This article was downloaded by: [130.233.35.163] On: 26 August 2019, At: 04:24 Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) INFORMS is located in Maryland, USA Organization Science Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://pubsonline.informs.org Get Noticed and Die Trying: Signals, Sacrifice, and the Production of Face Time in Distributed Work Ioana C. Cristea, Paul M. Leonardi To cite this article: Ioana C. Cristea, Paul M. Leonardi (2019) Get Noticed and Die Trying: Signals, Sacrifice, and the Production of Face Time in Distributed Work. Organization Science 30(3):552-572. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2018.1265 Full terms and conditions of use: https://pubsonline.informs.org/page/terms-and-conditions This article may be used only for the purposes of research, teaching, and/or private study. 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For more information on INFORMS, its publications, membership, or meetings visit http://www.informs.org ORGANIZATION SCIENCE Vol. 30, No. 3, May–June 2019, pp. 552–572 ISSN 1047-7039 (print), ISSN 1526-5455 (online) http://pubsonline.informs.org/journal/orsc/ Get Noticed and Die Trying: Signals, Sacrifice, and the Production of Face Time in Distributed Work Ioana C. Cristea,a Paul M. Leonardia a Technology Management Program, University of California, Santa Barbara, California 93106-5129 http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3019-1939 (PML) Contact: icris@ucsb.edu (ICC); leonardi@ucsb.edu, Received: September 21, 2016 Revised: May 4, 2017; May 23, 2018; September 14, 2018 Accepted: September 19, 2018 Published Online in Articles in Advance: May 17, 2019 https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2018.1265 Copyright: © 2019 INFORMS Abstract. Research shows that displaying face time—being observed by others at work—leads to many positive outcomes for employees. Drawing on this prior work, we argue that face time helps employees to receive better work and leads to career advancement because it is a strong signal of their commitment to their job, their team, and their organization. But when employees are geographically distributed from managers who control the assignment of work, they are often unable to display face time. To compensate, employees must engage in other behaviors that signal commitment. Our study of two large, globally distributed, product-development companies demonstrates that employees who engage in certain behaviors can effectively signal their commitment to the organization and, as a consequence, will receive better work assignments. But because they operate in a competitive signaling environment, they have to continually engage in the behaviors that produce desired signals to the point where they often feel that they are sacrificing their personal lives for their job. We induct a model from our data that explains why simple behaviors that signal commitment eventually turn into feelings of sacrifice and why employees at headquarters who have the power to assign better work fail to notice the sacrifice behind the signals. We discuss the implications of this model and the signal misalignment it explains for theories of distributed work and signaling in organizations. Funding: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant SES-1057148]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2018.1265. Keywords: distributed work • signaling • face time • commitment • better work • sacrifice Everyone knows you have to have face time. But how the hell are you supposed to do it when you’re thousands of miles away? It’s a big disadvantage for you when they can’t see you working hard at your desk. — Juan, Product Engineering, Autoworks, Mexico colleagues to form perceptions that may result in positive outcomes. But as Juan points out in the opening quote, face time is much more difficult to achieve in distributed work arrangements. Juan worked in central Mexico at a subsidiary of a large automotive company headquartered in the state of Michigan. Juan found it easy to have face time with his colleagues and managers in Mexico but very difficult to show his face to leaders of the engineering teams at the company’s headquarters. As Juan observed, “If they can’t see that I’m a hard worker, how am I supposed to get better work?” Juan’s situation as an employee at a subsidiary of a large globally distributed company with a matrix reporting structure is common. Although he had a local functional manager in Mexico who assigned him routine engineering jobs, Juan had the ability to work on more exciting projects that were based out of headquarters (projects he and others deemed “better work”) if he could attract the interest of the project manager in Michigan. But with dozens of other employees in Mexico who were equally smart and who also had deep expertise in the subject matter, Juan believed that his only hope to differentiate himself enough to get better work was to display more face time. Why do you “have to have face time” at work? Recent research has begun to suggest a few answers to this question. One reason is that employees who actively work to display it engender positive perceptions of their competence among work colleagues (Alley 1997, Munck 2001). A second reason, surfaced by Elsbach et al. (2010), is that employees who engage in face time are often able to secure higher performance appraisals. A third reason is that organizational compensation schemes are often linked to displays of face time such that people who are frequently seen in the office and at specific events receive higher pay (Howell et al. 2016). For employees who work in close physical proximity to their colleagues, doing face time at work is relatively easy. As Elsbach and Cable (2012. p. 10) note, to be credited with face time, “you need only to be observed at work, no information is required about what you are doing or how well you are doing it.” That means that simply being seen working in the office can lead 552 Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS Several studies of distributed work arrangements show evidence of employees in positions of low power— such as employees who work in less developed countries, those who work outside of the company’s headquarters, or those who work on contract arrangements— that actively seek the attraction of better work from their colleagues in positions of high power. For instance, in her ethnographic study of software developers distributed between the United States and India, Metiu (2006) found that employees who worked in Bangalore considered challenging projects run from the United States to be better work and actively sought them. The author shows that in most cases, Indian software developers were not able to get the better work they wanted and left the company. Similarly, Koppman et al. (2016) found that workers at Indian offshore companies actively sought better work from their counterparts in North America, which consisted of technically complex assignments that were meaningfully integrated with the company’s core product. The authors show that, much to their disappointment, Indian information technology (IT) professionals typically received work that was routine and technically unsophisticated or of lower importance to the firm. This type of work did not align with their own image of their qualifications. But North American managers who had the power to make job assignments continued to send the Indian IT professionals this kind of work because they viewed them as low-status workers. In both studies, the workers agreed with Juan that their chances of landing better work would increase if they were just able to secure more face time with those who had the power to assign it to them. As one Indian IT professional from the study by Koppman et al. (2016) lamented, despite the fact that workers at the offshore center did all of the hard work, “the credit call goes to onsite because the clients interact with them and the clients appreciate them, you know, face to face.” Such a belief in the importance of face time for landing better work is not without additional empirical support. Yoon et al. (2016) have argued that after determining if an employee had sufficient technical expertise to work on a project, managers often chose employees who they thought were dependable and hard working. Concordantly, Elsbach et al. (2010) showed that two of the traits most typically attributed to people who displayed high levels of face time in the workplace were dependability and commitment to work hard. Although many researchers have acknowledged that advanced communication technologies can help employees who work at some distance from one another communicate more effectively, they routinely show that face time is still hard to achieve in distributed work arrangements and, consequently, becoming noticed by the powerful actors in a company who can distribute better work assignments is more 553 difficult to achieve (Cramton 2001, Levina and Vaast 2008, Erhardt and Gibbs 2014). As one clear example, the study by Hinds and Cramton (2014) of two hightech multinational companies showed how employees who worked in different countries often had a difficult time becoming familiar with one another because of the temporal and spatial boundaries separating them. Despite the fact that employees in both companies had advanced communication technologies in place to help traverse these boundaries, it was not until they traveled to the offices of their colleagues abroad and had face time with them that they were able to foster positive perceptions and develop the ties needed to build a deep working relationship. Although it may be difficult to display face time in distributed work settings, research suggests it is not impossible. People who are separated by time and space can form positive impressions of each other despite their lack of common physical location if they are competent (Walther 1996, 2007) or strategic (Leonardi et al. 2010, Birnholtz et al. 2012, O’Leary et al. 2014) in their use of communication technologies. But even if communication technologies may provide the kinds of features that afford users the ability to engage in face time, there is no guarantee that employees will recognize that they can use technology to try to establish face time or, if they do, that they will be able to successfully do it. In their study of face time in the workplace, Elsbach and Cable (2012) found that some remote workers (employees who did not work in the company’s main office) attempted to use “virtual” face time to make up for their absence from the office. But they observed that only a small percentage of employees engaged in behaviors meant to establish face time and present no data about whether these behaviors were effective or not. Given these findings, it is unclear how employees who wish to establish face time with workers at other locations might do so and what the outcomes of attempting to establish face time are for employees and for the organizations in which they work. To build a framework for exploring these issues, we turn to signaling theory (Spence 1973, Zahavi 1975, Donath 2007, Connelly et al. 2011), which provides a theoretical foundation for understanding how behaviors vary in their interpretability and how modes of interpretation are tied to the cost required to produce those behaviors. We argue that employees in subsidiary locations may attempt to use communication technologies to display behaviors that will signal to managers at headquarters their commitment and proclivity to do hard work—two traits that researchers argue are often inferred when employees engage in face time with colocated coworkers (e.g., Elsbach et al. 2010). We draw on data collected in two large product development companies to explore how employees like Juan, located at a subsidiary, try to display face time with colleagues at headquarters so that they will Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work 554 be able to get better work. In so doing, we induct a model outlining the process by which subsidiary employees engage in signaling strategies that can bring both planned and unplanned outcomes for the employees doing them and for the companies in which they work. Our data show that behaviors generate signals of commitment that are indeed effective at helping subsidiary employees land better work from headquarters. But, over time, subsidiary employees need to conduct ever more costly behaviors to compete with other employees who also want better work. From the perspective of subsidiary workers, their engagement in these costlier behaviors signals the extent of the sacrifice that they are willing to make to take on better work. But because of the power differences between headquarters and subsidiary sites, headquarters employees continue to interpret these behaviors as signals of commitment and fail to see the toll that such sacrificial behaviors have on subsidiary employees. We use this model to develop theory about signal misalignment and its effects on the dynamics of distributed work in situations of power imbalance. Face Time and Signaling in Distributed Work Within many organizations—particularly high-tech organizations—employees are evaluated not only on whether the outcomes of their work meet certain criteria (e.g., high quality, on time, on budget) but also on whether they engage in sufficient “face time” in the workplace (Bailyn 1993, Perlow 1997). As Pedersen (2015, p. 50) suggests, face time refers to “the amount of time an employee is seen at work or in the office, whether interacting with others or not, and whether being productive or not . . . In essence, it is simple validation or ‘getting credit’ for being physically present at work.” Face time has been linked to employees “getting credit” for their presence in the workplace in a variety of ways, including garnering perceptions that they are more committed (Thompson et al. 1999), more productive (Santos and Cabral-Cardoso 2008), or harder working (Eder and Lundberg 1990) than their colleagues who do not display as much face time. Such perceptions often turn into tangible benefits for those who engage in face time, including better performance appraisals (Elsbach et al. 2010), shorter time to promotion (Munck 2001), and higher pay (Howell et al. 2016) when compared with colleagues who display less face time. Current research suggests that inferences made about people who engage in face time are made through seeing others physically present in the office. Rosengren (2015) has suggested that as work performance in the knowledge economy becomes increasingly difficult to assess and judge, seeing people actually working hard in the workplace is an ever more useful way to determine if Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS someone is a good worker. As he notes, “we are judged and evaluated not so much by what we do but by our presence and visibility in the workplace. . . spending much time outside the office can affect both your income and career prospects negatively” (p. 11). Elsbach et al. (2010) provide a theoretical rationale for why physical copresence is so often linked to the positive effects of face time. Their experimental study showed that managers frequently made spontaneous trait inferences about employees who they saw working at their desks. The results showed that seeing employees working hard during and after work hours lead to positive (e.g., dedicated, responsible) and not negative (e.g., manipulative, unproductive) inferences about their personality traits. As the authors concluded: “Our findings suggest that trait-based performance appraisals may lead to an unfair advantage for employees who are willing and able to hang around the office a lot. Conversely, remote workers, such as telecommuters, may suffer unfair comparisons and poorer performance ratings relative to their in-office peers” (p. 754). There is empirical support for the speculation of Elsbach et al. (2010) that employees who are geographically distributed from sources of power within the organization will have a more difficult time achieving the same performance benefits as their in-office peers. Research shows that geographically separated employees suffer from limited career advancement opportunities due to a lack of face time (Ryan and Kossek 2008). Studies of the way distributed workers use communication technologies to interact with colleagues who work in the office often show that such employees are able to communicate as effectively as if they were in the same office, but that their colleagues are still unable to see them working and, consequently, they do not accrue the benefits that face time provides (Leonardi et al. 2010, Erhardt and Gibbs 2014). Despite the difficulty in achieving it, face time may be critically important for many distributed workers because, on average, they are more junior (because more senior positions are available at headquarters than at subsidiaries) and they are newer (because turnover rates are higher at subsidiaries than at headquarters) than employees who work at a company’s headquarters (Oshri et al. 2008). In addition, research shows that the employees who benefit the most from doing face time are those who are new to the company and who are not senior enough to have a reputation that precedes them (O’Neill 2012). If employees who work at an organization’s subsidiary are not able to engage in face time with important decision makers at headquarters because of their geographic dispersion, might there be other ways to produce the positive inferences that face time enables? One way, documented in the literature, is that subsidiary employees could focus on increasing the Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS quality of their work to impress headquarters managers (Levina and Vaast 2008). Another way would be for employees working at subsidiary locations to request a transfer (either temporary or permanent) to headquarters and become “headquarters employees” themselves, even though Gibbs (2009) showed that such transfers sometimes make the situation worse. Another option would be to shift their focus from getting assigned to projects with headquarters to creating the desired work themselves at their subsidiary. In such a situation, research shows how employees who do not work at a company’s headquarters try to get better work by engaging in collective job crafting activities and proposing completely new business ideas (Mattarelli and Tagliaventi 2015). A final path, according to Leonardi and Bailey (2008), would be for subsidiary employees to strive to get firsthand contact with their colleagues at headquarters through digital communication to ensure access to a direct learning resource and, later on, for the receipt of better work. However, what appears to work best for such distributed workers—when they want to work on projects with individuals who hold power in the organization—is finding ways to actually be seen working. The study by Hinds and Cramton (2014) of situated coworker familiarity showed that when distributed workers went to headquarters to spend time working, they were able to engage in face time and even those limited observations of their work provided positive consequences for their ongoing interactions with the headquarters teams. Yet, as Bailey et al. (2012) discuss, asking distributed employees to travel to headquarters sites often undermines the economic rationale for doing distributed work in the first place and, thus, many companies are not likely to do it often, if at all. Another option, recently proposed by scholars of distributed work, is to abandon the attempt to engage in face time explicitly and, instead, to focus on making certain behaviors that signal attributes such as being committed and diligent visible to others. O’Leary et al. (2014, p. 1220) suggest that the surest way for distributed employees to gain the positive outcomes typically attributed to face time is by “communicating in ways that signal and symbolize their dependability, reliability, accessibility, likability, and informality.” If one primary benefit of face time is that it leads observers to make positive spontaneous trait inferences about an employee (Elsbach et al. 2010), the suggestion by O’Leary et al. (2014) is that distributed workers might benefit from finding other behavioral means to produce signals that will lead observers to make those inferences. Scholars who study signaling argue that information asymmetries between parties in a relationship often make it difficult for one party to evaluate the claims made by another (Stiglitz 2000). In such contexts, 555 signals are an important evaluation heuristic because people do not always have direct experiences with each other that would allow them to reduce such information asymmetries (Spence 2002, Connelly et al. 2011). If an employer cannot observe a job candidate doing a particular task, the best alternative is to look for behaviors that signal the attribute in question—like receipt of higher education (Spence 1973). Moreover, behaviors that are the most costly to produce create the most believable signals (Durcikova and Gray 2009). Distributed work is a prime example of a context in which information asymmetry is high. An individual working in one location is rarely able to directly observe whether someone working in another location is hardworking, committed, or punctual because he or she does not have direct experience working with this person (Leonardi et al. 2010). In distributed work contexts, people in one location often watch whatever behaviors are easily visible and make attributions about the individuals based on those behaviors (Cramton et al. 2007). In other words, people at one location take the behaviors they can see as signals of a person’s underlying qualities or attributes. The literature on signaling suggests that the signals an employee receives from a colleague who works at a distance are more likely to be believed if the behaviors in which a distant colleague engages were costly to produce. Signals are powerful markers of behavior when observers need to distinguish between multiple options. Maynard Smith (1985) illustrates this point through his discussion of the “handicap principle.” The idea behind the handicap principle is that because more reliable signals require that an animal engage in costly behaviors, animals that purposefully handicap themselves (e.g., those willing to incur even higher costs than their peers) produce signals that are more likely to be believed by observers than are signals sent by peers who do not handicap themselves (Zahavi 1975, Johnstone and Grafen 1993). As Zahavi (1977) argued, the wastefulness of a signal ensures its honesty because only animals with an excess of the signaled resource can afford to waste it on expensive communicative displays; other animals that do not have such excess cannot afford such wasteful behavior. The comparison of the behavior of multiple actors—being able to observe variations in the amount of effort spent on them—thus makes certain signals more salient. O’Neill (2012) suggests that face time is most important when there are multiple individuals vying for the attention of an observer because it allows actors to differentiate themselves from the competition. Similarly, behaviors take on value as strong signals when there is variance in the amount of effort that various actors expend to produce them. Donath (2007) has suggested that signaling theory can be usefully employed to explain the conduct of social relations in mediated environments. She discusses how Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work 556 users of social networking sites can signal the strength of a relationship with a friend through the amount of time they invest in making comments on that person’s wall and how frequently they communicate with that person. As she notes, “returning to a friend’s page, day after day, to say hello is a way of engaging in ‘social grooming.’ The cost in time is a signal of the resources one is willing to commit to this relationship, and references to mutual friends and external events are indices of shared experience” (p. 238). Although Donath (2007) notes the important relationship between costly signals and believability in mediated contexts, she stops just short of considering why people think they need to produce those signals in the first place and what the consequences are that follow from engaging in such costly behaviors. In the context of distributed work, these questions are important. If employees, like Juan, working from a remote location, wish to get better work but cannot display face time, sending signals that will lead observers to infer that they possess traits like commitment and dependability may help them to achieve their goal. It is not clear, however, what conditions prompt distributed workers to begin sending signals or whether and how powerful observers of those signals might treat those signals as substitutes for face time. Further, if the behaviors required for producing potential signals are costly, the time and effort required to produce them will have to be reallocated from some other activity because time and effort is not infinite. We explore what consequences arise when distributed employees engage in costly behaviors to produce signals that appear reliable, how those signals are interpreted by powerful actors, and the way the dynamic between signal production and interpretation plays out in the lives of distributed workers. Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS North Carolina, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Singapore. Autoworks is a major international automobile manufacturer headquartered in Michigan’s Detroit metro area. Autoworks conducts product development at its headquarters and at subsidiaries in seven other countries. We focused our data-collection efforts on the division whose employees designed and optimized the vehicle’s frame and body to absorb energy in a collision. Automotive engineers worked at the company headquarters in the Detroit metro area as well as in Germany, Sweden, Mexico, Brazil, and India. At both SunTech and Autoworks, productdevelopment projects initiated and run from headquarters were widely considered the most valuable, important, and prestigious projects on which one could work. The normal staffing procedure for headquarters projects at both companies was that the project lead could choose their desired project members from headquarters or any of the subsidiary locations. Typically, the majority of members of any headquarters project were from the headquarters, with the remaining project members usually coming from two to three subsidiary locations. The average size of a core team in both companies included between 12 and 18 people, and these core team members often worked closely with members of other adjacent teams of the same size, such that the overall number of employees working on various aspects of the project was typically 30–40. Core teams that were run out of sites other than company headquarters included roughly the same number of individuals but consisted almost entirely of individuals from that subsidiary location. It was common for employees at both companies to be part of multiple teams concurrently. At SunTech the average project duration was 1.5 years, whereas at Autoworks it was slightly over 3 years. Methods Research Setting We drew from data collected in two large productdevelopment companies, SunTech and Autoworks (pseudonyms), both Fortune 100 companies, headquartered in the United States, to explore what behaviors employees at subsidiary locations display to signal their worthiness to be staffed on headquarters projects, as well as the consequences these signals have for the employees who attempt to produce them. SunTech is a large hightech organization headquartered in the heart of California’s Silicon Valley that designs, manufactures, and sells computer networking equipment, with productdevelopment operations in 10 other U.S. states and at 14 subsidiaries in other countries. At SunTech we focused our data-collection efforts on the division whose employees develop online collaboration tools. Network engineers who worked in this division were located at headquarters, as well as at subsidiaries in California, Data Collection Following the lead of other scholars who have conducted in-depth field studies of organizational practice across settings (Barley 1996, Bechky and Okhuysen 2011), we combine in-depth, semistructured interview data drawn from field studies collected in the two organizations. We also used information from intranets, organizational artifacts, informant-provided material (e.g., screen shots of work documents and policy documentation), and observations to triangulate and to gain insights into the respective contexts and the specific work and communication behaviors in which we were interested. The primary data used in this study were collected via semistructured interviews with employees at SunTech and Autoworks. At both companies, we put out an open call for informants who were willing to discuss their distributed work arrangements in the divisions under study. After recruiting initial informants, Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS our data collection proceeded through snowball sampling (Lofland and Lofland 1995). In total, we conducted 92 in-depth interviews with informants at both companies. Interviews at SunTech were conducted between September 2012 and July 2014, and all were done in person, with the exception of 21 interviews of subsidiary employees that were conducted via teleconferencing tools. All interviews with employees at Autoworks—both at headquarters and at subsidiaries— were conducted in person between March 2008 and May 2009. Table 1 summarizes other relevant demographic information. Following procedures for conducting semistructured interviews (Kvale 1996), we organized interview protocols into four sections. We used the same interview protocols for interviewing both headquarters managers and subsidiary employees, with the exception of questions targeting relationships between employees and managers, where questions were flipped for headquarters managers to inquire about relationships with subsidiary employees and the other way around. The first section covered background questions including work history at the organization, demographic details, and a description of current job roles. In this section, we also asked participants to walk us through an average workday and to describe the specific tasks they did. In the second section, questions were aimed at learning about the specific projects on which participants worked. We asked questions about the composition of the core team, the types of technologies they used, and the types of assignments they were given, as well as whether they were part of a headquarters project currently or had been in the past. We also asked questions about how they were selected to be on the projects and how they typically ended their affiliation with a project. Some of the questions in this section were flipped when we interviewed headquarters managers to learn how they selected employees for their projects. The third section inquired about the kinds of knowledge that participants needed to do their work. We asked questions about how employees developed needed knowledge; how they acquired it from their colleagues, artifacts, or repositories; and how they integrated knowledge from others into their own work. In the fourth section, we asked questions about the way participants communicated with members of their projects and with people who were working on projects of which they would like to be a part. We asked specific questions about the types of technologies they used to communicate, the types of messages they sent, the time of day they sent messages, and how they attempted to make persuasive appeals to their colleagues. In this final section, we also asked about why participants sent the messages they did, and we asked them to assess how easy or difficult it was to produce and send those 557 messages. Participants were also asked to describe why some messages were easy to produce and why others were difficult to produce, as well as what types of consequences they experienced (positive or negative) when trying to produce these messages. In addition, we asked both headquarters managers and subsidiary employees to recall the evolution of projects over time and to further elaborate on certain episodes that we found interesting. These types of questions, aimed at capturing employees’ experiences with specific events over time, were instrumental in providing a temporal dimension to our emerging grounded model. Data Analysis As we read the interview transcripts, it became apparent that many informants at the subsidiaries of both companies were actively trying to get better work through specific types of communicative displays aimed at headquarters colleagues. To explore this issue in depth, we analyzed the data following the coding stages outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1990): open, axial, and selective coding. In the open-coding stage, we identified all instances in the data in which subsidiary employees discussed their desire to get better work or their discussions of activities aimed at trying to get better work. These codes evinced reasons why subsidiary employees were motivated to create signals, what behaviors they conducted to produce signals, how they worked to continue to produce signals over time, and what impact producing signals had on them in the short and long term. We also coded all instances in which headquarters employees discussed perceiving signals and what their reactions—affective and behavioral—were to those signals. Detailed examples of these open codes can be found in the bullet points of the first column (“Codes”) of online appendix Figure A1, which presents codes from interviews of subsidiary employees, and online appendix Figure A2, for codes from interviews with headquarters employees. In the second stage of coding (axial coding), we created second-order codes that grouped the open codes into clusters that were conceptually similar in the areas of perception, behavior, and outcome. The first round of axial coding reduced the 66 codes generated during the open-coding phase to 30 codes. We then conducted a second round of axial coding to cluster these similar codes yet again into categories that represented why people signaled, how they signaled, what signaling did to them, whether and how signals were interpreted, and the outcomes associated with those signals. This second round of axial coding produced 15 distinct codes. The results of these procedures are summarized in the first (“Codes”) and second (“Categories”) columns of online appendix Figures A1 and A2. Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work 558 Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS Table 1. SunTech and Autoworks Informants Autoworks SunTech Informant Location (Subsidiary) Tenure (years) Age group (years) Informant Location (Subsidiary) Tenure (years) Age group (years) Jack Dylan Bill Liam Ryan Zack Ben George Phillip Fabian Jan Horst Nils Viktor Max Tim Amit Ritoban Priyanka Aditya Vinay Rahul Nilesh Shivani Raj Alonso Juan Carlos Fernando Alejandro Jaime Per Mia Kai Daniel Michael Ankit Erik Gina Brandon Ram Luis Melissa Rodrigo Mateo Ashish Simon Tobias Walter Mike Jim Gary Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany India India India India India India India India India Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico Sweden Sweden Sweden HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan HQ–Michigan 6 8 3 5 7 15 3 6 6 5 14 13 7 8 8 11 3 3 5 2 2 2 2 5 5 4 5 3 5 7 9 8 12 14 15 12 16 8 11 9 18 14 16 10 17 20 22 28 15 23 27 20 30–39 40–49 20–29 30–39 30–39 40–49 20–29 30–39 30–39 20–29 40–49 40–49 20–29 30–39 30–39 40–49 20–29 30–39 40–49 20–29 20–29 20–29 20–29 30–39 30–39 30–39 30–39 20–29 20–29 30–39 40–49 30–39 40–49 40–49 40–49 40–49 40–49 50–59 50–59 40–49 40–49 40–49 40–49 40–49 40–49 50–59 50–59 50–59 40–49 50–59 60–69 40–49 Logan Anne Collin Steve Frederik Mathias Luke Rob Karthik Kelsey Brian Christian Frank Ramesh Spencer Peter Jordan Kevin Anthony Damian Justin Greg Alex Craig Nick Amanda Ayaan Martin James Randy Andrew David Krishna Stephen Ruben Emily Jane Thomas Jared Mark England England England Netherlands Belgium Norway Singapore North Carolina North Carolina North Carolina North Carolina California (site 1) California (site 1) California (site 1) California (site 1) California (site 1) California (site1) California (site 1) California (site 1) California (site 1) California (site 1) California (site 2) California (site 2) California (site 2) California (site 2) California (site 2) HQ–California (site 3) HQ–California (site 3) HQ–California (site 3) HQ–California (site 3) HQ–California (site 3) HQ–California (site 3) HQ–California (site 3) HQ–California (site 3) HQ–California (site 3) HQ–California (site 3) HQ–California (site 3) HQ–California (site 3) HQ–California (site 3) HQ–California (site 3) 16 3 1 14 8 4 4 7 7 2 2 6 2 2 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 8 5 3 2 4 16 14 8 7 6 14 13 12 10 4 4 2 2 2 30–39 30–39 30–39 40–49 30–39 40–49 30–39 50–59 40–49 20–29 20–29 40–49 20–29 20–29 20–29 20–29 20–29 20–29 20–29 20–29 20–29 40–49 40–49 40–49 30–39 30–39 50–59 50–59 50–59 30–39 30–39 50–59 50–59 40–49 40–49 30–39 20–29 40–49 30–39 30–39 Note. All names used in this document are pseudonyms. In the final stage of coding (selective coding), we aimed to take the previous groupings of codes to an aggregate theoretical level. To do this, we examined what work each of the prior categories of codes were doing. This iterative process resulted in categories revealing a set of drivers associated with the process of getting better work, a set of behaviors the subsidiary employees engaged in to make themselves visible to headquarters, intended and unintended consequences of subsidiary employees’ behaviors, and how Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS headquarters managers made sense of the behavior of subsidiary employees and responded to it. In total, this final stage of coding resulted in eight aggregate theoretical categories. For example, some of the prior categories of codes revealed reasons why subsidiary employees wanted better work. We aggregated those codes into the theoretical category “Drivers to get noticed,” which indicated the reasons that compelled subsidiary employees to signal. We also discovered theoretical categories representing the ways that employees signaled their commitment to headquarters via their availability (“Signal production”), how they interpreted the signals sent back to them from headquarters as expectations to be continuously committed (“Signal (re)interpretation”), how they then attempted to resend a different signal in response to those interpretations by making themselves available at all times and showing their commitment through sacrifice (“Signal reproduction”), and how they ultimately decided to leave the signaling process (“Exit”). For headquarters employees, we generated aggregate theoretical codes that identified what they believed subsidiary employees should do to deserve better work (“Expectations of commitment”), how they interpreted signals coming from subsidiaries as commitment via availability (“Signal (re)interpretation”), and how they sent signals that revealed their expectation of commitment (“Signal (re)production”). These aggregate theoretical dimensions are displayed in the last column of online appendix Figures A1 and A2. As a final step, we organized these aggregate theoretical dimensions temporally by sorting them into distinct phases of interaction between subsidiary and headquarters employees. As we examined this ordering, we noticed a vicious cycle taking place between signal (re)interpretation and (re)production across subsidiary and headquarters employees. We discuss how this vicious cycle arose, why it continued to occur, and what effects it had on workers in both organizations in the next section. Findings Employees who worked at SunTech’s and Autoworks’ subsidiaries understood that in a large multinational product-development company the best projects were run out of the company headquarters. Being chosen to work on one of these projects often meant better work opportunities. The term “better work” took on specific meaning among employees at both companies because subsidiary employees used it to refer to work that was state of the art, highly valued by company executives, and vitally important to the company’s overall success. Subsidiary employees believed the problem of getting better work had to do with their lack of face time. In line with this belief, subsidiary employees worked to 559 establish their commitment to the organization through other means. Specifically, they modified their behavior in ways that they hoped signaled their commitment to working hard to their colleagues at headquarters. We found that the constant engagement in signal production was similar to a push-and-pull process between subsidiaries and headquarters, or between getting and giving better work. We illustrate this process and its three phases in Figure 1. The specific behaviors and beliefs we uncovered in our study (those likely to be particular to the two empirical contexts we studied) are represented in the ovals. The broader categories of action, which are likely to be seen across contexts other than the ones we studied (and which represent the grounded theory developed in this study), are represented as rectangles. We discuss this grounded theory, as depicted in Figure 1, in the following sections. Phase 1. Getting Noticed Subsidiary employees believed they could get better work opportunities if only they were noticed by their colleagues at the power center. Therefore, they engaged in behaviors that signaled to headquarters managers their commitment to hard work by making themselves available when needed, specifically by demonstrating face time and incurring occasional personal inconveniences. But headquarters managers had certain expectations of commitment from subsidiary employees, which they used as a baseline when evaluating signals received from subsidiaries. Our data show how, early on in the process, headquarters managers’ interpretation of the signals received matched that of the signals sent, indicating an alignment between what subsidiaries pursued and how headquarters interpreted their pursuit. Subsidiary: Drivers to Get Noticed and Signal Production. Our data analysis indicated that subsidiary employees were aware that being chosen to work on a headquarters project was not easy. Because of their geographic distribution and sometimes large time zone difference between them and headquarters, it was difficult for subsidiary employees to engage in face time with the decision makers who had the authority to give them better work. Nick, an IT engineer at SunTech, commented that it was hard to demonstrate face time with headquarters managers because they were not in the same office with him, so they could not see him work. Another engineer at Autoworks’ Sweden subsidiary, Mia, observed how the global distribution of work made it “impossible” to demonstrate face time with headquarters managers. “How are you going to show your face? People see your face when they see you at your desk working hard. That’s impossible to do when you don’t work near the people who matter.” Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work 560 Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS Figure 1. The Signaling Process Subsidiary employees at both companies were convinced that their inability to engage in easy face time with headquarters managers prevented them from being chosen on projects that were better work. This reasoning had some employees wanting to be constantly involved in activities involving the presence of a headquarters manager, as a senior IT engineer at SunTech, Karthik, noted, “FOMO [fear of missing out] is so high with people here. People are afraid to miss out on things, on people, on discussions . . . They [are afraid] of not showing face, missing out on networking—that’s all part of the way up. You need to work hard . . . but that’s just one piece.” Similarly, an engineer from Autoworks’ Mexico subsidiary, Fernando, recounted, “I know all the important decisions are happening over there [at headquarters]. If you don’t know what they are making decisions about, you can’t be involved and you will just be missing out on all the good projects.” These beliefs in linkages between demonstrating face time and career advancement were strongly entrenched in the culture of both companies. For example, the authors of SunTech’s yearly “Internal Collaboration Report” explicitly encouraged employees to be present in the office because doing so would lead to “opportunity for a new assignment or career development.” However, the fact that subsidiary employees recognized that they needed to engage in face time to get better work opportunities did not immediately translate into a desire to be seen by headquarters managers. As an engineer at Autoworks’ Germany subsidiary, Viktor, noted, “They have to know you are willing to work hard and that you will not disappoint them in order to get the project.” But invisibility and the desire to overcome it by showing their hard work to colleagues at headquarters were not the only drivers motivating subsidiary employees to get better work. Over time, the frustration from drowning in too many routine, unexciting tasks, sitting on too many meetings, or hearing colleagues brag about their existing projects, coupled with the ambition fanned by seeing fellow colleagues get promoted, constantly pushed subsidiary employees to work harder on improving their chances of getting noticed by headquarters colleagues. Talking about one of those situations, a young employee at a SunTech California subsidiary, Frank, described how seeing one of his coworkers switch teams and get assigned to work on more challenging projects pushed him to work harder and demonstrate the same level of commitment as his colleague. After being “always there” and working hard, he followed in his coworker’s footsteps and got to be part of a project run directly from headquarters, which motivated him even more to continue working hard and showing it. Similarly, at Autoworks, many engineers recounted how they would sit at lunch with one engineer who was Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS working on a headquarters project and would grow frustrated and annoyed at him for describing, as an engineer at the Germany subsidiary, Horst, put it, “all the great work he is able to do.” Employees at subsidiary locations felt that because they were out of sight of colleagues at headquarters, they were also out of mind, so they looked for ways to remain present. If colleagues at headquarters did not have a reason to think about them, they reasoned, those colleagues would not check to see if they were available to work on important tasks. Consequently, employees at subsidiaries conducted behaviors that demonstrated that they were indeed around and working and, in so doing, signaling they were available for questioning, task assignment, or simple discussions. The data showed two strategies that employees at subsidiaries used to demonstrate that they were indeed working and available for consult: creating occasional presence and demonstrating flexibility when needed. Subsidiary employees worked hard to ensure their presence was felt. For example, sometimes they opted to turn on the video in meetings, while other times they chose to log in to a meeting via an online meeting portal rather than call in, so that their name would be emblazoned on everyone else’s screen throughout the entire meeting. In other cases, fearing that people who joined a conference call later than them did not know they were on, they would hang up and call in again so that the automated announcer would say their name again and fellow colleagues knew they were there. They also tried to maintain an online presence both during standard work hours and outside of them. Part of their strategy for creating occasional presence was also making sure that colleagues at headquarters received a steady stream of content throughout the day. An Autoworks engineer located in Australia described this strategy succinctly: I used to send an update to [headquarters] at the end of the day of the things I did. It was one big email. I stopped that and instead I just send lots of emails during the day so [that] when they open their mail they see in their inbox lots of messages from me from all times of day, and they know I am working. What is good about that is that if they ask me to do something else, they already know I am very busy and working hard, so when I say yes, it looks extra good like I am doing it just for them. (George, Autoworks) A second strategy was to demonstrate their flexibility when needed—for example, by volunteering for extra work when necessary or, when the amount of work was too overwhelming, choosing to multitask to cope with it. A network engineer from SunTech’s UK subsidiary commented on how common the expectation for multitasking was across the company and how it was considered a way to show one’s commitment to hard work: 561 It just comes down to how much time there is in the day. If there’s only X number of hours and we’re trying to—let’s say I have six hours’ worth of meetings, and I have five hours’ worth of work, and I’m going to work for nine hours, I have two hours of work over what I planned to spend. That is common here. That’s where multitasking becomes necessary if you’re to get everything done that day. And it is ok, because everyone does it and expects you to do it. (Collin, SunTech) Regardless of the strategy one used to demonstrate face time, employees at subsidiary locations were careful to prove to headquarters managers, who could not look across the room and see them, that they were indeed around and working, available to help at a moment’s notice and willing to incur an occasional personal inconvenience for doing so. For employees located at subsidiaries, showing commitment to their projects and making sure their behavior was visible to headquarters also meant sometimes having to sacrifice late evenings for being present in a meeting. As one network architect at SunTech’s Netherlands subsidiary noted: I start to work about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, my time, and essentially I work until midnight because in my job as a network architect, I have lots of meetings. And, a lot of those meetings, as I said, are with people at headquarters, and the only way to do that reasonably is to adjust my schedule. I would never tell them to change their schedule because they would think I am not a good team player. I just change my own schedule around my family to fit them. (Steve, SunTech) Another subsidiary employee at SunTech’s California subsidiary, Nick, noted, “It’s hard to keep up with everything going on, so sometimes you need to put work first, and family second. Sometimes, I need to skip dinner with my wife to finish a project or skip my early morning workout to get to work for a meeting. But that’s not the norm. Luckily, I’m in the same time zone with them [headquarters]; otherwise I would have it much worse [chuckles].” The same behavior was used by employees at Autoworks’ subsidiaries. As an engineer from India recounted, he was willing to make sacrifices to his personal life to schedule meetings at times that were convenient for colleagues at headquarters, but he was also sure that they understood the constraints he faced: What they [people at headquarters] do not know is that we are taking the bus two hours to get to work and two hours home. The bus only leaves two times in the evening—at 6 pm or 9 pm. So if they want to schedule a meeting at 5:30–6:30 my time I am going to miss the bus and will have to stay another 2.5 hours. So sometimes I make sure to tell them this, so they know that I am making this sacrifice. But I will always stay for the meeting. They are happy for it, but my wife gets very Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work 562 mad. But it is good to show they can count on me for the team. (Raj, Autoworks) Across both companies, scheduling meetings at inconvenient times or staying up late to finish a project when necessary were part of the behaviors subsidiary employees conducted to signal commitment to the project by virtue of personal inconvenience and willingness to be accommodating. Thus, signaling their commitment via availability meant not only demonstrating face time but also incurring an occasional personal inconvenience. Headquarters: Expectations of Commitment and Signal Interpretation. Headquarters managers were aware that because of the large geographical distribution and lack of direct interactions with employees, it was harder to identify who the most qualified and hard-working distributed employees were, than if those employees were located in the same office with them. They admitted it was often a challenge to find the right fit for a project, or the best person for the job, from the multitude of employees available but spread across geographical spaces and sometimes in different time zones. Of the 32 headquarters managers we interviewed across both companies, 25 indicated that they chose for their projects or assigned the highest caliber tasks to subsidiary employees who they viewed as continuously committed to the company and to their jobs. Our analysis showed that headquarters managers valued employees who were willing to go the extra mile and who displayed evidence of their hard work. We found evidence of managers at headquarters commenting about the importance of having team members they could “count on at all times,” who were “there for their colleagues” regardless of time zone differences, and who were constantly “on top of things.” They also mentioned, repeatedly, how necessary it was, especially in a globally distributed context, to be able to easily reach employees and to have proof of hard work. Managers at both companies validated these expectations when describing how they chose employees for their projects. One manager at SunTech’s headquarters, Randy, confessed that he was biased toward choosing employees that he saw in the office frequently simply because they were present. “It’s hard to be impartial when you have someone who’s always here [at headquarters], always ready to help, and someone who’s working from [another location] and he or she is hard to get a hold of.” At Autoworks, managers at headquarters similarly observed, “Of course you’re going to give priority to people who are here because you see them and you know what they can do and that they’ll do a good job. It’s just much harder to know if you can depend on someone you don’t work close to everyday” (Simon, Autoworks). Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS In fact, headquarters managers became so reliant on the receipt of these signals that they began to look for them specifically when making work assignments or project staffing decisions. When doing so, they interpreted the incoming signals from subsidiaries by individually evaluating them, as well as by comparing each employee’s signal against those of others. But in order to interpret behaviors such as demonstrating face time and incurring occasional personal inconvenience as signals of commitment, headquarters managers had to witness subsidiary employees conducting them. Several times, headquarters managers remarked on how they found themselves searching for clues or evidence of hard work and dedication, as noted by an IT project manager from SunTech’s headquarters, Mark: “The fact that he [subsidiary employee] is always there when I ping him, day or night, lets me know that I can count on him. I need that kind of people on my team.” As participants from headquarters regularly observed, these behaviors did not take on meaning unless they saw other employees who were not doing them. In other words, it was difficult to determine that incurring a personal inconvenience to attend a meeting actually signaled commitment unless they had a comparison point: an employee who was unwilling to “go the extra mile.” As a manager at Autoworks’ headquarters, Walter, noted: “You can tell who you want on a project by looking at the field. You see who is willing to take on the extra work. You can see what guys will and what guys won’t. So you sort of figure out what is reasonable to expect.” Headquarters managers depended on implicit or explicit comparisons among subsidiary employees to make determinations about who was committed and who was not. Because headquarters managers worked with a variety of subsidiary employees (sometimes at the same subsidiary and sometimes across multiple subsidiaries), their work structure gave them a platform to make easy comparisons. For example, Gina, an engineering manager at Autoworks’ headquarters, had a team of engineers that she led in Michigan. The team would regularly send some of their tasks to be completed in Mexico, Australia, and India. The team was able to compare the behaviors of subsidiary employees in all three locations. As Gina recounted: I needed to bring in someone to help on my team. Bill in Australia was always willing to come in at odd hours and once he even called in from the hospital. I remember that. It was like this guy is dependable. Of course I told him he shouldn’t have called in. But, you know, that stuck. That was very different when I was thinking about having Javier from Mexico on the team and he was like always telling me he had to leave to go do something. He made Bill look like an even better choice. (Gina, Autoworks) Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS Gina’s penchant for comparison was common among headquarters managers. Several headquarters managers from both SunTech and Autoworks also discussed how they were looking for subsidiary employees who were committed to work hard on their projects and the best way to determine commitment was by comparing behaviors among them, as this senior manager at SunTech, Ruben, remarked: “Whenever I have meetings with my team, I am on the lookout for people who don’t have their videos on. Then, at some point I’ll start asking them some random questions just to make sure they are actually listening . . . I think video is a great way of showing your colleagues that you are engaged, I always appreciate it when they have their video on.” The explicit comparison among employees increased the salience of even basic behavioral changes. Another manager from SunTech, Andrew, explained how seeing which employees were willing to endure some level of personal inconveniences for their work and which ones were not helped to make salient which employees were committed: “Yeah, I’m annoyed when I see that people are not there when I need them. I mean, I understand—I don’t enjoy spending my Friday nights in meetings either, but they should also understand I don’t set them up for fun. So, if they are not there, I will just think they don’t care about the project . . . It doesn’t take long for me to realize who you can count on—and it’s usually the guys who are always there. Those are the guys you want to work with long term, and the ones you want to help.” Implicit in this comparison was the idea of cost. According to Andrew, what separated subsidiary employees who were committed from those who were not was whether someone was willing to pay the price for their commitment by extending the work day to get the job done. An Autoworks’ headquarters manager, Mike, was more explicit about the function of perceived cost in making comparative assessments of commitment, saying: “ It’s not like you want people to have to come in the middle of the night or anything. But sometimes you’ll schedule a meeting with India like right at the end of their workday and someone will tell you that they will stay late. I know if they do that they’re gonna miss their bus, and the next one won’t come for three more hours. So you have to give them respect for doing that kind of thing.” Across both companies, headquarters managers frequently commented that they came to view subsidiary employees as committed to their work when they saw them take on tasks or responsibilities that incited personal inconvenience and when they could feel their presence pervasively despite the fact that they worked in different offices. Phase 2: Die Trying As a result of their interpretation of the headquarters signals as expectations of continuous commitment, 563 subsidiary employees kept reproducing the same behaviors over and over again, reasoning that their signals were effective and they were indeed getting noticed by headquarters. But the need to continually be available when needed (to continue to signal commitment) took its toll on them. Regularly canceling personal activities in the evening and missing important events amounted to more than commitment demonstrated via availability—it was commitment demonstrated via sacrifice. Yet, although subsidiary employees felt that their continued conduct of behaviors that signaled commitment was a sacrifice, headquarters managers did not see the sacrifice. Instead, they kept interpreting behaviors that demonstrated availability as signals of commitment and seemed to not reflect on the fact that sacrificing personal time for work one time had a different impact and significance than doing it over and over again. At this stage in the process, we noticed there was a misalignment between the signals sent by subsidiaries and the ones interpreted by headquarters. We provide data on this misalignment below. Headquarters: Signal (Re)Production. For headquar- ters managers commitment to hard work was the baseline expected from everybody, while for subsidiary employees signaling commitment translated not only into hard work but also into sacrifice. Yet, again and again, what mattered for headquarters managers was that employees were willing to go the extra mile and show face. The effects of doing so over time did not concern them. At SunTech, an employee who had been recently promoted and moved to headquarters to take on a senior position not only praised the effectiveness of sending such signals in general but also commented on how sending such signals benefited him personally. It even seemed as though he was taking pleasure in encouraging subsidiary employees’ struggle to be noticed. He acknowledged that those practices were the ones that helped him boost his career, but he no longer remembered the personal inconveniences he had experienced alongside. Being on a project with headquarters will boost their career and will make them stand out in their local teams as well. They know it, and we know it—so they all try to get on one. I also did that, I worked really hard for it, and as you can see it worked [chuckles]. Now that I’m a manager I sometimes have fun looking at how they struggle to get here as well [chuckles] . . . I often tease them in meetings and ask unexpected questions to see if they are paying attention. (Ayaan, SunTech) Headquarters managers produced their signals by letting subsidiary employees know that if they wished to work on projects with them, they needed to show commitment. If the signal received from the Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work 564 subsidiaries matched or exceeded their expectations, they rewarded their efforts; otherwise, they reprimanded them. For example, one SunTech headquarters manager, Emily, recounted how she often praised employees who stayed up late for meetings, saying: “It doesn’t hurt to let them know you appreciate them . . . On the contrary—it makes them feel even more motivated.” Similarly, an Autoworks’ headquarters manager, Mike, told us how he empowered subsidiary employees who proved they were willing to go the extra mile and who were always there when he needed them by giving them extra responsibilities and by consulting them on new project ideas. He also mentioned that he sometimes traveled to subsidiaries nearby and invited committed employees out for lunch. He knew that display would boost their local standing with colleagues and maybe motivate others to do better and aim higher themselves. When the reverse was true, and employees were not doing their best, headquarters managers did not shy away from reprimanding them. One manager from SunTech’s headquarters, James, talked about how he called out employees who were not paying attention in meetings, noting: “I need them to do their best. If I catch them not paying attention when someone asks them a question, I will quickly call them out. That teaches them a lesson.” An Autoworks manager, Ram, talked about how when employees were not doing well enough, he would reiterate his expectations of commitment to them, first in a one-on-one meeting and then publicly. He also mentioned that past experience had taught him that calling out someone publicly is memorable for everyone else present. The evidence showed that subsidiary employees’ behaviors were indeed noticed by headquarters and that these behaviors helped them achieve their planned goal of getting better work. The data also showed that to get this better work in an environment where headquarters managers were making comparative assessments, subsidiary employees had to regularly engage in behaviors that produced signals of commitment. However, engaging in such behaviors over and over often also led to negative personal consequences. Subsidiary: Signal (Re)Interpretation and Reproduction. The signals received from headquarters allowed subsidiary employees to observe how commitment was noticed and lack of commitment was punished. They interpreted headquarters’ actions as proof that their signals were successful, which motivated them to keep doing the same behaviors that showed their commitment to hard work. Employees at subsidiaries recognized that headquarters managers were making comparisons among them. As a new employee from a SunTech California subsidiary described, the fact that his own behaviors were being interpreted as signals by Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS way of comparison with his colleagues’ behaviors was always top of mind and, in fact, it often motivated him to up his game: I don’t really care if I miss out on a night out with my friends. I know there will be others. But if I miss out on a meeting with my manager (from headquarters), and Jordan (a coworker at the subsidiary) will not, I know Jordan will be his first choice for the next project, not me. So I’d rather not take any chances. You can’t afford to miss out on things like that if you’re serious about wanting to move up. Because if you do, there’s always someone else there waiting to take your spot. (Peter, SunTech) Understanding that their behaviors were evaluated comparatively meant that subsidiary employees could not simply send a signal of commitment once and be done. Instead, they had to continually engage in behaviors that were more costly than the behaviors conducted by other subsidiary employees so that headquarters managers perceived them as committed employees. As an engineer at Autoworks’ Australia subsidiary, George, described: “It’s a long road, and you have to hustle the whole way. If you stop doing things that make you look like a rock star, then they’ll [headquarters managers] stop asking you to be on their team. It’s pretty simple.” We noticed how easy it was for subsidiary employees to enter the cycle that required them to continue producing signals of commitment over and over again. With each cycle, it was not so much that subsidiary employees created more presence or that they incurred more personal inconvenience but that they did so repeatedly. They could miss dinner with their family or a night out with their friends one time, but the fact that they were constantly missing those events was what ultimately created a feeling of sacrifice. Thus, the more times they went through the loop, the more their commitment became synonymous with sacrifice. As one of SunTech’s subsidiary employees from the Bay Area, Christian, recalled how his weekend was gone “again and again” because of work engagements: “I forgot the last time I went out with my friends on a Friday night. For some reason, I always end up with late night meetings on Fridays. Which also means I tend to be wasted on Saturday mornings, and Sundays I need to prepare for Mondays . . . And there goes my weekend, again and again.” To stay competitive, subsidiary employees had to consistently signal their commitment, which left them paying higher and higher prices for doing so over time. Because subsidiary employees were so busy with their routine product-development tasks, in order to engage in increasingly costly behaviors, they had to give something up. As the data showed, employees at subsidiary locations temporarily pushed off important Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS product-development tasks to perform behaviors they hoped would signal their commitment. However, product-development tasks had to get done, which forced employees to encroach on the time they dedicated to their personal lives to be able to complete them. Thus, the typical cost associated with trying to produce signals of commitment was paid out of the time and energy they would normally devote to their family and friends—and to themselves. As a senior network engineer at SunTech’s North Carolina subsidiary, Rob, lamented when reflecting on working hard to send the kinds of signals that would earn him better work: I have reached a point where I realize this is not going anywhere. I have spent my entire life in meetings, skipped lunches, skipped dinners with my friends, skipped exercising . . . I realized after some time my friends were not even calling me out anymore. I was close to my fifties, and I had no wife or kids—I was married to SunTech. That’s why I decided things can’t go on like that, so I decided to focus on me, instead of SunTech, and see how that works out. (Rob, SunTech) An engineer from Autoworks’ India subsidiary discussed having similar feelings about the difficulty of his job, attributing his feelings of sacrifice to the extra work he felt he had to do to signal his commitment to headquarters: I am always working late and showing up at all the meetings and it is very difficult. I do not see my family enough and my wife is telling me to get a new job. I might be thinking of doing that because I am tired and frustrated just to try to be working on the best projects. (Ritoban, Autoworks) Although they voiced concerns that the sacrifices they were making to be constantly committed were leaving them feeling extremely exhausted on their jobs, many subsidiary employees, especially more junior employees, believed that the need to engage in costly behaviors to signal commitment would be temporary and that they worked to steel themselves for a period to ride out the intense feelings of sacrifice they experienced. For example, Craig, a SunTech IT engineer, talked about his career strategy and what he was willing to sacrifice for it, emphasizing that it was just for “two more years”: “Yeah, it’s not ideal for my family, but they also know it’s not going to be forever. I just have to hang in here for two more years; then I’ll be a senior engineer. I know that’s how much it takes around here . . . Then I’ll take it easier.” Similarly, an engineer from Autoworks’ Australia subsidiary, Bill, noted that despite urging from his wife to quit his job because of his prolonged sacrifice of family time for work time, he was hoping to find a way to continue to be selected on headquarters projects while trying to regain happiness at work and in his life: “I am working 565 all the time. I am bending myself backwards to do things for them [headquarters]. I cannot keep it up. I miss dinner, and I miss my kids going to bed. It is really bad. Sometimes I think I’m losing it. My wife tells me to quit and get another job. I have been thinking about it. It is just hard to work for a company where you have to do so much to show other people your value when they are not there (physically) to see it.” The fact that headquarters managers determined whether a signal of commitment existed by comparing the behaviors of multiple subsidiary employees meant that subsidiary employees were compelled to produce costly behaviors to “win” the right to be viewed as “committed.” As one Autoworks employee from Sweden, Kai, observed, the need to continuously produce signals of commitment meant that he had to “ratchet up” his behaviors over time. Consequently, subsidiary employees who were able to consistently signal their commitment were finding themselves paying higher and higher prices for doing so over time. Because the main currency with which the cost of signal production could be paid was one’s personal life, employees at both companies often commented on the continuous sacrifices they were making and how that they felt exhausted and were either becoming or had become exhausted. Across both companies, headquarters and subsidiary employees alike also told stories of colleagues who had spent so much time trying to please headquarters until they reached exhaustion. Headquarters: Signal Reinterpretation. Our data show that there is no difference in how headquarters interpreted the signals over time. What we noticed was that headquarters constantly interpreted the signals produced by subsidiaries as commitment via availability. As a result, their signal back to subsidiaries was always that of the expectation of commitment. The words of this manager from SunTech’s headquarters talking about how he routinely checked in on subsidiary employees who were working on his projects or on related projects to see whether they were making themselves available echoed perfectly with the majority of our informants: I am perfectly okay with people working from wherever they want, as long as they are available when they are needed, and they meet their milestones . . . Sometimes I ping them just to get a feeling of what they are doing and to let them know I’m here if they need me. I am also available for them at any time for any quick questions and they know it. (Thomas, SunTech) One thing that’s really important is to make sure that you’ve got the right kind of people working for you when they are in other parts of the world. So you just want to know that they can be there when you need them. So that’s what I’m constantly checking for. And Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work 566 you do lot of little things, you know, to see that. You just want to know that they are available for you at all times. (Jim, Autoworks) One senior employee from SunTech remarked on the signaling process’ effects for employees, especially on the effects it had on young employees’ lives, when they worked constantly to signal their commitment: What people don’t realize is that this is not a temporary thing. I see a lot of young people getting trapped into this career mirage. They think it’s just until they get some tenure, then they think it’s just until they get another promotion, then they want to move to headquarters, and it just goes on like that. And at the end of the day they forget to live, they forget there is life outside work. It’s really sad. (David, SunTech) However, this was the exception from the general rule. Everyone else’s interpretation matched the thoroughly described “Headquarters: Signal Interpretation” in phase one and resonated with the thoughts of most of the managers in our study. Phase 3: Revival Because these signals were costly, they produced the expected rewards. But they also took a cumulative toll on the employees who produced them. More than 90% of employees that we interviewed had either ended their quest for better work or were planning to end it soon because the sacrifices they had to incur to signal their commitment were just too great. These employees took one of three paths to exit the signaling process. They either “settled,” as many termed it, for the work that was available in the subsidiary and no longer tried to acquire better work from headquarters; they moved to another team within the subsidiary that they felt would give them more satisfying work conditions and a better working environment, even though the work on that team was not better work; or they left the company, citing that they felt burned out by their work. There were only a handful of employees for whom the exit meant moving to headquarters as a result of a promotion and so getting the better work for which they had hoped. Some employees who left the company permanently found employment in other companies that they hoped would provide better work without the costs incurred of signaling to headquarters, whereas others simply left the workforce in frustration. No matter what the exit path, subsidiary employees noted that they were hoping for a revival of their personal lives and, in some cases, their spirits. Subsidiary: Exit. Subsidiary employees entered the third phase of the signaling process after having gone through the vicious cycle in phase two several times. By that time, subsidiary employees’ signals of commitment via availability had already turned into sacrifice. Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS Thus, moving away from stage two often came with a sense of taking control of one’s life either personally, placing health and social activities on the first place, or career-wise, by being promoted and moving to headquarters. In some of cases, subsidiary employees decided to settle for their current position, disregarding their initial ambitions of getting better work rather than to continue sacrificing any more personal time for work. As one SunTech employee, Rob, sadly remarked: “I reached a point where I realized this was not going anywhere . . . I was close to my fifties, and I had no wife or kids—I was married to SunTech. That’s why I decided things couldn’t go on like that, so I decided to focus on me, instead of SunTech, and see how that works out [i.e., to settle].” An Autoworks engineer from a German subsidiary similarly concluded: All the things I do to show them [colleagues at headquarters] that I am just as good of a worker as they are takes a toll. I worked in a company that was just here in Germany before and I did not have to do all that. I know it is because we are not the center of the company so they do not think we are as capable. So, we have to show them, but it is just too hard to do all the time. In the end, I have decided to just stop. I know I will not get good projects or get promoted as fast, but you cannot just be burned out all the time. That is bad. (Sven, Autoworks) Another reason behind subsidiary employees’ decisions to settle for their current position was that they were no longer motivated to pursue any goals or simply because they had become detached from their jobs. As one manager at Autoworks in Sweden commented, the colleagues he knew who had become fatigued had begun to “phone in” their work—an American colloquialism indicating that they were at minimal levels of engagement in the workplace. Disengagement with job duties was thus common, as one SunTech subsidiary employee, Alex, remarked: “You keep going, but for how long? At one point you are there, but not really there. Do you know what I mean? You are just like a robot. You don’t care about your job anymore; you just care about getting out of the job.” A second way of exiting the process was by moving to another project locally or moving to headquarters. When talking about his decision to transfer to another team, an engineer at SunTech’s North Carolina subsidiary, Kelsey, lamented about the number of hours he had put in with the company and how relieved he was to finally put an end to so much sacrifice and to be moving to another team: “I’ve put in more hours for this company than for myself. Luckily, it’s almost over now. I’m transitioning to another team next month.” On the opposite spectrum, another SunTech employee from a California subsidiary, Amanda, was happily talking about her success and how her work was finally Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS paying off because she would soon be moving to headquarters to work on a new project: “It’s all working out for me. I’m moving to headquarters end of next month. All this hard work is finally paying off.” Another way of exiting the signaling process was by leaving the company either because of retirement or because of quitting. An engineer at Autoworks’ India subsidiary, Nilesh, recalled about one of his close work colleagues: “He worked so hard and got everything that he wanted, but it almost killed him to get it, and he could not take it anymore, so he quit.” Similarly, an engineer from SunTech’s North Carolina subsidiary, Karthik, talked about how one his friends working for the same company had recently quit because he had become overworked, saying: “A friend of mine quit last month. He couldn’t take it anymore. And I have to tell you—that thought crossed my mind several times as well!” With the exception of the few subsidiary employees who exited the signaling process after getting the expected better work and moved to headquarters, everyone who left the process did so hoping for a revival of their own lives. Thus, the search for better work ended with hopes for a “better life,” where repeated sacrifice would not be the necessary cost for career advancement. Discussion The central finding of this study calls for a slight revision of the popular expression, “Get noticed or die trying.” Employees at subsidiary locations who are geographically distributed from headquarters have difficulty engaging in face time with the colleagues who can give them access to high-quality projects and career advancement. Although physical face time may not be an available vehicle through which to demonstrate one’s commitment, distributed workers can change their behaviors in ways that are effective at demonstrating it at a distance. Because multiple employees at subsidiary locations are competing for better work from headquarters, headquarters managers have to make comparisons among them about who they feel is most committed. To win better work (and, importantly, to keep winning it over time), subsidiary employees continue to incur personal inconveniences and be present to coworkers at headquarters. Doing this work again and again takes its toll on subsidiary employees: it is annoying to miss a family obligation once to stay late at work, but it is a sacrifice to consistently miss family obligations. Surprisingly, our data showed that although subsidiary employees felt the sacrifice of continually producing signals, employees at company headquarters failed to recognize the sacrifices they were making and continued to send their own signals that they expected to see continued commitment from subsidiary employees for them to continue 567 receiving better work. Because headquarters managers did not recognize the sacrifices felt by subsidiary employees, they did not change their behavior, and many subsidiary employees felt caught in a vicious cycle that gave them great distress. Thus, our data show that employees in distributed work arrangements often, to revise the expression, nearly die trying to get noticed. Although we documented a few cases in which subsidiary employees moved to headquarters and did not need to continue signaling their commitment in the absence of face time, most informants eventually chose to quit sending signals of commitment, which meant that they actually reduced their commitment to the organization in various ways. These findings produce a model of the signaling process to get better work in distributed organizations, which we depict in Figure 1. Although the specific actions taken by informants in our study (represented by the ovals in Figure 1) may be particular to the companies we researched, those specific actions constitute aggregate theoretical categories (represented by the rectangles in Figure 1) that serve as broader building blocks for a theory of signaling in distributed work contexts. Importantly, our model shows how signals can become misaligned between sender and receiver such that receivers are not understanding the messages senders wish to communicate. When such misalignment occurs, it can lead to a cycle of signaling that has adverse effects on the individuals involved and the system as a whole. This emerging framework casts signaling as both a positive and potentially destructive practice in globally distributed organizations. Below we discuss several ways in which our findings, and the model they produced, contribute to theory on work in distributed organizations, and we discuss reasons why signal misalignments may occur and persist over time. Contribution to the Literature on Face Time in Distributed Work Research suggests that managers interpret face time in the office as a signal of commitment, and employees who are seen to be committed are given numerous rewards (Elsbach et al. 2010, Elsbach and Cable 2012, O’Neill 2012, Pedersen 2015). We began this study asking how employees at subsidiary locations who are not able to engage in face time because they are not physically copresent with managers might try to find other ways of signaling their commitment. The findings showed specific behavioral changes made by subsidiary employees that headquarters managers interpreted as signals of commitment. The data suggest that managers who came to view subsidiary employees as committed bestowed on them the types of rewards that the literature suggests are associated with displays of face time in the office. This finding is noteworthy because it suggests that making certain behavioral Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work 568 changes visible in distributed work settings may be an effective substitute for “being there” physically and engaging in face time. Our focus on distributed work arrangements revealed a mechanism linking face time and interpretations of commitment that is not mentioned in the existing literature on face time: comparison. Headquarters managers in our study appeared more likely to interpret behavioral changes as signals of commitment when they compared the performance of those behaviors across a number of colleagues. For example, headquarters managers were not always sure whether incurring personal inconvenience was really all that inconvenient until they compared the behaviors of multiple employees. One employee might indicate that he was missing a date with friends to work late, whereas another might indicate that he was missing a child’s birthday. In the comparison between these two “inconveniences,” managers began to form interpretations of what they felt really constituted an inconvenience and what did not. Put in the language of signaling theory, one behavior (missing a birthday) appeared more costly than another (missing a date with friends), and the costlier behavior became the stronger signal. Thus, we add to discussions of face time the ideas of comparison and cost, which help to explain why variance exists in translating face time into its various rewards. Comparison and cost are certainly not specific to our study of distributed work contexts. Managers in any setting are likely to make comparisons among employees when evaluating commitment via the performance of face time. This insight feeds into a second contribution of our work to discussions of face time: its dark side. Although some studies have explored how engaging in face time can backfire such that observers find employees who do it disingenuous or obsequious (Watson 1994, Worrall et al. 2000), most studies of face time have explored the positive benefits that accrue to employees who participate in it (Kossek and Van Dyne 2008, Elsbach and Cable 2012, O’Neill 2012). We found evidence of these positive benefits in our study—namely, receipt of better work, promotions, and the occasional transfer to headquarters—but we also discovered that employees made numerous personal sacrifices to engage in behaviors that signaled their commitment. Employees were often physically exhausted from working long days and late into the night, they were frustrated because they had to constantly demonstrate their presence in meetings and calls, and they felt ineffective because they had little control over their own days as they bent their schedules to the whims of people at headquarters. As our findings show, these feelings of exhaustion, lack of control, and ineffectiveness were made manifest as subsidiary employees were pushed through the vicious cycle of signaling their commitment, receiving signals validating the need for their Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS commitment from headquarters, and then repeating the behaviors that signaled commitment so often that it became a sacrifice. Although signaling often helped subsidiary employees get what they wanted, to keep it meant that they had to continue producing signals in ways that they found detrimental to their own wellbeing over the long term. The extra work we have identified that distributed employees do to signal their commitment adds clarity to speculations made by Elsbach et al. (2010) that distributed workers might be disadvantaged compared with colocated workers in their ability to achieve the positive benefits of face time. Our findings showed that distributed employees were able—through signaling behaviors—to demonstrate their commitment and get better work, but they had to engage in extreme behaviors that were personally costly to produce those benefits. Thus, our study contributes by helping to articulate how and why distributed workers may have a more complicated relationship with face time than employees who work in an office colocated with their managers. Our study also contributed to the development of theories of face time in distributed settings by showing how there is little implicit face time in distributed environments compared with colocated environments (Elsbach et al. 2010). In distributed environments, face time needs to be explicit for it to be recognized, and that requires more work on behalf of the signalers. Contribution to Studies of Signaling in Distributed Work Over the last three decades, organizational researchers have become increasingly interested in understanding the role of signals in organizations. But as the extensive review of Connelly et al. (2011, pp. 47–51) demonstrates, nearly all organizational studies of signaling have focused on how the firm signals its value to shareholders, investors, or potential investors. This study employs signaling theory at the individual level of analysis, rather than the firm level, by examining how employees within the organizations create signals for their colleagues. Only two studies have looked explicitly at how employees within organizations send signals (Ryan et al. 2000, Hochwarter et al. 2007), and both studies have focused on how employees use signals to achieve greater or lesser fit with the expectations of their colleagues. As a consequence, organizational theorists know very little about the role that signals play in organizational dynamics broadly and in globally distributed work arrangements more specifically. Further, studies at the firm level have focused on signals such as press releases (Carter 2006), board prestige (Certo 2003), top management team composition (Higgins and Gulati 2006), and CEO background (Zhang and Wiersema 2009) that lack specific Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS behavioral underpinnings. Our findings demonstrate that people try to produce and sustain signals by conducting specific behaviors. In other words, signals do not exist apart from the behaviors through which they are enacted. Our identification of these behaviors showcases two important points. First, behaviors and signals are tightly linked. This insight adds to theory on signaling within organizations by demonstrating the importance of their behavioral moorings. Even though signalers may hope to communicate a particular signal, they only have behaviors at their disposal with which to communicate that signal. Receivers of a signal actually enact the signal as they infer it from behaviors they observe. In other words, receivers do not see signals; they see behaviors that they then interpret as signals of various types. Consequently, the major tool that signalers have at their disposal to control the interpretation made by the signal is cost. The more the receiver recognizes that the behavior the signaler conducted was costly, the more likely the receiver is to interpret that behavior as a signal. A surprising finding in our study was that even though receivers could interpret signals that subsidiary employees sent as costly, they seemed unable to notice the magnitude of the cost. Specifically, headquarters managers, who held the power to make job assignments such that subsidiary employees could get better work, failed to recognize the sacrifice those subsidiary employees were making to continually signal their commitment. They noticed the behaviors such as subsidiary employees making themselves available to help at the last minute or volunteering to do extra work that generated a signal of commitment, but they seemingly ignored, or failed to notice, that it was very difficult for subsidiary employees to continually reproduce those behaviors. As field researchers, we were surprised that headquarters managers failed to see the sacrifice that subsidiary employees made when they were otherwise observant of the signals employees were sending. Construal level theory (Trope and Liberman 2003) offers one lens by which to interpret this finding. Construal level theory posits that there is a direct link between one’s construal level and one’s position of power (Lee and Tiedens 2001, Overbeck and Park 2001), as well as the existence of a relation between psychological distance and the extent to which people’s thinking is abstract or concrete (Trope and Liberman 2010). In other words, the greater a person’s psychological distance from an event (or object or another person), the more likely they are to represent that event at a higher level—for example, by focusing on the general features that communicate its core. Similarly, the closer a person is to an event (or object or another person), the more likely he or she is to construe that event by focusing on its contextual characteristics. For the distributed work context, this means that “group 569 members who are separated by geography are likely to construe their distant group members at a higher, more abstract level” (Wilson et al. 2013, p. 631). High-level construals are “abstract, schematic and decontextualized representations that extract the gist from the available information” (Liberman and Trope 2008, p. 1202), which lead to interpretations that focus more on why, and less on how, an action is performed (Liberman and Trope 1998). On the opposite end, lower-level construals are concrete and contextualized representations, meaning that the focus is changed from how something was done to why it was done (Eyal and Liberman 2012). For example, a high-level construal representation made by a headquarters manager would use relatively abstract personality traits to refer to a subsidiary employee’s action (e.g., “Juan is committed”), whereas a low-level construal of the same action seen by a subsidiary employee would refer to it in more concrete terms (e.g., “Juan attends every meeting regardless of the time in the day”). Research on construal level theory also documents that people in positions of power tend to be associated with more abstract thinking, focusing on the essentials and using higher-level categorizations to refer to actions, compared with people in low-power positions (Smith and Trope 2006). Smith and Trope (2006) write that “power is fundamentally linked to abstract thinking” (p. 578). They propose that to be able to see the overall picture and follow one’s ambitions are both prerequisites for obtaining power as well as requirements for holding on to it. These underpinnings of construal level theory may help explain why headquarter employees could interpret certain behaviors as a signal of commitment but failed to see that the continual production of those behaviors was a difficult sacrifice for subsidiary employees. In their position of relative power, headquarter employees had high construal levels and, consequently, failed to see that the very repetition of behavior they expected could be damaging for subsidiary employees. In other words, they saw commitment in the abstract but not how occasional behaviors that subsidiary employees engaged in to make themselves available gave way to more continuously enacted behaviors of availability that were indeed sacrifices. Construal level also may have affected subsidiary employees. From their lower level of construal, subsidiary employees seemed to think that people they interacted with at headquarters could see the details of their predicaments and would, for example, piece together the fact that they were consistently coming home from work at a late hour. Moreover, because of their psychological proximity to other subsidiary employees (Dhar and Kim 2007; Wilson et al. 2008, 2013), they noticed the concrete actions that their local coworkers were taking to get noticed by headquarters and reacted to them by increasing the intensity of their own behaviors. Cristea and Leonardi: Signals and Sacrifice in Distributed Work 570 The different construal levels lead to a misalignment between how subsidiary employees interpreted headquarters actions and how headquarters managers interpreted subsidiary employees’ actions in return. And as indicated in our model, this misalignment of signals caught subsidiary employees in a vicious cycle that typically ended only when they were able to exit the signaling process by moving to a different team at their local site (or headquarters), settling for working in an environment devoid of better work, or leaving the company. These findings point to the important role that power can play in the production and interpretation of signals and for the overall reproduction of behavior in an organization. Power asymmetries are very common in distributed work arrangements (Metiu 2006, Levina and Vaast 2008, Hinds et al. 2015). Therefore, we suspect that it would be quite common for the vicious cycle of signal misalignment to occur in distributed work settings and that it might be more difficult to correct than in face-to-face settings. In faceto-face settings, the close psychological proximity to relevant people and their behaviors could lessen the high-level construals specific to positions of power (Smith and Trope 2006, Dhar and Kim 2007). Limitations and Implications for Future Research Like all studies, ours is not without limitations. First, our research focuses on the effect of managers’ behavior on subsidiary employees. Future work could focus more closely on the motivations behind the managers’ behaviors. Our research focuses on the subsidiary employees’ path to get better work from headquarters. We show the slippery slope from commitment to sacrifice. Future researchers could try to better understand the driving forces behind subsidiary employees’ behavioral responses not only to headquarters managers but also to each other’s actions. Second, although we interviewed many headquarters managers, only a few had previously been subsidiary employees. It would be useful to investigate how managers who were former subsidiary employees themselves become immune to recognizing the sacrifices their distributed team members make to get noticed and to understand the reasons behind their apparent “forgetfulness” of the pain caused by the sacrifices they had once incurred as well. Two bodies of research point to ways to do such study. Our concept of sacrifice resonates with the way studies on work/family conflict process it (Greenhaus and Beutell 1985, Frone et al. 1992). However, to the best of our knowledge, the work/family conflict literature rarely takes workers’ distribution into account. Further, this stream of research focuses on human resources practices. Interestingly, our research shows no evidence of employees bringing up their feelings of sacrifice with human resources (HR). On the contrary, through the internal collaboration report released by the HR Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 552–572, © 2019 INFORMS department of one of the companies, employees seemed to be encouraged to engage in practices that would ensure that they get noticed in the office. Future research could explore why employees’ voices are not heard and their sacrifices remain unnoticed by HR. Second, studies on the “ideal worker” image or the devotion to work suggest that people use different strategies to show how they conform to the ideal identity of a committed worker, such as embracing, passing, and revealing (Reid 2015). While such studies examine workers’ identities at one point in time, our study had questions aimed at capturing employees’ experiences over time. We believe it would be valuable for future researches to also explore the process of getting noticed or die trying over time and triangulate it with employee internal movement and turnover data, as well as data on employees’ well-being. Conclusion One key ingredient of successful distributed work arrangements is ensuring that subsidiary employees feel challenged and engaged in work that captures their interest (Levina and Vaast 2008, Bailey and Leonardi 2015, Mattarelli and Tagliaventi 2015). Participants in our study, and in many other distributed work contexts, challenge the notion that engagement is linked to the receipt of better work. Our study showed that subsidiary employees are often successful at attracting better work if they can overcome the absence of face time by sending signals that they are committed to their organization and to doing a good job. But because distributed work arrangements are competitive signaling environments, subsidiary employees must continually increase the costly behaviors that generate signals of better work, and such increases often result in personal sacrifices that go unnoticed by headquarters. By exposing this dynamic, we hope that our study is a significant step forward in helping to design distributed work arrangements that are healthy for employees and organizations alike. Acknowledgments For insightful feedback on earlier drafts of this manuscript, the authors thank Steve Barley, Dorthe Døjbak Håkonsson, and Børge Obel, the research groups at Technology Management Program (TMP) and ICOA, as well as the TMP visiting scholars. 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