Aniyah Bailey
PHIL-238-01
Paper Outline
The central question my paper will investigate is whether a society committed to Rawls’s conception of
justice could more faithfully realize the demands of justice as fairness by transferring portions of political
decision-making from human agents to algorithmic systems designed to approximate the impartial standpoint
of the original position. John Rawls describes the original position as the device in which “no one knows his
place in society, his class position or social status,” and the principles chosen under such conditions ground the
legitimacy of the basic structure. If this veil-based model is the normative benchmark for just institutions, then
an important question arises: Can human citizens, embedded in social identities, interests, and biases, ever
approximate the impartiality Rawls demands?
To help illuminate this problem, this paper will draw extensively on the work of Iason Gabriel, a
political philosopher and senior AI ethicist whose 2020 scholarly essay “Artificial Intelligence, Values, and
Alignment” argues that modern algorithmic systems increasingly structure access to opportunities, resources,
and political influence in ways that make them part of society’s “basic structure.” Gabriel’s central claim is that
because AI systems shape the distribution of advantages, “egalitarian norms of justice apply to the technology
when it is deployed in these contexts.” By explicitly situating AI inside the landscape of distributive justice,
Gabriel provides a powerful framework for extending Rawlsian reasoning to algorithmic governance.
The thesis that follows from the convergence of these ideas is that Rawls’s own commitments suggest
that algorithmic governance, when appropriately designed, regulated, and constrained, may better approximate
the impartial reasoning of the original position than ordinary human decision-making. Rawls repeatedly
emphasizes that “justice is the first virtue of social institutions,” grounding legitimacy not in participation for its
own sake but in whether institutions conform to principles that would be chosen behind the veil. If real human
deliberators systematically fail the impartiality test due to cognitive biases and interest-laden reasoning, and if
algorithmic systems can be structured to ignore personal characteristics and prioritize the least-advantaged, then
the Rawlsian standard could, in principle, favor the incorporation of algorithmic adjudication.
My argument proceeds in three steps. First, Rawls’s conception of the original position demands that
the principles governing society emerge from conditions in which irrelevant personal information is excluded.
Rawls notes that parties are defined only by “their rationality and their mutual disinterest,” creating a procedural
ideal aimed at protecting the least advantaged. Second, empirical research demonstrates that human political
agents routinely violate this impartiality. Identity-based voting, motivated reasoning, and partisan self-interest
are well-documented features of democratic behavior, and they directly diverge from what Rawls’s veil is meant
to achieve. Third, Gabriel’s work shows that AI systems, already embedded in hiring, credit allocation, predictive
policing, and administrative decision-making, function as nodes of the basic structure and thus must be subject
to principles of distributive justice. Gabriel argues that because these systems affect background conditions of
fairness, they require “a standard of public justification” and governance structures capable of generating
substantively just outcomes. This opens conceptual space for the claim that algorithmic systems, if engineered
Aniyah Bailey
PHIL-238-01
Paper Outline
with Rawlsian fairness constraints and subjected to democratic auditing, might better realize the impartiality
Rawls envisions.
A major and valid counterargument that could arise would insist that algorithms are not neutral, that
they inherit biases from data, and that delegating political authority to opaque systems threatens democratic
freedom and accountability. This concern is grounded in substantial empirical literature documenting
algorithmic discrimination. Yet within a Rawlsian framework, this objection, though serious, is not decisive.
Rawls’s criterion of legitimacy is not the psychological participation of citizens but the fairness of institutional
procedures relative to what would be chosen in the original position. If algorithmic bias is a technical problem
that can be mitigated through transparency requirements, bias audits, and data regulation, while human bias is a
structural and permanent feature of political psychology, then even this objection may ultimately support,
rather than defeat, the generalized Rawlsian case for algorithmic assistance. Gabriel reinforces this point by
arguing that because AI systems already shape “background justice,” institutions must regulate them so that
they generate publicly justifiable outcomes, precisely the kind of constraint Rawlsian governance demands.
In this way, once Rawls’s procedural commitments are taken seriously, they open onto a radical but
internally coherent conclusion: if the legitimacy of institutions is defined by their approximation of the veil of
ignorance, then algorithmic systems, properly governed, might outperform human agents in realizing justice as
fairness. The Rawlsian framework does not automatically endorse technocracy, but it does require that we
evaluate new forms of governance by asking which institutional procedures most closely track the impartial
standpoint of the original position. Under contemporary technological conditions, that question cannot be
answered without confronting the normative role of AI.