Introduction
The inalienable and inviolable values of dignity and autonomy provide the foundations to the principles of human
rights and are upheld by human rights instruments. These practices exist to affirm that every person has the inherent
right to self-determination and to be treated with respect on the sole basis of being human.
The persistent problem of sexual harassment raises serious concerns regarding its impact on the fundamental values
of dignity and autonomy within human rights. Sexual harassment involves unwelcome sexual conduct that intrudes
upon an individual’s personal boundaries in both public and private life. It is significant as it violates the dignity and
autonomy of an individual by undermining their inherent worth; in this way their right as a human is violated. What is at
stake is more than just the prevention of ‘bad behaviour’; it is the safeguarding of every person’s right as a human to
live free from humiliation, coercion and discrimination. This matters because recognising sexual harassment as a
violation of human rights compels stronger legal protections and cultural change, that ensures the principles of human
rights are realised in the lived human experiences.
This essay will begin with a discussion of the meaning of dignity and autonomy in the framework of human rights. The
body of the essay will then examine the significance of sexual harassment in relation to undermining autonomy and
dignity through three interconnected dimensions. This essay recognises that sexual harassment affects all individuals
of different genders, however its analysis will focus specifically on women by reflecting the disproportionate impact
they experience due to their gender. The first section will address sexual harassment as a denial of consent and
erosion of agency by drawing on theories of autonomy and protections in international law. The second section
examines sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination that perpetuates power imbalances with references to
feminist legal theory and relevant case law to highlight its structural dimensions. Finally, the third section will consider
how sexual harassment imposes unwanted identities on victims, drawing on concepts of recognition theory and dignity
in human rights law to explore how misrecognition undermines self-definition. Together, these arguments will illustrate
how sexual harassment diminishes both dignity and autonomy, constituting a profound violation of human rights.
Dignity and Autonomy
To understand the relationship of human rights and sexual harassment, it is first necessary to examine the meaning
and significance of dignity and autonomy. As the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2003, p.1) explains
“Autonomy is generally understood as self-governance: the capacity to be one own’s person…and not the product of
manipulative or distorting external forces”. Sexual harassment operates through these manipulative and constraining
external forces, often occurring in hostile environments marked by coercion and intimidation which distorts consent. In
this context, dignity is recognised as “an intrinsic element of being human” (Neal, 2010, p.10) and “presents a simple
command to all of us: that we should value the human person, simply because he or she is human” (McCrudden,
2013, p.1). These values are mutually reinforcing, since dignity affirms the equal moral status that justifies autonomy,
while autonomy is a necessary condition for living a life that is consistent with dignity.
Denial of Consent and Erosion of Agency
Sexual harassment directly undermines an individual’s dignity and autonomy by denying them of meaningful consent
and reducing agency.
A central feature of autonomy is consent which is the “the ability to make choices and exercise one’s preferences”
(Miller, 2022, p.247) and a “distinctive constituent of personhood and freedom” (Schulhofer, 1992, p.35).
Consent is not a mere formality, but the operational expression of autonomy. Schulhofer (1992) emphasises that the
nonviolent impairment of this is an “egregious abuse that warrants serious criminal sanctions” (p.36). This conception
links directly to dignity, which requires individuals to be treated with respect for their capacity to make meaningful
choices, rather than as objects for another individual’s gratification. As Nussbaum (1995, p.257) notes, objectification
is a direct denial of autonomy and a degradation of dignity.
The universal values of dignity and autonomy are embedded in international human rights law as Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasises “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”
(UDHR, 1948). These principles are further reaffirmed by Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which prohibits degrading treatment of individuals (ICCPR, 1966). Sexual harassment violates these principles
by introducing coercion, threats or unwanted sexualisation into an interaction, thus removing the possibility of
meaningful consent. As Panichas (2001, p.254) observes, “a person violates another person’s autonomy…with
consent that was obtained by coercion”, underscoring the idea that consent tainted by pressure and intimidation is not
consent at all.
Beyond the denial of consent, sexual harassment erodes an individual’s agency, which is their capacity to act
independently and make self-determined choices without interference; agency is the practical exercise of autonomy in
daily life. Nussbaum (1995) identifies the “denial of autonomy” as a central feature of objectification and is directly
relevant to understanding the harms of sexual harassment. By reducing a person to that of an object for another’s
gratification, harassment not only strips the individual of their ability to consent but also creates conditions that restrict
their ability to act upon their own actions.
This loss of agency may lead to individuals to alter their behaviour such as avoiding certain spaces or remaining silent
to protect themselves. Nussbaum’s (1995) discussion of this ‘silencing’ is significant, as it emphasises the impact
harassment has in forcing individuals into a position where exercising their autonomy comes at a cost. Even when the
formal right to autonomy remains, the substance of it is undermined when agency is constrained. Such limitations
diminish autonomy from a living human right to a hollow principle that entrenches inequality and reduces human
dignity.
However, critics such as Jeffrey Minson (Mason & Chapman, 2003, p.221) contend that not all instances of sexual
harassment should warrant the label of human rights violations, suggesting they are mere breaches of “sexual
etiquette” or “good manners”, which may be analogous to “inconsiderate behaviour” or “gross impoliteness”. Whilst
acknowledgement of varying degrees in social norms, this critique risks trivialising the extent sexual harassment
impacts dignity and autonomy. Feminist legal theory rejects this minimisation, arguing the harm of sexual harassment
must be understood in its social and structural context as well. Catharine MacKinnon (1979) explains that “Typically,
employers, husbands, judges” and even the “victims themselves have understood and dismissed such incidents as
trivial…from this social context (p.2)”. She further explains that these seemingly trivial advances function in defining
the environment as sexual, and in turn the woman as sexual within it. From this standpoint, these repeated actions of
‘bad behaviour’ cannot be seen as inconsequential as it marks women as sexual objects and reinforces inequality.
By stripping individuals of meaningful consent and eroding their agency, sexual harassment inflicts a dual harm on
autonomy and dignity, underscoring that it is not just ‘bad behaviour’ but direct violation of the fundamental human
rights to live with freedom and equality.
Sex Discrimination & Perpetuation of Power Imbalances
Sexual harassment operates not only as a violation of individual human rights but also acts as a form of sex
discrimination that perpetuates power imbalances. MacKinnon (1979) conceptualises sexual harassment as a
mechanism of sex discrimination that preserves power imbalances, defining it as “the unwanted imposition of sexual
requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power” (p.1).
In this context, sexual harassment is also a structural barrier to equality that constrains the autonomy of targeted
groups. This is reflected in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW,
1979), which recalls that “discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for
human dignity” and obliges states to eliminate discrimination against women in all its forms (Article 3).
Sexual harassment as sex discrimination comes in two main categories. Quid pro quo harassment involves the
conditioning of employment benefits with sexual compliance, whilst ‘hostile environment’ harassment entails the
creation of an intimidating or humiliating environment that interferes with an individual’s ability to work. Both forms of
harassment deny the individual equal terms and conditions of participation, thus undermining autonomy and dignity.
Thornton (2002, p.434-435) argues that “harassment…represents a manifestation of systemic discrimination that is
ever-present” yet the legal framework has continuously reframed it as a matter of individualised dignity rather than
structural inequality. This obscures how sexual harassment operates to maintain gender hierarchies by framing it as
individual behaviour rather than a systemic pattern.
However, some critics argue that extending anti-discrimination legal frameworks to all cases of sexual harassment
risks overreach, as it potentially overextends its scope and undermines legal clarity.
Case law has also reinforced this link between sexual harassment as sex discrimination. In the case of Meritor
Savings v Vinson (477 US 57, 1986), the U.S Supreme Court recognised that sexual harassment, which included the
creation of a “hostile working environment”, constitutes discrimination based on sex under the Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. The Court had noted that hostile environments can deter women from reporting misconduct, limit career
opportunities and force them to endure degrading treatment to maintain employment. This persistent exposure to
degrading treatment erodes dignity, signalling women must accept objectification to remain in professional spaces. As
Mackinnon (1979) argues, by defining the conditions in which women may participate, results in “mandating
subordination of women to men without regard to individual capacity…arbitrarily ranking the woman as inferior to the
man” (p.269). Scholars such as Cynthia Bowman (1993) add that these environments operate much like the dynamics
of street harassment, all of which serve to remind women of their vulnerability, informally ‘policing’ their presence and
discouraging full participation.
Similarly, the case O’Callaghan v Lodger (3 NSWLR 89, 1984) further confirms that unwanted sexual conduct by an
employer can lead to a violation of the Anti-Discrimination Act when it constitutes a “detriment” or conditions
employment benefits based on sexual compliance. In this case, the victim’s continued employment was tied to
reluctant compliance to sexual demands. The perpetrators leveraged institutional control to coerce compliance and
submission, which effectively nullifies the victim’s autonomy by making consent conditional on economic or
professional survival. These preceding legal cases demonstrate how sexual harassment exploits and reinforces
structural power disparities.
However, legal scholars such as Epstein (1992) argues that expansive interpretation of discrimination laws can
impose constraints on employers, burden workplace dynamics and undermine an individual’s freedom of association.
This perspective suggests that treating all instances of sexual harassment as systemic discrimination risks
overregulating the workplace and diverting focus from productivity and individual choice. Yet, this framework overlooks
the persistent gendered nature of workplace harassment which is not merely a ‘workplace conflict’ but a result of
structural inequality. The evidence from case law and human rights framework demonstrates how sexual harassment
systemically restricts a woman’s ability to participate on equal terms, resulting in permanent impacts on their career,
autonomy and dignity. Recognising these harms as a form of sex discrimination is essential for meaningful redress,
and in upholding the dignity and autonomy of individuals, as its perpetuation of structural inequality directly
undermines their human rights.
Degradation of Identity
Sexual harassment imposes unwanted identities on victims, redefining them in a way that distorts their autonomy and
erodes their dignity. Autonomy is not only about one’s ability to make choices in the moment, but also about the
authorship of oneself over time.
Dignity in human rights law involves respect for all individuals as autonomous and equal agents that are capable in
defining their own identities, free from degrading treatment (UDHR, ICCPR). Axel Honneth’s (2007) theory of
recognition highlights that dignity is rooted in being recognised as an autonomous equal in social relations. In the case
where an individual is persistently ‘misrecognised’, their capacity for self-respect is undermined. In the context of
sexual harassment, this misrecognition occurs when victims are seen as sexualised objects rather than as competent
equivalents. This aligns with Noya Rimalt’s (2008) critique of the “dignitary paradigm” in harassment law, in which she
argues “individualises harassment” and obscures its role as it “violates their dignity mirroring and perpetuating a social
reality that does not treat them as equal (p.407). Mason (2002) adds to this by reiterating the role sexual harassment
has as part of a ‘continuum’ of daily practices, contributing to the cumulative construct of subordinate gender identities.
The case of Dunn-Dyer v ANZ Banking Group Ltd illustrates this misrecognition, where the victim’s professional
identity was reframed through gender stereotypes such as “mother hen” and faced persistent sexualised ‘humour’.
The identity that she created autonomously, and her dignity was undermined by an imposed identity of a sexualised
figure in a masculinised workplace. Similarly, sexual harassment substitutes a subordinate identity on the one the
victim asserts, essentially disrupting the conditions needed for self-respect and self-determination. In the case of
O’Callaghan v Loder (1984), the victim’s identity as an employee was reframed through persistent, unwelcome sexual
advances from her authority figure. This power imbalance and imposed identity constrained the victim’s autonomy in
rejecting advances but also in participating in the workplace on equal terms.
We can further observe how ‘framing’ impact’s identity by looking at a two-country comparison of the definition of
sexual harassment. Abigail Saguy (2000) notes how the U.S law tends to treat harassment as a form of workplace
discrimination with a focus on impact on equal opportunities, whereas French law frames it as an abuse of authority
that significantly inhibits dignity and personal integrity. The differences in framing approaches affect whether sexual
harassment is recognised as an imposition of identity and violation of self-definition. Joanna Grossman (2003)
critiques formalized approaches to legal compliance frameworks where organisations prioritize procedural
requirements over substantive change. These risks treating sexual harassment as merely an avoidance of liabilities
rather than its core issue of eroding dignity and autonomy. Kathryn Abrams (1998) adds that it is specifically the law
that has the capacity to reshape workplace norms and “acceptable forms of conduct” (p.1219) to support equal
recognition of identity.
The #MeToo movement demonstrates how these imposed identities can be resisted through collective recognition and
alternate framing. By reframing sexual harassment as systemic rather than in isolation, the #MeToo movement
effectively disrupted consistent patterns of misrecognition and repositioned the victims as credible truth-tellers.
Speaking out under the movement allowed individuals to reclaim back some narrative control. This reclamation
directly restores the elements of autonomy and dignity, further underscoring the idea that sexual harassment is not an
isolated incident, but a profound violation of human rights.
Conclusion
While this essay has argued that the persistent and systemic nature of sexual harassment violates human rights by
undermining the central values of autonomy and dignity, it has also revealed a deeper tension within human rights
practices itself. Even where laws and policies have recognised the harms of sexual harassment, their implementation
is often framed through individualised solutions rather than any meaningful change. This leaves the structural
conditions that sustain this harassment intact and raises the question on whether the existing human rights
frameworks are sufficiently equipped in addressing the system nature of these violations. Until this structural question
is addressed, the principles of autonomy and dignity remain risk remaining aspirational rather than transformative.
Acknowledging sexual harassment as both a violation of autonomy and dignity is the essential first step to dismantling
its pervasive nature.
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