Article
Understanding the Phoenix Phenomenon:
Can a Project Be Both a Failure and
a Success?
Christophe Midler1
Project Management Journal
2024, Vol. 55(2) 187–204
© 2023 Project Management Institute, Inc.
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DOI: 10.1177/87569728231171825
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and Marc Alochet1
Abstract
While the concept of project success remains largely open nowadays, we introduce here the Phoenix phenomenon, namely a
project being both a success and a failure. Our analysis of an automotive vanguard project exhibits key characteristics of a
Phoenix phenomenon: the very innovative and ambitious nature of the project; a project management approach that hybridizes
causal innovative project development and effectual approaches; the strategic and operational capacity of the company to recover
and valorize after the initial failure; and the learnings from and the achievements of the project in renewed scenarios. We conclude that project evaluation must now combine retrospective and prospective assessments methods to evaluate both achieved
outcomes and potentialities of a project.
Keywords
project evaluation, success and failure, innovative development, effectual approach, causal approach, Phoenix phenomenon,
serendipity, exaptation process, prospective assessment, retrospective assessment
Introduction
Is this project a success or a failure? This question has fueled
research in the field of project management for decades.
Traditionally, the answer is obtained by comparing the
results of the project with the quality, cost, and development
deadline objectives that were assigned to it at the beginning.
Any discrepancy is then a sign of failure, which fits well with
the primary mindset of project management: “get the things
done.”
But this vision has also been debated for a long time, because
some projects that had led to major deviations from the initial
targets have turned out to bring major benefits afterward. In
the field of megaprojects, the Suez Canal, the Channel Tunnel,
and the Sydney Opera House are emblematic cases of major deviations on the classic criteria of time and cost (Flyvbjerg, 2014).
Moreover, many authors discuss these evaluations in the name
of the narrowness of the reference frame for the evaluation of
such projects with broad socioeconomic issues (Lehtonen et al.,
2017). In the field of new product development, we can cite the
case of the drug Viagra®, for years a cash cow for the biopharmaceutical firm Pfizer, but once a failure in its primary objective to
address angina disease (Goldstein et al., 2019). Another wellknown example is the 3M Post-it® Note, based on the deceptive
technological project of “the glue that did not glue” (Garud
et al., 2018, p. 130). The project experimented a long and
chaotic path from scientific junk to become one of the firm’s bestsellers (Garud et al., 2018; Nayak & Ketteringham, 1986).
In short, some projects can paradoxically be both a failure
and a success. Of course, this ambivalent judgment may be due
to a difference in evaluation methods: the project can then be a
success according to certain criteria and a failure according to
others. This is often the case with megaprojects where the societal
benefits are positive, while the results on traditional project evaluation criteria are often bad or even catastrophic. But the resolution
of the failure–success enigma is less obvious when there is no such
heterogeneity in evaluation criteria.
This article addresses such a phenomenon, which we call the
Phoenix-type project and characterize as follows:
• A Phoenix-type project is a project that fails in its ability
to achieve the goals initially given.
• It is a project that continues beyond this failure to achieve
a result that proves, ex post, to be a success.
• Finally, it is a project whose final success could not have
been envisaged without the failure of the objective defined
ex ante. This third characteristic is important, because it
indicates that the trajectory leading to success is not the
1
I3-CRG, Ecole Polytechnique, CNRS, Institut Polytechnique de Paris,
Palaiseau France
Corresponding Author:
Christophe Midler, I3-CRG, Ecole Polytechnique, CNRS, Institut
Polytechnique de Paris, Palaiseau France.
Email: Christophe.midler@polytechnique.edu
188
Project Management Journal 55(2)
simple correction of a wrong initial objective or insufficient
management performance as many ex-post judgments might
conclude.
Although other streams of literature, such as those related to the
sociology of science or entrepreneurship, have already made
significant contributions to understanding situations where the
application of processes does not lead to the achievement of
expected results, we affirm that there is still work to be done
to understand these situations, which are becoming more and
more important in the management of contemporary projects.
Firstly, because such projects, which combine the notions of
failure and rebirth—as a necessary condition for achieving ultimate success— are not as exceptional as that. Then, because
knowing how to reuse the strengths of previous failures
becomes essential as the instability of the contexts of innovation
projects increases, while at the same time resources are becoming increasingly rare and expensive.
Consequently, our intention is to deepen our knowledge of
these phenomena and thus contribute to the research stream
of project management by addressing two research questions:
RQ1: How can we characterize the trajectory of a Phoenix-type
project?
RQ2: Can we propose a theory to anticipate ex ante that a
project may have a Phoenix destiny?
The case we study here is the development of an automobile
product, which bore the code name “KZE” and was developed
in collaboration among three automakers. This project is innovative as much by its functional and technological content as by
the novel and uncertain character of the market for which it is
intended. It is a vanguard project (Brady & Davies, 2004) and
its fate is typical of a Phoenix phenomenon.
This article is organized in five sections. The first section
introduces the theoretical context of processes whose application
does not produce the expected results and of project evaluation.
It also specifies the research gap and our research questions.
The second section is devoted to research design and methodology. We explain how we selected our case, introduce the
research context, and present the data collection process. We
also introduce the analytical framework we have defined to
grasp the key elements of the project trajectory and to allow
the analysis of its dynamics.
In the third section, we analyze the dynamics of the project
by highlighting the tension between the initial objectives and
the major events opposing their realization, some of which
are in the realm of classic risk management, others unforeseeable. We show that, depending on when we stop the clock to
evaluate this project, it appears as a success, then a failure in
its initial market; finally, in a third time, it experiences a
rebirth and impressive success in another market and leads.
Such a trajectory makes this case an emblematic example of
Phoenix failure and rebirth trajectory.
In the fourth section, we use lessons learned from the analysis of the KZE project. We characterize an ex-post pattern of
the trajectory of a Phoenix-type project and propose an
ex-ante identification of potential candidates for the
Phoenix-type project. Finally, we draw out more general
lessons about the theory and practice of project evaluation.
Because it makes Phoenix-type projects appear to be sunk
costs, the standard evaluation practice of comparing the
outcome at the end date with the original goal is no longer
appropriate. The case study suggests to combine retrospective
and prospective approaches, the latter allowing for the evaluation of opportunities and assets created during the project.
Finally, we summarize the contributions of this exploratory
case research to the stream of project management research
and identify its limitations and prospects for future research
they call for.
Theoretical Background
“A Phoenix is an imaginary bird which, according to ancient
stories, burns itself to ashes every five hundred years and is
then born again” (Collins English Dictionary). We use this metaphor here to name projects that fail to achieve the goal
assigned to them at the beginning and which, beyond this
failure, “rise from their ashes” to reach a final success.
Such a definition refers, first of all, to research already
carried out to analyze why the application of processes does
not lead to obtaining the expected results. It also calls for a conceptual clarification of project evaluation, which is the basis of
the notions of success and failure as well as of the paradox
inherent in the attribution, to the same project, of the qualifiers
of success and failure.
The field of scientific research provides multiple examples
where important discovery did not result directly from processes aimed at achieving the targeted problem. The term “serendipity,” coined by Merton and Barber (2004), is generally
used to describe those processes where the positive and unexpected productions of the explorations are not the results of
the intentions explicitly aimed by the scientists. To illustrate
the concept of serendipity, we summarize the emblematic
example of the Viagra® drug. Since 1986, Pfizer’s cardiovascular R&D group had been focusing on treatments for angina, and
in 1993 the compound (sildenafil citrate) did not demonstrate
increased efficacy compared to known treatments. As penile
erection was also noted as a side effect, two scientists made
the assumption that the drug could have an effect on arterial
dilatation that could be required for erections to occur, which
was effectively demonstrated shortly after. “Scientists converted what appeared to be an unremarkable drug for angina
into a successful treatment for a completely unexpected condition, resulting in the serendipitous history of sildenafil
(Goldstein et al., 2019, p. 118).”
Elaborating on the rich case base developed by Merton and
Barber (2004), Yaqub (2018) shows the generality of the phenomenon revealed by numerous cases in all areas of physical
Midler and Alochet
and natural sciences. He also proposes a taxonomy to characterize different configurations of serendipity by drawing a relationship between the research process (is the research finalized or
not by a target objective?) and the phenomenon of serendipity
(is the result a solution to the problem posed or not?). The
case of non-finalized research clearly differs from the problems
studied in the field of project management. In the case of
research with a target objective, the author distinguishes
between cases where the solution discovered responds to the
problem sought (“Mertonnian serendipity”) and those where
the discovery appears to be a solution to a problem different
from the one studied by the researcher (“Walpolian serendipity”).
Yaqub insists on the importance of four mechanisms at the
origin of the serendipity phenomenon: (1) the existence of a preexisting theoretical framework, which will allow the unexpected discovery to be revealed as an interesting deviation
from existing knowledge; (2) the individual skills of scientists,
their capacity for observation and for innovation in instrumentation; (3) the tolerance of error, which often plays an important
role in the discovery of unexpected results; and, (4) the importance of scientific networks, which are as necessary to recognizing the interest of an unexpected discovery as to asserting its
validity in the scientific field.
Another relevant contribution for our purpose is the exaptation process, a complementary notion to the serendipity phenomenon, characterized by Garud et al. (2018). Analyzing the
context of science-based innovation projects, they propose a
theory by which the result of a scientific discovery can find
an unanticipated functionality that will give the project its
value for users. The Post-it® Note, one of 3M’s flagship products, is a very good example of the application of the “exaptation process” that could follow a serendipitous event. In their
paper, Garud et al. analyze the complex organizational processes and arrangement that transformed a valueless scientific
discovery of “a glue that did not glue” (Garud et al., 2018,
p. 130) into the market jackpot of the 3M Post-it® Note:
(1) the importance of narratives to explore and communicate
on new potential valuable usages; and (2) the existence of communication platforms, and forums where innovation could circulate in a perennial way inside the organization to allow the
meeting between an offer formulated in an open way and a specific
need. The exaptation process appears as the exact contrary of the
traditional definition of projects: a solution in search of a problem
to be solved as opposed to the traditional problem-solving characterization of projects: the key bottleneck is not the development of
a new offer but the search for a value niche for an existing one.
Therefore, serendipity and exaptation theories could be
useful sources of inspiration to explain the conditions of the
appearance of Phoenix-like projects.
Nevertheless, it should be remembered what the differences
are between scientific exploration and project management
domains. At the epistemological level, the scientist seeks to discover the laws of a world that are external to them, whereas
project management—a science of the artificial (Simon, 1969)
—seeks to construct artifacts that respond to the identified
189
problems it seeks to solve. The question of the coherence
between result and target is thus both much more decisive
and, to some extent, easier because the project reframes, if necessary, a world adapted to its aims, according to Donald
A. Schon’s brilliant metaphor of design activities as “reflective
conversations with the situation” (1987, p. 132). Therefore, the
existence of the phenomenon of Phoenix projects in the field of
projects is, a priori, more surprising than the phenomenon of
serendipity in the field of natural sciences.
At the organizational and social levels, the world of scientific
research and that of projects are two fields of action whose professional structures have been and still are different, even if for
several decades the world of science has appropriated the techniques and methods of project management to implement
scientific programs mobilizing larger and larger teams and
increasingly heavy investments.1 In short, projects, in technological and business contexts, have been managed for decades
to ensure this coherence between initial intentions and final
results, whereas the legitimacy of projects as a relevant tool
to manage scientific activity has long remained, until today, a
widely debated question (Laillier & Topalov, 2022).
The Phoenix phenomenon thus appears as a deviation from
the best practices often searched for in the field of project management. This was already noted by Lenfle in his analysis of
strange projects (2008, 2016) for which the comparison with
a precise target value defined ex ante is clearly insufficient to
evaluate success or failure.
The entrepreneurship literature informs us about another
context where the result of innovative dynamics often deviates
from the goal set in the initial trajectory. The phenomenon highlighted here is the pivot of start-ups, where the very definition of
the intended target is an integral part of the learning process
(Ries, 2011). The literature has identified this form of management under the term effectual logic in the field of entrepreneurship (Huff, 2016; Sarasvathy, 2001; Silberzahn, 2014).
This logic, which consists of continuously analyzing the firm
situation in order to adapt its trajectory, contradicts the causal
way of managing projects, which is to define ex ante a desirable
goal and mobilize the resources and processes necessary to
achieve it. Effectuation can be summarized as follows: (1) an
original combination of successive short-term steps to achieve
learning that is by its very nature uncertain; (2) caution in monitoring these trajectories based on the economic use of available
resources; (3) focus on admissible costs and not on maximization of value; and (4), a capacity for deviation of the target that
allows for the avoidance of an insurmountable obstacle when it
arises. The effectual concept can therefore also be a source of
inspiration for understanding the Phoenix project phenomenon.
However, here again, the differences between project
management and entrepreneurship must be highlighted.
Entrepreneurship addresses start-up trajectory, which generally
encompasses several successive projects, rather than the management of a single project. More conceptually, Huff (2016)
pointed out that the effectual and causal approaches involve
logical and pragmatic contradictions. This ability to maintain
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these two antagonistic behaviors within the same project in the
face of hazards is still an essential management dilemma.
If sociology of science and entrepreneurship literatures can
be fruitful sources of inspirations to understanding the
Phoenix phenomenon in the project management field, it is
also necessary to come back to the notions of success and
failure defined in project management theory.
For most of the (ancient) project management literature, the
notion of success or failure is simple: whether or not the project
succeeds in meeting the objectives set at the outset, according to
the golden triangle encompassing delivery time, cost, and
quality.
With the wide deployment of projectification (Midler, 1995)
in increasingly diverse application contexts, the criteria and,
more generally, the points of view for evaluating the outcomes
of projects have diversified beyond the initial vocation of projects as temporary organizations for getting things done.
Whereas academic research on project success is old and abundant (Pinto & Slevin, 1988), this very success of project management in contemporary society paves the way to an
academic revival of the old notion of project evaluation, as evidenced by recent papers (Aubry et al., 2021; Fregolente et al.,
2022; Pinto et al., 2021; Rode et al., 2022; Scheepers et al.,
2022).
Since the 1990s, project management has expanded considerably to new domains (Lundin et al., 2015; Schoper et al.,
2018), including public management (Hodgson et al., 2019)
and sustainable developments (Cerne & Jansson, 2019). Since
then, the points of view of performance evaluation have been
diversifying at the same time as projects deal with more diversified stakeholders and increasingly heterogeneous societal
issues encompassing complex and heterogeneous dimensions.
The development of research, on both benefits management
and the role of stakeholders in projects, reflects the need to
study this new complexity of evaluating project results
(Aubry et al., 2021).
Logically, the abundance of research on the evaluation of
megaprojects, such as the Sydney Opera House (Gaim et al.,
2022) or those studied by Flyvjberg (2014), crystallize these
debates on the evaluation of success or failure because they
embody, in an emblematic way, this new complexity of the
field of application of project management. Their duration,
their complex and colossal stakes as well as their symbolic,
political, financial, and operational dimensions create a favorable ground to conflictual evaluation perspectives. That can
be said more generally in public-driven projects such as infrastructure developments (Sergeeva & Winch, 2021).
The second area of extension of the scope of projects concerns the coordination of increasingly uncertain explorations.
Traditionally, it was typical to hear this about the management
of upstream and research activities: “this is not a project.” In
fact, project management was confined in companies to
product or service development. Yet research in the field
(Lenfle, 2008, 2012; Loch et al., 2006) has shown how much
the coordination of exploratory activities could benefit from
Project Management Journal 55(2)
project management methods. They have also shown how this
broadening of the scope of project management implies a questioning of the traditional project management paradigm, since it
is as much about producing new knowledge as it is about
obtaining results that conform to an initial objective that is
often imprecise and risky. In this context, the traditional criteria
for evaluating projects are no longer relevant (Volden & Welde,
2022). The notion of success must be broadened to include the
possibility of deviation from the initial objective and to take into
consideration both the learning generated by the exploration
and the results obtained. The perspective here is reversed:
success or failure is not measured by the deviation from the
ex-ante objective but by the potentialities generated by the
knowledge and assets produced along the way, which confirms
that projects produce much more than they deliver (Iansiti &
Clark, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1985; Shenhar & Dvir,
2007). Those new assets have to be valorized by subsequent
projects, thus contributing to the dynamic capabilities of the
firm (Teece, 2007) according to, for example, a logic for managing successive project lineages (Le Masson et al., 2010;
Maniak & Midler, 2014).
Finally, these different extensions of the project concept
invite us to rethink the traditional process of evaluating the
success or failure of a project. It is no longer the measurement
of a simple deviation from the target defined ex ante on the basis
of stable criteria, but a complex process—both multidimensional and dynamic—associating retrospective and also prospective perspectives and allowing for the views of various
observers. This is a complexity that is summarized by Rode
et al., when they state: “for project evaluation to be beneficial,
there must be acknowledgment of its holistic nature… (2022,
p. 416).”
Coming back to the Phoenix phenomenon, we wonder how a
project can be both a failure and a success. The ambiguous evaluation exhibited in a Phoenix situation is of a different and more
radical nature than those just mentioned. The contradiction
between the evaluation of success or failure is not due to a
weighting of heterogeneous criteria or the expression of different observers’ points of view. Using the notion of “holistic evaluation” proposed by Rode et al. (2022, p. 416), the same project
is evaluated globally as a failure and a success by the same communities of actors involved but at different times during its
course. The Phoenix phenomenon involves a time sequence,
which we underline in the third condition of the definition of
the Phoenix concept: failure is the condition of further
success. In other words, the project, directly aiming at the
final target, would never have been engaged. Here we find the
link with the metaphor of the Phoenix: the mythical bird rises
precisely from its own ashes: learnings and technical and industrial assets, which, in another perspective, would have been analyzed as sunk costs.
In conclusion, while the project management literature provides ex-post analyses of projects that have had a trajectory
profile close to that of the Phoenix, to our knowledge, there is
no theory of the phenomenon that is sufficiently coherent to
Midler and Alochet
191
both characterize the trajectory of such a project and to formulate ex-ante hypotheses on the qualification of a project as a
potential Phoenix. Indeed, the phenomenon of serendipity and
the concept of exaptation from the literature in the sociology
of science or the concept of effectuation, from the literature in
entrepreneurship, could be sources of inspiration for understanding the Phoenix phenomenon. As we have shown that
they are not directly applicable in the context of project management, our research aims to deepen our knowledge of these
phenomena and thus contribute to the construction of such a
theory by focusing on two questions:
Q1: How can we characterize the trajectory of a Phoenix
project?
Q2: Can we propose a theory to anticipate ex ante that a project
may have a Phoenix destiny?
Methodology
Qualitative Research
Most research on the success or failure of projects proceeds
from a posteriori analysis based only on second source documents. Such a method is unsuitable for the analysis of a
Phoenix phenomenon project, which requires understanding
how situations are evaluated along the way and how the trajectory of the project is constructed according to the knowledge
and uncertainties at a given date.
The concept of trajectory is central to Strauss’s theory of collective action, which he studied specifically in the medical field.
It is the result of a process of negotiation among actors of organizational arrangements, events, and so forth, which gradually
build the dynamics of interactions (Glaser & Strauss, 1967;
Strauss, 1993). Qualitative or comprehensive research based
on case studies is adapted to account for these complex
dynamic interaction processes (Dana & Dumez, 2015; Yin,
2009).
An analysis of the project in real time is therefore necessary
to account for, without bias, the ex-ante indeterminacy of this
trajectory and to understand the specific determinants of the
process that builds it.
Such epistemologies, for example, the grounded theory
approach, advocate continuous contact between theorizing
and data collection (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1993).
In the domain of project evaluation, we have used the trailing
research method, defined as “The research is trailing the program’s activities in ‘real time’ and aims at providing almost
instantaneous feedback (Finne et al., 1995, p. 11).”
Research Context: The KZE Project in a
Nutshell
The Phoenix phenomenon is analyzed through a normal new
product development project case, with a clearly defined
ex-ante objective, which explains why the non-achievement
of the objective is clearly experienced as a failure.
The project addresses an automobile development for the
Chinese market in collaboration with three automakers of
European, Japanese, and Chinese origins during the second
half of the 2010s. This project, named here “KZE,” is innovative as much by its functional and technological content—an
affordable electric vehicle, two characteristics often considered
incompatible—as by the novel and uncertain character of the
Chinese industrial context and electric vehicle market for
which it is intended.
Most of the project best practices, such as autonomy in
decision-making from parent companies and heavyweight
project management in an ambidextrous environment, have
been implemented in KZE. Thus, and despite many major
adverse events, some of which totally unpredictable in their definition and magnitude, the product was developed in accordance with its main objectives, namely, performance, cost,
quality, and delivery schedule. The product was successfully
launched in the Chinese market and quickly met its sales
targets by the end of the first year.
At the beginning of its second year of marketing, KZE faced
new obstacles, leading to a rapid halt in its commercialization
and a serious failure: despite large investments, neither sales
nor profitability targets were met.
The project governance team then decided to pivot by targeting the European market, which had been envisaged at the
beginning of the project but for a much more distant horizon.
In addition to important engineering work to adapt the
product to the new context, the project team had to make an
important effort to convince the company that saw the arrival
of this unexpected product as competition that could jeopardize
what was planned.
Finally, this new scenario was implemented, and its launch
was a great success: KZE, named Dacia2 Spring in Europe,
quickly became one of the top three sellers in one of its main
target markets and has remained there ever since.3
This succession of an initial success, followed by a serious
failure and a new success—all evaluated according to the
same criteria, by the same actors, and at different times
during the course of the project—provides a relevant study
case of a Phoenix type phenomenon.
Data Collection
In concrete terms, the research was carried out in four stages
over a period of six years.
A first stage of analysis took place between 2014 and 2015,
as part of a PhD thesis (Chen, 2018) conducted under the supervision of the first author within the product planning department
of the European automaker. The objective was to explore the
Chinese market that the automaker aimed to conquer at the
time, as well as the different product scenarios capable of realizing this ambition. This phase allowed analysis of the emergence phase of the studied project, in particular how the
192
Project Management Journal 55(2)
scenario of electrification of an existing low-cost vehicle developed for the Indian market imposed itself compared to the other
options.
A second stage of analysis was realized at the request of the
program director in the last week of March 2018 and was focused
on the product development phase that the project (now named
KZE) was going through. At that time, the authors interviewed
13 members of the project team (including the program director
and the CEO of the joint entity of the three automakers in charge
of operating the development of the project) as well as two top
executives from the European and Chinese automakers. Another
extensive interview with the program director took place in
October 2018, just before he stopped working on the project.
The third stage of analysis started in September 2020 at the
request of the CEO of the joint entity of the three automakers in
charge of the development of the KZE project. The objective
was to analyze the industrialization and marketing phases of
the product developed by the KZE project in China.
Therefore, between October 2020 and June 2021, interviews
were conducted with some members of the project teams in
order to deepen our understanding of these two phases;
finally, interviews with the actors of the commercial launch of
the project in China allowed us to understand the reasons of
its initial success as well as those of its subsequent failure.
In spring 2020, following the failure of the vehicle commercialization in China, the European automaker quickly
made the decision to pivot and launch the product, after
some adaptations, in Europe. The fourth round of analysis
then focused on the launch of the product in Europe and
led to a new series of interviews, held between June and
December 2021, with the actors in charge of this new commercial launch.
Table 1 summarizes the number of interviews according to
the role of the interviewees on the project (team member or
stakeholder) as well as the time they were conducted.
While the 2018 interviews were conducted face-to-face, the
2020 and 2021 interviews were conducted virtually, with the
interviews recorded at that time. Interviews typically lasted
from one to two hours. All interviews were conducted by the
authors who then cross-referenced their notes.
The authors also had access to inside operational documents
provided by team members (notably the program director and
the CEO of the joint development entity), which they crosschecked with the information gathered during the interviews.
All verbatim quotations in this article have been validated by
their authors.
A book had been published relating the whole analysis of the
case and the various learnings that it led to (Midler et al., 2023).
This article provides an original exploitation of this empirical
corpus through the theoretical lens of a Phoenix-type project.
Data Analysis
To answer our research questions, we used the data from the
interviews and the documents provided by the project actors
to reconstruct two dynamics: that of the trajectory of the objectives pursued and that of the realization of the project. This
allowed us to characterize, at different stages of the project,
the successive evaluations that were made and the decisions
made accordingly.
The temporal framework of the analysis was structured by
the phases leading to the main milestones instituted in the
company: emergence, preliminary project, product and industrial development, and commercial deployment. In the trajectory of this specific project, a fifth stage was added: the
rebound of the project on the European market.
Consequently, our methodology consists in systematically
identifying, at each phase, four main variables that had an
impact on the project trajectory:
1. The aim of the project, in other words, the specifications
and the main characteristics of the project target.
2. The key events happening in the environment of the
project (Chinese industrial, regulatory, and market contexts), which had a significant impact on its course.
3. The dynamics of the mother company that define the
context in which the project is processed.
4. The internal project decisions and management processes
that treated those variables in the project implementation.
Table 2 presents the analytical framework we used to perform
this analysis.
During the analysis of each of the project phases, the analytical framework is completed with the key elements that will
make it possible to answer the two identified research questions.
With regard to the identity of the target, we give the definition fixed during the phase of emergence, whereas for the
other phases we only provide its main evolutions. The project
Table 1. Summary of Interviews
Interviewees
Project team
members
Project
stakeholders
Total
First Round of Interviews
(March 2018)
Second Round of Interviews
(November 2020–June 2021)
Third Round of Interviews (June
2021–December 2021)
Total Number of
Interviews
13
6
0
19
2
6
6
14
15
12
6
33
Midler and Alochet
193
Table 2. Template of the Analytical Framework Supporting the Analysis of the Project
Project Phase
Emergence
Preliminary
Project
Product and Industrial
Development
Chinese Commercial
Deployment
European
Rebound
Identity of the target
Environmental factors
Mother company
factors
Internal projects
decisions
analysis along the main phases of the development is summarized in Appendix A at the end of the article.
Table 3. Key Elements from the Emergence Phase
Project Phase
Identity of the target
The Odyssey of KZE
A Laborious Strategic Genesis and a Tense
Emergence Phase (mid-2014–2015)
The story of this project begins in mid-2014, with Renault
Group’s strategic will to penetrate the Chinese market after
multiple attempts, all of them doomed to failure. The explosion
of the electric vehicle (EV) market in China, strongly stimulated
by Chinese public policies, seemed to be an opportunity for this
European EV first mover to finally succeed in establishing itself
there.
However, all projects developed to adapt existing European
EVs to the Chinese market failed one after the other, because
their price/performance ratio was far out of line with the
requirements of this market. Finally, a tiger team, led by the
project director of an A-segment, low-cost vehicle previously
developed in India, managed to achieve a credible breakthrough
based on the electrification of this vehicle. After multiple loops
to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of these different
projects, the company’s CEO validated this project and at the
end of 2015 launched the preliminary project phase of KZE
under the responsibility of the program director who had conducted the preliminary study (Table 3).
Exploring the Possibilities in the Preliminary
Project Phase (2016)
The tiger team carried out a first phase of rough exploration of
the market, the technical solutions, and the Chinese industrial
partners to evaluate the manufacturing cost of the vehicle: “In
total, we arrived at an amount that was approximately the
same as the admissible selling price as it appeared in the
market studies. This coarse-grained calculation was and
would remain the cornerstone of the project.”4 This first estimate will play—as the project actors will recall several times
in the interviews—the key role of compass during the whole
development process. Apart from that, all the variables of the
project in terms of product definition, industrialization, and
marketing scenarios remain to be explored and validated in a
Environmental
factors
Mother company
factors
Internal projects
decisions
Emergence
An uncertain and ambitious target
Battery pack: 12, 18, 24 kWH
Range: 100, 150, 200 km (according to NEDC
standard cycle—Directive 70/220/EEC)
Maximum speed: 110 km/h
Electric motor: 26 kW, air cooling
Battery charging: AC 3, 3 kW
Weight: < 1,000 kg
Cost: consistent with a price set at the bottom
of the price range of low end BEVs
Pass minimum Chinese regulations
China’s EV market is the largest in the world
A strong involvement of the Chinese
government to develop the EV industry
Strategic will of the Renault Group to enter
the Chinese market
New opportunity for the Renault Group, a
“late mover” in China, to “leap-frog” on EV,
thanks to its experience in Europe since
2011
Ambidextrous CEO sponsorship to develop a
new vehicle to derivate an existing
European electric vehicle
Proposal of KZE platform versus “Chinese
adaptation” of existing European EVs or
alternatives proposed by the other partners
totally new context: the European automaker knew neither the
Chinese market of EVs nor the automotive industrial environment with which it would be able to produce the car.
Moreover, the target objective was very ambitious: the
project must be profitable and therefore have a minimum investment and a cost maintained within the initial target objective;
the development time must be that of a typical project, while
it involves the design of an entirely original electric powertrain,
the permanent adaptation to fast moving Chinese regulations,
and the preservation of subsequent marketing in Europe.
In nine months, the preproject team accomplished the tour de
force of confirming the target cost of the vehicle (including
electric powertrain components), selecting the car’s production
site, detailing the minimum regulatory level, building a KZE
prototype to test its future performances and, finally, negotiating with five potential commercial partners the construction
194
Project Management Journal 55(2)
of a sales network to maximize volumes. As a team member of
the preproject study put it about the confirmation of the targeted
cost: “This helped us to convince our partner, Dongfeng, who
had some doubts at the time about our ability to keep costs
down: 70% of the car’s structure had been analyzed, so it was
empirically proven.”
The CEOs of the three automakers5 met in September 2016
to decide on the launch of a joint project, as the Chinese and
Japanese automakers had studied alternative scenarios. After
long and tense discussions, the KZE project was validated for a
launch of an A-segment EV, sold through five different sales networks on the Chinese market, and potentially—in the longer term
—in Europe. But the clear target is the Chinese market, as emphasized by the Dongfeng CEO in the minutes of the meeting: “The
Renault-Nissan team has to keep in mind that this product is
designed for China, not for India or Brazil.”6
KZE entered the development phase with a consensus on the
overall vision of the project, but the (few!) compromises
implicit in its definition still needed to be worked out. In addition, key elements for the success of the project remained to be
clarified: the economic model and the respective responsibilities
of the partners in this scenario. The key elements of the preliminary phase are summarized in the Table 4.
An Agile Development in an Unprecedented
Context (2017–2019)
After the difficult convergence to a common project, the question
of how (to make it) remained largely unresolved, exacerbated by
the fact that it was taking place in the complex context of cooperation among three automakers of different origins, cultures, and
histories and the presence of five sales networks.
Quickly an organization was put in place to operate the
development of the project: an independent company—named
eGT7—was created to which the three automakers brought
cash and industrial contributions, the latter representative of
their respective strengths and skills to carry out the project.
eGT and the associated contractual framework were organized
according to the model of heavyweight project functions (Clark
& Fujimoto, 1991; Midler, 1993) providing unicity of development, responsibility toward a global objective, a target shared
by the partners, and a scope integrating all the variables of
the project.
From September 2016 to March 2018—when the car’s definition was fixed—there was a continuous inflation of the performance and benefits of the intended target. As KZE Chief
Vehicle Engineer explained: “In such a fluctuating market, we
had no choice but to be agile. Every six months, we had to
adapt to changes in regulations and competitors.”8 In addition,
the project team had to overcome other obstacles. They had to
converge with the suppliers on very ambitious cost objectives—
in particular on the battery when the supplier wanted to unilaterally increase its price and reduce production capacity. They
needed to find an economical solution to meet the differentiation requirements of the five sales networks. They had to
meet the key engineering challenge of incorporating a 200-kg
battery on a platform that originally weighed 750 kg.
The evaluation of the project at the end of the development phase
was quite positive. The information gathered from the project documents confirmed this positive evaluation. In terms of production
cost, there was a significant reduction of one-third on the cost of
the vehicle produced in China versus the cost of the vehicle produced in Europe (see Appendix B at the end of the article9).
The combination of design to cost10 and cost sharing resulting from the cooperative strategy among the three automakers
and the five sales networks allowed an impressive reduction
in investment. The entry ticket of this almost totally new
vehicle was one-eighth of that of adapting, for the Chinese
market, a product already developed in Europe (see Appendix
C at the end of the article).
In terms of development time, the KZE was developed in 36
months, from the development agreement in September 2016 to
the production launch date in September 2019 and the first sales
in October 2019 (see Appendix D at the end of the article).
As far as quality is concerned, the SVP of the European automaker11 in charge of project development, clearly stated that:
Table 4. Key Elements from the Preliminary Project Phase
Project Phase
Identity of the target
Environmental factors
Mother company factors
Internal projects decisions
Preliminary Project
Battery pack: 18, 24 kWH
Range: 170, 200 km
Maximum speed: 120 km/h
Electric motor: 33 kW, liquid cooling
Battery charging: AC 6, 6 kW, DC 17 kW
Continuous growth of the Chinese EV market
Key intervention of the CEO to support the KZE scenario at the decision meeting with Chinese and Japanese
partners of the project
Heavyweight management, “tiger team” dedicated to the project and empowered to achieve the preliminary
project in a short time
Target a profitable product without subsidies contribution
Minimize costs by assigning the production of parts and components to Chinese manufacturers (and not to joint
ventures or subsidiaries of global groups)
Midler and Alochet
195
“Technically, the product respected all the company’s quality
standards and has not given rise to any problems since it was
launched.…” Table 5 is a summary of the main events of the
development phase.
Successful but Quickly Stopped Marketing in
China (2020)
April 2019 was a key moment for the commercial launch of
KZE as it was unveiled to the public at the Shanghai Motor
Show and the tests were carried out by the specialized
Chinese press. The reception was excellent, as reported by a
top executive of one of the automakers we interviewed: “In
terms of price–customer value balance, the product was excellent compared to competitors in the segment,”12 and sales began
under a brand of the European automaker in September 2019.
Sales were on target and the car quickly reached its target of
5% of its segment by the end of 2019.
Therefore, in December 2019, when the production stopped, as
it is usual in China at this time of the year, the path to success
seemed clear for the project. But, four months later, it appeared
as a spectacular fiasco, definitely stopped by the combination of
four strong obstacles, some of them of unknown-unknown types
(Loch et al., 2006):
1. The joint venture between the European and Chinese
automakers encounters serious failures with conventional
vehicle sales and strapped for cash, do not place additional orders by the end of 2019; worse, it filed for bankruptcy in March 2020.
2. Three of the five sales networks don’t place any order, which
prevents the expected volumes from being reached in China.
3. The COVID-19 pandemic places the whole of Hubei
province, where KZE’s engineering and production facilities are located, under lockdown.
4. Finally, while the vehicle has been developed to the
minimum regulatory level for autonomy, a sudden increase
in the latter deprives it of purchase subsidies, taking it de
facto out of the market because of a too high price.
Consequently, the production doesn’t restart in March 2020.
However, in this context of multiple crises, radical and quick
decisions were needed: the reengineering of KZE to increase
its autonomy beyond the minimum threshold in autumn 2020,
and the industrialization of the European version were
adopted unanimously by the members of the eGT governance.
The contract among the partners (Renault, Dongfeng, and
Nissan), increasing the production volume for Europe, was
signed in March 2020. Table 6 is a summary of the key elements from the Chinese commercial deployment.
Success in Europe (2021–2022)
How would the KZE electric car project, coming from elsewhere, fit into a strategy that was now quite different from
that of the group that had decided to launch the project in late
2015? In addition, this possible launch in Europe raised suspicions, inside the corporate divisions, about both the quality of a
product developed in full autonomy in China and the risk of
cannibalization of products designed in Europe for the
European market.
But the product quickly found three important and motivated
allies within the company. First, the Renault Group’s commercial division in the European area, faced with the need to comply
with European regulatory requirements (CAFE)13; second, the
management of the Dacia brand of the Renault Group, which combines the brand identity of less expensive vehicles with convenience and reliability. As analyzed by CEO of Dacia: “Spring
meets the needs of both those who do not have a large budget
to devote to their car mobility and those who, by choice, do not
wish to allocate more than is reasonable.”14 Finally, the new subsidiary, responsible for developing and marketing the company’s
new mobility services, welcomed a non-polluting vehicle that
was easier to make money from than the more expensive and
sophisticated existing European electric vehicles.
Table 5. Key Elements from the Product and Industrial Development Phase
Project Phase
Identity of the target
Environmental factors
Mother company factors
Internal projects decisions
Product and Industrial Development
Battery pack: 24 kWH
Range: 250 km
The manufacturing cost of the low-end version had risen by almost 30%, of which 25% is the result of product
enhancements necessary to meet regulatory and market requirements.
Constant evolution of Chinese regulations in favor of more demanding criteria for subsidy allocation
Many new products launched by competitors
Brutal and high increase of price demanded by the battery maker
Legitimacy of heavyweight project management to transgress usual best practices
Continuous support from the CEO
Implementation of a dedicated organization, independent from the parent companies, acting as a project operator
Constant adaptation of the product to new regulations and competitors’ offers
Steady deployment of “design to cost” methodology to reach cost targets, especially in the case of the price increase
claimed by the battery maker
Application of a dedicated development validation process to cope with the specificities of the product and context
196
Project Management Journal 55(2)
Table 6. Key Elements from the (Chinese) Commercial Deployment
Project Phase
Identity of the target
Environmental factors
Mother company factors
Internal projects decisions
Chinese Commercial Deployment
Range: from 274 km to > 300 km
Renault-Dongfeng joint venture is bankrupted
Sales networks do not order the vehicle as they committed to before COVID-19
Following a sudden change in the regulations, the autonomy threshold (allowing for subsidies) increases, pushing
the vehicle out of the market for lack of price competitiveness.
Crisis governance at the top of the Renault Nissan Alliance
Death of the emblematic program director of the affordable Dacia brand
Bankruptcy of the joint venture between the Renault Group and Dongfeng Motor Corporation
Don’t restart production after the new year break
Extend range to pass the autonomy 300-km threshold
Pivot to an immediate commercialization scenario in Europe
Develop adaptations to launch the vehicle on the European market
Table 7. Key Elements from the European Rebound Phase
Project Phase
Identity of the target
Environmental factors
Mother company factors
Internal projects decisions
European Rebound Phase
Range: up to 305 km according to WLTP, urban cycle condition (WLTP, Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicles
Test Procedure-European directive 2017/1151/EC)
Battery charging: AC 6,6 kW, DC 33 kW (option)
Adaptation to European regulations and price increase accordingly
European CAFE regulation
Development of new mobility services
Intense negotiations with head office stakeholders to accept the new European commercialization scenario in the
product plan of the firm
Dacia’s marketing and sales department recognizes the KZE project as a key asset in the brand’s environmental
strategy
The new mobility services division of Renault Group recognizes the Spring product as a profitable tool for their
electric mobility services.
KZE is marketed in Europe through the Dacia brand, under the name Spring.
The product launch first takes place via a car rental network
The launch then took place in two stages: first the vehicle was
proposed by a short-term car rental operator, which allowed the
product to become known and tested by customers in real conditions and then deployed in different electric car–sharing services.
Marketing to final customers began in March 2021 in several
European countries with a pre-order phase: about 16,000 reservations were made by the end of June, and waiting lists were
opened in several countries.
While KZE’s use in electric mobility services is still very
new, it is certainly too early to draw any conclusions in terms of
user satisfaction; in terms of sales, 2022 exhibits a monthly rate
of 5,000 orders, and the vehicle is one of the top three sellers in
one of its main target markets. Table 7 is a summary of the key
elements from the European rebound phase.
KZE: An Archetype of a Phoenix Project
The history of the KZE project shows a representative trajectory
of a Phoenix project: depending on whether one stops the clock
in April 2020 or in December 2021, it appears as a clear failure
or, on the contrary, a success. But it is the third characteristic of
a Phoenix project that is best illustrated here: the final result, in
other words, the marketing, in Europe in 2021, of an accessible
electric vehicle could not have been achieved without the
failure in China.
During the project, the design scenario for the car in China
created a performance/cost/weight combination that did not exist
in the European competition and would have required prohibitive
levels of investment had it been developed in Europe from the
outset. But the product was dedicated, at least in its first years of
marketing, to the Chinese market, Europe being targeted later
after the success in China. Consequently, all the production capacities and marketing efforts were focused on the Chinese market.
The sudden and unexpected failure—due to the strong headwinds
we have described—of KZE in China reshuffled the cards and
pushed the stakeholders of the project to find a way to leverage
the assets developed during the project.
At the time of its launch in 2016, the KZE project would certainly not have found its place in the company’s product plan as
it was in direct competition with the range developed specifically for Europe. At the beginning of 2020, the need to meet
the CAFE objectives and the capability to produce a vehicle
with a magic triangle (price/mass/autonomy) unmatched on the
market at a time when all competitors launch their EV line-up,
Midler and Alochet
prompted the company to introduce it on the European market
with the success we have come to know since then. The passage
through the Chinese failure thus appears to have been the condition
for the European success.
Discussion: From Characterization of the
Phoenix Trajectory to a Theory of the
Phoenix Phenomenon
The trajectory of the KZE project is thus the result of multiple
and varied factors. In this discussion, we propose to group them
around four variables from which we will formalize an ideal
type of Phoenix-type project trajectory: (1) the characteristics
of the project brief; (2) the importance of project and innovation
culture inside the company; (3) the capacity to hybridize causal
and effectual project management, and lastly, (4) the flexibility
of the firm to revive a failed project.
The Project Brief: Pitfalls and Opportunities
of a Vanguard Project
The ambitious, innovative, and uncertain nature of the project’s
target identity appears to be an important factor in its dynamics.
On the one hand, it is a source of surprises and risks leading to
unforeseen drifts and bifurcations. On the other hand, it is also a
lever for learning in areas previously unknown to the company,
leading to the creation of original assets that proved to be key
resources in the rebound phase. Here we find the characteristics
of vanguard projects, already identified in the literature on projectbased learning (Brady & Davies, 2004). Conversely, a project that
does not innovate much is probably more likely to achieve its
ex-ante defined objective but brings little knowledge and new
assets to the company. This characteristic is also in line with the
results of the sociology of science, which emphasizes the importance of the existence of a deviation from the known domains as
the origin of the phenomenon of serendipity.
The Importance of Projectification Maturity
and Innovation Culture of the Firm
The case shows the importance of the firm’s managerial projectification maturity and innovation culture on the Phoenix’s
trajectory.
Innovative Development Process
In traditional approaches, such a risky development just
wouldn’t have gotten off the ground. The electric powertrain
was entirely new and was developed with Chinese partners
the European automaker had never worked with. More generally, Chinese suppliers were not listed in the company’s supplier panels, which is normally a mandatory condition for
them to be selected. The production plant, a choice imposed
by the Chinese automaker, was far from the requirements
defined by the company’s process engineering division. As
197
the project director put it, it was a “Zola like factory” that
needed a complete renovation. We would then have expected
a two-stage process for exploring such an uncertain target, in
line with the stage gate approach (Cooper, 2008), which is
highly institutionalized in the automotive sector. Firstly, a
proof of concept was needed to validate the new technologies
of the electric drive train and the attractiveness of the concept
during the advanced engineering phase; then, if positive, the
launch of the vehicle development. On the contrary, here
vehicle development integrates both the exploration activity
and the realization of the objective. The KZE development
practices are in line with the characteristics of what had been
formalized in project management literature as the innovative
development model (Midler, 2019) or triple A project management model (Kock & Gemünden, 2021). Such models associate
heavyweight project management structure, inside agile exploration/decision processes, and autonomy from the standard processes through the support of an ambidextrous governance. The
unfortunate end of the Chinese phase of the project in 2020 demonstrates the importance of a strong ambidextrous governance to
sustain the innovative development model: the mobilization of
the Chinese marketing networks in the described context would
have required a powerful intervention of the general management
of the Renault Group to persuade the Chinese partners to continue
the marketing effort in China despite the problems encountered.
This was, at the time, impossible in the context of the crisis of
the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance and the disappearance of
the emblematic director of the KZE project.
Frugal and Reverse Innovation Strategy is a Successful
Experience
The other learning on which the project was able to rely on to
emerge and assert its specific identity is the strategic experience
of the Renault Group in the field of low-end disruption strategy
and reverse innovation. This experience began in the early
2000s, with the Logan project in Eastern Europe and the Kwid
project in India (Midler et al., 2013). The success of this strategy
allowed, on the one hand, to constitute a professionalism of design
to cost and agility of exploration, which were mobilized with profit
within the project; on the other hand, it reinforced the legitimacy of
the sponsorship of this new project, despite the tensions it brought
with the development standards in place in the headquarters.
We can bring this characteristic closer to the conditions identified in the literature of the sociology of science concerning the
phenomenon of serendipity: the interest of the unexpected discovery appears only because the surprise makes sense in relation to a
problem worthy of interest for those who assess the project.
Project Management That Hybridizes Causal
and Effectual Approaches
However, although this capacity enabled the development
of product and process engineering, it failed to overcome
the major obstacles imposed on the project: inflation of
198
performance standards imposed by Chinese regulations and
competitors, battery rising price in a context of soaring
demand, failure of Chinese sales networks and, last but not
least, the COVID-19 pandemic. In the face of these crises, the
project has achieved a bifurcation from an innovative development model, consistent with a causal approach (Huff, 2016) and
driven by the initial target—a true project compass—to an
effectual approach, where redefinition of the target can occur
along the way (Sarasvathy, 2001; Vanderstraeten et al., 2020).
Such a bifurcation, although necessary under the circumstances, nevertheless appears to be a denial of the management
principles that the project management team had asserted from
the start. In other circumstances, it could have caused the loss of
credibility of the project management team and its immediate
stop. In the case studied, the strong legitimacy of the program
director, acquired through the experience of his previous successes, as well as the colocated management team were certainly
facilitating conditions to maintain these two antagonistic behaviors
over time in the face of hazards. Similarly, the sponsorship of the
CEO of the European automaker, well known in the Chinese
industry, played a decisive role in the key moments of the
project, when it could have been stopped or deeply questioned.
The Strategic and Operational Flexibility of
the Firm to Revive the Project From Its
Ashes: The Exaptation Side of the Project
The last characteristic revealed by the case as a possible
Phoenix trajectory trait concerns the strategic and organizational context of the company where it takes place: it is the
ability to revive the project after its first failure. According to
the last principle of the effectual approach, it is the identification
of new sponsors, likely to appreciate the bifurcation of the
project, which is the condition for its continuation after the
failure of the initial scenario.
Firstly, the case demonstrates that such recovery is not
obvious. On the one hand, from the group head office, the
sudden availability of a new original electrical product following the failure of the Chinese marketing appeared to be a surprise and out of step with scheduled plans, since the launch
of KZE in Europe had not been part of any product strategy
for several years. On the other hand, the project, which took
place on the periphery of the company and often applied its
own processes, which differed from the company’s standards,
did not make many internal allies. This is a typical difficulty
of structural ambidexterity situations (O’Reilly III &
Tushman, 2013), well identified in the literature: the autonomy
of the project, which was a necessary condition for its development, is not conducive to its recovery by the parent company.
Not surprisingly, such capacity is first attested in the domain
of corporate venturing (Keil et al., 2009), where start-up
death and pivoting are usual practices. In more traditional
project management–oriented contexts, the failure would
likely have become a sunk cost.
Project Management Journal 55(2)
The lessons of the sociology of scientific discoveries are
interesting: taking advantage of serendipity is not evident. It
needs an exaptation capability (Garud et al., 2018) where it is
no longer a question of finding a solution to fixing an identified
problem but rather the opposite: to find a market target that
could value an existing offer. A project where the key players
are changing; they are no longer the R&D people but the marketing ones. To overcome such difficulties and value the KZE
opportunity, the company has to implement an exaptation
process through modifying what was planned and improvising
a new strategy. The project illustrates the elements of these
exaptation processes identified by Garud et al. (2018): (1) the
importance of narratives, which transform a discourse focused
on the relevance of the project for the Chinese market into an
opportunity to be seized for the strategy of the Dacia brand in
Europe; and (2) the mobilization of networks of allies to legitimize this unexpected shift.
The development of such a renaissance capacity is an important issue in line with the dynamic capability school (Teece
et al., 1997), as innovative development projects emerge in an
increasingly chaotic and unstable world as well as in radically
new and dramatic areas such as war or climate crises. The existence of an intrapreneurial culture and exaptation arrangement
within the firm appear as potential leverages for such rebirth capability (Kaufmann et al., 2021; Keil et al., 2009).
Conclusion
Phoenix trajectories are certainly surprising but not unpredictable. From the analysis of our study case, we have characterized
four conditions that can support ex-ante diagnoses of their
potentiality.
These conditions relate, first of all, to the very nature of the
project: is it radically new, ambitious, and therefore uncertain?
They also have to do with the maturity of the company in the
field of innovative project management: has it built a capacity
for innovative development management? Can this management legitimately switch to an effectual logic when faced
with imponderables? Finally, they are related to the company’s
capacity to accept and value these pivots, to make the project
rise from its ashes and not to consider it as a sunk cost. These
are all conditions that can be diagnosed in a company and be
built as key dynamic capabilities in the contemporary world.
Beyond a contribution to the management of Phoenix projects,
this study brings a more general lesson concerning the evaluation
of projects. Phoenix projects, of course, cannot be called successful in the strict sense of the term but they are not complete failures,
as they appear to be at first sight. This study emphasizes, in a particularly clear way, the key importance in today’s chaotic and
uncertain context of an evaluation that is not only retrospectively
focused on the achievement of previously defined objectives, but
also on the prospective assessment of the potentialities made possible by the project’s outcomes. Today, projects are as much
about making new things possible as they used to be about
getting things done (Obstfeld, 2012). In a context that combines
Midler and Alochet
urgency, radicalness, and uncertainty of the transitions to be
made, we can expect that companies will be challenged to
quickly develop riskier projects, leading to higher failure
rates. The ability to revive them and, even better, to anticipate
from the start those that have the potential to become
Phoenixes, constitutes an asset in the contemporary period in
order to enhance the overall performance of the project
portfolio.
On a theoretical level, this research shows the interest in
feeding the developments of the field of project management
with the contributions of other disciplines—here those of the
sociology of sciences and entrepreneurship. On a more
general epistemological level, it confirms the fruitfulness of
the pragmatism paradigm, and especially the Strauss approach
(1993), to research on and understand project processes.
Obviously, the status of this case-based research is exploratory.
We formalized our hypotheses for the Phoenix project theory, but
they will have to be tested and validated by other researchers. Our
objective here is to outline new perspectives for the discipline of
project management, which must, like other institutions, evolve to
confront the new challenges of the 21st century.
ORCID iDs
Christophe Midler
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3302-7854
Marc Alochet
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7542-7610
Notes
The “big sciences” of space and high-energy observation programs in particular.
2. The Dacia brand was created in Romania in 1966, with the objective of providing modern, robust, and economical cars to all
Romanians. The takeover of Dacia by Renault in 1999 marked
a strategic turning point, as Dacia became a Renault Group
brand whose objective is to make new cars accessible to the greatest number of people.
3. Second best-selling EV in France in 2022; see https://www.
automobile-propre.com/marche-automobile-voici-les-10-voitureselectriques-les-plus-vendues-en-france-en-2022/
4. Interview with one of the actors of the preliminary project phase
held in November 2020.
5. Renault Group, Nissan Motor Corporation, and Dongfeng Motor
Corporation.
6. Minutes of the summit meeting provided to the authors.
7. eGT stands for “electric golden triangle,” referring to the cooperation among the three firms.
8. Interview with the Chief Vehicle Engineer conducted by the
authors on 11 March 2021.
9. Appendices B, C, and D: source: KZE project, information provided
to the authors during the China mission in March 2018 and completed during the interviews conducted by the authors in 2020.
10. The design to cost approach constrains the technical solutions
implemented according to cost objectives. Here, this is the very
ambitious target set from the outset.
1.
199
11. Interview with the SVP of the European automaker in charge of
projects development conducted by the authors on 22 June 2021.
12. Interview with a top executive from the European automaker conducted by the authors on 17 March 2021.
13. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (European policy for the
reduction of CO2 emissions, which can lead to very high penalties
in the case of non-compliance with the legislation).
14. Interview with the Executive Vice President Renault Group, CEO
of Dacia, 2021.
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Author Biographies
Christophe Midler is Emeritus Research Director at the
Management Research Center (CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique,
Institut Polytechnique Paris). He is a member of the National
Academy of Technologies of France and Doctor Honoris
Causa at Umea University, Sweden. His research topics are
product development, project and innovation strategy, and management. He has explored these topics in various industrial contexts,
especially automotive industry. He has published his work in
various journals, including Project Management Journal®,
International Journal of Project Management, Research Policy,
and International Journal of Automotive Technology Management.
201
He has authored or coauthored books, including Working on
Innovation, (2010) The Logan Epic: New trajectories for innovation
(2013), Managing and Working in Project Society – Institutional
Challenges of Temporary Organizations (2015), Rethinking
Innovation and Design for Emerging Markets: Inside the Renault
Kwid Project (2017), and The Innovation Odyssey: Lessons From
an Impossible Project (2023). He can be contacted at Christophe.
Midler@polytechnique.edu
Marc Alochet, an engineer by training, has spent most of his
career in the engineering division of a European automaker. In
his last position, he was responsible for the strategic area of
expertise “vehicle and powertrain assembly engineering.” In
2017, he joined the management research center of the Ecole
Polytechnique, where he defended a thesis dedicated to the
impacts of vehicle electrification on the architecture of the automotive industry. Since then, he has been pursuing research on the
evolution of the automotive industry under the impact of the irruption of new electromobility services. He is guest editor for a forthcoming special issue of International Journal of Automotive
Technology and Management: “From Oil to Electricity: Are HV
Batteries Changing the Game for the Automotive Industry?” and
has recently published in Industrial and Corporate Change. He
can be contacted at marc alochet@polytechnique.edu
202
Project Management Journal 55(2)
Appendix A. Summary of the Project Analysis Along the Main Phases of the Development
Product and Industrial
Development
Chinese Commercial
Deployment
Battery pack: 18, 24 kWH
Range: 170, 200 km
Maximum speed:
120 km/h
Electric motor: 33 kW,
liquid cooling
Battery charging: AC
6,6 kW, DC 17 kW
Battery pack: 24 kWH
Range: 250 km
The manufacturing cost of
the low-end version
had risen by almost
30%, of which 25% is
the result of product
enhancements
necessary to meet
regulatory and market
requirements
Range: from 274 km to >
300 km
Range: up to 305 km
according to WLTP,
urban cycle condition
Battery charging: AC
6,6 kW, DC 33 kW
(option)
Adaptation to European
regulations and price
increase accordingly
Continuous growth of
the Chinese EV market
Constant evolution of
Chinese regulations in
favor of more
demanding criteria for
subsidy allocation
Many new products
launched by
competitors
Brutal and high increase of
price demanded by the
battery maker
European CAFE regulation
Development of new
mobility services
Strategic will of the
Renault Group to enter
the Chinese market
New opportunity for
Renault Group “late
mover” in China to
“leap-frog” on EV,
thanks to its experience
in Europe since 2011
Ambidextrous CEO
sponsorship to make
the KZE project against
alternative strategies
consisting in adapting
existing European
products
Key intervention of CEO
to support the KZE
scenario at the
decision meeting with
Chinese and Japanese
partners of the project
Heavyweight
management, “tiger
team” dedicated to the
project and
empowered to achieve
the preliminary project
in a short time
Legitimacy of
heavyweight project
management to
transgress usual best
practices
Continuous support from
CEO
Sales networks do not
order the vehicle at
the level they
committed to
COVID-19
Following a sudden
change in the
regulations, the
autonomy threshold
(allowing subsidies)
increases, pushing the
vehicle out of the
market for lack of
price competitiveness.
Crisis governance at the
top of the Renault
Nissan Alliance
Death of the emblematic
program director of
the affordable Dacia
brand
Bankruptcy of the joint
venture between the
Renault Group and
Dongfeng Motor
Corporation
Proposal of KZE platform
versus “Chinese
adaptation” of existing
European EVs or
alternatives proposed
by the other partners
Target a profitable
product without
subsidies contribution
Minimize costs by
assigning the
production of parts
and components to
Chinese
manufacturers (and
not to joint ventures
Implementation of a
dedicated
organization,
independent from the
parent companies,
acting as a project
operator
Constant adaptation of
the product to new
regulations and
Project Phase
Emergence
Preliminary Project
Identity of the
target
An uncertain and
ambitious target
Battery pack: 12, 18, 24
kWH
Range: 100, 150, 200 km
(according to NEDC
standard cycle)
Maximum speed:
110 km/h
Electric motor: 26 kW, air
cooling
Battery charging: AC
3,3 kW
Weight: < 1,000 kg
Cost: consistent with a
price set at the bottom
of the price range of
low end BEVs
Pass minimum Chinese
regulations
China’s EV market is the
largest in the world
A strong involvement of
the Chinese
government to develop
the EV industry
Mother company
factors
Internal projects
decisions
Environmental
factors
Don’t restart production
after the new year
break
Extend range to pass the
autonomy 300-km
threshold
Pivot to an immediate
commercialization
scenario in Europe
European Rebound
Intense negotiations with
head office stakeholders
to accept the new
European
commercialization
scenario in the product
plan of the firm
Dacia’s marketing and sales
department recognizes
the KZE project as a key
asset in the brand’s
environmental strategy
The new mobility services
division of the Renault
Group recognizes Spring
product as a profitable
tool for their electric
mobility services.
The product launch first
takes place via a car
rental network
(continued)
Midler and Alochet
203
Appendix A. (continued)
Project Phase
Emergence
Preliminary Project
or subsidiaries of
global groups)
Product and Industrial
Development
Chinese Commercial
Deployment
competitors’ offers
Steady deployment of
design to cost
methodology to reach
cost targets, especially
in the case of the price
increase claimed by the
battery maker
Application of a dedicated
development
validation process to
cope with the
specificities of the
product and context
Develop adaptations to
launch the vehicle on
the European market
Appendix B. Analysis of the Gain on Vehicle Cost
Source: Authors’ research.
European Rebound
204
Project Management Journal 55(2)
Appendix C. A Comparison Between the Entry Ticket for KZE and a Second Industrialization
in China of an Existing European Vehicle
Source: Authors’ research.
Appendix D. Evolution of the KZE Schedule
Source: Adapted from project documents by the authors.
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