1. Are human rights a form of imperialism? The claim that human rights function as a form of imperialism is a powerful critique in political theory. Postcolonial scholars argue that human rights discourse can operate as a civilising mission that legitimises intervention and entrenches global hierarchies. While acknowledging the profound force of these critiques, I will argue against the idea of an inherent imperialistic core within human rights. This essay contends that the practice and instrumentalisation of human rights by powerful states often embody imperial tendencies, which starkly contrast with the normative ideal of universal dignity and the vibrant, global history of human rights struggles. Human rights should be seen not as a fixed Western export but a deeply contested global framework, continuously reinterpreted and reclaimed by actors across the Global South to serve emancipatory, rather than dominative, ends (Mutua, 2001). The most potent and frequently cited evidence for the charge that human rights are a form of imperialism lies in the stark and systemic inconsistencies of their global enforcement. Critics point to a world where military intervention is justified on humanitarian grounds in one region, while similar or greater suffering is met with diplomatic paralysis elsewhere. This pattern of geopolitical selectivity is undeniable. However, a deeper analysis reveals that this inconsistency does not prove human rights are inherently imperialistic. On the contrary, it exposes the very mechanism of their imperial instrumentalisation and, paradoxically, underscores why the normative framework remains a vital site of struggle for disempowered states and communities. Inconsistent enforcement is not a byproduct of the system but a direct consequence of the unequal power structures within which human rights operate, a phenomenon powerfully theorised by scholars of international law and politics (Pahuja, 2019). The charge of imperialism finds its strongest foundation in a critical examination of history and discourse. As Antony Anghie meticulously demonstrates, the architecture of modern international law, within which human rights regimes are embedded, did not emerge from neutral, universal principles. Its evolution is inextricably linked to the colonial project, forged in the encounter between European powers and the societies they sought to dominate. Anghie argues that international law's foundational concepts were developed to manage and legitimise colonial administration, creating a system where sovereignty and legal personality were initially reserved for the "civilised" West. Consequently, contemporary human rights law operates within a structure originally designed to regulate and subordinate the nonWestern world. This historical legacy creates a persistent power asymmetry, where the very tools for claiming justice are housed within an edifice built upon imperial foundations (Anghie, 2006). Complementing this structural critique, Makau Mutua provides a potent discursive analysis through his "Savage-Victim-Saviour" metaphor. He posits that mainstream human rights narrative follows a predictable script: a savage (often a non-Western state) commits atrocities against a helpless victim (its people), requiring a saviour (Western states, NGOs, or international institutions) to intervene. This framework is not merely descriptive but performative; it reproduces colonial-era hierarchies by casting the West in the perpetual role of the enlightened moral guardian, while relegating the non-West to positions of barbarism or passivity. The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya stands as a textbook case of this dynamic. Framed by the UN Security Council under the emergent "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) doctrine, a concept itself rooted in human rights, the mission was publicly justified as a humanitarian imperative to shield civilians. However, the swift shift from establishing a nofly zone to actively facilitating regime change revealed how human rights rhetoric can serve as a malleable cloak for geopolitical objectives. The aftermath, a state of protracted conflict and division, starkly illustrates how the SVS narrative can empower Western states to dictate political outcomes in the name of salvation, thereby reinforcing neo-imperial patterns of influence under a banner of moral responsibility (Mutua, 2001). Public and political responses to humanitarian crises reveal how hierarchies of worth shape who is seen as a “victim”. The extensive Western media coverage, political rhetoric, and refugee welcome for Ukrainians following Russia's 2022 invasion contrasts sharply with the often parsimonious and securitised response to refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, or subSaharan Africa. This discrepancy, often unconsciously reflecting racial and civilisational biases, feeds the perception that some victims are deemed more "worthy" of salvation than others, a core tenet of the imperial gaze. The United States' sustained diplomatic protection of Israel from critical UN Security Council resolutions regarding its occupation of Palestinian territories, coupled with its massive military aid, stands as a decades-long example. Similarly, the muted international response to Saudi Arabia's domestic human rights record or its role in Yemen illustrates how strategic partnerships (oil, counter-terrorism, arms sales) can create de facto immunity. This reveals that the "savage" label is applied not to the worst violators objectively, but to geopolitical adversaries (Baxi, 1998, pp.152-155). This selective application exposes the hollowness of any claim to a disinterested civilising mission. If human rights were purely an imperial project for remaking the world in a single image, one would expect coercion to be applied universally and relentlessly. The fact that it is not, but rather carefully modulated, demonstrates that human rights rhetoric is a tool within traditional power politics, not a replacement for it. The saviour intervenes not out of pure altruism, but when the cost is low, the benefit is high, and the target is aligned with broader strategic objectives. (Donelly, 2013) To strengthen the critique of Imperialism, I would use Moyn's argument that human rights, in their current globalised form, only rose to prominence in the 1970s as a moral language, deliberately separated from state politics and anti-colonial revolutionary struggles. This "antipolitical" turn actually served to depoliticise more radical demands for economic justice and self-determination from the Global South, making human rights a safe, liberal alternative. Incorporating this perspective shows that the human rights project can marginalise transformative agendas, even as it claims universal moral authority (Moyn, 2010, pp.103107). The foundation of inconsistent enforcement is not merely political whim but is legally codified within the institutions designed to uphold the international order. The United Nations Security Council, the body with the primary authority to mandate forceful action for the "maintenance of international peace and security, a mandate now frequently intertwined with human protection, grants permanent veto power to five states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). This structure, a legacy of the post-World War II settlement, legally enshrines inequality. As a result, any action against a permanent member or its close ally becomes a legal impossibility, regardless of the scale of human rights abuses. The ongoing war in Yemen serves as a tragic case study. Despite years of documented widespread civilian casualties, famine, and cholera outbreaks exacerbated by a military coalition, the Security Council has been unable to pass any resolution for an arms embargo or meaningful intervention, largely due to the geopolitical interests of permanent members. This contrasts sharply with the swift authorisation of force in Libya in 2011, where no vital power’s core interests were directly threatened. This dichotomy illustrates that the "rule of law" is, in practice, preconditioned by the "rule of the powerful." (Moyn, 2010, pp.43-46) This structural reality aligns with the critical legal theory of scholars like Martti Koskenniemi, who argues that international law is fundamentally indeterminate. Its rules and principles, sovereignty, non-intervention, and human rights, are open to contradictory yet equally plausible interpretations. A state can justify intervention by appealing to the supremacy of human rights, while another can condemn it as a violation of sovereignty. Which argument prevails is seldom decided by legal logic alone but by political context and power. The inconsistent enforcement of human rights is thus the surface manifestation of this deeper indeterminacy, where powerful actors navigate the legal vocabulary to serve strategic ends. The law does not dictate outcomes but provides the language for political contestation (Onuf, 1990). The agency of actors in the Global South has been pivotal in shaping the very substance and mechanisms of international human rights. Kathryn Sikkink's concept of the "justice cascade" provides compelling evidence for this claim. Her research traces the global shift toward holding state officials individually criminally accountable for human rights violations not to European courts, but to persistent activism in Latin America. Following the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala, victims' groups and local activists, often at great personal risk, fought to make prosecutions a reality. Their efforts transformed transitional justice from an abstract concept into a global normative expectation, ultimately influencing the creation of the International Criminal Court. This history powerfully contradicts the diffusionist model of a West-to-rest human rights movement. As Sikkink shows, it was often "peripheral" actors who pushed the core tenets of accountability, demonstrating that human rights norms are constructed through global contestation and grassroots mobilisation (Sikkink, 2011). Beyond shaping global mechanisms, regions of the Global South have actively reinterpreted the human rights corpus to reflect distinct philosophical and historical experiences. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) is a seminal example of this constructive resistance. The Charter was a conscious project by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to articulate a vision of rights that was not a mere copy of European conventions. It deliberately embedded individual civil and political rights within a framework that also emphasised collective rights (to development, to a healthy environment), individual duties to the community, and, crucially, the anti-colonial principle of self-determination. This formulation emerged directly from Africa's historical experience of colonialism and its sociopolitical realities, asserting that universality does not mean uniformity. The Charter stands as a formal, institutional rebuttal to the imperial co-option critique, proving that the human rights framework is sufficiently pliable to be indigenized and used as a tool for empowerment and the articulation of a post-colonial political identity, rather than one of subjugation (Mathews, 1987). A frequent and potent counterargument points to the glaring inconsistencies in the global enforcement of human rights as proof of their imperial character. Critics highlight the selective application of sanctions, the geopolitically motivated use of international tribunals, and the willingness of powerful Western states to exempt themselves from the standards they impose on others. The United States' longstanding refusal to ratify core treaties like the Convention on the Rights of the Child or the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, while simultaneously championing human rights abroad, appears to exemplify a self-serving double standard. (Beitz, p.186-189) Yet, these very inconsistencies do not indict the idea of human rights; they indict the power structures that manipulate its application. Selective enforcement is the hallmark of political instrumentalisation, not of a genuinely imperial system. A truly imperial human rights regime would require consistent, universal imposition by a hegemon to reshape societies according to a fixed blueprint. The reality is messier: human rights language is invoked or ignored based on strategic interest. The divergent international responses to civilian crises in Libya and Syria, or the muted reaction to abuses in countries allied with powerful states, reveal that geopolitical calculation, not a steadfast commitment to universal principles, often drives action. This selectivity underscores that the struggle is not over the validity of human rights per se, but over who controls their interpretation and application (Baxi, 1998, pp.134-135). Furthermore, if human rights were purely an imperial instrument, one would not witness their vigorous adoption and institutionalisation by states seeking to resist Western dominance. The fact that nations from the Global South actively participate in the UN Human Rights Council, file cases at the International Court of Justice, and build sophisticated national human rights institutions suggests they perceive strategic and normative value in the framework. They engage not as passive recipients of a Western imposition, but as active agents seeking to use these tools to hold both domestic and international power to account, and to challenge the very double standards that define imperial practice. The contestation over enforcement is thus a central battleground in the larger war to de-centre Western authority within the international system. In conclusion, the relationship between human rights and imperialism is one of historical entanglement and persistent political risk, not of essential identity. The critiques of Anghie and Mutua are indispensable for exposing the colonial lineages of international law and the neo-imperial narratives. They correctly warn that without critical vigilance, human rights can serve as a potent ideology for powerful states. However, the lived history of human rights demonstrates that the framework has been fundamentally shaped by global struggles for emancipation. In my opinion, the idea, therefore, is not to discard human rights as imperial, but to engage in the continuous, difficult work of decolonising its practice: to confront enforcement double standards, to amplify subaltern interpretations, and to dismantle the structural inequalities that allow powerful states to instrumentalise universal norms. The inconsistent enforcement, underpinned by Koskenniemi’s indeterminate legal language and veto-based institutions, allows powerful states to pursue interests behind a moral cloak, lending empirical support to Mutua’s SVS metaphor. Yet, this very inconsistency also creates openings for resistance, accusations of hypocrisy, and institutional reform by weaker actors. The central struggle is to build an international order in which the power to define who counts as victim, savage, or saviour is genuinely redistributed (Mutua, 2001; Onuf, 1990). Bibliography: Anghie, A. (2006). The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities. Third World Quarterly, 27(5), 739–753. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4017775 Baxi, U. (1998). “Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights”. Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, pp. 125-169. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/8134847/_1998_Voices_of_Suffering_and_the_Future_of_Huma n_Rights_Transnational_Law_and_Contemporary_Problems_Fall_1998_pp_125_169 Beitz, C.R. (2009) The idea of human rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/6237008/Beitz_C_R_The_Idea_of_Human_Rights Donnelly, J. (2013). Chapters 1 and 6. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 3rd edition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801467493 Mathews, K. (1987). The OAU and Political Economy of Human Rights in Africa: An Analysis of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981. Africa Today, 34(1/2), 85–103. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4186410 Moyn, S. (2010). The Last Utopia : Human Rights in History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press. Available at: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=nlebk&AN=34 5165&authtype=shib&site=ehost-live&scope=site Mutua, M. (2001). Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights. Harvard International Law Journal, 42(1), 201-245. Onuf, N. (1990). [Review of From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument., by M. Koskenniemi]. The American Journal of International Law, 84(3), 771– 775. https://doi.org/10.2307/2202930 Pahuja, S. (2019) ‘Corporations, Universalism, and the Domestication of Race in International Law’, in D. Bell (ed.) Empire, Race and Global Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 74–93. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108576307 Sikkink, K. (2011). The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Available at: http://books.wwnorton.com/books/978-0-393-07993-7/
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