUTCH
ARCHIVES).
• SC VOTED UNANIMOUSLY FOR FORCE
REDUCTION TO 270 PERSONS ON April 21.
39
CONTINUING MAIN
CONCLUSIONS 3.
• DOMINATING TRUST IN PRESIDENT
AND PEACE PROCESS
• SHIFT IN PERCECEPTION NEEDED
• FROM PROMOTING PEACE TO
EMERGING GENOCIDE
40
41
MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON
WARNING IN SREBRENICA 1.
• In May 2005 SC Members and UN Officials
knew about intended Serbian Attack but they did
not share this information with the Dutch.
• A preventative military enforcement attack was
excluded by the UN and the major powers
• No SC debate on maintaining safe area
Srebrenica
42
AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS IN
SREBRENICA 2.
• NORDIC peacekeepers successful with tanks to
deter Serbian aggressor in safe area at Tuzla.
• DUTCH peacekeepers not only missed military
enforcement power but they did not try in any
way to deter or resist Serbian aggression.
• NATO AIR support was available but not used at
the moment of the attack on Srebrenica.
43
LESSONS LEARNED
• RECOGNITION OF ANNAN OF MISTAKES IN
PERCEPTION IN 2004 (CHANGING MINDS)
• CHAPTER VII MEASURES (USE OF FORCE
AUTHORIZED) WHEN ‘national authorities are
manifestly failing to protect their populations
from genocide’ sept.05
• INVOLVEMENT OF SC WITH GROSS HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS HAS INCREASED
TREMENDOUSLY
44
R2P
• Sovereignty (STATE SOVEREIGNTY NOT AS A BARRIER BUT AS A
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ITS PEOPLE):
• 1.PROTECT OWN POPULATION
• 2.HELP GOVERNMENTS TO PROTECT OWN
POPULATION
• 3.COLLECTIVE ACTION, EXTREEM NEED
AND LACK OF WILL (RESPONSIBILITY TO REACT,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, CHAPTER VII DECISIONS)
45
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE
26 February 2007
CASE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION
ON THE
PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA v. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)
46
Obligations to prevent
• it is clear that the obligation to prevent is one of
conduct and not one of result. The obligation of States
parties is rather to employ all means reasonably
available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as
possible.
• A State does not incur responsibility simply because the
desired result is not achieved; responsibility is however
incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all
measures to prevent genocide which were within its
power, and which might have contributed to preventing
the genocide.(430)
47
Prevention – awareness of danger
• a State may be found to have violated its
obligation to prevent even though it had no
certainty, at the time when it should have acted,
but failed to do so, that genocide was about to
be committed or was under way;
• it is enough that the State was aware, or should
normally have been aware, of the serious
danger that acts of genocide would be
committed.(432)
48
Duty to act
• a State’s obligation to prevent, and the
corresponding duty to act, arise at the
instant that the State learns of, or should
normally have learned of, the existence of
a serious risk that genocide will be
committed.(431) (see art. 8 for UN)
49
50
51
DARFUR, CONFLICT
CHARACTERISTICS
PRIORITY FOR NORT-SOUTH
CONFLICT SUDAN
GENOCIDE OR CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY
STRONG PUBLIC OPINION
52
53
WARNINGS FROM THE START 1.
• UN RAPPORTEUR, KAPILA’S ROLE
• UN HEAD HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
• NGOs
• USA INQUIRY, LABELING GENOCIDE,
SEPTEMBER 2004
54
INSTRUMENTS DARFUR 2.
• DIPLOMACY CEASE FIRE
• ARMS EMBARGO
• AFRICAN PEACE KEEPERS, EU FORCE in CHAD, UN
PEACE KEEPERS
• NO NO-FLY ZONE, NO SEIZURE OF WEAPONS
• ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
• PROSECUTION, BASHIR TRAVELS
55
MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON
DARFUR 3
• CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION IN SC
BUT NO ACTION AT THE START – PREVENTION
FAILED - AND WEAK DECISIONS LATER
• INCREASING CONFUSING SITUATION, good versus
bad, international conflict Chad and CAR
• STRONG INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF SUDAN,
China 80% oil, Russia weapons, US intelligence
• SMART LEADERS, giving impression of cooperation but
in fact doing the opposite, strong power position.
56
DARFUR
Darfur Deaths
350000
300000
Res. 1706 UNMIS
Res. 1672 Targeted sanctions
Deaths
250000
Res. 1769
UNAMID
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
February 2003
Res. 1778
MINURCAT
EUFORTCHAD/RCA
Res. 1591 commission to
prepare sanctions
Res. 1593 ICC
Res. 1556
arms embargo
non state actors
Res. 1547
condemnation
2004
Res. 1574
No more sanctions
Res. 1564
Com.Inq.
2005
11 June
late March
30 July 15 Nov
18 Sept
2006
25 April
2007
31 August
2008
25 sept.
31 July
57
ALL CASES
• We did not Know. No, because
Information was clear, reliable and
available. Enough Early and later
Warnings.
• We were not able to act. No, because
Instruments in soldiers and equipment
were available to prevent or stop.
• Failures. Perhaps decision-making,
political power, indifference?
CONCLUDING QUOTE
The bystanders at the state level and at the
international level did not act in solidarity with
the victims. They did not attempt to rescue.
Evaluating afterwards, we may conclude that
these bystanders turned into collaborators who
facilitated the genocidaires by not acting against
continuing atrocities.
Nowadays Ivory Coast, Lybia, Egypt, Syria ?
59