Name: Vaidehi Gupta​​
TA Name: Mani Bandaru (Group 4)​ ​
Reflection Paper 3
While previous readings suggest machines could achieve intelligence, Searle (1980) argues the
contrary. He refutes the idea that programs can possess intentionality, claiming that without it,
they lack causal powers. He specifically uses the Chinese Room argument, where he focuses on
the “Systems Reply” that claims that even if with the man being able to give the correct output,
the man doesn’t understand the Chinese he is outputting, and therefore, there is no intelligence in
this system. However, it is important to define what we are calling the “system.” This
relationship between the man and the room can be analogous to organelles and a cell; we don’t
define the organelle as the building block of life, but rather, the cell itself. In the same way, we
don’t define the man as the intelligent system, but rather the entire room, as it processes the
given input and produces the correct output. Searle is missing the concept of connectionism and
emergence– the combination of various units allows for a more complex behavior than the
individual parts. With this logic, the next proposal might be that if this unit can be replicated by
proper technological means, then the behavior of the brain can also successfully be replicated.
Searle argues that brains have specific “causal powers” that silicon chips cannot duplicate,
contrary to Newell and Simon’s PSSH argument of symbolic manipulation. However, he fails to
clarify what exactly are the causal powers that disappear when attempting to replicate
intelligence with technological means. Searle views AI as a “simulation” of the mind, as AI fails
to truly capture what is internally being processed. In terms of LLMs, could it be said that LLMs
are just various “Chinese Rooms” that mimic the behavior of understanding (right outputs given
inputs) without truly experiencing the reality? With this era of AI, the true question stands– does
the distinction between “simulation” and “reality” matter to determine intelligence if the output
is indistinguishable? Was Searle right that “internal experience” is the only thing that counts?