Expert Report of Laurie J. Alsaffar, Ph.D. Dr. Laurie J. Alsaffar Department of Horticulture & Plant Sciences Midlands State University 488 Greenhouse Row, State Center, ML 30405 ljalsaffar@midlandsstate.edu August 15, 2026 INTRODUCTION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 My name is Dr. Laurie J. Alsaffar. I was retained by counsel for Defendant Midlands Gas and Electric Company (“MG&E”) to evaluate the role that the vegetation, insect and avian activity, drought conditions, and weather in and around Rapid River Valley may have played in the ignition and spread of the wildfire of January 1, 2026 (known as the Dip Fire) and to assess whether natural or environmental factors could account for that fire independent of MG&E’s distribution equipment. I was also asked to respond to certain statements in the expert report of Emerson Brock, insofar as that report speaks to industry standards concerning vegetation and weather as they relate to electric distribution infrastructure. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 I want to be candid at the outset about the boundaries of what I do and do not offer. I am a plant scientist. My opinions concern botany, plant flammability, fuels, and the interaction of vegetation with drought and weather. I am not a certified fire investigator. I did not perform an origin-and-cause investigation. And I offer no opinion on the electrical or mechanical condition of MG&E’s distribution pole and poletop equipment, on whether any arc or fault occurred there, or on what a reasonable utility’s inspection or de-energization practices should be as an engineering matter. My conclusions are drawn to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty within my own field, and where I am reaching beyond the physical evidence, I will say so plainly. QUALIFICATIONS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 I hold a B.S. in Botany from Midlands State University, an M.S. in Horticulture from Cornell University, and a Ph.D. in Plant Physiology from the University of California, Davis, where my dissertation examined the volatile oil content and flammability of Mediterranean-climate shrubs. I have been a member of the faculty in the Department of Horticulture & Plant Sciences at Midlands State University for sixteen years, where I direct the Plant Flammability Laboratory. My research concerns the chemistry of plant tissues, the moisture dynamics of living and dead vegetation, and why some plants burn far more readily than others. I am a member of the American Society for Horticultural Science and the Ecological Society of America. 1 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Although my expertise sits alongside the discipline of wildland fire investigation, it is not the same. Fire investigators are trained to read a burn scene— char patterns, directional indicators, points of origin—and to work backwards to a cause. That is not what I do. I handle the front half of the problem. Given a particular set of plants, in a particular condition, and under a particular weather regime, I determine how likely that vegetation is to ignite and how it will behave once it does. I have spent my career on those questions. 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 I have been retained as a litigation expert eleven times, every time for the defense. Nine of those retentions were by utility companies (by the company itself or its insurers or their defense counsel), and the other two retentions were by landowners. Four of those retentions resulted in trials at which I testified. I charge $850 per hour. To date, I have devoted approximately 45 hours to this matter. If I testify at trial, I will be paid an additional $15,000 appearance fee, which I will receive at least 14 days before trial. My additional qualifications, including my relevant publications in the field, appear in my curriculum vitae (Exhibit 13c). MATERIALS REVIEWED AND METHODOLOGY 43 44 45 46 47 In forming my opinions, I reviewed and relied upon the following case materials: Exhibits 1a-b, Exhibits 2a-b, Exhibits 3a-b, Exhibit 4, Exhibits 5a-e, Exhibits 6a-c, Exhibit 9a, Exhibits 12a-c, Exhibit 14, and Emerson Brock’s report (and any exhibits / affidavits reviewed by Brock not already stated herein). I also relied upon publicly available sources, which I cite when used. 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 My job is not to reconstruct a burn scene or work backward from char to a point of origin. That is a fire investigator’s job. I work the front half of the problem. I take a landscape of known plants, place them in a known drought-and-weather regime, and ask how readily that vegetation would ignite and how hard it would burn. Each conclusion in this report rests on methods and data that are customary and peerreviewed in my field. Every technique I used to answer those questions is a standard, published tool of plant science and fire ecology. Each one can be run again by another qualified scientist on the same materials, each has been tested and described in peerreviewed literature, and each is in ordinary use in my field. 57 58 59 60 61 I visited the site on March 22, 2026, roughly eleven weeks after the Dip Fire. I walked the burn area and the surrounding unburned terrain along Dip Road, including the right-of-way corridor beneath the Rapid River Valley distribution circuit. By the time I arrived, the fuels that had carried the fire were ash, and winter and spring had begun to change the remaining vegetation. So, I did what fuel scientists routinely do 2 62 63 64 65 when the burning material is gone: I examined the immediately surrounding terrain. The vegetation just outside the burn area that did not burn is a reasonable stand-in for the vegetation that did. I identified the plant communities present and estimated the pre-fire fuel load from surviving root crowns and unburned margins. 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 I organized the fuels the way my field does: by how quickly each responds to moisture. Sorting the vegetation into proper classes, discussed below, provides data the raw weather record cannot. That is, one night of rain could leave the surface grass damp while the heavy fuel beneath it stayed dry. For the samples I could measure, I used the standard methods described in the Laboratory Testing section below, all of which are accepted tests for fuel moisture. To be clear, although I could measure the live vegetation I collected from unburned areas in March 2026, I could not directly measure the specific fuels present in the area on January 1, 2026 because they no longer existed. My picture of the pre-fire fuels, therefore, is a reconstruction rather than a direct reading of the fuels that burned. 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 Finally, I placed the fuels in their season. I used the Keetch-Byram Drought Index, a standard 0-to-800 gauge of how much moisture the soil and heavy fuels have lost, together with the weather and precipitation records for the site to describe the moisture regime the vegetation was living in going into New Year’s 2026. Combining site observation, comparison fuel estimates, laboratory measurements, published drought indices, and the known botany of these species into a single reconstruction is the leading way experts in my field proceed when the burned fuel is no longer available. DISCUSSION I. The vegetation and fuels of Rapid River Valley 84 85 86 87 88 89 Rapid River Valley sits in a dry, Mediterranean-type climate—wet, mild winters and long, hot and rainless summers—which allows Mediterranean vegetation to grow in the area. Vegetation adapted to that climate tends to be exactly the kind of vegetation that burns. The slopes above Dip Road are dominated by evergreen sclerophyll shrubs of the chaparral type, interspersed with dry annual and perennial grasses and scattered oak and pine. 90 91 92 93 94 Fire scientists sort the fuels in a landscape like this by size because size governs how fast a fuel dries out or wets up. Fine fuels like grasses, leaves, and twigs under a quarter inch are “one-hour” fuels. Larger material grades up through ten-hour, hundred-hour, and thousand-hour fuels, the last fuels being logs or stems three to eight inches thick. These are the fuel time-lag classes used in the U.S. National Fire 3 95 96 97 Danger Rating System, and the number is roughly how long the fuel takes to move twothirds of the way toward equilibrium with the surrounding humidity. Fine fuels and heavy fuels respond to a night of rain in completely different ways. 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 Two properties then decide whether a given stand ignites and how hard it burns: moisture and chemistry. As a fuel’s moisture falls, less heat is wasted boiling off water and more is available to drive the fuel to its ignition temperature. So, the probability of ignition climbs, and the energy needed to start a fire drops. Chemistry is the second factor, and that is where my laboratory work comes in. Many Mediterranean shrubs, including those on the slopes above Dip Road, are what ecologists call pyrophytes. Pyrophytes are essentially fire-adapted plants whose tissues are rich in volatile organic compounds, chiefly terpenes and other essential oils. These compounds are flammable. They volatilize as the plant heats and lower the effective ignition temperature of the foliage. In plain terms, these plants carry their own accelerant. A slope of resinous, oil-rich chaparral is, all else equal, a slope that ignites more readily and burns hotter than a slope of well-watered turf. 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 I should also add a word about fauna because animals shape fuels, too. Insect activity—bark beetles and wood-boring insects in particular—can kill standing shrubs and trees, converting living, high-moisture fuel into dead, dry, readily ignitable fuel. Birds can likewise affect the fuel picture in a different, more localized way. Birds’ nesting structures—typically consisting of fine twigs, grasses, leaves, and bark fibers— concentrate otherwise dispersed fine vegetative material within the crowns and branch structures of shrubs and small trees, creating localized concentrations that can provide receptive pockets of fuel capable of sustaining an existing flame or ember. During my site visit in March 2026, I observed evidence of both insect-driven dieback in several unburned stands near the site and approximately 35 birds in and immediately adjacent to the right-of-way, including American crows, white-crowned sparrows, house finches, and bushtits. I also observed approximately 10 apparent nesting structures in surviving shrubs and trees. I cannot determine from my March observation which of those structures were occupied on January 1, 2026, nor can I determine precisely when each was constructed. But their number and distribution were consistent with substantial avian use of the vegetation around the corridor. However, to the extent animals could have contributed to ignition (e.g., wildlife like birds contacting energized equipment), that ignition pathway would implicate equipment, not the vegetation, and would fall outside my field of expertise. II. 129 130 How vegetation and weather together govern ignition Whether a given patch of vegetation will ignite, and how vigorously it will burn, is driven first by moisture and second by chemistry. Taking moisture first, every fuel 4 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 particle carries water, expressed as fuel moisture content, which is the weight of water as a percentage of the fuel’s dry weight. Living fuels hold a great deal of water when healthy. Dead fuels track the atmosphere, gaining moisture in humid or wet weather and losing it in dry, hot, windy weather. As fuel moisture falls, less heat is wasted boiling off water and more is available to raise the fuel to its ignition temperature. So, the probability of ignition climbs, and the energy needed to start a fire drops. For most chaparral species, once they fall below a live-fuel-moisture threshold of 30%, stands become markedly easier to ignite and to carry fire. III. The results of laboratory findings 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 Rather than describe these species in the abstract, I tested them. From the unburned comparison stands adjacent to the burn, I collected foliage of the dominant chaparral shrub on these slopes, chamise (Adenostoma fasciculatum). As a control, I collected foliage of a co-occurring but low-oil shrub, toyon (Heteromeles arbutifolia). I securely transported both to my Plant Flammability Laboratory and ran three standard analyses: oven-dry gravimetric moisture, volatile-oil content, and time-to-ignition under an epiradiator, a radiant-heat bench source held at a constant heat flux. Each test has been peer reviewed and reflects top methodologies in my field. 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 Moisture. Measured in March 2026, with the winter and spring rains already returning water to the plants, the live chamise carried a live-fuel moisture of approximately 78 percent. The published “critical” live-fuel moisture for chamise—the range below which stands ignite and carry fire markedly more readily—is near 60 percent. The drought indices I describe later place the stand at or below that critical range going into January. I therefore conditioned my laboratory samples down to a live-fuel moisture of about 55 percent to represent the January condition. 154 155 156 Volatile oil. By dry weight, the chamise foliage was approximately five percent volatile oil, which is several times the roughly one percent I measured in the toyon control. That is the “accelerant” the plant carries built into its leaves. 157 158 159 160 161 Time-to-ignition. The result is best shown directly. Under an identical radiant source, conditioned to the same drought-level moisture, the terpene-rich chamise ignited in roughly a third of the time of the low-oil toyon. And the same chamise, when well-watered, took more than twice as long to ignite as it did at the January-level moisture. 5 Table 1 – Time to sustained ignition (epiradiator, constant heat flux) 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 Sample Conditioned live-fuel Time to sustained moisture ignition Chamise (high volatile-oil chaparral) ~55% (January-level) ~8 seconds Chamise (same species, well-watered) ~78% ~19 seconds Toyon (low volatile-oil control) ~55% (January-level) ~21 seconds The table above shows the conditions based on my reconstruction: this valley’s dominant fuel—conditioned to the moisture the drought implies—ignites in about eight seconds under a steady heat source, and a low-oil plant from the very same hillside at the very same moisture takes nearly three times as long. That difference is the terpene chemistry, and that is why this is a landscape that inherently carries fire. The diagrams below further convey the concepts and my opinions on the respective levels at the time of the Dip Fire based on my reconstruction of the January moisture. Chart 1 – Plant Flammability Laboratory. Midlands State University (The January value is a drought-based reconstruction, not a direct measurement) 6 Chart 2 – Illustrative of U.S. National Fire Danger Rating System’s Standard Fuel Time-Lag Behavior (Values depict the modeled response of each fuel class, not site measurements) 7 IV. The abnormally dry season of 2025 and the rain that night 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 The autumn of 2025 in Rapid River Valley was abnormally dry. The droughtmonitoring data placed the region in moderate-to-severe drought heading into winter. The KBDI—a standard 0-to-800 measure of cumulative moisture deficiency in soil and heavy fuels—was running in the high 500s to low 600s in the weeks before the fire. Those values are associated with elevated wildfire potential. A dry season like that does not merely lower fuel moisture at the margins. It changes how the plants themselves behave. Drought-stressed shrubs curtail transpiration, drop moisture in their living tissues, cure and shed fine material, and in some species concentrate the very volatile oils that make them flammable. In short, the vegetation going into New Year’s was primed to burn in a way it would not have been in a normal, wetter year. 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 Now, it’s true that, on the night of December 31, 2025 into January 1, 2026, a weather system moved through the valley and brought precipitation, which is the same inclement weather described in the accounts of the crash. Weather records show approximately 0.06 to 0.08 inches of rainfall at the site that night, well below the roughly 0.2-inch threshold at which a single precipitation event meaningfully depresses the KBDI. Still, rain matters. Fine dead fuels are one-hour and ten-hour fuels. They equilibrate with moisture quickly, and even within a matter of hours, rain can raise their moisture content above the threshold at which they will readily carry fire. So, to whatever extent a theory of this fire depends on tinder-dry grass and fine tinder at the moment of ignition, the rain that night undercuts it. Simply put, the fine surface fuels were most likely dampened by the time of the fire. 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 The drought does not simply vanish under that rain, however, and here the time-lag classes do their work. Heavy fuels—the hundred-hour and thousand-hour material, the deep duff, and the soil itself—have long response times and do not rehydrate meaningfully from a single night of light precipitation after months of deficit. A short storm wets the surface, but it does not erase a season of drought stored in the coarse fuels and the ground. So, the full picture on January 1, 2026 is mixed: damp fine fuels sitting over a still-dry heavy-fuel and duff layer, with wind beginning to rise again as the storm cleared the valley in the pre-dawn hours. I cannot say that the landscape that night was uniformly dry. V. 199 200 201 Natural ignition pathways considered Given fuels in that condition, I considered whether the fire could have begun from a purely natural source. Three possibilities are worth stating, along with the evidence supporting and undermining each. 8 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 The first is lightning. Storm systems can produce cloud-to-ground lightning, and lightning is one of the leading natural causes of wildfire worldwide. Lightning ignitions are also notorious for behaving as “holdover” or “sleeper” fires, where a strike smolders quietly in duff or a punky snag for hours or even days before flaring into open flame. So, the timing of a visible fire does not always coincide with the strike. That mechanism is real, but I must be plain that the evidence for it here is minimal. I am not aware of reported lightning at the origin, and I did not obtain or review lightning-detection network data that could confirm or exclude a strike. Without that data, lightning remains a possibility I cannot rule out but also cannot substantiate. It is true that I could have run this possibility to the ground and that I did not. 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 The second is spontaneous combustion of vegetation. There is a longstanding lore—and some genuine chemistry beneath it—that certain oil-rich Mediterranean plants can burst into flame in extreme heat. The rockrose genus, Cistus, is the plant most often named. The kernel of truth is that Cistus—and relatives like the gas plant, Dictamnus—release clouds of flammable volatile oils in hot weather, and those vapors can flash if an ignition source is brought near them. What the reliable science does not support is that a living, standing shrub self-ignites at ambient temperatures with no ignition source at all. Genuine spontaneous combustion in plant matter is a real phenomenon, but it occurs through microbial self-heating in wet, piled organic material—think hay, mulch, or compost—not in standing chaparral. Therefore, Cistus standing alone would not have caused the Dip Fire. It is possible that, if there were a separate ignition source, the presence of Cistus could have exacerbated the fire, turning it into a wildfire. But critically, although the Rapid River Valley has the climate to support the growth of Cistus, I did not see any evidence of Cistus (or any comparable species) during my site visit. So, unless all of the Cistus in the area burned up during the Dip Fire, which is highly unlikely, this natural pathway was not in play. 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 The third purely environmental pathway is simply that the drought-cured heavy fuels created conditions in which a fire, once started by some minor or unrecorded source, could take hold and spread far more destructively than it otherwise would. I can opine to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that certain environmental conditions (e.g., dryness, temperature, wind speed) turned what could have been a contained or self-extinguishing event into a catastrophic one. But that opinion can only speak to the severity of the spread, not to the identity of the ignition source. I cannot, from botany alone, tell you what actually set the fire. 9 VI. Distribution infrastructure, mechanical failure, and vegetation as a receptive fuel bed 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 Vegetation and electrical infrastructure are a well-documented ignition combination, and the specific mechanism described in this case—a vehicle collision causing a distribution pole to lean and place its hardware under abnormal mechanical stress, followed by progressive failure and eventually arcing—is a physically realistic and recognized wildfire ignition pathway. Equipment failure at distribution-level poles producing arcing, hot particles, or momentary conductor contact with ground or vegetation is among the documented causes of powerline-ignited fires in the United States. However, I am not an electrical engineer. I offer no opinion on whether or how the failure occurred. My opinion is confined to what the vegetation condition meant for that mechanism if it did occur. 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 From a botany standpoint, arcing and the ejection of hot metallic particles from a failing distribution circuit are high-energy ignition sources, which are far more energetic than a natural spark, a discarded cigarette, or the kind of mild heat that would be needed to ignite bone-dry fine fuels but that cannot reliably ignite somewhatdamp ones. This matters because of the rain. I said earlier that the fine surface fuels were most likely dampened that night, and that this undercuts purely natural ignition theories. The same rain does comparatively less to rule out an arc from failing equipment because a sufficiently energetic source can bridge the moisture gap that a weaker source cannot. From what I observed during my site visit, drought-cured heavy fuels at the base of the pole and along the base of the span are precisely the kind of receptive fuel bed that a high-energy ignition source ignites readily even when the very surface of that fuel layer has been dampened by a night of rain. In plain terms, the vegetation condition made the difference between an arc that ignites vegetation and one that does not, and it made the difference between a fire that grows and one that goes out. If the mechanism the evidence points toward is confirmed, then the droughtcured fuels at the base of that pole were not a mere backdrop. They were the necessary second ingredient. 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 I observed dry brush and cured fine fuel near the base of the pole and along the right-of-way during my site visit in March. I noted that the corridor did not appear to have been recently cleared. I acknowledge that drought-cured fuel accumulating beneath electrical equipment with aging mounting hardware is exactly the type of combined hazard that a competent vegetation-management program is designed to prevent. However, as stated below, my opinion is that MG&E’s practices were within the range of reasonable conduct since, to my knowledge, the industry does not have a 10 270 271 single prescriptive standard on the requirements of a vegetation-management program. VII. Standards, foreseeability, and Emerson Brock’s report 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 I was asked to address industry standards for vegetation treatment as they relate to weather and distribution infrastructure. I was also asked to respond to Emerson Brock’s report on that subject. To begin, given the size of a 12-kilovolt distribution circuit like the Rapid River Valley circuit, there are no applicable federal regulations. As for applicable state regulations, although Section 1.4 of the Midlands Electric Reliability Code states: “Every public utility shall furnish and maintain such adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable service, instrumentalities, equipment, and facilities . . . as are necessary to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience of its patrons, employees, and the public,” nothing in the Code provides prescriptive requirements for a vegetation-management program. Therefore, without any applicable regulations, I analyzed MG&E’s vegetation-management program to determine whether it comported with my views of what a reasonably prudent vegetation-management program should accomplish and conclude that it did. Part of MG&E’s inspection process includes checking nearby vegetation, and MG&E’s Manual has a chapter dedicated to vegetation management. Most importantly, no vegetation-management program would have been designed to address the particular confluence of events in this case—an overnight vehicle collision, a progressively failing pole assembly, and a pre-dawn weather window. Now, to be clear, I did not review MG&E’s documentation related to vegetation clearing work specifically, only MG&E’s Manual and available inspection reports (Exhibits 4 and 5a-e), but nothing in those documents suggested that MG&E ignored vegetation issues. 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 That said, as pointed out in Emerson Brock’s report, MG&E still had a duty of care, even if there were no prescriptive regulations. Utilities operating in fire-prone regions bear additional responsibility to develop their own programs and exercise their own judgment. Many utilities in fire-prone regions now maintain formal wildfire mitigation plans. Several utilities have successfully utilized de-energization or shutoff programs to turn off distribution circuits in elevated-risk conditions. A plaintiff could fairly argue that an abnormally dry season is a known, published, and indexed condition—not a surprise—and that the KBDI values I relied upon are exactly the kind of information a utility with a fire-risk program would monitor and act on. I acknowledge all of that. My professional judgment is that MG&E’s conduct fell within the range of reasonable practice. However, I freely acknowledge that reasonable experts—examining the same practices—may weigh these considerations differently. I will also admit that, had MG&E engaged me prior to January 1, 2026, I would have 11 306 307 suggested reforms to its vegetation-management program to bring it in line with best practices, as outlined in Exhibit 14. VIII. The vehicle collision as a contributing intervening event 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 I understand one argument in this case is that the vehicle collision itself was the initiating cause of the fire and that MG&E should not be held responsible for the consequences that flowed from a third-party striking MG&E’s equipment. From a purely physical standpoint, if the fire investigator’s evidence points toward arc ignition from the mechanically failing pole, the causal chain does begin with the collision. The collision placed the hardware under abnormal stress. The hardware, over the following hours, failed. The failure produced the ignition source. So, the crash is, in the physical sense, a but-for cause of this ignition in a way that it would not be if the fire had started from, say, unmanaged vegetation contacting an intact and properly functioning line. 318 319 320 321 322 323 From a botanical standpoint, the vegetation condition at the base of Pole #4742 likely bears on the severity of the outcome regardless of the originating cause. For example, a crash into a pole in a landscape with properly managed, moist vegetation would produce a different result than a crash in a landscape with drought-cured fuels. The former might produce a brief ground fire that self-extinguishes. The latter would produce a catastrophe. CONCLUSION 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 I conclude that, after an abnormally dry season, the vegetation of Rapid River Valley was in an unusually flammable condition heading into January 1, 2026. The drought-cured heavy fuels in the right-of-way and at the base of Pole #4742 on the Rapid River Valley distribution circuit constituted a receptive fuel bed that, in my professional opinion, was capable of igniting from a high-energy source such as electrical arcing even in conditions where surface fuels had been partially dampened by the night’s rain. That same vegetation condition substantially increased the rate and severity of the fire’s spread once ignited, and the environmental conditions turned what might otherwise have been a limited event into a catastrophic one. 333 334 335 336 337 338 The available evidence does not permit me to identify the source of the initial ignition. Arcing from distribution equipment damaged by the collision is one physically plausible explanation. The vegetation conditions I observed are consistent with the drought-cured fuels near Pole #4742 that could have ignited from a highenergy source like sparking, despite the night’s rain. However, I cannot rule out a natural ignition source of the kind discussed above, although each such theory has the 12 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 evidentiary limitations identified in this report. In my professional judgment, MG&E’s vegetation treatment fell within the range of reasonable practice given the absence of a prescriptive regulatory standard, and a vehicle collision with a distribution pole is not an event ordinarily contemplated by a vegetation-management program. I recognize that Emerson Brock’s report offers a reasonable contrary opinion on the applicable standard and that Brock has significantly more experience than I do in operating a utility company. My expertise, however, concerns the plants, fauna, fuels, drought, and weather. My opinions explain why the vegetation was receptive to ignition and why the resulting fire became so severe. They do not resolve what supplied the initial ignition. CERTIFICATION 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 I understand that I am certifying this report under oath. Every fact contained herein is correct to the best of my knowledge and memory, and all conclusions stated here have been reached to a reasonable degree of scientific and / or professional certainty unless noted otherwise. This report contains all conclusions I have drawn in this case, all facts I personally remember from my expert analysis, and all exhibits with which I am familiar that I used to come to my conclusions. I understand that if I reach or form any new conclusions, remember any new facts, or otherwise alter my opinion in this case, I have an obligation to update this report accordingly. I know that this obligation continues until the moment before opening statements begin in this case, and I may not testify to facts or conclusions at trial unless they are already contained or referenced in this report. Laurie J. Alsaffar Laurie J. Alsaffar August 15, 2026 13
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