DDI BDK --- Hypersonics Aff
1AC—CAMP TOURNAMENT
1ac – adversaries
SCENARIO 1 IS NOKO AGGRESSION
Insufficient US missile capabilities means Kim strikes now
AC 25, [(Atlantic Council, the Atlantic Council is a think tank that promotes constructive
leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the Atlantic Community’s central
role in meeting global challenges. The Council provides an essential forum for navigating the
dramatic economic and political changes defining the twenty-first century by informing and
galvanizing its uniquely influential network of global leaders. The Atlantic Council—through the
papers it publishes, the ideas it generates, the future leaders it develops, and the communities it
builds—shapes policy choices and strategies to create a more free, secure, and prosperous
world..)) "'First, we will defend the homeland': The case for homeland missile defense, Atlantic
Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/first-we-willdefend-the-homeland-the-case-for-homeland-missile-defense/, 1-4-2025, accessed 7-72025]//UT
This is especially challenging since North Korea’s nuclear strategy includes threatening
intercontinental nuclear strikes on the US homeland to split the US alliance with Japan and
South Korea, as well as possibly backstop limited nuclear use in the region, including for battlefield purposes. Pyongyang would
also consider counter-value strikes on Japan and South Korea. Finally, North Korea has laid out a “fail deadly”
posture, in which attacks on North Korean nuclear forces, nuclear command and control, or the Kim regime itself would trigger an
“automatic” nuclear counterattack.88 Since the stated US goal is regime elimination, then the Kim regime
has no reason not to order an all-out attack. For the US threat to be credible, then, US forces
must be able to eliminate the North Korean intercontinental nuclear threat through
attack operations and active defenses .
In the words of the 2022 MDR, “as the scale and the complexity of [North Korea’s] missile capabilities
increase, the United States will also continue to stay ahead of North Korean missile threats to
the homeland through a comprehensive missile defeat approach, complemented by the credible
threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and non-nuclear means .”89
Comprehensive missile defeat therefore includes counterproliferation efforts to impede Pyongyang’s missile
development and testing, so-called “left-of-launch” operations to destroy nuclear missiles and their associated equipment before
ignition, and active missile defense to intercept North Korean weapons.
Through counterproliferation activities, the United States and its allies and partners work to constrain North Korea’s WMD and
ballistic missile programs by preventing Pyongyang’s acquisition of technology relevant to these programs and imposing sanctions
that punish proliferation and restrict the resources available. Economic sanctions on North Korea include limits or bans on its
imports and exports of weapons and dual-use technologies, hydrocarbons, foodstuffs, textiles, luxury goods, and industrial products
and components; prohibitions on North Korean nationals working abroad; and requirements to counteract vessels engaged in
sanctioned activity; among other measures.90 North Korea’s global campaign to evade these sanctions is robust and is a major focus
of US, allied, and partner counterproliferation efforts. Russia and China have played significant roles in allowing the DPRK to evade
certain sanctions. Moreover, in April 2024, Russia vetoed the renewal of a key UN panel charged with detailing violations.91
Through left-of-launch operations, the United States would attempt to destroy North Korean ICBMs (and other nuclear missiles)
before Pyongyang could launch them by using a range of kinetic and non-kinetic strike capabilities. Public discussion of those
capabilities is limited, but, Guillot, in his March 2024 statement as the USNORTHCOM and NORAD commander to the US Senate
Armed Services Committee (SASC), said, “It is a near certainty that homeland defense in the coming years will rely less on point
defense and traditional kinetic defeat mechanisms in favor of area defense and left-of-launch effects that take full advantage of
multi-domain capabilities.”92 There is speculation in the news media that some failures of Pyongyang’s missile programs are
attributable to US cyber and electronic interference.93
Attack operations on North Korean forces would be a whole-of-alliance activity. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has a “kill
chain” concept and plans to integrate strike forces (such as its ballistic missiles and F-35A strike fighters) into its own Strategic
Command to carry out such attacks.94 One US Marine Corps general suggested that ROK Strategic Command would plan to engage
in “counter-nuclear operations, conventional nuclear integration, and conventional support to nuclear operations.”95
Finally, the United States deploys a limited number of exo-atmospheric midcourse interceptors to actively defend against incoming
North Korean ballistic missiles. The United States fields a force of forty-four silo-based GBIs capable of intercepting North Korean
reentry vehicles (RVs) in the midcourse phase, that a variety of space-, land-, and sea-based sensors support. On November 16,
2020, the United States successfully shot down an ICBM-class target with the Standard Missile (SM) 3 block IIA missile, which was
originally designed against intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).96 The SM-3 could therefore play a role in a layered
defense of the US homeland from North Korean ballistic missiles. (See Section Nine for a more thorough explanation of the current
US HBMD system.)
Current and projected North Korean nuclear-armed long-range missile threat to the United States
The 2022 NPR recognizes that North Korea presents a “persistent threat and growing danger to the U.S.
homeland and the Indo-Pacific region as it expands, diversifies, and improves its
nuclear, ballistic missile, and non-nuclear capabilities. …”97 And 2022 MDR elaborates
that “North Korea continues to improve, expand, and diversify its conventional and nuclear missile capabilities, posing an increasing
risk to the U.S. homeland. …”98 While North Korea’s existing long-range nuclear missile arsenal would already stress US
countermeasures, at least four factors in the development of North Korea’s long-range nuclear force further complicate US
comprehensive missile defeat and defense operations: solid fueling, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)
arming, countermeasures, and growth in launcher count.
North Korea has tested intercontinental missiles of increasing range and
sophistication . In 2017, Pyongyang tested its first two ICBM-class missiles—the Hwasong-14 and -15—on lofted
trajectories; both missiles are road mobile and liquid-fueled.99 In 2022, Pyongyang conducted three lofted-trajectory tests of a new
ICBM dubbed the Hwasong-17.100 The US Defense Intelligence Agency assessed this missile as “probably designed to deliver
multiple warheads.”101 Most recently, North Korea paraded the Hwasong-18 solid-fueled road-mobile missile and then flight tested
it three times in 2023.102 Solid fueling is a major advancement for Pyongyang. It is generally very difficult to store or move liquidfueled missiles while fueled, which often requires positioning them before fueling. The missile is highly vulnerable to attack
operations during this hours-long process. A more widespread combination of mobility and solid fueling
would likely degrade US missile defeat operations . North Korea is also developing countermeasures
for its ICBMs, which would complicate US attempts at interception.
In addition to the improvement in the quality of the North’s missiles, the quantity of the missiles and their
attendant transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) is growing. In 2023, Pyongyang paraded eleven Hwasong-17
ICBMs.103 Since the “publicly stated shot doctrine for the GMD [Ground-based Midcourse Defense] system is four to five
interceptors per one incoming ICBM,” that may indicate that the North could overwhelm existing US defenses (in a worst-case
scenario in which all North Korean weapons worked as expected and the United States and allies were unable to strike before
launch).104 More importantly, perhaps, than the number of missiles paraded at one point in time is Pyongyang’s ability to
indigenously manufacture heavy TELs, a capability which had previously been a limiting factor, but which Kim Jong-Un highlighted
in a recent visit.105 (The North is also exploring rail-mobile launchers, which would further complicate US and allied attack
operations. Shorter-range missiles are already armed on rail launchers.)106
Pyongyang continues its development and testing of space-launch vehicles (SLV), in violation of UN Security Council mandates. SLV
testing helps the DPRK develop missile technology and test other components necessary for a
successful ICBM strike. Russia is actively assisting North Korea in this effort.107
North Korea has steadily expanded its stockpile of fissile material, and nongovernmental experts assess a growth in the size of its
nuclear arsenal. While there is no public US government estimate of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, a 2024 estimate from the wellregarded “Nuclear Notebook” lists fissile material sufficient for up to ninety warheads, of which fifty might be deliverable by
missiles.108 A Congressional Research Service (CRS) survey of open-source estimates reports a range of fissile material sufficient for
twenty to sixty warheads.109 In September 2023, Kim called for an “exponential” increase in Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal, a policy
that the country’s legislature endorsed in a constitutional amendment.110 One RAND report estimates that Pyongyang could grow
its nuclear arsenal to up to two hundred warheads by 2030.111
There are several key uncertainties in the degree of threat that North Korea’s nuclear program will pose as it progresses. North
Korea has never tested a RV for its ICBMs on a minimum energy trajectory, so it remains unclear if its nuclear weapons can survive
reentry into Earth’s atmosphere. (Several nongovernmental experts assess that Pyongyang would not face difficulty doing so.)112 For
that matter, despite analysis of the capability of North Korean ICBMs, based on size and throw weight, to deliver multiple warheads
and decoys, there has been no open-source documentation of Pyongyang testing multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs), post-boost
vehicles (PBVs), MIRVs, or penaids. (In June 2024, North Korea claimed to have tested underlying technology for a MIRV; South
Korean officials cast doubt on this claim.)113 Preventing North Korea from testing these systems, in the view of some distinguished
Korea watchers, should be a top priority for US policy toward Pyongyang.114
Even still, the current and ongoing developments in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are likely to pose
severe challenges to the current US HBMD system.
Conflict results in nuclear escalation
Nick Kodama 20, PhD, Government & International Relations, Georgetown University,
"Threatening the Unthinkable: Strategic Stability and the Credibility of North Korea’s Nuclear
Threats," Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 0, Issue 0, pg. 9-13, 2020, OUP. [italics in
original]
Proponents of such a preventive strike dismiss the possibility of North Korean first use and argue
that No rth Ko rea would be deterred from retaliating against the U nited S tates because the
U nited S tates’ conventional and nuclear superiority would allow it to control crisis escalation.
Any North Korean retaliation would be met by further—and stronger—attacks from the United
States. However, this argument contains the fundamental contradiction that a “bloody nose” strike is necessitated by North
Korea’s undeterrability, but once such an attack is conducted, North Korea will be deterred from further escalation (Cha 2018).
Nonetheless, while it is impossible to be certain that a limited strike would have triggered nuclear weapons use, there are many
reasons why such a strike could cross No rth Ko rea ’s nuclear threshold.
First, threats that states make are made more credible if there are costs imposed by making the
threat, and conversely, if making a threat carries implicit costs then states will be penalized for
failing to carry it out (Fearon 1994, 1997). As a result, by making these threats, North Korea lowers the
threshold at which the use of nuclear weapons becomes rational: in the event that North Korea
backs down in a crisis, the cost suffered would consist of not only those imposed by the
adversary, but also the reputational costs from both domestic and international audiences.
Additionally, despite research suggesting that personalist regimes like North Korea do not face domestic audience costs, there are
indications that Kim Jong Un relies on the support of North Korean elites to maintain power
(Weeks 2008). The Kim regime’s rewarding of elites and scientists responsible for North Korea’s weapons programs with newly built
housing in Pyongyang, and reports of purges and executions of government officials, illustrate the extent to which the regime is
cognizant of the need to maintain a supportive domestic audience (O’Brien 2018). The other type of reputational cost suffered would
be the credibility of North Korea’s future threats. If North Korea fails to act on its threat to retaliate against
the United States—that is, it is called on its bluff—then it will need to take even costlier steps in
the future to reestablish credibility.
Second, in a severe security crisis, leaders will be under immense pressures and will need to make decisions
with imperfect information. In these situations, leaders may overvalue the losses they face while
simultaneously being willing to take large risks to prevent them. This is explained by a concept known
as “prospect theory:” individuals have a tendency to attach more significance to losses than corresponding gains, and be risk
accepting to prevent losses but risk averse to pursue gains (Jervis 1992). This is not merely an abstract theoretical concept or an
academic exercise: in 1941, the overextended Japanese Empire faced severe resource constraints, but instead of withdrawing from
overseas territories and acceding to US demands, the decision was made to attack Pearl Harbor. Fifty years later, Saddam Hussein—
burdened with debt from the Iran-Iraq War—refused to withdraw from Kuwait despite the significant buildup of coalition forces in
Saudi Arabia and the near certainty of Iraqi defeat. In a US-DPRK crisis, these effects are likely to be exacerbated by mutual
suspicion of and uncertainties over each other’s intentions. In addition to these psychological factors ,
limitations in No rth Ko rea ’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities may
hamper the regime’s ability to accurately assess a limited strike. As a result, if the United States were to carry
out a “bloody nose” strike against a North Korean missile test site with the limited intention of deterring future launches, North
Korea may nonetheless believe that the attack was part of a larger campaign to topple the Kim regime. Therefore, North Korea’s
response would be not only retribution for the damage inflicted, but also an effort to stave off what it perceives to be imminent
additional losses.
Finally, although the arrangement of nuclear command-and-control systems does not directly affect North Korea’s nuclear calculus,
certain arrangements may have the effect of “locking in” a particular threshold by
streamlining—or in some cases, automating—the process of launching nuc lear weapons . Nuclear
commandand-control systems can generally be categorized by a positive and negative control typology, where positive control
ensures that nuclear weapons will always launch when ordered and negative control ensures that nuclear weapons are not used
without proper authorization (Feaver 1992). States with small arsenals , vulnerable nuclear
infrastructure , and a limited ability to detect attacks are susceptible to decapitation
strikes and will therefore adopt nuclear postures and hardware that skew towards positive
control . This may involve decentralizing command and control by delegating the authority to
launch nuclear weapons or implementing procedures such as launch-on-warning to streamline
the process of responding to attacks. Although there are some indications that launch authority in peacetime is strictly
centralized under Kim Jong Un, vulnerabilities in No rth Ko rea ’s nuclear arsenal suggest that it may
adopt a delegative approach in crises and potentially design it to be fail-deadly (Narang and
Panda 2017). In a system that is designed to be fail-deadly, the point of failure would represent an ex ante
assessment of the threshold to trigger first use. Therefore, a crisis that crossed the threshold—
such as a “bloody nose” strike—could immediately set in motion nuclear weapons use regardless of
subsequent efforts at de-escalation.
Perception of US insecurity instigates east Asian prolif
AC 25, [(Atlantic Council, the Atlantic Council is a think tank that promotes constructive
leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the Atlantic Community’s central
role in meeting global challenges. The Council provides an essential forum for navigating the
dramatic economic and political changes defining the twenty-first century by informing and
galvanizing its uniquely influential network of global leaders. The Atlantic Council—through the
papers it publishes, the ideas it generates, the future leaders it develops, and the communities it
builds—shapes policy choices and strategies to create a more free, secure, and prosperous
world..)) "'First, we will defend the homeland': The case for homeland missile defense, Atlantic
Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/first-we-willdefend-the-homeland-the-case-for-homeland-missile-defense/, 1-4-2025, accessed 7-72025]//UT
North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal is stressing extended deterrence in South Korea
and Japan, though proximity and a different attitude toward nuclear weapons means that these concerns are more dire in
Seoul than they are in Tokyo.
In the years since North Korea’s test of an ICBM capable of striking the US homeland, South Korea’s leaders and public
are demonstrating an increased skepticism of US extended deterrence and interest in developing
indigenous ROK nuclear weapons. In January 2023, ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol publicly mused that Seoul
would consider developing its own nuclear weapons or asking for US nuclear forces to be deployed to the
Peninsula, should the nuclear threat from Pyongyang continue to escalate .129 In June 2024, following a
Russian announcement that seemed tantamount to a mutual defense pledge with North Korea, leading South Korean politicians
called for the ROK to develop nuclear capabilities , with one leader even going so far as to call
for Seoul to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to do so.130 Another senior politician
from the ruling People Power Party vowed to include the pursuit of nuclear weapons in the party’s political platform.131 The same
month, a South Korean state-run think tank released a report explicitly linking the North Korean ability to hold the US homeland at
risk with South Korean doubts in US extended deterrence commitments.132 (The more liberal Democratic Party, currently in
opposition, is far less sanguine on ROK nuclear capabilities, and some of its representatives condemned statements in favor of South
Korean nuclear weapons.)133 Pro-nuclear sentiments are not limited to political leadership. According to a Chicago Council on
Global Affairs opinion poll in February 2022, a remarkable 71 percent of South Koreans supported an
indigenous nuclear weapons program, and a majority supported the deployment of US nuclear weapons.134
In response to the worsening security environment and risks to the assurance of Seoul, President Joe Biden and President Yoon held
an April 2023 summit and issued the Washington Declaration, spelling out several steps to strengthen extended deterrence. These
included the routine visit of US strategic assets to the ROK (including existing strategic bomber overflights and renewed ballistic
missile submarine port visits), the standup of a US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), enhanced ROK conventional support to
US nuclear operations, increased scenario-based exercises for nuclear contingencies, etc. The ROK, for its part, reaffirmed its
commitments under the NPT to not acquire nuclear weapons.135”136 The NCG held its third meeting in June
2024.137 ROK Prime Minister Han Duck-soo reaffirmed that the additional measures implemented following
the Washington Declaration were sufficient for Seoul’s assurance “ for now” without
developing or hosting nuclear capabilities.138
Japan is also taking steps to enhance its deterrence capabilities and the extended deterrence relationship with
the United States, even though Tokyo mutes its concerns about US vulnerability to North Korean missile attack more than Seoul.
Japanese politicians have floated the need for an indigenous Japanese nuclear program since the
Cold War, and events like North Korea’s nuclear weapons tests and missile tests often provoke
similar reactions.139 Then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pointed out in 2016 after a North Korean missile test the
challenge that system poses to the United States.140 In response to a December 2023 test of the Hwasong-18, Japan’s Parliamentary
Vice Minister of Defense Shingo Miyake made a point of noting that the missile could range the continental United States.141
That senior Japanese officials call attention to the ability of North Korea to hold the US
homeland at risk demonstrates the impact that US homeland vulnerability has on
assurance to allies.
To address these concerns, Japan is enhancing its conventional forces and deepening its extended deterrence
relationship with the United States; calls for nuclear sharing or nuclear modernization are also present but
lack the public support evident across the Korea Strait. Japan has increased its conventional military capabilities, revising its
constitution to allow for a greater range of military operations, raising its defense budget to 2 percent of gross domestic product, and
developing so-called “counterstrike” capabilities for long-range conventional precision strikes.142 Notably, a justification for
these capabilities is to complement a missile defeat approach for North Korean nuclear
weapons.143 While not explicitly conducted in a nuclear context, the Japanese military has conducted joint exercises with US
nuclear-capable bombers.144 Since 2010, the United States and Japan have conducted the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. The latest
edition, held in June 2024, covered measures to enhance extended deterrence, exchange views on strategic threats in the IndoPacific region, and improve coordination on missile defense. Japanese officials also participated in a tabletop exercise and viewed
US ICBM facilities.145 The United States, Japan, and the ROK are also deepening trilateral cooperation on several fronts, including
a facility to exchange real-time missile tracking and missile warning information on North Korean missile launches.146
That goes nuclear
Loo 23, [(Bernard F.W. Loo, Bernard Loo is Assistant Professor at S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Singapore) ", RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/CO23025.pdf, 01-16-2023, accessed 79-2025]//UT
For both Japan and South Korea, indigenous nuclear arsenals might appear to be a panacea to offset
their strategic rivals’ nuclear advantages. North Korea, surely, must be more circumspective if its southern neighbour is
also nuclear-armed. To borrow from Albert Wohlstetter’s 1958 RAND Paper, there would then be a “ balance of terror ”
on the Korean peninsula. A similar case, also seemingly intuitive, can be made for relations between China and Japan:
would China recklessly violate Japanese territorial waters or ADIZ if it faced a Japan that is capable of inflicting nuclear
devastation upon Chinese soil? However, this balance of terror, as Wohlstetter had portrayed it, is a delicate
one. By the end of the Cold War, through much trial and error and happenchance, both the Soviet Union and the United States had
constructed fairly robust mechanisms through which they managed their delicate balance of terror – from “hotlines” that connected
the White House with the Kremlin; treaties that established limits to types of nuclear weapons, nuclear tests, and anti-missile
systems; and confidence-building instruments such as those providing each other with alerts regarding missile tests and military
exercises. In addition, and perhaps most significantly, both the Soviet Union and the United States had robust retaliatory nuclear
attack capabilities; it meant that neither could gain a war-winning advantage by attacking the other first. Without such robust
systems to manage their nuclear rivalries, the inter-Korean and Sino-Japanese relationships will likely be
fraught with potential dangers. Chief amongst these potential dangers is the “ use ’em or lose ’em”
mentality . If there is no capacity to retaliate after sustaining a nuclear attack, both Seoul and
Pyongyang, as well as Beijing and Tokyo, will face intense pressures to initiate a nuclear attack
against their respective adversaries, especially if one side or the other believes that its adversary will soon
launch a nuclear attack.
Extinction
Lynas 22, [(Mark, Lynas is research and climate lead for the Alliance for Science and is cofounder of the pro-science environmental network RePlanet Since 2009 he has been climate
advisor to former president of the Maldives Mohamed Nasheed (with whom he appears in the
2011 documentary film The Island President), and he currently works to assist Nasheed with the
Climate Vulnerable Forum, a group of the world's most climate-vulnerable 58 developing
countries. He is a strategic advisor for the international ecomodernist NGO WePlanet. He has
co-authored a number of peer-reviewed scientific publications, including a 2021 paper which
found that the consensus on anthropogenic climate change in the scholarly literature now
exceeds 99%) "What the science says: Could humans survive a nuclear war between NATO and
Russia?, Alliance for Science, https://allianceforscience.org/blog/2022/03/what-the-sciencesays-could-humans-survive-a-nuclear-war-between-nato-and-russia/, 3-10-2022, accessed 7-92025]//UT
If global nuclear famine could result from just 100 nuclear detonations, what might be the result of a
fuller exchange of the several thousand warheads held in current inventories by the US and Russia? One 2008 study looked at a
Russia-US nuclear war scenario, where Russia would target 2,200 weapons on Western countries and the US would target 1,100
weapons each on China and Russia. In total, therefore, 4,400 warheads detonate, equivalent to roughly half the current inventories
held each by Russia and the US. Nuclear weapons held by other states were not used in this scenario, which has a 440-Mt explosive
yield, equivalent to about 150 times all the bombs detonated in World War II. This full-scale nuclear war was estimated to cause 770
million direct deaths and generate 180 Tg of soot from burning cities and forests. In the US, about half the population would be
within 5km of a ground zero, and a fifth of the country’s citizens would be killed outright. A subsequent study, published in 2019,
looked at a comparable but slightly lower 150 Tg atmospheric soot injection following an equivalent
scale nuclear war. The devastation causes so much smoke that only 30-40 percent of sunlight
reaches the Earth’s surface for the subsequent six months. A massive drop in temperature
follows, with the weather staying below freezing throughout the subsequent Northern
Hemisphere summer. In Iowa, for example, the model shows temperatures staying below 0°C for 730 days
straight. There is no growing season. This is a true nuclear winter . Nor is it just a short blip.
Temperatures still drop below freezing in summer for several years thereafter, and global precipitation falls by half by years three
and four. It takes over a decade for anything like climatic normality to return to the planet. By this
time, most of Earth’s human population will be long dead. The world’s food production would crash by
more than 90 percent, causing global famine that would kill billions by
starvation . In most countries less than a quarter of the population survives by the end of year two in this scenario. Global
fish stocks are decimated and the ozone layer collapses . The models are eerily specific. In the
4,400 warhead/150 Tg soot nuclear war scenario, averaged over the subsequent five years, China sees a reduction in food
calories of 97.2 percent, France by 97.5 percent, Russia by 99.7 percent, the UK by 99.5 percent and the US by 98.9 percent. In all
these countries, virtually everyone who survived the initial blasts would subsequently starve. Human
extinction ?
SCENARIO 2 IS THE WORLD’S COLDEST HOTSPOT
Hypersonic superiority emboldens Russian and Chinese first strike
Lee 23 [Caitlin Lee, Caitlin Lee is a senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace studies, a DC
based think tank with a focus on Aerospace "Bolstering Arctic Domain Awareness to Deter Air & Missile
Threats to the Homeland", June 2023, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace studies,
https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/app/uploads/2023/06/41-Bolstering-Arctic-Domain-AwarenessFINAL.pdf?]
Moscow and Beijing can exploit their Arctic footholds to launch air and
cruise missile strikes that can reach targets in nearly every U.S. state . Growing
U.S. Government concern about cruise missile threats emanating from northern approaches is reflected in DOD’s 2022 Missile
Defense Strategy, which identifies the U.S.-Canada partnership through NORAD as the backbone of efforts to improve early warning
surveillance of “increasingly sophisticated conventional missile capabilities that are able to target
critical infrastructure in North America.”22 Over the last three decades , conventional missiles of all
types have become weapons of choice for U.S. adversaries. Since the 1990s, China and Russia have
explored options to employ long-range, conventional weapons to deter U.S. leaders
without provoking a nuclear response . Chinese doctrine describes precision
strikes as a means of “war control” to manage escalation and frames power
projection nodes, such as Air Force and Navy bases in Guam that are in the range of China’s DF-26 ballistic missiles, as
sources of U.S. vulnerability in warfare.23 In 2017, China deployed its DF-17 ballistic missile, reportedly with approval from
Moscow, along its border with Russia where it could reach the U.S. homeland via the polar region while remaining outside the range
of Navy Aegis anti-ballistic missile ships in the Pacific.24 Missile warfare is becoming a premier means for
Russia to project power; in Ukraine, Russia has launched hundreds of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as suicide drones,
targeting power grids and other critical infrastructure in an attempt to force Kyiv into a settlement. Given adversaries’
growing interest in employing missiles for a quick, low-cost advantage, it’s perhaps not surprising
that missile-related threats to the U.S. homeland have, as the 2022 Missile Defense Review noted, “rapidly
expanded in quantity, diversity, and sophistication.”26 Modern conventional cruise missiles are
the most rapidly growing threat in terms of numbers and employment because they are
harder to detect, track, target, and intercept compared to ballistic missiles. The
operational advantages of cruise missiles can best be understood by comparing them to ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles
generally cost less than ballistic missiles.28 They are also highly maneuverable, in contrast to ballistic
missiles, which fly a predictable ballistic trajectory that can be detected from thousands of miles
away. Cruise missiles are also harder to detect because they can fly at low altitudes below the scans of
surface radars and take advantage of ground clutter to obscure their signatures. Finally, subsonic cruise
missiles, which constitute the great majority of current cruise missile inventories, are harder to detect because they do not
produce significant infrared signatures. Cruise missile rocket boosters are small and burn for only a few seconds, and
air-launched subsonic cruise missiles would not even need a rocket booster.29 This means cruise missiles may not be
detectable by existing space-based missile detection and warning systems, which were designed
to detect ballistic missiles with a bigger heat signature during the Cold War era.30 Because cruise missiles
greatly complicate detection and early warning, adversaries have begun to favor their development over
continued ballistic missile development. The trend is part of a broader one that favors increasingly maneuverable
designs, to include not just conventional cruise missiles, but other types as well. These include hypersonic
cruise missiles , which fly above Mach 5 and trade a larger heat signature and less maneuverability for higher speed. And
then there is China’s fractional orbital bombardment system, or (FOBS), which launches a highly
maneuverable hypersonic glide missile into orbit and then de-orbits it into the earth’s atmosphere
on an unpredictable trajectory. Overall, these trends suggest that adversaries are developing missiles with a
spectrum of attributes specifically designed to impose increasingly tough operational problems on
U.S., allied, and partner missile defenses .31 The attributes of cruise missiles make them particularly attractive
options for longrange strikes, and their relatively low cost means adversaries can access them at scale and may be more willing to
expend them to deter U.S. leadership below the nuclear threshold. On the higher end of the missile spectrum, to include
ballistic missiles, more sophisticated hypersonic cruise missiles, and FOBs, weapon costs increase with their
capability. Adversaries will have fewer of these assets and may prefer to hold them for actions that are higher on the escalation
ladder, to include offensive and retaliatory nuclear strikes.
Conventional conflict goes nuclear
Sugden 21, [(Bruce M, Research Staff Member at Institute for Defense Analyses) "Nuclear
Operations and Counter-Homeland Conventional Warfare: Navigating Between Nuclear
Restraint and Escalation Risk, Texas National Security Review,
https://tnsr.org/2021/10/nuclear-operations-and-counter-homeland-conventional-warfarenavigating-between-nuclear-restraint-and-escalation-risk/, 10-xx-2021, accessed 7-13-2025] UT
Though the publicly available data on the three nuclear competitors’ nuclear thresholds and views of a conventional-nuclear
firebreak paint an incomplete picture, this first cut at the data reveals several themes and potential triggers of nuclear escalation. If
these potential triggers are salient in decision-makers’ minds in wartime, then they might diminish their likelihood of initiating
counter-homeland conventional strikes. The first potential trigger of a nuclear response is enemy conventional
strikes that degrade or destroy a significant proportion of U.S., Russian, or Chinese means of
exercising national-level command and control, especially of nuclear forces. Conventional
strikes against the nuclear retaliatory weapon systems themselves will similarly increase the likelihood of nuclear
escalation.
Second, because the nuclear competitors’ integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems are pivotal in ensuring
their nuclear retaliatory forces and command-and-control nodes do not suffer a surprise counterforce
attack and in safeguarding their senior leadership from decapitation, the competitors seem prepared to view
conventional strikes against their own systems as a trigger for nuclear escalation. A complicating factor is that
some of the integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems are increasingly dual-use: They ensure the survival and
responsiveness of nuclear forces, as well as the effective operations of non-nuclear forces, such as air and missile defense forces.109
For example, Russia could conduct a set of initial conventional strikes to degrade or destroy U.S. missile early-warning
and tracking systems in order to enable more effective follow-on conventional strikes on the continental United States.
However, losing those systems could increase the risk of a surprise counterforce attack against U.S. nuclear
forces, thus moving American decision-makers to believe that Russia was on the cusp of a nuclear first strike
against U.S. nuclear forces. As a result, the United States might decide to conduct a preemptive nuclear first
strike against Russia to limit damage against the U.S. homeland. It is possible that the competitors will view attacks against
an opponent’s integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems as a likely nuclear trigger, and therefore decide not to
conduct such an attack in the first place and forego the military benefits of the attack in a conventional conflict.
Third, intentionally or unintentionally targeting civilian society raises the risk of social upheaval or a steep, deep, and
prolonged decline of the domestic economy, which could lead to nuclear escalation to persuade the attacker to
halt its counter-homeland campaign. Targeting homeland energy infrastructure and warsupporting industry is common to the major nuclear competitors’ ways of war. Though
conventional strikes targeting these assets are not akin to directly targeting population centers to inflict pain and
suffering (the intended initial effects of a punishment strategy), pain and suffering across population centers could be the secondorder effects of strikes against some types of energy infrastructure and war-supporting industry targets.110
Chinese probing escalates—Arctic war
Scheers 4-28, [(Alex Alfirraz, Alex Alfirraz Scheers is a London-based defense analyst. He
has held research positions at the Henry Jackson Society and the International Centre for the
Study of Radicalisation, and his work on nuclear issues has been published by the Diplomat,
Small Wars Journal, RealClearDefense, and the Royal United Services Institute.) "Get Ready for
the Aleutian Island Crisis, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/04/28/aleutianschina-russia-arctic-geopolitics-defense/, 04-28-2025, accessed 7-13-2025] UT
Move over, Cuba—there are new islands in town. While the prospect of a nuclear crisis over Taiwan remains a genuine and
dangerous possibility, China’s activities around the Aleutian Islands should not be overlooked. Brazen
Chinese military activities in and around the islands and the Bering Strait could escalate.
The Aleutian Islands are part of the U.S. state of Alaska, so they are part of U.S. vital interests. Failure to enhance
deterrence and demonstrate resolve over the chain not only threatens the territorial integrity of
the United States in the Arctic, but could also embolden Beijing to intensify military operations
in the Taiwan Strait.
The situation in the Arctic is heating up. In recent years, China and Russia have made joint military forays into the region. Now, U.S.
President Donald Trump seemingly wants to annex Greenland. “We need Greenland for international safety and security,” Trump
said recently. On March 28, he even deployed his didactic sidekick, Vice President J.D. Vance, to the Danish territory.
Meanwhile, the threats to the Alaskan Arctic, northwest of the continental United States, have intensified. Indeed, the
most recent annual threat assessment report published by the Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) briefly
mentions Alaska in the context of emerging threats.
The DNI report, published on March 25, is chilling. While it highlights growing concerns over Chinese designs on Taiwan and
Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, it fails to address the specific threats posed to the Aleutian Islands, an obscure
island chain off the coast of Alaska.
This warrants a course correction. While the Trump administration obsesses over Greenland, China’s assertiveness in the
Alaskan Arctic should be of major concern to the U.S. military and foreign-policy establishment.
Consequently, the United States should make defense of the Aleutian Islands a national security
priority to offset the possibility of a nuclear crisis in the Arctic.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has gradually downscaled its military outposts around the
island chain. In 1997, a major naval base located on Adak Island was closed. Today, Washington’s adversaries have
renewed their interest in the Aleutian Islands. While remote, the chain is not impervious to Chinese
and Russian military predations.
Alaskan Sen. Dan Sullivan has recently expressed his concerns about Chinese and Russian incursions around the islands. Last
September, Sullivan wrote that “as the world becomes more dangerous, Alaska continues to be on the frontlines of
authoritarian aggression. Coordinated activity off Alaska’s shores by the Russians and Chinese is
increasing.”
Washington should heed the strategic salience of the Aleutian Islands, if its foreign-policy and military establishment wants to
secure its vital interests in the Arctic.
China is not an Arctic nation, yet it has declares itself to be an Arctic power, designating the region to
China’s high north as part of its sphere of influence. In Chapter 33 of its 14th five-year plan, a document that
outlines Chinese geostrategic policy, Beijing explicitly stated its vision for the region: China “will strengthen the investigation and
evaluation of strategic resources in the deep sea” and “participate in practical cooperation in the Arctic and build the ‘Polar Silk
Road.’”
Conducting research expeditions in the Arctic deepens China’s economic links to the region. Economic
and military resilience is the bedrock of Chinese national security strategy, and both shape Chinese
President Xi Jinping’s global ambitions.
Speaking about the Chinese in December, Iris A. Ferguson—the former U.S. deputy assistant secretary for defense for Arctic and
global resilience—said that the United States needs “to be clear-eyed about some of their intentions” as well as
“thinking about their long-term interests” and “how we can best protect ours.”
To this point, in July 2024, two Chinese H-6 nuclear-capable bombers operating within the Alaska Air Defense
Identification Zone were intercepted by American and Canadian fighter jets, indicating that Chinese
excursions into the Arctic are not merely done for scientific and economic purposes.
The Chinese aircraft were accompanied by Russian TU-95 nuclear-capable bombers, meaning that the air
patrol was the first time that China and Russia have been documented conducting a joint patrol near Alaska.
That same month, four Chinese military warships were spotted in the Bering Sea, roughly 200 kilometers (124
miles) north of Amchitka Pass and northeast of the Atka Island, both part of the Aleutian Islands.
According to comments made at the time by Michael Salerno, a U.S. Coast Guard public affairs officer, these encounters have
become commonplace since 2021 but were rare before 2017.
In recent years, China has also increased its naval presence in the Arctic—completing extensive round trips across critical strategic
areas such as the Bohai Sea and the Bering Sea. Beijing’s increased naval presence in these geostrategic locations puts the United
States at a disadvantage, threatening to disrupt its maritime military capabilities and frustrate navigational operations.
As U.S. Maj. Ryan Tice indicated in 2020, “because the Bering Strait lies at the boundary of three
geographic combatant commands (GCCs), increased adversary activity around the strait creates
challenges for unity of effort among those combatant commands.’
Sullivan, the senator, has raised these concerns with the Senate Armed Services Committee. Following additional Chinese and
Russian joint military exercises in September 2024, Sullivan stated, “on five separate occasions in the past seven days, Russian
military incursions into our ADIZ [air defense identification zone] or EEZ [US exclusive economic zone] have occurred—both naval
and air.”
In response, the U.S. Army deployed its 11th Airborne Division to the Aleutian Islands. Yet as the United States’s strategic
environment grows increasingly dangerous, more needs to be done to counter the threat emanating
from Chinese forces in the Arctic. By conducting military exercises in places such as the Bering Sea and the Aleutian
Islands, a region dominated by the United States, China is also demonstrating resolve at the United States’s
expense.
As Brandon J. Babin, a senior analyst at the China Strategic Focus Group, has asserted, “[t]his counterbalance seems to require a
buildup of China’s means of strategic deterrence.”
Freedom of navigation is a critical factor in ensuring the United States can maintain its mission to deter adversaries in the Arctic.
While Beijing’s interests appear to be ostensibly economic, Chinese access to important geostrategic locations carries significant
national security implications for the United States and its allies across the Pacific.
Specifically, Chinese efforts to bolster military operations in U.S. strategic buffer zones undermine
regional deterrence capabilities. Indeed, such activities are a direct challenge to the United States’
vital interests and could potentially obstruct Washington’s extended deterrence operations from
the Arctic and northern Pacific regions, with potential implications rippling down to the western
and southern Pacific as well.
Furthermore, the U.S. has multiple interests in the Arctic, which overlap with the interests of NATO member states such as Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. As tensions intensify between the United States, China, and
Russia, the importance of strategic choke points such as the Bering Sea will only increase.
While Washington’s extended nuclear deterrence mission against China focuses on dissuading aggression against Taiwan, coercion
of Japan and South Korea, and the potential targeting of strategic positions such as the U.S. territory Guam—all concerns located
farther south in the vast Pacific Ocean—the threats that the United States and its regional allies face from China in the Arctic are just
as severe.
Attempts to undermine long-standing territorial boundaries in the form of provocative activities can also lead to increased tensions
and could escalate even further, turning critical island chains into theaters of crises—or worse, war.
For example, there are indications that China perceives the Aleutian Islands as part of what is known as its
first island chain. As Adm. Liu Huaqing, the former commander of the Chinese Navy, stated in 1987, “the first island chain
refers to the Aleutian Islands, the Kurile Islands, the Japanese archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands,
Taiwan Island, the Philippine archipelago, and the Greater Sunda Island in the Western Pacific
that form an arc-shaped arrangement of islands akin to a metal chain.”
To put Liu’s claims into context, the Aleutian Islands comprise 14 main islands and 55 smaller ones. These islands continue to host
U.S. Naval and Coast Guard forces. The distance between the westernmost island in the archipelago, Attu Island, and the eastern
coast of mainland China is 4,000 kilometers (nearly 2,500 miles).
Yet in the aforementioned incident in July 2024, four Chinese military warships were spotted in the Bering Sea. Such activities could
lead to a tense standoff in the United States’ backyard. By expending unnecessary foreign-policy attention in Greenland, Washington
risks being caught off guard. Being prepared in the Alaskan Arctic would enhance Washington’s ability
to deter conflict across the first island chain—including the East Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the
South China Sea.
Taiwan has long been a focal point for analysts and policymakers alike, and rightly so. However, as Sullivan
warned in September, “authoritarian regimes are testing the United States. … Congress and the President should
do more to deter further aggression. … We must continue to send a strong message to Xi Jinping and [Russian
President Vladimir] Putin that the United States will not hesitate to protect and defend our vital interests in
Alaska and beyond.”
Joint Chinese and Russian military naval and air patrols around the Aleutian Islands should deeply concern the United States’
military and foreign-policy establishment. Permanently reopening the naval base on Adak Island would certainly be a vital first step
in enhancing deterrence around the region.
When nuclear weapons states are involved, miscalculations can prove to be gravely consequential. As
RUSI analyst Jamie Kwong wrote in 2018, “the Arctic remains an important region in the global nuclear
security complex.” The United States operates the North Warning System, an early warning system intended to detect threats
in the Arctic. Deliberate or accidental Chinese actions that are perceived to be threatening could
trigger these U.S. early warning systems, and detection could lead to defensive military action.
In the fog of uncertainty, U.S. nuclear command and control would have to make a decision that could precipitate
a standoff—and a standoff between nuclear powers always carries with it the inextricable risk of nuclear escalation.
With tensions already running high, a deep distrust between China and United States underpins the strategic environment. An
incursion into U.S. territory could compel the United States to militarily engage with Chinese
assets. For example, should a Chinese jet fly into U.S. Arctic airspace, or should a vessel stray into regional territorial waters, the
United States could opt to strike.
Accidental or inadvertent escalation also poses a risk. In September 2022, a Type 055 Nanchang guided missile
destroyer came within 160 kilometers (about 100 miles) of the Aleutian Island of Kiska. It was armed with up to 112 cruise missiles.
The accidental launch of a Chinese missile could push the protagonists to the nuclear brink. After
all, the strategic environment in the Arctic is already febrile, and costly accidents can happen.
The threshold for U.S. military action in the Arctic remains unclear. A Chinese crossing of a trip wire could also lead to escalating
tensions and trigger a nuclear crisis. The United States should establish a clear threshold in the Arctic in order to
signal to its adversaries which activities are tolerable and which would prompt a military response. Trump
stated in January that “you don’t even need binoculars—you look outside. You have China ships all over the place. You have Russia
ships all over the place. We’re not letting that happen.”
The United States should respond to the growing Chinese threat by communicating red lines in the Arctic. Should the United
States fail to issue clear red lines to Beijing over military activities in the Bering Strait and the northern Pacific,
then Washington stands to unwittingly encourage Beijing to take greater geopolitical risks close
to U.S. territorial boundaries.
Beijing may perceive a lack of resolve as a source of encouragement to escalate tensions in the
Taiwan Strait. Or worse, U.S. inaction might be seen as a sign that Taiwan is there for the taking. If
deterrence isn’t restored in the Alaskan Arctic, then the Aleutians could be next in line to join Cuba and Taiwan in the
annals of crisis history.
Taiwanese intervention culminates in extinction
Anderson 24, [(James H., The Honorable James H. Anderson is the former Acting Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. Prior to serving in that role, Dr. Anderson was Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, sworn in on June 8, 2020. In this capacity, Dr. Anderson was
the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for defense policy and leads the formulation
and coordination of national security policy within the Department of Defense. He was
responsible for efforts to build partnerships and defense cooperation with U.S. friends and
allies.) "The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear Threats, U.S. Naval
Institute, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-willalmost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats, 03-XX-2024, accessed 7-24-2025] UT
At the very least, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would provide a major stress test of its NFU policy if the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) struggled to subdue the island with conventional force. Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) leaders might even consider failure an existential threat. As defense analyst Mike Sweeney at Defense
Priorities put it:
Any battle over Taiwan will not just be a question of territorial aggression but a fight over the core conception of
modern China’s soul. And for the leaders who launch such an endeavor, their political futures will
hinge on the outcome, as will, possibly, their physical safety and that of their families in the event of
failure. Under such circumstances, nuclear use might not be palatable, but it could seem far more plausible if military
defeat were to equate to loss of domestic power and possible death anyway.5
It has become conventional wisdom among China watchers that if China’s leaders decide to invade Taiwan, there
is nothing anyone can do to change their minds. If true, this provides another reason to consider potential Chinese
nuclear threats, since the “stop at nothing” narrative logically entails escalation if conventional means fail to
achieve success.
China’s DF-17 solid-fuel, road-mobile ballistic missile (above, on parade in Beijing) can be conventionally or nuclear armed. In a
Taiwan scenario, the United States must be prepared to deal with nuclear threats to its allies in the Indo-
Pacific area.
These considerations raise the question of how China might use nuclear threats in a Taiwan invasion. Notably, there is evidence that
not all Chinese military theorists believe using nuclear weapons on their own soil (which they consider Taiwan to be) would
constitute a violation of the NFU policy.6 That said, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which China might be tempted to use
nuclear weapons on the island itself. It is more plausible to imagine Beijing launching an electromagnetic pulse attack over Taiwan.7
In theory, such a weapon could paralyze the island’s communication networks. Inflicting such a sudden and massive psychological
blow might, in turn, shock Taipei’s political leaders into capitulation.
China also could use nuclear threats to dissuade the United States from rendering military assistance to Taiwan during a crisis.
Here, it is worth recalling that senior Chinese officials have already issued such threats against the United States, as happened
during the Taiwan crisis in 1996 and again in 2005.8 What is more, Chinese military publications and journals have mentioned—on
multiple occasions—the potential for nuclear first strikes against the United States as part of various Taiwan invasion scenarios.9
China might seek to leverage its nuclear weapons in a future Taiwan crisis without resorting to explicit nuclear threats. Since a good
portion of the PLA’s nuclear forces are based on mobile platforms, it could disperse them during a crisis to assume a
more threatening posture.10 It also could adjust nuclear alert levels to signal intent. If these measures did
not deter third-party intervention, China could resort to more dramatic action, such as firing a nuclear
demonstration shot near Taiwan, Okinawa, Guam, or even Hawaii during an invasion crisis.
One might counter that China is unlikely to cross the nuclear threshold in a Taiwan conflict for fear of international
condemnation. This may well be the case, at least initially. But China could reconsider its position, especially if
third-party intervention threatened to derail its invasion plans. It is worth remembering that China did not
intend to issue nuclear threats when it instigated its 1969 border war with the Soviet Union. But eventually Beijing did exactly that
after it feared the Soviets might escalate the conflict.11
China’s Growing Nuclear Arsenal
China has long had a no-first-use policy when it comes to nuclear weapons. According to Center for a New American Security analyst
Jacob Stokes, however, decisions regarding first use are more likely to be made based on the worldview of the nation’s leader—
currently Xi Jinping (left)—than on strategic documents.
The growth of China’s nuclear arsenal may increase its willingness to issue nuclear threats in the
future. To understand why, it is important to recall China’s nuclear history. At the dawn of the Nuclear Age, China
sought to diminish the importance of nuclear weapons. In 1946, CCP Chairman Mao Zedong famously denigrated the bomb as
nothing more than a “paper tiger.” Mao made a virtue of necessity because China did not have the
technological means to develop nuclear weapons until 1964. For decades afterward, China appeared
content with a small nuclear arsenal, confident it could deter the United States—and later the Soviet Union—with an
assured second-strike capability. But the discovery of China’s new missile fields in 2021 suggests Beijing’s
nuclear doctrine is changing.
China’s decision to dramatically expand its nuclear capabilities is the most consequential development in
the PLA’s ongoing modernization efforts. As the Pentagon’s 2023 annual report put it, “Over the next decade, the PRC will
continue to rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces. Compared to the PLA’s nuclear
modernization efforts a decade ago, current efforts dwarf previous attempts in both scale and complexity
[emphasis added].”12
Over time, China’s nuclear arsenal expansion may embolden its behavior—including the propensity to
issue nuclear threats.13 As the 2021 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report asserts, “It could also be
intended to support a new strategy of limited nuclear first use. Such a strategy would enable Chinese leaders to
leverage their nuclear forces to accomplish Chinese political objectives beyond survival, such as coercing another state or deterring
U.S. intervention in a war over Taiwan.”14
The United States still maintains an advantage in terms of strategic warheads, but the PLA is closing the gap. In its 2023 report on
Chinese military power, the Pentagon estimates China “will probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030.”15 The
fact that the U.S. nuclear arsenal will remain larger than China’s for at least the next few years provides no guarantee that
Beijing will refrain from nuclear threats in the near term. Historically, China has demonstrated a
willingness to instigate crises, even against stronger military powers, to achieve political aims.16
Moreover, Chinese writings have long focused on the political nature of nuclear weapons, especially
their potential to inflict psychological shock. All this should be front of mind when considering the potential for China to
resort to nuclear threats during a Taiwan invasion, whether in the near or distant future.
The nature of the PLA’s force structure also increases the odds that the next major crisis over Taiwan will
include a nuclear dimension. The dual-use capability of selected Chinese missiles, such as the DF-26
“carrier killer,” means the PLA can exchange conventional warheads for nuclear ones in short order. This
would present special intelligence and operational challenges for the U.S. Navy during a conflict over
Taiwan. In addition, the PLA’s commingling of conventional and nuclear weapons raises the risk of inadvertent
nuclear escalation since the Pentagon’s playbook normally involves precision strikes deep into
enemy territory.17
SCS escalation is fast and destabilizing.
Andreas Kluth ‘24 [(Andreas Kluth is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering US
diplomacy, national security and geopolitics. Previously, he was editor-in-chief of Handelsblatt
Global and a writer for the Economist.) "The South China Sea Is the Next Test of US Resolve,"
Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-03-03/the-south-china-sea-isamerica-s-next-crucible, 3-3-2024] UT
If we weren’t so preoccupied with Russia and Ukraine, Israel and Gaza, North and South Korea or China and Taiwan, we’d also be
paying due attention to another conflict zone: the S outh C hina S ea. US strategizing there, as it happens,
can clarify Washington’s stance in those other hotspots. The question in all of them is when, why and
how the US should intervene, and whether it should be prepared to go to war. The aggressor in the South China Sea is
communist China. Like five other littoral nations — Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Vietnam — China is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. A sixth, Taiwan, can’t sign the
treaty only because it isn’t a member of the UN. (The US is not a signatory, although in practice it abides by Unclos.) If China
respected international law, therefore, there wouldn’t be any disputes in the first place. As ever and everywhere, however,
international law coexists awkwardly with the reality of state power and national
interests . And China has long staked a claim to almost the entire South China Sea. In doing so, Beijing points to an old map
of obscure provenance, first drawn when the Nationalists still controlled China. It shows a nine-dash line around the South China
Sea. In other contexts (most bizarrely, the movie Barbie), this alleged boundary has ten or eleven dashes. In 2016 a tribunal in The
Hague ruled that under international law and Unclos the line was poppycock. That should have settled the matter. It did not. China
kept building military structures on disputed shoals and rocks — one atoll is aptly named Mischief Reef. Its intent is to turn these
isles into unsinkable aircraft carriers that will one day help China to push the US Navy out of waters Beijing considers to lie within
its “first island chain” — that is, inside China’s proper s phere o f i nfluence. That build-up naturally pits
China against Vietnam and others who claim the same islands. China has also resumed
bullying the Philippines, a former US territory that now has a mutual-defense treaty with its
one-time overlord. In recent months, the Chinese coast guard water-cannoned, blocked, harassed and even rammed
Philippine boats sailing in shoals over which Manila has sovereignty. The two nations are not yet close to going to war. But
collisions and clashes can easily escalate . China’s truculence therefore raises the question: Under what
circumstances should the US show up to back its ally, with the attendant risks of a conflagration? It’s tempting to argue, as Lyle
Goldstein at the think tank Defense Priorities does, that America “should not go to war over rocks or reefs or shoals.” But there’s
more at stake than fish, coral and sand, as Jacob Stokes at the Center for a New American Security told me. The
stakes are both similar to those in today’s other conflicts and different. The S outh C hina S ea, like the Red Sea, is one of
the world’s busiest waterways, with more than $3 trillion in goods passing through every year.
Allowing China to fortify the sea to a point where it can close off maritime trade to specific
countries in the event of a war would seem poor strategy. But China wouldn’t do that at first; it
would merely seize shoals and reefs. In doing so, however, China would again disdain and break
international law , or what the US (which itself doesn’t always want to be bound by that law) prefers to call the “rulesbased order.” In that way, the South China Sea is analogous to Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine with a
tale as spurious as China’s nine-dash line: a mystical narrative that Ukrainians are really Russians and therefore belong to the
Kremlin. Russia is now trampling on the sovereignty and integrity of a fellow member state of the UN. If Putin isn’t stopped, he will
go on — to Moldova and elsewhere. Likewise, if Beijing got away with seizing a Vietnamese or Philippine
island, it would grab more . The UN Charter and international law would become as
irrelevant as the League of Nations did when it failed to stop Mussolini and Hitler.
Admittedly, the Filipinos wouldn’t experience anything remotely as disastrous as the Ukrainians are suffering. The latter are fighting
for their national existence, being bombed in their own homes and mourning the loss of children the Russians have abducted. The
former, at least initially, only stand to lose some uninhabited islands. But there’s also the defense alliance between the US and the
Philippines to consider. If the Chinese seized the islands, America’s other allies would observe
Washington’s response. So uth Ko rea would determine whether it can still feel safe under
the US nuclear umbrella against North Korea, as would Japan with an eye to both
Pyongyang and Beijing and NATO members such as Estonia that are in Putin’s crosshairs. If
the US reneged on its commitments to defend the Philippines, all its other alliances would
lose value , triggering new nuclear and conventional arms races and inviting
aggression by America’s enemies. The US should also ensure that it never has to fight alone. So it ought to keep
expanding its network of partners to align the equivalent of posses — in the Indo-Pacific region that could include the “Quad,” a
partnership with Australia, Japan and India; and AUKUS, a triad formed with the Brits and Aussies. China, like Russia, should
always have to worry that its aggression might face a response from a large part of the world. Two other major conflicts raging today
are qualitatively different, however. One is the war between Israel and Hamas. It’s not an interstate conflict (and only will be once
there is a two-state solution). Instead, it’s the fight by a militarily strong nation, Israel — which is a partner of the US but doesn’t
have a mutual-defense treaty — against a terrorist group, Hamas, that attacked it in the most sadistic ways. In the process of
retaliating against Hamas, however, Israel now stands accused in The Hague of violating international law. In this struggle the US
can mediate, but it cannot side simply with either Palestinians or Israelis. In the long term, it must distance itself from the region,
where its own interests are increasingly unclear. The other worry is about China and Taiwan — Beijing indeed sees the cross-Strait
question as linked to its ambitions in the South China Sea. This too isn’t officially an interstate dispute. The US recognizes only one
China, and in the 1970s acknowledged the People’s Republic as its representative. At the same time, with the Taiwan Relations Act,
Washington expressed its “expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means” and that anything else would
be a matter “of grave concern.” Deliberately ambiguous, the phrase nonetheless suggests that the US might go to war on behalf of a
democratic friend if the mainland attacked. All these conflicts — in Ukraine, the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and even the
Middle East, where Israel has nukes and Iran could soon get them — involve nuclear powers, making the stakes potentially
existential. As it’s been said, such wars “cannot be won and must never be fought.” But the US would be wrong to
conclude that it should therefore deter itself rather than its enemies. The best way to ensure a
world that’s worth living in is for the US to make clear to its adversaries that it would , if it
came to it, go to war — even over reefs, shoals and rocks.
Modernizing missile defense systems is k2 countering adversarial
advances
AC 25, [(Atlantic Council, the Atlantic Council is a think tank that promotes constructive
leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the Atlantic Community’s central
role in meeting global challenges. The Council provides an essential forum for navigating the
dramatic economic and political changes defining the twenty-first century by informing and
galvanizing its uniquely influential network of global leaders. The Atlantic Council—through the
papers it publishes, the ideas it generates, the future leaders it develops, and the communities it
builds—shapes policy choices and strategies to create a more free, secure, and prosperous
world..)) "'First, we will defend the homeland': The case for homeland missile defense, Atlantic
Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/first-we-willdefend-the-homeland-the-case-for-homeland-missile-defense/, 1-4-2025, accessed 7-72025]//UT
First, the 2022 NDS clearly defines the requirement for homeland missile defense. Moreover, the strategy designates the defense of
the homeland as the first priority, followed by deterring strategic attacks against the homeland.12 More to the point, the 2022 MDR
provides that missile defenses “are critical to the top priority of defending the homeland and deterring attacks against the United
States.”13 This overarching policy reflects continuity with prior administrations.
Second, the threat driving that requirement is growing. According to senior administration officials, Russia and China are
“fielding more advanced offensive missiles—ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic—in greater
numbers to not only deter [US] involvement in a regional conflict but also to directly target the
US homeland. The scale and scope of these multi-dimensional threats present significant risks to the American people and the
homeland.”14 The North Korean ICBM threat continues apace and may include missiles with
multiple warheads in the future. Senior US military commanders are starting to fear that
currently planned missile defense capabilities will not be able to maintain the advantageous US
position against North Korea and potentially Iran.
Third, the strategy behind these threats is clear. Potential adversaries will seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the “American way of
war” by posing threats to the US homeland “in an effort to jeopardize the U.S. military’s ability to project power and counter regional
aggression.”15 These states’ intent also is to break the will of US political leaders who may be unwilling to fulfill commitments to
allies if it means running extraordinary risks to the homeland.
Fourth, if left unaddressed, these threats to the homeland could significantly narrow US decision-
making and curtail a president’s freedom of action during crisis and conflict. Adversaries know
that the United States depends on its allies and partners to maintain its “global strategic
advantage,” and that allies, in turn, depend on US security commitments.16 Russia and China
hope to weaken US alliance ties by creating doubts about US security commitments among its allies. Allies,
fearing a weakening of US commitment due to an increasing US vulnerability to attack, could seek accommodation with
challengers in their region or develop their respective nuclear weapons to deter these threats.
Fifth, the objective or purpose of US homeland missile defense is not to create an impenetrable
missile shield for the American public, but rather to frustrate adversary strategies that rely on
threatening missile attacks against the United States. Missile defense systems are meant to
supplement the deterrence value provided by US nuclear forces and the prospect of an
overwhelming conventional response to attacks against the homeland—not to replace deterrence
by the threat of punishment. The objective of the missile defense system is to create enough doubt in
the adversary’s mind about the prospect of a successful attack that the adversary concludes such an
attack is not worth the risk—especially alongside fears of enormous consequences. In other
words, such an attack would be futile and fatal.
Sixth, to solve the missile problem, the United States incorporates other military means in its comprehensive missile defense and
defeat strategy. In addition to active defenses meant to intercept warheads after launch, the United
States will employ means to stop an adversary from successfully launching its offensive missiles
when possible. In this way, “offensive measures add credibility to our defensive efforts and reduce the
possibility of continued attacks.”17 This comprehensive approach compensates for any shortcomings in the missile defense
architecture, so the United States need not rely only on active defenses.
Seventh, modest, though important, improvements to current homeland defenses are available over the next five years to address
these threats if policymakers choose to do so. More advanced technologies for missile defense and defeat are
on the horizon and could be exploited with sufficient funding. Increasing the funding for homeland missile
defense—to a full one percent of the annual defense budget—may be sufficient to achieve the missile defense objectives discussed in
this study.
Eighth, arguments against expanding US homeland missile defense because it could stoke an arms race with Russia and China need
to be put in perspective. Not only are Russia and China pursuing their own homeland air and missile
defenses against limited US missile strikes (Russia deploys more homeland defense interceptors than the United
States), but it is counterfactual to assume that US missile defenses will provoke an “action-reaction”
arms race. Quite the opposite has occurred: following the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM
Treaty in 2002, US and Russian nuclear arsenals declined by two-thirds. The New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New START), in effect since February 2011, took numbers even lower. Nevertheless, the United States should
work with Russia and China to make its missile defense plans as transparent as possible.
To summarize, the missile threat to the homeland is real and growing and, if left unaddressed, could
seriously undermine US grand strategy and the very basis of national defense strategy. Since the
objective of missile defense is to supplement and enhance deterrence by complicating attacker plans—
rather than comprehensive population protection—the defensive architecture does not need to be leak-proof.
Rather, a layered architecture with certain key attributes, based on existing and future
technology, can provide an affordable defense to restore the basis for US defense strategy while
reassuring allies.
A change in policy
The principal recommendation of this study is to update US homeland missile defense policy to remove the false
distinction between rogue-state and major-power missile threats and to eliminate sole reliance on nuclear
retaliation to deter Russian and Chinese limited coercive missile attacks against the homeland.
Improving the survivability of US nuclear forces and nuclear command and control also should
be a policy objective. Likewise, the distinction in policy for addressing ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic glide threats no longer
makes sense: If the United States is going to defend against Russian cruise missiles (which is current policy), then Washington
should defend against Russian ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs).
The objective of homeland missile defense is not an impregnable missile defense shield for the country, but rather sufficient defenses
to counter adversary missile threats of coercion—to enable US regional defense strategy—and defenses adequate to ensure the
survivability and endurance of US nuclear retaliatory forces and nuclear command and control against any combination of
adversaries. This requires some tailoring of the missile defense mission depending on the strategy objectives and missile capabilities
of potential adversaries.
The study outlines three categories of threats or scenarios for which missile defense must provide a solution: first, there are the
smaller and possibly undeterrable threats presented by accidental and unauthorized launches as well as by countries such as North
Korea that have limited nuclear capabilities; the second category is limited Russian and Chinese missile threats meant to coerce the
United States (to provoke but not enrage); finally, there is the larger scale (but still limited) preemptive attack against US nuclear
forces and command and control designed to prevent nuclear retaliation.
Accordingly, it should be US policy to:
Stay ahead of the North Korean long-range missile threat through a strategy of layered missile defense combined with offensive
measures to prevent launches before they occur;
Deploy a layered missile defense system to thwart Russian and Chinese coercive strikes (as well as unauthorized or
accidental launches), sized to about one hundred Russian or Chinese warheads, including missiles armed with HGVs. The objective
is not to replace nuclear deterrence provided by US nuclear forces, but to strengthen deterrence by invalidating Russian and Chinese
limited coercive threats.
Enhance the survivability of US nuclear forces and nuclear command and control through a layered missile defense composed of
GBIs, Standard Missile (SM) 3 block IIA missiles deployed on land and at sea, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
missiles for preferential terminal defense of US nuclear forces, and requisite defenses against cruise missiles;
Protect critical US civilian and military infrastructure against air- and sea-launched cruise missile attacks by Russia and China to the
extent feasible and necessary to allow the United States to stay in the fight; and increase funding for research and
development of next-generation missile defense capabilities to stay ahead of the threats,
including improved space-based sensors, space-based interceptors (SBIs), and directed-energy
capabilities.
Homeland defense system design
There is far too much stress placed on the efficacy of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system with its GBIs and radars
for the defense of the homeland. Originally intended to undergo regular upgrades after its initial deployment in 2004,
modernization of the GMD system has failed to keep pace with advancing missile threats.
Moreover, the GMD system was never meant to stand alone against the threat—but rather as part of a layered approach that
contemplates defenses in other phases of flight to compensate for the GMD system’s shortcomings and to provide
additional intercept opportunities.
Layering is essential to a successful missile defense architecture (See Figure 1). This approach
improves overall effectiveness by intercepting warheads during different phases of flight and
with different interceptor missiles supported by a range of radars and sensors. Intercepts at each
layer “thins the herd” for the following layers. Attacking warheads containing countermeasures that may fool the defense in
one layer may prove useless in another. Multiple layers greatly complicate the calculations of the attacker, while reducing the
technical requirements for any given interceptor, because no single layer must work perfectly.
Though layered missile defense has been a long-standing mission of the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA), only GBIs protect the
homeland today. In the near term, the SM-3 and THAAD missiles can bolster homeland protection by providing additional shot
opportunities against incoming warheads that penetrate the GBI defense, but these systems have not been integrated with the GMD
system. Sensor support from satellites under development can substantially improve the viability of layered missile defense early in
the next decade by helping to distinguish between real warheads and countermeasures. When viewed from the attacker’s
perspective, a layered missile defense system presents a very difficult challenge that cannot be solved simply with increased
numbers.
The recommended near-term steps are meant to be a bridge to follow-on technologies necessary to create a next-generation missile
defense capability to defend the homeland.
The DOD must also place more emphasis on investing in future, revolutionary capabilities, such as space
sensors, SBIs, and non-kinetic options (such as directed energy) to outpace adversary capability
development. Another option that has been considered over the years is the development of an air-launched
weapon that could engage threat missiles early in their trajectory.
The MDA also needs to get back into the technology business. The MDA’s technology budget has been dismal
over the past four to five years. Notably, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, the MDA’s science and technology
(S&T) budget was at a historical low, below one percent of its Total Obligational Authority
(TOA). Sticking to only incremental improvements will not defeat rapidly evolving threats. The
DOD should make high-priority technology investments to prove out the Discriminating Space Sensor (DSS) concept on orbit and
rapidly field the capability, per the US Space Development Agency (SDA) model. Other pursuits should include an SBI testbed
demonstration alongside increased investments in directed energy, more robust funding for advanced discrimination techniques, as
well as technological investments in lighter-weight, lower-cost interceptors to make kinetic interceptor options more affordable.
1ac — plan
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially
increase its hypersonic programs and/or homeland missile defenses
in the Arctic.
1ac – A2/AD
SCENARIO 1 IS EUROPE
Russia is escalating A2/AD capabilities in the GIUK gap
Ward 24, [(Shane,) "The GIUK Gap: A New Age of A2/AD in Contested Strategic Maritime
Spaces, Nuclear Network, https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/the-giuk-gap-a-new-age-of-a2-ad-incontested-strategic-maritime-spaces/, 9-12-2024, accessed 7-26-2025] UT
The global strategic environment is ripe for technology-driven great power competition once more.
Russia’s war in Ukraine and pursuit of novel nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, coupled with China’s
expanding nuclear arsenal and capabilities, mean the United States must assess its capabilities and
posture in more theaters simultaneously than ever before. Among them, contested maritime spaces
could be the most pivotal, acting as chokepoints for military movement, trade, and anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) measures. Changing technology and heightened great power tensions are making control of strategic maritime
spaces, such as the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap, more important and more challenging than ever
before. To combat it, NATO can leverage its incomparable joint forces and embrace a new array of technologies to
safeguard control, avoiding ambiguity and harnessing a transparent posture.
“Mind the Gap”
During the height of the Cold War, the GIUK Gap was a critical naval chokepoint in the North Atlantic. Its deep waters represented
the only outlet into the Atlantic Ocean for the Soviet Northern Fleet, essential for affording Moscow the ability to hit the North
American continent with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). “Closing” the gap thus became a NATO priority; sonar
surveillance systems were established across the gap to listen for Soviet submarines, while naval deployments sought to establish
operational control of the seas in the event the conflict turned hot.
The strategic importance of the GIUK Gap diminished as the range of Soviet SLBMs increased, meaning submarines no longer had
to get as close to their targets. This capability allowed Moscow to avoid increased western monitoring that might render their nuclear
weapons-capable submarines (SSBNs) vulnerable to detection. Instead, these submarines retreated into bastions, highly defended
waters close to their homebase on the Kola Peninsula in Russia’s north. As the Cold War ended and the age of peace dividends
began, NATO anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities in the Gap atrophied; in 1989, the United States alone had a force of 80
submarines and 122 principal surface combatants in the Atlantic. In 2022, the United States had 35 and 60, respectively.
Today, conventional wisdom argues that Russia’s revanchist foreign policy and calculated nuclear
modernization mean the GIUK Gap has regained significance despite Moscow’s intercontinental standoff
capabilities. Fears about Russian A2/AD “bubbles,” its ability to influence the European theater with
capable long-range missiles from bastions, the threat of hybrid operations, and new
deployments in the High North necessitate a fresh approach to the waters in and beyond the
Gap. This paper builds on that wisdom, identifying the technical, strategic, and political implications of a NATO A2/AD push in
the region.
Why the Gap matters to Moscow
While the Gap doesn’t feature prominently in written Russian doctrine, it clearly “imposes itself on Russian naval
thinking as a potential barrier to operations.” The security of Russia’s prized Northern Fleet
depends on effective A2/AD and control in the High North.
Russian SSBNs in the Arctic are the Navy’s raison d’être, and they are undergoing a spate of modernization that will take Moscow’s
submarines far into the 21st century. Eventually, six new Borei-A type submarines will be assigned to the Fleet to replace the aging
Delta IV class, while a new next-generation sub, Arktur, could replace older Borei models after 2037. Each Borei submarine can
carry 16 Bulava SLBMs, which can carry up to six warheads each – though this number is probably less under New START
constraints.
Despite the range of these weapons, effective A2/AD around the GIUK Gap is key for Moscow if it is to keep
its most prized bases out of the range of U.S. Tomahawk missiles and give them a safe haven
from which to hold Europe and beyond at risk. Freedom in the north also enables Russia to utilize
hybrid tactics that are challenging to combat.
Despite the poor performance of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea and the rebuilding that must be undertaken, Moscow’s Northern
Fleet remains a challenge for NATO in the north. Putin’s long-term ambition for a blue water navy appears steadfast. While a
Russian break through the Gap is not immediately likely, weakening Moscow’s A2/AD dominance in the GIUK
neighborhood for long-term control ought to be a top priority for the Alliance.
Reprioritizing the “forgotten flank”
Amidst an atrophied northern force and other strategic priorities, NATO’s presence in the High
North and around the Gap remains patchwork. This, despite the 2022 Strategic Concept noting that Russia’s High
North “capability to disrupt Allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North
Atlantic is a strategic challenge to the Alliance.” NATO needs to embrace new technology to
tighten its own A2/AD stranglehold in the key GIUK Gap neighborhood, leveraging initiatives in longstanding member states and capitalizing on the momentum of welcoming two new Arctic countries to the Alliance.
NATO’s priority is slowly turning to the once-forgotten flank. The U.S. Navy re-established the 2nd Fleet in 2018, bolstering forward
presence, while other NATO allies have modernized and closed intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) gaps, including
with a new radar array in the Faroe Islands. Norway, a key player in mitigating unimpeded Russian A2/AD,
signed a defense cooperation agreement with Washington in 2022, enabling U.S. assets to
maintain closer proximity to Russian bastions than before, while presence has been
strengthened in Iceland too.
The United Kingdom will play a pivotal role across the GIUK Gap, though its ASW capabilities are slimmer than before. Royal Air
Force P-8A Maritime Patrol Aircraft deployments and a proposed new generation of ASW frigates have bolstered joint force efforts
and exercises like Dynamic Mongoose for this purpose, but eyes will be on next year’s defense review and whether it will embrace the
challenge with new focused procurement, including on unmanned systems.
Some analysts have suggested that the Russian challenge in the High North cannot be solved by focusing on the GIUK Gap alone.
While a full embrace of open-ocean ASW is ideal, capacity and technology constraints are limiting factors. In the interim, a
hardened barrier of A2/AD assets around the Gap and outward from Norway’s territorial waters
will not only strengthen NATO’s High North capabilities and protection of key operating lanes
from Russian influence, but also provide a training ground for a host of new technologies
relevant to the wider region and other global strategic chokepoints.
Nuclear war
Redmon 21, [(Stephen G. Redmon, he was appointed Special Assistant to the General
Counsel of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and now serves a senior attorney/advisor
with the VA’s Office of General Counsel Information Law Group. A certified mediator, he
received the VA’s Secretary Excellence Award for exemplary national efforts in integrated
alternate dispute resolution. A former Peace Corps Volunteer in Sierra Leone and graduate of
the Certificate in Positive Psychology, Stephen holds three law degrees, a master’s in strategic
intelligence, a PhD in human and organizational systems, He was an assistant professor at the
US Military Academy at West Point and is an adjunct professor at the University of Maryland.)
"War In The Arctic? Rising Tensions Fuel Military Posturing in the Melting North » Karve,
School of Advanced Military Studies US Army Command and General Staff College,
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1161629.pdf, XX-XX-2021, accessed 7-26-2025] UT
The necessity for NATO to move troops to a potential conflict zone near Russia’s border highlights Russia’s relative advantage in its
ability to develop defensive positions before the significant buildup of NATO forces. Russia’s advantage increases with
their existent anti-access area denial ( A2AD) capabilities , which will hinder NATO and the US’s
ability to establish a foothold in an area of conflict . Due to Russia’s perception of NATO’s
conventional weapon’s superiority and its analysis of US operations in Iraq and Kosovo, Russian
planners emphasize the initial period of war in their doctrine.71F 72 Russian military analysts and
theorists determined that the US and NATO set conditions for operational success during the
initial period of war. In American military doctrine, the IPW is the “ seize the initiative ” and early
in the “ dominate” phases . The United States achieves an advantage through the employment of aerial and precision
strike capability.72F 73 Russian success in the IPW would seek to deny NATO forces access to critical
infrastructure for the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of troops into an
area of conflict. It would also deny any ground avenues of approach for NATO ground forces to
move into a potential conflict zone and restrict NATO’s ability to achieve any periods of
air superiority or air supremacy. The key to denying NATO air superiority is Russia maintaining its air defense capability.
Russian air defense capability is not only useful in denying its adversaries the use of aircraft but can defeat cruise
missiles as well.73F 74 US military doctrine employs a mix of groundbased surface to surface fires and air to surface delivery
systems to disrupt adversarial air defense capability.74F 75 The US Army employs weapon systems such as the multiple launch
rocket system (MLRS) to defeat an adversary’s air defense capability. Russian doctrine task organizes to address these threats
specifically.According to a 2019 report by Hans Kristensen, Russia has three different nuclearcapable munitions for its Iskander
missile system. This short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) launcher is employed at the Russian army group level, organized into
Iskander brigades. These brigades have a total of 12 Iskander launchers. Russia has one brigade deployed in the Kaliningrad region,
placing a tactical nuclear-capable system between two NATO countries, Poland and Lithuania. With the Iskander’s reported ability
to range 500 km, Russia can range most of Poland and just over the German border from the Kaliningrad Oblast.75F 76
Additionally, Russia may easily modify the Iskander to range over 500 km.76 F 77In addition to the Iskander system, Russia also has
aircraft capable of delivering nonstrategic nuclear weapons, such as the Tu-22M3M, Tu 22M3, Tu-22, Su 24/34/57, and MiG-31K
(see Table 1). With these aircraft, the Russian military can deliver NSNW with air-launched cruise missiles, air-delivered
ballistic missiles, and bombs. Along with delivering nuclear weapons with a howitzer, Russia can deliver LYBNW to its
adversaries across various weapons systems. A History of Doctrine and Exercising Russian capability goes beyond
resources. Russia has a history of planning the employment of battlefield nuclear weapons. In the 1960s, Russian doctrine
planned to use nuclear weapons to create a hole in a prepared defense that Soviet
mechanized forces could exploit. In the 1980s, Soviet doctrine identified multiple battlefield nuclear weapons employment
would result in highly restricted terrain due to excessive cratering. This estimate drove Soviet doctrine to recommend
employing tactical nuclear weapons on the enemy’s second echelon or reserves. In addition
to the Soviet’s incorporating tactical nuclear weapons into their doctrine, the Soviet military made plans for a two-phased
nuclear operation that employed thousands of nuclear weapons. NATO discovered copies of the plan after
German unification, which the USSR left behind in East Germany.77F 78Russia possesses multiple aircraft that can deliver
non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russian military theorists determined aircraft used against tactical targets
would achieve greater success than using aircraft to strike “strategic” targets based on the Russian experience in World War II and
Russian analysis of the Spanish Civil War.78F 79 Understanding that Russia views aircraft as essential in supporting ground forces
and as a critical weapon to oppose enemy ground forces, some of the planning for the air delivered NSNW likely
intends to achieve tactical victories against NATO ground forces. Recently, Russia exercised nuclear capabilities
during military exercises. Notably, in the 2009 Zapad Exercise, Russia employed a simulated nuclear strike using aircraft while
conducting an amphibious assault on a simulated Polish beach in Kaliningrad.79F 80 In 2016, Russia reportedly simulated the
launch of cruise missiles with non-strategic nuclear weapons during the Kavkaz military exercise. That same year, NATO reported
that Russia had conducted an exercise in 2013 where Russian simulated nuclear weapons delivery against targets in Sweden.80F 81
In August 2020, during a snap drill, Russia exercised the Iskander missiles systems in their nuclear capacity in the Russian Southern
Military District along with conventional Russian forces.81F 82 Russia not only has a history of planning for nuclear
weapons on the tactical and operational level but is currently exercising and planning for these capabilities on
the battlefield.
The Baltics are key theatre in deterring further Russian expansion—
mitigating A2/AD signals resolve
Courtney Stiles Herdt and Matthew Zublic 22, Former Military Fellow at the
International Security Program; European Foreign Area Officer, 11/14/22, Baltic Conflict:
Russia’s Goal to Distract NATO?, https://www.csis.org/analysis/baltic-conflict-russias-goaldistract-nato//UT
The Baltics are a key strategic region where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
Russian military and economic interests overlap. Sabotage of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, regardless of who
executed the attack, has signaled that conflict in the region is no longer left of bang. Gray zone
operations are underway , and the United States, NATO, and their partners need to be
ready to act in unity against an increasingly hostile Russia that is now trying to
distract attention from its military shortcomings in Ukraine . In this effort, Russia’s playbook will
test the limits and try to exploit the seams of the alliance. An exacting response is
needed to deny Russia control and ensure full conflict is avoided. The NATO summit in Vilnius will
be critical to strengthening resolve and a path forward to a combined strategy to deter
further Russian aggression.
Conflict in the Baltics will take place in every domain —air, sea, land, space, and cyber. Russia has
maintained a constant threat to the Baltic region through the full spectrum of gray zone operations, including economic coercion,
disinformation and propaganda, cyber disruption, and covert military incursions. Ukraine may have changed
the calculus for a Russian conflict in the Baltics by revealing significant gaps in Russia’s ability to control the
land and air domains. Conflict in the Baltics would meet the same national, existential resolve that
are on display in Ukraine —with the added weight of mutual defense agreements and NATO Article V commitment.
Though an invasion of the Baltic states or conflict in the Suwalki Gap is unlikely, the conflict in Ukraine has
increased preparation across all domains and on every flank. Baltic states are rightfully
concerned with how fast NATO can collectively respond to a crisis. Control of the maritime domain
and suppression of Russian anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities will be central to that
response. Ironically, the most important preparation has been the solidifying of partnerships and alliances—an unintended
consequence of Russian president Putin’s war.
Nuclear war
Clifford D. May 23, [president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and columnist
for The Washington Times, 06/20/23, What would happen if Putin were to prevail in Ukraine?,
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jun/20/what-would-happen-if-putin-were-toprevail-in-ukra/]UT
After that, perhaps a bolder move: The creation of a land bridge to Kaliningrad, a Russian territory — it was
Konigsberg when it was captured from Germany in 1945 — 400 miles west of the Russian mainland.
Based in Kaliningrad is the Russian navy’s Baltic Fleet. Russian troops there are equipped with mobile nuclear-
capable Iskander-M missiles, and sophisticated air defense systems.
Russian tanks would roll west into Lithuania from Belarus and east into Lithuania from
Kaliningrad. Mr. Putin would need to take only a ribbon of southern Lithuania — in particular, the main road running from
Belarus to Kaliningrad.
But Lithuania is a NATO member, so Mr. Putin wouldn’t dare, right? Don’t be so sure. He’d likely call the invasion “a
special military operation to restore Russian territorial contiguity at a time of
increased NATO aggression against Russia.”
He might also charge that the Russian minority in Lithuania, roughly 7% of its 2.8 million population, is being oppressed and
requires his help. Neighboring Latvia and Estonia, where ethnic Russians are close to a quarter of the population, could be
dealt with later.
Mr. Putin could say to NATO: “I’m open to diplomacy — a land-for-peace deal. But if you’d rather wage war, you should understand
that extreme measures will be considered.”
Now ask yourself: Which NATO members would be willing to risk a nuclear war with Russia over a ribbon of
countryside in the southern Baltics? Turkey? Germany? France? Would most Americans support such a conflict?
It’s tough to see how NATO could survive if it failed to defend one of its members as pledged in Article 5 of the
North Atlantic Treaty.
For Mr. Putin, NATO’s collapse would be a huge victory, one that his communist allies in Beijing and his Islamist
allies in Tehran would regard as a significant battle won in their war against the West.
And in both those capitals, as well as in nuclear-armed Pyongyang, a lesson would be learned: The U.S. and
Europe cave in to nuclear blackmail.
There’s one more geostrategic reality I want to mention. Sandwiched between Lithuania on the north and Poland on the south is the
Suwalki Gap, a narrow stretch of Polish land running from Belarus to Kaliningrad.
A rail link just north of this corridor links Kaliningrad to the Russian mainland. But it functions under an agreement between Russia
and Lithuania, whose relations are now severely strained.
A year ago, Lithuania, complying with European sanctions, prohibited the transit of coal, metals and building materials.
Kaliningrad’s governor called that a “serious violation” of the agreement.
A Russian invasion and occupation of the Suwalki Gap would also trigger Article 5. And it would cut
off Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from their NATO allies, complicating any attempt to provide
materiel and reinforcements in case of a Russian invasion.
Not just coincidentally, comrade, two years ago, Russian and Belarusian troops staged a military exercise to
practice closing off the Suwalki Gap and attacking Lithuania.
Perhaps you’ll say that, after the war in Ukraine, Mr. Putin wouldn’t have the resources and manpower necessary for such
aggressions. But if he’s been successful, Tehran and Beijing would be as helpful as possible. The morale of his troops would improve.
And he’d have millions of Ukrainians whom he could draft and then — with bayonets pressed against their backs — use as cannon
fodder.
This much we should understand by now: Mr. Putin’s mission, as he sees it, is to restore the Russian Empire,
which, for less than a century, was rebranded as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Only mirrored response to Russian hypersonics can revitalize NATO
power projection and counter adversarial aggression
Richard Weitz 22, senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at
Hudson Institute, 02/21/22, NATO’s Hypersonic Challenge, https://icds.ee/en/natoshypersonic-challenge/
Introduction
The hypersonic age has come to European defence. Russia and other European militaries are
researching, developing, and starting to deploy hypersonic delivery systems , which travel five or more
times the speed of sound. Moscow’s hypersonic delivery vehicles – including both hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV)
launched on ballistic missiles and air-breathing hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM) – represent a novel element in
NATO’s threat environment . Due to their combination of sustained rapid speed (at least Mach 5, or around
6,000 km/h), manoeuvrability, unpredictable flight paths, and other characteristics, hypersonic weaponry will intensify
surprise, compress decisionmaking time, strain existing command-andcontrol structures, and
alter warfighting and escalation dynamics.1
There are two general types of hypersonic delivery vehicles. Hypersonic glide (aka “boostglide”) vehicles are boosted into the upper
atmosphere on ballistic missiles; then, at a predetermined height above 50 km in altitude, they detach from their rocket booster and
glide unpowered towards a target, conducting evasive manoeuvres on the way down that make it more difficult to anticipate their
targets or intercept the vehicles. In contrast, hypersonic cruise missiles, even if initially boosted by a plane or other vehicle, employ a
rocket or, more commonly, ramjet or scramjet engine. These advanced engines, which lack moving parts, mix fuel with oxygen
compressed from the surrounding air by the engine’s own design to maintain sustained hypersonic propulsion. Due to their
high speed, all hypersonic missiles offer defenders only a narrow time frame to respond. In
coming years, NATO must craft an effective means of deterrence and defence against Russia’s
emerging arsenal of offensive hypersonic missiles.
1. Russia’s Hypersonic Portfolio
The Russian armed forces aim to equip several military branches with hypersonic delivery systems. The Russian Aerospace Forces
are arming several types of fighters and bombers with precision-strike hypersonic systems. They have already developed the Kh47M2 Kinzhal “Dagger” Air-Launched Ballistic Missile (ALBM); the Kh-47M2 can fly approximately 2,000 km with a maximum
speed of Mach 10. It is presently deployed on a modified 1,000 km-range Mikoyan MiG-31K (NATO code name Foxhound) Sovietera supersonic aircraft, which has a large payload and the power to carry the Kh-47M2 high into the atmosphere before releasing it
for standoff strikes against land and sea targets. By 2024, the Russian military plans to base a fully operational MiG-31 Fighter
Aviation Regiment at Kansk in Russia’s Central Military District.2 From this location, the planes can rapidly redeploy to Russia’s
upgraded Arctic bases and other regions.3 In the future, the Russian Aerospace Forces may arm their strategic bombers with the Kh47M2 or smaller versions of it. These may include the Tu-160 Blackjack supersonic bombers, which have a large payload and 15,000
km range, and the upgraded 2,000 kmrange Tu-22M3 Backfire supersonic bombers, which can carry less but fly faster than the Tu160 Blackjack.4 The new fifth-generation Su-57 Felon multirole stealth fighter-bomber has begun test flights with a new hypersonic
missile.5 Russia’s new Tupolev PAK DA strategic bomber will also carry hypersonic missiles as part of its attack portfolio.6 Although
the PAK DA is not a supersonic bomber, the plane’s missiles could hit targets in central and eastern Europe without leaving Russian
air space. These Russian bomber and fighter forces will be complementary. While bombers have longer ranges and larger payloads,
fighters generally have superior speed and manoeuvrability, allowing for tailored force packages for different scenarios.
The Russian Navy has equipped its surface and subsurface vessels with a 3S-14 universal vertical launch system, which can fire
multiple subsonic, supersonic, or hypersonic anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles.7 Russia has traditionally acquired long-range
anti-ship missiles to compensate for its inferior numbers versus Western navies. Now the Russian Navy is equipping its cruisers,
corvettes, and attack submarines with the new Tsirkon hypersonic missile, under development for the past decade.8 It has
undergone approximately a dozen operational tests, including against land and sea targets, launching from submarines and surface
vessels, and in late December as a salvo shot involving a pair of missiles.9 Alternatively spelled as Zircon, the Tsirkon (NATO code
name SS-N-33) launches initially with a solid-propellant rocket booster and then relies on a scramjet air-breathing engine, and can
fly twice as far and more than twice as fast as the current P-800 Onyx antiship missile.10 Having a range of up to 1,000 km, the
Tsirkon can attack both naval and land targets at speeds reportedly up to ten times the speed of sound (Mach 10).
In December 2021, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the Tsirkon would enter into operational service with the Navy
in the following year.11 Though the multipurpose Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates will become the first Russian ship armed with the
Tsirkon, according to the head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, all future Russian warships can be equipped with it.12 These
could include Kirov-class battlecruisers, Admiral Grigorovichclass frigates, multiple classes of corvettes, and the next-generation
Yasen-M class nuclear-powered attack submarines. The latter could prove particularly challenging for NATO defences since allied
forces would not be able to know from where they might attack, further compounding the problem of tracking and intercepting
hypersonic delivery systems. The Russian Navy even aims to equip many of its smaller vessels, such as coastal defence ships, with
hypersonic missiles to give them long-range strike capacities.13
One major uncertainty is the extent to which Russian warships and other delivery platforms can take full advantage of hypersonic
missiles given possible limits of the Russian detection, targeting, strike, and post-strike assessment kill chain.14 Possible gaps may
exit in Russia’s global sensor coverage, long-range naval reconnaissance, and other elements of Russia’s Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. Towards this end, the Russian
armed forces have been testing a new naval automated control system closely integrated with the Tsirkon.15 The Navy could also
equip some missiles with nuclear warheads to help compensate for targeting and navigation uncertainties since a nuclear detonation
would destroy a vessel even if its delivery system was somewhat off target.16
A recent exercise shows how the Russian armed forces might integrate these capabilities in combat. At the end of June 2021, the
Russian Navy and Aerospace Forces conducted a combined drill off the coast of Syria in the eastern Mediterranean. According to a
statement released by the Russian Ministry of Defence, “In the course of the joint manoeuvres of the Russian Navy’s standing
Mediterranean taskforce and aircraft of Russia’s Aerospace Force that kicked off in the eastern Mediterranean on June 25, the crews
of MiG-31K planes capable of employing the latest Kinzhal hypersonic missiles that arrived at the Russian Hmeimim airbase in the
Syrian Arab Republic the other day have started accomplishing the tasks of mastering the airspace in the maritime zone.”17 The
Russian military released a video showing a Mig-31 taking off from the base with the Kinzhal. In addition to the MiG-31Ks, the
planes that participated in the Syrian drills included Tu-142MK and Il-38 maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare
aircraft, as well as several Tu-22M3 strategic bombers and Su-35S air superiority planes. The warships participating in the exercises
included the Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov frigates, the Moskva missile cruiser, and the Stary Oskol and Rostov-on-Don Kiloclass dieselelectric submarines.18 Such a combined force could jointly strike coastal targets or naval targets, with the Mig-31Ks using
Kinzhals to remove high-value targets such as adversarial air-and-missile defence systems and aircraft carriers. (The planes
reportedly simulated attacks against the Royal Navy’s only carrier, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, which at the time was conducting air
strikes against ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria while on patrol in the eastern Mediterranean).19
Moreover, despite Russian leaders’ recurring denunciations of NATO missile defence efforts, the Russian Federation is the only
country that has an active programme to develop nearterm national defences against hypersonic missiles. Putin has declared the
goal of having an operational national hypersonic missile defence system by the time the United States deploys such weapons. The
latest versions of Russia’s early-warning radars, the Rezonans-N systems, have been designed to detect incoming hypersonic
missiles.20 In a March 2020 test, a S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile defence system reportedly demonstrated a capacity to
intercept hypersonic targets.21 The most advanced Russian air-and-missile defence systems, the S-500 Prometheus (aka 55R6M
Triumfator-M) and the newly announced S-550, which are now entering into service, have a declared ability to intercept hypersonic
targets in near-Earth space.22
China has also been researching, developing, and deploying a range of hypersonic delivery systems. In accordance with the PRC’s
militarycivil fusion approach, this comprehensive R&D effort encompasses academic, commercial, scientific, and military projects.
Before 2017, most Chinese HGV tests involved shorter-range ballistic missiles, which would be optimal for strikes against Taiwan,
Japan, or US bases in the western Pacific. In the fall of 2019, China unveiled the DF-17, an intermediate-range ballistic missile
specifically designed to launch the DF-ZF HGV to hit more distant targets to a distance of some 2,500 km.23 Last summer, China
reportedly tested a fractional orbital bombardment system, which could launch a HGV into space and then deorbit it over a
particular position on Earth, essentially allowing China to attack many targets in the North Atlantic region which are within NATO’s
area of responsibility under Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.24
2. Implications for NATO
Shoigu has said that Moscow’s diverse portfolio of hypersonic weapons will form “the backbone of
Russia’s non-nuclear deterrence forces .”25 Though it will take years for Russia to field many hypersonic
delivery systems, even a few hypersonic weapons , of varying speeds and ranges, will
substantially complicate NATO defences . Russia is pursuing hypersonic capabilities to
defeat alliance forces in wartime; deter attacks on Russian national territory;
discourage NATO military intervention in neighbouring countries that Moscow sees as falling
within Russia’s regional spheres of influence; challenge the credibility of US security guarantees to
NATO allies; hold critical defence and dual-use infrastructure and military forces at risk; and
provide additional means of coercing NATO allies and partners in peacetime. Since
hypersonic systems pose a different threat profile than Russia’s other systems, they can hold NATO assets at
risk in novel or different ways, which could change when and how Russia may launch strikes
against targets. They also raise the risks of crises , wars , and escalation by potentially
making Russian decision makers more confident about employing force, controlling
conflicts, making rapid war gains, and deterring or defeating NATO counteractions.
2.1. Soviet Origins
Russia’s poor military performance against Georgia in August 2008 spurred a
comprehensive military reform that streamlined command layers, reduced officer corps billets, and
decreased reliance on conscript soldiers, and transitioned the Soviet-era mass mobilisation army to a smaller, more professional,
battleready force. The Russian government also launched a programme to revitalise the country’s military-industrial complex by:
enhancing Russia’s research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) infrastructure; forging novel public-private innovation
partnerships, including the establishment of high-tech defence industrial parks and strengthening ties between academic, research,
and the defenceindustrial institutions; launching a new National Defence Management Centre for processing real-time data;
initiating a Russian Foundation for Advanced Research Projects to support, like the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
high-risk but potentially high-payoff defence technologies; decreasing parliamentary, media, and other civilian oversights of Russia’s
military technology activities; and increasing defence R&D expenditures. The reforms have also refocused the national defence
establishment on exploiting what Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff from 1977- 1984, termed the MilitaryTechnical Revolution. Impressed by the increasing precision of hightech weaponry, Ogarkov’s vision was to combine emerging strike
systems and novel information technologies with Russia’s long-standing strengths in mass and firepower. The intent was to attain
sustainable advantages through early gains at the initial stages of conflict. The expectation was that, through these
qualitative enhancements, Russian forces would make rapid gains and then thwart adversary
countermeasures by, for instance, building layered and interlinked Anti-Access/Area Denial
( A2/AD ) bubbles. As a result, Russia would win the battle of attrition and resolve, terminating the war on favourable terms.
2.2. Tasks and Missions Russian decision makers now believe that exploiting advanced hypersonic
technologies will empower the Russian armed forces to compete better with
NATO militaries in critical domains . Russia has been seeking both a limited number of Avangard strategic
nuclear HGVs and several types of operational-tactical systems. The Avangard is designed primarily for assured
strategic retaliation against the US homeland; the non-strategic systems are intended for
operational strikes against NATO’s forward-deployed forces. Regarding the former, Russian policymakers
have diversified beyond traditional intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) as a hedge against improving US deterrence by denial
capabilities. They want an assured retaliatory second-strike capability against whatever US homeland advancements the United
States makes in missile defence technologies. Moscow seeks this capacity for both offensive and defensive purposes. In line with
Moscow’s theory of military victory, Russia’s hypersonic and other strike systems aim to deter US
assistance to NATO countries by providing enhanced means to attack the US
homeland . Similarly, their augmented force could make threats of retaliation to NATO
attacks against Russian territory more credible.
At the operational level, Russian policymakers expect hypersonic technologies to bolster Russia’s
power projection , non-strategic nuclear options, and “active defence” capabilities. Russian
military planners perceive hypersonic capabilities as asymmetric instruments to negate NATO military advantages by destroying the
alliance’s critical military infrastructure, missile defences, command-and-control centres, air and sea bases, logistical hubs,
forwardoperating forces, and other highvalue targets. In particular, Moscow envisions hypersonic technologies as
means to revitalise many of the Sovietera warplanes and warships that will remain in service as well as to
enhance any new platforms that Moscow can produce.26 Given the difficulties the Russian militaryindustrial complex has faced in
producing novel platforms, renewing existing planes and ships with modern missiles and other technologies provides a means to
sustain Russian military power during the transition to a wholly postSoviet force.
Even limited range hypersonic delivery systems can have strategic effects. Russia could use its
hypersonic missiles as first-strike weapons , employed in conjunction with large-scale
cyber and electronic warfare, to blind and paralyse NATO defenders. They give defenders less time to
respond, an advantage when attacking time-sensitive, mobile, or high-value targets. Conversely, Russia can
employ hypersonic missiles as formidable first-strike weapons for disabling NATO’s air-andmissile defences, thereby facilitating follow-on strikes by Russia’s non-hypersonic delivery
systems. In addition to counterforce strikes against NATO weapon systems, hypersonic strike systems can
degrade NATO’s command, control, and transportation facilities, compromising the
alliance’s ability to rely on member countries’ ports, airfields, and other infrastructure. Even a
successful intercept with a point defence system might not shield the target since the missile’s debris would rain on it at hypersonic
speeds. Furthermore, though Russian representatives deny that they have an “escalate-to-deescalate” doctrine to employ nuclear
munitions to shock NATO into backing down in a conflict, nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons could
provide another means for Moscow to exploit Western fears of Russian escalation
from conventional to nuclear warfare in a war. For example, Moscow might launch a nuclearcapable hypersonic missile during a conventional conflict in Europe to highlight the
dangers of escalation to nuclear weapons’ use. The threat to NATO from Russian
hypersonic strike systems results from both the damage they can inflict through direct
attacks and the increased risks of escalation they pose in limited nuclear or major
conventional conflicts in Europe.
Moscow’s hypersonic anti-ship, anti-air and ground-to-ground missiles can decrease NATO power
projection capabilities by augmenting Russia’s A2/AD capabilities along Russia’s
periphery. Their manoeuvrability, speed, and target ambiguity can complicate efforts to track and
intercept them, especially as they fly below the targeting range of most ground-based missile
radars, which are typically looking at higher attitudes, and associated endoatmospheric ballistic missile
defence (BMD) interceptors but above the range of lower-level radars and interceptors like the Patriot.
In this manner, they can elude the widely available NATO sensors designed to take custody of
incoming missiles and generate an equation to intercept them. Their wing design allows for greater lateral and vertical
manoeuvres than traditional missiles flying more parabolic paths. Their high speed would also confront NATO with a compressed
response time compared with the opportunities to defend against slower flying non-hypersonic missiles or planes. All these
characteristics give hypersonic delivery systems an advantage for hitting time-sensitive,
mobile, or high-value targets. Moscow’s hypersonic capabilities thereby reinforce its
capacity to challenge NATO’s ability to deploy and operate forces in Russia’s vicinity.
These hypersonic delivery systems, combined with Russia’s other offensive strike systems, could help Moscow
negate NATO’s integrated multidomain operations .27
The characteristics of Russia’s emerging hypersonic delivery systems could worsen strategic stability – the lack of incentive to launch
wars – by potentially making Russian decision makers more confident about successfully employing force, making rapid military
gains, and deterring or defeating NATO counteractions. They could thereby raise the risks of regional crises and wars as well as
weaken the credibility of allied conventional deterrence. Furthermore, hypersonic capabilities can challenge crisis stability – defined
as a condition when parties lack the incentive to attack first in a crisis – by giving possessors reasons to strike first in a potential
conflict. Given the contemporary limits of sensor and interceptor technologies, NATO countries can at best detect the launch of a
Russian HGV, but then lose track of the missile until it has impacted its target.
Due to their special characteristics of speed and manoeuvrability, as well as their probably limited availability in a conflict due to
their high costs, Russia would likely employ hypersonic systems early in a conflict to disable high-
priority NATO defence structures. In particular, Russia could employ these systems as preemptive weapons to decapitate NATO’s command, control, and communications
networks, denying fielded forces access to the enabling networks to which they have become
accustomed and impeding their ability from acting as a coherent entity. If they disabled critical NATO
defence systems (such as the alliance’s forward-based integrated air-and-missile defences) early in a conflict, they would make
it easier for Russia’s nonhypersonic systems to overcome other NATO defences.
Conversely, due to their currently limited number and vulnerability before they launch, Russia’s hypersonic systems are themselves
valuable targets for NATO first strikes. Thus, Russian policymakers have an incentive to use them early
in a conflict before they lose them.
Even in the absence of a war, hypersonic capabilities provide Russia with additional means for
peacetime coercion of US allies and other countries to realign their policies in line
with Moscow’s preferences. Russian policymakers could leverage the elevated risk of
escalation provided by hypersonic weapons to provide a shield under which Russia
could intensify its hybrid , grey-zone intimidation and subversion . Moscow can
brandish hypersonic missiles to discourage NATO countries from hosting US
forces or specific weapons systems, such as missile defences . For example, Kremlin presidential
spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that one reason Russia had tested a salvo of its Tsirkon hypersonic missiles on 24 December was
to make its demands for a new European security treaty “more convincing”.28
3. How to Respond
NATO can employ a combination of deterrence, defence, and arms control measures to address the novel challenges associated with
Russia’s growing arsenal of offensive hypersonic missiles.
3.1. Defence and Deterrence
In response to the growing extant threat from Russia’s hypersonic missiles, as well as the potential emerging threat from China’s
hypersonic development programmes, NATO countries will need to upgrade their radar and other sensor coverage to detect the
trajectories of hypersonic missiles after launch. The alliance will also need superior early-warning and command-and-control
systems to make more rapid threat assessments and responses to these hypersonic missile launches.
NATO countries should also conduct more exercises simulating defending against Russia’s hypersonic missiles. To decrease NATO
forces’ vulnerability to Russia’s hypersonic delivery systems, NATO commanders can increase their use of passive measures such as
concealment, hardening, dispersal, deception, mobility, redundancy, and enhancing reconstitution capabilities. Since Russia could
employ its hypersonic weapons to decapitate NATO’s C4ISR systems, they could prevent NATO forces from acting as a coherent
entity. NATO forces will need to prepare to operate in scenarios even after they suffer tactical decapitation of critical C4ISR nodes
due to Russian hypersonic, cyber, and other attacks. NATO forces need to plan and train a force to potentially operate without the
superior C4ISR structure that the United States and its allies have enjoyed for decades – operating for a period of time without
connecting with robust network of sensors and commend elements.
More active defences against Russian hypersonic delivery systems might include disrupting their targeting data or communications,
investing in novel BMD technologies, and building a network of spacebased sensors to provide “birth-to-death” tracking of objects in
the upper atmosphere. Moreover, NATO members could enhance their export controls to deny Russian entities’ access to Western
military and dual-use goods and technologies that could contribute to the Russian military’s hypersonic capabilities. China’s
hypersonic programme has benefitted from such imported Western technologies.29
Furthermore, NATO governments should cooperate to restrict the flow of technologies, equipment, and material that Russia, China,
and other potential adversaries could use to augment their hypersonic capabilities. Additionally, NATO will need to evaluate the
effects of any allied and partner military interoperability gaps due to the likely more rapid US acquisition of hypersonic defence
technologies than other Western countries. NATO governments require “interlocking” air and missile defence systems, with
integrated command-and-control supported by interoperable or at least complementary capabilities, to establish comprehensive
shields against hypersonic missiles.30
Russia’s and China’s progress in developing hypersonic missiles has contributed to the
decision of NATO countries to pursue similar capabilities . One multinational project under the
auspices of the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) aims to field a Mach 5-speed missile interceptor by around 2030
as part of a larger effort to enhance the EU’s capacity for employing space-based surveillance to
counter missile threats.31 The thinking is that a scramjet hypersonic interceptor could have
greater range, speed and energy upon impact.32 A joint French-British project to develop a Future Cruise/AntiShip Weapon (FC/ASW) has fallen into abeyance due to the AUKUS dispute.33 France is independently researching a potential
scramjet-powered nuclear-armed missile for possible development on strategic bombers in the mid-2030s and funding a HGV
demonstration project, the Vehicule Manoeuvrant Experimental (V-MaX).34 The United States is pursuing several
hypersonic R&D programmes that are at various stages of execution but, unlike Russia and China, the
United States has yet to deploy an operational hypersonic capability. For example, the US Army
Artillery Regiment, 17th Field Artillery Brigade, is experimenting with a manoeuvrable ground-launched Long-Range Hypersonic
Weapon in order to develop appropriate doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures for its use.35 Though it is well-funded, the
US hypersonic test programme, perhaps due to its rushed nature, has suffered several mishaps.36 In
contrast to Russia and China, which have tested strategic HGVs designed to overcome US homeland missile defences, NATO
militaries are seeking offensive hypersonic missiles exclusively for conventional counterforce
strikes against high-value military targets. They can provide a niche capability for a limited range of scenarios to supplement
NATO’s more numerous theatre-range attack aircraft and non-hypersonic missiles.
General John Hyten, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that US hypersonic systems could attack
“distant, defended, and/or time- critical threats when other [US] forces are
unavailable , denied access , or not preferred .”37 NATO hypersonic missiles
could enhance deterrence of Russian policymakers , reassure NATO
members and partners threatened by Russia, and counter perceptions of a
“hypersonic gap” with Moscow. Hypersonic systems could help NATO penetrate
Russia’s formidable A2/AD bubbles since these highspeed delivery vehicles could launch
further away from Russian defences but still rapidly reach their targets, which could include the
A2/AD defensive systems or the objects they are trying to protect. They could also more effectively reach
roador rail-mobile missiles (if they can be detected), along with ships and planes, before they move far.
NATO might employ hypersonic delivery systems pre-emptively to destroy Russian
hypersonic weapons before Moscow launches them rather than avoid reliance on expensive
and only partially effective defences.
Adversarial cohesion is driving advanced A2/AD that undermines US
power projection.
Wang 25 [(Daniel H., MA, Defense & Strategic Studies, Missouri State University) "Death of
a Doctrine: The End of Classical Deterrence in a Complex Multipolar World," Missouri State
University, 05/01/2025, pg. 1-134, accessed 07/27/2025] UT
China has built strategies to counter U.S. operations and partnerships across Asia. Taiwan is a flash point; other regional
alliances are also under threat. China is seeking a tech nological advantage through new emerging
tech, and it aims to introduce risk and uncertainty into any crisis in Asia to cause adversarial
hesitation.
The clearest flashpoint of U.S.-PRC competition is Taiwan. The last artifact of the Chinese Civil War is what the CCP views as a
fundamental challenge to its claim of power over China. China’s strategy of A2/AD and nuclear force expansion is
explicitly designed to counter US advantages and strategy in the Pacific stemming from a conflict in
Taiwan.261
The Taiwan strategy also involves fragmenting U.S. alliances and partnerships in the region.
Like Russia, which employs hybrid tactics to foment disharmony among NATO members, China employs similar tactics across Asia.
Unlike Russia, China has significant economic influence that often overshadows even the U.S. It wants U.S. allies to doubt U.S.
security guarantees and introduce hesitation.262 Should a conflict with the U.S. break out? This also relates to China’s historical
narrative as a center of gravity in Asia and its role as a "father figure" for the rest of Asia.263
As outlined in Chapter 2, emerging technologies offer many opportunities and potential for the pioneer who gets it right. China is
seeking to compete with the U.S. across all domains, utilizing all technological advantages it can achieve.264
With a significant credible nuclear deterrent backed by dominance across multiple domains using emerging technology and U.S.
allies unwilling to commit fully, China is hoping to introduce enough ambiguity and risk into U.S.
decision-making and have allies question the determinization of a U.S. pledge so that it will
opt not to intervene in conflict over Taiwan or other potential theaters. It wants instability in
crisis management because Beijing believes it can achieve its overall objectives without fighting a war.265
China's strategy completely changes the U.S.-China deterrent dynamic. China has the initiative with its bold strategies and
investments. At the same time, U.S. policymakers must reassess extended deterrence commitments across Asia and decide how to
enhance crisis management mechanisms and match the Chinese threat.
One of the most challenging aspect s of China and Russia is their increasing
collaboration in geopolitical, military, and economic affairs.266 This includes nuclear
capabilities , space, and cyber operations .267 This was driven by Russia's desire to build an
alternate economic order with friendly nations like Iran and No rth Ko rea, which hoped to include BRICS
members.268 It would serve to counter the US -dominated G-7. Section 3.5 will examine these adversarial overlaps
more closely.
It shreds material and perceptual resolve in every hotspot.
Joyce & Blankenship 21, [(Renanah M., PhD, Postdoctoral Fellow, Grand Strategy,
Security, and Statecraft, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Brian, PhD, Assistant Professor,
Political Science, University of Miami. Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign
Relations) "Access Denied? The Future of U.S. Basing in a Contested World," War on the Rocks,
02/01/2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/access-denied-the-future-of-u-s-basing-ina-contested-world/] UT
This experience is symptomatic of a broader challenge facing every branch of the U.S.
military : a contested basing environment. Efforts to secure military access overseas will
increasingly confront physical, commercial, and political challenges. The physical challenges to U.S. bases stem from
the operational approaches of America’s adversaries, particularly so-called “anti-access/area denial”
(A2/AD) capabilities , while commercial and political challenges concern potential partners who might be reluctant to
provide access due to economic pressures from competitors. These dynamics may be most acute in the Indo-Pacific, where global
U.S. power projection needs are shifting in light of China’s growing economic and military clout.
To square its strategic needs with operational and political realities, the United States should adopt a new, hybrid approach to basing
that combines elements of the Cold War model — large, concentrated bases in key allies — and the Global War on Terror model —
small dispersed bases scattered across informal partners. The Biden administration should tailor its security cooperation and
economic strategy to attract partners, balance its need for more options against resource constraints, and revisit global posture plans
to achieve this approach.
Challenges to Basing
A worldwide network of bases underpins the U nited S tates’ global command of the commons.
The Defense Department’s base structure reports acknowledge more than 600 facilities across eight U.S. territories and 45
countries. Many smaller locations fall below the size and value thresholds for reporting, so the actual number is almost certainly
much higher. In exchange for access, hosts receive an array of benefits, including alliance treaty protections, aid, arms, base rents, or
contracts for local firms. Access is broader than basing and can range from overflight rights to permanent garrisons. Our research
focuses on bases, which endow U.S. forces with staying power by serving as sources of housing, resupply, and storage, and are
visible demonstrations of U.S. presence. But the ways in which hosts sanction base use also matter since
hosts can regulate the sorts of weapons systems that can be stationed and the contingencies in which facilities can be used.
The U.S. network of bases — as well as any future efforts to relocate or expand it — is subject to three forms of contestation that
make it politically and operationally vulnerable. The first is physical, stemming from adversaries’ ability to rapidly
destroy U.S. infrastructure and equipment from afar using A2/AD capabilities such as
ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, and air defense systems. Pessimistic
assessments suggest that China , for example, could decimate U.S. a ir and s ea b ases in the
Western Pacific within days. Russian and Iranian missiles pose similar challenges for U.S. bases
in Europe and the Mid dle East as well. The U.S. military is well aware of the risk. Indeed, the 2018 National
Defense Strategy explicitly calls for new approaches to basing designed to minimize the physical vulnerabilities of U.S. infrastructure
and equipment.
Second, U.S. bases are subject to commercial contestation from American competitors, especially China. Countering China’s
economic influence is core to the focus on strategic competition envisioned in both the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the 2017
National Security Strategy. Many current and prospective base hosts such as the Philippines, Cambodia, and Singapore have deep
economic ties with China, the largest trading partner of almost every country in East Asia, that have only grown as a result of China’s
Belt and Road Initiative. This gives the government in Beijing indirect leverage to prevent or curb U.S. access by threatening to
cancel infrastructure projects or cut commercial ties, as happened in the Northern Marianas Islands.
China might soon find itself with direct leverage as well. Chinese firms in recent years have gained major stakes in, for example, a
number of ports that might be useful for the U.S. Navy, such as Djibouti’s Doraleh multi-purpose port. China could undermine U.S.
interests in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa if it called in Djibouti’s substantial debt and took control of the port — as it did
when it acquired Sri Lanka’s port at Hambantota in 2017 — or pressure the government to limit U.S. access. Even if China avoids
overtly denying U.S. access in strategic locations like Djibouti, the operational implications of limiting, delaying, or surveilling U.S.
military movements could be significant.
The third form of contestation is political, stemming from potential partners’ reluctance to host a U.S. presence. There is a long
history of some local populations resenting the consequences of hosting U.S. military forces, including environmental and noise
pollution and crimes committed by U.S. servicemembers. At the national level, political challenges are often exacerbated by
commercial contestation. In East Asia, many prospective hosts worry that appearing too close to the United States would invite
Chinese retaliation. Chinese-imposed sanctions on South Korea for accepting the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system
in 2016 contributed to widespread domestic protests. Though the controversy was over a new weapons system, not a new base, it
illustrates how economic coercion could induce changes to U.S. military posture. Other states might reasonably imagine that China
would sanction them too.
These forms of contestation can interact to create political, strategic , and operational dilemmas
for the U nited S tates. For example, the U nited S tates uses forward presence to reassure allies
it has skin in the game and is willing to accept costs on their
behalf . Such assurances signal that the U nited S tates will defend allies in times of need,
that
making strategic alignment and hosting U.S. forces worth their while. But A2/AD
capabilities also render forward presence vulnerable , creating a tension between the
need to demonstrate U.S. resolve and the need for operationally effective capabilities, which may need
to be concealed, dispersed, and positioned further out of range of adversary A2/AD capabilities.
Assurances are key to prevent nuclear proliferation
Cirincione and Brown 20, [(Zack Brown Zack Brown is the Policy Associate and
Special Assistant to the President at Ploughshares Fund. Joseph Cirincione is a national security
analyst and author with over 35 years of experience working these issues in Washington, D.C.,)
"Why letting our allies get nuclear weapons is a bad idea, Responsible Statecraft,
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/05/20/why-letting-our-allies-get-nuclear-weapons-isa-bad-idea/, 5-20-2020, accessed 7-27-2025] thatcher
It is tempting to think that it would be cheaper and more effective to have distant allies like
Germany or South Korea or Saudi Arabia get the bomb rather than link their security to U.S.
forces, bases, and assurances . Nuclear theorists like Kenneth Waltz point to the so-called “pacifying” effects of
nuclear weapons, saying their existence makes states “exceedingly cautious” and therefore less likely to fight similarly-armed
opponents. If more countries had the bomb, the logic goes, fewer wars would occur.
But countries do not obtain the bomb in a vacuum . The nuclear posture and strategic
decisions of nuclear-armed nations have a significant, often immediate , impact on the
nuclear acquisition decisions of other nations . More simply: If your adversary or your
neighbor goes nuclear, you will, too.
There is nothing automatic about the nuclear domino theory, and it has been successfully countered in some
regions, but the theory is generally correct. The Soviet Union got the bomb because, as Stalin told his scientists after Hiroshima,
“The balance has been broken. Build the bomb. It will remove the great danger from us.” Britain and France got the bomb because
the Soviets (and the U.S.) had it. China did the same, then India got the bomb because China did; Pakistan because India did.
Nuclear competition in Asia would not end if South Korea decided to build a nuclear arsenal.
Others in the region would likely follow suit. Japan, Taiwan, perhaps Vietnam. Similarly, a Saudi
bomb would likely beget an Iranian bomb, a Turkish bomb and even an Egyptian bomb. Far from
making the region — and the United States — safer, these arms races would blanket the globe with nuclear tripwires, each primed
to unleash unprecedented destruction at the slightest twitch .
Where you stand determines what you see. Kennedy and the other presidents stood atop the chain of command, and their own
experiences with that awful responsibility (particularly with the near-miss of the Cuban Missile Crisis) colored how they saw nuclear
politics. They recognized the limitations of theory in a world characterized by imperfect information and the frictions of human
interaction. They understood what the nuclear theorists could not — that more countries having nuclear weapons
would only increase the risk of their use , not lessen it.
Three months before the Cuban Crisis, Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, gave a speech in Ann Arbor, Michigan
where he laid out this danger. “The mere fact that no nation could rationally take steps leading to nuclear war does not guarantee
that a nuclear war cannot take place,” he said. “Not only do nations sometimes act in ways that are hard to explain on a rational
basis, but even when acting in a ‘rational’ way they sometimes, indeed disturbingly often, act on the basis of
misunderstandings of the true facts of a situation. They misjudge the way others will react,
and the way others will interpret what they are doing.”
Any attempt to rationalize nuclear relationships — treating adversaries like two sides of a balanced equation — removes the human
factor: the tendency towards irrationality and error. In a world with just a handful of nuclear states, that factor has already nearly led
to apocalypse. In a world with a dozen more, those risks would go up exponentially.
It does not have to be this way. For over 50 years, since the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, successful diplomacy,
security assurances, and global norms have largely kept nuclear proliferation at bay. The nightmare scenario of
dozens of nuclear states has so far been averted, in no small part through the conscious and continual effort of American presidential
administrations of both parties. Yes, there will always be those who advocate for more nuclear weapons in more hands. But the
forces of restraint, and with it, survival, have prevailed and can continue to prevail if U.S. policy leads the way.
That is the beauty of nuclear policy: it leaves a track record. We can look back over the 75 years of the nuclear age and see what has
worked to make the world safer and what has made it more dangerous.
When we let the nuclear virus spread unchecked, without any mitigation or suppression efforts,
the contagion went from one nuclear nation in 1945 to five by 1964. From two bombs to over
34,000. But when we applied controls like test ban treaties, strategic arms limitations, nuclear non-proliferation accords and,
most importantly, reduction treaties, we were able to flatten the nuclear curve, to limit the spread to just the nine nations today and
to slash arsenals by over 85 percent from their peak of some 66,000 weapons in the mid-1980s to just under 13,400 today.
The Trump administration rejected this proven treatment plan. They resurrected 1950’s policies, dubbed them “new thinking” and
“next generation arms control” and systematically destroyed the strong containment and suppression techniques patiently
constructed by their predecessors.
The results are not the promised “better deals.” Reductions have stopped. Negotiations have stopped. Effective restraints, like the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that shrunk Iran’s civilian nuclear program to a fraction of its former size, froze it for a
generation and put it under lock and camera, have been abandoned without replacement. All of the nine nuclear nations are building
new weapons. Capitals and columns buzz with talk of new national arsenals. Once again, some define the problem not as the
weapons themselves, but as just the bad guys who have them.
We are at a nuclear tipping point. Continuing on this path leads to the nuclear nightmares of the
1960s. Change course and we can again live in a world with fewer weapons and fewer nuclear-armed states — one working steadily
towards the elimination of the only weapon that can destroy humanity in an afternoon.
We should not be diverted by the illusion of nuclear stability. There is no such thing.
Absent hypersonics, Chinese A2/AD ambitions hinder assurances and
power projection in the Pacific
Dr. Corinne Kramer 23, Physicist at Congressional Budget Office and former assistant
director of the Science and Technology division at the Institute for Defense Analyses, January
2023, U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives,
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58924#_idTextAnchor126 //UT
Scenarios That Define Potential Requirements for Hypersonic Missiles
The U.S. military’s arsenal includes a wide variety of guided weapons that can be used to attack targets on land. Those weapons have
ranges that vary from as short as a few kilometers (for the Joint Direct Attack Munition) to more than 1,500 kilometers (for the
Tomahawk cruise missile) and speeds that vary from well below the speed of sound (for the AGM-154 glide bomb) to more than
three times the speed of sound (for the Army Tactical Missile System). With that variety available, why is the Department of Defense
interested in pursuing new and relatively expensive hypersonic missiles?
Longer ranges and higher speeds are the main attributes that distinguish the hypersonic weapons DoD is
developing from the conventional strike weapons in today’s inventory. Long range and high speed are nearly always desirable
characteristics for a strike weapon, but they can be expensive. DoD’s shift in focus, to potential conflicts with near-peer
adversaries that have advanced militaries, has brought those characteristics to the fore. Of specific concern are potential
conflicts with China or Russia, both of which have advanced air defenses, long-range bombers and
missiles, and antiship missiles. With those systems, Chinese or Russian forces could establish large
areas in which U.S. forces would be vulnerable to attack.
Such an antiaccess, area-denial strategy would reduce U.S. combat power and give an adversary
greater freedom of action. In particular, the A2/AD weapon systems that China and Russia have
deployed could force the U.S. military to use ground- or ship-launched weapons from as far as
4,000 km (about 2,500 miles) away and air-launched weapons from at least 1,000 km (about 600 miles) away.
Launching such weapons from shorter distances would put the launchers
and the units operating them at greater risk. Long-range weapons with high
speeds could be launched from areas of lower risk but not take too much
time to cover the longer distances to their targets.
This chapter describes, in general terms, the planning scenarios for near-peer adversaries that DoD is currently using and their
implications for the performance requirements of weapons designed to overcome the A2/AD threats found in those scenarios. In
any conflict, combatants try to establish A2/AD zones to protect their own forces and territory
and to limit where their opponents can safely operate. But near-peer adversaries pose particular
A2/AD challenges because they are likely to possess longer-range weapons (and the ability to
target them) in greater numbers than less advanced adversaries do. In particular, China and Russia
both have many offensive and defensive weapon systems capable of establishing challenging A2/AD
environments.1 Beyond those challenges, other types of scenarios could also affect the U.S. military’s requirements for
hypersonic missiles.
China
Disputes over territory in the South China Sea have occurred in recent years. The People’s Republic of
China has threatened at times to take the island of Taiwan by force. And the United States has indicated in
increasingly explicit ways its intent to come to Taiwan’s aid should China attempt to do so. In addition , if the Chinese
military tried to coerce other U.S. allies in the Pacific or shut down access to sea lanes there, the
United States could choose to respond militarily.
If a conflict erupted in the region, China has a variety of A2/AD weapons that could pose challenges to the United
States and its allies. At present, China’s antiship and air defenses have the potential to limit U.S. naval and air
access to much of the South China Sea, particularly because China could extend the reach of those weapons by
basing them on disputed islands in the South China Sea, such as those in the Paracel and Spratly chains.
Chinese surface-to-air missiles and antiship cruise missiles located on the mainland could cover an area with an estimated radius of
400 km, potentially including Taiwan (see Figure 2-1). If those missiles were located on the Paracel Islands—which China has
claimed sovereignty over, in violation of international law—China’s reach into the South China Sea could be
roughly doubled.
In addition, Chinese DF-21D antiship ballistic missiles have a range of 1,500 km. DF-26 antiship ballistic missiles may reach as far
as 4,000 km, but their actual capabilities are not yet clear and would require that China have an intelligence and surveillance system
that could detect and track targets at those long ranges with enough accuracy for the missiles to find their targets. Chinese H-6K
bombers flying from an inland base could reach 3,500 km offshore, and SU-30MKK fighter aircraft have a range of 1,350 km.
China also employs modern air defenses, most of which were purchased from Russia or designed in Russia and licensed for
production in China. The most notable are the S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems, which have maximum ranges of a
few hundred kilometers. China has also fielded a variety of shorter-range air-defense systems that could engage naval
aircraft in the region or land-based fighters and bombers. Those defenses would be less effective against cruise
missiles, such as the Tomahawk, that fly a few hundred feet above the surface to avoid detection
until they are close to their targets. But such defensive systems would still have some
capabilities against low-flying missiles at short ranges.
To defend against ballistic missiles, China’s S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems (like
the U.S. Patriot missile system) have some capability as point defenses against shorter-range ballistic missiles as they approach their
targets. (A point defense can protect a relatively small area, from a few kilometers to a few tens of kilometers in diameter.) China
is working to develop interceptors to defend against longer-range ballistic missiles, but those systems
are still in development and have not yet been deployed. Thus, China’s ability to intercept very fast, high-flying missiles en route to
their targets is likely to be limited for at least the near future.
Russia
As evinced by its invasion of Ukraine, Russia may harbor aspirations to restore the territory of the
former Soviet Union. That territory includes the three Baltic Sea nations of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, which are now members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).2 If Russia invaded a NATO country, the
United States would have a treaty-based obligation to respond. Such a response would be harder if
Russian forces were able to establish a strong ground presence in one of those NATO countries and could
protect themselves with long-range air defenses and missile attacks.
Like China, Russia has a variety of antiaccess and area-denial weapons that could pose challenges for the United
States and its allies—particularly Russia’s long-range missiles and air defenses. For attacking targets on land,
Russia can use ground-launched Iskander ballistic missiles, which have a range of 300 km, and ground-, ship-, and air-launched
land-attack cruise missiles, which have ranges up to several thousand kilometers. In addition, Russia’s Kinzhal ballistic missiles,
which have a range of 2,720 km when launched from fighter aircraft, can be used to strike targets on land or at sea and could limit
naval access to the Baltic Sea. And Russia’s air defenses, such as the S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems also deployed
by China, could limit access by NATO air forces to areas that would include much of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland
(see Figure 2-2).
However, the Russian military’s failure to seize the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv in February 2022, which many analysts thought would
be fairly easy for Russia, suggests some of the pitfalls of relying on technical assessments to measure military capability. Sensors,
intelligence gathering, flexible command-and-control systems, and well-trained personnel are just as important. Thus, the risks to
U.S. weapon systems in potential adversaries’ A2/AD zones may be overstated.
Other Scenarios
Hypersonic weapons could prove to be useful in ways other than thwarting the A2/AD defenses
of near-peer adversaries. Notable examples would be scenarios in which the United States wanted to conduct a rapid,
long-distance strike because it had intelligence indicating the location of a high-value target, such as the leader of a
terrorist organization or a nuclear-armed missile about to be launched by a rogue nation. Such
intelligence would have to be acted on quickly because of potential movement of the target. Although there might
not be U.S. forces nearby, a hypersonic missile could potentially hit the target from a long distance in a
time frame that would not be possible with a slower-flying missile, such as a subsonic cruise
missile. That type of mission is what initially revived DoD’s interest in hypersonic weapons in the early 2000s.
OLD 1AC
1ac – adversaries
SCENARIO 1 IS NOKO AGGRESSION
Insufficient US missile capabilities means Kim strikes now
AC 25, [(Atlantic Council, the Atlantic Council is a think tank that promotes constructive
leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the Atlantic Community’s central
role in meeting global challenges. The Council provides an essential forum for navigating the
dramatic economic and political changes defining the twenty-first century by informing and
galvanizing its uniquely influential network of global leaders. The Atlantic Council—through the
papers it publishes, the ideas it generates, the future leaders it develops, and the communities it
builds—shapes policy choices and strategies to create a more free, secure, and prosperous
world..)) "'First, we will defend the homeland': The case for homeland missile defense, Atlantic
Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/first-we-willdefend-the-homeland-the-case-for-homeland-missile-defense/, 1-4-2025, accessed 7-72025]//UT
This is especially challenging since North Korea’s nuclear strategy includes threatening
intercontinental nuclear strikes on the US homeland to split the US alliance with Japan and
South Korea, as well as possibly backstop limited nuclear use in the region, including for battlefield purposes. Pyongyang would
also consider counter-value strikes on Japan and South Korea. Finally, North Korea has laid out a “fail deadly”
posture, in which attacks on North Korean nuclear forces, nuclear command and control, or the Kim regime itself would trigger an
“automatic” nuclear counterattack.88 Since the stated US goal is regime elimination, then the Kim regime
has no reason not to order an all-out attack. For the US threat to be credible, then, US forces
must be able to eliminate the North Korean intercontinental nuclear threat through
attack operations and active defenses .
In the words of the 2022 MDR, “as the scale and the complexity of [North Korea’s] missile capabilities
increase, the United States will also continue to stay ahead of North Korean missile threats to
the homeland through a comprehensive missile defeat approach, complemented by the credible
threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and non-nuclear means .”89
Comprehensive missile defeat therefore includes counterproliferation efforts to impede Pyongyang’s missile
development and testing, so-called “left-of-launch” operations to destroy nuclear missiles and their associated equipment before
ignition, and active missile defense to intercept North Korean weapons.
Through counterproliferation activities, the United States and its allies and partners work to constrain North Korea’s WMD and
ballistic missile programs by preventing Pyongyang’s acquisition of technology relevant to these programs and imposing sanctions
that punish proliferation and restrict the resources available. Economic sanctions on North Korea include limits or bans on its
imports and exports of weapons and dual-use technologies, hydrocarbons, foodstuffs, textiles, luxury goods, and industrial products
and components; prohibitions on North Korean nationals working abroad; and requirements to counteract vessels engaged in
sanctioned activity; among other measures.90 North Korea’s global campaign to evade these sanctions is robust and is a major focus
of US, allied, and partner counterproliferation efforts. Russia and China have played significant roles in allowing the DPRK to evade
certain sanctions. Moreover, in April 2024, Russia vetoed the renewal of a key UN panel charged with detailing violations.91
Through left-of-launch operations, the United States would attempt to destroy North Korean ICBMs (and other nuclear missiles)
before Pyongyang could launch them by using a range of kinetic and non-kinetic strike capabilities. Public discussion of those
capabilities is limited, but, Guillot, in his March 2024 statement as the USNORTHCOM and NORAD commander to the US Senate
Armed Services Committee (SASC), said, “It is a near certainty that homeland defense in the coming years will rely less on point
defense and traditional kinetic defeat mechanisms in favor of area defense and left-of-launch effects that take full advantage of
multi-domain capabilities.”92 There is speculation in the news media that some failures of Pyongyang’s missile programs are
attributable to US cyber and electronic interference.93
Attack operations on North Korean forces would be a whole-of-alliance activity. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has a “kill
chain” concept and plans to integrate strike forces (such as its ballistic missiles and F-35A strike fighters) into its own Strategic
Command to carry out such attacks.94 One US Marine Corps general suggested that ROK Strategic Command would plan to engage
in “counter-nuclear operations, conventional nuclear integration, and conventional support to nuclear operations.”95
Finally, the United States deploys a limited number of exo-atmospheric midcourse interceptors to actively defend against incoming
North Korean ballistic missiles. The United States fields a force of forty-four silo-based GBIs capable of intercepting North Korean
reentry vehicles (RVs) in the midcourse phase, that a variety of space-, land-, and sea-based sensors support. On November 16,
2020, the United States successfully shot down an ICBM-class target with the Standard Missile (SM) 3 block IIA missile, which was
originally designed against intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).96 The SM-3 could therefore play a role in a layered
defense of the US homeland from North Korean ballistic missiles. (See Section Nine for a more thorough explanation of the current
US HBMD system.)
Current and projected North Korean nuclear-armed long-range missile threat to the United States
The 2022 NPR recognizes that North Korea presents a “persistent threat and growing danger to the U.S.
homeland and the Indo-Pacific region as it expands, diversifies, and improves its
nuclear, ballistic missile, and non-nuclear capabilities. …”97 And 2022 MDR elaborates
that “North Korea continues to improve, expand, and diversify its conventional and nuclear missile capabilities, posing an increasing
risk to the U.S. homeland. …”98 While North Korea’s existing long-range nuclear missile arsenal would already stress US
countermeasures, at least four factors in the development of North Korea’s long-range nuclear force further complicate US
comprehensive missile defeat and defense operations: solid fueling, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)
arming, countermeasures, and growth in launcher count.
North Korea has tested intercontinental missiles of increasing range and
sophistication . In 2017, Pyongyang tested its first two ICBM-class missiles—the Hwasong-14 and -15—on lofted
trajectories; both missiles are road mobile and liquid-fueled.99 In 2022, Pyongyang conducted three lofted-trajectory tests of a new
ICBM dubbed the Hwasong-17.100 The US Defense Intelligence Agency assessed this missile as “probably designed to deliver
multiple warheads.”101 Most recently, North Korea paraded the Hwasong-18 solid-fueled road-mobile missile and then flight tested
it three times in 2023.102 Solid fueling is a major advancement for Pyongyang. It is generally very difficult to store or move liquidfueled missiles while fueled, which often requires positioning them before fueling. The missile is highly vulnerable to attack
operations during this hours-long process. A more widespread combination of mobility and solid fueling
would likely degrade US missile defeat operations . North Korea is also developing countermeasures
for its ICBMs, which would complicate US attempts at interception.
In addition to the improvement in the quality of the North’s missiles, the quantity of the missiles and their
attendant transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) is growing. In 2023, Pyongyang paraded eleven Hwasong-17
ICBMs.103 Since the “publicly stated shot doctrine for the GMD [Ground-based Midcourse Defense] system is four to five
interceptors per one incoming ICBM,” that may indicate that the North could overwhelm existing US defenses (in a worst-case
scenario in which all North Korean weapons worked as expected and the United States and allies were unable to strike before
launch).104 More importantly, perhaps, than the number of missiles paraded at one point in time is Pyongyang’s ability to
indigenously manufacture heavy TELs, a capability which had previously been a limiting factor, but which Kim Jong-Un highlighted
in a recent visit.105 (The North is also exploring rail-mobile launchers, which would further complicate US and allied attack
operations. Shorter-range missiles are already armed on rail launchers.)106
Pyongyang continues its development and testing of space-launch vehicles (SLV), in violation of UN Security Council mandates. SLV
testing helps the DPRK develop missile technology and test other components necessary for a
successful ICBM strike. Russia is actively assisting North Korea in this effort.107
North Korea has steadily expanded its stockpile of fissile material, and nongovernmental experts assess a growth in the size of its
nuclear arsenal. While there is no public US government estimate of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, a 2024 estimate from the wellregarded “Nuclear Notebook” lists fissile material sufficient for up to ninety warheads, of which fifty might be deliverable by
missiles.108 A Congressional Research Service (CRS) survey of open-source estimates reports a range of fissile material sufficient for
twenty to sixty warheads.109 In September 2023, Kim called for an “exponential” increase in Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal, a policy
that the country’s legislature endorsed in a constitutional amendment.110 One RAND report estimates that Pyongyang could grow
its nuclear arsenal to up to two hundred warheads by 2030.111
There are several key uncertainties in the degree of threat that North Korea’s nuclear program will pose as it progresses. North
Korea has never tested a RV for its ICBMs on a minimum energy trajectory, so it remains unclear if its nuclear weapons can survive
reentry into Earth’s atmosphere. (Several nongovernmental experts assess that Pyongyang would not face difficulty doing so.)112 For
that matter, despite analysis of the capability of North Korean ICBMs, based on size and throw weight, to deliver multiple warheads
and decoys, there has been no open-source documentation of Pyongyang testing multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs), post-boost
vehicles (PBVs), MIRVs, or penaids. (In June 2024, North Korea claimed to have tested underlying technology for a MIRV; South
Korean officials cast doubt on this claim.)113 Preventing North Korea from testing these systems, in the view of some distinguished
Korea watchers, should be a top priority for US policy toward Pyongyang.114
Even still, the current and ongoing developments in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are likely to pose
severe challenges to the current US HBMD system.
Conflict definitively results in nuclear escalation
Nick Kodama 20, PhD, Government & International Relations, Georgetown University,
"Threatening the Unthinkable: Strategic Stability and the Credibility of North Korea’s Nuclear
Threats," Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 0, Issue 0, pg. 9-13, 2020, OUP. [italics in
original]
Proponents of such a preventive strike dismiss the possibility of North Korean first use and argue
that No rth Ko rea would be deterred from retaliating against the U nited S tates because the
U nited S tates’ conventional and nuclear superiority would allow it to control crisis escalation.
Any North Korean retaliation would be met by further—and stronger—attacks from the United
States. However, this argument contains the fundamental contradiction that a “bloody nose” strike is necessitated by North
Korea’s undeterrability, but once such an attack is conducted, North Korea will be deterred from further escalation (Cha 2018).
Nonetheless, while it is impossible to be certain that a limited strike would have triggered nuclear weapons use, there are many
reasons why such a strike could cross No rth Ko rea ’s nuclear threshold.
First, threats that states make are made more credible if there are costs imposed by making the
threat, and conversely, if making a threat carries implicit costs then states will be penalized for
failing to carry it out (Fearon 1994, 1997). As a result, by making these threats, North Korea lowers the
threshold at which the use of nuclear weapons becomes rational: in the event that North Korea
backs down in a crisis, the cost suffered would consist of not only those imposed by the
adversary, but also the reputational costs from both domestic and international audiences.
Additionally, despite research suggesting that personalist regimes like North Korea do not face domestic audience costs, there are
indications that Kim Jong Un relies on the support of North Korean elites to maintain power
(Weeks 2008). The Kim regime’s rewarding of elites and scientists responsible for North Korea’s weapons programs with newly built
housing in Pyongyang, and reports of purges and executions of government officials, illustrate the extent to which the regime is
cognizant of the need to maintain a supportive domestic audience (O’Brien 2018). The other type of reputational cost suffered would
be the credibility of North Korea’s future threats. If North Korea fails to act on its threat to retaliate against
the United States—that is, it is called on its bluff—then it will need to take even costlier steps in
the future to reestablish credibility.
Second, in a severe security crisis, leaders will be under immense pressures and will need to make decisions
with imperfect information. In these situations, leaders may overvalue the losses they face while
simultaneously being willing to take large risks to prevent them. This is explained by a concept known
as “prospect theory:” individuals have a tendency to attach more significance to losses than corresponding gains, and be risk
accepting to prevent losses but risk averse to pursue gains (Jervis 1992). This is not merely an abstract theoretical concept or an
academic exercise: in 1941, the overextended Japanese Empire faced severe resource constraints, but instead of withdrawing from
overseas territories and acceding to US demands, the decision was made to attack Pearl Harbor. Fifty years later, Saddam Hussein—
burdened with debt from the Iran-Iraq War—refused to withdraw from Kuwait despite the significant buildup of coalition forces in
Saudi Arabia and the near certainty of Iraqi defeat. In a US-DPRK crisis, these effects are likely to be exacerbated by mutual
suspicion of and uncertainties over each other’s intentions. In addition to these psychological factors ,
limitations in No rth Ko rea ’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities may
hamper the regime’s ability to accurately assess a limited strike. As a result, if the United States were to carry
out a “bloody nose” strike against a North Korean missile test site with the limited intention of deterring future launches, North
Korea may nonetheless believe that the attack was part of a larger campaign to topple the Kim regime. Therefore, North Korea’s
response would be not only retribution for the damage inflicted, but also an effort to stave off what it perceives to be imminent
additional losses.
Finally, although the arrangement of nuclear command-and-control systems does not directly affect North Korea’s nuclear calculus,
certain arrangements may have the effect of “locking in” a particular threshold by
streamlining—or in some cases, automating—the process of launching nuc lear weapons . Nuclear
commandand-control systems can generally be categorized by a positive and negative control typology, where positive control
ensures that nuclear weapons will always launch when ordered and negative control ensures that nuclear weapons are not used
without proper authorization (Feaver 1992). States with small arsenals , vulnerable nuclear
infrastructure , and a limited ability to detect attacks are susceptible to decapitation
strikes and will therefore adopt nuclear postures and hardware that skew towards positive
control . This may involve decentralizing command and control by delegating the authority to
launch nuclear weapons or implementing procedures such as launch-on-warning to streamline
the process of responding to attacks. Although there are some indications that launch authority in peacetime is strictly
centralized under Kim Jong Un, vulnerabilities in No rth Ko rea ’s nuclear arsenal suggest that it may
adopt a delegative approach in crises and potentially design it to be fail-deadly (Narang and
Panda 2017). In a system that is designed to be fail-deadly, the point of failure would represent an ex ante
assessment of the threshold to trigger first use. Therefore, a crisis that crossed the threshold—
such as a “bloody nose” strike—could immediately set in motion nuclear weapons use regardless of
subsequent efforts at de-escalation.
Perception of US insecurity instigates east Asian prolif
AC 25, [(Atlantic Council, the Atlantic Council is a think tank that promotes constructive
leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the Atlantic Community’s central
role in meeting global challenges. The Council provides an essential forum for navigating the
dramatic economic and political changes defining the twenty-first century by informing and
galvanizing its uniquely influential network of global leaders. The Atlantic Council—through the
papers it publishes, the ideas it generates, the future leaders it develops, and the communities it
builds—shapes policy choices and strategies to create a more free, secure, and prosperous
world..)) "'First, we will defend the homeland': The case for homeland missile defense, Atlantic
Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/first-we-willdefend-the-homeland-the-case-for-homeland-missile-defense/, 1-4-2025, accessed 7-72025]//UT
North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal is stressing extended deterrence in South Korea
and Japan, though proximity and a different attitude toward nuclear weapons means that these concerns are more dire in
Seoul than they are in Tokyo.
In the years since North Korea’s test of an ICBM capable of striking the US homeland, South Korea’s leaders and public
are demonstrating an increased skepticism of US extended deterrence and interest in developing
indigenous ROK nuclear weapons. In January 2023, ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol publicly mused that Seoul
would consider developing its own nuclear weapons or asking for US nuclear forces to be deployed to the
Peninsula, should the nuclear threat from Pyongyang continue to escalate .129 In June 2024, following a
Russian announcement that seemed tantamount to a mutual defense pledge with North Korea, leading South Korean politicians
called for the ROK to develop nuclear capabilities , with one leader even going so far as to call
for Seoul to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to do so.130 Another senior politician
from the ruling People Power Party vowed to include the pursuit of nuclear weapons in the party’s political platform.131 The same
month, a South Korean state-run think tank released a report explicitly linking the North Korean ability to hold the US homeland at
risk with South Korean doubts in US extended deterrence commitments.132 (The more liberal Democratic Party, currently in
opposition, is far less sanguine on ROK nuclear capabilities, and some of its representatives condemned statements in favor of South
Korean nuclear weapons.)133 Pro-nuclear sentiments are not limited to political leadership. According to a Chicago Council on
Global Affairs opinion poll in February 2022, a remarkable 71 percent of South Koreans supported an
indigenous nuclear weapons program, and a majority supported the deployment of US nuclear weapons.134
In response to the worsening security environment and risks to the assurance of Seoul, President Joe Biden and President Yoon held
an April 2023 summit and issued the Washington Declaration, spelling out several steps to strengthen extended deterrence. These
included the routine visit of US strategic assets to the ROK (including existing strategic bomber overflights and renewed ballistic
missile submarine port visits), the standup of a US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), enhanced ROK conventional support to
US nuclear operations, increased scenario-based exercises for nuclear contingencies, etc. The ROK, for its part, reaffirmed its
commitments under the NPT to not acquire nuclear weapons.135”136 The NCG held its third meeting in June
2024.137 ROK Prime Minister Han Duck-soo reaffirmed that the additional measures implemented following
the Washington Declaration were sufficient for Seoul’s assurance “ for now” without
developing or hosting nuclear capabilities.138
Japan is also taking steps to enhance its deterrence capabilities and the extended deterrence relationship with
the United States, even though Tokyo mutes its concerns about US vulnerability to North Korean missile attack more than Seoul.
Japanese politicians have floated the need for an indigenous Japanese nuclear program since the
Cold War, and events like North Korea’s nuclear weapons tests and missile tests often provoke
similar reactions.139 Then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pointed out in 2016 after a North Korean missile test the
challenge that system poses to the United States.140 In response to a December 2023 test of the Hwasong-18, Japan’s Parliamentary
Vice Minister of Defense Shingo Miyake made a point of noting that the missile could range the continental United States.141
That senior Japanese officials call attention to the ability of North Korea to hold the US
homeland at risk demonstrates the impact that US homeland vulnerability has on
assurance to allies.
To address these concerns, Japan is enhancing its conventional forces and deepening its extended deterrence
relationship with the United States; calls for nuclear sharing or nuclear modernization are also present but
lack the public support evident across the Korea Strait. Japan has increased its conventional military capabilities, revising its
constitution to allow for a greater range of military operations, raising its defense budget to 2 percent of gross domestic product, and
developing so-called “counterstrike” capabilities for long-range conventional precision strikes.142 Notably, a justification for
these capabilities is to complement a missile defeat approach for North Korean nuclear
weapons.143 While not explicitly conducted in a nuclear context, the Japanese military has conducted joint exercises with US
nuclear-capable bombers.144 Since 2010, the United States and Japan have conducted the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. The latest
edition, held in June 2024, covered measures to enhance extended deterrence, exchange views on strategic threats in the IndoPacific region, and improve coordination on missile defense. Japanese officials also participated in a tabletop exercise and viewed
US ICBM facilities.145 The United States, Japan, and the ROK are also deepening trilateral cooperation on several fronts, including
a facility to exchange real-time missile tracking and missile warning information on North Korean missile launches.146
That goes nuclear
Loo 23, [(Bernard F.W. Loo, Bernard Loo is Assistant Professor at S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Singapore) ", RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/CO23025.pdf, 01-16-2023, accessed 79-2025]//UT
For both Japan and South Korea, indigenous nuclear arsenals might appear to be a panacea to offset
their strategic rivals’ nuclear advantages. North Korea, surely, must be more circumspective if its southern neighbour is
also nuclear-armed. To borrow from Albert Wohlstetter’s 1958 RAND Paper, there would then be a “ balance of terror ”
on the Korean peninsula. A similar case, also seemingly intuitive, can be made for relations between China and Japan:
would China recklessly violate Japanese territorial waters or ADIZ if it faced a Japan that is capable of inflicting nuclear
devastation upon Chinese soil? However, this balance of terror, as Wohlstetter had portrayed it, is a delicate
one. By the end of the Cold War, through much trial and error and happenchance, both the Soviet Union and the United States had
constructed fairly robust mechanisms through which they managed their delicate balance of terror – from “hotlines” that connected
the White House with the Kremlin; treaties that established limits to types of nuclear weapons, nuclear tests, and anti-missile
systems; and confidence-building instruments such as those providing each other with alerts regarding missile tests and military
exercises. In addition, and perhaps most significantly, both the Soviet Union and the United States had robust retaliatory nuclear
attack capabilities; it meant that neither could gain a war-winning advantage by attacking the other first. Without such robust
systems to manage their nuclear rivalries, the inter-Korean and Sino-Japanese relationships will likely be
fraught with potential dangers. Chief amongst these potential dangers is the “ use ’em or lose ’em”
mentality . If there is no capacity to retaliate after sustaining a nuclear attack, both Seoul and
Pyongyang, as well as Beijing and Tokyo, will face intense pressures to initiate a nuclear attack
against their respective adversaries, especially if one side or the other believes that its adversary will soon
launch a nuclear attack.
Extinction
Lynas 22, [(Mark, Lynas is research and climate lead for the Alliance for Science and is cofounder of the pro-science environmental network RePlanet Since 2009 he has been climate
advisor to former president of the Maldives Mohamed Nasheed (with whom he appears in the
2011 documentary film The Island President), and he currently works to assist Nasheed with the
Climate Vulnerable Forum, a group of the world's most climate-vulnerable 58 developing
countries. He is a strategic advisor for the international ecomodernist NGO WePlanet. He has
co-authored a number of peer-reviewed scientific publications, including a 2021 paper which
found that the consensus on anthropogenic climate change in the scholarly literature now
exceeds 99%) "What the science says: Could humans survive a nuclear war between NATO and
Russia?, Alliance for Science, https://allianceforscience.org/blog/2022/03/what-the-sciencesays-could-humans-survive-a-nuclear-war-between-nato-and-russia/, 3-10-2022, accessed 7-92025]//UT
If global nuclear famine could result from just 100 nuclear detonations, what might be the result of a
fuller exchange of the several thousand warheads held in current inventories by the US and Russia? One 2008 study looked at a
Russia-US nuclear war scenario, where Russia would target 2,200 weapons on Western countries and the US would target 1,100
weapons each on China and Russia. In total, therefore, 4,400 warheads detonate, equivalent to roughly half the current inventories
held each by Russia and the US. Nuclear weapons held by other states were not used in this scenario, which has a 440-Mt explosive
yield, equivalent to about 150 times all the bombs detonated in World War II. This full-scale nuclear war was estimated to cause 770
million direct deaths and generate 180 Tg of soot from burning cities and forests. In the US, about half the population would be
within 5km of a ground zero, and a fifth of the country’s citizens would be killed outright. A subsequent study, published in 2019,
looked at a comparable but slightly lower 150 Tg atmospheric soot injection following an equivalent
scale nuclear war. The devastation causes so much smoke that only 30-40 percent of sunlight
reaches the Earth’s surface for the subsequent six months. A massive drop in temperature
follows, with the weather staying below freezing throughout the subsequent Northern
Hemisphere summer. In Iowa, for example, the model shows temperatures staying below 0°C for 730 days
straight. There is no growing season. This is a true nuclear winter . Nor is it just a short blip.
Temperatures still drop below freezing in summer for several years thereafter, and global precipitation falls by half by years three
and four. It takes over a decade for anything like climatic normality to return to the planet. By this
time, most of Earth’s human population will be long dead. The world’s food production would crash by
more than 90 percent, causing global famine that would kill billions by
starvation . In most countries less than a quarter of the population survives by the end of year two in this scenario. Global
fish stocks are decimated and the ozone layer collapses . The models are eerily specific. In the
4,400 warhead/150 Tg soot nuclear war scenario, averaged over the subsequent five years, China sees a reduction in food
calories of 97.2 percent, France by 97.5 percent, Russia by 99.7 percent, the UK by 99.5 percent and the US by 98.9 percent. In all
these countries, virtually everyone who survived the initial blasts would subsequently starve. Human
extinction ?
SCENARIO 2 IS THE WORLD’S COLDEST HOTSPOT
Hypersonic superiority emboldens Russian and Chinese first strike
Lee 23 [Caitlin Lee, Caitlin Lee is a senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace studies, a DC
based think tank with a focus on Aerospace "Bolstering Arctic Domain Awareness to Deter Air & Missile
Threats to the Homeland", June 2023, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace studies,
https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/app/uploads/2023/06/41-Bolstering-Arctic-Domain-AwarenessFINAL.pdf?]
Moscow and Beijing can exploit their Arctic footholds to launch air and
cruise missile strikes that can reach targets in nearly every U.S. state . Growing
U.S. Government concern about cruise missile threats emanating from northern approaches is reflected in DOD’s 2022 Missile
Defense Strategy, which identifies the U.S.-Canada partnership through NORAD as the backbone of efforts to improve early warning
surveillance of “increasingly sophisticated conventional missile capabilities that are able to target
critical infrastructure in North America.”22 Over the last three decades , conventional missiles of all
types have become weapons of choice for U.S. adversaries. Since the 1990s, China and Russia have
explored options to employ long-range, conventional weapons to deter U.S. leaders
without provoking a nuclear response . Chinese doctrine describes precision
strikes as a means of “war control” to manage escalation and frames power
projection nodes, such as Air Force and Navy bases in Guam that are in the range of China’s DF-26 ballistic missiles, as
sources of U.S. vulnerability in warfare.23 In 2017, China deployed its DF-17 ballistic missile, reportedly with approval from
Moscow, along its border with Russia where it could reach the U.S. homeland via the polar region while remaining outside the range
of Navy Aegis anti-ballistic missile ships in the Pacific.24 Missile warfare is becoming a premier means for
Russia to project power; in Ukraine, Russia has launched hundreds of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as suicide drones,
targeting power grids and other critical infrastructure in an attempt to force Kyiv into a settlement. Given adversaries’
growing interest in employing missiles for a quick, low-cost advantage, it’s perhaps not surprising
that missile-related threats to the U.S. homeland have, as the 2022 Missile Defense Review noted, “rapidly
expanded in quantity, diversity, and sophistication.”26 Modern conventional cruise missiles are
the most rapidly growing threat in terms of numbers and employment because they are
harder to detect, track, target, and intercept compared to ballistic missiles. The
operational advantages of cruise missiles can best be understood by comparing them to ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles
generally cost less than ballistic missiles.28 They are also highly maneuverable, in contrast to ballistic
missiles, which fly a predictable ballistic trajectory that can be detected from thousands of miles
away. Cruise missiles are also harder to detect because they can fly at low altitudes below the scans of
surface radars and take advantage of ground clutter to obscure their signatures. Finally, subsonic cruise
missiles, which constitute the great majority of current cruise missile inventories, are harder to detect because they do not
produce significant infrared signatures. Cruise missile rocket boosters are small and burn for only a few seconds, and
air-launched subsonic cruise missiles would not even need a rocket booster.29 This means cruise missiles may not be
detectable by existing space-based missile detection and warning systems, which were designed
to detect ballistic missiles with a bigger heat signature during the Cold War era.30 Because cruise missiles
greatly complicate detection and early warning, adversaries have begun to favor their development over
continued ballistic missile development. The trend is part of a broader one that favors increasingly maneuverable
designs, to include not just conventional cruise missiles, but other types as well. These include hypersonic
cruise missiles , which fly above Mach 5 and trade a larger heat signature and less maneuverability for higher speed. And
then there is China’s fractional orbital bombardment system, or (FOBS), which launches a highly
maneuverable hypersonic glide missile into orbit and then de-orbits it into the earth’s atmosphere
on an unpredictable trajectory. Overall, these trends suggest that adversaries are developing missiles with a
spectrum of attributes specifically designed to impose increasingly tough operational problems on
U.S., allied, and partner missile defenses .31 The attributes of cruise missiles make them particularly attractive
options for longrange strikes, and their relatively low cost means adversaries can access them at scale and may be more willing to
expend them to deter U.S. leadership below the nuclear threshold. On the higher end of the missile spectrum, to include
ballistic missiles, more sophisticated hypersonic cruise missiles, and FOBs, weapon costs increase with their
capability. Adversaries will have fewer of these assets and may prefer to hold them for actions that are higher on the escalation
ladder, to include offensive and retaliatory nuclear strikes.
Russian or Chinese conventional conflict goes nuclear
Sugden 21, [(Bruce M, Research Staff Member at Institute for Defense Analyses) "Nuclear
Operations and Counter-Homeland Conventional Warfare: Navigating Between Nuclear
Restraint and Escalation Risk, Texas National Security Review,
https://tnsr.org/2021/10/nuclear-operations-and-counter-homeland-conventional-warfarenavigating-between-nuclear-restraint-and-escalation-risk/, 10-xx-2021, accessed 7-13-2025] UT
Though the publicly available data on the three nuclear competitors’ nuclear thresholds and views of a conventional-nuclear
firebreak paint an incomplete picture, this first cut at the data reveals several themes and potential triggers of nuclear escalation. If
these potential triggers are salient in decision-makers’ minds in wartime, then they might diminish their likelihood of initiating
counter-homeland conventional strikes. The first potential trigger of a nuclear response is enemy conventional
strikes that degrade or destroy a significant proportion of U.S., Russian, or Chinese means of
exercising national-level command and control, especially of nuclear forces. Conventional
strikes against the nuclear retaliatory weapon systems themselves will similarly increase the likelihood of nuclear
escalation.
Second, because the nuclear competitors’ integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems are pivotal in ensuring
their nuclear retaliatory forces and command-and-control nodes do not suffer a surprise counterforce
attack and in safeguarding their senior leadership from decapitation, the competitors seem prepared to view
conventional strikes against their own systems as a trigger for nuclear escalation. A complicating factor is that
some of the integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems are increasingly dual-use: They ensure the survival and
responsiveness of nuclear forces, as well as the effective operations of non-nuclear forces, such as air and missile defense forces.109
For example, Russia could conduct a set of initial conventional strikes to degrade or destroy U.S. missile early-warning
and tracking systems in order to enable more effective follow-on conventional strikes on the continental United States.
However, losing those systems could increase the risk of a surprise counterforce attack against U.S. nuclear
forces, thus moving American decision-makers to believe that Russia was on the cusp of a nuclear first strike
against U.S. nuclear forces. As a result, the United States might decide to conduct a preemptive nuclear first
strike against Russia to limit damage against the U.S. homeland. It is possible that the competitors will view attacks against
an opponent’s integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems as a likely nuclear trigger, and therefore decide not to
conduct such an attack in the first place and forego the military benefits of the attack in a conventional conflict.
Third, intentionally or unintentionally targeting civilian society raises the risk of social upheaval or a steep, deep, and
prolonged decline of the domestic economy, which could lead to nuclear escalation to persuade the attacker to
halt its counter-homeland campaign. Targeting homeland energy infrastructure and warsupporting industry is common to the major nuclear competitors’ ways of war. Though
conventional strikes targeting these assets are not akin to directly targeting population centers to inflict pain and
suffering (the intended initial effects of a punishment strategy), pain and suffering across population centers could be the secondorder effects of strikes against some types of energy infrastructure and war-supporting industry targets.110
Chinese probing escalates—Arctic war
Scheers 4-28, [(Alex Alfirraz, Alex Alfirraz Scheers is a London-based defense analyst. He
has held research positions at the Henry Jackson Society and the International Centre for the
Study of Radicalisation, and his work on nuclear issues has been published by the Diplomat,
Small Wars Journal, RealClearDefense, and the Royal United Services Institute.) "Get Ready for
the Aleutian Island Crisis, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/04/28/aleutianschina-russia-arctic-geopolitics-defense/, 04-28-2025, accessed 7-13-2025] UT
Move over, Cuba—there are new islands in town. While the prospect of a nuclear crisis over Taiwan remains a genuine and
dangerous possibility, China’s activities around the Aleutian Islands should not be overlooked. Brazen
Chinese military activities in and around the islands and the Bering Strait could escalate.
The Aleutian Islands are part of the U.S. state of Alaska, so they are part of U.S. vital interests. Failure to enhance
deterrence and demonstrate resolve over the chain not only threatens the territorial integrity of
the United States in the Arctic, but could also embolden Beijing to intensify military operations
in the Taiwan Strait.
The situation in the Arctic is heating up. In recent years, China and Russia have made joint military forays into the region. Now, U.S.
President Donald Trump seemingly wants to annex Greenland. “We need Greenland for international safety and security,” Trump
said recently. On March 28, he even deployed his didactic sidekick, Vice President J.D. Vance, to the Danish territory.
Meanwhile, the threats to the Alaskan Arctic, northwest of the continental United States, have intensified. Indeed, the
most recent annual threat assessment report published by the Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) briefly
mentions Alaska in the context of emerging threats.
The DNI report, published on March 25, is chilling. While it highlights growing concerns over Chinese designs on Taiwan and
Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, it fails to address the specific threats posed to the Aleutian Islands, an obscure
island chain off the coast of Alaska.
This warrants a course correction. While the Trump administration obsesses over Greenland, China’s assertiveness in the
Alaskan Arctic should be of major concern to the U.S. military and foreign-policy establishment.
Consequently, the United States should make defense of the Aleutian Islands a national security
priority to offset the possibility of a nuclear crisis in the Arctic.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has gradually downscaled its military outposts around the
island chain. In 1997, a major naval base located on Adak Island was closed. Today, Washington’s adversaries have
renewed their interest in the Aleutian Islands. While remote, the chain is not impervious to Chinese
and Russian military predations.
Alaskan Sen. Dan Sullivan has recently expressed his concerns about Chinese and Russian incursions around the islands. Last
September, Sullivan wrote that “as the world becomes more dangerous, Alaska continues to be on the frontlines of
authoritarian aggression. Coordinated activity off Alaska’s shores by the Russians and Chinese is
increasing.”
Washington should heed the strategic salience of the Aleutian Islands, if its foreign-policy and military establishment wants to
secure its vital interests in the Arctic.
China is not an Arctic nation, yet it has declares itself to be an Arctic power, designating the region to
China’s high north as part of its sphere of influence. In Chapter 33 of its 14th five-year plan, a document that
outlines Chinese geostrategic policy, Beijing explicitly stated its vision for the region: China “will strengthen the investigation and
evaluation of strategic resources in the deep sea” and “participate in practical cooperation in the Arctic and build the ‘Polar Silk
Road.’”
Conducting research expeditions in the Arctic deepens China’s economic links to the region. Economic
and military resilience is the bedrock of Chinese national security strategy, and both shape Chinese
President Xi Jinping’s global ambitions.
Speaking about the Chinese in December, Iris A. Ferguson—the former U.S. deputy assistant secretary for defense for Arctic and
global resilience—said that the United States needs “to be clear-eyed about some of their intentions” as well as
“thinking about their long-term interests” and “how we can best protect ours.”
To this point, in July 2024, two Chinese H-6 nuclear-capable bombers operating within the Alaska Air Defense
Identification Zone were intercepted by American and Canadian fighter jets, indicating that Chinese
excursions into the Arctic are not merely done for scientific and economic purposes.
The Chinese aircraft were accompanied by Russian TU-95 nuclear-capable bombers, meaning that the air
patrol was the first time that China and Russia have been documented conducting a joint patrol near Alaska.
That same month, four Chinese military warships were spotted in the Bering Sea, roughly 200 kilometers (124
miles) north of Amchitka Pass and northeast of the Atka Island, both part of the Aleutian Islands.
According to comments made at the time by Michael Salerno, a U.S. Coast Guard public affairs officer, these encounters have
become commonplace since 2021 but were rare before 2017.
In recent years, China has also increased its naval presence in the Arctic—completing extensive round trips across critical strategic
areas such as the Bohai Sea and the Bering Sea. Beijing’s increased naval presence in these geostrategic locations puts the United
States at a disadvantage, threatening to disrupt its maritime military capabilities and frustrate navigational operations.
As U.S. Maj. Ryan Tice indicated in 2020, “because the Bering Strait lies at the boundary of three
geographic combatant commands (GCCs), increased adversary activity around the strait creates
challenges for unity of effort among those combatant commands.’
Sullivan, the senator, has raised these concerns with the Senate Armed Services Committee. Following additional Chinese and
Russian joint military exercises in September 2024, Sullivan stated, “on five separate occasions in the past seven days, Russian
military incursions into our ADIZ [air defense identification zone] or EEZ [US exclusive economic zone] have occurred—both naval
and air.”
In response, the U.S. Army deployed its 11th Airborne Division to the Aleutian Islands. Yet as the United States’s strategic
environment grows increasingly dangerous, more needs to be done to counter the threat emanating
from Chinese forces in the Arctic. By conducting military exercises in places such as the Bering Sea and the Aleutian
Islands, a region dominated by the United States, China is also demonstrating resolve at the United States’s
expense.
As Brandon J. Babin, a senior analyst at the China Strategic Focus Group, has asserted, “[t]his counterbalance seems to require a
buildup of China’s means of strategic deterrence.”
Freedom of navigation is a critical factor in ensuring the United States can maintain its mission to deter adversaries in the Arctic.
While Beijing’s interests appear to be ostensibly economic, Chinese access to important geostrategic locations carries significant
national security implications for the United States and its allies across the Pacific.
Specifically, Chinese efforts to bolster military operations in U.S. strategic buffer zones undermine
regional deterrence capabilities. Indeed, such activities are a direct challenge to the United States’
vital interests and could potentially obstruct Washington’s extended deterrence operations from
the Arctic and northern Pacific regions, with potential implications rippling down to the western
and southern Pacific as well.
Furthermore, the U.S. has multiple interests in the Arctic, which overlap with the interests of NATO member states such as Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. As tensions intensify between the United States, China, and
Russia, the importance of strategic choke points such as the Bering Sea will only increase.
While Washington’s extended nuclear deterrence mission against China focuses on dissuading aggression against Taiwan, coercion
of Japan and South Korea, and the potential targeting of strategic positions such as the U.S. territory Guam—all concerns located
farther south in the vast Pacific Ocean—the threats that the United States and its regional allies face from China in the Arctic are just
as severe.
Attempts to undermine long-standing territorial boundaries in the form of provocative activities can also lead to increased tensions
and could escalate even further, turning critical island chains into theaters of crises—or worse, war.
For example, there are indications that China perceives the Aleutian Islands as part of what is known as its
first island chain. As Adm. Liu Huaqing, the former commander of the Chinese Navy, stated in 1987, “the first island chain
refers to the Aleutian Islands, the Kurile Islands, the Japanese archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands,
Taiwan Island, the Philippine archipelago, and the Greater Sunda Island in the Western Pacific
that form an arc-shaped arrangement of islands akin to a metal chain.”
To put Liu’s claims into context, the Aleutian Islands comprise 14 main islands and 55 smaller ones. These islands continue to host
U.S. Naval and Coast Guard forces. The distance between the westernmost island in the archipelago, Attu Island, and the eastern
coast of mainland China is 4,000 kilometers (nearly 2,500 miles).
Yet in the aforementioned incident in July 2024, four Chinese military warships were spotted in the Bering Sea. Such activities could
lead to a tense standoff in the United States’ backyard. By expending unnecessary foreign-policy attention in Greenland, Washington
risks being caught off guard. Being prepared in the Alaskan Arctic would enhance Washington’s ability
to deter conflict across the first island chain—including the East Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the
South China Sea.
Taiwan has long been a focal point for analysts and policymakers alike, and rightly so. However, as Sullivan
warned in September, “authoritarian regimes are testing the United States. … Congress and the President should
do more to deter further aggression. … We must continue to send a strong message to Xi Jinping and [Russian
President Vladimir] Putin that the United States will not hesitate to protect and defend our vital interests in
Alaska and beyond.”
Joint Chinese and Russian military naval and air patrols around the Aleutian Islands should deeply concern the United States’
military and foreign-policy establishment. Permanently reopening the naval base on Adak Island would certainly be a vital first step
in enhancing deterrence around the region.
When nuclear weapons states are involved, miscalculations can prove to be gravely consequential. As
RUSI analyst Jamie Kwong wrote in 2018, “the Arctic remains an important region in the global nuclear
security complex.” The United States operates the North Warning System, an early warning system intended to detect threats
in the Arctic. Deliberate or accidental Chinese actions that are perceived to be threatening could
trigger these U.S. early warning systems, and detection could lead to defensive military action.
In the fog of uncertainty, U.S. nuclear command and control would have to make a decision that could precipitate
a standoff—and a standoff between nuclear powers always carries with it the inextricable risk of nuclear escalation.
With tensions already running high, a deep distrust between China and United States underpins the strategic environment. An
incursion into U.S. territory could compel the United States to militarily engage with Chinese
assets. For example, should a Chinese jet fly into U.S. Arctic airspace, or should a vessel stray into regional territorial waters, the
United States could opt to strike.
Accidental or inadvertent escalation also poses a risk. In September 2022, a Type 055 Nanchang guided missile
destroyer came within 160 kilometers (about 100 miles) of the Aleutian Island of Kiska. It was armed with up to 112 cruise missiles.
The accidental launch of a Chinese missile could push the protagonists to the nuclear brink. After
all, the strategic environment in the Arctic is already febrile, and costly accidents can happen.
The threshold for U.S. military action in the Arctic remains unclear. A Chinese crossing of a trip wire could also lead to escalating
tensions and trigger a nuclear crisis. The United States should establish a clear threshold in the Arctic in order to
signal to its adversaries which activities are tolerable and which would prompt a military response. Trump
stated in January that “you don’t even need binoculars—you look outside. You have China ships all over the place. You have Russia
ships all over the place. We’re not letting that happen.”
The United States should respond to the growing Chinese threat by communicating red lines in the Arctic. Should the United
States fail to issue clear red lines to Beijing over military activities in the Bering Strait and the northern Pacific,
then Washington stands to unwittingly encourage Beijing to take greater geopolitical risks close
to U.S. territorial boundaries.
Beijing may perceive a lack of resolve as a source of encouragement to escalate tensions in the
Taiwan Strait. Or worse, U.S. inaction might be seen as a sign that Taiwan is there for the taking. If
deterrence isn’t restored in the Alaskan Arctic, then the Aleutians could be next in line to join Cuba and Taiwan in the
annals of crisis history.
Intervention culminates in extinction
Anderson 24, [(James H., The Honorable James H. Anderson is the former Acting Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. Prior to serving in that role, Dr. Anderson was Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, sworn in on June 8, 2020. In this capacity, Dr. Anderson was
the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for defense policy and leads the formulation
and coordination of national security policy within the Department of Defense. He was
responsible for efforts to build partnerships and defense cooperation with U.S. friends and
allies.) "The Next Taiwan Crisis Will (Almost) Certainly Involve Nuclear Threats, U.S. Naval
Institute, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/march/next-taiwan-crisis-willalmost-certainly-involve-nuclear-threats, 03-XX-2024, accessed 7-24-2025] UT
At the very least, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would provide a major stress test of its NFU policy if the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) struggled to subdue the island with conventional force. Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) leaders might even consider failure an existential threat. As defense analyst Mike Sweeney at Defense
Priorities put it:
Any battle over Taiwan will not just be a question of territorial aggression but a fight over the core conception of
modern China’s soul. And for the leaders who launch such an endeavor, their political futures will
hinge on the outcome, as will, possibly, their physical safety and that of their families in the event of
failure. Under such circumstances, nuclear use might not be palatable, but it could seem far more plausible if military
defeat were to equate to loss of domestic power and possible death anyway.5
It has become conventional wisdom among China watchers that if China’s leaders decide to invade Taiwan, there
is nothing anyone can do to change their minds. If true, this provides another reason to consider potential Chinese
nuclear threats, since the “stop at nothing” narrative logically entails escalation if conventional means fail to
achieve success.
China’s DF-17 solid-fuel, road-mobile ballistic missile (above, on parade in Beijing) can be conventionally or nuclear armed. In a
Taiwan scenario, the United States must be prepared to deal with nuclear threats to its allies in the Indo-
Pacific area.
These considerations raise the question of how China might use nuclear threats in a Taiwan invasion. Notably, there is evidence that
not all Chinese military theorists believe using nuclear weapons on their own soil (which they consider Taiwan to be) would
constitute a violation of the NFU policy.6 That said, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which China might be tempted to use
nuclear weapons on the island itself. It is more plausible to imagine Beijing launching an electromagnetic pulse attack over Taiwan.7
In theory, such a weapon could paralyze the island’s communication networks. Inflicting such a sudden and massive psychological
blow might, in turn, shock Taipei’s political leaders into capitulation.
China also could use nuclear threats to dissuade the United States from rendering military assistance to Taiwan during a crisis.
Here, it is worth recalling that senior Chinese officials have already issued such threats against the United States, as happened
during the Taiwan crisis in 1996 and again in 2005.8 What is more, Chinese military publications and journals have mentioned—on
multiple occasions—the potential for nuclear first strikes against the United States as part of various Taiwan invasion scenarios.9
China might seek to leverage its nuclear weapons in a future Taiwan crisis without resorting to explicit nuclear threats. Since a good
portion of the PLA’s nuclear forces are based on mobile platforms, it could disperse them during a crisis to assume a
more threatening posture.10 It also could adjust nuclear alert levels to signal intent. If these measures did
not deter third-party intervention, China could resort to more dramatic action, such as firing a nuclear
demonstration shot near Taiwan, Okinawa, Guam, or even Hawaii during an invasion crisis.
One might counter that China is unlikely to cross the nuclear threshold in a Taiwan conflict for fear of international
condemnation. This may well be the case, at least initially. But China could reconsider its position, especially if
third-party intervention threatened to derail its invasion plans. It is worth remembering that China did not
intend to issue nuclear threats when it instigated its 1969 border war with the Soviet Union. But eventually Beijing did exactly that
after it feared the Soviets might escalate the conflict.11
China’s Growing Nuclear Arsenal
China has long had a no-first-use policy when it comes to nuclear weapons. According to Center for a New American Security analyst
Jacob Stokes, however, decisions regarding first use are more likely to be made based on the worldview of the nation’s leader—
currently Xi Jinping (left)—than on strategic documents.
The growth of China’s nuclear arsenal may increase its willingness to issue nuclear threats in the
future. To understand why, it is important to recall China’s nuclear history. At the dawn of the Nuclear Age, China
sought to diminish the importance of nuclear weapons. In 1946, CCP Chairman Mao Zedong famously denigrated the bomb as
nothing more than a “paper tiger.” Mao made a virtue of necessity because China did not have the
technological means to develop nuclear weapons until 1964. For decades afterward, China appeared
content with a small nuclear arsenal, confident it could deter the United States—and later the Soviet Union—with an
assured second-strike capability. But the discovery of China’s new missile fields in 2021 suggests Beijing’s
nuclear doctrine is changing.
China’s decision to dramatically expand its nuclear capabilities is the most consequential development in
the PLA’s ongoing modernization efforts. As the Pentagon’s 2023 annual report put it, “Over the next decade, the PRC will
continue to rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces. Compared to the PLA’s nuclear
modernization efforts a decade ago, current efforts dwarf previous attempts in both scale and complexity
[emphasis added].”12
Over time, China’s nuclear arsenal expansion may embolden its behavior—including the propensity to
issue nuclear threats.13 As the 2021 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report asserts, “It could also be
intended to support a new strategy of limited nuclear first use. Such a strategy would enable Chinese leaders to
leverage their nuclear forces to accomplish Chinese political objectives beyond survival, such as coercing another state or deterring
U.S. intervention in a war over Taiwan.”14
The United States still maintains an advantage in terms of strategic warheads, but the PLA is closing the gap. In its 2023 report on
Chinese military power, the Pentagon estimates China “will probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030.”15 The
fact that the U.S. nuclear arsenal will remain larger than China’s for at least the next few years provides no guarantee that
Beijing will refrain from nuclear threats in the near term. Historically, China has demonstrated a
willingness to instigate crises, even against stronger military powers, to achieve political aims.16
Moreover, Chinese writings have long focused on the political nature of nuclear weapons, especially
their potential to inflict psychological shock. All this should be front of mind when considering the potential for China to
resort to nuclear threats during a Taiwan invasion, whether in the near or distant future.
The nature of the PLA’s force structure also increases the odds that the next major crisis over Taiwan will
include a nuclear dimension. The dual-use capability of selected Chinese missiles, such as the DF-26
“carrier killer,” means the PLA can exchange conventional warheads for nuclear ones in short order. This
would present special intelligence and operational challenges for the U.S. Navy during a conflict over
Taiwan. In addition, the PLA’s commingling of conventional and nuclear weapons raises the risk of inadvertent
nuclear escalation since the Pentagon’s playbook normally involves precision strikes deep into
enemy territory.17
SCS escalation is fast and destabilizing.
Andreas Kluth ‘24 [(Andreas Kluth is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering US
diplomacy, national security and geopolitics. Previously, he was editor-in-chief of Handelsblatt
Global and a writer for the Economist.) "The South China Sea Is the Next Test of US Resolve,"
Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-03-03/the-south-china-sea-isamerica-s-next-crucible, 3-3-2024] UT
If we weren’t so preoccupied with Russia and Ukraine, Israel and Gaza, North and South Korea or China and Taiwan, we’d also be
paying due attention to another conflict zone: the S outh C hina S ea. US strategizing there, as it happens,
can clarify Washington’s stance in those other hotspots. The question in all of them is when, why and
how the US should intervene, and whether it should be prepared to go to war. The aggressor in the South China Sea is
communist China. Like five other littoral nations — Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Vietnam — China is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. A sixth, Taiwan, can’t sign the
treaty only because it isn’t a member of the UN. (The US is not a signatory, although in practice it abides by Unclos.) If China
respected international law, therefore, there wouldn’t be any disputes in the first place. As ever and everywhere, however,
international law coexists awkwardly with the reality of state power and national
interests . And China has long staked a claim to almost the entire South China Sea. In doing so, Beijing points to an old map
of obscure provenance, first drawn when the Nationalists still controlled China. It shows a nine-dash line around the South China
Sea. In other contexts (most bizarrely, the movie Barbie), this alleged boundary has ten or eleven dashes. In 2016 a tribunal in The
Hague ruled that under international law and Unclos the line was poppycock. That should have settled the matter. It did not. China
kept building military structures on disputed shoals and rocks — one atoll is aptly named Mischief Reef. Its intent is to turn these
isles into unsinkable aircraft carriers that will one day help China to push the US Navy out of waters Beijing considers to lie within
its “first island chain” — that is, inside China’s proper s phere o f i nfluence. That build-up naturally pits
China against Vietnam and others who claim the same islands. China has also resumed
bullying the Philippines, a former US territory that now has a mutual-defense treaty with its
one-time overlord. In recent months, the Chinese coast guard water-cannoned, blocked, harassed and even rammed
Philippine boats sailing in shoals over which Manila has sovereignty. The two nations are not yet close to going to war. But
collisions and clashes can easily escalate . China’s truculence therefore raises the question: Under what
circumstances should the US show up to back its ally, with the attendant risks of a conflagration? It’s tempting to argue, as Lyle
Goldstein at the think tank Defense Priorities does, that America “should not go to war over rocks or reefs or shoals.” But there’s
more at stake than fish, coral and sand, as Jacob Stokes at the Center for a New American Security told me. The
stakes are both similar to those in today’s other conflicts and different. The S outh C hina S ea, like the Red Sea, is one of
the world’s busiest waterways, with more than $3 trillion in goods passing through every year.
Allowing China to fortify the sea to a point where it can close off maritime trade to specific
countries in the event of a war would seem poor strategy. But China wouldn’t do that at first; it
would merely seize shoals and reefs. In doing so, however, China would again disdain and break
international law , or what the US (which itself doesn’t always want to be bound by that law) prefers to call the “rulesbased order.” In that way, the South China Sea is analogous to Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine with a
tale as spurious as China’s nine-dash line: a mystical narrative that Ukrainians are really Russians and therefore belong to the
Kremlin. Russia is now trampling on the sovereignty and integrity of a fellow member state of the UN. If Putin isn’t stopped, he will
go on — to Moldova and elsewhere. Likewise, if Beijing got away with seizing a Vietnamese or Philippine
island, it would grab more . The UN Charter and international law would become as
irrelevant as the League of Nations did when it failed to stop Mussolini and Hitler.
Admittedly, the Filipinos wouldn’t experience anything remotely as disastrous as the Ukrainians are suffering. The latter are fighting
for their national existence, being bombed in their own homes and mourning the loss of children the Russians have abducted. The
former, at least initially, only stand to lose some uninhabited islands. But there’s also the defense alliance between the US and the
Philippines to consider. If the Chinese seized the islands, America’s other allies would observe
Washington’s response. So uth Ko rea would determine whether it can still feel safe under
the US nuclear umbrella against North Korea, as would Japan with an eye to both
Pyongyang and Beijing and NATO members such as Estonia that are in Putin’s crosshairs. If
the US reneged on its commitments to defend the Philippines, all its other alliances would
lose value , triggering new nuclear and conventional arms races and inviting
aggression by America’s enemies. The US should also ensure that it never has to fight alone. So it ought to keep
expanding its network of partners to align the equivalent of posses — in the Indo-Pacific region that could include the “Quad,” a
partnership with Australia, Japan and India; and AUKUS, a triad formed with the Brits and Aussies. China, like Russia, should
always have to worry that its aggression might face a response from a large part of the world. Two other major conflicts raging today
are qualitatively different, however. One is the war between Israel and Hamas. It’s not an interstate conflict (and only will be once
there is a two-state solution). Instead, it’s the fight by a militarily strong nation, Israel — which is a partner of the US but doesn’t
have a mutual-defense treaty — against a terrorist group, Hamas, that attacked it in the most sadistic ways. In the process of
retaliating against Hamas, however, Israel now stands accused in The Hague of violating international law. In this struggle the US
can mediate, but it cannot side simply with either Palestinians or Israelis. In the long term, it must distance itself from the region,
where its own interests are increasingly unclear. The other worry is about China and Taiwan — Beijing indeed sees the cross-Strait
question as linked to its ambitions in the South China Sea. This too isn’t officially an interstate dispute. The US recognizes only one
China, and in the 1970s acknowledged the People’s Republic as its representative. At the same time, with the Taiwan Relations Act,
Washington expressed its “expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means” and that anything else would
be a matter “of grave concern.” Deliberately ambiguous, the phrase nonetheless suggests that the US might go to war on behalf of a
democratic friend if the mainland attacked. All these conflicts — in Ukraine, the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and even the
Middle East, where Israel has nukes and Iran could soon get them — involve nuclear powers, making the stakes potentially
existential. As it’s been said, such wars “cannot be won and must never be fought.” But the US would be wrong to
conclude that it should therefore deter itself rather than its enemies. The best way to ensure a
world that’s worth living in is for the US to make clear to its adversaries that it would , if it
came to it, go to war — even over reefs, shoals and rocks.
1ac – alliances
SCENARIO 1 IS EUROPE
NATO military cred in jeopardy
Ataman 25, [(Joseph, CNN Field Producer and long-form text reporter with a particular eye
on all things defence in Europe. Think: Deterring Russian aggression, arming Ukraine, all things
NATO and the revival of Europe's defence industry.) "To many in Europe, Trump has punched
holes in NATO’s nuclear umbrella, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/16/europe/trumpnato-umbrella-europe-intl, 3-16-2025, accessed 7-9-2025]//UT
Megaton for megaton, Europe’s arsenal bears no comparison with that of Moscow. Boosting Europe’s
nuclear arsenal would be a “question of years, if not decades,” of investment and development,
according to RUSI’s Kulesa. But deterrence isn’t just a question of the number of missiles; demonstrating the
operational credibility of Europe’s nuclear forces is also essential. More cohesive cooperation
with allies around nuclear forces would be a strong boost to deterrence, Kulesa said. That could entail air-to-air
refuelling from allies in support of French bombers or anti-submarine warfare capabilities to protect British or French nuclear sub
maneuvers. Given decades of shrinking investment in the British military, questions have been raised
over the deterrence that Britain’s conventional and nuclear weapons offer, particularly given its
reliance on a US supply chain. In the last eight years, the UK has publicly acknowledged two failed
nuclear missile tests, one of them in the waters off Florida, when dummy missiles didn’t fire as intended. British Prime
Minister Keir Starmer last month promised what the government described as “the biggest investment in defense spending since the
Cold War” in an increasingly dangerous world. Other non-nuclear European allies are boosting their spending
on conventional weapons – and this also counts, analysts say. Fundamentally, “nuclear weapons are not a magic
instrument,” said Kulesa. Any true deterrence to Russia will need conventional and nuclear forces,
he said, and under Trump, “the question is whether you can count on the American
commitment and involvement .”
Putin strikes now
Gardner 25, [(Frank Gardner, Security Correspondent,) "Russia may attack Nato in next
four years, German defence chief warns, No Publication,
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c62v63gl8rvo, 6-1-2025, accessed 7-9-2025]//UT
His comments come weeks ahead of a summit of Nato nations at The Hague where they are expected to discuss defence budgets,
among other topics. Gen Breuer said that Nato was facing "a very serious threat" from Russia, one that he has
never seen before in his 40 years in service. At the moment, he said, Russia was building up its forces to an
"enormous extent", producing approximately 1,500 main battle tanks every year. "Not every
single tank is going to [the war in] Ukraine, but it's also going in stocks and into new military
structures always facing the West," he said. Russia also produced four million rounds of 152mm
artillery munition in 2024, and not all of it was going to Ukraine either, added Gen Breuer. The figures
come from German and allied nations' analysts. "There's an intent and there's a build up of the stocks" for a
possible future attack on Nato's Baltic state members, he said. "This is what the analysts are assessing - in 2029. So we have to be
ready by 2029... If you ask me now, is this a guarantee that's not earlier than 2029? I would say no, it's not. So we must be able
to fight tonight ," he said. Many have long feared an attack on a Nato state as it could trigger a larger war between Russia
and the US, which is a key member of Nato. Under Article 5 of the Nato agreement, any attack on a member state would mean other
members must come to its defence. Gen Breuer singled out the so-called Suwalki Gap, an area that borders Lithuania, Poland,
Russia and Belarus, as one of the most vulnerable. "The Baltic States are really exposed to the Russians, right? And once you are
there, you really feel this... in the talks we are having over there," he said. The Estonians, he said, had given the analogy of being
close to a wildfire where they "feel the heat, see the flames and smell the smoke", while in Germany "you probably see a little bit of
smoke over the horizon and not more". Gen Breuer said this showed the differing perspectives among European states of the threat
of a possible Russian attack. Russia's view of the Ukraine war was different from the West's, he said, where
Moscow sees the war as more of a " continuum " in a larger conflict with Nato and is therefore
"trying to find ways into our defence lines and it's testing it". He cited recent attacks on
undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, cyber attacks on European public transport, and unidentified
drones spotted over German power stations and other infrastructure.
US draw in goes nuclear
Lynas 22, [(Mark, Lynas is research and climate lead for the Alliance for Science and is cofounder of the pro-science environmental network RePlanet Since 2009 he has been climate
advisor to former president of the Maldives Mohamed Nasheed (with whom he appears in the
2011 documentary film The Island President), and he currently works to assist Nasheed with the
Climate Vulnerable Forum, a group of the world's most climate-vulnerable 58 developing
countries. He is a strategic advisor for the international ecomodernist NGO WePlanet. He has
co-authored a number of peer-reviewed scientific publications, including a 2021 paper which
found that the consensus on anthropogenic climate change in the scholarly literature now
exceeds 99%)) "What the science says: Could humans survive a nuclear war between NATO and
Russia?, Alliance for Science, https://allianceforscience.org/blog/2022/03/what-the-sciencesays-could-humans-survive-a-nuclear-war-between-nato-and-russia/, 3-10-2022, accessed 7-92025]//UT
Russian leader Vladimir Putin has suggested that he would consider using nuclear weapons if confronted with a
NATO military response in Ukraine, or if faced with a direct threat to his person or regime. If the war spreads to a NATO
country like Estonia or Poland a direct US-Russia confrontation would take place, with a clear danger
of runaway nuclear escalation. The world is therefore arguably now closer to nuclear conflict than at any time since the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. So what would a full-scale nuclear exchange look like in reality? Is it truly global Armageddon, or would it
be survivable for some people and places? Many scientists have investigated this question already. Their work is surprisingly little
known, likely because in peacetime no one wants to think the unthinkable. But we are no longer in peacetime and the shadows of
multiple mushroom clouds are looming once again over our planet. Current nuclear weapons inventories The latest assessment of
Russian nuclear military capability estimates that as of early 2022 Russia has a stockpile of approximately
4,477 nuclear warheads — nearly 6,000 if “retired” warheads are included. The US maintains a similar
inventory of 5,500 warheads, with 3,800 of those rapidly deployable
Absent US assurances, European prolif is imminent—cascades
Deen ’25 (Thalif, United Nations, “If the US Nuclear Umbrella Collapses, Will it Trigger a
Euro-Bomb?”, https://www.globalissues.org/news/2025/04/28/39711, April 28, 2025///
Solis)
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 28 (IPS) - The Trump administration’s hostile attitude towards Western Europe—
and the threat to pullout of the 32-member military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – signifies
the danger of losing the longstanding protection of the US nuclear umbrella over Europe.
Jana Puglierin, director of the German office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, was quoted as saying: “Trump may,
or may not, want to leave NATO officially, but he has every means to undermine NATO”.
Trump’s antagonism towards NATO also extends to the 27-member European Union (EU), which he
said, was created, “to screw the US.”
The widespread speculation, in the current political climate, is whether the UK and France could provide nuclear protection to
Western Europe—or will countries like Germany, Poland and the Nordics be forced to go
nuclear ?
The New York Times said last month that Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland , with its long history of Russian occupation,
might eventually develop its own nuclear weapon.
Of the world’s approximately 12,331 nuclear warheads, roughly 9,604 are in the military stockpiles for use by missiles, aircraft, ships
and submarines. The remaining warheads have been retired but are still relatively intact and are awaiting dismantlement, according
to FAS.
The world's nine nuclear-armed states are the UK, US, Russia, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel.
Both UK and France have only 515 warheads compared to about 3,700 in the American arsenal, with an additional 1,300 waiting to
be de-activated.
Tariq Rauf (former Head of Verification and Security Policy, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told IPS “for some time
now, I have believed that NATO's European members have failed to integrate Russia into a common European security
architecture”.
It is a concerning reality that some of the new members of NATO, former East bloc countries, have
endeavoured to get some form of revenge for the wrongs inflicted upon them by the USSR , and
have found ways to provoke Russia which in turn has led to bad behaviour by Russia.
“Now the proverbial chickens have come home to roost and a shooting war has been going on for three years. US pull back
from Europe has long been on the books, President Trump is the latest US leader who seems to
let the Europeans fend for themselves. Eighty years after the end of WW2, EU economies are thriving but their foreign
policy remains confused and now there are concerns about "friendly proliferation".
The Polish president, Rauf pointed out, has openly voiced interest in developing own nuclear weapons if
the US does not station nuclear weapons in his country. Interestingly, this did not elicit any concerns from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other countries as Poland is a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NonProliferation Treaty.
Both France and the UK still labour under delusions of being global powers and have pretensions of providing "extended deterrence"
to their European friends as the US distances itself.
In the UK, Prime Minister Starmer is cutting support to pensioners and other social programmes ,
as well as overseas development assistance, to fund new nuclear-missile submarines and maintaining an
arsenal of about 260 operational nuclear weapons.
In France, President Macron is reversing President de Gaulle's policy and is openly offering to bring in EU countries under a French
nuclear "umbrella", even as the economy declines and social problems increase.
While France has about 300 operational nuclear warheads, it has permanently closed and dismantled it nuclear weapon test sites
and facilities to make nuclear material for nuclear weapons.
Germany has reversed policy as well and will again host US medium-range nuclear-armed
ballistic missiles; as will the UK which will bring back US nuclear-armed bombers.
The 55-year old NPT system is on the verge of collapse and it that happens the result will be a
cascade of nuclear proliferation in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, warned Rauf.
Jackie Cabasso, Executive Director, Western States Legal Foundation, Oakland, California, told IPS talk of a potential “Eurobomb”
goes back decades, but it has escalated sharply since the Trump administration’s antipathy towards its NATO allies has caused some
of them to question the reliability of the U.S. commitment to Article 5 of the 1949 NATO treaty.
Runaway prolif and nuclear terror
Rittenhouse Green 18 [Brendan Rittenhouse Green is an assistant professor of political science at
the University of Cincinnati, "Primacy and Proliferation: why security commitments don't prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons", 01/29/2018, US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,
https://www.biknotes.com/_files/ugd/b8b6dc_f714e70cfe39438b910e544c4271792b.pdf#page=77]
It is difficult to imagine an interest more important to American national security policy than preventing a nuclear detonation on the homeland. Even a
nuclear exchange that took place elsewhere in the world would be sure to
produce such horrendous outcomes , and so radically reshape international politics,
that the consequences for the United States cannot be lightly dismissed. The grinding logic of
statistical probability means that these dangers can only rise as the number of
nuclear states increases . The more actors with nuclear weapons, the more potential dyads exist for
nuclear war; the more opportunity there is for those weapons to fall into
the hands of terrorists; the more likely it is that organizational pathologies
will result in irrationally risky nuclear decision-making ; the more likely it
is that some variable outside the austere logic of mutual deterrence will
end up determining outcomes. Even if these risks are small, nuclear
proliferation multiplies them, and the consequences are massive . In principle,
therefore, it is worth paying something to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the right circumstances. That logic is why policymakers display such unanimous
support for nuclear inhibition as a goal of American foreign policy. In a world where genuine dangers to American security are few and far between, the
potential negative consequences of nuclear proliferation stand out . They serve as
something of a trump card in the grand strategic debate between primacy and restraint. In one recent exchange, primacy advocates Brooks, Ikenberry, and
Wohlforth retreated from a number of security-based justifications for American political and military commitments, substituting instead the threat that increased
international competition might pose to the international economic and institutional order. But they retain their emphasis on the potential consequences of nuclear
use (Craig et al. 2013). Primacy’s simple syllogism—retrenchment increases insecurity; insecurity causes proliferation; proliferation begets more proliferation; while
military and political engagement reduce all of the preceding variables—is a powerful weapon against efforts to restrain
SCENARIO 2 IS OUR MAPLE STAPLE
Canada develops nukes due to American instability
Belanger 25 [Jean-Francois Belanger is the assistant professor of Military Operations at the Royal Danish
Defense College., "Opinion: Canada needs to develop its own nuclear program", 03/21/2025, The Globe
and Mail, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canada-needs-to-develop-its-own-nuclearprogram/]
We are in the midst of the largest geopolitical realignment since the end of the Cold War. The United States , once a staunch ally,
is slowly pulling out of European security arrangements, leaving everyone
guessing about its security commitments to allies. Canada, therefore, needs to bolster its own defence, and
many have argued for shoring up the Canadian Armed Forces’ capabilities. But it is likely not sufficient. Canada is an enormous territory, and we have at the
moment about 65,000 active duty troops. What once was a ludicrous idea is becoming an important question: Should Canada explore developing nuclear weapons?
A window of opportunity is opening. NATO allies are rethinking their nuclear stances for the sake of their security and that of Europe. Poland is overtly signalling it
will look at acquiring nuclear weapons. Germany had nuclear discussions in recent years, and they are likely to pick up.
There is a rationale
to developing a nuclear capacity for Canada that aligns with European allies and
directs it toward Russia, while ensuring our continental security against a
former friend, the United States . It will be an important discussion to have with our allies. Some in Canada are
waking up to this new reality. During her Liberal Party leadership run, C hrystia Freeland
suggested British nuclear weapons could help protect Canada from Donald
Trump . There are important issues with this proposal. First, it does not address the main threat of Russia or China. Second, Britain’s nuclear arsenal is
intertwined with the Americans’ through the Trident missiles it uses, and therefore is not independent. There are already rumours Washington might terminate this
collaboration. The only independent nuclear force in Europe is France. Former president Charles De Gaulle had insisted on it in the early years of NATO, believing he
could not trust a future American leadership he had never met. Paris appears willing to extend its protection to Europe and perhaps Canada, but questions remain,
namely about credibility. In normal circumstances, obtaining or developing nuclear weapons would be unthinkable for Canada due to the cost on its foreign
relations, security and reputation as a strong non-proliferation state. We are, however, going through uncertain times and
should develop our nuclear capacity. Canada is in an enviable position . It has
almost all the components and infrastructure to develop nuclear weapons .
The country historically participated in the Manhattan project, and it currently has one of the
strongest nuclear energy industries in the world. Only Kazakhstan produces more uranium, and we have stockpiles of heavy
water, which can be used to develop nuclear weapons. The only thing missing is reprocessing facilities to make weapons-grade plutonium. Plutonium would
produce a bomb faster than uranium, taking a year or two. Alternatively, Canada could seek to purchase materials. Reprocessing technologies are dual-use, meaning
commercial sectors use them as well, which can provide cover for a nuclear program. The next hurdle is to ensure that Canada has the proper delivery mechanisms
– missiles, aircraft or submarines – that allow the weapons to be used. Nuclear latency – the possession of nuclear knowledge and technology – has no value
without it. There are a few options here Canada should explore. Ideally, Canada would move forward with an independent rocket launch capacity as sending rockets
into space uses the same technology as missiles. Moreover, Canada would move away from the hybrid diesel-electric submarines it is planning on buying and move
to nuclear-powered submarines capable of carrying nuclear weapons, such as the French Suffren-class submarine. These powerful submarines would protect the
weapons, and as an added bonus, would be more effective in icebound Arctic waters. Moving away from the purchase of American F-35 fighter jets is another
option. Calls are being made in Canada already to cancel the purchase. If other allies follow suit, it might provide justification to align on what NATO allies will
purchase instead. The Dassault Rafale or the Eurofighter Typhoon would be adequate replacements since they are nuclear-capable. The idea of shoring up Canada’s
nuclear weapons capabilities would have been ludicrous just a few months ago. However, our new security reality forces us to ask hard and difficult questions.
Canada needs to develop the means to adapt to the worst-case scenario: a
continued and serious threat of annexation by the United State s, or an
anticipated conflict with Russia in Europe or the Arctic. The territorial integrity of the country is at stake. There is no plan to
invade Canada – yet. However , as the United States continues its democratic backsliding,
it is impossible to predict with certainty that plans would not materialize . It
is time to hedge our bets.
Triggers American intervention and cascading prolif
Spencer-Churchill 25 [Julian Spencer-Churchill is associate professor of international relations at
Concordia University, director of the Canadian Centre for Strategic Studies and former Canadian Forces
captain. He has extensively researched and written about Pakistan for over 10 years with a focus on
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. , "Bombs away: A Canadian nuclear weapons program to deter Trump is
not feasible", 05/16/2025, Policy Options, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may2025/canadian-nukes/]
Too easy to detect However, there is no chance of hiding a nuclear weapons program .
Manufacturing the infrastructure to produce plutonium or to enrich uranium would be immediately noticeable to the U.S., as well as the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Isotope decay products leading to plutonium create easily detectable Krypton-85 gas. Enrichment centrifuges emit radiofrequency waves that are
difficult to shield. All other enrichment methods either consume noticeably large quantities of energy or rely on specialized equipment, such as calutrons.
Although South Africa employed fewer than 20 engineers to manufacture its six
warheads within a large dual-use infrastructure , its attempted test was immediately
detected by satellites of the U.S.S.R
. In addition, Pretoria’s purchase of Israeli intermediate-range ballistic missiles was
quickly known by U.S. intelligence. The nuclear dilemma There are some other important truths to consider. First, second-strike nuclear arsenals are the basis of
military and national power, and the U.S. wields great influence through the provision of its nuclear umbrella to its allies. While nuclear weapons cannot occupy
territory like an army can, they can shatter the economy of the great powers sufficiently to expose them to conquest by their neighbours. A United States deurbanized and de-industrialized by a major city-busting Russian or Chinese nuclear strike would be unable to replace or maintain its navy, which is so vital to assert
its sphere of influence over North America. Conventional forces permit more fine-grained applications of deterrence and force, but integration with tactical nuclear
forces is doctrinal and theoretical, never having been tested in battle. Second, U.S. nuclear power does not depend solely on retaliatory capability, which is termed
immediate deterrence, but also on having an arsenal so large that potential adversaries do not even try to start a nuclear program, which is called general
, it would undermine the
psychological deterrent effect of a large U.S. arsenal and could even lead to
nuclear programs in Brazil, Argentina or Mexico, or a purchased
Venezuelan or Cuban arsenal. Be careful what you wish for Trump’s 51st state threats reveal that Canada has an immature
deterrence. If Canada were to seek nuclear weapons capability
national security culture. Much like the Liberal government’s bewildered response to the Quebec referendum in 1995, Canadian political leaders lack a clearly
articulated survival strategy for the nation when under stress. Much recent anti-Americanism in Canada is driven most by economic concerns related to tariff
negotiations, highlighting the lack of a sense of proportion of many Canadians. It is because of centuries of harsh historical experience that Russian, Chinese, French
and Polish citizens, for all their jingoism, are more confidently calm when confronting security threats and war. Grade school history texts celebrate how stalwart
Canadians resisted the U.S. invasion in the War of 1812, but Canada was mainly lucky that the U.S. was divided over the issue of war. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s
regarded account shows how anglophile New England critically sabotaged the U.S. war effort, with Boston grain merchants clandestinely feeding the Royal Navy
Canadian nuclear program , designed to assure
its citizens, would instead excite anti-Americanism to new heights and would
likely provoke a physical and irreversible U.S. intervention . The manifest lack
of political will in Ottawa means that politicians could not credibly threaten
retaliation against a U.S. incursion , defeating the purpose of a nuclear arsenal in the
ships blockading the port of Boston. A losing proposition A formal
first place. Any weaponized nuclear program would also require a dramatically militarized
security regime that would disproportionately undermine Canadian freedoms. Even
possession of a latent pre-assembly capability would make Canada an easy
target of nuclear espionage and fillip to nuclear proliferation. It was low confidence in
Canada’s ability to protect from espionage the design plans of the infamous CF-105 Avro Arrow
that led to its shredding. International issues would arise The foreign relations implications of a Canadian nuclear weapons program raise other
important questions. Would Canadian armed forces that are deployed abroad extend our nuclear umbrella to host nations, such as Latvia? Where would Canada
deploy nuclear weapons? Hudson Bay provides a vast and easily secured ballistic missile submarine
bastion. But at only 100 metres deep, submarines would be vulnerable to detection by wakeanalyzing satellites and air drones equipped with magnetic anomaly detectors (MAD).
Washington would not appreciate nuclear-armed submarines patrolling in
collision-prone Lake Ontario. Harsh winters might cause missile-carrying TEL trucks to slide into ditches along an inadequately
extensive highway system. Would CN and CPKC railway unions demand protocols to minimize the exposure of their employees if Canada adopted a rail-mobile
option, especially because much of the rail network goes through inhabited areas ? Deploying first-generation ballistic missile
submarines into the deep oceans would require a protective surface flotilla, exposing its
location. Washington wants Canada nuclear free Lastly, in the event of Quebec sovereignty, would Ottawa
share a proportional number of nuclear warheads and missiles, or only those portions manufactured in Quebec, such as rocket components and krytron
switches? The approach of purchasing an off-the-shelf readily deployable system, such as acquiring one of France’s four ballistic missile submarines, is
improbable. As Mao Zedong once advised Libya, states don’t sell nuclear weapons. Besides which, France’s ducking of any suggestion that it would use
a battalion of parachute troops, supported by its nuclear arsenal, to back Denmark’s defence of Greenland against Trump’s threats to the island means
that Paris does not want to involve itself in any U.S.-North American altercation. The U.S. has historically been unusually respectful of Canadian
sovereignty, given that the borders were settled by treaty, rather than through war. Canada’s freedom of manoeuvre in North America depends on its
continued close relationship with its European allies, particularly France, which it uses to counterbalance unilateralism in Washington. Crucially,
America’s goodwill depends on Canada acquiescing to Washington’s
security redlines , which includes remaining nuclear-free. Most importantly, it is in
Canada’s national interest for the United States to remain the preeminent
nuclear power.
SCENARIO 3 IS DUAL USE
Research into hypersonics is necessary to enable rapid aerospace
advancement
Boretti 24, [(Alberto, Alberto Boretti is a research professor of mechanical engineering at
the Missouri University of Science and Technology. After he received his PhD from the
University of Florence, Italy, in 1988, he was a senior researcher and project and team manager
in the automotive industry for 17 years) "Hydrogen hypersonic combined cycle propulsion:
Advancements, challenges, and applications, Research Gate,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360319923059815, 2-15-2024, accessed
7-24-2025] UT
Developing practical and reliable propulsion systems for hypersonic aircraft is a complex
engineering challenge. Research and development efforts continue to focus on improving fuel efficiency,
thermal management, structural integrity, and overall performance to enable the realization of hypersonic flight
capabilities for various applications, including long-range transportation, space access, but also
military applications.
The commercial perspective of propulsion by scramjet engines holds potential for various applications and
industries, despite different analysts having different opinions [29,[49], [50], [51], [52], [53]]. Some key points to consider
include Hypersonic Travel, Space Launch Systems, Military Applications, Research and
Development, Economic Growth and Job Creation, and Technological Spin-Offs.
Scramjet engines can propel vehicles at hypersonic speeds, which could revolutionize air travel. With
hypersonic propulsion, long-distance flights could be completed in significantly reduced time compared to
traditional subsonic aircraft. This could lead to a paradigm shift in commercial aviation, enabling faster and more efficient global
transportation. Scramjet engines can also be utilized in space launch systems, specifically for the
atmospheric phase of the launch. By using air-breathing engines like scramjets during the initial part of the ascent, the
need for carrying oxidizers (such as liquid oxygen) onboard can be eliminated, reducing the overall launch mass and
cost. This can potentially make access to space more affordable and enable the launch of larger
payloads. Scramjet technology has significant military applications. High-speed scramjet-powered missiles or hypersonic glide
vehicles can provide enhanced capabilities for defense purposes. They can deliver rapid response times, maneuverability, and
increased range compared to traditional missile systems, offering a strategic advantage in various scenarios. The development
of scramjet engines for commercial purposes drives research and development efforts in aerospace and
propulsion technologies. This leads to advancements in materials science, aerodynamics,
combustion, and thermal management, which have wider applications beyond scramjet engines. The
knowledge and technology developed for scramjets can be leveraged in other fields, contributing to
technological progress and innovation. The commercialization of scramjet technology can foster economic growth and
job creation. It stimulates investment in research, development, and manufacturing infrastructure. It also creates employment
opportunities across a range of industries, including aerospace, engineering, manufacturing, and associated support services. The
development of scramjet engines may lead to technological spin-offs that can benefit other sectors. Advances in
high-temperature materials, aerodynamics, combustion processes, and thermal management techniques have applications beyond
scramjets. These advancements can find utility in industries such as energy, automotive, and environmental sectors. The
commercialization of scramjet engines is a complex and multi-faceted process. It requires significant investments, research, and
regulatory considerations. Challenges related to cost, safety, scalability, and infrastructure need to be addressed for widespread
commercial adoption. Furthermore, the successful integration of scramjet technology into commercial applications depends on
factors such as market demand, regulatory approvals, environmental considerations, and public acceptance. Collaboration
between industry, government agencies, and research institutions is essential for realizing the full
commercial potential of scramjet engines. About 70 years after the first proposal of supersonic combustion ramjets [36], the
success of scramjets is likely approaching, hopefully, to deliver better civil transport, faster and at a reduced environmental and
economic cost, rather than produce new weapons.
Absent effective space colonization, extinction is inevitable
Gunderson et al 21, [(Ryan Gunderson, yan Gunderson is an Associate Professor in the
Department of Sociology and Gerontology and Affiliate of the Institute for the Environment and
Sustainability at Miami University. Current research projects concern the potential effectiveness
and political-economic dimensions of proposed solutions to environmental problems, climate
change inaction, and the social and environmental impacts of technology. He is co-author of
Climate Change Solutions: Beyond the Capital-Climate Contradiction (University of Michigan
Press, 2020) and The Degrowth Alternative (Routledge, forthcoming)) "In search of plan(et) B:
Irrational rationality, capitalist realism, and space colonization, No Publication,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001632872100166X, 12-XX-2021, accessed
7-24-2025] UT
Justifications for space colonization are historically and culturally diverse, including the utopian Russian cosmists who hoped to
achieve human immortality through space travel (Groys, 2018). Here we focus on contemporary justifications of space colonization
as a survival strategy in the face of climate change and other crises making the Earth increasingly
“inhospitable” and even, someday, perhaps “uninhabitable” (Wallace-Wells, 2020). The idea is that
humans must find ways to live off-Earth, as our planet is becoming increasingly difficult to live on and
may become impossible to live on as we face escalating existential threats. Indeed, scientists are increasingly stating that
climate change and biodiversity loss represent threats to our survival as a species (IPBES, 2019; Lenton et al., 2019;
Ripple, Wolf, Newsome, Barnard, & Moomaw, 2019; Steffen et al., 2018). While some may disregard this warning as exaggerated, for
many people – including future-thinking billionaires – this is a real threat and requires that we respond and plan accordingly. Here
we look at justifications for space colonization as an approach to protect people from increasingly inhospitable conditions on Earth.
The idea of creating a back-up plan(et) (Piper, 2018) through space colonization is not new, as scientists and public intellectuals
including Carl Sagan and Stephen Hawking have been quoted stating we need space colonization as a way to protect humans and
bring civilization back in the case of a catastrophic event on Earth. While this event could be an asteroid, it could also be human
caused, from nuclear war to climate and ecological breakdown. Due to the need to protect the human species, it is argued that “[w]e
have an obligation to colonize outer space” (Munevar, 2019: 38), in the form of colonies on Mars, the Moon, or space
stations. Space colonization projects are increasingly framed as necessary to protect humans from
existential threats on Earth and as morally obligatory to save the species. The moral argument is
summarized well here:
[w]e have an obligation to ensure the long-term survival of our species. We ought, then, to expand beyond Earth, because once
humans are established elsewhere in the heavens, our species will no longer be vulnerable to catastrophes on Earth. (Stoner, 2017)
This supports what Abney (2019) calls the “interstellar doomsday argument”: if something is going to destroy Earth, we must move
off-planet. Thus, engaging in space colonization represents a morally obligatory risk mitigation strategy: not putting all your eggs
(humans) in one basket (Earth).
The existential threats we face could be “natural” risks, like an asteroid or supernova, but more pressing are the
existential threats caused by humans. These “[a]nthropogenic existential risks. . . are man-made in that they are the
direct or indirect consequence of the technological progress of our civilization” (Kovic, 2020: 2). Here we focus on the case
for space colonization in response to human-caused ecological risks.1 Scientists are increasingly warning that due to human
activities causing climate change and biodiversity loss we face existential threats; again, our current
course puts our species at risk (see above). As explained by Levchenko, Xu, Mazouffre, Keidar, and Bazaka (2019: 2), as “our ever
growing environmental footprint threatens the survival of the human race on Earth. . . Colonization of other planets could
potentially increase the probability of our survival.” Green (2019: 37) argues that it is imperative to save our
species and to pursue space colonization as a means to do so, explaining that the fact that “we are our own worst threat does
complicate the matter, but not enough to warrant a morose resignation towards thinking we deserve our own demise.”
1ac - solvency
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially
increase its hypersonic programs and/or homeland missile defenses
in the Arctic.
Developing missile defenses assure allies and shore up alliances
Soofer 25 [Robert Soofer was a senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic
Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security., "'First, we will defend the homeland': The case for
homeland missile defense", 01/04/2025, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depthresearch-reports/report/first-we-will-defend-the-homeland-the-case-for-homeland-missile-defense]
harliu
Introduction Post-Cold War Republican and Democratic administrations, as evidenced by their respective MDRs, have well established the role of
missile defense in US defense strategy. During crises and conflicts, missile defenses offer additional military options to help the White House and
military leadership deter and, if necessary, counter adversary aggression and strategy. Missile defense is a contributor to integrated deterrence—not a
standalone capability. Protection of the homeland, military forces, and other critical assets is meant to enable US military strategy and the achievement
of war aims more broadly. Missile defenses contribute to and complement other military capabilities. While the 2022 MDR is the focal point for analysis,
the strategic value of missile defenses cannot be understood without reference to higher-order documents such as the NDS and the National
Security Strategy (NSS). How missile defenses contribute to these first-order security and strategy principles and objectives should determine the
priorities afforded to these defenses in a constrained defense budget. Put another way, US regional and homeland missile defense capabilities are an
enabler of US grand strategy, complement other military capabilities necessary for deterrence and defense, play a critical role in defeating adversary
strategies (or theories of victory), and ensure the survivability of US nuclear forces—the ultimate insurance policy against existential threats to the
nation. This section first examines the important role assigned to missile defense within the broader national security and national defense strategies—
sometimes referred to as US grand strategy. It then elaborates on the benefits of missile defense in deterring aggression and fulfilling US theater and
operational objectives during a war. Based on this assessment, this section draws some conclusions about the type and effectiveness of missile
defenses needed to contribute to US strategy objectives. Complicating this assessment is the fact that missile defenses have viable uses in a theater
or regional contingency (for the protection of allies, US forces, and key military forces and facilities), and these defenses also can work to protect the
homeland against long-range missile threats. While US missile defense policy does distinguish between the objectives for homeland and regional
missile defenses, this study argues that the military and strategic benefits provided by missile defense extend to both regional and homeland missile
defense. For example, both regional and homeland missile defenses can undermine an adversary’s confidence in the employment of missiles by
introducing doubt and uncertainty into attack planning—whether these are conventionally armed medium-range missiles or nuclear-armed ICBMs
attempting a disarming first strike. Missile defense and US grand strategy The Biden administration’s NSS declares that “the post-Cold War era is
definitively over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next.”62 It is a challenge from “powers that layer
authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy” such that “the risk of conflict between major powers is increasing,” and the “need for a strong
purposeful American role in the world has never been greater.”63 To address this challenge and to achieve the US goal of a “free, open, prosperous,
and secure international order,” the United States “will build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the
United States seeks to maintain favorable
balances of power in key regions of the world for the protection of US vital national
global strategic environment.”64 Framed another way, the
interests and its allies. But to do so, the United States recognizes that its alliances and partnerships around the world are its most important strategic asset in deterring aggression and
that “we are stronger in each region because of our affirmative engagement in the others.”65 For the first time, a photo at the July 2024 Washington summit captures all 32 NATO member states’ delegation groups
together. Source: The White House. If US grand strategy has as its base the support of allies for its execution, then it is axiomatic that allies must have confidence that the United States will come to their aid in
The credibility of US security guarantees, therefore, influences
whether allies will remain confident and work to strengthen the alliance or
accommodate regional challengers for fear that the United States will not
be there when it count s. If this is the case, then the United States must convince
allies that it is willing to run risks on their behalf —risks that include, ultimately,
nuclear threats to the US homeland. As these risks continue to increase —they are now
from even small powers such as North Korea— it becomes harder to convince allies
that the United States will be there in extremis. To be sure, the United States goes
times of great distress.
to great lengths—though troop deployments, exercises, demonstrations of will, and high-level
consultations—to reassure allies of its alliance commitments, but the increasing
vulnerability of the United States to nuclear missile threats (ballistic,
cruise, and hypersonic glide) against its homeland certainly must be
considered. A rising public opinion in South Korea in favor of acquiring its own nuclear weapons, for example, reflects this concern. As one conservative politician frames it, “Can the United
States defend Seoul while risking New York turning into a sea of fire?” As if to recall that this is not a new situation, he adds, “Now is the time that we show our determination like de Gaulle’s,” who, in the early
1960s, asked whether the United States was willing to trade New York for Paris.66 Likewise, the vice defense minister of Japan, during a briefing for reporters after a North Korean ICBM test in December 2023,
noted that, based on this test, the new missile could range all of the United States.67 When was the last occasion a major ally called attention to the increasing vulnerability of the US homeland?
Clearly,
the growing exposure of the United States to long-range nuclear threats has
not gone unnoticed by allies . Indeed, many US allies have faced these threats recently
from Russia during its re-invasion of Ukraine, while Chinese regional missiles continue to taunt
US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. Then US Defense Secretary Ash Carter and then US Secretary of State John Kerry attend a bilateral meeting with South Korean Defense
Minister Han Min Koo and South Korean Foreign Affairs Minister Yun Byung-se at the State Department, Washington, DC, October 2016. Source: Amber I. Smith, US Department of Defense. Washington has
long understood the critical relationship between protection of the homeland and the United States’ ability to project military power on behalf of allies and US vital interests. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review,
conducted by the DOD, is emphatic on this point and bears repeating here: Defending the Nation from attack is the foundation of strategy. As the tragic September terror attacks demonstrate, potential
adversaries will seek to threaten the centers of gravity of the United States, its allies and its friends. As the U.S. military increased its ability to project power at long-range, adversaries have noted the relative
vulnerability of the U.S. homeland. They are placing greater emphasis on the development of capabilities to threaten the United States directly in order to counter U.S. operational advantages with their own
strategic effects.68 As the following sections of this report argue, US adversaries, more specifically North Korea, Russia, and China, may believe that holding at risk the US homeland—with conventional, nuclear,
or other WMDs—will weaken the US center of gravity and thereby US resolve in any conflict. That is a risky strategy, to be sure: the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 did not weaken US resolve; quite the opposite.
But, on other occasions, such as the 1983 bombing of the US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon (resulting in the loss of 241 service members), which led to the withdrawal of the US military presence in
that country, the United States has reconsidered its policy and strategy objectives based on perceived risks. It is those risks that adversaries will seek to exploit with missiles and other strikes against the
homeland. Missile defense and national defense strategy It is no wonder, then, that protecting the homeland has consistently been the first priority of US defense strategy. The DOD in the 2014 Quadrennial
Defense Review reflected a realization that “the homeland is no longer a sanctuary” and that “we must anticipate the increased likelihood of an attack on U.S. soil.”69 That priority was maintained in subsequent
reviews and assessments and reflects prominently on the first page of the 2022 NDS, which declares: “first, we will defend the homeland.”70 This priority is followed by “deterring strategic attacks against the
United States, our allies and partners,” which also has implications for missile defense.71 Like prior US strategy documents, the 2022 NDS reiterates that the United States cannot meet today’s challenges alone
and that “mutually-beneficial alliances and partnerships are our greatest global strategic advantage—and they are a center of gravity for this strategy.”72 Again, this emphasis is further evidence that attending to
growing allied concerns about increasing US homeland vulnerability must be a priority and is central to US strategy. The NDS further implicates US homeland vulnerability by pointing out that “competitor
strategies seek to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in the American way of war, including by … posing all-domain threats to the U.S. homeland in an effort to jeopardize the U.S. military’s ability to project power
and counter regional aggression.”73 Specifically, “the PLA [Chinese People’s Liberation Army] seeks to target the ability of the Joint Force to project power to defend vital U.S. interests and aid our allies in crisis
and conflict,” and that “Russia has incorporated these capabilities and methods into an overall strategy that, like the PRC, seeks to exploit advantages in geography and time backed by a mix of threats to the U.S.
homeland and to our allies and partners.”74 The methods referred to include nuclear threats to the homeland and long-range cruise missile threats. Most importantly, according to the NDS: [T]he scope and scale
of threats to the homeland have fundamentally changed … the PRC or Russia could use a wide array of tools in an attempt to hinder U.S. military preparation and response in a conflict, including actions aimed at
undermining the will of the U.S. public, and to target our critical infrastructure and other systems.75 Similar warnings have been taken up by multiple US Northern Command leaders, as well as the Secretary of the
Army, who warned that in “a major war with China, the United States homeland would be at risk … with both kinetic and non-kinetic attacks. … They are going to go after the will of the United States public. They
are going to try to erode support for a conflict.”76 Taken together, the NDS warns that these capabilities “threaten to erode the United States’ ability to deter aggression and to help maintain favorable balances of
power in critical regions.”77 Recognizing these threats, how, then, does the NDS suggest that the United States can deter them? The broad answer includes a combination of denial, resilience, and cost imposition.
With respect to the homeland specifically, the NDS declares: [The] Department will take steps to raise potential attackers’ direct and indirect costs while reducing their expected benefits for aggressive action
against the homeland, particularly by increasing resilience. Nuclear attacks against the United States are to be deterred by modernized nuclear forces, while deterring regional nuclear threats include tailored
combinations of conventional, cyber, space and information capabilities along with nuclear weapons.78 Although it is not explicitly stated by the NDS, raising the attacker’s costs (through punishment) while
reducing expected benefits (by denying the objectives of their attacks) illustrates the important role that missile defenses play in the broader US national defense strategy. In other words, deterrence and missile
defense are complementary; resilience through missile defense helps make credible US threats of cost imposition (punishment) by reducing US vulnerability and the risks of escalation. Currently, adversaries
enjoy a “free ride” against the US homeland, which may promote the belief by Russian and Chinese leadership that they can successfully coerce US leadership by threatening US population or critical
infrastructure. Even a modest level of protection for the United States presents adversaries the worst of both worlds: They must contemplate that their attacks will fail to achieve their objectives and that such
attacks may provoke an unacceptable US response. Further, they must assign larger numbers of weapons to accomplish their desired effects, running greater escalation risks if the damage they inflict is greater
To summarize thus far, a central objective of US grand strategy is to maintain
favorable balances of power in regions of vital interest. To do so, maintaining strong alliances is
essential. The enduring support of allies, in turn, depends on the perception
than originally intended.
that the United States remains committed to their security and would run
risks to its own security to fulfill those commitments . Adversaries recognize the vulnerability of
the US homeland as a center of gravity to exploit with threatened attacks. It follows, therefore, that the first priority of US defense strategy is to protect
the homeland. If, as it is increasingly evident, potential adversaries are expanding their missile arsenals to hold at risk the United States (with nuclear
and conventional warheads), then lessening that vulnerability (and the perception of that vulnerability) through a comprehensive missile defense and
defeat strategy is essential for US grand strategy. This logic applies to rogue states such as North Korea as well as great-power competitors with large
, allies will interpret the credibility
and efficacy of US nuclear guarantees in the context of US interests and the risks
associated with employing nuclear weapons against nuclear-armed adversaries. If allies perceive the
United States as unwilling to defend its homeland against these threats,
they may wonder whether the United States would be willing to protect
them under similar circumstances. The 2022 MDR acknowledges this concern, stating that: [M]issile defense
systems such as the GMD offer a visible measure of protection for the U.S.
population while reassuring allies and partners that the United States will
not be coerced by threats to the homeland from states like North Korea and
and sophisticated long-range conventional and nuclear forces. Likewise
potentially Iran.79 Missile defense, integrated deterrence, and military operations Having established the critical role of homeland missile defense in lessening the vulnerability of the homeland
to missile strikes, the 2022 MDR emphasizes how missile defenses are a “core deterrence-by-denial component of an integrated deterrence strategy” meant to counter the continued use of missiles by
adversaries “as a principal means by which to project conventional or nuclear power.”80 Based on the 2022 MDR, missile defenses for the homeland: Add resilience to US conventional defenses and undermine
adversary confidence in missile use by introducing doubt and uncertainty into strike planning and execution. In the regional context, protection of US and allied ports, bases, transportation nodes, and critical
infrastructure allows the United States to continue military operations and flow in reinforcements. In the strategic nuclear context, the protection of US nuclear forces and nuclear command-and-control nodes
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the adversary nuclear attack planner to execute a disarming first strike with any confidence. Reduce the incentive to conduct small-scale coercive attacks, decreasing the
probability of attack success, and raising the threshold for conflict. In instances in which the adversary contemplates limited conventional or nuclear attacks against US and allied forces in the region—or against
the US homeland—such defenses reduce the likelihood of success and may require much larger adversary strikes that could force an escalation far beyond what the adversary is willing to risk
.
Reinforce US diplomatic and security posture to reassure allies and partners that
the United States will not falter in fulfilling its global commitments. This might
include deploying regional missile defenses to allied countries during crises but also applies to the defense of the US homeland, as stated previously.
Safeguarding this role is vital for maintaining alliance cohesion, particularly during a crisis or conflict. Provide additional military options that help counter the expanding presence of missile threats and may be less
escalatory than employing offensive weapons. A prime example of this is the defense of Israel against Iranian missile strikes in April 2024. Israel’s retaliation was measured. But, if Israel had sustained serious
damage without such defenses, then Israeli leadership likely would have, of necessity, retaliated more significantly against Iran. This wider retaliation could have forced a wider war between Israel and Iran at a
time when Israel remains engaged in a campaign against Hamas in Gaza. Offer some damage limitation against missile strikes, expanding the decision-making space for senior leaders at all levels of conflict,
preserving capability and freedom of maneuver for US forces in a conflict region. For example, keeping an airbase or seaport operational longer could provide additional and better options for military leaders
conducting offensive strikes or reinforcing forces in the region. Implications for homeland defense objectives and architectures Defense of the homeland against missile attack contributes to US national security at
the regional, strategic, and grand-strategic levels. The protection of US military forces and war-supporting critical military and transportation infrastructure in the homeland enables the execution of US war plans
that depend on moving reinforcements into battle as soon as possible. At the strategic (national defense) level, missile defense protection for the homeland against an adversary’s limited conventional or nuclear
strikes removes that as a coercive tactic against the United States because adversaries would lack confidence that those limited strikes will reach their intended targets, while also having to worry of an escalatory
Finally, homeland missile defenses play a critical role in a US
grand strategy that depends on allies to protect its vital interests in key
regions; reducing US homeland vulnerability demonstrates, to adversaries
and allies alike, the US commitment to run risks on behalf of its vital
interests and allies . General considerations From the discussion above, it is possible to derive certain general principles to guide the consideration of the type and
response by the United States.
scope of missile defenses necessary to provide the strategy benefits heretofore mentioned. First, the objective is not to replace deterrence provided by other military forces or even US nuclear retaliatory
capabilities. Rather, it is to strengthen the credibility of US nuclear threats and conventional force commitments by lessening (not eliminating) the potential vulnerability of the US homeland to missile threats. In
this sense, missile defense and deterrence are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Second, the objective or “strategic effect” is not the comprehensive protection of the homeland, but to create attack
uncertainty or erode attacker confidence in the attack plans, thereby defeating the adversary’s strategy. For example, an adversary might contemplate attacks against US sea- and airports of embarkation for
reinforcements to slow a US response, alongside added political aims, such as loss of public support for the military campaign. In this example, protection would be for specified key ports rather than broad swaths
of US territory. Third, from these objectives, which drive the limited scope of the missile defense architecture, one can derive that the United States does not intend to undermine the Russian or Chinese nuclear
second-strike capability. Finally, these objectives for homeland missile defense lead to the crucial conclusion that even limited missile defenses can create fundamental strategic and deterrence effects. As such,
one could reduce the scope, efficacy, and cost of the defense system required to generate the desired effects. Missile defense and deterrence are complementary Senior defense policymakers and strategists
across Republican and Democratic administrations have long realized the complementary nature of deterrence and defense. One of the best such examples is in the 1999 congressional testimony of Walter
Slocombe, the undersecretary of defense for policy in the Clinton administration, who on that day explained to the House Armed Services Committee the administration’s plans to deploy defenses capable of
protecting the US homeland against up to a few dozen North Korean ICBM warheads: Active defenses can play an important role in strengthening and complementing our overall deterrence policy. There is no
contradiction between defenses and deterrence. At the core of deterrence is convincing an adversary that the assured negative consequences of an action greatly outweigh any potential positive results of that
action. Thus, there are two sides to deterrence. The threat of retaliation drives home that the negative consequences would be huge. But it is also valuable for deterrence to reduce the chance that an attack
would succeed in the first place; that is, to reduce the prospect of positive results. And missile defenses can do that.81 The Biden administration seems to share this view and explains that “missile defense and
nuclear capabilities are complementary. U.S. nuclear weapons present a credible threat of a robust response and overwhelming cost imposition, while missile defenses contribute to deterrence by denial.”82 Yet,
the extent to which this strategic logic applies to Russian and Chinese nuclear ballistic missile threats to the homeland is unclear. While this notion seems self-evident to most military planners, it has been a point
of some debate between advocates and opponents of homeland missile defenses reaching back to the 1960s debate leading up to the 1972 ABM Treaty. One school of thought believes nuclear deterrence is best
preserved through the maintenance of mutual vulnerability to nuclear counterstrikes—a theory of deterrence supposedly codified in the ABM Treaty. Yet there has always been an alternative view arguing that
mutual vulnerability should not be the basis for deterrence—and that mutual vulnerability, by definition, makes it difficult for the United States to run risks on behalf of allies (thereby diminishing the credibility of
extended deterrence). Adherents of the deterrence through mutual vulnerability school have drawn the conclusion that since it is necessary to “deter” (through the threat of retaliation), one, therefore, must not
“defend.” The approach outlined in this study does not advocate a defense-only approach to military strategy. Rather, it argues that missile defenses—by increasing attacker uncertainty and reducing US
vulnerability—contribute to the broader integrated deterrence approach by countering adversary strategy that increasingly relies on missile threats to the homeland to weaken US national will and prevent
reinforcement of allies in a timely fashion. Uncertainty’s contribution to deterrence Missile defenses do not have to work perfectly or be cost-prohibitive to have the intended strategic effect on adversaries—which
is to convince them that conventional or nuclear missile attacks against the US homeland will not tilt conflicts in their favor—and that the consequences of these inconsequential attacks will make the attackers
worse off or risk further intolerable escalation by the United States. The main objective, then, is to erase enemies’ confidence in their success: either a large-scale preemptive attack against US nuclear retaliatory
forces, or more limited strikes intended to coerce the United States at lower levels of the escalation ladder. Uncertainty for deterrence is not a new concept. A few examples from the Cold War are instructive.
Norman Augustine, a former undersecretary of the Army and distinguished aerospace executive, explains the advantage of uncertainty in this excerpt from a 1980s-era study on ballistic missile defense: Since
deterrence is in the eye of the beholder, the cause of deterrence can be served merely by eroding the enemy’s confidence in the success of an attack … Today a Soviet planner can calculate almost exactly how
many reliable ballistic missiles are required to eliminate the strategic bomber bases, the command and control structure, the ICBM force, submarines in harbors, and so on. In contrast, a defense that can at the
last minute be devoted in its full force to the protection of a specific subset of these assets makes high-confidence attacks difficult to carry out successfully, reduces the chances of silver bullet attacks against
uniquely valuable targets, and makes survival strikes much less plausible.83 Henry Kissinger, former secretary of state and national security advisor (and architect of the 1972 ABM Treaty), in the 1980s, makes a
similar point: Even granting as I do that a perfect defense of our population is almost certainly unattainable, the existence of some defense means that the attacker must plan on saturating it. This massively
complicates the attacker’s calculation. Anything that magnifies doubt inspires hesitation and adds to deterrence.84 As does Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to former President Jimmy Carter: A
limited strategic defense … would have the key effect of introducing a high degree of randomness into any calculation of the consequences of a nuclear attack … this would enhance strategic deterrence and
inhibit a Soviet conventional attack because it would provide the United States with the confidence needed for responding firmly on various levels of possible conflict.85 Contemplating a disarming first strike
against the United States would be a huge gamble for any enemy. Yet, it is a gamble an enemy might take if convinced that the planned attack has a decent, calculated probability of success based on the
number of weapons that could target key US nuclear forces and command and control. Injecting missile defenses into that calculation, regardless of presumed effectiveness, would raise so many doubts as to
make that gamble too risky for the attacker. And for this purpose, missile defenses do not have to be perfect. Homeland missile defense against two major nuclear powers Today’s nuclear deterrence problem is
arguably more difficult than what the United States faced during the Cold War. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the central principles of missile defense discussed above need reimagining.86 As this report later
explains in more detail (see Sections Six and Seven), there are two general conflict scenarios with Russia and China in which missile defenses may play an important role in the United States’ broader integrated
deterrence approach. The first concerns limited coercive strikes against the homeland by Russia and China, and the second involves larger-scale attacks against US nuclear forces by Russia, China, or a
combination of the two, intended to prevent significant nuclear retaliation. The deployment of even a modestly sized missile defense system can contribute to the deterrence of such attacks by creating uncertainty
in the minds of the adversary leadership. Unable to calculate the odds of a successful attack and fearful of the resulting escalation, the adversary would likely choose restraint—or such is the hope. Without the
complicating factor of missile defenses, the adversary still must make a difficult decision. However, with defenses, the problem would become appreciably more daunting to the adversary. In the first instance, the
attacker cannot successfully calibrate an attack that is small enough to coerce, yet not large enough to elicit a major nuclear response from the United States. In the second instance, the attacker is unsure of
success in targeting US forces before they would disperse or launch against the attacker—a task made more difficult because the United States must maintain a strategic reserve capable of surviving a general
nuclear exchange with the first adversary that would then be available against the second adversary. Limited, preferential defenses for US nuclear forces and nuclear command and control against Russian and
Chinese attacks could help in this respect. Impact on crisis stability and arms control When assessing the role of enhanced missile defenses for the protection of the homeland, the discussion quickly turns to
Russian and Chinese responses. While it is not unreasonable to ask how Moscow and Beijing might respond to expanded US homeland defenses, the answer to this question is harder to divine than most people
imagine. There is no shortage of Russian and Chinese views—official and otherwise—to suggest that these countries will object to any expansion of US homeland missile defenses, as these states have done in
the past for the expansion of virtually all US missile defense systems, including those theater missile defense systems deployed abroad to protect US forces, allies, and partners. Less appreciated, however, is the
gap between what the Russians and Chinese say, and what they do or will do in response to US missile defense capabilities. Perhaps the best example of this “say-do” gap is the Russian reaction to the US
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002. Based on Russia’s complaints about US missile defenses during the Cold War (particularly the 1984 SDI), one would have expected Russia to respond to the US
withdrawal by building up its nuclear arsenal. Instead, Russia joined the United States in reducing its nuclear arsenal by some two-thirds in the Moscow Treaty. If Russia were truly apprehensive about US
homeland defenses, that would have been the time to expand, not contract, its nuclear forces. In addition to the arms race stability argument, critics of homeland missile defense also suggest US missile defenses
will increase incentives for a nuclear first strike during a crisis. Homeland missile defense, some argue, would make the Russians nervous during a crisis, fearing that the United States might strike first, believing
that its missile defense system could deal with any resulting (and greatly weakened) Russian retaliation. The report goes into more later, but this is a highly unrealistic crisis scenario. US and Russian nuclear
forces would be on alert, meaning the launch readiness of their respective nuclear forces compromise and eliminate the prospects for success of a surprise first strike from either side. Russia would gain nothing
by launching first due to the protection of US nuclear forces afforded by the missile defense system. Not only would Moscow’s attack fail to prevent retaliation, but Russia would suffer intolerable consequences.
Rather than revisit these arguments in comprehensive form, this study suggests a different way of thinking about the problem. The objectives for a US homeland missile defense system, as proposed in this study
would, by definition and design, not be able to provide comprehensive protection for the US population—whether the United States struck first or second. With each of their second-strike capabilities intact, Russia
and China would have little reason to begin an arms race to counter US missile defense deployments. Russia may continue to field in modest numbers the new novel nuclear systems it has developed (e.g., a
long-range underwater nuclear torpedo and nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile), but this would not add appreciably to the threat currently posed by Russia nor substantially impact the nuclear
balance. Russia and China may also avail themselves of the homeland missile defense capabilities they currently have under development and deployed in small numbers to improve the survivability of their
respective nuclear forces—but this would be a stable situation. The central point is that the inherently limited nature of the proposed US homeland missile defense system could serve as a basis for assuaging
Russian and Chinese concerns. Regardless of the likely success of such efforts, at the end of the day, the United States cannot allow Russia and China a veto over measures the United States deems necessary
to assure its security and that of its allies. There may be unknown risks in going forward with expanded homeland defenses, but there are surely risks associated with maintaining the vulnerability of the United
States to adversary missile strikes.
A country unwilling to take measures to protect itself against
these threats may be seen by adversaries and allies alike as unwilling to
take risks during a crisis—this poses the greatest danger to deterrence . Allies
must also understand that US homeland missile defense makes Washington
more likely—not less—to come to their aid and increases—rather than
jeopardizes—strategic deterrence across the alliance. Historically, allies have manifested three primary concerns
about US homeland missile defenses. First, allies have worried about strategic stability and arms racing. As explained above and throughout this report, those concerns are overblown and hypocritical (as Section
Eleven explains). Indeed, as allies develop their homeland defenses against limited attacks, especially in Europe under the “Skyshield” initiative, it is becoming apparent that European capitals see a similar logic
to what this study proposes. Second, allies have long-standing concerns about decoupling, that is, the fear that an impervious defense of the US homeland would leave the United States less invested in the
defense of its allies. The approach proposed here would do just the opposite, giving US political leadership increased confidence that it could run risks on behalf of allies and reduce the likelihood that adversary
“cheap shops” could coerce Washington to abstain from intervening in defense of allies or sue for peace on terms unfavorable for allies. Third, the United Kingdom and France worry that a marked improvement in
Russian and Chinese strategic missile defenses (perhaps driven by US developments in this area) could reduce the credibility of these states’ nuclear arsenals. It is in the national interest of the United States for
the United Kingdom and France to have confidence in their nuclear deterrents, and the separate decision-making centers for nuclear use in these countries contribute to overall strategic deterrence. Regardless of
the drivers of Russian and Chinese strategic missile defenses, the United States should work with its nuclear-armed allies to ensure they retain confidence in their strategic deterrence even as adversary strategic
defenses improve.
Aerial asymmetry demands US hypersonic investment
White 3-12, [(Michael E. White, Michael E. White was the Principal Director for
Hypersonics (PD,H) in the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
(Modernization) within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering; Head of the Air and Missile Defense Sector at the Johns Hopkins University; Prior
to this 2016 appointment as Sector Head, and starting in 2005, Mr. White served as the APL
Mission Area Executive for Air and Missile Defense where he was responsible for a program
portfolio that included AEGIS, STANDARD Missile, Ship Self Defense System, Cooperative
Engagement Capability, the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program, and Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense, along with numerous other Navy and Missile Defense Agency
programs.; Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees in Aerospace Engineering.) "The
hypersonic imperative, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/contentseries/strategic-insights-memos/the-hypersonic-imperative/, 3-12-2025, accessed 7-72025]//UT
There has been a recent focus on the development of long-range, hypersonic weapons that maneuver high within the atmosphere
leveraging speed, a survivable altitude corridor, and lethality to change the dynamic on the battlefield. Unfortunately, potential US
adversaries have seized the initiative to develop, field, and use this new class of weapons to help
create an asymmetry that challenges US and allied battlefield dominance. The United States must not let
that asymmetry persist.
Why are hypersonic capabilities important on the battlefield? Hypersonic weapons can defeat heavily defended,
high-value targets from long range within minutes. To deliver effects on a target at five hundred miles, a
traditional subsonic cruise missile, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) or Tomahawk, would take
approximately one hour of flight time. Hypersonic cruise missiles can make that trip in less than ten minutes. A hypersonic
glide vehicle can make the trip between Guam and the Taiwan straights in under 30 minutes.
Additionally, these missiles cruise or glide above most air-defense systems and below most ballisticmissile-defense systems and are highly maneuverable. Hypersonic weapons, therefore, dramatically
compress the timescale of relevance on the battlefield, are highly survivable, and have long
range to ensure survivability of their launch platform.
What is the current posture in hypersonics? Russia and China have aggressively pursued the development
of long-range hypersonic weapons and have developed and fielded several types of hypersonic strike
weapons that hold US theater land and sea bases at great risk. Furthermore, potential adversaries such as
North Korea and Iran have reportedly developed and deployed hypersonic weapons. Russia has
developed and deployed a nuclear-armed hypersonic weapon that holds the US mainland at risk from a
highly survivable nuclear first strike . While the United States has made great progress developing a first
generation of air-, land-, and sea-launched hypersonic strike weapons over the past five years, Washington has
not yet fielded its first weapon. Most notably, the US Air Force decided not to field the Air-Launched Rapid
Response Weapon (ARRW), a boost-glide hypersonic weapon, when it was ready at the end of 2023. Additionally, while
there have now been two very successful flight tests, there are delays in fielding the Army Long-Range
Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) and Navy Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) weapons, originally
scheduled to field in 2023 and 2025, respectively. As a result, the US ability to dominate the current and nearfuture battlefield has been significantly degraded by the current, and projected, asymmetry in
hypersonic weapons.
The hypersonic imperative!
To address the battlefield asymmetry that Washington currently faces in hypersonics, it is imperative that the United States 1.
accelerate the fielding of recently matured air-, land-, and sealaunched weapons in numbers; 2. establish block upgrade programs
that insert advanced capabilities in a timely manner; 3. prioritize cost-reduction initiatives to ensure the United States can
affordably field the necessary capacity; 4. accelerate fielding of capability to defend against adversary hypersonic systems; 5. develop
and mature next-generation weapon systems, including reusable hypersonic aircraft; 6. enhance hypersonic ground and flight test
capability, modeling and simulation (M&S), science and technology (S&T), and workforce initiatives; 7. energize the broad industrial
base to instill affordability and innovation across the portfolio; and 8. work with allies to capture innovation and enable accelerated
fielding of affordable capacity. Should the United States fail to improve its offensive hypersonic capabilities,
Washington’s ability to penetrate adversary A2/ AD nodes and manage escalation could
degrade, making it more difficult to deter great-power war and manage intrawar
deterrence . Failing to protect the United States from hypersonic weapons could allow adversaries to more
effectively coerce the United States by threatening limited warning conventional strike against
key civilian and military infrastructure, as well as attacking US forces deployed abroad.
Why now?
The United States must field and evolve hypersonic capabilities now as part of a comprehensive warfighting
strategy to maintain its ability to dominate the battlefield against an increasingly capable set of adversaries. These
adversaries have developed integrated capabilities to create a highly contested environment to defeat US and
allied forces across all domains: air, land, sea, and space. This multi-domain threat must be addressed with a
comprehensive and layered defeat strategy that leverages new offensive and defensive capabilities across kinetic and non-kinetic
domains to attack and disable adversaries’ high-end systems before and after launch. Hypersonic strike weapons,
launched from stand-off ranges that protect launch platforms, will be essential to allowing US and
allied forces to defeat these systems with lethal, survivable effects in a timescale of relevance on a
modern battlefield. This offensive capability must be coupled with effective, layered, kinetic, and
non-kinetic defenses against adversary hypersonic and ballistic missile capabilities.
Modernizing missile defense systems is k2 countering adversarial
advances
AC 25, [(Atlantic Council, the Atlantic Council is a think tank that promotes constructive
leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the Atlantic Community’s central
role in meeting global challenges. The Council provides an essential forum for navigating the
dramatic economic and political changes defining the twenty-first century by informing and
galvanizing its uniquely influential network of global leaders. The Atlantic Council—through the
papers it publishes, the ideas it generates, the future leaders it develops, and the communities it
builds—shapes policy choices and strategies to create a more free, secure, and prosperous
world..)) "'First, we will defend the homeland': The case for homeland missile defense, Atlantic
Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/first-we-willdefend-the-homeland-the-case-for-homeland-missile-defense/, 1-4-2025, accessed 7-72025]//UT
First, the 2022 NDS clearly defines the requirement for homeland missile defense. Moreover, the strategy designates the defense of
the homeland as the first priority, followed by deterring strategic attacks against the homeland.12 More to the point, the 2022 MDR
provides that missile defenses “are critical to the top priority of defending the homeland and deterring attacks against the United
States.”13 This overarching policy reflects continuity with prior administrations.
Second, the threat driving that requirement is growing. According to senior administration officials, Russia and China are
“fielding more advanced offensive missiles—ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic—in greater
numbers to not only deter [US] involvement in a regional conflict but also to directly target the
US homeland. The scale and scope of these multi-dimensional threats present significant risks to the American people and the
homeland.”14 The North Korean ICBM threat continues apace and may include missiles with
multiple warheads in the future. Senior US military commanders are starting to fear that
currently planned missile defense capabilities will not be able to maintain the advantageous US
position against North Korea and potentially Iran.
Third, the strategy behind these threats is clear. Potential adversaries will seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the “American way of
war” by posing threats to the US homeland “in an effort to jeopardize the U.S. military’s ability to project power and counter regional
aggression.”15 These states’ intent also is to break the will of US political leaders who may be unwilling to fulfill commitments to
allies if it means running extraordinary risks to the homeland.
Fourth, if left unaddressed, these threats to the homeland could significantly narrow US decision-
making and curtail a president’s freedom of action during crisis and conflict. Adversaries know
that the United States depends on its allies and partners to maintain its “global strategic
advantage,” and that allies, in turn, depend on US security commitments.16 Russia and China
hope to weaken US alliance ties by creating doubts about US security commitments among its allies. Allies,
fearing a weakening of US commitment due to an increasing US vulnerability to attack, could seek accommodation with
challengers in their region or develop their respective nuclear weapons to deter these threats.
Fifth, the objective or purpose of US homeland missile defense is not to create an impenetrable
missile shield for the American public, but rather to frustrate adversary strategies that rely on
threatening missile attacks against the United States. Missile defense systems are meant to
supplement the deterrence value provided by US nuclear forces and the prospect of an
overwhelming conventional response to attacks against the homeland—not to replace deterrence
by the threat of punishment. The objective of the missile defense system is to create enough doubt in
the adversary’s mind about the prospect of a successful attack that the adversary concludes such an
attack is not worth the risk—especially alongside fears of enormous consequences. In other
words, such an attack would be futile and fatal.
Sixth, to solve the missile problem, the United States incorporates other military means in its comprehensive missile defense and
defeat strategy. In addition to active defenses meant to intercept warheads after launch, the United
States will employ means to stop an adversary from successfully launching its offensive missiles
when possible. In this way, “offensive measures add credibility to our defensive efforts and reduce the
possibility of continued attacks.”17 This comprehensive approach compensates for any shortcomings in the missile defense
architecture, so the United States need not rely only on active defenses.
Seventh, modest, though important, improvements to current homeland defenses are available over the next five years to address
these threats if policymakers choose to do so. More advanced technologies for missile defense and defeat are
on the horizon and could be exploited with sufficient funding. Increasing the funding for homeland missile
defense—to a full one percent of the annual defense budget—may be sufficient to achieve the missile defense objectives discussed in
this study.
Eighth, arguments against expanding US homeland missile defense because it could stoke an arms race with Russia and China need
to be put in perspective. Not only are Russia and China pursuing their own homeland air and missile
defenses against limited US missile strikes (Russia deploys more homeland defense interceptors than the United
States), but it is counterfactual to assume that US missile defenses will provoke an “action-reaction”
arms race. Quite the opposite has occurred: following the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM
Treaty in 2002, US and Russian nuclear arsenals declined by two-thirds. The New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New START), in effect since February 2011, took numbers even lower. Nevertheless, the United States should
work with Russia and China to make its missile defense plans as transparent as possible.
To summarize, the missile threat to the homeland is real and growing and, if left unaddressed, could
seriously undermine US grand strategy and the very basis of national defense strategy. Since the
objective of missile defense is to supplement and enhance deterrence by complicating attacker plans—
rather than comprehensive population protection—the defensive architecture does not need to be leak-proof.
Rather, a layered architecture with certain key attributes, based on existing and future
technology, can provide an affordable defense to restore the basis for US defense strategy while
reassuring allies.
A change in policy
The principal recommendation of this study is to update US homeland missile defense policy to remove the false
distinction between rogue-state and major-power missile threats and to eliminate sole reliance on nuclear
retaliation to deter Russian and Chinese limited coercive missile attacks against the homeland.
Improving the survivability of US nuclear forces and nuclear command and control also should
be a policy objective. Likewise, the distinction in policy for addressing ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic glide threats no longer
makes sense: If the United States is going to defend against Russian cruise missiles (which is current policy), then Washington
should defend against Russian ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs).
The objective of homeland missile defense is not an impregnable missile defense shield for the country, but rather sufficient defenses
to counter adversary missile threats of coercion—to enable US regional defense strategy—and defenses adequate to ensure the
survivability and endurance of US nuclear retaliatory forces and nuclear command and control against any combination of
adversaries. This requires some tailoring of the missile defense mission depending on the strategy objectives and missile capabilities
of potential adversaries.
The study outlines three categories of threats or scenarios for which missile defense must provide a solution: first, there are the
smaller and possibly undeterrable threats presented by accidental and unauthorized launches as well as by countries such as North
Korea that have limited nuclear capabilities; the second category is limited Russian and Chinese missile threats meant to coerce the
United States (to provoke but not enrage); finally, there is the larger scale (but still limited) preemptive attack against US nuclear
forces and command and control designed to prevent nuclear retaliation.
Accordingly, it should be US policy to:
Stay ahead of the North Korean long-range missile threat through a strategy of layered missile defense combined with offensive
measures to prevent launches before they occur;
Deploy a layered missile defense system to thwart Russian and Chinese coercive strikes (as well as unauthorized or
accidental launches), sized to about one hundred Russian or Chinese warheads, including missiles armed with HGVs. The objective
is not to replace nuclear deterrence provided by US nuclear forces, but to strengthen deterrence by invalidating Russian and Chinese
limited coercive threats.
Enhance the survivability of US nuclear forces and nuclear command and control through a layered missile defense composed of
GBIs, Standard Missile (SM) 3 block IIA missiles deployed on land and at sea, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
missiles for preferential terminal defense of US nuclear forces, and requisite defenses against cruise missiles;
Protect critical US civilian and military infrastructure against air- and sea-launched cruise missile attacks by Russia and China to the
extent feasible and necessary to allow the United States to stay in the fight; and increase funding for research and
development of next-generation missile defense capabilities to stay ahead of the threats,
including improved space-based sensors, space-based interceptors (SBIs), and directed-energy
capabilities.
Homeland defense system design
There is far too much stress placed on the efficacy of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system with its GBIs and radars
for the defense of the homeland. Originally intended to undergo regular upgrades after its initial deployment in 2004,
modernization of the GMD system has failed to keep pace with advancing missile threats.
Moreover, the GMD system was never meant to stand alone against the threat—but rather as part of a layered approach that
contemplates defenses in other phases of flight to compensate for the GMD system’s shortcomings and to provide
additional intercept opportunities.
Layering is essential to a successful missile defense architecture (See Figure 1). This approach
improves overall effectiveness by intercepting warheads during different phases of flight and
with different interceptor missiles supported by a range of radars and sensors. Intercepts at each
layer “thins the herd” for the following layers. Attacking warheads containing countermeasures that may fool the defense in
one layer may prove useless in another. Multiple layers greatly complicate the calculations of the attacker, while reducing the
technical requirements for any given interceptor, because no single layer must work perfectly.
Though layered missile defense has been a long-standing mission of the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA), only GBIs protect the
homeland today. In the near term, the SM-3 and THAAD missiles can bolster homeland protection by providing additional shot
opportunities against incoming warheads that penetrate the GBI defense, but these systems have not been integrated with the GMD
system. Sensor support from satellites under development can substantially improve the viability of layered missile defense early in
the next decade by helping to distinguish between real warheads and countermeasures. When viewed from the attacker’s
perspective, a layered missile defense system presents a very difficult challenge that cannot be solved simply with increased
numbers.
The recommended near-term steps are meant to be a bridge to follow-on technologies necessary to create a next-generation missile
defense capability to defend the homeland.
The DOD must also place more emphasis on investing in future, revolutionary capabilities, such as space
sensors, SBIs, and non-kinetic options (such as directed energy) to outpace adversary capability
development. Another option that has been considered over the years is the development of an air-launched
weapon that could engage threat missiles early in their trajectory.
The MDA also needs to get back into the technology business. The MDA’s technology budget has been dismal
over the past four to five years. Notably, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, the MDA’s science and technology
(S&T) budget was at a historical low, below one percent of its Total Obligational Authority
(TOA). Sticking to only incremental improvements will not defeat rapidly evolving threats. The
DOD should make high-priority technology investments to prove out the Discriminating Space Sensor (DSS) concept on orbit and
rapidly field the capability, per the US Space Development Agency (SDA) model. Other pursuits should include an SBI testbed
demonstration alongside increased investments in directed energy, more robust funding for advanced discrimination techniques, as
well as technological investments in lighter-weight, lower-cost interceptors to make kinetic interceptor options more affordable.
Alaska k2 US power projection
Forsyth 18, [(Michael J., associate professor and director of the Department of Command
and Leadership at the US Army Command and General Staff College. I continue to conduct
research in civil-military relations and military historical topics. During my military career I
focused on leadership development to ensure our future military leaders are prepared for
positions of higher responsibility. Further, I continue to do so as a director and teacher at CGSC
by helping individual officers reach their potential by teaching, coaching, and mentoring them to
establish and achieve their goals. I help by encouraging them to set the conditions for their
growth and creating a positive learning environment that emphasizing innovation and creativity
that contributes to learning outcomes designed to help them achieve success.) "Why Alaska and
the Arctic are Critical to the National Security of the United States,
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-EditionArchives/January-February-2018/Why-Alaska-and-the-Arctic-are-Critical-to-the-NationalSecurity-of-the-United-States/, 02-xx-2018, accessed 7-12-2025] UT + harliu
Increasingly,
human activity is occurring in the Arctic as the sea ice recedes and economic opportunity opens
to nations via new shipping lanes. Characteristically, in any geographical area, with the rise in human activity there is also the corresponding possibility that
Over the past five years, Russia has moved aggressively to build its Arctic military capabilities, apparently in an effort to secure its claims and interests in the region.1
friction will occur as people compete to exploit the natural resources and corresponding economic possibilities. Such friction—and potential conflict—in the Arctic is highly likely at some point
unless preparations are made to mitigate it. Alaska makes the United States an Arctic nation, and its location places the state and country at the center of this fast-evolving region.2
Thus,
Alaska is critical to the national security of the United States ; however, we are not, as a nation,
keeping pace with the rapidly changing security situation in the Arctic. Lagging here could also have an enormous impact on our economy. To change this dynamic, there are several things that
the U.S. military can do to ensure the future security of the region. Alaska’s Geostrategic Importance “Alaska is the most strategic place on earth,” stated Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell in testimony
The state is
singularly closer to many national capitals in the hemisphere than most points in
the lower forty-eight states. This makes Alaska the perfect power projection
platform for the United States from a military standpoint. Further, because Alaska
before Congress in 1935.3 The reason for this bold statement is that Alaska is the closest U.S. location to the center of the Northern Hemisphere (see figure 1).
sits astride the Bering Strait chokepoint and the Great Circle Routes
between North America and Asia as can be seen in figure 2, it is critical to our economic
and national security .4 Figure 1. The Northern Hemisphere from the Perspective of the North Pole Graphic courtesy of North American Aerospace Defense
Command [NORAD]; used in an Alaskan Command and Alaska NORAD Region command briefing. Alaska is close to the center of the hemisphere and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson [JBER] is
uniquely positioned to project power. The distances depicted in nautical miles are to select world capitals from JBER.) The air lanes and sea lanes of the Great Circle Routes are heavily
trafficked by shipping companies because they shorten the distance between the two continents, saving time and money for shippers. Consequently, the city of Anchorage and Alaska are at
the center of existing commercial shipping lanes between East and West. Anchorage, at roughly the halfway point between the major commerce centers of North America and Asia, is an
important hub for such international corporations as Federal Express and DHL.5 Moreover, many nations such as China and Russia are routinely making use of these routes for their economic
However, while Alaska is critical to intercontinental shipping now , emerging
routes due to shrinking ice impediments could raise the state’s economic stature to even greater
heights. The retreat of ice coverage in the Arctic Ocean has opened up the potential for shipping along the Northern Sea Route and the fabled Northwest Passage (see figure 3).6 The
benefit.
Northern Sea Route parallels Russia’s Arctic coastline, as much of it is within the country’s exclusive economic zone. In the past few years, shipping along this route has increased, topping out
with seventy-one passages in 2013.7 Moving goods along this route cuts off thousands of miles, saving money on fuel costs and insurance (since there are no pirates along this route).8
Moreover, Russia is facilitating passages through the use of its large icebreaker fleet, making her an indispensable player in shipping through the High North while profiting from such transit by
charging fees for services akin to a toll.9 Thus, the emerging Northwest Passage has recently become a possibility for shippers. For centuries, explorers and adventurers sought a route from
Europe to Asia across Canada’s High North. Most of these individuals failed in this attempt, but now the dream is nearing reality. In 2017, the luxury cruise liner Crystal Serenity made a trip
through the Northwest Passage starting from Seward, Alaska, and terminating in New York City.10 While much of the Northwest Passage remains difficult to navigate due to remaining heavy
Alaska’s position on the east side of the
Bering Strait places the state in a central position on the choke point of
both routes . However, with increasing human activity, it is inevitable that disagreements
among nations making claims in the area will arise as competition heats up. Again , Alaska’s
location thrusts her to the forefront of strategic calculations that the United
ice pack, continued ice retreat could make this route feasible in the future.
States must make to deal with emerging geopolitical and geoeconomic circumstances. Incidentally, what
makes the Great Circle Route good for shipping also makes it the preferred route for the employment of missiles aimed at North America. As previously noted, this route shortens the distance
reduced distance saves time and money, the same principle of distance holds true for
ballistic missiles. Potential adversaries could fire weapons along this trajectory to close the
distance more quickly while lessening the potential for early warning to their attacks. Thus,
between the two continents. Just as shippers prefer the route because the
Alaska’s location makes the state a critical component of the nation’s
ballistic missile defense system .
2AC
Case
Frontlines
Noko
Kim is bolstering offensive capabilities
Fahmy ’25 (Gabrielle, New York Post, “North Korea delivers a show of force with rocket launches after
US air drills”, https://nypost.com/2025/06/21/world-news/north-korea-fires-rockets-as-tensions-withsouth-korea-mount/, Jone 21, 2025///Solis)
North Korea fired more than 10 rounds of rockets into the Yellow Sea Thursday, just one day after South Korea held joint air drills with the US
and Japan — in the latest sign of mounting tensions between the neighboring countries.
The missiles were shot from Pyongyang’s upgraded 240-millimeter multiple rocket launcher — believed to be capable
of targeting South Korean population centers including the Seoul metropolitan area — which the hermit country
unveiled last year.
“The projectiles, believed to be multiple launch rockets, flew tens of kilometers before falling into the Yellow Sea,”a
South Korean military official told local media, adding South Korean and US intelligence are closely analyzing details.
<<Image Omitted>>
On Wednesday, South Korea, the US and Japan held their first trilateral military air exercise of the Lee Jae
Myung administration — the new leader elected earlier this month.
Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have increased in recent months, following North Korean
leader Kim Jong Un’s alignment with Russian President Vladimir Putin — supplying weapons and as many as
15,000 troops to support Russia’s war against Ukraine.
South Korean officials are concerned that Pyongyang could receive economic aid in return and
advanced military technology to further develop its weapons programs.
Kim has also continued to accelerate the development of his nuclear and missile program.
<<Image Omitted>>
The reclusive leader has been visiting military industrial factories across the country, calling on them to ramp up production of shells in order to
meet the demands of war in the 21st century.
North Korea also successfully built two 5,000-ton naval destroyers this year, with Kim calling
the new battleship “convincing proof of the rapid transformation of our Navy.”
First strike escalates
Luse 24, [(Keith Luse, executive director of the U.S.-based National Committee on North
Korea, was the senior professional staffer on East Asia issues for Senator Richard G. Lugar (RInd.) on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.) "OP-ED: Premonitions of War on the Korean
Peninsula, No Publication, https://www.ncnk.org/news/op-ed-premonitions-war-koreanpeninsula, 4-1-2024, accessed 7-12-2025] UT
Although U.S. and Soviet forces were sent to intercept the bombers, launched by accident due to a fault in the electronic system, they
failed. The U.S. president, portrayed by Henry Fonda, simultaneously ordered the destruction of New York City in a desperate move
to prove that the U.S. attack was a mistake and thus prevent all-out nuclear war between the two nuclear-armed
countries1. In the end, New York and Moscow were obliterated, and millions of people died. Despite a hotline that allowed the U.S.
and Soviet leaders to talk to each other, they were ultimately unable to prevent Armageddon. It was a haunting, if fictional, case of
war by accident.
Such fiction may become reality on the Korean peninsula, which is now a hot spot with verbal volcanic
ash spewing from both sides of the 38th parallel. Due to these tensions, which began to build after the failed
2019 Hanoi summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and later
intensified following the election of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, the prospect of war
resulting from accident or miscalculation has increased . By all indications, however, this
rising threat has been lost on the international community. Global leaders appear numb to the festering crisis, much like the frog
that remains in the pot of steadily heating water until it boils to death.
Provocative Behavior
For anyone paying attention, there is no lack of evidence that leaders in North and South Korea are acting
provocatively . A prime example is Kim Yo Jong, the North Korean leader’s sister, who has emerged as an authorized, key
spokesperson for her brother, channeling his sentiments by offering unceasing, critical assessments of South Korean and U.S.
leaders.
A case in point was her 2022 reference to South Korean Defense Minister Suh Wook’s statement about his country’s capability to
launch a preemptive military strike if there were indications of a potential North Korean missile attack on the South. Kim Yo Jong
was quoted as dismissing the minister as “the senseless and scum-like guy [who] dare mentioned the ‘preemptive strike’ at a nuclear
weapons state, in his senseless bluster, which will never be beneficial to South Korea, either.”2 On the prospect of new sanctions
targeting North Korea, she also lashed out, calling Yoon “a running wild dog gnawing on a bone given by the U.S. and his
government idiots.”3
Not to be outdone in raising the regional temperature, the Yoon administration in 2022 “reinvigorated military planning for
preemptive and retaliatory strikes against the North Korean leadership under the so-called Kill Chain and Korean Massive
Punishment and Retaliation…strategies, respectively.” Killing the North Korean leader is a priority4
Although eliminating an enemy leader may be a traditional component of military strategy, in this case, South Korea’s
personalization of its intent has not been lost on the North Koreans. Yet, rather than intimidating the North Korean leadership, the
publicly announced assassination plan, which was conceived years earlier and revived during the Yoon administration, has
boomeranged.
The North Koreans reacted by enacting a law that calls for “automatic” nuclear launches if the country’s leadership or command and
control systems are threatened, underscoring leader Kim Jong Un’s concern for a so-called decapitation strike. As North Korea
enshrined the right to use preemptive nuclear strikes to protect itself, Kim warned that the law makes the
country’s nuclear status “irreversible” and bars denuclearization talks5.
If the North Korean leader were eliminated or Pyongyang concluded that enemy actions directly threatening its leadership were in
play, institutional buttons automatically will be pushed. There will be no need or opportunity for a North-South
hotline conversation to cool tensions. Missiles will be launched , and among
other offensive military actions, full-force cyberattacks will be unleashed by North Korean cyber warriors operating from
home, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, and perhaps elsewhere6.
Meanwhile, emboldened by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, angered by the failed Hanoi summit, and determined to
strengthen his country’s defenses, Kim is rapidly advancing his missile and other military capabilities and
putting them on full display. Gone is the day when Russian President Vladimir Putin would warn Kim that making threats
of “preventive nuclear strikes” could create a legal basis for military action against North Korea7. Now, Putin is more apt to buy
North Korean weapons than act as a check on Kim’s excesses. As North Korea closes in on achieving the
capability of hitting a U.S. city with a missile, Kim’s lingering angst over the summit may be defused. It is possible
that he will conclude that he will restore the reputational “face” that he felt he lost at the summit only when he
has the power to strike the U.S. homeland and can look eye to eye with U.S. President Joe Biden or Biden’s successor as
the leader of a nuclear-armed state. As one U.S. analyst noted, in Hanoi, the North Korean leader appeared particularly
upset because the results seemed different from what he had been led to believe would occur.
If this is the analysis in Pyongyang, the North Korean leader is being ill-advised by his inner circle. The U.S. president is
undoubtedly briefed on the status of North Korea’s progress toward developing a nuclear-tipped
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of striking New York or anywhere else in the
United States. As the North Koreans get closer to achieving this goal, some Biden administration officials or their successors
almost certainly will press for preemptive strikes on Pyongyang to protect the U.S. population.
There is another possible destructive outcome as the North Korean leader seeks to achieve his
fullest satisfaction and reclaim his self-esteem after the summit debacle. Kim may be compelled to extract
a pound of flesh such as happened in 2010 when the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan sank and nearly 50 sailors died after an
attack that Seoul blamed on Pyongyang. The North Korean leader may be planning another surgical strike,
mistakenly believing that any South Korean or U.S. response would be limited and manageable.
Even as Kim has been energized by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and his symbiosis with Putin, Yoon too has been emboldened by
his meetings with Biden and their joint emphasis on a policy of deterrence that is intended to tame North Korea. The Yoon
administration has demonstrated a robust response to North Korean actions, including intensifying military
drills, pulling a larger U.S. military presence into the region , and touting the plans to
kill the North Korean leader. In December, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won Sik reminded North Korea that “[t]raining for
decapitation strikes to take out North Korean leader Kim Jong Un remains an option for South Korea’s military.”8 It is unclear if
Seoul is conducting assessments to determine whether specific U.S.-South Korean deterrent actions could trigger further
provocations by Pyongyang or even trip the wire of war.
Meanwhile, citing the Russian war on Ukraine, many South Koreans are questioning the
credibility of the United States as an ally and advocating Seoul’s development or
acquisition of its own nuclear weapons arsenal. If that occurs, North Koreans would protest publicly; privately,
there would be smiles and toasts among the military elites in Pyongyang. Their analysis would include the premise that South
Korea’s nuclearization would reduce significantly any pressure on North Korea to eliminate its own nuclear program, which is
estimated to have produced sufficient fissile material for 50 or more nuclear bombs, according to nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker.
Ignoring Risk Reduction
Despite the tensions and hardening attitudes, risk reduction does not appear to be a priority of either side. A
casual negligence in addressing this brewing storm is palpable in Washington, Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo, and other capitals where
officials should understand how catastrophic another war on the Korean peninsula could be.
One example of this indifferent attitude is the fact that many South Koreans ignored an air defense drill held in August and did not
bother to take shelter9. Perhaps international leaders, discouraged by the tight Putin-Kim embrace, have sidelined thoughts about
how to engage North Korea. The North Korean leader, however, astutely leverages his timing and
interventions with peers in the international community. Why is there no obvious urgency or determination to
develop creative exit-ramp options that might be considered by both Koreas and defuse the gathering crisis?
Given the Ukraine war, the October attack on Israel by Hamas, Israel’s far-reaching response, and the myriad of other global
hotspots, the U.S. international to-do list is overloaded. For members of Congress who usually are eager to underscore any sign of
North Korean aggression, recent moves by Pyongyang showcasing its advancing missile, submarine, and drone capabilities may
simply prompt a resigned sigh. For lawmakers who steadfastly support the U.S.-South Korean alliance, worries about the situation
on the Korean peninsula getting out of hand are tempered by the confidence that the Yoon government can be relied on to deal with
North Korea as need be. Many in Congress may be unaware of the extent to which South Korean leaders are stoking the
embers that could become flames of war.
Although the U.S. president has the lead in managing foreign policy, Congress also has a major role to play, and its response to
international crises over many years offers important lessons for this situation. Should a nuclear weapons exchange occur on the
Korean peninsula, for instance, multiple House and Senate committees would convene oversight hearings with officials from a range
of government departments and agencies called to testify publicly and explain what happened. Classified hearings and briefings also
would be held. Depending on legislative rules, testimony might be sought from officials of South Korea and Japan, both U.S. allies,
and from representatives of emergency relief organizations. Some individual lawmakers would reach out to the Chinese embassy in
Washington, inquiring as to why that government allowed developments on the peninsula to evolve into war.
Besides public and classified congressional hearings, members would demand copies of cables and other communications by
officials throughout the U.S. executive branch in Washington and those stationed throughout Northeast Asia. The second-guessing
would be fast and furious. What questions would be asked by Congress? That depends in part on whether Seoul and Pyongyang
continued to exist or were leveled to the ground. There will be much for which to answer. The impact of nuclear strikes on the
Korean peninsula would have global implications.
As U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) stated in a February 2006 address to the UN Security Council, “Does anyone believe that
proposals for advancing standards of living, such as expansions in education for our children, stronger protections for the
environment, or broader health care coverage, would be unaffected by the nuclear obliteration of a major city somewhere in the
world? They would not. The immediate death toll would be horrendous, but the worldwide financial and psychological costs might
be even more damaging to humanity in the long run.”10
Here is a sampling of possible hearing questions that foreshadow the devastation and instability that such a war would unleash. It
would be better to consider such questions now as a motivator for governments to search for a solution that could prevent a debacle.
Questions for U.S. Department of State, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency officials. What action or
combination of events tripped the wire that started the conflict? Do the South Korean and North Korean governments still function
and, if so, in what way? Are any of the leaders still alive? Although we know that a few million people are dead in South Korea, what
are your estimates of North Korean casualties? As emergency health care workers in Seoul and Pyongyang and other impacted areas
were largely eliminated in the catastrophe, who will provide health care services to survivors in both countries? Are discussions
underway with the Chinese and the United Nations on developing a strategic plan for how China, the United States, and the UN
might provide emergency assistance on the peninsula without getting in each other’s way? Have there been any communications
between Washington and Moscow following the nuclear attack on Seoul and Pyongyang, between Pyongyang and Seoul, between
Pyongyang and Washington?
In addition, how many U.S. Defense Department ships are available to provide offshore medical services? What other countries are
qualified to assist in addressing the challenges associated with this catastrophe? Given Japan’s experience with Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, will the Japanese government be consulted on recovery operations? Have reports been confirmed that Russian ships are
headed toward the peninsula? Were mutual defense treaties in place between Moscow and Pyongyang and Beijing and Pyongyang?
Even though Pyongyang and Seoul are destroyed, do you anticipate an attack by Russia or China on U.S. interests in Northeast Asia
or elsewhere? Did U.S. and South Korean officials actively attempt to work with North Korea on exit-ramp options to reduce
tensions? Did the Chinese make any effort to assist? Did South Korea and the United States put in place any fail-safe mechanism to
prevent the unthinkable that has now occurred?
Questions for UN officials, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and nongovernmental organizations involved in
humanitarian assistance. Are the deaths concentrated in Seoul and Pyongyang or spread throughout both countries? Given the large
number of U.S. citizens, including military personnel and civilian, living in South Korea, it appears that U.S. casualties may be in the
tens of thousands. What medical assistance is available to U.S. military and embassy personnel in addition to those U.S. civilians
who survived? Do the human remains examined so far reveal whether weapons of mass destruction in addition to nuclear weapons
were utilized? What food and medical supplies are available? Were blood supplies protected during the attacks? Given the
radioactive fallout, how many years need to pass before the citizens of Seoul and Pyongyang could return?
The Legacy of Conflict
It is unclear whether most citizens of Seoul or Pyongyang realize that war could be imminent . If it happens, people
in both capitals would die after an attack as they walk or shop, take kids to school, or sleep. Older members of the North Korean
leadership circle certainly remember the U.S. carpet bombing of their country during the Korean War, including blanketing the
civilian population with napalm as skin fell from the bodies of children and adults. As U.S. Air Force General Curtis LeMay, head of
the Strategic Air Command during the Korean War, told the Office of Air Force History in 1984, “Over a period of three years or so,
we killed off…20 percent of the population.” Dean Rusk, a supporter of the war and later secretary of state, said the United States
bombed “everything that moved in North Korea, every brick standing on top of another.” After running low on urban targets, U.S.
bombers destroyed hydroelectric and irrigation dams in the later stages of the war, flooding farmland and destroying crops11.
Russia
Unmitigated Russian influence in the arctic causes extinction—our ev
post dates and prices in defense.
Gordon Corera 7/10, B.A. in Modern history from Oxford, graduate studies in US foreign
policy at Harvard University, BBC Security Analyst and worked in Bill Clinton's Campaign, "The
struggle for control of the Arctic is accelerating - and riskier than ever," BBC, 07/10/2025,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-f92bc043-3893-4688-8937-fd9cad8b0d5b, JLB,
DOA: 7/10/25
Tensions are growing at the top of the world.
US President Donald Trump wants Greenland, Russia is modernizing its Arctic military bases, Chinese icebreakers are
opening new routes and spies are being unmasked.
But as the battle for one of the world’s coldest places heats up, an increasingly fragile security
balance may be breaking down, leading to an escalating arms race.
To grasp why the Arctic matters to these superpowers, you need to look at the world differently – literally.
Forget flat maps – peer down on the Arctic from the top of the globe.
the struggle over its land, sea and sky is accelerating
With this view, it’s clear why the region is considered pivotal - and why
.
‘Frontier for deterrence’
President Trump has repeatedly stated his desire to control Greenland.
“We need Greenland for national security purposes,” he has said. “I've been told that for a long time.”
The question of why a territory with only 56,000 or so people matters comes down to geography.
In the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union, nuclear weapons were the ultimate instruments of war, holding the balance of terror. And the fastest route for weapons to
reach their targets was over the North Pole.
At the dawn of the Cold War, the US established an important base in the remote North of Greenland at a place called Thule - recently renamed Pituffik Space Base, which I
visited in 2008.
At the base, a huge radar stands like a giant sentry, scanning the skies and space for anything coming over the top of the world. As I approached, the car engine began buzzing
and the dashboard controls jumped wildly thanks to its emissions.
Inside the base, US military officers explained how the radar allowed them to see objects as small as a tennis ball as they moved through space.
The Cold War may be gone but the site’s importance has not diminished. It still forms a crucial part of BMEWS – America’s Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.
President Trump has talked about wanting a Golden Dome to protect the US, a reference to the Iron Dome that helps protect Israel from missiles. Early warning sites would be
vital for such a system, with Greenland offering significant potential as a forward operating base for both defence and offense.
“Greenland is an enviable piece of real estate for Washington, it is basically physical insurance for the American homeland,” explains Dr Elizabeth Buchanan, a former
Australian defence official and author of a forthcoming book on the territory. “It is no wonder it has always been viewed as a frontier for deterrence.”
That will worry Russia, which has long been nervous about US missile defence undermining its deterrence. But it is also alienating allies.
Greenland is still part of Denmark, where there has been anger over Washington’s acquisitive talk earlier this year. Many in Canada have also been profoundly shocked by talk of
making it the 51st state of the US, something that Justin Trudeau, who was prime minister at the time, flatly ruled out.
Gaining more control of Greenland is a more likely ambition, and Europeans are quietly and privately worrying how Nato – an alliance designed to defend against Russia - could
deal with a situation when its most powerful member, the US, wants to take territory from another member, Denmark.
Potential for escalation’ over the seas
Russia is the most important player in the region. A fifth of its territory is in the Arctic and it accounts for more than half of the
‘
coastline.
It is the country that others worry most about when it comes to militarizing the Arctic, but also
the country with most to lose from such a development.
Where Western powers largely drew back from the region until recently, Russia has spent years
investing in its presence, upgrading airbases like Nagurskoye, which has been in operation since
the Cold War and can now handle large aircraft in the extreme North.
The Kola Peninsula is where much of Russia’s nuclear submarine fleet is based. Russian submarines depart bases here to lurk
beneath the Arctic ice ready for an order to launch a strike on their adversary and Moscow sees
it as vital for its deterrent and ability to project force.
“The Baltic Sea has become less accessible for Russian military operations following Sweden and Finland joining Nato, which means that the Northern Fleet becomes more
important,” Vice Admiral Nils Andreas Stensønes, Chief of the Norwegian Intelligence service, told me in June.
“And there is more reliance on nuclear deterrence.
And a fair share of their nuclear weapons are in the Kola
Peninsula in the Arctic.”
Vice Admiral Stensønes says that Russia sees it as in its own interest to keep tension low in order to avoid the Arctic becoming more militarised, which would stretch a Russian
military still focused on a war on Ukraine.
But Russia’s build up, its desire to project force and its accusations that Western powers are
themselves militarising the Arctic are in turn causing alarm, and he warns that the “ potential
for escalation ” is real.
Russia will
“demonstrate its power through aggressive and threatening behaviour which will carry along
with it a greater risk of escalation than ever before in the Arctic”.
The islands of Svalbard are another place to watch. Under a treaty, Norway controls them but other
countries, including Russia, are allowed to operate there, making them a potential flash point as
Norway has tended to focus more on lowering tensions, but other countries are sounding the alarm. Denmark’s most recent intelligence outlook warned that
Moscow claims they are being militarised to pose a threat to it.
Russia prepares for artic dominance
Sönmez 4-11, [(Doğuş, Research Assistant, Kadir Has University / PhD Candidate, International
Relations Programme, Galatasaray University Doğuş' most recent research examined how the Russian
war on Ukraine has affected the environment and whether the Russian Federation's environmental
policies are inconsistent with the outcomes.) "Russia’s changing Arctic policy: from economic ambitions
to military dominance, Loop, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/russias-changing-arctic-policy-from-economicambitions-to-military-dominance/, 4-11-2025, accessed 7-8-2025]//UT
Russia’s Arctic policy has shifted from economic ambitions to military dominance , especially since the
outbreak of war in Ukraine. As Western sanctions isolate Moscow, it is deepening ties with China while
militarising the Arctic to counter NATO’s northern expansion. Doğuş Sönmez explains how Russia's policy on the Arctic is
reshaping the geopolitical balance of the region
Why the Arctic matters
The Arctic is no longer an indiscoverable and frozen area but a strategic arena for global energy and trade. The region is estimated to hold 13%
of the world’s untapped oil and 30% of its undiscovered natural gas reserves, a resource base that surpasses Saudi Arabia’s known petroleum
deposits. Simultaneously, climate change is accelerating ice melting, making the Northern Sea Route (NSR) a viable alternative for trade
between Asia and Europe.
For Russia, the Arctic is not just about energy and shipping, but is a core component of its geopolitical
strategy. Moscow views the region as essential for national security, economic growth, and global power
projection. But Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the ongoing war, have significantly
reshaped Russia’s Arctic ambitions. Western sanctions have hindered Arctic energy projects, NATO has expanded its northern
presence, and Russia has shifted its focus eastward, strengthening ties with China and other Asian nations.
Russia’s pre-war Arctic strategy
Before 2022, Russia’s Arctic policy was guided by two key documents: the 2008 Arctic Strategy and the 2020 Arctic Policy.
These documents emphasised the region’s role in Russia’s economic security, and geopolitical strategy.
One pillar of Russia’s Arctic ambition is resource extraction. The Arctic is rich in oil, gas, minerals, and rare earth metals, and Moscow has
invested heavily in developing these reserves. State-backed energy giants such as Rosneft and Gazprom have launched massive Arctic
exploration projects. The NSR, which Russia aims to develop into a competitive global shipping corridor, controlling access and generating
revenue from transit fees, has also been a strategic focus.
Beyond economic ambitions, Russia has prioritised military security in the Arctic. In recent years, Moscow has
reopened Soviet-era military bases, deployed advanced radar systems, and expanded its fleet of
nuclear-powered icebreakers. The Kremlin explains this military buildup as its response to growing NATO presence in the Arctic.
Russia previously maintained cooperation with Canada, Norway, and the US. But the Ukraine war changed this dynamic, isolating
Russia from the West
Environmental protection has been part of Russia’s Arctic rhetoric, but economic and military priorities have often overshadowed sustainability
efforts. While Moscow claims to support Arctic conservation, Western analysts argue that Russia’s industrial activities pose significant
environmental risks.
Despite geopolitical tensions, Russia previously maintained cooperation with Arctic states such as Canada, Norway, and the United States. The
Ukraine war changed this dynamic, isolating Russia from Western Arctic institutions.
Postwar changes
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered three significant shifts in Russia’s Arctic policy:
economic disruptions as a result of Western sanctions, increased militarisation, and a strategic pivot
towards Asia.
First, Western sanctions devastated Russia’s Arctic energy sector. Companies like ExxonMobil and BP withdrew from Russian projects,
disrupting key oil and gas developments. Sanctions also restricted Russia’s access to Western technology, slowing energy extraction efforts. In
response, Russia has sought new partnerships with China, which has expressed growing interest in Arctic
investments. However, Chinese technology cannot fully replace Western expertise, and this creates challenges for Russia’s Arctic
ambitions.
Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession has transformed the regional security landscape, forcing Moscow
to reinforce its military presence in the Arctic
Second, NATO’s northern expansion has heightened military tensions in the Arctic. The accession to NATO of Finland
and Sweden has transformed the regional security landscape, forcing Moscow to reinforce its military presence in the Arctic. Russia has
increased Arctic military exercises, expanded its air defence systems, and deployed new Arctic-based
military units. These actions suggest a shift from economic prioritisation to military dominance in the
region.
Third, Russia has intensified its cooperation with China under the 'Polar Silk Road' initiative. As Western
shipping companies reduce operations along the NSR, Russia has turned to Chinese investments to sustain Arctic
infrastructure projects.
<table omitted>
Russia’s Arctic strategy has traditionally balanced economic ambitions with military and geopolitical
considerations. However, the Ukraine war has forced a recalibration: militarisation and reliance on Asian
partnerships now define Moscow’s Arctic approach.
The long-term success of Russia’s Arctic ambitions depends on several factors. Can Russia sustain its Arctic economy without Western
investment and technology? Can China and other Asian partners fill the gap left by Western companies? How will NATO’s Arctic presence shape
Russia’s security policies? These questions will determine whether Moscow can maintain its leadership in the region.
If Trump maintains his scepticism toward NATO, Russia might feel emboldened to further militarise the Arctic
With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Russia’s Arctic strategy may have to grapple with new geopolitical dynamics. Trump’s past
foreign policy favoured bilateral deals over multilateral alliances. This could lead to a loosening of US Arctic commitments and, potentially,
make room for limited US-Russia cooperation in energy and trade. However, if Trump maintains his scepticism toward NATO,
Russia might feel emboldened to further militarise the Arctic, exploiting potential fractures in Western
security coordination.
I-law can’t constrain
Gorchakov 25, [(Dmitry, He has more than 20 years experience in nuclear science and nuclear
energy use. He also researched radioecology at the Russian Academy of Sciences, developed
technologies for radioactive waste management and environmental monitoring for the private sector
and worked as an independent consultant and analyst. Graduated from the Faculty of Physics and
Technology of the Ural State University in Russia with a degree in nuclear reactors and power plants. He
completed postgraduate studies at the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences in
environmental protection. He has visited dozens of nuclear facilities in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and
Lithuania.) "Nuclear risks in the Russian Arctic during the war in Ukraine, Bellona.org,
https://bellona.org/news/arctic/2025-01-nuclear-risks-in-the-russian-arctic-during-the-war-in-ukraine,
1-31-2025, accessed 7-8-2025]//UT
Increased military activity in the Arctic and Nuclear escalation
Russia’s main focus now is to confront the West. Most of the nuclear legacy comes from past military programs, but nuclear
militarization in the Arctic is still ongoing. By early 2025, the Russian Northern Fleet had accrued around 30 nuclear ships and
submarines. The Navy remains the main operator of nuclear installations in the Russian Arctic. Among those are some 40 nuclear reactors—
many more than the 25 reactors operated in a civilian capacity within the nuclear icebreaker fleet and at nuclear power plants.
And no less important are the 300 nuclear warheads on combat duty on strategic submarines. Russia spends $10
billion a year on its nuclear weapon programs. In recent decades, Russia has built over 10 new nuclear
submarines and is developing new nuclear weapon carriers. This will create a new nuclear legacy in the future and
poses risks of accidents during testing and operation today.
Among accidents with nuclear vessels over the past few decades, we must note the tragedy of the Kursk nuclear submarine,
the sinking of the K-159 submarine, and a fire aboard the top-secret Losharik submarine. In 2019 the Burevestnik cruise missile, equipped with
a nuclear reactor, suffered an accident that caused a radiation release in the Arkhangelsk region and killed five Rosatom engineers. These tests
have now been moved to another site in the Arctic –the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago.
The Novaya Zemlya test site has seen 132 nuclear explosions. Fortunately, no full-scale nuclear tests have been conducted here since 1990.
However, the site has never been officially closed and is deliberately kept open and ready for use. This is a part of Putin’s strategy to
intimidate the West. In recent years, he has taken many of steps toward nuclear escalation.
Last year, in fact, Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. And in a
year, the New START treaty between the United States and Russia will expire. This means that, likely next year, for
the first time in decades, we will find ourselves in a situation where there are no treaties between the two
largest nuclear powers limiting their nuclear arsenals. Potentially, this will allow Russia to quickly place up to 100
additional nuclear warheads on existing submarines in the Arctic.
Unmitigated Russian influence in the arctic causes extinction—our ev
post dates and prices in defense.
Gordon Corera 7/10, B.A. in Modern history from Oxford, graduate studies in US foreign
policy at Harvard University, BBC Security Analyst and worked in Bill Clinton's Campaign, "The
struggle for control of the Arctic is accelerating - and riskier than ever," BBC, 07/10/2025,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-f92bc043-3893-4688-8937-fd9cad8b0d5b, JLB,
DOA: 7/10/25
Tensions are growing at the top of the world.
US President Donald Trump wants Greenland, Russia is modernizing its Arctic military bases, Chinese icebreakers are
opening new routes and spies are being unmasked.
But as the battle for one of the world’s coldest places heats up, an increasingly fragile security
balance may be breaking down, leading to an escalating arms race.
To grasp why the Arctic matters to these superpowers, you need to look at the world differently – literally.
Forget flat maps – peer down on the Arctic from the top of the globe.
the struggle over its land, sea and sky is accelerating
With this view, it’s clear why the region is considered pivotal - and why
.
‘Frontier for deterrence’
President Trump has repeatedly stated his desire to control Greenland.
“We need Greenland for national security purposes,” he has said. “I've been told that for a long time.”
The question of why a territory with only 56,000 or so people matters comes down to geography.
In the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union, nuclear weapons were the ultimate instruments of war, holding the balance of terror. And the fastest route for weapons to
reach their targets was over the North Pole.
At the dawn of the Cold War, the US established an important base in the remote North of Greenland at a place called Thule - recently renamed Pituffik Space Base, which I
visited in 2008.
At the base, a huge radar stands like a giant sentry, scanning the skies and space for anything coming over the top of the world. As I approached, the car engine began buzzing
and the dashboard controls jumped wildly thanks to its emissions.
Inside the base, US military officers explained how the radar allowed them to see objects as small as a tennis ball as they moved through space.
The Cold War may be gone but the site’s importance has not diminished. It still forms a crucial part of BMEWS – America’s Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.
President Trump has talked about wanting a Golden Dome to protect the US, a reference to the Iron Dome that helps protect Israel from missiles. Early warning sites would be
vital for such a system, with Greenland offering significant potential as a forward operating base for both defence and offense.
“Greenland is an enviable piece of real estate for Washington, it is basically physical insurance for the American homeland,” explains Dr Elizabeth Buchanan, a former
Australian defence official and author of a forthcoming book on the territory. “It is no wonder it has always been viewed as a frontier for deterrence.”
That will worry Russia, which has long been nervous about US missile defence undermining its deterrence. But it is also alienating allies.
Greenland is still part of Denmark, where there has been anger over Washington’s acquisitive talk earlier this year. Many in Canada have also been profoundly shocked by talk of
making it the 51st state of the US, something that Justin Trudeau, who was prime minister at the time, flatly ruled out.
Gaining more control of Greenland is a more likely ambition, and Europeans are quietly and privately worrying how Nato – an alliance designed to defend against Russia - could
deal with a situation when its most powerful member, the US, wants to take territory from another member, Denmark.
Potential for escalation’ over the seas
Russia is the most important player in the region. A fifth of its territory is in the Arctic and it accounts for more than half of the
‘
coastline.
It is the country that others worry most about when it comes to militarizing the Arctic, but also
the country with most to lose from such a development.
Where Western powers largely drew back from the region until recently, Russia has spent years
investing in its presence, upgrading airbases like Nagurskoye, which has been in operation since
the Cold War and can now handle large aircraft in the extreme North.
The Kola Peninsula is where much of Russia’s nuclear submarine fleet is based. Russian submarines depart bases here to lurk
beneath the Arctic ice ready for an order to launch a strike on their adversary and Moscow sees
it as vital for its deterrent and ability to project force.
“The Baltic Sea has become less accessible for Russian military operations following Sweden and Finland joining Nato, which means that the Northern Fleet becomes more
important,” Vice Admiral Nils Andreas Stensønes, Chief of the Norwegian Intelligence service, told me in June.
“And there is more reliance on nuclear deterrence.
Peninsula in the Arctic.”
And a fair share of their nuclear weapons are in the Kola
Vice Admiral Stensønes says that Russia sees it as in its own interest to keep tension low in order to avoid the Arctic becoming more militarised, which would stretch a Russian
military still focused on a war on Ukraine.
But Russia’s build up, its desire to project force and its accusations that Western powers are
themselves militarising the Arctic are in turn causing alarm, and he warns that the “ potential
for escalation ” is real.
Russia will
“demonstrate its power through aggressive and threatening behaviour which will carry along
with it a greater risk of escalation than ever before in the Arctic”.
The islands of Svalbard are another place to watch. Under a treaty, Norway controls them but other
countries, including Russia, are allowed to operate there, making them a potential flash point as
Norway has tended to focus more on lowering tensions, but other countries are sounding the alarm. Denmark’s most recent intelligence outlook warned that
Moscow claims they are being militarised to pose a threat to it.
Russia is a revisionist. Economic initiatives, hybrid warfare,
expanding spheres of influence, propaganda.
Parfinenko 23 [(Anatoliy, Ph.D (History), Associate Professor, Head of the
Department of Travel Business and Regional Studies of the V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National
University) " RUSSIAN REVISIONISM AS A CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
ORDER, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09668136.2020.1776221, 05-XX2023, accessed 7-11-2025]//UT
"Frozen" conflicts and imposition of integration projects have become important tools for
achieving the Kremlin's geopolitical goals in the post-Soviet space. Having no significant success in the
implementation of economic initiatives, Russia deliberately ignited and "froze" separatist
conflicts in post-Soviet countries, waged " hybrid" wars, created puppet regimes and
zones of influence . Examples of such policies include: Nagorno- Karabakh, Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
Crimea, the so-called "people's republics" in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In 2014, Russian troops occupied Crimea
and started a war in eastern Ukraine under the guise of separatists. At the beginning of 2022, under the
guise of the CSTO, Russia sent its troops to suppress mass protests in Kazakhstan. In addition, the
Russian army fully controls the territory of Belarus, which has been used to carry out attacks on
Ukraine since February 2022. Today, most analysts agree that after suffering a catastrophic defeat and failing the plan to
seize the Ukrainian capital in March 2022, the Kremlin again seeks to "freeze " the conflict, engaging Ukraine in long negotiations,
which will allow to buy time for a further offensive. Integration projects led by the Kremlin have become another important direction
for restoring geopolitical influence in the post-Soviet space. They were aimed at making the European
integration aspirations of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, etc. impossible and thus
impose a strategy of "limited sovereignty". Moscow-initiated multilateral associations and
integration structures (CIS, Eurasian Economic Community, Customs Union, Eurasian
Economic Union, etc.) caused particular opposition in Ukraine. Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity
(2013-2014) became the clearest embodiment of such sentiments. Millions of people in Ukraine strongly opposed the attempt of the
then pro-Russian leadership of Ukraine to deviate from the European integration course and refuse to sign the Association
Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. Realizing that the government's proposed alternative of joining the Customs Union with
Russia would ultimately lead to a loss of sovereignty. The end of the "Yeltsin era" in Russia marked the end of
democratic experiments and the transition to state propaganda to discredit liberal values. With the
appearance of a new leader in the Kremlin, V. Putin, a representative of the special services, Russian political elite was formed
mostly from representatives of the power bloc, and the revisionist character of Russia's foreign policy acquired
established features [Balachandran, 2022]. The vision of the future state presented by Putin was based on four "pillars"
imbued with the apotheosis of the "great power": patriotism, statehood, statesmanship, and social solidarity. It is significant that
statehood was explained as "great power", which is an "integral" characteristic of Russia's existence, and determines the mentality of
Russians and government policy throughout history [Putin, 1999]. In Russia, an autocratic system of power is rapidly being formed,
which is strengthened due to the rapid increase in energy prices, the formation of a clan-oligarchic system, and the establishment of
state control over the media. Russian capital controlled by Moscow actively infiltrated the post- Soviet space, European countries
and other regions of the world, forming various forms of energy and economic dependence and supporting right- and left-wing
populist movements [Svitova hibrydna viina, 2017: 126]. With the formation of an autocratic regime in Russia, scientists
increasingly began to notice the features of fascist societies in Russian society. In the book "Putinism: The slow rise of a radical right
regime in Russia" (2013), which was published even before the occupation of Crimea, the famous Dutch political scientist Van
Herpen draws attention to the "ultranationalist" nature of the Russian state ideology. The entire work is permeated with a large
number of parallels between "Putinism" and fascism, between Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia, because both at one time
experienced the post-imperial syndrome of loss of territories, hyperinflation and institutional chaos, which multiplied the
disappointment from the loss of empires [Van Herpen, 2013]. As carbon exports and financial inflows to the "petrodollar"
budget grew, the Kremlin began to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy, spreading openly
revisionist discourse and resorting to hybrid warfare practices. As is known, since 2005, Putin has
publicly and repeatedly stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century."
In 2007, the head of the Kremlin in the well-known "Munich speech" harshly criticized unipolarity as "the world of one master" and
"one sovereign" [President of Russia, 2007], thereby declaring to the West about his geopolitical claims on spheres of influence in
Europe. In the Munich speech, there was also a decisive criticism of the expansion of NATO to the East and its approach to Russia's
borders. Although by that time, almost all the countries of post-communist Eastern Europe, as well as the Baltic countries, which
were part of the USSR, had joined NATO. Despite the fact that the expansion of NATO was accompanied by its demilitarization and
was dictated by the defense initiatives of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which sought to protect themselves from a
possible renewal of Russia's imperial aggression, as happened to Georgia in 2008. After the "Munich speech", blaming the West for
the expansion of NATO became the leitmotif of Russian foreign policy. The culmination of this policy was the presentation of almost
ultimatum proposals to the USA and NATO on written security guarantees by Moscow in December 2021. They included demands to
remove NATO infrastructure from Eastern Europe to the borders of 1997, exclude the possibility of Ukraine joining the Alliance, not
to conduct military exercises in the post- socialist countries of Europe without the prior consent of Russia. It should be reminded
that the "proposals", unprecedented in form and content, were made public against the background of the gathering of 100,000
troops at the border with Ukraine, which directly threatened European security. They were initiated against the background of
Russia's prolonged hybrid war with Ukraine and the West, which made them impossible. Russian demands, especially
regarding the non-aligned status of Ukraine, are often used for propaganda purposes, claiming
that the expansion of NATO allegedly provoked Russian aggression. However, the very idea of a
Western-oriented but militarily neutral Ukraine has not withstood the test of history. It should
be reminded that the military invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was not provoked by joining NATO (at
that time Ukraine had a non-aligned status), but by Kyiv's rejection of the economic union with Moscow and
an attempt to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. This decision was dictated by a stubborn reluctance
to recognize the sovereignty of Ukraine and the geopolitical realities that developed after 1991. It was determined by distorted
historical ideas that equate medieval Kyivan Rus with the modern Russian state. Putin explained the annexation of Crimea by
"restoring historical justice." The first thing he drew attention to, speaking on this matter before the State Duma, was his pride in the
shared history with Crimea, where the ancient Chersonesus was located and Prince Volodymyr of Kyiv was baptized [President of
Russia, 2014]. After the seizure of Crimea and the intervention in Eastern Ukraine, Russia began to be perceived as a noninstitutional and non-systemic actor in the system of international relations. The White House made this quite clear when the 2015
National Military Strategy included Russia, along with Iran, China, and North Korea, on the list of "revisionist states." In the
national security strategy of the United States in 2017, China and Russia were also defined as "revisionist states" that seek to
form a world opposed to the values and interests of the United States, to project their influence
in the world and, in particular, in all parts of Europe and Central Asia [White House, 2017]. Seeking to "soften"
sanctions and find allies in the confrontation with the West, the Kremlin made a foreign policy
adjustment, known as the " Pivot to Asia ", ideological foundstion of which became the concept of neoEurasianism, and the real basis was the "connection" or coordination of the ways of cooperation within the Eurasian
Economic Union and the Silk Road "Economic Belt" with the prospect of building the
" Greater Eurasian Partnership " around the interaction between China, Russia, India,
Kazakhstan, Iran and other countries, on which agreements were reached in 2015. Thus evolved a convergence of the
two autocratic regimes of the largest countries of Eurasia, united by a common revisionist goal – the establishment of a multipolar
(post-Western) world order, which guarantees the consolidation of spheres of influence and the preservation of their own
authoritarian regimes. For Russia, this meant establishing a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space and
in the countries of Eastern Europe, for China – the satisfaction of territorial claims in the South China Sea, established
by the "nine-dash line" (since 1947 it has defined China's "historic rights" to marine areas). In 2019, Beijing and Moscow upgraded
relations to the highest level of partnership in China's diplomatic relations hierarchy, underscoring the growing identity of the
worldviews and interests of the two regimes. During his visit to Moscow in June 2019, Xi Jinping called the Russian leader his "best
friend" [China's Xi praises 'best friend' Putin during Russia visit, 2019] against the background of a fierce trade confrontation with
the United States. Russian-Chinese strategic rapprochement has become a kind of "anti-democratic
alliance" and a real challenge for international security. During 2021, Russia and China simultaneously
intensified their separate military activities and threats to the sovereignty of Ukraine and Taiwan. The Winter Olympic Games in
Beijing in February 2022, boycotted by the West, became a symbol of the unity of authoritarian revisionist regimes, where Xi
Jinping and V. Putin declared "friendship without borders", which became a harbinger of the war in Ukraine. Beijing and Moscow
issued a statement where they set out their agreed position on the rejection of the foreign policy of the US
and Western countries, which seem to use the protection of democracy and human rights as a means of
pressure on other countries. They noted the "transformation of the architecture of global governance and world order" and called on
NATO to respect the sovereignty and security of other countries, to stop "expansion" in Eastern Europe, and condemned the
formation of security blocs in the Asia-Pacific region [Roth&Ni, 2022]. The Russian invasion of Ukraine strengthened transatlantic
ties and united the world's democracies in opposing the aggressor. It is no coincidence that the confrontation between democracy
and authoritarianism became the key theme of the US National Security Strategy, released in October 2022. The strategy notes that
the United States and the world are entering a "decisive decade" (mentioned several times) that will determine the terms of
geopolitical confrontation. Since China, Russia and other authoritarian regimes are trying to change the international order itself.
The biggest strategic problem, the Strategy notes, comes from states that "combine authoritarian rule with revisionist foreign policy"
[White House, 2022: 8]. The strategy singles out China and Russia as distinct but different challenges facing different tasks. If
Russia is defined as an "imminent threat to the free and open international system" that defies all norms of the international order
today, China is a challenge to the global order. The PRC, according to the White House, is the "only competitor" that aims to "change
the existing international order" [White House, 2022: 8].
China
Taiwan war escalates leading to China first strike on U.S.
John Feng 6/26 {} - (“Key US ally quietly prepares for China's Pacific war with America,” Newsweek,
published 6-26-2025, accessed 7-11-2025, https://www.newsweek.com/us-ally-japan-prepares-plansus-china-pacific-war-taiwan-strait-2090216)//marlborough-SMe/
Japan will begin building bomb shelters next year on its remote islands closest to Taiwan amid fears that
its far western territory could become a legitimate target for Chinese missiles if China and the United
States go to war.
The plans point to a possible scenario in which Beijing orders preemptive strikes against major U.S. and
allied bases in the Pacific before launching an amphibious invasion by sea and air across the Taiwan
Strait to achieve what strategists call a fait accompli.
They also acknowledge the complex reality that Japan—the U.S. treaty ally hosting the most American troops anywhere in the world outside
of U.S. territory—will in all probability not avoid the spillover of a superpower conflict so near its shores.
The Core of Core Issues
The Communist Party claims democratically governed Taiwan as part of Chinese territory, despite Taipei's objections. China refuses to rule
out the use of force to unify the island with the mainland, and a widening hard power imbalance across the Taiwan Strait is fueling concerns
that Beijing could soon compel Taipei with the threat of a hot war.
U.S. officials say Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered his armies to be ready to take Taiwan by force
by 2027. Whether the military capability will be matched by political intent cannot be known. Taiwan is a core issue in the U.S.-China
relationship, Beijing's officials say.
At Asia's top security forum in Singapore last month, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said China's military was
"rehearsing for the real deal," and that an attack "could be imminent."
China will strike the U.S. in support of Iran
Kristen Altus 6/12 {an associate editor with Fox News Digital} - (“China could 'strike us' amid IsraelIran conflict, Gordon Chang warns,” Fox Business, published 6-12-2025, accessed 7-11-2025,
https://www.foxbusiness.com/media/china-could-strike-us-amid-israel-iran-conflict-gordon-changwarns)//marlborough-SMe/
Iran being set back on its heels by Israel means "nothing is off the table" for China and its military
advances, according to one foreign policy expert.
"The Chinese… they're losing their proxy, Iran. Iran has been accomplishing China's foreign policy goals for quite some time. And China's Middle
East policy is now in disarray," Gatestone Institute senior fellow Gordon Chang said on "Varney & Co." Friday.
"This is a point where China is suffering a terrible loss in the Middle East," he continued. "It is not going to take
that lying down, and it's probably going to get Iran or some other party to strike us."
Overnight Friday, Israel Defense Forces launched a sweeping strike on Iran following months of attempted, and seemingly failed, nuclear
negotiations.
The strikes were heard in the Iranian capital of Tehran, as Israel said it launched "Operation Rising Lion" to target their nuclear and missile
infrastructure. A state of emergency has been declared across Israel as the country braces for an Iranian response.
"China was supporting the attacks on Israel across the board with elevated commodity purchases.
Remember, China has taken more than 90% of Iran's exports of crude oil, but also weapons support,"
Chang noted.
"Hamas, Houthi militia, Hezbollah, all of them have large quantities of Chinese weapons. Iran's weapons
are made with China's computer chips."
President Donald Trump promised that Israel’s next round of attacks on Iran would be "even more brutal" in a Truth Social post pressuring Iran
to cut a deal on its nuclear activity.
"There has already been great death and destruction, but there is still time to make this slaughter, with the next already planned attacks being
even more brutal, come to an end," Trump said.
The U.S. and Iran were set to have another round of nuclear talks scheduled for Sunday in Muscat, Oman, while the two sides remain on
opposite ends over whether Iran should have the capacity to enrich uranium at all, even for civil energy purposes. Iran, however, reportedly
pulled out of the talks indefinitely in light of Israel's strikes.
"There's a lot of evidence that Xi Jinping has lost control of the Chinese military, and he's in increasing
trouble with civilians at the top of the party," Chang pointed out. "So this right now is anyone's guess as to
how the Chinese would view it, but nothing is off the table."
Europe
EU unsure of Trumps commitment to NATO in the case of an attack.
Naishadham ’25 (Suman, AP News, “European leaders downplay skepticism from Trump about NATO
solidarity”, https://apnews.com/article/trump-nato-defense-european-union-ukraine-war-russiasecurity-fe2a215c86900d8e7b9e0de3ae49df0a, March 7, 2025/// Solis)
MADRID (AP) — European Union leaders on Friday downplayed skepticism from U.S. President Donald Trump
about solidarity among NATO members a day after they backed plans to spend more on defense amid
wavering U.S. support.
After European leaders committed Thursday to freeing up hundreds of billions of euros for security,
Trump said he was “not so sure” that the military alliance would come to the United States’ defense if
the country were attacked.
“We are loyal and faithful allies,” French President Emmanuel Macron said late Thursday in response,
expressing “respect and friendship” toward U.S. leaders and adding that France was “entitled to expect
the same.”
Māris Riekstins, Latvia’s ambassador to NATO, stressed the military alliance remained the most important platform
for addressing transatlantic security issues. He emphasized the commitment from his country — which shares a nearly 300kilometer (186-mile) border with Russia — to defense spending.
On Thursday, EU leaders signed off on a move to loosen budget restrictions so that willing EU countries
could increase their military spending.
Following the emergency talks in Brussels, Trump again suggested that the U.S. could abandon its NATO
commitments if member countries didn’t meet the alliance’s defense spending targets. He expressed doubt
that other allies will come to the defense of the U.S. — though they have done so after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, the
only instance in which the Article 5 mutual defense guarantee was invoked.
The U.S. president has criticized the alliance for years, arguing that European members have not contributed enough
toward their own security.
In Spain, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said his country would raise defense spending to reach NATO’s
target faster than previously committed. But he did not specify when the eurozone’s fourth-largest economy — and NATO
laggard — would hit the 2% of GDP military spending target.
Spain spent an estimated 1.28% of GDP on defense last year. Italy and Belgium also spent less than the
2% target last year, according to NATO estimates.
NATO members pledged in 2014 to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense, which 23 countries were expected to meet last year amid concerns
about the war in Ukraine. Spain, which ranked last among NATO members for the share of GDP it contributed to the military, previously said it
would reach that target by 2029.
Sánchez emphasized Spain’s commitment to European security and to backing Ukraine — though he stated that the security threats
faced by the southern European nation were of a different nature than what European allies on the
bloc’s eastern front face from Russia.
Still, he said, “it’s clear that we all have to make an effort and an accelerated effort.”
Solvency
Noko
Defense solves Noko
Herlihy 24, [(Joseph,) "The Case for U.S. Homeland Ballistic Missile Defense Against North Korea,
Georgetown Security Studies Review, https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2024/05/02/thecase-for-u-s-homeland-ballistic-missile-defense-against-north-korea/, 05-02-2024, accessed 7-92025]recut harliu
The United States has long maintained that it can defend the homeland against limited North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) strikes. The 2022
Missile Defense Review (MDR) reaffirmed that the
United States “will continue to stay ahead of North
Korean missile threats to the homeland” through homeland missile defense, missile
defeat, and “the credible threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and non-nuclear
means.” While “missile defeat” destroys North Korean ICBMs before they are launched,
homeland ballistic missile defense (BMD) defends the U.S. homeland by intercepting ICBMs
after they are launched. Given North Korea’s recent ICBM expansion – it tested the Hwasong-18 in December 2023 – and its policy that places its
nuclear forces on “trigger” alert and promotes preemptive nuclear weapons use in response to threats , the need for homeland
BMD should not be understated . While some argue that homeland BMD is ineffective
and costly and upsets strategic stability with Russia and China, it is necessary to defend
against the evolving North Korean threat to the U.S. homeland. How Homeland BMD Works The U.S. homeland ballistic
GMD
integrates data , via fire control (GFC) and communications systems, from global
sensors on land, sea, and space to intercept incoming missiles during their
missile defense system is the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system that protects all 50 states from limited ICBM strikes.
mid-course of flight using the Ground-based Interceptor (GBI). Sensors and satellites detect the
incoming missile and send a message to ground-based radar in Alaska, which discriminates
between the missile warhead and decoys. The GFC system then sends a message to launch the GBI through secure communications.
The interceptor launches, and the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) separates from the interceptor. The EKV uses sensors to track the incoming missile, and data
updates the direction the EKV travels mid-flight. The EKV then physically collides with the incoming missile and destroys it upon impact. Sensors and data finally
verify the hit. There are currently 44 GBIsnited States – 40 at Fort Greely in Alaska and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The Department of Defense
will augment the GBIs with 20 Next Generation Interceptors (NGIs) – advanced technology with multiple kill vehicles atop each interceptor – around 2028. The Case
BMD augments the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent against North Korea by adding denial to threats of punishment.
Homeland BMD prevents limited North Korean ICBM strikes from
reaching the U.S. homeland, which adds to the threat of “cost impositio n”
should North Korea launch a nuclear weapon. Deterrence is strongest when the
United States can deny and punish North Korean aggression . First, homeland
BMD protects U.S. cities from limited North Korean ICBM strikes . While experts
for Homeland BMD Against North Korea Homeland
estimate that North Korea has between 20 and 60 total nuclear weapons, it lacks the ICBM numbers to threaten U.S. nuclear forces. So, it threatens U.S. cities.
Estimates suggest North Korea has at most 11 Hwasong-17 ICBMs, based on a February 2023 parade. Using this number, with 44 GBIs, the United States currently
has a four-to-one interceptor to ICBM ratio. When the United States adds 20 NGIs to its GMD system in 2028, this ratio will become nearly six to one. Given these
, the GMD system
has proved to be effective. All three GMD tests since 2017 , including most
recently in December 2023 , successfully intercepted ballistic missiles with the
favorable ratios, the United States can prevent North Korean ICBM strikes from reaching the homeland. Moreover
Capability Enhanced-II (CE-II) Block I EKV. This demonstrates the improvements made in the GMD system, as only half of all tests
before 2017 were successful. Just like any other product in any other industry, research and development pays off. Second, because the GMD system is effective,
homeland BMD complicates North Korean planning by introducing
uncertainty about the success of a strike on the American homeland. North Korea’s
limited capabilities are highly unlikely to penetrate the GMD system, and
this uncertainty deters it from launching a first strike because its strike will be
futile (its missiles will not hit the United States) and fatal (the United States will respond
overwhelmingly). The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) stated that “there is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and
survive.” Th e uncertainty of strike success combined with the certainty of
destruction enhances deterrence vis-a-vis North Korea. Third, homeland BMD
prevents “cheap shot” coercion by raising the threshold for North Korean nuclear
use. Because the GMD system prevents limited strikes from reaching the U.S. homeland, it increases the number of missiles – likely above what North Korea
possesses – needed for a successful strike. This raises the threshold for nuclear conflict, which negates the credibility of a North Korean threat to launch one or two
missiles (“cheap shots”) that hit the United States and then threaten to launch more if the United States does not succumb to North Korean demands. The
first couple of missiles simply will not penetrate the GMD system , so North Korea
cannot coerce the United States with limited strikes. Fourth, homeland BMD reassures
allies that the United States will fulfill its global security commitments . Not
only does the GMD system demonstrate physical capability, but it also signals American
resolve and commitment to maintaining its deterrent at home and abroad
.
The 2022 MDR makes it clear that the GMD system offers “a visible measure of protection for the U.S. population while reassuring allies and partners that the
United States will not be coerced by threats to the homeland from states like North Korea.” Because the United States takes steps to protect itself and reduce its
, it may instill confidence in allies and partners that the
United States will run risks on their behalf to protect them from coercive threats.
Japan and South Korea should feel protected from North Korean coercion, knowing
that the United States has the capability, resolve, and freedom of action to
defend them . Indeed, North Korea would not want to strike Japan or South Korea, knowing
that the United States will respond overwhelmingly. Fifth , homeland BMD provides
decision-makers additional time in crisis to end conflict at the lowest level .
vulnerability to ballistic missile strikes
Because global sensors increase warning time, and GBIs prevent limited North Korean ICBM strikes from reaching the U.S. homeland, the GMD system provides
enables the United States
to respond flexibly to end conflict at the lowest level possible . Sixth, should
deterrence fail, homeland BMD limits damage to the U.S. population . The GMD system will
decision-makers additional time in crisis to consider less escalatory actions than nuclear strikes. This
intercept limited North Korean ICBM strikes, but if North Korea launched 20-plus ICBMs – which it likely does not have – only a few would hit the United States
rather than the entire strike force. Damage limitation protects the U.S. population, preserves American capability and freedom of action, and expands decisionmaking space for leaders.
Alaska
Alaska k2 US power projection
Forsyth 18, [(Michael J., associate professor and director of the Department of Command and
Leadership at the US Army Command and General Staff College. I continue to conduct research in civilmilitary relations and military historical topics. During my military career I focused on leadership
development to ensure our future military leaders are prepared for positions of higher responsibility.
Further, I continue to do so as a director and teacher at CGSC by helping individual officers reach their
potential by teaching, coaching, and mentoring them to establish and achieve their goals. I help by
encouraging them to set the conditions for their growth and creating a positive learning environment
that emphasizing innovation and creativity that contributes to learning outcomes designed to help them
achieve success.) "Why Alaska and the Arctic are Critical to the National Security of the United States,
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/JanuaryFebruary-2018/Why-Alaska-and-the-Arctic-are-Critical-to-the-National-Security-of-the-United-States/,
02-xx-2018, accessed 7-12-2025] UT + harliu
Over the past five years, Russia has moved aggressively to build its Arctic military capabilities, apparently in an effort to secure its claims and interests in the region.1 Increasingly,
human activity is occurring in the Arctic as the sea ice recedes and economic opportunity opens to
nations via new shipping lanes. Characteristically, in any geographical area, with the rise in human activity there is also the corresponding possibility that friction will
occur as people compete to exploit the natural resources and corresponding economic possibilities. Such friction—and potential conflict—in the Arctic is highly likely at some point unless
preparations are made to mitigate it. Alaska makes the United States an Arctic nation, and its location places the state and country at the center of this fast-evolving region.2
Thus,
Alaska is critical to the national security of the United States ; however, we are not, as a nation, keeping pace with the rapidly
changing security situation in the Arctic. Lagging here could also have an enormous impact on our economy. To change this dynamic, there are several things that the U.S. military can do to
ensure the future security of the region. Alaska’s Geostrategic Importance “Alaska is the most strategic place on earth,” stated Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell in testimony before Congress in 1935.3
The state is singularly closer
to many national capitals in the hemisphere than most points in the lower forty-eight states. This
The reason for this bold statement is that Alaska is the closest U.S. location to the center of the Northern Hemisphere (see figure 1).
makes Alaska the perfect power projection platform for the United States from a military
standpoint. Further, because Alaska sits astride the Bering Strait chokepoint and the Great Circle
Routes between North America and Asia as can be seen in figure 2, it is critical to our economic and
national security .4 Figure 1. The Northern Hemisphere from the Perspective of the North Pole Graphic courtesy of North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD];
used in an Alaskan Command and Alaska NORAD Region command briefing. Alaska is close to the center of the hemisphere and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson [JBER] is uniquely positioned
to project power. The distances depicted in nautical miles are to select world capitals from JBER.) The air lanes and sea lanes of the Great Circle Routes are heavily trafficked by shipping
companies because they shorten the distance between the two continents, saving time and money for shippers. Consequently, the city of Anchorage and Alaska are at the center of existing
commercial shipping lanes between East and West. Anchorage, at roughly the halfway point between the major commerce centers of North America and Asia, is an important hub for such
international corporations as Federal Express and DHL.5 Moreover, many nations such as China and Russia are routinely making use of these routes for their economic benefit.
However, while Alaska is critical to intercontinental shipping now , emerging routes due to
shrinking ice impediments could raise the state’s economic stature to even greater heights. The retreat of ice
coverage in the Arctic Ocean has opened up the potential for shipping along the Northern Sea Route and the fabled Northwest Passage (see figure 3).6 The Northern Sea Route parallels
Russia’s Arctic coastline, as much of it is within the country’s exclusive economic zone. In the past few years, shipping along this route has increased, topping out with seventy-one passages in
2013.7 Moving goods along this route cuts off thousands of miles, saving money on fuel costs and insurance (since there are no pirates along this route).8 Moreover, Russia is facilitating
passages through the use of its large icebreaker fleet, making her an indispensable player in shipping through the High North while profiting from such transit by charging fees for services akin
to a toll.9 Thus, the emerging Northwest Passage has recently become a possibility for shippers. For centuries, explorers and adventurers sought a route from Europe to Asia across Canada’s
High North. Most of these individuals failed in this attempt, but now the dream is nearing reality. In 2017, the luxury cruise liner Crystal Serenity made a trip through the Northwest Passage
starting from Seward, Alaska, and terminating in New York City.10 While much of the Northwest Passage remains difficult to navigate due to remaining heavy ice pack, continued ice retreat
Alaska’s position on the east side of the Bering Strait places the state in
a central position on the choke point of both routes . However, with increasing human activity, it is
could make this route feasible in the future.
inevitable that disagreements among nations making claims in the area will arise as competition heats
up. Again , Alaska’s location thrusts her to the forefront of strategic calculations that the United
States must make to deal with emerging geopolitical and geoeconomic circumstances. Incidentally, what makes the
Great Circle Route good for shipping also makes it the preferred route for the employment of missiles aimed at North America. As previously noted, this route shortens the distance between
reduced distance saves time and money, the same principle of distance holds true for ballistic
missiles. Potential adversaries could fire weapons along this trajectory to close the distance more
the two continents. Just as shippers prefer the route because the
quickly while lessening the potential for early warning to their attacks. Thus, Alaska’s location makes
the state a critical component of the nation’s ballistic missile defense system .
Arctic hypersonic are specifically key
Brady 25, [(brady, national defense fellow for the arctic council) "Greenland’s Military
Possibilities for the United States, War on the Rocks,
https://warontherocks.com/2025/04/greenlands-military-possibilities-for-the-united-states/,
4-4-2025, accessed 7-8-2025]//UT
Thus far, I have focused on monitoring. Now I shift to responding. While the United States has strong response
military options from Alaska, there is a notable gap in force posture between Alaska and Norway.
In the western Arctic (west of the Lomonosov Ridge), the U.S. has substantial military assets. Alaska hosts the world’s highest
concentration of fifth-generation fighters (F-22s and F-35s) and the U.S. Army’s 11th Airborne Division, reactivated in 2022.
Deepwater ports like Kodiak support naval staging, while well-developed infrastructure in Alaska and northwest
Canada enables rapid deployment of long-range missile and air defense units if necessary. These bases give
the president multiple military response options in the Arctic.
In the eastern Arctic (east of the Lomonosov Ridge), options are far more limited. Year-round sea ice and sparse infrastructure limit
deployment capabilities in northern Canada and Greenland. The Svalbard Treaty bars military bases in the Norwegian islands.
Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command operates with minimal forces. While Denmark plans to boost defense spending, the impact will be
marginal. Beyond Norway, the Arctic from Europe to Alaska lacks infrastructure capable of supporting even small force deployments
(i.e., a long-range missile or air defense battalion) — leaving a 3,000-mile strategic gap across some of the planet’s harshest terrain.
Closing this gap does not require bases along its entire length. When needed, major power
projection can still emanate from Alaska, northern Europe, or the Atlantic seaboard. However,
expanding capacity in Greenland creates an additional staging point, offering strategic flexibility
and mitigating political constraints from Canada or Norway during a crisis. In a war, the U.S. Army’s LongRange Hypersonic Weapon and other long-range anti-ship or anti-air systems could allow
missile units deployed to eastern Greenland to strike targets across the Russian Arctic and block
enemy attempts to move across the Arctic or North Atlantic.
Arctic missile defense modernization is pertinent
Bouffard 25, [(troy, Assistant Professor for Arctic Security, College of Business and
Security Management, UAF, Director - Center for Arctic Security and Resilience (CASR)
Research Fellow - Modern War Institute at West Point. Former Congressional Fellow - Arctic
Advisor to U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski Research Fellow (non-resident), Centre for Defense and
Security Studies (CDSS), University of Manitoba Network Coordinator: North American and
Arctic Defense and Security Network (NAADSN) edX Instructor: Arctic Security Fundamentals,
Arctic Council EPPR project member George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies alumni
(former adjunct)) "The Golden Dome and implications for the North, https://thewatchjournal.com/2025/03/27/the-golden-dome-and-implications-for-the-north/, 1-27-2025,
accessed 7-8-2025]//UT
Missile defense and modernizing early warning systems in the North American Arctic are
complicated by the lack of persistent satellite communications capabilities above 60 degrees latitude.
Today’s effective missile defense systems are extremely information-intensive, and future versions will be
more so. One reason the F-35 is so hotly anticipated in Canada is because it is a data and information vacuum, but managing such
information flows requires new communications capabilities. Technical issues posed by the Arctic location include frequent low
cloud cover, aurora effects, maintaining a stable power supply, thermal management for optics, ice formation, protecting sensitive
optical components and complex atmospheric turbulence, among many others. Adequate supply chains and industry capacity are
other challenges.
Strategically, the Arctic is a critical portion of the future Golden Dome, especially for cruise missiles, given the
shortest avenue of approach for many adversaries’ delivery systems is over the Arctic. Analysts have
wrestled with missile defense for decades, including the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Strategic Command, USNORTHCOM,
NORAD, U.S. Space Force (and component commands), and Defence Research Development, Canada’s missile defense research
programs.
Canada, which contributes to and benefits from its longstanding binational NORAD with the U.S., shares these concerns and has
committed to help address them through NORAD modernization programs, including promises to enhance its military footprint in
the northern approaches to North America. NORAD warns of incoming missiles, but USNORTHCOM decides which ones to defeat
using its Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System, which is oriented to defeat
intercontinental ballistic missiles from North Korea or Iran but is unable to manage the large
and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese missiles. NORAD’s North Warning System, a series of short-
and long-range radars, and future Arctic and Polar Over the Horizon Radar systems will
be essential sources of information. The latter two will be able to see far beyond North
America and into the Arctic and the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. A firm
commitment to contribute to the Golden Dome is an important shift in policy for Canada.
General
Hypersonic k2 deterrence commitments
Toliver 25, [(Brandon, National Institute of Deterrence Studies (NIDS) Fellow Engineering,
Strategist Researcher, I specialize in security and military policy analysis, with expertise in
defense strategies, infrastructure resilience, and force development. Recognized as a NSPE
Federal Engineer of the Year in 2023 and 2025, Doctor of Engineering from George Washington
University, multiple advanced degrees, and licensure as a Professional Engineer (PE) in Texas
and Maryland.) "Hypersonic Weapons: Are We Entering a New Era of Vulnerability?, Global
Security Review, https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-weapons-are-we-entering-anew-era-of-vulnerability/, 05-05-2025, accessed 7-13-2025] UT
To counter this burgeoning vulnerability, the United States must not merely react, but fundamentally
redefine its strategic posture, acknowledging that piecemeal technological solutions are
insufficient to address the profound shift hypersonic weapons impose on the security landscape.
The rapid development of the glide phase interceptor (GPI) and space-based tracking systems is not just about enhancing
missile defense; it is about restoring a sense of strategic stability, reassuring allies and deterring
potential adversaries. The expansion of conventional hypersonic programs, such as the AGM-183 ARRW,
conventional prompt strike, and the long-range hypersonic weapon, is not just about developing
counterforce capabilities; it is about demonstrating a commitment to maintaining a credible
deterrent, signaling to potential adversaries that aggression will be met with a swift and decisive
response. The integration of hypersonic weapons into existing military doctrines does not just require tactical adjustments; it
demands a fundamental reevaluation of strategic thinking, adapting to a new era of high-speed
warfare.
General
Russia China Revisionist
China and Russia are revisionist in the arctic
Türker 25, [(Haşim Türker, Dr. Turker is the academic coordinator and senior researcher at
Bosphorus Center for Asian Studies, which is an independent think-tank located in Ankara. In 2005, Dr.
Turker graduated from the National Defense University ATASAREN with an MA in ‘International
Relations’ and in 2008 from the Turkish Naval War College, with an MA in ‘National and International
Security Strategies Management and Leadership.’ He received his PhD from Kocaeli University in 2018.
Dr. Turker is the author of two books in Turkish: ‘European Security and Defense Policy,’ published in
2007 by Nobel Publications, and ‘Towards a New Cold War: Rising China, The United States, and the
NATO,’ published in 2019 by Cinius Publications.) "China's Arctic Aspirations and Polar Silk Road:
Implications for Great Power Competition, DergiPark,
https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/atasobed/issue/83652/1454578, 25.03.2024, accessed 7-12-2025]
recut harliu
Moreover, China's Arctic policy implies its intention to participate in the governance of
the Arctic Ocean . The policy infers China's objective to occupy an active role in the area, identifying itself as a collaborative partner rather than a
contentious actor (China’s Arctic Policy 2018). This represents a considerable shift from the conventional power dynamics in the region, predominantly dictated by
. China's proactive approach in the Arctic indicates its escalating global
influence and its aspiration to assert itself in zones traditionally beyond its
sphere of influence . Nevertheless, China's Arctic objectives have triggered apprehensions among Arctic states and other leading powers.
the Arctic states
These worries pertain to matters of sovereignty, environmental conservation, and security in the Arctic. Specifically, the establishment of the Polar Silk Road carries
implications for the region's balance of power (Peiqing & Huiwen, 2023). The environmental impact of China's Arctic endeavors is a primary concern. For example,
heightened shipping traffic along the Polar Silk Road could result in increased emissions of greenhouse gases and other contaminants, potentially intensifying
climate change and inflicting harm on the delicate Arctic ecosystem. Moreover, the exploitation of natural resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals, could contribute
the augmented
presence of non-Arctic states in the region could escalate tensions and
potential disputes over resources and territorial claims. This is especially pertinent in the context of the ongoing
to environmental degradation and a decrease in biodiversity (Manta, 2019). From a security standpoint,
debates over the Arctic Ocean's legal status and the rights to its resources (Viguier, 2021). In terms of investment, China's financial commitment in the Arctic has
been noteworthy. For instance, between 2012 and 2017, C
hina invested over $90 billion in the Arctic
region, with the majority of these investments allocated towards energy and mining projects
(China Regional Snapshot: Arctic 2022). Additionally, China has been an active
participant in Arctic governance , with Chinese entities maintaining observer status in
several essential Arctic organizations, such as the Arctic Council (Chen, 2023) Regarding the effect on the Arctic states, China's activities
have elicited varied responses. Some Arctic states, such as Russia and Iceland, have greeted Chinese investments and partnerships as opportunities for economic development. In contrast, other states, including the United States
and Canada, have voiced concerns about China's expanding influence in the region and the potential threats to their national security (Chen, 2023). In conclusion, China's Arctic strategy and the construction of the Polar Silk Road
are altering the dynamics in the Arctic region. While these developments usher in opportunities for economic growth and collaboration, they also present challenges concerning environmental protection and security. Therefore, it
is essential for the Arctic states and the international community to engage with China in constructive dialogue to ensure the sustainable and peaceful development of the Arctic. China's Arctic aspirations and Polar Silk Road
China's Arctic objectives are shaped by an amalgamation of economic, strategic, and environmental factors. Economically, the Arctic is conjectured to harbor substantial untapped resources such as oil, gas, and valuable minerals
(Biedermann, 2021). Strategically, the region offers a maritime shortcut—the Northern Sea Route—promising a significant reduction in transit time between East Asia and Europe. This strategic corridor forms the backbone of the
Polar Silk Road, a vital artery in China's expansive Belt and Road Initiative (Çevik & Durukan, 2020). In its 2018 White Paper, China delineates a multifaceted Arctic strategy that encapsulates its vision to actively shape Arctic
governance, develop Arctic shipping routes, and engage in scientific research and environmental conservation (China’s Arctic Policy 2018). The paper positions China not merely as a stakeholder but as a 'near-Arctic state,' a term
China adopts to justify its involvement in the region despite its geographical distance. This designation underscores China's intent to assert its presence and influence in Arctic affairs. External events have considerably impacted
China's Arctic interests, including the annexation of Crimea in Ukraine by Russia in 2014 and the subsequent incursion into Ukraine that commenced in February 2022. These actions provoked serious economic and financial
penalties against Russia by Western countries (Troush, 2022). Reacting to these circumstances, Russia has sought closer economic relations with China. Consequently, the Russian Arctic has metamorphosed into a fresh horizon for
Moscow's economic diplomacy with China. China's interests in energy and shipping dovetail with Russia's economic objectives in the Arctic, cultivating a fortified China-Russia alliance with notable consequences for the Euro-Arctic
region. The persistent conflict and the developing alliance between China and Russia infuse an additional layer of intricacy to the geopolitical panorama in the Arctic, further amplifying the competition between great powers in the
area (Sheng, 2022). China's Arctic plan has increasingly adopted a security aspect, reinforced by the military (Havnes & Seland, 2022). In 2015, five Chinese warships were observed navigating along the Alaskan coast, leading
observers to infer that China was broadening its maritime domain into the Arctic (LaGrone, 2015). This incited countries like Sweden, Norway, and Denmark to perceive China as a potential threat in the Arctic. In 2018, China
publicized its plan for a 'Polar Silk Road' as a segment of the Belt and Road Initiative, underscoring the strategic and economic values of the Arctic. China's BRI and PSR infrastructure objectives have prompted a shift in China's Arctic
interests towards the Barents Sea, given that 80% of trans-arctic shipping traverses Norwegian waters (China’s Arctic Policy 2018). Concurrently, the European Union's Arctic strategy is also gravitating towards the Barents region,
where it maintains a robust institutional presence, and where Denmark and Iceland's roles are comparatively diminished. The Barents region, rich in minerals—including rare earth elements—and marine protein, is not only the
rthermore,
most economically promising sub-region of the Arctic but also the most viable channel for trans-Arctic shipping, per the Northern Sea Route's current trajectory (Biedermann, 2021). Fu
China's Arctic pursuits are not only influenced by resource acquisition and strategic
positioning but also by the desire to establish itself as a key player in global
environmental governance . China's involvement in Arctic research initiatives, particularly in climate change studies, reflects its commitment to understanding and mitigating
environmental impacts in the region. This scientific engagement, though beneficial for global climate research, also serves China's interests in gaining a foothold in Arctic governance and policy-making (Wang, 2023). In
addition,
China's Arctic ambitions are closely linked to its broader geopolitical
strategy, where it seeks to balance its rise as a global power with the
existing international order . The Polar Silk Road is more than a route for commerce; it is a symbol of
China's growing global influence and its ability to project power in new and
strategic domains. However, this expansion has led to apprehension among traditional Arctic powers, who view China's growing presence in the region
as a potential challenge to their interests and sovereignty (Çevik & Durukan, 2020). As the Arctic becomes an arena of heightened geopolitical interest, the interplay
of these various factors – economic opportunities, strategic positioning, environmental stewardship, and global power dynamics – will continue to shape the
policies and actions of China and other key players in the region. The outcome of these interactions will have significant implications for the future of the Arctic,
highlighting the need for a balanced approach that considers the interests of all stakeholders in the region. Implications for Great Power Competition China's Arctic
endeavors and the creation of the Polar Silk Road hold significant implications for the trajectory of global power dynamics. The Arctic region is progressively
transforming into a venue for strategic rivalry, with major powers such as the United States, Russia, and the European Union keeping a vigilant eye on China's
activities in the region. The complex interplay between these nations and their Arctic strategies is multifaceted (Fravel et al., 2021). The factors driving China's
interest in the Arctic are diverse, encompassing the quest to secure novel shipping paths, access to natural resources, and a strategic position within the region. The
formation of the Polar Silk Road, a system of maritime routes through the Arctic, is a central element of China's Belt and Road Initiative, leading to heightened
observation from other major powers apprehensive of China's expanding influence in the region (Sharma, 2021).
Golden Dome not enough
Golden Dome not enough, specifically for hypersonics
Dorf 25 [Michael C. Dorf Michael C. Dorf is the Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law at Cornell
University and co-author, most recently, of Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights., "Golden Dome
is the Worst Star Wars Sequel Ever", 5/28/2025, Verdict, https://verdict.justia.com/2025/05/28/goldendome-is-the-worst-star-wars-sequel-ever]harliu
Why Missile Defense Still Won’t Work Trump chose to name his proposed missile defense Golden Dome as a shoutout to Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense, which
the U.S. helped fund and build. Iron Dome has been very successful in shooting down short-range missiles and rockets launched by Hezbollah from Lebanon and by
key
differences between the security threats Israel faces and those against
which Golden Dome would need to respond. Iron Dome is designed to protect population centers from short range
Hamas from Gaza. It also worked reasonably well to prevent mass casualties from a missile attack by Iran last year. But there are
conventional weapons. It focuses its firepower on rockets and missiles heading towards populated cities. It cannot and does not shoot down all incoming weapons.
As a consequence, Israel considers it a success when a rocket or missile lands in an open field. But while a conventional weapon that explodes in an open field a few
miles away from a city does little damage, the blast, heat, and radiation from the explosion of a 100-kiloton-or-larger nuclear weapon would extend for miles. Russia
A missile defense system that shot down 99 percent of them
would still leave the U.S. vulnerable to the slaughter of millions of civilians and
has thousands of such bombs.
the slow poisoning of tens or hundreds of millions more. Indeed, there is reason to believe that even the most sophisticated
missile defense system would be much more porous than that. Many Russian missiles contain multiple warheads, each independently targetable. They are, in
missile jargon, MIRVed (for Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle). To be effective, a missile defense system would
need to strike an incoming missile before it released the multiple warheads, which provides a
short lead time; targets need to be hit when they are still in space or the upper atmosphere. For that
reason, it has been proposed that Golden Dome would be satellite-based . But a
satellite-based system is itself vulnerable to attack
. An adversary that wished to strike the U.S. with
nuclear weapons would first disable the satellites. What about shooting down the warheads via a ground-based system after they separate from the main missile?
That would require the deployment of hundreds of batteries of defenses that could be overwhelmed by a large attack, including one that used decoys: Russia,
China, or another adversary could outfit its missiles with both warheads and dummies. A defense system would need to either distinguish between warheads and
.S. faces nuclear threats from submarinelaunched missiles and potential threats from low-flying hypersonic missiles. A shield
designed to hit ballistic missiles would provide little to no defense against
dummies or shoot down them all. Meanwhile, the U
bombs sent via these means.
Golden Dome thumps
Golden Dome thumps
Tucker 25 [Patrick Tucker, "AI, satellites, and Golden Dome shine in new House-passed defense
bill", 07/17/2025, Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/07/ai-satellites-and-goldendome-shine-new-house-passed-defense-bill/406787/]harliu
The bill also gives a big nod to Golden Dome , calling on the Defense Department to
construct a missile defense shield that could “deter, and defend [United States’] citizens
and critical infrastructure…against any foreign aerial attack on the homeland.” The change may seem small,
but it’s actually quite significant. The Pentagon already maintains about 44 missile interceptors in Alaska and California, which are capable of dealing with a missile
threat from a nation like Iran or North Korea, but not nearly enough to shoot down all the missiles that Russia or China could launch in the event of an attack.
“ Any” in the bill’s language provides a mandate to actually build the Golden Dome as
envisioned.
AT no miscalc
T
T: Arctic
CI: Arctic is the area of land governed by Arctic institutions. That
includes Alaska and Northern Canada
Svensson 17, [Eva Maria Svensson, Professor Emerita at Department of Law, School of Business,
Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Doctor of Laws, Master of Laws, "Gender Equality in the
Governance of the Arctic Region," Nordic Journal on Law and Society, vol. 01, no. 01-02, 2017, pp. 16-64
What is “the Arctic”?
The demarcation of the region denoted to as “the Arctic” remains contested by states with territorial
and economic interests in the circumpolar region, and by the various bodies that claim to govern all or
part of this area. The specific boundaries identified for the region depend on the purpose for which
researchers, states, or organisations define those boundaries. No matter which demarcation is used,
however, transnational governance of the region is made up of many overlapping governing
bodies .
The Arctic is the northern part of the northern hemisphere , and much of the region consists of the
large Arctic Ocean . The simplest demarcation of the Arctic is the Arctic Circle (drawn at roughly 66°
34’north). This geographical definition is shown as a blue line in Figure 2. Alternatively, the region can be defined by
reference to the tree line or by locations where average daily temperatures for the warmest month (July)
remain below 10 degrees Celsius. The red line in Figure 2 shows this way to define the area. None of these definitions include all
eight circumpolar countries that claim segments of the Arctic in territorial terms ; the latitudinal
definition exclude Iceland , while the tree line and temperature definition includes Iceland but
excludes Sweden and Finland .
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Administrative definitions of the Arctic are also unique , depending on the purposes for which they are
identified. For example, the Arctic Council has created boundary lines on the circumpolar map
relevant to its mandates . The various working groups have slightly different demarcations as
shown in Figures 3 to 5.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED] [FIGURE 4 OMITTED] [FIGURE 5 OMITTED] The Barents Euro-Arctic region encompasses
physiographic Arctic parts of Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden, and also include substantially more southern areas of these countries, see
Figure 6. [FIGURE 6 OMITTED] The European Union Northern dimension policy area is even more expansive, including the whole of
Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as the Russian Kola Peninsula and northwestern Russian areas, and
parts of Belarus, Poland, Denmark, and Germany. This demarcation enables the EU and Russia to address crossborder relations and sea routes
through the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean, see Figure 7. [FIGURE 7 OMITTED] Administrative regions of the Arctic recognised
specifically for purposes of Indigenous governance are also demarcated in various ways. No one administrative body considers itself to concern
all Indigenous peoples located in or near the Arctic Circle. The most inclusive demarcation is Sápmi, the cultural region traditionally inhabited by
the Sami people, see Figure 8. The geographical territory of Sápmi is not precisely defined and has changed over time. Lapland is sometimes
understood to be the same as Sápmi. The name Lapland refers to the land inhabited by the Sami people, but the name is used only in Finland
and Sweden for the provinces in the north. Sápmi, according to the Samis, is a nation without state or country borders but with a common
language, culture and history (Samiskt informationscentrum 2017). The area is comprised of the northern parts of Fennoscandia, and stretches
over the four countries of Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden (Kent 2014). Sápmi is also increasingly recognised as an administrative region,
and the Samis participate in public governance of the Arctic. This participation is not as a state, but as a specific group with legitimate interests
in the region entitled to membership as permanent participants of the Arctic Council. The Sami do not constitute the majority population in
Sápmi. One estimation is that the total population is 80,000, with Norway having the biggest Sami population (50,000 – 65,000), Russia the
smallest (2,000) and the other countries in between (Sweden 20,000 and Finland 8,000). [FIGURE 8 OMITTED]
As a consequence of the various demarcations, there are diverging data on the population of the Arctic
regions and countries. According to one report (Einarsson 2004, 27) the population was in 2003 approximately 4 million. According to the Arctic
Center, also using the circumpolar North as the boundary, the population is a little more than 13 million, of which 10 percent belong to one of
40 indigenous groups (Arctic Centre, 2015). Almost all of these people live as a minority within the borders of contemporary nation states.
There is considerable diversity among Indigenous peoples, their legal and constitutional status, and their roles in national or regional
governance. Only in Greenland are the Inuit in the majority, constituting 88 percent of the population. In Canada half of the population in the
northern regions is indigenous, in Alaska around 20 percent. In the Nordic countries and in north Russia indigenous peoples comprise only 4-5
percent of the population in the region (Arctic Portal 2015). Iceland (if included in the Arctic region) is the only Nordic country without
indigenous people.
The population in the Arctic grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s due to improved healthcare for indigenous people and a large influx of
immigrants resulting from the discovery of vast natural resources located in the region. Recently the population growth has slowed and,
between the years 2000– 2010, even declined in many parts of the Arctic (Nordregio 2017a). The net- migration pattern among females is
stronger than for men, more women than men out-migrate from the north, and the number of females per 100 males in age group 15-64 years
is fewer than 100 in strikingly large parts of the Arctic (Nordregio 2017b).
As discussed in both the Arctic Human Development Reports from 2004 and 2015 there is much to say
about defining the Arctic; the question of how the area is defined requires further research and
consideration (Einarsson 2004, 17; Nymand Larsen and Findahl 2015, 218). As shown, there are several demarcated
regions defined from a variety of aspects and interests . Here, the term Arctic is used for the area of
land, named as the Arctic region, which is subject to regional governance through various , partly
overlapping, bodies, forming the geopolitics of Arctic (Keskitalo 2004; Geopolitics in the High North 2017).
T: development
We meet—missile development requires mineral extraction
Wischer 23, [(Gregory, is the founder of a critical minerals consulting firm. He is also a
non-resident fellow at the Payne Institute for Public Policy at the Colorado School of Mines and
a non-resident fellow at the Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre at the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute. Previously, Mr. Wischer was executive vice president at an American
company building a nickel-cobalt metal refinery in the United States.) "As America’s Military
Rearms, It Needs Minerals—and Lots of Them, Modern War Institute at West Point -,
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/as-americas-military-rearms-it-needs-minerals-and-lots-of-them/,
11-29-2023, accessed 7-22-2025] UT
The US military is attempting to quickly replenish diminished weapons stocks in its largest production ramp-up in
decades. With an eye on its pacing threats and the risk of major conflict—with China, in particular—it is transitioning to modern
platforms, including attack submarines, heavy bombers, and air defense systems, as well as new approaches to electric
vehicles. Given its security assistance to Ukraine and recent military support to Israel, and conflict risks with China, it is
simultaneously rearming with legacy munitions—155-millimeter artillery, Javelin antitank missiles, and surface-to-air Stinger
missiles. Because of the quantity of minerals required to meet these dual demands, for replenishment of
munitions and construction of new platforms, both endeavors could be put at risk. Specifically, the mineral
supply chains that the US military depends on could face overwhelming demand and possible supply disruption. To
ensure a secure, resilient, and sufficient mineral supply for its platforms and munitions, the Department of
Defense should refine its approach to mineral stockpiling, its engagement with mineral mining and refining, and its implementation
of mineral recycling.
Development Includes military
NMFS 12, [(National Marine Fisheries Service...,) NOAA,
https://media.fisheries.noaa.gov/dammigration/ccc_coho_salmon_esu_recovery_plan_volume_iii_august_14_2012.pdf#page=2.58
, xx-xx-2012, accessed 7-22-2025] UT
This threat includes urban, industrial, suburban, recreational, or rural residential developments resulting in permanent alteration of
the natural environment and encroachment onto floodplains and into riparian areas. Development includes military
bases, factories, shopping centers, resorts, etc. This includes the physical and social (e.g., homeless encampments)
consequences of development such as increased impervious surfaces, increased runoff, changes to the natural hydrograph (e.g.,
flashy flows), household sewage, urban wastewater, increased sedimentation, industrial effluents, and garbage and other solid waste
Military operations require experimentation
Worley ND, [(D. Robert Worley, D. Robert Worley is a Fellow with the Johns Hopkins
University Washington Center for the Study of American Government. He previously held
adjunct faculty positions at George Washington University's Elliott School of International
Affairs and UCLA's School of Engineering and Applied Sciences) INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE
ANALYSES, "https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA375425.pdf, xx-xx-xxxx, accessed 7-22-2025]
UT
The Department of Defense recently established experimentation as a new military mission.1 What does
experimentation mean in a military sense? What does a proper military experiment most resemble, and what are its elements? The
physical, social, and life sciences each use words like experiment and hypothesis differently. Each
community of scientists considers its own definitions correct because these same definitions are useful for their purposes.
Military experimenters should borrow, adapt, and develop definitions that best support their purposes.
This paper examines various approaches in search of meanings that are useful for the purposes of peacetime military
experimentation. Scientists involved in the pursuit of new knowledge employ the methods of scientific
inquiry. The earliest phases of scientific inquiry are about exploration and discovery and often result in
plausible theories; the latter phases are about testing and verifying those theories. The field research method of scientific inquiry
employs the heuristically guided discovery experiment and the experimental research method is based on the hypothesistesting
verification experiment. Inventors and engineers, rather than pursuing new knowledge, apply available knowledge to develop
products for patent or for market. They often apply a trial-and-error procedure in a goal seeking invention experiment. Social
scientists and policy analysts use a fourth type of experiment, the performance measuring experiment, to monitor existing program
performance and predict new program performance to inform resource allocation decisions.
That’s exploration
Worley ND, [(D. Robert Worley, D. Robert Worley is a Fellow with the Johns Hopkins
University Washington Center for the Study of American Government. He previously held
adjunct faculty positions at George Washington University's Elliott School of International
Affairs and UCLA's School of Engineering and Applied Sciences) INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE
ANALYSES, "https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA375425.pdf, xx-xx-xxxx, accessed 7-22-2025]
UT
The fundamental value of a military experiment is that it provides the opportunity to observe military phenomena empirically—to
learn by doing without the attendant costs of war. Military experimentation is therefore a process of exploration
and discovery. Any experiment ought to permit the observation of military phenomena to support the higher purpose of keeping
tactics, techniques, and procedures abreast of technological advances—exploiting technology through methods of employment.
CI: In resolutional context, ‘its development’ is federal activity
involving the planning, construction, modification, or removal of
structures, AND the acquisition, utilization, or disposal of land or
water resources.
Harold Fong 84, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, nominated by
President Ronald Reagan, confirmed by the Senate, "Enos v. Marsh," 616 F. Supp. 32, United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii, 01/05/1984, https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/districtcourts/FSupp/616/32/1811974/
This court has reviewed the CZMA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and finds that the federal defendants' arguments are
dispositive on this issue. Under the regulations promulgated under the CZMA, a consistency determination is not required for
development projects initiated prior to the approval of the State's coastal zone management program:
A consistency determination will be required for ongoing Federal activities other than development projects ... initiated prior to
management program approval.... (emphasis supplied)
15 C.F.R. § 930.38(a). The term " development project" is defined as follows:
A Federal development project is a Federal activity involving the planning ,
construction , modification , or removal of public works , facilities , or other structures ,
and the acquisition , utilization , or disposal of land or water resources .
15 C.F.R. § 930.31(b).
There should be no question that the harbor project is a " development project " within the above
definition. The critical question is whether the project was "initiated" prior to the approval of the state's management program. The state's
Coastal Zone Management program was approved on September 19, 1978. The project, however, was planned and approved some two years
previously, although construction began only in 1982. Nevertheless, it would seem that the project was "initiated" prior to the approval of the
state's management program.
‘Development’ is the use of state economic resources for the purpose
of promoting economic growth, institutional capacities, and
individual well-being.
Cassandra Stimpson 20, Program Analyst at U.S. Department of State, MA in Intelligence, Security
and Strategic Studies from University of Glasgow, BA in Political Science from Pace University,
"Securitisation of Development: USAID's development assemblage," University of Glasgow, Dublin City
University, Charles University, 07/29/2020,
https://dspace.cuni.cz/bitstream/handle/20.500.11956/177225/120370661.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed
=y
Defining the security-development nexus
While the terminology of development securitisation has been adapted over time, debates of the subject are
not a new phenomenon, nor are disagreements amongst and between development and security experts on
definitions of “development”, “security”, and the “security-development nexus.” In practice, history, context, the
status of security and development create and change their outcomes for those involved in the
production and on receiving end of both concepts . Definitions of the term s development , security,
securitisation, militarisation, and the securitydevelopment nexus often blend and are used in lieu of one another. I will
attempt to outline basic tenants of such terms below, but as such terms are so value laden and context-dependent, wholly agreed upon
definitions do not exist (Spear and Paul D. Williams, 2012a). It is also important to note that these definitional and critical components leave out
the element of their political economy.
Many scholars, like Brown and Grävingholt (2016), use foreign aid as a proxy for development, to mean Official Development Assistance (ODA),
which is international development funding sourced from a donor country or multilateral institutions like the World Bank. Within ODA, there
is a distinction between aid and development , though their usage often overlaps. Aid is ‘categorized as external
finance for recovery and reconstruction to repair and rehabilitate infrastructure and services devastated
by naturally triggered disaster or armed conflict’ whereas development boosts ‘long-term investment and
growth’ and lessens poverty rates (Harborne, 2012, p. 39). The distinction here is namely between humanitarian and
emergency programming versus longer-term development work that aims to create sustainable
systems that reduce the need for external inputs over time . Aid and development in these terms can be thought to
represent the freedom-from-fear and freedom-from-want paradigms from human security respectively in a broad manner (as well as negative
peace and positive peace, though nuances arise in each division) (Hynek, 2010).
My usage of development refers to the work of USAID, which blends the work of aid and development in their structures. Especially due to the
rise of intra-state conflicts and “failed” and “fragile” States that constantly ebb between these paradigms (Morrow, 2012), it is not especially
useful to delineate between aid and development. The distinction has become less practical as international development bodies try to address
the so-called humanitarian-development nexus together within country programming (Redvers and Parker, 2020). A special Development
Dialogue issue (2012) points to the merger as well, finding that the security-development nexus no longer exists, as securitisation through
constant management of natural and manmade disasters and poverty have become institutionalised (Söderbaum and Sörensen, 2012). As
securitisation has blended the concepts of emergency and long-term development, I do not distinguish between them in my work.
I use the term development broadly to mean U.S. state funds that flow through NGOs and IDCs , as
well as other entities such as universities and research institutions . Development here then generally
means funding for interventions in the developing world , which is conducted by USAID as well as other agencies,
though USAID is the focus of this study. I will be using it to represent development wherein economic resources are
transferred from the West to the Global South , in a State or non-state capacity, with built in
parameters designed to promote economic growth , institutional capacities , and individual
wellbeing in terms of broad health, human rights, and education. The previous definition emerged roughly in the
wake of decolonisation (Söderbaum and Sörensen, 2012). It is thus distinct from definitions of development used in development economics
and economic literature put forth by the likes of Jeffery Sachs, Bill Easterly, and Esther Duflo, who examine the globalised political economy,
multilateral institutions, and their effects on the poor. These scholars link economic poverty to aggregate market, institution, and government
failures. While development aid contributes to this field, my use is more limited to intended interventions.
Similarly, while I will speak about how agencies and firms use results measurement and how these influence program implementation, I will not
attempt to engage with the development economics analysis in that realm. Measures on aid effectiveness are far from definitive, and outside
the scope of this study (see Roodman, 2007). More so, I will examine how security concerns alter the context within which certain results are
aligned with the goals and targets of specific development actors.
OVERLIMTING. Anything can have a military purpose.
Carolin Wuerzner 8, Former Editorial Assistant for the International Review of the Red Cross, Now
Working with UNHCR, "Mission Impossible? Bringing Charges for the Crime of Attacking Civilians or
Civilian Objects Before International Criminal Tribunals," International Review of the Red Cross,
12/01/2008, http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-wuerzner.pdf
In order to clarify better what constitutes a military objective, there have been attempts to draw up
non-exhaustive lists of objects that are generally recognized as military objectives. The ICRC, for instance, made
such an attempt in 1956.40 The defence counsel in the Strugar case also gave a list of examples of military objectives, namely buildings and
objects that provide administrative and logistical support for military objectives, as well as examples of objects that in certain circumstances
may constitute military objectives: transport systems for military supplies and transport centres where lines of communication converge.41 It
is, however, impossible to rely on a list in order to define the term ‘military objective’. Practically
everything can become a legitimate target, as long as two conditions are cumulatively met: the
object’s contribution to military action must be ‘effective’, and the military advantage of its destruction must be
‘definite’.42 Both criteria must be fulfilled ‘in the circumstances ruling at the time’.43 Furthermore, in this definition of the term ‘military’
the said advantage and contribution are strictly limited to what is purely military, thus excluding objects of political, economic and psychological
importance to the enemy.44
T: And/Or
It means ‘either’.
Dictionary [Dictionary.com; world's leading digital dictionary;
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/and-or]
(used to imply that either or both of the things mentioned may be affected or involved):
insurance covering fire and/or wind damage.
‘And/or’ is disjunctive---Supreme Court and common understanding.
Robbins ’18 [Ira P; 2018; Distinguished Professor of Law and Barnard T. Welsh Scholar at American
University Washington College of Law; Maryland Law Review, "And/Or" and the Proper Use of Legal
Language,” vol. 77]
Contrarily, many United States S upreme C ourt Justices have used and/or in their own opinions. The late Justice Antonin
Scalia, who is wide- ly considered to be one of the best and most expressive writers in the Court’s history,15 wrote in a qui tam case that “the
relator’s bounty is simp- ly the fee he receives . . . for filing and/or prosecuting a successful action on behalf of the Government.”16 Other
Justices who have used the term include Justice O’Connor,17 Justice Sotomayor,18 Justice Breyer,19 and Justice
Alito.20 Moreover, as an institution, the Supreme Court routinely uses and/or in denying “ writ[s] of
mandamus and/or prohibition.”21
While grammarians, scholars, and judges typically despise and/or, the problems associated with it are often wrongly attributed to the term
itself. Many criticisms that and/or is imprecise or ambiguous ignore that the term has a definite meaning: it is “a formula denoting
the items joined by it can be taken either together or as alternatives”22—i.e., “ A or B, or both .”23 Critics urge those wanting to use
and/or to simply write out its meaning for the sake of clarity. Given the term’s definite meaning, however, proper use of and/or
creates neither ambiguity nor confusion . Of course, and/or critics seem to overlook that any term can be ambiguous when
used incorrectly. In short, the term’s potential for confusion has been severely overstated— drafters should seek to incorporate it where
appropriate.
T—AT: minerals
Excludes extraction
SCC 14, [(Straffordshire County Council, upper-tier county governance) "Topics,
https://staffordshire.moderngov.co.uk/documents/s54255/Planning%20Cttee%2002%2010%2
02014%20Saredon%20Quarry%20Appdx%202.pdf, 04-03-2014, accessed 7-22-2025] UT
As the proposed development is not mineral extraction it is necessary to demonstrate that there are
very special circumstances to accept this development in this Green Belt location. It is considered that
the following very special circumstances exist in this case:
DA
Strategic Stability
Strat Stab—AT: U/Q
Strat Stab low now
Strat Stab doesn’t assume ambitions—Arms control fails
Trachtenberg 25, [(David J.,) "Why Arms Control Must Fail, RealClearDefense,
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/06/13/why_arms_control_must_fail_111633
8.html, 6-12-2025, accessed 7-21-2025] UT
The central problem with this belief is that there is a growing body of evidence supporting the proposition that U.S.
adversaries do not share such goals and objectives. In simple terms, both China and Russia—which pose
the greatest threat to U.S. security—are not interested in “stability” as the United States defines it. Rather, their goal
is to work against a stability that preserves the status quo. These opposing objectives are what
make meaningful arms control impossible.
Different Worldviews, Irreconcilable Differences
The United States is a status quo power. The focus of U.S. foreign policy is on maintaining or restoring stability in the international
environment. Why? Because global instability heightens the risk of upheaval and conflict, which can have catastrophic results with
decidedly negative consequences for U.S. global interests. The view that arms control is the best way to ensure stability among rival
powers has been reflected over the years in numerous policy and strategy documents. Most recently, for example, as the Biden
Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) stated, “The United States will pursue a comprehensive and balanced
approach that places a renewed emphasis on arms control, non-proliferation, and risk reduction to strengthen stability….”[1]
Indeed, arms control is described as a way to “enhance strategic stability with the PRC [People’s Republic of China] and Russia…”
and as offering “the most effective, durable, and responsible path to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy and to
prevent their use.”[2] Yet the 2022 NPR also acknowledged that U.S. and Russian “priorities are not identical, underscoring the
importance of dialogue, when conditions permit, to address each side’s differing goals and perceptions of military systems that affect
strategic stability.”[3] Indeed, the stability that the United States seeks to “strengthen” and “enhance”
is one that works to resolve conflicts via international law and institutions vice the use of military force—characteristics of a world
order created and nurtured by the United States after World War II. This is clearly not the kind of stability America’s
adversaries have in mind or wish to cement in practice.
Indeed, America’s primary rivals, China and Russia, believe the time has come to change the existing
world order in a way that displaces the United States as the predominant global power—militarily,
economically, and politically. They seek a world order more accommodating to their authoritarian worldviews and
interests. And their expanding military cooperation reflects a belief that they will more likely succeed by working
together rather than separately. In the contemporary political environment, the phrase, “The whole is greater than the sum of its
parts,” often attributed to Aristotle,[4] can be interpreted as meaning that Beijing and Moscow can accomplish more in support of
their common purpose through collaborative and coordinated actions than by acting separately.
The United States now must confront not one, but two, major nuclear powers. This is an unprecedented development that greatly
complicates deterrence, as what may deter one party may be insufficient to deter the other, and the risks of opportunistic aggression
may grow.[5] In addition, U.S. allies may feel less secure as the United States tries to balance the demands of deterring both powers
simultaneously while assuring allies of the U.S. commitment to their own security.
The Dangers of Wishful Thinking
Unfortunately, the United States has yet to come to grips with how best to address deterrence in a world of two nuclear peers. This
has led to calls by some to advance arms control efforts as if limitations on armaments will help solve the deterrence problem by
codifying a situation of strategic stability. For example, the chief American negotiator for the New START Treaty has argued that the
United States should conduct “two parallel negotiations” with Russia and China and “exercise mutual restraint in order to avoid a
nuclear arms race—in other words, arms control.”[6] Another former arms control negotiator opined, “Looking to the expiration of
New START, the United States could pursue an interim regime of mutual restraint with Russia…. Decades of nuclear arms control
have improved strategic stability and reduced the risk of nuclear conflict. Continued mutual restraint might help sustain these gains
if risks can be managed.”[7]
Others contend that resuming arms control negotiations with Russia is imperative, noting that divisive issues like Ukraine “should
not delay prompt attention by the United States and Russia to a restart of the dialogue on a post-New START agreement…. Ending
or pausing their arms control dialogue will contribute to unnecessary force building and more uncertainty about the qualities of their
weapons inventories.”[8]
The Arms Control Association has argued, “Today, nuclear arms control and disarmament are more important than ever. Now is the
time to call on your Representative and Senators to show there is bipartisan support for strong U.S. leadership for nuclear arms
control.”[9] Last year, a resolution introduced in the House of Representatives called on the Biden Administration “to pursue
nuclear arms control and risk reduction dialogue with the Russian Federation to maintain strategic stability.”[10] An identical
resolution was introduced in the Senate several days later.[11] However, the notion that the path to stability lies through arms
control is illusory, as the parties differ in what they seek to accomplish and how they see arms control as a tool to accomplish it.
This advocacy wrongly assumes a commonality of interests and objectives among Washington,
Moscow and Beijing. For example, suggesting that arms control now will reverse China’s nuclear
ambitions ignores the reality that Beijing’s nuclear buildup underpins its desire to expand its
power and influence at America’s expense—a goal that China is unlikely to abandon by agreeing to
negotiate arms limitations in the interest of “stability.” Similarly, decades of Soviet/Russian arms control
cheating, coupled with the massive buildup of Russian nuclear forces and the plethora of nuclear threats expressed by Russian
officials, show that Moscow has no interest in “mutual restraint.”
There is no reason to believe China or Moscow have any interest in arms control to facilitate the U.S. definition of “stability.” Rather,
they seek to upset the existing world order with assertive behavior and extensive military and nuclear capabilities—the antithesis of
stability. Wishful thinking that they share U.S. goals is more likely to encourage further delays in
the necessary and long-overdue U.S. strategic modernization program, further undermining the
efficacy and credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, including the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. At a time when nuclear
deterrence is under significant stress, this would be dangerous folly.
Strats Stab—Golden Dome
Golden Dome thumps
Karako and Williams 25 [(Tom Karako, Director, Missile Defense Project and Senior
Fellow, Defense and Security Department, Heather Williams Director, Project on Nuclear Issues
and Senior Fellow, Defense) "America's 'Golden Dome' Explained, CSIS,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-golden-dome-explained, 6-4-2025, accessed 7-212025] UT
Dr. Williams: President Trump announced an ambitious timeline for the completion of the
initiative, stating that Golden Dome would be fully operational before the end of his term in
2029. The total projected cost of the initiative is estimated to be $75 billion. An initial $25
billion down payment for the initiative was included in the reconciliation bill. U.S. Space Force
General Michael Guetlein was tapped to lead the Golden Dome efforts and will serve as the
direct report program manager. The United States nuclear armed adversaries – Russia, China
and North Korea – have all made comments warning that the Golden Dome would disrupt
strategic stability and might spark a dangerous arms race.
What can the administration execute on this ambitious timeline? What are the ingredients for
success and potential roadblocks ahead? I’m Heather Williams, director of the Project on
Nuclear Issues here at CSIS. And here to unpack these questions I am joined today by Tom
Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project; and Kari Bingen, director of the Aerospace
Security Project. We will take audience questions, so please submit those via the homepage.
So, Tom, let’s start at the very beginning here. There’s still a lot that we don’t know. The biggest
question that I’m hearing, I suspect you are also hearing, is the feasibility question here. The
reconciliation bill earmarks $25 billion for Golden Dome. Trump expects it to cost 175 billion
(dollars) over approximately three years. So how feasible do you think this is on that three-year
timeline, taking into account technical constraints but also political ones, and some of the
budgetary pressures?
Tom Karako: Yeah. So a couple of things. Thanks, Heather.
I think, first of all, let me just start with the threat. We saw in the past week a very impressive
intelligence operation and a UAV attack by Ukraine, Operation Spider Web, hitting a bunch of
Russian bombers. Of course, couldn’t happen to a nicer set of folks, but it really showed – and I
think it sparked some imagination for what innovative and highly proliferated aerial attack is
capable of. And it affects strategic stability and lots of other things. I’ll say as well that the
Defense Intelligence Agency put out an infographic, which we can pull up here real quick,
identifying some of the threat types and the numbers which – the numbers, by the way, were
pretty interesting to have up – of fractional orbital bombardment, for instance. And they put
some numbers down there in terms of how many they expected China and Russia to have by, I
think, 2035.
And you have basically the other categories – your SLBMs, your ICBMs, your long-range cruise
missiles. And they also have kind of the maneuvering ballistic missiles or aeroballistic missiles.
So, look, it’s the whole spectrum, right? And the executive order also talked about advanced
aerial threats. So think sophisticated UAVs, although, again, a huge attack, the biggest singleday attack by Russia against Ukraine, immediately preceded the Ukrainian success. I think it
was 450-some Shaheds, which those are the V-1s of today, they’re the buzz bombs of today.
In terms of the reconciliation bill, look, you put it well, Heather, as a $25 billion down payment.
I like to say that reconciliation is a Catholic sacrament designed to blot out past sins. And in this
case, that down payment is to blot out the years of inattention to this. We’ve known these threats
were coming. We’ve known that we needed to do these kinds of things. And so in some respects
the Golden Dome Initiative, put aside the name, so much of this has been exactly what multiple
NDAAs have called for, multiple defense strategy – National Defense Strategy commissions have
called for in terms of a high level, four-star, undersecretary person with substantial authority to
go after this, and to pull together integration.
I mean, in some respects the dog caught the car here and now we have to figure out how to
execute. And so the question about feasibility and timelines, there will be something, I predict,
in 12 months from now. I think there will be something in three years. It will not be a full
operational capability of all the things. The president also said that it will come in phases. But
they will probably snap the chalk line in three years and have some set of capability to come
after that. So that’s good. I think it’s, again, long overdue. But I think there’s a whole lot of
integration efforts and tying things together, which we can get to in just a bit, that actually
probably can be done on a faster timeline than folks might expect.
Dr. Williams: I think you also hit on a really important theme. You used the phrase, “years of
inattention,” which I think applies across – certainly applies on the nuclear enterprise. But I
think for all of our programs there have been years if not decades of inattention. And so I would
like us at some point to come back to that conversation about the attention might be there, is the
political will there to follow through on a lot of these things? Because I think that’s going to be
really crucial for this.
But, Kari, I really wanted to turn to you and get your thoughts on the feasibility side. So same
question, but particularly on the space component to all this. Space-based sensors are likely to
play a huge role in the Golden Dome architecture. So can you give us an evaluation on the
current status of space-based sensors and how do you think these existing capabilities might
integrate with that architecture?
Kari A. Bingen: Yeah. Sure, Heather. Thanks, and great to be back here with this fantastic group
of colleagues.
You mentioned years of inattention. I’d first say, you know, you had both the Congress – both
the House and the Senate and the reconciliation markups as well as – you know, Secretary of
Defense Hegseth both say, you know, hey, we’re looking to make a generational investment in
defense.
So I think you’re absolutely right about that surge, but it needs to have follow through and,
hopefully, we’ll get back to that. But feasibility – you know, I want to hit technology, cost, and
time, and I think we need to manage expectations here for what will transpire over the next few
years.
Technology, you know, in general, I think, largely, this is not a science problem. This is an
engineering and an integration challenge ahead of the department. So I think, generally, these
pieces are feasible but, you know, you mentioned, there’s still a lot we don’t know. There’s still a
lot we don’t know.
We need to see the details of the architecture. There needs to be a strategy. We need to have a
better understanding of what’s going to be prioritized over what time period and at what cost.
Tom mentioned Operation Spider Web – phenomenal success by the Ukrainians, and you said it
exactly right both from an intelligence placement and access perspective as well as just the
capability and the creativity.
But think about the threat of drones over military bases. We’ve already seen that happen in the
U.S. at Vandenberg Space Force Base, Langley Air Force Base. The solutions to address that
challenge in base defense are very different than the technical solutions to protect us against
incoming ballistic or cruise missiles. So there will have to be a prioritization discussion.
Time – I think three years is really ambitious. But, you know, I think the leadership – they’re
going to have decisions to make, right? So if the objective is fielding more, I’ll say, robust
homeland defense against, like, ballistic missiles or, you know, general missiles you’re, largely,
going to build on the existing systems that you have. Ground-based midcourse defense in Alaska
and California, Aegis. You’ll accelerate sensors and radars that are already in the pipeline, some
of your next-generation kill vehicles.
Space – you’ll probably look to field or expand upon your space sensor network. I think spacebased interceptors in three years’ time you’re probably looking at some limited –
Dr. Karako: Demonstrations.
Ms. Bingen: Demonstrations. Exactly. And I think the key to all of this is going to be integration,
which I really want to dive into later.
And then just lastly here I’ll say the outset cost. You know, it’s really hard to assess cost. I’d have
a hard time saying 25 billion (dollars) this year down payment about right because, again, we
don’t know the details. We don’t know the priorities. A hundred and seventy-five billion
(dollars), I don’t know. The 500 billion (dollars) that we saw at CBO I really question that
because I don’t know what architecture they used to cost that out.
So there’s just a lot here that we don’t know, which makes a lot of these cost numbers hard to
evaluate.
Dr. Williams: And if I can just weigh in a little bit on the feasibility thing from the nuclear
perspective. My concern – I think we did in our earlier discussion when it was then Iron Dome
and now it’s, obviously, been upgraded.
But one of my concerns has been this major investment. That doesn’t – you know, that’s going to
have to come from something. My concern is how are these investments going to be spread out,
really, across all of the strategic forces that we think about. There’s a huge bill coming up for
nuclear modernization and, I mean, you want to talk about years of inattention and kicking the
can down the road, and those investments just can’t be delayed anymore.
And so if you see that huge investment coming along, along with Golden Dome and the spacebased technology that’s going to go with it, where is all that money going to come from? And I
just hope that it doesn’t – that the Golden Dome investments don’t come at the expense of
something like nuclear modernization.
But I think Kari is making a really important point, which is that there are really big decisions
and priorities that have to be made. There has to be a strategy behind this. I also just haven’t
seen that yet..
Ms. Bingen: Well, and we – I think we talked about this maybe last time. As with reconciliation
it is a generational investment in defense but it’s a onetime injection or boost. I think, Tom, you
said this last time.
So what I’d really like to see when the budget comes – the budget details come out in a few
weeks is what is that FYDP, what is that future year projection to see all of these investments
happening now – are they being sustained in the out years.
Dr. Karako: Unfortunately, we’re not going to see those FYDP numbers for, basically, until this
time next year when FY ’27 comes out. But you’re exactly right. I’m not counting those chickens
until they’re actually in the ’27 budget, PB.
Dr. Williams: So we will come back to both Ukraine and some of these budget questions about
what comes next. But one really interesting development I thought from President Trump’s
announcement and since then has been the role of Canada potentially in Golden Dome – and
not just Canada, but some of our other allies and partners. Canada has, obviously, been the most
vocal in responding to President Trump’s announcement. Most of the other allies have been a
little bit quiet. But the initial announcement about Iron Dome did talk about working with allies
and partners. From conversations I was having, that seemed to be really well received as an
indication that the administration does want to work with them on things like strategic forces,
missile defense, potentially wider deterrence issues.
So, Tom, can you just say a little bit about what might be the role of allies, partners, particularly
our friends to the north, but then also industry? Like, industry is going to have to be a huge part
of this as well.
Dr. Karako: Yeah. So on the Canada front, I would say, broadly speaking, remember, the EO has
an allied and theater missile defense review. So presumably OSD Policy is going to be cranking
on that here soon. There’s a lot of potential for, I would say, mini-Golden Domes, you know,
everywhere. The interests of this are already manifest in, say, Germany and NATO’s or NATO
members’ European Sky Shield Initiative, right. The Japanese and the Australians and now the
Brits with the Strategic Defense Review, they say up to 1 billion pounds more for air and missile
defense. That just came out – that just came out this week.
I’ll say, in terms of the execution of this, connecting it to the feasibility thing, about a week ago
the SecDef reportedly signed the memo basically granting the DRPM the sort of – I’ve heard it
described as godlike acquisition authorities. Outside JCIDS, you know, the DR and DRPM
stands for “direct report.” It’s a direct report to the DepSec, which is good.
That high-level interest is going to be absolutely critical. This is only the fourth time in history
that missile defense has really gotten the presidential attention. So that’s going to be really
important. And I think that’s important because it’s about the contracting. It’s about the
acquisition authority to no-kidding get stuff on contract and move out. So it’s not the business as
usual.
But nevertheless, I think – and this is kind of channeling some of what you were saying, Kari – I
don’t expect this to be pie-in-the-sky, tilting-at-windmills kind of capability. I expect it to be
actually more meat and potatoes, the kind of architectural elements and plans that we’ve
basically had on the shelf and are now being pulled off. Again, the dog caught the car and now
we have to go do it.
And that’s the long-winded way to get to what’s Canada involved here. It’s because Canada is
part of NORAD. And the plan on paper for some time has been, hey, we need domain awareness.
We need lots and lots of especially OTHRs, over-the-horizon radars. Canada has already
announced that they’re going to be doing that. We are in the process of doing that. That’s what
NORAD and NORTHCOM want and need to see those – back to the DIA graphic, to see those
cruise missiles coming in from distance so you can actually do something about it.
So domain awareness – you know, whether they put something over Ottawa, look, that’s up to
them in terms of intercept capability. But lots and lots of sensors and the integration, yes, of
those sensors into some kind of battle-management layer. We’re not going to reinvent the tons
and tons of new systems – the Aegis, the GMD, the THAAD, the Patriot/IBCS. Those are
probably going to be the interceptor building blocks. But there’s going to need to be a battlemanagement layer over top of all that, with lots of lightning bolts of connectivity between all the
different inputs. And that’s where the – you know, the software and the tech-bro innovation, I
predict, in the near term has some potential to deliver results.
Dr. Williams: You know, Kari, I know you’ve been doing a lot of thinking on the integration side
of things. Did you want to weigh in on that piece of it as well?
Ms. Bingen: I completely agree with Tom. For me, you have all of these building blocks already.
And many of them are fielded. The linchpin in Golden Dome is going to be that integration of all
of these pieces and organizations. It will be automation as well as, you know, if you think about
all these different radars that Tom mentioned – land based; dozens to hundreds of satellite
sensors doing detection of missile launches, tracking those missiles in flight – in real-time
machine speed, we’ll have to figure out, how do you –how does one satellite who’s tracking pass
off that track to another satellite to another satellite to an interceptor? Which interceptor is
optimally placed? Is it a space-based interceptor? Is it a ground-based interceptor to take the
shot? How many do you have take the shot? If that misses, do you have another interceptor
ready to go to take the next shot? So it’s this massive automation optimization problem as well.
So this is – it’s not just hardware. To Tom’s point, it’s absolutely software. And, you know, I
think of this – this is – you know, everything we talk about in DOD right now in innovation, this
is an innovation and an integration problem at massive scale, but within a traditional defense
ecosystem.
So, I mean, I’ll tell you, I feel for General Guetlein because the – I mean, the headwinds of
traditional defense acquisition, requirements, culture, you know, how do you get all of these
services to each have a piece of the pie, how do you get them to work together, how do you get
the intelligence community to bring their assets to bear. You know, you’re working crossdomains. You’re working across all these different companies that probably want to own their –
(laughs) – data rights and whatnot. So how do you get all these folks to play together so, you
know, if you’re going to have any chance of success?
I’m noodling on a commentary here and I haven’t quite put it together, so I’ll run it by you. But
you know, in many respects it is you have to empower that program manager. And it’s both
empowering him to have – you know, be able to use all acquisition authorities that are on the
table – OTAs, you know, some of these other software ones – but at the same time be able to
waive those to be able to go fast and deliver: fail, learn, adapt. Like, that’s the only way we’re
going to get something fielded – integrated and fielded in a three-year window.
Dr. Williams: Mmm hmm.
Dr. Karako: Yeah, I’ll go – yea, verily, I’ll go even further. I’m old enough to remember the
phrase “integrated deterrence” – (laughter) – which was about whole-of-governmentism and
military and nonmilitary means.
Dr. Williams: I thought that was just from, like, two years ago. (Laughter.)
Dr. Karako: Yes indeed. But the concept is not especially new, but it also called for the
nonmilitary side of things. And what all am I talking about here? We put out a report on
national homeland air and cruise missile defense a couple years ago called “North America Is a
Region, Too,” and we pointed out that there’s tons of sensors, tons of inputs: FAA radars,
weather radars.
Here’s where the interesting big data and AI automation – so much of the inputs on that are just
laying fallow. It’s data being left on the cutting-room floor. So for wide-area surveillance of the
continent, we’re not going to put a new radar on every corner necessarily, but we have lots of
stuff that’s already there that actually could be stitched together. So that’s where the innovation
of and the urgency behind the DIRCM’s role is. Go listen to what NORAD/NORTHCOM has
been saying on this for years and start there. Start with the AOAs and the plans that have
already kind of been thought about. We don’t have to do everything from scratch. This is more
tractable than I think people might realize.
Ms. Bingen: That’s a – that’s a great point too. I’m now channeling my time at the Pentagon,
where I was fortunate to have this team called Project Maven within my organization that were
really pathfinding on bringing AI into the department to solve our problems. But what I really
liked about what the team did, it was in their approach. It was we’re going to do sprints. They
did six-month sprints. They had a wide set of competitors. So you may start with eight, 12
competitors. You give them six months, and then you have a bake-off. (Laughter.) You know,
don’t just bring me your PowerPoint; bring me your prototype. We’re going to test it. And then
the ones that meet that, you know, part of the relay, you go on.
And so, you know, space-based interceptors, you know, some of these other kill vehicles, it’ll be
different, but infusing that same philosophy and approach of sprint, wide competitors that
account for both maybe the traditional as well as some of these newer software and tech
companies, doing bake-offs and focusing on fielding and output, like, that, I think, is going to be,
you know, the recipe to success.
Dr. Williams: A strategic bake-off. I really – I really like it. The Kari Bingen special. (Laughter.)
Sticking with the theme of integration and innovation, I did want to come back to Ukraine and
have a question for both of you, and then we’ll turn to some questions that are coming – some
great questions coming in from the chat. And it’s the idea of not just integrating on our end
hardware/software, but also integrating to address a very diverse range of threats. And if we
think about what happened in Ukraine, there’s been some reporting on this, is that should raise
– what happened in Ukraine, and the drone attacks there on Russian nuclear-capable bombers,
should raise concerns about the security and vulnerability potentially of U.S. strategic forces as
well. If it can happen there, could something similar happen here?
And there was a really great quote from the Air Force chief of staff that I just want to read out
and get your reactions to. He had said, “I think the fascinating thing,” – this was in response to a
question about the Ukrainian drone attack. “I think the fascinating thing will be to what extent
in the future the Golden Dome will integrate not only systems to counter the larger ballistic,
cruise, hypersonic missiles, but also some of these closer in, more effective ones.” And so, Tom,
maybe I’ll start with you, and then turn to Kari, and what you think we – should be our lessons
learned from what just happened in Ukraine. What does it mean for U.S. strategic forces? Can
Golden Dome protect us against those in the future?
Dr. Karako: Well, first of all, just on the UAV thing, I mean, we’ve been – this is sort of an I told
you so moment. And go look at the opening scene of the 2019 movie “Angel Has Fallen,” where
essentially that scenario is depicted. It’s probably the best UAS threat kind of visualization. And,
you know, that’s going to happen. And, you know what? It is going to come here. It’s just a
matter of time. All these Chinese shipping ships that are on our coast at any given time, all the
shipping containers – no. That is coming. And it’s – perhaps we’re just lucky that it hasn’t
happened yet. And that’s why we’re always talking about how counter-UAS is just the next
chapter of air defense. It’s why counter-UAS was built into the 2022 Missile Defense Review,
because it is adjacent. Again, Shaheds are just the V-1s, poor man’s cruise missile, of today.
Nevertheless, as important as that is – and Project Replicator 2.0, all good to focus on that, and
there’s money in the reconciliation bill for that. That’s all good. As I understand it, the Golden
Dome, as an accounting function, is mostly focused on some higher-end threats. Again, as the
DIA graphic, what’s the problem they’re trying to solve? It’s the kind of the cruise missile and up
thing. And that’s why, at least in the reconciliation, over half of it goes to space. It’s really hard
to do counter-UAS from space. And so I think that the quote there is absolutely correct, that the
capabilities-based approach and the technology that’s going to be ingested here will have
offshoots and spin offs, just as STI had tons of technological spin offs over the years, that will be
applicable to counter-UAS and everything else. Because, yeah, I worry about an adversary
putting little easter eggs on every ICBM silo. I mean, the – it gets a little spooky when you start
thinking about the potential for these delivery systems affecting our bombers, our subs and
pens, and all that kind of stuff.
Dr. Williams: Sure.
Kari, your thoughts on this?
Ms. Bingen: Three thoughts on that. When David is up against Goliath, you have to be
imaginative and creative. And I think that’s what we saw here with, you know, they’ll say the
little that you have. So, again, I mean, kudos to Ukrainians for pulling this off.
Second, channeling my old intelligence days, you know, we’ve seen in reporting that this was a
year and a half in the making. So something like this just doesn’t happen overnight. There is a
tremendous amount of planning, and relationship building, and whatnot that has to go into –
you know, scouting the landscape, maintaining access, trying this out, red teaming yourself. You
know, in some respects this is somewhat – you know, what the Ukrainians have done is
somewhat similar to also what the Israelis did with the pagers against Hezbollah. And that was
also probably years, you know, in the making. And then you have it available at the time and
place of your choosing.
The third piece is, you know, close to home here. I think we’re going to have to have a serious
conversation on what base defense looks like going into the future. Who does it? The authorities
that base commanders will have. I mean, they do have self-defense capabilities today, but do you
think more broadly than that? And then when we think about capabilities, it’s detection and
tracking. So radars. And there’s a spectrum of implication that I’ll turn to Tom on, but, you
know, you have to be able to detect and track those threats incoming. And you have to be able to
take action. So is that kinetic action? Electronic warfare, that we’re seeing in spades on the
Ukrainian battlefield and Israel? Is it laser weapons to take down those drones? And no matter
what capability you invest in, you’re going to have to be able to test it. So we need to be able to
have the test ranges to actually go off and do this. And there are spectrum implications in all of
that too, that Tom knows very well.
Dr. Williams: We have some really great questions coming in. So I do want to turn to those. I
can already see we’re not going to get to nearly all of these. So I apologize in advance. But there’s
two in particular here that I want to flag, because you both have picked up on these a bit.
The first one I think I’m going to direct to Tom. This comes from Jason Suslavich at Applied
Intuition. And the question is: The modern battlefield will be defined by masses of both complex
and inexpensive systems paired with rapidly upgradable autonomous software. Our missile
defense systems must effectively and efficiently reflect this reality. What role do you believe
autonomy can and should play with Golden Dome?
I’m going to read out the second one because I have a feeling you might want to weigh in on this
one as well, time permitting. This one comes from Matt McLaughlin at GAO. Do you think there
is potential for other high-level programs to see Golden Dome as a precedent for high-interest
items obtaining alternate procurement authorities? Shipbuilding comes to mind as a topic that’s
also had a recent executive order. And so, Kari, I might ask you to take that one. But I want to
put them both out there because, I think, particularly because you both have experience on the
Hill and working on budgets, and obviously on the DOD side, you might want to weigh in. But,
Tom, autonomy. Discuss.
Dr. Karako: Yeah. So I think autonomy, machine learning, automation generally, is going to be –
is super important for things like really quick threat classification. When a UAV pops up over
the horizon, and it has a different configuration than what we’ve seen and what is in our threat
library, we’ve got to figure that out. Is it friend or foe? That’s one thing. Likewise, AI/ML for
looking at a threat cloud that may be spread out over miles in space and figuring out what’s the
good – what’s the good objects and what’s the bad objects to go to shoot. But also – and this – I
think we kind of talked about this already, which is that the autonomy to be able to ingest
massive amounts of data and use that big data very quickly to figure out that, hey, this swarm of
things that are being picked up by the OTH radars, doesn’t really move in the way that a Cessna
or a 747 would move, and kind of that tipping and queuing from this broad surveillance.
And then I’ll just say, in terms of the acquisition authorities, I certainly hope so. You know, the
PPBE Commission report that was from a couple years ago basically said our acquisition system
is broken. It can’t be fixed. And so over the past several years we’ve seen workarounds, this kind
of surge of workarounds. OTAs, everybody likes that, but other kinds of things. And, again, by
putting this out of the traditional acquisition system it’s an acknowledgement that the
traditional acquisition system ain’t working. And that I certainly hope that for shipbuilding and
for other things – we’ll know that we’re serious and that we’re acting as if a potential war with
China is coming when you see more of these things, whether it be for nuclear shipbuilding or
what have you.
Dr. Williams: Kari, what do you think? Alternate procurement authorities?
Ms. Bingen: Well, you know, it’s a really great question. And I’m thinking about all of my time
on the Hill dealing with this, and then being in the department myself. You know, if there’s
something that is that high of a priority to the secretary, to the administration, they’ll pluck it
out of the services. They’ll pluck it out of individual agencies. And you’ve seen that throughout
time. Missile Defense Agency was created because you didn’t have the services focused on
missile defense, and it was one of President Bush’s top priorities in 2002. Most recently, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Kath Hicks, she was the person that quarterbacked the JADC2, the Joint
All Domain Command and Control initiative, because it really – it was an integration challenge
as well.
But you’re integrating across weapon systems in each of the services. And they’re going to focus
on their own thing. You’re integrating across different agencies, across different domains – land,
air, sea, space. The first point of integration in the department, I’m sad to say, is the deputy
secretary of defense. (Laughter.) So there’s – you’re right. I mean, we’ve got to figure out ways to
fix this. But at the same point in time, if it’s a high priority and it cuts across all of these
different, I’ll say, equities and organizations, you do kind of need that central leadership to get it
done.
Golden Dome thumps. Russia didn't take it seriously
De Guzman 25 [Chad De Guzman is a reporter at TIME, based in the Singapore bureau. He covers
the Asia-Pacific region and global overnight news., "China, North Korea, and Russia’s Response to
Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’ Proposal", 05/08/2025, TIME, https://time.com/7288728/golden-dome-trumpnorth-korea-russia-china-response-space-militarization/]harliu
But after Trump spoke further about his plans for the Golden Dome at the Oval Office last week,
the Kremlin offered a more muted response . Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov told local
media that the project was “a sovereign matter ” for the U.S., adding: “ If the United States
believes there is a missile threat, then of course it will develop a missile defense system .”
Peskov also said Russia will not yet assess the threat to nuclear parity with the U.S . as details of
the project remained scant. Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said that while Moscow needs to take the Golden Dome project seriously, “ Russian
President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that our strategic systems are equipped so that
we can reliably break through any air defense systems , including layered ones.” Many of Russia’s space
programs are limited by international sanctions, but its missile arsenal still poses a notable air attack threat. Information from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
shows that by 2035 Russia may have 1,000 boosted hypersonic weapons, some 5,000 land attack cruise missiles, and around 400 ICBMs. A congressional report in
May also outlined the ability of Russia’s missiles to carry nuclear warheads and how it has used the threat of a nuclear attack to prevent any sort of international
intervention in its occupation of Ukraine.
Strategic Stab---AT: Russia + China lashout
Not a serious threat to Russia and China, it’s the perception that
deters them. Real defense deters Noko and Iran
Herlihy 24, [(Joseph,) "The Case for U.S. Homeland Ballistic Missile Defense Against North Korea,
Georgetown Security Studies Review, https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2024/05/02/thecase-for-u-s-homeland-ballistic-missile-defense-against-north-korea/, 05-02-2024, accessed 7-92025]recut harliu
Rebuttals and More Rebuttals The most significant criticism of homeland BMD is that it upsets strategic stability with Russia and China. This belief dates back to the
Cold War when scholars believed BMD sparked arms races, hindered arms control with the Soviet Union, and emphasized defense when offense was the main
deterrent. Therefore, in the current age, if Russia and China feel that U.S. homeland BMD threatens their nuclear strike success, they will build more delivery
systems to evade the defenses and maintain their second-strike capabilities (so, therefore, their nuclear deterrents). This is the “action-reaction” hypothesis. Some
see Russia’s development of the Sarmat heavy ICBM, the Kinzhal air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle, and plans for nuclear-explosive anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons
as driven by the need to evade the GMD system in Alaska and California. Others see China’s rapid nuclear build-up – estimates of 1,000 warheads by 2030 – as
, a few dozen interceptors – 44
current GBIs and 20 more NGIs around 2028 – do not threaten Russian or Chinese
ICBMs . Russia’s 1,800-plus strategic warheads, including over 1,200 ICBMs, and China’s 400-plus strategic warheads, including over 230 ICBMs, are not
ineffective in the face of a few dozen GBIs. Such a massive strike would penetrate the GMD system. Second , the rationale for the
first homeland BMD deployment, announced during the Johnson administration in
driven by the same motive. There are a few counters to this criticism. First, simply put
the early 1960s, is similar to today’s rationale for a GMD system. Early BMD intended to protect
the homeland against the limited threat from China, but not from the Soviet Union. Today, U.S. policy is
clear that homeland BMD defends against rogue states (North Korea and
Iran) but not Russia or China . The United States relies on strategic
deterrence of Russia and China and will continue to communicate this policy. Third,
homeland BMD does not, without fail, spark arms races . The largest bilateral U.S.-Russia deployed
strategic nuclear arms reductions coincided with expanded U.S. homeland BMD deployment after President George W. Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty in 2002. Ambassador Robert Joseph observed, “While the conclusion of the ABM Treaty in 1972 led to the largest Soviet strategic nuclear build-up in
history…the United States withdrawal from the treaty 30 years later was followed by an actual decrease in Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal.” In terms of China, its
rapid arms build-up all at once does not meet the action-reaction hypothesis; if BMD drove its build-up, then China should have built up slowly to mirror the U.S.
BMD build-up. Fourth,
arms control
homeland BMD is not, again, without fail, an impediment to
. The United States and Russia agreed to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002 after President Bush announced the
U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Negotiations for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in 1991 and New START (which superseded SORT in 2011) took
place while the United States had homeland BMD. New START limited deployed strategic warheads to 1,550, a greater reduction than SORT, yet the United States
still had homeland BMD during negotiations. In fact, today’s GMD system is less than one-quarter of the original interceptor limit (200 interceptors) enshrined in the
1972 ABM Treaty. Another criticism is that homeland BMD is ineffective and costly. However, all three GMD tests since 2017 have proven the opposite. The system
is effective. Moreover, in November 2020, the United States successfully tested the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA against an ICBM. Though part of the regional
Aegis BMD system intended to intercept shorter-range ballistic missiles, the SM-3 Block IIA proved it could intercept ICBMs and provide an additional layer
(“underlay”) to the GMD system. In terms of cost, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) requested $28.4 billion for its missile defense and defeat programs in Fiscal
Year (FY) 2025, which is about 3% of the total $850 billion DoD budget. Of that $28.4 billion, only $2.5 billion was requested for the GBI and NGI systems, which is
about three-tenths of a percent of the entire DoD budget. In context, the GMD system is quite affordable.
DA—Russia
NUQ – Arctic
Arctic coop with Russia’s low---the plan’s coop turns the DA
Williams 6/17 [Margaret; 6/17/25; Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center's Arctic Initiative;
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; “U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Science and
Conservation in the Bering Strait Region: Past Achievements and Current Status”;
https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/us-russian-cooperation-science-andconservation-bering-strait-region-past; accessed 7/11/25;]wmk
Status and Impacts of the Hiatus in U.S.-Russian Cooperation
1. Knowledge Gaps
A key area of bilateral work between Russia and Alaska has been assessing the impacts of rising
Arctic air temperatures on permafrost, the layer of frozen soils which stretches across much of
the circumpolar. Russia encompasses most of the permafrost-covered soils in the Arctic. The
wartime prohibition on communication meant that U.S. scientists stopped sending equipment
to Siberia, and Russian scientists could no longer send data to their Western partners. One
Russian permafrost scientist noted that in his field, an interruption in shared data collection and
analysis can be tolerated for a short while because anticipated changes in Siberia can be inferred
by research in Scandinavia and Alaska. However, the scientist said that, in the long term, the
loss of information coming from Russia will cause “estimates of changes in global permafrost [to
be] biased.”
2. Decline in Trust
Russian and American interviewees alike spoke about the value of both personal and
professional relationships with their respective international colleagues. They recounted how
developing research questions jointly, then working together, often for multiple years in a row,
built strong foundations of trust and respect for the other “side.” These bonds helped many
cooperative projects flourish over three decades. This core element of successful bilateral work,
however, is now in jeopardy, as two years of little to no in-person fieldwork (during the
pandemic), followed by three years of virtually no communication, have eliminated the
opportunities for Russian and American experts to meet, share ideas, conduct fieldwork, and
nurture their working relationships.
Two other factors may be expected to dilute the trust that developed between American and
Russian biologists and experts over the past 30 years. First, anti-American propaganda has
become deeply entrenched in Russian society, particularly in the media, since Russia invaded
Ukraine. Second, the Trump administration is hollowing out federal natural resource
management agencies and scientific organizations, further decreasing the likelihood that people
once actively involved in bilateral projects will be able to reignite their relationships.
NUQ – Trump-Putin Relations
Trump turning on Putin is likely.
Kempe 7/11 — Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic
Council, prize-winning editor and reporter at the Wall Street Journal for more than twenty-five
years, 2025 (“Turning on Putin would fit Trump’s trend of second-term wins,” Atlantic Council,
July 11th, Available Online at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflectionpoints/turning-on-putin-would-fit-trumps-trend-of-second-term-wins/, Accessed 7-11-2025)
It may seem counterintuitive —after years of speculation over US President Donald
Trump’s sympathies for Russian President Vladimir Putin— but the logic of Trump 2.0 suggests
that a tightening of US screws on Russia would make perfect sense.
In his second term thus far, Trump has defied his critics with several major international
wins, and he’s relished the results. His green light for the June 22 US strikes on Iranian nuclearrelated targets was a stunning interpretation of what defines “America first.” At the
NATO Summit in The Hague days later, he pivoted from years of lambasting European partners
to securing a historic agreement to lift Alliance-wide defense and defense-related spending to 5
percent of gross domestic product by 2035, while reaffirming shared security guarantees.
Both the Iran and NATO moves are legacy-defining, peace-through-strength actions. They could
transform the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East and Europe in ways that would have
eluded either a more cautious or a more reckless president.
The next link in this potential chain of positive disruption should be Russia. There are signs
Trump is steering in that direction. It wasn’t too long ago that Trump praised Putin’s peacemaking intentions, his smarts, and his strength. Then, this week, Trump said at a
cabinet meeting , with media recording every word, “ We get a lot of bullshit thrown at
us by Putin, if you want to know the truth. He’s very nice all of the time, but
it turns out to be meaningless .”
Also this week, Trump reversed a brief pause in weapons shipments to
Ukraine , which Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth reportedly okayed without informing the
White House. In the cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the US president praised Ukraine’s
soldiers, for the first time putting US investments in Kyiv in a more positive light. The
Ukrainians, Trump said, “whether you think it’s unfair that we gave all that money or not, they
were very brave, because somebody had to operate that stuff. And a lot of people I know
wouldn’t be operating it—they wouldn’t have the courage to do it.”
Let’s hear it for the men of the year…
Dettmer 7/11 [Jamie Dettmer is Opinion Editor and a foreign affairs columnist for
POLITICO. He also reports on the war in Ukraine and conflict in the Middle East. Dettmer
graduated from Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge, and holds a BA and MA in
history and English literature.
“Is the Trump-Putin bromance
really over?”, 07/11/2025, Politico, https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trumpunited-states-vladimir-putin-russia-war-in-ukraine-peace-talks/] kent
Has the penny finally dropped with U.S. President Donald Trump that Russia’s
Vladimir Putin has no serious interest in peace talks and is in no hurry to halt his war on
Ukraine? Is Trump’s bromance with the Russian leader, whom he described only last month as “very kind,” finally over?
The mercurial Trump’s midweek comments certainly prompted a flood of speculation on the matter.
“We get a lot of bullshit thrown at us by Putin, if you want to know the truth ,” he
said, indicating he’s finally understood he’s been played by the Russian “good guy” — and now he means to get tough.
“Trump has now figured it out that Putin is the problem,” former U.S. envoy to Ukraine Bill Taylor confidently
declared. “So what President Trump has to do is put pressure on Putin, which he can do.” And he’s not
wrong.
Trump not only voiced his irritation with Putin this week , he also promised to
resume deliveries of crucial defensive munitions to Ukraine, just a few days after the
Pentagon had announced it was going to do some stocktaking. “We’re gonna send
some more weapons we have to them. They have to be able to defend themselves,” Trump said, as U.S. and
Israeli officials stood alongside him. “They’re getting hit very hard now.” But will Trump
really apply the kind of pressure that might, just might, give Putin pause? That remains unclear — with Trump, you never know. And
that’s part of the problem. With its abrupt shifts in policy and tone, reversed decisions, extended deadlines and ultimatums, and
threats to bring the house crashing down, his whiplash diplomacy may have worked on real estate business deals in New York. But
this is the big leagues, and Putin could easily conclude — as he clearly has before — that Trump’s bark is worse than his bite, and that
he can just wait things out. Certainly, this week’s Trumpian huffing and puffing seemed to have little impact on the Kremlin. The
Russian response was bellicose, setting yet another record by targeting Ukraine with 728 drones overnight on Tuesday. Residents of
Kyiv and other major cities across 10 provinces were forced to spend the night in air raid shelters, including metro stations. Of
particular note was that Russia mounted the biggest aerial attack of the war on Volyn Oblast, near Poland, on Tuesday night. “It was
the most massive enemy attack with UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] and missiles on our city and community,” Lutsk Mayor Ihor
Polishchuk noted in a social media video. The following night, there was another massive air assault involving 18 missiles and
around 400 drones, primarily targeting Kyiv. Employing a new tactic to presumably try and confuse air defenses, some even passed
by the Ukrainian capital only to reverse course and return to target Kyiv. But Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov simply underlined
Moscow’s nonchalance in the face of Trump’s threats: “We are taking it quite calmly,” he told reporters midweek, adding that
“Trump, in general, tends to use a fairly tough style and expressions.” The escalating drone and ballistic missile assaults demonstrate
the necessity for “biting” sanctions on all major sources of income that help finance the war, including penalties on those who buy
Russian oil, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Telegram this week. And Trump saying he was now considering
supporting legislation that would see steeper sanctions imposed on Russia — including 500 percent tariffs on countries buying
Russian oil, gas, uranium and other key exports — was no doubt music to his ears. Trump only has to say the word and that
legislation will easily pass. The bill already has more than 80 co-sponsors in the 100-seat chamber. And according to a Republican
foreign policy expert who asked to remain anonymous in order to speak freely, by his estimate, 95 senators would vote in favor —
though it’s unlikely the bill’s passage would be before the August recess, he said. However, it wouldn’t add much to the powers
Trump already has, the foreign policy expert noted: “Substantively, the bill is nothing but important symbolically. Unless it’s
changed in a very significant way, it doesn’t actually force anything because it gives the president the right to determine whether
Russia is negotiating in good faith. It is up to him to apply sanctions or not, and he already has the ability to determine the Russians
aren’t negotiating in good faith and has the authority under U.S. law to apply more sanctions anyway,” he said. Kyiv never had any
faith that Trump — or anyone for that matter — could secure a favorable peace deal. Instead, Ukrainian officials long pinned their
hopes on the U.S. president growing exasperated with a recalcitrant Russian president, leading Trump to back them more directly
and substantively. They don’t believe Putin will agree to anything short of abject Ukrainian surrender unless forced to by military
means. Trump, on the other hand, appears to think he can cajole Putin into a fair
settlement by threatening to unleash unrestrained economic warfare . He talked
about it back in January, posting on Truth Social: “ We can do it the easy way, or the hard way —
and the easy way is always better ,” directly addressing Putin. The U.S. president also said he was ready to
slap tariffs and even impose more sanctions on Russia, if the Russian president failed to negotiate an end to the war. That was five
months ago.
Trump is angry at Putin over the Ukraine war & Russia isn’t
willing to call ceasefire.
Weissert 7/08 [Will Weissert covers the White House for The Associated Press. He is
based in Washington. ‘Trump says he’s ‘not happy’ with Putin and blames him for ‘killing a lot of
people’ in Ukraine’, AP Press & CBS, 07/08/2025, https://www.cbs17.com/news/ap-trumpsays-hes-not-happy-with-putin-and-blames-him-for-killing-a-lot-of-people-in-ukraine/] kent
President Donald Trump said Tuesday that he’s “not happy ” with his Russian counterpart,
Vladimir Putin , saying Moscow’s ongoing war in Ukraine is “killing a lot of people” on both sides.
“I’m not happy with him, I can tell you that much right now. This is killing a lot of people,” Trump said
of Putin during a meeting with his Cabinet.
The president also acknowledged that his previous suggestions that he might be able to cajole Russia’s president into bringing the
fighting to a close and quickly ending the war in Ukraine has “turned out to be tougher.”
It was notable for a president who has all but aligned himself with Putin at moments in the past and has praised the Russian leader
effusively at times — though less so in recent months.
The Cabinet meeting comments came a day after Trump said the United States will now send more weapons to Ukraine —
dramatically reversing a previous announcement of a pause in critical, previously approved firepower deliveries to Kyiv in the midst
of concerns that America’s own military stockpiles have declined too much.
“ We wanted (to) put defensive weapons (in). Putin is not, he’s not treating human
beings right,” Trump said during the Cabinet meeting, explaining the pause’s reversal. “ It’s killing too many
people. So we’re sending some defensive weapons to Ukraine and I’ve
approved that.”
Trump’s decision to remove the pause follows his privately having expressed frustration with
Pentagon officials for announcing a halt in some deliveries last week — an action he felt wasn’t properly
coordinated with the White House, according to three people familiar with the matter.
But the president refused to provide more details on that matter Tuesday.
“I don’t know,” he said sarcastically to a reporter who pressed him on the weapons pause’s
original approval. “Why don’t you tell me?”
Still, his expressing open displeasure with Putin — especially after approving a
resumption of U.S. weapons to Ukrain e — underscores how much Trump’s thinking on Russia and
Ukraine policy has shifted since he returned to the White House in January. It also lays bare how tricky navigating
the ongoing conflict has proved to be.
Trump suggested during last year’s campaign that he could quickly end the Russia-Ukraine war. But by April, he was using his Truth
Social account to exhort Putin to end military strikes on the Ukrainian capital.
“ Vladimir, STOP !” he wrote. But large-scale Russian attacks on Ukraine have continued
since then and Trump’s public pronouncements on Putin have continued to sour.
Trump said after a call last week with Putin that he was unhappy with Russia’s president and “I don’t think he’s looking to
stop” the war. Then, speaking at the start of a dinner he hosted for Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House on Monday night , Trump said, “I’m not
happy with President Putin at all.”
Asked during Tuesday’s Cabinet meeting what his growing displeasure with Putin might mean
for U.S. foreign policy, Trump declined to discuss specifics.
“I will say, the Ukrainians were brave. But we gave them the best equipment ever made,” Trump said. He also said that without U.S.
weapons and military support, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 might have otherwise sparked what “probably would
have been a very quick war.”
“It would have been a war that lasted three or four days,” he said, “but they had the benefit of unbelievable equipment.”
Russian skepticism destroys any semblance of good relations with
America.
Kempe 7/11 — Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic
Council, prize-winning editor and reporter at the Wall Street Journal for more than twenty-five
years, 2025 (“Turning on Putin would fit Trump’s trend of second-term wins,” Atlantic Council,
July 11th, Available Online at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflectionpoints/turning-on-putin-would-fit-trumps-trend-of-second-term-wins/, Accessed 7-11-2025)
As was the case with Iran’s supreme leader, Putin is not taking Trump’s peacemaking efforts seriously , and the US president knows it . Even as Trump has
worked toward peace, Putin has escalated his killing of Ukrainian civilians . Russia
may not be as vulnerable as Iran, but its economy is weak—straining under sanctions—and its
people have suffered. More than a million Russian troops have been killed or injured in a war in
which Russia has failed to achieve most of its initial ambitions.
There are still important voices in the Trump administration who believe Ukraine should be left
to the Europeans because China is the priority. That, however, fails to understand the MoscowBeijing “no limits” partnership that got us into this war in the first place—not to mention the
North Korean troops helping Russia and the hundreds of Iranian drones raining down on
Ukraine . Nothing could be more in the United States’ interests than
countering this axis of autocratic aggressors , building on the momentum from the
strike on Iran. That explains why leaders in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have said that the
best way to deter Chinese aggression is to stop Putin in Ukraine.
When it comes to the NATO Summit, Trump delivered not because of any nostalgic commitment
to Canadian and European allies, who he is at the same time threatening with steep tariffs.
Rather, it was because the allies met his price. He could walk away with a “win” both for himself
and the American people, reducing US taxpayers’ cost while increasing that of Europe.
At very little risk, turning the screws on Putin would provide Trump further
wins at low cost . He could silence those who continue to argue that some
tawdry relationship with Russia explains his reluctance to punish Putin . He
would further assert US global primacy , adding the reassertion of deterrence in Europe
to that in the Middle East. And if bringing peace is motivating Trump , he’s only going to
get there by providing Ukraine more leverage for any coming negotiations.
Pulling that off will take a staying power and consistency that will make his second-term
accomplishments so far look like a warm-up act. There’s plenty of reason for skepticism.
However, those who doubt Trump has it in him haven’t been paying attention
to Iran or NATO.
Trump’s attempting to impose sanctions on Russia.
Nicholson 07/09 [Kate Nicholson Is a Political Coorespondent,. She cover the day-today events occupying parliament while also specialising in the Ukraine war, international
relations and unpicking key economic events. I occasionally pop up on the radio to discuss the
major political events of the day. ‘’Trump Just Called Out Putin's 'Bulls***' – But Don't Expect
Anything To Change In Ukraine’, 07/09/2025, Yahoo News,
https://uk.news.yahoo.com/trump-just-called-putins-bulls161211415.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_
referrer_sig=AQAAAAjt33kIacKpkDmMJdH0z6A0Nyg7v7hKldyiAThBb85uMShx6LIMa94KFY
BkaGiRZU4XAK-NAKF76pNek__xycUDbWEhnCRllCEiOhDB7xT5IS4mamaI00Po03blqoxlr87JzdIRm6WmyyYQ520FqNYy11IgpEotJM8GmwxADx] kent
Trump even said he was “absolutely” considering imposing more sanctions on Russia after Putin
started to escalate his use of force against Ukraine, and seemed bewildered in May over Russian aggression, saying: “I don’t
know what the hell happened to Putin.”
At the start of July, he spoke to Putin on the phone and said he was “disappointed” in the Russian
leader and that he did not believe Moscow would end the war.
So, when Trump finally told reporters on Tuesday that Putin had been misleading him over his promises to seek peace in Ukraine, it
seemed like a watershed moment.
The US president said: “ We get a lot of bullshit thrown at us by Putin, if you want to
know the truth.
“ He’s very nice all the time, but it turns out to be meaningless.”
He also resumed weapon shipments to Ukraine after the White House implemented a brief pause of shortage fears last week.
Cooperation is unlikely on the table.
Kot & Vialko 7/9 [Roman Kot Specializes in international politics.Education: Graduated
from the National University of Ostroh Academy with a master's degree in International
Relations (2016). Daryna Vialko went to National Aviation University, master's degree in
Translation (2007). Has been working as a translator and editor since 2007 (medical and
pharmaceutical fields). Worked as a copywriter and rewriter in WordFactory in 2019-2020. ‘Is
Trump changing course? Criticism of Putin, weapons for Ukraine, and new sanctions coming’,
07/09/2025, RBC-Ukraine https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/analytics/is-trump-changing-coursecriticism-of-putin-1752079315.html] kent
Reasons for the shift
It is not easy to understand the reasons for Trump's tougher rhetoric toward
Putin , but a combination of external and internal factors may have played a significant role in this situation, said Volodymyr
Dubovyk, Director of the Center for International Studies at Odesa National University, in a
comment to RBC-Ukraine.
"I think that there is an element of irritation because every conversation between them
(Trump and Putin - ed.) is Trump calling for peace, but at the same time, Russia
continues, even intensifies, its attacks on Ukrain e. This puts Trump in an awkward
position . More and more people are calling him weak in this context. And that’s something he can’t tolerate,
because above all, Trump values his ego. Just the other day, he said something
similar on another issue — that he doesn’t know whether it would be good for Republicans, but what matters is
that it would be good for him," Dubovyk noted.
In addition, effective communication with Trump also played a role. The key event here was the NATO summit on June
24–25. During the summit, leaders of European NATO members openly flattered the US
President and tried to win him over by agreeing to increase defense
spending . There was a successful meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy on the sidelines of
the summit.
"I also think that in The Hague, he heard many calls to action from key NATO partners. Trump, of course, is known for sometimes
ignoring their opinions, but in this case, it’s possible that the European chorus had an effect, just like the conversation with
Zelenskyy, who remains a skilled communicator," Dubovyk said.
Still, despite all these public signals, a real shift in Trump’s position can only be judged by whether he
actually imposes new sanctions against Russia and applies other forms of pressure
on Russia. And the chances of that have been increasing recently.
"Trump is gradually coming to the conclusion that Russia is not capable of making agreements.
One way or another, Putin is undermining Trump himself, and the only way to achieve
anything with Russia is through pressure," emphasized Mykhailo Podolyak.
However, it will still take some time to reformat US policy. Especially since Russia is likely to continue trying to push its narratives
on Trump, including through people in his inner circle who are sympathetic to Moscow.
Trump’s frustration with Putin continues — making deals with NATO
over Ukraine aid.
Guzman 7/11 — Chad de Guzman, reporter at TIME on Asia-Pacific region and global
overnight news, 2025 (“Trump Announces ‘Deal’ to Arm Ukraine via NATO,” TIME, July 11th,
Avaliable Online at https://time.com/7301675/ukraine-us-weapons-nato-military-defensespending-trump-putin-russia/, Accessed 07/11/2025)
On Thursday, Trump announced that he “just made a deal” to make that happen, telling NBC
News that the U.S. will be “sending weapons to NATO, and NATO is paying for those weapons
100% … then NATO is going to be giving those weapons [to Ukraine].
The arrangement was reportedly first floated during the recent North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Summit, where NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte referred to Trump as
Europe’s “daddy” and alliance member states agreed to an increase in defense spending.
About the plan to use NATO as a middleman for U.S. weapons shipments to Ukraine, a Trump
Administration official told Axios that the U.S. is “not sending weapons to Ukraine” but rather
“sending defensive weapons to NATO” and “NATO can decide what to do with it.” Another
source told Axios that the weapons sold to NATO could include offensive weaponry, not just air
defense support.
Hours before Trump’s interview with NBC News was published, Rutte posted on X: “Russia’s
continued massive attacks against Ukrainian civilians are deplorable. Earlier today I urged
leaders to go further so Ukraine has more ammunition & air defences. I’ve just spoken with
President Trump & am now working closely with Allies to get Ukraine the help they need.”
The deal to allow European allies to act as an intermediary for U.S. weapons appears to have
come at the suggestion of Ukraine, which Politico reported earlier this month had asked the
Trump Administration about the potential for such an arrangement despite usual restrictions on
the resale of U.S. weapons.
The request from Ukraine came amid a surprise halt by the Pentagon of direct military support
to Ukraine, which apparently even blindsided Trump. The Trump Administration has since
resumed sending some weapons to Ukraine directly, as Trump has increasingly expressed
frustration with Russian President Vladimir Putin over the war’s continuation.
“I’m disappointed in Russia, but we’ll see what happens over the next couple of weeks,” Trump
told NBC News, teasing: “I think I’ll have a major statement to make on Russia on Monday.”
Russia’s relations with Western nations is over---regardless of the
outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war
Devyatkin 23 [Pavel Devyatkin, A Visiting Lecturer and PhD Fellow at the Higher School
of Economics in Moscow, Pavel teaches BA and MA courses on international relations. He was a
researcher at the Stanford US-Russia Forum and United Nations (UNCCD) and is a graduate of
LSE and UCL, 3-28-2023, "Can Arctic Cooperation be Restored?", Arctic Institute - Center for
Circumpolar Security Studies, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/can-arctic-cooperationrestored/] Y$
Despite the breakdown of relations between Russia and the seven other Arctic states, there is
still limited room to restore cooperation today – primarily between non-state actors. As the Arctic
faces a climate emergency that threatens the whole world, cooperation in research to understand the dramatic changes unfolding in
the region, in environmental protection, and in joint climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts remain imperative for all
involved.
In the context of the pause of the Arctic Council (AC), cooperation between non-state actors may be the most important form of
cooperation now. Science and citizen diplomacy remain important. Researchers, Indigenous peoples, non-governmental
organizations, and civil societies may be able to influence states to reignite intergovernmental cooperation as such non-state actors
and non-aligned states pressured the superpowers during the Cold War to converge on issues of common interest – especially
around climate change and environmental protection. The Cold War holds many lessons for the contemporary situation and
thinking about restoring cooperation in the midst of steep political tensions.
The freezing of state-to-state cooperation: Russian reactions
We are witnessing a severing of state-to-state cooperation after Russia’s military actions in
Ukraine. Right up until February 24, 2022, there was effective interstate circumpolar cooperation across various institutions and
frameworks. Even just the day before, on February 23, 2022, Russia’s ambassador to Norway read an opening speech written by
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the Kirkenes Conference in the Norwegian Arctic. The speech mentioned “mutual
assistance and good-neighborly relations” in the Arctic and complimented the Kirkenes conference as a setting for “constructive and
depoliticized discussion of the pressing issues of international cooperation.”1)
From my experience as an American scholar based in Russia during this volatile period, I believe most Russian
decision makers would still be supportive of Arctic cooperation, but government-level
cooperation, such as collaboration between state funded scientists, is more difficult than ever.
Some Russian decision makers are wholly pessimistic about the return of cooperation. Alexey Drobinin, director of the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) policy planning department, said, “The period of constructive cooperation
between Russia and Western countries is gone for good, regardless of the outcome of Russia’s
special operation in Ukraine.”2)
After seven of the AC states boycotted Russia’s AC chairmanship in March, Nikolay Korchunov, Russia’s Senior Arctic Official and
Arctic Ambassador, called the pause “regrettable” and warned that it would pose “risks and challenges to soft security.” Korchunov
stressed that Arctic cooperation “should not be subject to the spill-over effect of any extra-regional events.” Korchunov said, “it is of
utmost importance to safeguard the project activities of the Arctic Council in order to be able to pick up where we paused and step
up cooperation.”3
Evidently, Russia places great importance on its position in the AC. Russian experts and diplomats
have said Russia’s exclusion is counterproductive and irrational. Russian Ambassador to the United States,
Anatoly Antonov, and Minister of Natural Resources, Alexander Kozlov, have gone as far as calling it illegitimate and claiming that
the boycott violates the principles of consensus given that Russia is the chair of the AC during this period.4) Russian and
international scientists have also drawn attention to data gaps that result from cutting off Russian Arctic scientists. Arctic climate
research is crucial since warming in the region is a bellwether for global climate change. As such statements demonstrate, Arctic
cooperation with Western states is important to Russia, especially in regard to its recognition as a great power
Russia looking to non-Arctic states?
Instead of cooperation with the West, Russia is increasingly looking to the East and doubling down on collaboration with the U.S.’
strategic competitors such as China. This trend is one of the main consequences of pausing the work of the AC and discontinuing
cooperation with Russia. Korchunov has proclaimed that “it is difficult to imagine Arctic cooperation without
the participation of Russia [and that] Russia remains open to cooperation, including with nonArctic states.”5)
Russia’s welcoming of Eastern partners to the Arctic is part of a larger global trend that has been going on for years, but it has been
especially noticeable since February as Russia’s diplomats engage with the states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
Commonwealth of Independent States, Middle East, Turkey, India, Africa and others. In the Arctic, Russia is welcoming Chinese,
Indian, and Middle Eastern companies to invest in projects previously involving Western firms. For example, after Western
companies withdrew from the Russian Arctic due to sanctions, Russia’s Novatek is now looking to the Emirati firm Green Energy
Solutions to receive important technology to construct liquefied natural gas projects and to the Turkish company Karpowership for a
floating power plant.6
There are increasing signs of Russia-China strategic cooperation in the Arctic. The U.S. Coast Guard unexpectedly encountered
Chinese and Russian warships operating together close to Alaska in September 2022.7) A month later at the Arctic Circle Assembly,
China’s Special Arctic Envoy, Feng Gao, said that China would not support Norway’s AC chairmanship if Russia was excluded. Feng
Gao criticized the interruption of international cooperation due to geopolitical competition and confrontation.8)
The Snowflake international science stations in the Russian Arctic, which were expected to launch at the end of 2024 and become a
hub for international research, now seem to be developing into another Russia-China collaboration.9) The cancellation of U.S.-China
climate change talks in the wake of Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit may also speed up the process of Russia-China cooperation in climate
and environmental research in the Arctic.
However, it must be said that the degree to which a Russia-China partnership exists in the Arctic is still ambiguous. One of Russia’s
leading Arctic scientists, the president of Russia’s Arctic Academy of Sciences Valery Mitko, was arrested and charged with allegedly
sharing state secrets with China.10) Despite the hype around the Polar Silk Road, there has been no shipping from the Chinese
Overseas Shipping Company along the Northern Sea Route since February 2022.11)
Korchunov said at the 2022 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum that since dialogue with Russia has stopped, AC member
states have not proposed creating alternative cooperation formats because they see the situation as temporary and that there is an
assumption “that sooner or later, the situation will be resolved and we will continue our cooperation”.12) This is good news as there
was a fear from some experts that Russia or the seven other Arctic states would create their own new Arctic regional institutions
without the other party, but this is a low possibility. We also heard an optimistic view on this from Ambassador David Balton at the
Arctic Circle Assembly in October 2022, who still sees cooperation with Russia possible for a peaceful and cooperative Arctic.13)
Areas to restore circumpolar cooperation
If these new signs of Russia’s pivot to the East are alarming, then the task is now to find the gaps in the current freeze and identify
areas where scientific cooperation, track 2 diplomacy and other forms of dialogue are possible between the largest Arctic state,
Russia, and the seven other Arctic countries. Non-state actors, such as researchers, will now play a particularly important role as
state-level cooperation is frozen. Academic conferences that bring together researchers regardless of nationality to share insights
based on a common concern for the dramatic changes unfolding in the Arctic are themselves examples of science and citizen
diplomacy. Recent examples include the USC-NSF Conference on Strategic Ambition and Environmental Constraint and the Calotte
Academy14) Though government-level science may be restricted, cooperation at the individual-level is still manageable but laden
with obstacles such as visa restrictions and closed consulates.
What specific areas are there for cooperation today? Special attention can be paid to the synergies that exist between the National
Science Foundation’s Navigating the New Arctic agenda and the Russian AC chairmanship agenda. Both programs mention
knowledge coproduction with Indigenous peoples as well as scientific and cultural exchanges with Indigenous knowledge holders.15)
Research communities should prioritize working with Indigenous knowledge holders, not least because of their unique circumpolar
organizations that go beyond national borders and could be an avenue for scientific cooperation at the international, people-topeople level.
At the end of February 2022, the Russian Section of the Saami Council said “now, more than ever, the Sami people in Russia need
international support to continue cooperation between the Sami of the four countries.”16) Nonetheless, some Indigenous
representative organizations such as the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East (RAIPON) came
out strongly in support of Vladimir Putin’s actions in Ukraine.17) The Kola Saami Association signed onto RAIPON’s letter of
support and the Saami Council paused cooperation with its Russian member organizations in April.18) Consequently, cooperation
between government-backed Indigenous peoples’ organizations will remain a challenge.
In seeking opportunities for international cooperation during these political tensions, one can look to the Bering Strait – a region of
historically successful cooperation supported by the State Department and Russian MFA and of longstanding shared cultural
heritage between Alaska and Chukotka. The U.S. and Russia have maintained maritime safety cooperation in the Bering Strait since
February. This collaboration concerns the areas of search and rescue, oil spill response, law enforcement and fisheries management.
However, joint Coast Guard exercises are on pause.19) Similarly, Norway paused nuclear safety cooperation with Russia, but
maintains contact channels, emergency preparedness and information sharing.20) This shows that there are some critical areas of
cooperation that can be maintained.
Non-state actors and lessons from the Cold War
During the Cold War, the political struggle between the U.S. and USSR created an atmosphere where the environment was another
battlefield of ideological competition; virtuous ecological achievements were highlighted to show one socio-political system’s
advantages over the other. International concerns from non-aligned countries over environmental degradation played a major role
in pressuring the superpowers to demonstrate their system’s environmentalist superiority as well as develop mutually advantageous
forms of cooperation.21)
Arctic residents, Indigenous peoples, scholars, civil societies and NGOs also became concerned with environmental protection after
experiencing air and water pollution that largely originated from lower latitudes. Indeed, cooperation between Indigenous peoples’
organizations, sub-national governments, environmental NGOs and the scientific community was a key trend that caused a
paradigm shift from military tension to political stability in the Arctic.22) This history of external pressure on states presents a
lesson to us today. However, today, these groups operate under more difficult political conditions such as restrictions on Russian
organizations from working with foreign partners and restraining foreign agent laws.
Such external pressure provided the context for a number of Arctic science diplomacy agreements signed by U.S. and USSR
administrations. These included the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection,
which named the “Arctic and sub-Arctic ecological systems” as focus areas for the “exchange of scientists… exchange of scientific and
technical information… [and] joint development and implementation of programs.” Another example was the 1973 Agreement on
the Conservation of Polar Bears – a deliberate effort at using science to build confidence during détente. Environmental groups had
competing visions on the appropriate management of wildlife, but mutual concern was pressing enough that the multilateral treaty
was concluded.23)
The 1986 and 1988 Reagan-Gorbachev summits in Reykjavik and Moscow respectively facilitated high-level discussion of ecological
concerns. The joint statement from the 1988 Moscow summit reaffirmed the leaders’ “support for expanded bilateral and regional
contacts and… increased scientific and environmental cooperation.” Though we are living under different political conditions to
those of the Cold War, it is noteworthy that such agreements were able to be implemented under high political tensions.
As the Cold War came to an end, relations between scientists proved to be a significant source of trust-building that spilled over into
the political and military spheres in the form of arms reduction talks. U.S.-Soviet/Russia tensions eased and scientific cooperation
gradually entered more sensitive fields such as oceanography and natural resources. In this way, it makes sense to start thinking and
planning for the post-Ukraine conflict period when the West and Russia may be able to restore cooperation at the state-to-state level
too.
Trump is actively working to support Ukraine against Russia.
Wallbank 7/10 — Derek Wallbank, Senior Editor on US Economics and Government at
Bloomberg, 2025 (“Trump Plans ‘Major’ Russia Statement Monday, Mulls Sanctions,”
Bloomberg, July 10th, Avaliable Online at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-0711/trump-plans-major-russia-statement-monday-criticizes-putin?embedded-checkout=true,
Accessed 07/11/2025)
President Donald Trump said he plans to make a “major statement” on Russia, as the US
prepares to send more American weapons to Ukraine via purchases from NATO allies.
“I think I’ll have a major statement to make on Russia on Monday,” Trump told NBC News in a
telephone interview.
Trump, in the interview, reiterated criticism of Russian President Vladimir Putin over Russia’s
continued attacks on Ukraine. He also said he expects the Senate to pass a tougher Russia
sanctions bill sponsored by a close ally, Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina.
“It’s at my option if I want to use it,” Trump said of the measure. “They’re going to pass a very
major and very biting sanctions bill, but it’s up to the president as to whether or not he wants to
exercise it.
Trump told NBC that he and NATO leaders had reached an agreement in which allies would pay
for US arms that would be then sent to Ukraine.
“We’re sending weapons to NATO, and NATO is paying for those weapons, 100%,” Trump said.
“So what we’re doing is the weapons that are going out are going to NATO, and then NATO is
going to be giving those weapons, and NATO is paying for those weapons.”
He added that he was unaware of a pause ordered by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth halting
distribution of a planned weapons shipment to Ukraine.
The president’s remarks came after Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Sergei Lavrov, his
Russian counterpart, during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations gathering in Kuala
Lumpur.
Russia has been pounding Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities with record numbers of drones and
missiles, leading Trump to express his mounting frustration with Putin in recent days.
The US arms headed for Ukraine include air-defense missiles, artillery shells and other
hardware, a decision that swept aside an earlier pause by the Pentagon, which reflected Trump’s
frustration over the billions of dollars in aid sent to Kyiv since the war started in 2022.
Trump is readying to sign a punishing sanction bill against Russia.
Carney et al. 7/9 — Jordain Carney, reporter at POLITICO, Rachael Bade, POLITICO's
Capitol Bureau Chief and Senior Washington Columnist, author of "UNCHECKED: The Untold
Story Behind Congress’s Botched Impeachments of Donald Trump”, Eli Stokols, White House
and Foreign Affairs Correspondent at POLITICO, 2025 (“Trump is interested in new Russia
sanctions. But there’s a catch,” POLITICO, July 9th, Avaliable Online at
https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/09/trump-is-interested-in-new-russia-sanctionsbut-theres-a-catch-00445148, Accessed 07/11/2025)
President Donald Trump is ready to sign a punishing Russia sanctions bill that GOP
hawks have pushed for months. But only if it changes to give him more control.
A senior administration official granted anonymity to discuss the president’s view said that
“conceptually there’s an openness” to the bill from Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), but the
person suggested that the legislation needs to preserve what the White House sees as the
president’s sole authority to oversee U.S. foreign policy.
The current draft of the bill allows the president to waive a 500 percent tariff on countries that
buy Russian oil and uranium for up to 180 days, and Graham said Tuesday he has agreed
to revise the bill to allow for a second waiver, subject to congressional oversight.
The administration’s desired changes would solidify the president’s waiver authority, ensuring
that Congress has no power to question Trump should he decide to end the sanctions.
“The current version would subject the president’s foreign policy decisions to micromanagement
by Congress through a joint resolution of disapproval process. … That’s a nonstarter for us,” said
the official. “The administration is not going to be micromanaged by the Congress on the
president’s foreign policy. The bill needs a waiver authority that is complete.”
Trump’s new willingness to engage with Congress on a sanctions bill underscores his growing
frustration with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who he says has rebuffed efforts to negotiate
an end to the bloodshed in Ukraine.
“For the president now, he has invested his own reputation of being able to negotiate anything
anywhere, and Putin has made him look foolish,” said one Republican operative close to the
White House.
Trump said Tuesday that Putin was throwing “a lot of bullshit” at him and that he was “looking
very strongly” at the sanctions bill. On Wednesday, Speaker Mike Johnson threw his support
behind the sanctions push.
“Vladimir Putin has shown an unwillingness to be reasonable and to talk seriously about
brokering a peace, and I think we have to send him a message,” he said.
NUQ – Ukraine
Russian cooperation is a fantasy — Trump has ruined their relations.
Harding and Lowell 7/8 — Luke Harding, British journalist who is a foreign
correspondent for The Guardian, holds PhD in Applied Linguistics from the University of
Melbourne and is currently a professor in Linguistics and English Language at Lancaster
University, Hugo Lowell, BSc in Economics and Philosophy from Bristol University, White
House Correspondent for The Guardian, 2025 (“Trump criticises Putin and promises to send
Ukraine 10 Patriot missiles,” The Guardian, July 9th, Available Online at
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/08/ukraine-russia-us-military-weaponspentagon, Accessed 7-9-2025)
Donald Trump has voiced his frustration with Vladimir Putin and promised to
send 10 Patriot missiles to Ukraine , after announcing on Monday that US weapons
deliveries would resume days after they were halted by the Pentagon, according to an official
familiar with the matter.
Speaking at a cabinet meeting on Tuesday, Trump said he was getting increasingly
frustrated with the Russian leader . “We get a lot of bullshit thrown at us by Putin, if
you want to know the truth. He’s very nice all the time, but it turns out to be meaningless,” he
said.
Asked if he wanted to see further sanctions against Russia, Trump replied:
“I’m looking at it.” On Monday he said he was “ disappointed” with Russia’s
president and would send “more weapons” to Ukraine.
“We’re gonna send some more weapons we have to them. They have to be able to defend
themselves . They’re getting hit very hard now,” Trump said, alongside a US and Israeli
delegation.
Ukrainian officials said on Tuesday they were grateful for the US president’s Uturn but described the number of Patriots being supplied to Kyiv as “minuscule”. Ukraine’s
defence ministry said it was seeking to clarify the details.
In a statement, the ministry said it not received official notification of the change in policy
and it was “critically important” for Ukraine to have “stability, continuity and
predictability” in the provision of arms, especially air defence systems.
Putin’s continued attacks on Ukraine have slaughtered relations with
the United States.
Date 7/9 — Shirish Dáte, Bachelor's degree in political science from Stanford University,
Currently serves as a Senior White House Correspondent at HuffPost, Previously held positions
at NPR, National Journal, The Palm Beach Post, The Associated Press, The Orlando Sentinel,
and the Times-Herald Record in Middletown, NY, 2025 (“Trump Accuses His Benefactor Putin
Of Spewing ‘Bullshit’ About Ukraine Invasion,” HuffPost, July 9th, Available Online at
https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/trump-accuses-his-benefactor-putin-of-spewingbullshit-about-ukraine-invasion_uk_686dfff3e4b09bd98fe3fe47, Accessed 7-9-2025)
“ He’s not treating human beings right. He’s killing too many people ,” Trump
said.
Trump’s new criticisms of his benefactor are a departure from the way he has
spoken of Putin for years. When Putin started the war in February 2022 , Trump in the
first days called it “savvy” and “genius.” In the months and years to come, he continued
defending Putin and essentially blaming Ukraine for getting invaded, as he did during an
Oval Office visit by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in February. Trump as he
campaigned to return to the White House last year claimed he would be able to end the
war in a single day , and in fact would do so before he even took office January 20.
Since then , though, he has acknowledged that making Putin stop his killing was
proving more difficult than he anticipated. Recently, he expressed bewilderment about
the former KGB officer who openly pines for the days of the old Soviet Union. “ I don’t know
what the hell happened to Putin ,” Trump told reporters in May. “I’ve known him a long
time, always gotten along with him, but he’s sending rockets into cities and killing people,
and I don’t like it at all.”
The Kremlin is upset with the United States continued aid to Ukraine
— relations have tanked.
Nicholson 7/8 — Kate Nicholson, Senior Trends Reporter at HuffPost UK, worked in the
national news, 2025 (“Kremlin Slams Trump Administration For Resuming Weapon Shipments
To Ukraine,” HuffPost, July 8th, Available Online at
https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/kremlin-slams-trump-for-resuming-weaponshipments-to-ukraine_uk_686cf6d0e4b052503286de84?origin=related-recirc, Accessed 7-92025)
Vladimir Putin’s government has attacked Donald Trump’s administration after
announced it would be sending military equipment to Ukraine once more.
The White House paused its regular shipments to Kyiv last week over fears that
the US was facing its own shortages . Russia celebrated the news at the time, claiming
the fewer weapons Ukraine’s allies provided, “the closer the end of the war”.
But the US president told reporters on Monday that he would be sending “some
more weapons” after all.
Speaking after Russia stepped up its bombardments of Ukraine in recent days, he said: “ We
have to, they have to be able to defend themselves .” “They’re getting hit very hard.
Now they’re getting hit very hard. We’re going to have to send more weapons,
defensive weapons, primarily, but they’re getting hit very, very hard.”
Responding on Tuesday morning, the Kremlin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said
this was all an attempt to continue “hostilities”.
He added: “There has not been any final information that deliveries of [American weapons to
Ukraine] have been stopped or halted, as multiple controversial statements have been made.”
According to Russian state news agency TASS, he noted : “Obviously, there have been
continued [weapons] shipments as the Europeans, too, have been taking an active part in
pumping Ukraine with weapons.
“ These actions are hardly part of attempts to contribute to a peaceful
settlement.
“The policy being pursued by the Europeans certainly aims at continuing hostilities.”
Both leaders have ran out of patience — the chance of negotiation is
zero.
Wintour 7/9 — Patrick Wintour, British journalist who is currently the diplomatic editor of
The Guardian, worked as the Political Editor of The Observer, receiver of the British Press
Awards' "Political Journalist of the Year" in 2007, 2025 (“ Has the Trump-Putin
bromance finally run its course? ,” The Guardian, July 9th, Available Online at
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jul/09/has-the-trump-putin-bromance-finallyrun-its-course, Accessed 7-9-2025)
I’m not happy with Putin. I can tell you that much right now,” Trump said,
expressing his frustration with the Russian leader over the war in Ukraine. “We get a lot of
bullshit thrown at us by Putin … He’s very nice all the time, but it turns out to be meaningless.”
It may not have been Churchillian in oratorical flourish, and with Trump everything is capable
of being reversed in hours, but possibly, just possibly, the rupture between Vladimir
Putin and Donald Trump has happened . If so it is a transformatory moment ,
and a vindication for both Volodymyr Zelenskyy as he arrives in Rome for the annual Ukraine
reconstruction conference and for those others, notably the British and the French governments,
who have patiently helped the scales to fall from Trump’s eyes about Putin’s true intentions. At
long last and after many false starts, the US president seems to have accepted he is
unpersuadable on ending the war.
With Trump the parting of the ways is unlikely to be complete, or permanent. Above all Trump’s
disappointment in Putin may not translate into the kind of practical financial and support
Ukraine and Europe has been seeking, but America First is no longer Russia First .
It has been a long process with many low points . In February it seemed as if the
whole transatlantic alliance was on the brink of collapse , as Trump initiated
direct talks with Putin, and ordered Ukraine to make concessions. On 19 February he echoed
Kremlin talking points in a post to his Truth Social network that called Zelenskyy a “dictator”
and warned him time was running out for Ukraine: “Think of it, a modestly successful
comedian, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, talked the US into spending $350 Billion Dollars, to go into a
War that couldn’t be won […] A Dictator without Elections, Zelenskyy better move fast or he is
not going to have a Country left.”
NUQ – Ukraine S/O to Arctic
Arctic exceptionalism is finished---escalating Russia-Ukraine war
tensions are driving divides.
McVicar 22 [Daniel McVicar, master’s degree in strategic studies from the University of St.
Andrews, BA in International Studies from Holy Cross College, 5-10-2022, "How the RussiaUkraine War Challenges Arctic Governance", Council on Foreign Relations,
https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-russia-ukraine-war-challenges-arctic-governance] Y$
In late January 2022—as Russia amassed 190,000 troops on the Ukrainian border—four Norwegian members of parliament
nominated the Arctic Council for the Nobel Peace Prize in a last-ditch attempt to forestall the bloody conflict by highlighting the
achievements of Russia-West cooperation. Although this may appear to be wishful thinking in hindsight, there was reason to believe
that Arctic Council cooperation could spill over into other forms of dispute resolution. While the Arctic Council is not directly
involved in security issues, its collaboration on environmental and scientific matters has fostered cooperation that has led to
amicable security arrangements, such as the 2010 Barents Sea delimitation agreement brokered between Oslo and Moscow.
In late May 2021, less than nine months before Russia ultimately invaded Ukraine, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
convened with his ministerial level peers in Reykjavik, Iceland as Russia assumed the revolving chairmanship of the Arctic Council.
The chairmanship rotates every two years among the eight permanent members of the intergovernmental forum: the United States,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden. Arctic Council chairmanship grants agenda-setting power
bounded by the body’s core mission, as codified in the 1996 Ottawa declaration: promoting and preserving Arctic sustainable
development and environmental protection.
Thus, in May 2021, as Russia began its second tenure as Arctic Council chair, most observers assumed it would proceed much the
same as its rather uneventful term from 2004 to 2006. Moscow’s chairmanship priorities for 2021 were strikingly similar to those it
espoused in 2004. Although Russia has sought reinstatement to the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum after having been suspended
following its 2014 annexation of Crimea, the request was not included in its priorities. Instead, Moscow projected a welcoming
posture, mentioning “cooperation” thirty times in its chairmanship priorities report.
The ministerial meeting in Iceland followed the cooperative path set by Russia’s chairmanship priorities. Although Minister Lavrov
and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken had strong disagreements over introducing a military component to the Arctic Council,
the meeting ended on a conciliatory note, with Blinken citing the January 2021 renewal of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty as an
example of the two nations’ ability to negotiate military-to-military. The conversation opened the door for serious discussion on
sensitive issues such as high north military-to-military communication and Arctic resource development. Moreover, the meeting’s
tone signaled a cooperative shift from the bombastic rhetoric Secretary of State Mike Pompeo used before the ministerial meeting in
Finland just two years earlier.
Despite these positive indicators, the Arctic Council’s ability to weather geopolitical storms abruptly ended with Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine. On March 3, 2022, less than two months after the Arctic Council was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, the seven other
permanent members of the council took an unprecedented step in declaring they would be “pausing participation in all meetings of
the [Arctic] Council and its subsidiary bodies.” The forum previously navigated diplomatic disagreements among member states,
including over the Iraq War in 2003, Georgian War in 2008, and annexation of Crimea in 2014, but disagreement over the invasion
of Ukraine was irreconcilable. Not only does this change the future of Arctic relations, but it also (temporarily) ends Russia’s
participation in one of its few remaining soft power venues capable of meaningful international coordination.
How Will the Diplomatic Fallout Change Arctic Governance?
Following the seven-member states’ boycott of the Arctic Council, there has been speculation that the West will fundamentally
reshape Arctic governance by forming a new international body without Russia, known as “Nordic Plus.” Theoretically, this forum
would include the seven protesting states and Arctic indigenous peoples (including those from Russia). While Nordic Plus would
have shared values and government norms, it would forfeit the institutional legitimacy and progress that the Arctic Council has
fostered. Furthermore, little utility exists in such an organization without Moscow.
Russia accounts for nearly half of the Arctic’s population, over half of the Arctic’s coastline, and
the majority of Arctic industry. It also dominates Arctic energy production, fishing, and
shipping. Moreover, the Russian Arctic remains critical to addressing global environmental
issues such as permafrost thawing and wildfire prevention. Without Russia in the Arctic Council,
scientists will not be able to share data between weather observatories or monitor Siberian
permafrost melt. Given Russia’s Arctic assets, any organization governing the region without Moscow would be attempting to
oversee an area mostly outside its control. Even if a forum like Nordic Plus attempted to include other Russian partners such as
indigenous representatives, it is hard to imagine that Moscow would permit such representatives to attend.
These rumors notwithstanding, the structure of the Arctic Council is likely to stay intact, though its operations will surely change. In
all likelihood, the Arctic Council will resume operations when Russia turns over its chairmanship to Norway in spring 2023, or when
a resolution is reached to end the war in Ukraine. But the story of future Arctic governance does not end here.
The Arctic Council will lose legitimacy and goodwill and its agenda will shrink in both scope and size as future Russian statements
on Arctic cooperation will likely be met with more skepticism from the other seven members than ever before. While some might
argue that this was already the case after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the reverberations felt in the Arctic from the two episodes of
Russian belligerence were of vastly different scales. The war in Ukraine has led to all seven Arctic states
implementing unprecedented sanctions against Russia and boycotting the Arctic Council. The
reaction to the annexation, by contrast, was lukewarm. While the states ended most military-to-military discussions, they also
increased regional cooperation by forming the Arctic Coast Guard Forum in 2015.
Many have seen the Arctic region as a zone of peace, insulated from external political disputes.
The war in Ukraine and subsequent boycott of the Arctic Council will prove devastating to this
theory of Arctic exceptionalism, and to the council’s position as the foundation of Arctic governance going forward. High
tensions among members of the council will likely mean that only the least controversial Arctic issues will be addressed when the
council reconvenes. The least contentious issues are not coincidentally the three binding treaties passed by the Arctic Council: the
Agreement on Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011), Agreement on Marine Oil Pollution in the Arctic (2013), and Agreement on
Enhancing Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017).
Recent progress on imposing international legal frameworks on more sensitive issues such as fishing disputes, energy production,
continental shelf claims, and freedom of navigation will come to a standstill as the war in Ukraine drags on and geopolitical tensions
rise. While the Arctic Council was never directly responsible for drafting and enforcing agreements on some of these matters, it
served as the facilitator of regional diplomacy. Moreover, the forum played a pivotal role in proposing oil and gas drilling guidelines
and encouraging states to join the International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the High Seas (2018).
Unfortunately, these issues become more difficult to solve with every passing year as the Arctic
Ocean becomes increasingly navigable, thus heightening the probability of interstate conflict.
Rising tensions will transition the Arctic Council from a high-level diplomatic facilitator to a
low-level tactically-oriented talk shop. Arctic Council representatives will likely eschew ministerial-level discussions.
Foreign Minister Lavrov is personally sanctioned by the United States, Canada, European Union, and the United Kingdom and he is
unlikely to ever step foot in an Arctic Council meeting again. This incidentally means that the ad hoc Arctic Five group, which
includes the five Arctic littoral states of the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia and almost exclusively works at
the ministerial level, will become defunct. By contrast, the Arctic Council’s six working groups and scientific research operations are
politically insulated because they work at a technical level and are one layer removed from political leadership.
Although the role of the Arctic Council may adapt to changing geopolitical currents, it is vital for Arctic governance that the council
preserves all eight of its permanent members and fulfills its commitments to its core missions of sustainable development and
environmental stewardship. There remains a need for a forum to address transborder regional issues that cannot be effectively
undertaken by individual states, yet are too localized to be addressed by a global forum. If there is an institution that can cooperate
in the darkest of times, it is the Arctic Council. But if the seven members of the council do not rejoin when Norway assumes the
chairmanship in May 2023, it is likely that the much-touted race for the Arctic will accelerate in a dangerous governance vacuum.
The future of the Arctic is uncertain---exceptionalism may persist but
insulation is gone.
Raspotnik et al. 25 [Andreas Raspotnik, Romain Chuffart, Pavel Devyatkin 6-24-2025,
"The Evolving Concept of Arctic Exceptionalism: From Isolation to Geopolitical Leverage", High
North News, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/evolving-concept-arctic-exceptionalismisolation-geopolitical-leverage] Y$
If the Arctic is brought into discussions surrounding Ukraine, does this mark the end of its
exceptionalism, or simply a new perspective on its role in global politics? It could be both.
On one hand, the idea that the Arctic is an isolated, exceptional space will be permanently upended by
the region’s integration into larger geopolitical debates.
On the other hand, Arctic exceptionalism may persist in a new form, one in which the region’s
significance is no longer defined by isolation and its peripheral location/geography, but by its
interconnectedness with global security, climate policy, and the broader balance of power.
At the heart of this transformation lies the question of how to balance regional stability with broader geopolitical ambitions. The
Arctic’s changing strategic importance suggests that its exceptionalism is no longer a question of
geography, but of the evolving geopolitical environment.
As (non-Arctic) nations increasingly look northwards, the challenge will be to ensure that the Arctic does not
become a flashpoint for conflict, but rather a space for cooperation and dialogue, particularly in
light of the war in Ukraine.
Canada is at the epicenter for Arctic militarization---there is no longer
political insulation.
Trent 25 [Trent University News, 7-7-2025, "Threats Through the Arctic",
https://www.trentu.ca/news/story/42915] Y$
Canada’s Arctic is no longer a distant frontier insulated from global threats. Canada Research Chair in
the Study of the Canadian North Dr. Whitney Lackenbauer says the Arctic has become a critical transit zone for
modern weapons systems that could be used against North America. In an op-ed for Yukon News,
Professor Lackenbauer explains that systems such as hypersonic missiles and long-range cruise missiles are likely to pass
through or over Canada’s North en route to targets further south, which makes Arctic
surveillance and detection systems a key component of continental defence.
Prof. Lackenbauer outlines Canada’s $4.9 billion commitment to modernizing NORAD as a significant update to the country’s early
warning and surveillance capabilities. The plan focuses on new radar technologies, expanded data and communications systems, and
faster, more informed decision-making tools. While most of the spending is expected to be directed to firms in southern Canada, the
geographic role of the North remains central. Prof. Lackenbauer emphasizes the importance of ensuring long-term
value for northern communities through infrastructure, training, and local capacity as Canada strengthens its
continental security systems.
Arctic exceptionalism is a facade---post-Cold-War demilitarization
norms are being dismantled in the Arctic
Thatcher 24 [Iris Thatcher, Iris Thatcher is a recent graduate of the M.A. in European
Studies program at Georgetown University. Throughout the past year, she has interned with the
Polar Institute. Her research interests include the EU’s impact on Arctic affairs, as well as the
respective roles Finland and Sweden play in Arctic security and broader foreign policy, July
2024, "From complex to weaponized interdependence: Scenario-building in the Arctic",
ResearchGate,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/382018921_From_complex_to_weaponized_interd
ependence_Scenario-building_in_the_Arctic] Y$
Complex interdependence consequently asserts that the interwoven nature of the Arctic helped
the region remain stable during and after the annexation of Crimea. Though, as Käpylä and Mikkola (2015)
argue, the Arctic has never truly been insulated from global events: “the contemporary Arctic is not
only global but –precisely because it is global– no different from any other region.” The authors point
out that the emergence of an “exceptional” space came out of the immediate post-Cold War environment. New
Arctic fora –including the Arctic Council– ushered in an era of “desecuritization.”
NUQ – Ukraine – AT: Science
Aftermath of Ukraine invasion proves science development without
Russia thrives
Coninsx ’24 [Marie Anne Coninsx is a Senior Associate Fellow at the Egmont Institute-Royal
Institute for International Relations and First EU Ambassador at Large for the Arctic. Marie
Anne Coninsx, 10-10-2024, "Science Diplomacy in and for the Arctic: Opportunities in
Turbulent Times," Arctic Circle, https://www.arcticcircle.org/journal/science-diplomacy-inand-for-the-arctic-new-opportunities-in-turbulent-times]
Already before the war, there was and still is, an impressive amount of Arctic science cooperation,
without Russian participation. This was demonstrated at a seminar of the Polar Institute / Wilson Center on EUUS research cooperation related to the Arctic. It discussed the global importance of Arctic science and research, how science
diplomacy supports the safety and stability of Arctic regions, and particularly the importance of US-EU scientific
cooperation to build bridges of understanding in a world moving towards strategic competition.
One example of the strong EU-US scientific cooperation related to the Arctic is the INTERACT Project, which involves a
network of one hundred research stations in the Arctic and over 1000 researchers.
Moreover, we are witnessing a substantive increase of research cooperation elsewhere. The following examples are mentioned in a
publication by the Academia European Bergen Special Report, on “The future of Arctic science and science diplomacy”:
The seven Western Arctic States have expanded partnerships between them. A stronger
Nordic science collaboration is being established. Norwegian universities are building new
scientific partnerships with Canada, the US, and Greenland. At the European level, scientists are connecting
closer, sharing experiences, best practices, and data. EU programs, such the EU-Polar Net, the European Polar
Board, and the EU Polar Cluster, are of high value in the current situation.
I would like to add the invaluable contribution of non-Arctic States to polar research to this already impressive list of increased
scientific cooperation. Indeed, the need to increase cooperation among the like-minded has created
opportunities for non-Arctic States. One example is Belgium, which has historically strong ties with the Arctic
states, expertise in polar science and climate research, and a long tradition on
multilateral cooperation. In May 2022, the IASC welcomed Belgium as the 24th new member
country.
The changing landscape of scientific collaboration in the Arctic also offers the ‘opportunity’ to shift the
focus of climate research to regions other than Russia. More studies by SIOS, the Svalbard
Integrated Arctic Earth Observation System are now done in Greenland; and permafrost research by the
German Alfred Wegener Institute has shifted to the American Arctic, after more than 30 years of
scientific research cooperation with Russia on permafrost in Siberia.
The lack of scientific data from Russia is problematic, but strategies exist for scientists to close some of the data
gaps. Scientists now cooperate more intensively with the earth observation community, providing
opportunities for global space-based observations. Already now, the EU’s Space Program,
COPERNICUS, with its Climate Change Services, helps researchers in understanding permafrost
thaw, and its impact on infrastructure, society and people. The new Sentinel mission, the CIMR—Copernicus
Imaging Microwave Radiometer—is particularly interesting for monitoring permafrost. Moreover, the (planned)
Copernicus CO2M constellation of satellites will enable detailed monitoring of emissions of
methane.
To summarize, some Arctic scientific cooperation might indeed be affected by the current global tensions, but it is not a
black and white picture. New avenues and promising opportunities have been created.
NUQ – AT: Arctic Council
The Arctic Council cannot thump external tensions---turn--- the Arctic
council causes further tensions.
Erin & Fitz 22 [Gabriella Gricius Erin, Gabriella Gricius is a Ph.D. student in the
Department of Political Science, an InTERFEWS NRT Trainee, and a Graduate Fellow at the
North American & Arctic Defense and Security Network. She obtained her B.A. in International
Relations and German Language from Boston University and her M.A. in International Security
from the University of Groningen, B Fitz, 8-30-2022, "Can Exceptionalism Withstand Crises?
An Evaluation of the Arctic Council's Response to Climate Change and Russia's War on
Ukraine", OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/2/3/ksac042/6678853] Y$
In sum, our study provides further evidence to suggest that the Arctic Council is not, in fact, exceptional. Having
argued that even idealized versions of institutions do not truly offer unique ways to withstand crises,
we add to literature which challenges current understandings of how non-or-intergovernmental institutions respond to crises.
Altogether, this paper suggests there is much more to be considered not only for the Arctic Council, but also the precariousness of
international institutions considered broadly. As an endogenous, or internal/goal-driven crisis, our review of existing Arctic
scholarship—notably published prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine—largely indicates that the Council can
perhaps contribute in certain ways (e.g., as a knowledge producer and agenda setter); however, it does not distinctly
respond to climate change. Specifically, evidence suggests that the Arctic Council’s success is largely
contingent upon political, environmental, and domestic issues. In turn, disputes over the
prioritization of such issues and regime changes are hugely influential in shaping the Council’s
ability to respond to crises. Considering climate change is a long-developing endogenous crisis that is also subject to fastoccurring exogenous events, it appears unlikely that intergovernmental organizations such as the Arctic Council can facilitate the
type of continuous mitigation efforts necessary to offset the effects of climate change on a substantive level. Furthermore, our
analysis also indicates that the Arctic Council lacks substantive capacity to respond to exogenous, or
externally driven, crises. At the very least, and given previous geopolitical challenges, our findings further support the
assumption that regimes matter. Last, our findings also align with research on global environmental governance, which suggests that
environmental policy implementation is less the result of polycentric governance efforts and agreements and rather the result of
domestic objectives. In turn, one plausible explanation for the Arctic Council’s purported exceptionalism
reflects member states that have implemented climate change policies that align with—but are not
necessarily the result of—the Council itself. Because the regions, states, communities, and even leaders within the
organization seek to achieve their own domestic objectives, internal reports are likely biased in favor of those policy positions and
goals. In turn, they may be likely to over-attribute successes to Council efforts while shifting
blame to other non-council actors.
NUQ – BRIC Relations
Targeted tariffs towards BRIC affiliated countries means tensions are
on the rise.
Liu and Egan 7/9 — John Liu, News Desk Reporter for CNN International based at the
network’s Asia-Pacific headquarters in Hong Kong, Matt Egan, an award-winning senior
reporter at CNN covering business, the economy and financial markets across CNN’s television
and digital platforms, 2025 (“Trump promises more tariff letters and warns BRICS of what’s
coming,” CNN Business, July 9th, Available Online at
https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/09/business/tariffs-trump-letters-threat-brics-intl-hnk,
Accessed 7-9-2025)
BRICS group targeted
At his Tuesday cabinet meeting, Trump said he plans to slap a 10% tariff on imports
from the BRICS economic group of emerging market nations, including Brazil,
Russia , India and China . “If they’re a member of BRICS, they are going to have to pay a
10% tariff, just for that one thing – and they won’t be a member long,” Trump said.
Trump explained the BRICS tariff threat was being driven by a desire to protect
the US dollar from potential threats to its dominance. In 2023, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silva floated the idea of a BRICS currency, though it hasn’t been a focus of the group
since then.
“ BRICS was set up to hurt us , BRICS was set up to degenerate our dollar and take our
dollar, take it off as the standard,” said Trump.
He added that the US dollar losing its status as the world’s reserve currency would
be as damaging as “losing a war , a major world war.”
BRICS is an acronym of its early members: Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa. The economic club has expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran
and the United Arab Emirates. It’s not clear if Saudi Arabia has accepted an invitation to join
BRICS. The group also has 10 lower-level partner countries, including Vietnam.
Trump’s comments came after he delivered a vague threat on Sunday night to impose an
additional 10% tariff on countries “aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of
BRICS.”
Trump’s anti BRIC standpoint means emerging negations are
impossible
Kantchev 7/7 — Georgi Kantchev, foreign correspondent for The Wall Street Journal
based in Berlin, MA in Media Management from the University of Oxford, Completed PhD level
research at the University of Oxford, 2025 (“Trump Steps Up His Fight With Brics Nations,” The
Wall Street Journal, July 7th, Available Online at https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-steps-uphis-fight-with-brics-nations526c04ea?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAj6Uk9ZJ4yAnJdsRXz6OXku31bcMSf9by5SmBuXNsLl
GmdMEvgfPG7TjJxNgTE%3D&gaa_ts=686e876f&gaa_sig=Z497NMlK3u5R4RfBOnaIVvUDq6
8tz6XToxDoU8iWvMmXXypbwQ5gxQ8dv5BgogEStncgCYQ1X2Z0hGQeapPzvw%3D%3D,
Accessed 7-9-2025)
President Trump’s threat to put new tariffs on countries embracing the policies of
the Brics group has added fresh uncertainty to global trade and prompted
pushback from Moscow and Beijing.
Trump posted on social media that countries aligning themselves with “the AntiAmerican policies of Brics, will be charged an ADDITIONAL 10% Tariff .” The
threat appeared to be a response to a statement put out by the group of emerging economies—
whose members include Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and others—
that took a swipe at Trump’s policies.
Trump’s threat came as his administration faces a crucial week for reaching trade deals before
new tariffs are scheduled to hit dozens of countries starting Wednesday.
The Brics group has long sought to present itself as a multilateral counterweight to a U.S.dominated world order. Internal divisions and differing political and financial frameworks,
however, have hobbled its quest for expanding its geopolitical influence.
Representatives of Brics nations, including Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi, have been meeting at a summit in Rio de Janeiro. In a joint declaration, the
group said it had “serious concerns about the rise of unilateral tariff and
non-tariff measures ,” without mentioning the U.S. directly. It also condemned recent
military strikes against Iran following the Israeli and American campaign to destroy Tehran’s
nuclear facilities.
Responding to Trump’s threats, a spokeswoman for China’s Foreign Ministry stated on Monday
its oft-repeated line that trade wars and tariff wars have no winners. Brics “does not target any
country.” The Kremlin echoed those remarks, saying that Brics “has never been and will never
be directed against third countries.”
While Trump didn’t spell out the group’s “Anti-American policies,” the Brics have in recent years
discussed ways to promote alternatives to Western-led geopolitical and financial frameworks.
L – AT: Resources
Link turn – Russia wants to cooperate with the U.S. over Arctic
resources and will improve future relations
Hodunova ’25 (Kateryna, The Kyiv Independent, “Russia offering US deal on natural
resources, access to Arctic”, https://kyivindependent.com/russia-offers-us-deal-on-its-naturalresources-access-to-arctic/, February 19, 2025/// Solis)
Russia is offering the Trump administration a deal on Russian natural resources and access to
the Arctic, The Moscow Times reported on Feb. 18, citing Kirill Dmitriev, one of the Russian
delegates in recent Saudi Arabia talks.
A Russian delegation led by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met on Feb. 18 with a U.S.
delegation led by State Secretary Marco Rubio, marking the highest-level meeting between the
two sides since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russian and the U.S. delegates in Riyadh also discussed economic cooperation, including global
energy prices. Moscow is suggesting that American oil companies may return to the country and
is interested in joint projects with the U.S. in the Arctic, Dmitriev said before the talks started.
The statement comes as Kyiv announced it is not ready to sign the U.S.-proposed deal on
Ukraine's natural resources. President Volodymyr Zelensky commented that Ukraine is open to
investment but argued that the memorandum, presented by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott
Bessent on Feb. 12, needs more work as it does not include any concrete security guarantees.
"We believe that at some point, they (American companies) will come back because why would
they start giving up the opportunity to access Russian natural resources that Russia gave them?"
Dmitriev said, adding that large American oil companies had "very successful businesses" in
Russia.
"We should also do joint projects, including, for example, in the Arctic and other areas. Joint
projects will allow us to be more successful," Dmitriev added.
U.S. companies allegedly lost $300 billion from sanctions against Russia, and Joe Biden's
administration "gave a lot of wrong messages" about the state of the Russian economy, Dmitriev
claimed.
Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, only one major U.S. company, Exxon Mobil, was
producing oil in Russia. The company also owns 30% of the Sakhalin 1 oil project. Following the
imposition of sanctions against Sakhalin 1, Exxon Mobil tried to sell its stake but failed,
according to The Moscow Times.
After the outbreak of the all-out war, the leading American oilfield service companies, including
Halliburton, Schlumberger, and Baker Hughes, also announced their withdrawal from Russia.
Russia is also expecting the U.S. to unfreeze Russian state assets, including those owned by the
Central Bank, which were previously invested in American ones. The assets are valued at about
$6 billion, the outlet reported.
Altogether, nearly $300 billion of the Central Bank's foreign exchange reserves have been
frozen, of which over $200 billion are in Europe.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly assured European allies that the U.S. would
maintain sanctions against Moscow at least until an agreement is reached to end the RussiaUkraine war.
Yet, following talks between the U.S. and Russian delegations, Rubio suggested that lifting
sanctions against Russia would be part of any peace process, saying that "concessions" would
have to be made by "all sides" to bring an end to "any conflict."
Independently from geopolitical tensions in the Arctic, Putin is
willing to cooperate in the Arctic for resources.
Soldatkin and Antonov ’25 (Vladimir and Antonov, Reuters, “Putin says rivalries are
increasing in the Arctic, but economic cooperation is possible”,
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-geopolitical-rivalries-are-rising-arcticcooperation-is-possible-2025-03-27/, March 28, 20253:38 AM EDT/// Solis)
MOSCOW, March 27 (Reuters) - Geopolitical rivalries are intensifying in the Arctic but Russia is
willing to cooperate with foreign partners, including from the West, in economic ventures there
that will benefit all sides, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday.
In a major speech, Putin said U.S. President Donald Trump's stated intention to acquire
Greenland was "serious", and it was clear that the U.S. would continue to promote its interests
in the Arctic. The Greenland question had nothing to do with Russia, he said
But Moscow was concerned that "NATO countries in general are increasingly designating the far
north as a springboard for possible conflicts, practising the use of troops in these conditions,
including by their 'new recruits', Finland and Sweden," he said, referring to the alliance's latest
members.
Russia was monitoring the situation and building a response, including by boosting its military
capabilities in the region.
"We will not allow encroachments on the sovereignty of our country and will reliably protect our
national interests," Putin said.
Focus on the Arctic's strategic importance for mining, shipping and security has increased
sharply because of repeated statements by Trump that he wants to acquire Greenland. He has
not ruled out doing so by force.
The Arctic holds fossil fuels and minerals beneath the land and the seabed that could become
more accessible with global warming. It is also an area of military competition, where defence
analysts say Russia has built up its presence much faster than the West by reopening Soviet-era
bases and modernising its navy.
The United States sees the Arctic as crucial for natural security, including for its early warning
system against nuclear attacks.
The Kremlin says the Arctic is a zone of Russian strategic interest, and suggested in February
that Russia and the U.S. could work together to develop natural resources there as the two
countries pursue a fast-moving rapprochement that has unnerved Ukraine and its European
allies.
L – AT: Science
Science Diplomacy in the Arctic is possible with Russia.
Devyatkin ’24 (Pavel, The Nation, “Can Russian-US Scientific Cooperation Be Restored as
Arctic Warming and the Ukraine War Intensify?”,
https://www.thenation.com/article/world/russia-global-warming-science-diplomacy/#, April
16, 2024)
Two years into the war in Ukraine, there are some headways in Russia-West Arctic cooperation.
Norway took over the chair of the Arctic Council in 2023 and is gradually resuming work with
Russia.
In February 2024, the council announced that official meetings of project and expert working
groups will resume in a digital format. A month before, Norway’s chief Arctic official, Morten
Høglund, met in person with the six Indigenous peoples’ organizations, including two
representatives from Russia.
Norway’s relationship with Russia can serve as an example for dealing with Russia under the
current political circumstances. In recent years, Norway has imposed sanctions against Russia,
signed a bilateral defense agreement with the United States, and hosted NATO troops in the
largest military exercise since the Cold War. At the same time, Norway continues collaboration
with Russia to comanage fisheries in the Barents Sea, the Norwegian-Russian border, and Coast
Guard rescue operations.
Similarly, the United States maintains some channels of cooperation with Russia in the Arctic,
especially in the Bering Strait. The US and Russian Coast Guards maintain lines of
communication to protect people and marine resources on both sides of the strait. While joint
exercises have been on hold, the US and Russian Coast Guards still commit to the enduring
agreements on search-and-rescue and emergency operations. Cooperation continues even
against the background of provocative Russian naval exercises off the coast of Alaska.
Moreover, there is collaboration at the individual and informal levels. Some academic
conferences in the US and Russia, where scientists share research on Arctic natural and social
sciences, still involve Russian and American researchers. Such developments demonstrate that
while relations may have been mostly severed, there are still narrow openings for cooperation
around issues that are seen as essential.
L – No S/O
Although Russia is modernizing its military assets, the majority of
this equipment is directed in places other than the Arctic.
Pezard et. al 17 [Stephanie Pezard, Associate Research Department Director, Defense and
Political Sciences; Senior Political Scientist, received her Ph.D. in international relations
(political science) from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies,
Geneva, and her M.A. in contemporary history from the French School of Political Science
(Sciences-Po) in Paris, Abbie Tingstad, Kristin Van Abel, Scott R. Stephenson, 3-2-2017, "How
to Maintain Arctic Cooperation with Russia", RAND,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1731.html] Y$
It is also important to put the new capabilities being developed in the Arctic into a broader
context. Russia has engaged in an ambitious, statewide program to restructure and modernize
its military and ensure better readiness.34 Thus, many military developments in the Arctic are
actually consistent with changes to the overall Russian defense posture, without signaling any
particularly ominous intent in the Arctic. For instance, Russia resumed long-range aviation patrols over the Arctic
Ocean in 2007, but also over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans at the same time.35 It is also worth noting that in spite of
the strategic importance of the Northern Fleet, most new naval assets being built or acquired by
Russia are destined for other fleets.36 The Black Sea Fleet, in particular, was given the lion’s share of re-equipment
projects—a priority that has only been reinforced by the Ukraine crisis.37 Several analysts have emphasized the difference between
militarizing the Arctic (to prepare for Arctic-specific threats) and militarizing in the Arctic, as part of a larger process of
modernization that is more relevant to Russian armed forces in general than to the Arctic in particular.38 Keeping this
distinction in mind is important insofar as it puts increased military activity in the Arctic in a
broader perspective and suggests that the Arctic may not warrant more concern than other
regions of Russia that are also receiving more attention, in terms of military assets and
activities, from the Kremlin.
! – Climate Turns War
Arctic climate change efforts are a prior question – reversing arctic
warming controls all Arctic war scenarios.
Geri 24 (Maurizio Geri, Former NATO analyst, Italian Navy Lieutenant POLAD reservist and
postdoctoral researcher at the George Mason University and EU Marie Curie Fellow, “War with
Russia will start in the Arctic, unless leaders move to stop climate change”, February 16th 2024,
https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/critical-thinking-war-with-russia-will-start-in-thearctic-unless-leaders-at-the-munich-security-conference-move-to-stop-climate-change/) julm
As the Munich Security Conference gets underway, the spectre of a third world war looms on the horizon. Military and
political leaders in NATO nations have issued chilling warnings for populations to brace for the
possibility of devastating superpower conflict. Admiral Rob Bauer, chair of NATO’s Military Committee, fired the
opening salvo in the grim round of predictions. He cautioned that Russia could launch an attack within the next two decades. In
words reminiscent of World War II, Bauer urged allied countries to mobilise citizen armies. British Defence Secretary Grant Shapps
has gone even further, foreseeing potential wars involving China, Russia, North Korea and Iran within the next five years. The
situation is transitioning “from a post-war to pre-war world”, he asserted bleakly. General Sir Patrick Sanders, the UK’s army chief,
echoed that dark prediction. He described the British population as a “pre-war generation” that may need to prepare for conflict with
an increasingly aggressive Russia. German politicians and military leaders have discussed resurrecting mandatory military service in
response to growing threats and Sweden has already introduced a form of national service as it closes in on NATO membership.
With Russia holding over 53% of the Arctic Ocean coastline, Vladimir Putin believes domination of the region’s resources is critical
to the economic survival of his regime To many, the idea that increased tensions sparked by Russia’s
attacks on Ukraine could lurch towards a wider European conflict seems not only probable but
inevitable. However, amid the drumbeats of international conflict, one crucial factor is being overlooked: the impact of
climate change as a potential trigger for war. NATO has committed to taking a leading international role on climate
and security. Yet the landmark climate agreement reached late last year at the COP28 conference in Dubai underscores the need for
Western leaders meeting in Munich to raise their climate ambitions and translate them into tangible action. NATO recognises
climate change as a ‘threat amplifier’ for traditional security issues, but it needs to go further
as studies indicate global warming is already rapidly accelerating the likelihood of armed
conflict, especially in the Arctic. Arctic icecaps are melting at record rates, making deposits of
gas, oil and minerals worth trillions of dollars accessible for the first time. Over the coming
years, this will spark a race for Arctic dominance that Russia is hellbent on winning. With
Russia holding over 53% of the Arctic Ocean coastline, Vladimir Putin believes domination of the region’s resources is critical to the
economic survival of his regime. The Arctic is estimated to hold 412 billion barrels of oil and gas, about 22% of the world’s
undiscovered reserves. Putin is hardly trying to hide his agenda. Russia already operates a third more Arctic military bases than the
US and its NATO allies. Now Putin is moving soldiers, icebreakers, warships and submarines to the region, as well as conducting
Arctic drills that test hypersonic missiles capable of evading American defences. His propaganda machine regularly releases pictures
of troops training in white fatigues and clutching assault weapons as they zip over the snow on sleighs pulled by reindeer. It is
time for world leaders to act in the knowledge that failure to urgently address the climate
emergency exposes the world to the risk of a devastating conflict between NATO and
Russia America and Denmark have filed sovereignty claims in the central Arctic Ocean but it was Moscow that, in 2007, planted
a titanium Russian flag on the seabed two-and-a-half miles under the North Pole. More aggressive Russian claims in the Arctic could
force NATO to act and risk sparking the global conflict that the generals and politicians are warning of. While traditional military
preparations for global war are undoubtedly vital, leaders convening at Munich must also prioritise climate action to mitigate the
risk of global warming becoming the catalyst for a catastrophic clash. Following the COP28 agreement to ‘transition away from fossil
fuels’, NATO must modify its climate ambitions and let the consensus reached in Dubai guide its strategy to head off the threat of
global war provoked by climate change. The Dubai agreement has been endorsed by 198 countries, including NATO allies. However,
in the words of COP28 President Sultan Al Jaber, who is also attending the Munich conference: “An agreement is only as good as its
implementation … We must take the steps necessary to turn this agreement into tangible action.” NATO’s focus should extend
beyond its current voluntary emissions reduction targets to include COP28’s agreement to triple renewable energy capacity by 2030.
Since halting Arctic warming is pivotal to preventing conflict, NATO must also explore
safe geoengineering solutions to slow or reverse Arctic melting. It is time for world leaders to act
in the knowledge that failure to urgently address the climate emergency exposes the world to the
risk of a devastating conflict between NATO and Russia, as well as the wider environmental
dangers of unchecked climate change.
! – No Esc
Russia will play by the rules in the Arctic if granted the opportunity to
do so
Roberts ’15 [Kari Roberts is a policy studies professor at Mount Royal University in Calgary
primarily researching Russian foreign policy towards the United States and the influences of
structure and agency on Russia’s interests in the Arctic. Kari Roberts, 2-03-2015, “Why Russia
will play by the rules in the Arctic,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, https://dacemirror.scihub.se/journal-article/d5afb885ea14a5a46481dfa93ac31290/roberts2015.pdf]
This paper asserts that this residual fear of Russia’s motives in the Arctic is rooted more in the past
than it is in the present. Talk in 2007 –2008 of a “new Cold War” (S. Cohen 2006, Simes 2007, Lucas 2008), while it
abated under Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, has been revived in Putin’s third term.1 Recently, and in addition to Russia’s
agitation of the political instability in Ukraine, Russia’s harboring of Edward Snowden,2 and its
stance of perpetual opposition to Western initiatives in dealing with the Assad regime in Syria,
have revived the demonization of Russia and reawakened concerns that the West has much to
fear from Russia. Such concerns were amplified by former United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who likened Putin’s
seizure of Crimea to Hitler’s annexation of Czechoslovakia and Poland in the 1930s (Rucker 2014). This will no doubt embolden the
extant new Cold War sentiments extended to the Arctic region, such as Pavel Baev’s labeling of Russia’s Arctic policy as “realpolitik
with a Stalinist flavor”, suggesting that there is a final frontier mentality in Russia that, for some, enhances the appeal of the Arctic
as a territory yet to be conquered, ripe for the exertion of Russian dominance (Baev in Trenin and Baev 2010). This paper takes the
view that such Cold War rhetoric is unhelpful; disagreements between Russia and its Arctic
neighbors, such as Canada, are not inherently cause for alarm. The paper demonstrates the ways in which
it benefits Russia to work within existing diplomatic and legal frameworks to resolve
Arctic disputes. In support of this thesis, the paper argues that mistrust of Russia’s Arctic intentions is
overblown for three reasons. First, there is little evidence that Russia will not respect the processes
that it has agreed to in the Arctic; suspicions about Russia’s motives are Cold War derivatives. Second,
undermining the United Nations (UN) and international laws and norms is not in Russia’s best
interests; Russia repeatedly underscores the importance of the UN and its agencies to
international peace and security. Third, the nationalism or “sovereigntization” that Putin
sometimes employs when talking about Russian interests is largely aimed at Russian domestic audiences
rather than foreign ones. It may even be fair to say that Putin’s tough Arctic talk may not be that different from that of
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. In fact, there may actually be more similarities than differences between Canadian and
Russian approaches to Arctic sovereignty (Lackenbauer 2010).
! – Coop Inevitable
The Arctic is a zone of cooperation, marked by larger symbolic
politics---Russia and China prove that external conflicts can be
overcome
Hansen 24 [Birgitte Annie Hansen, Bachelor's degree in English Literature and Language
from Nord University, 9/20/2024, ""The Cooperation Between Russia and China in the Arctic Is
Still Limited"", High North News, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/cooperation-betweenrussia-and-china-arctic-still-limited] Y$
Symbolic politics
The two senior researchers believe that future cooperation between Russia and China in the Arctic will be
even further characterized by symbolic politics and base itself on declarations of intent to a
higher degree than actual deeper cooperation.
Both parties hold back on developing deeper cooperation in the Arctic . For China, the Arctic is not high enough
on its list of priorities, and it is not worth any possible reactions from the US.
On Russia's part, it is due to a desire to maintain sovereign self-determination in a region that is very important to them. This is
particularly about the increasing power imbalance between the two states, in China's favor, and Russia not wanting interference
from such a geopolitical heavyweight, according to the researchers.
"The most likely scenario for Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic in the near future is that it will continue in the form of
letters of intent and signaling to their shared "enemy" in the West. It is unlikely that any substantial cooperation will develop as long
as Russia fears Chinese influence while also lacking real cooperation partners to act as a counterweight against Chinese influence,"
states the two IFS researchers.
When asked by High North News whether they consider the cooperation between Russia and China to be exaggerated in the media
and other research, they reply:
"No, we do not necessarily believe that the cooperation is exaggerated. Rather, the attention paid to Russian-Chinese cooperation in
the Arctic shows that this is an important and interesting topic that we should follow, something we agree with."
"At the same time, it is important to put this into context. It is not unnatural that Russia and China cooperate, also in the Arctic.
However, even though there is cooperation between them, it does not mean that China and Russia cooperate well. A lot of the
cooperation entails declarations of intent (of which we have many examples) and have little substance thus far."
"We believe this is a topic deserving of closer examination, particularly regarding which cooperations are (s far) only intentions,
which are substantial, and not least, how the cooperation works in these cases."
Knows no limits
Russia and China have previously described their relationship as "knowing no limits."
So far, the two actors have managed to put their conflicting ambitions aside to cooperate. While
China wants an internationalization of the Arctic, Russia wants to secure sovereign national rights over the largest
possible area and as many resources as possible, the researchers write.
"The big question now is whether Russia and China will expand their cooperation in the Arctic in the
coming time – in light of the geopolitical situation, Russia and China's respective interests in the Arctic, the relationship
between them, and their respective relations to other parties," they conclude.
! – AT: RCA
Russia and China disagree over the Arctic. U.S. leadership is key.
Dageav 2/18 [Andrei Dagaev is a PhD student at the National Chengchi University
(Taipei), “The Arctic Is Testing the Limits of the Sino-Russian Partnership”, Carnigie,
2/18/2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/02/russia-chinaarctic-views?lang=en]//me
Over the past three years, Russia’s cooperation with China has reached unprecedented levels.
Still, there is one area where the two countries have been unable to find common ground: the
Arctic . Even in the current geopolitical climate, the differences between Moscow and Beijing’s
approaches to the Arctic have so far proven too great to overcome, limiting China’s advances in
the Far North.
Publicly, Russia and China maintain they have a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” which
ostensibly extends to Arctic issues. Yet their interests in the region can be quite disparate.
China first took a serious interest in the Far North in the early 2010s, initially seeking a seat on
the Arctic Council, the region’s most important multilateral organization. Russia did not
immediately agree to admit China, setting two conditions: that China respect the sovereignty of
regional powers and abide by freedom-of-navigation rules. In 2013, China was
finally granted observer status, and with it, a platform to articulate its regional objectives.
In 2018, China’s State Council published the country’s first-ever white paper on Arctic policy.
The document described China as a “ near-Arctic state ” with a vested interest in the region’s
affairs. It argued that the Arctic belonged to all mankind, and so China had the right to enter its
waters and airspace, just like other “constructive” parties.
The Arctic was easily integrated into China’s global Belt and Road Initiative—in the form of a
proposed “Polar Silk Road”—and its vision of a “Community of Common Destiny.” Overall, it
presented Beijing with an opportunity to burnish its image as a responsible great power.
China’s stated objectives in the Arctic have not changed significantly since 2018. It remains
committed to conducting scientific research, conserving the region, carrying out commercial
activities, and assisting with the Arctic’s joint management in line with international law.
Indeed, all of China’s statements and documents on the region reiterate its willingness to engage
in multilateral cooperation for the benefit of the Arctic. Meanwhile, the military-political
dimension always goes unmentioned, with neither the 2018 white paper nor any subsequent
pronouncements hinting at the expansionist designs about which then U.S. secretary of state
Mike Pompeo warned in 2019.
Russia’s Arctic policy is based on altogether different principles. For Moscow, it is all about
unlocking the region’s economic potential and defending sovereignty . Essentially,
Russia wishes to commercialize the region—with an emphasis on oil and gas exploration and the
creation of a transportation corridor—and militarize it, too.
! – AT: Cyber
No impact to cyberattacks—at most there’s alt causes.
Libicki ’20 [Martin Libicki (Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley 1978) holds the Keyser Chair of
cybersecurity studies at the U.S. Naval Academy. In addition to teaching, he carries out research
in cyberwar and the general impact of information technology on domestic and national
security, 2020 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, ‘Correlations Between
Cyberspace Attacks and Kinetic Attacks’, 07/02/2020,
https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/05/CyCon_2020_11_Libicki.pdf] kent
But would they? Much of the answer depends on what constitutes “comparable.” Kinetic
military effects tend to include death and destruction. No cyberattack has killed anyone
directly, and few have actually broken physical things; wiping a hard drive – as many
cyberattacks have done – still leaves the hard drive physically intact. But cyberattacks have been
quite costly to their victims, even if measured solely in disruption and remediation costs. The
NotPetya attacks were said to have cost their (mostly corporate) victims up to $8 billion
(Greenberg 2018). Putatively, a kinetic attack that destroys $8 billion worth of military
equipment but harms no one would be comparable and should, one would imagine, bring about
a comparable reaction. Imagining a kinetic attack that breaks things but hurts
no one used to be an exercise in fantasy . But the Iranian take-down of a $150 million
U.S. Global Hawk in the summer of 2019 was such an attack. The U.S. response, a cyberattack,
was also non-lethal. Lest this choice of avoiding lethality be ascribed to the individual
characteristics of the U.S. President, note that the Pentagon was also thinking along similar
lines. One 204 of its favored options was to sink an Iranian craft, but only after giving its
sailors time to get away (Baker, Schmitt, and Crowley 2019). Earlier, a Turkish
shootdown of a Russian jet near the Syrian border had drawn a cyber response (e.g., DDOS
attacks), but nothing violent (Murgia 2015).
! – AT: Terrorism
No terrorism impact—prefer empirics, bathtubs are sooo much
deadlier and counterterrorism measures prevent it.
Mueller & Stewart ’18 [John Mueller is a Senior Research Scientist, Mershon Center
for International Security Studies Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science. Mark
Stewart is a Professor and Director, Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability The
University of Newcastle, New South Wales ‘Terrorism and Bathtubs: Comparing and Assessing
the Risks’, The Abstract, Taylor & Francis, 10/29/2018,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2018.1530662#abstract] kent
The likelihood that anyone outside a war zone will be killed by an Islamist extremist terrorist is
extremely small. In the United States, for example, some six people have perished each year
since 9/11 at the hands of such terrorists — vastly smaller than the number of
people who die in bathtub drownings . Some argue, however, that the incidence of terrorist destruction is
low because counterterrorism measures are so effective. They also contend that terrorism may well become more
frequent and destructive in the future as terrorists plot and plan and learn from experience, and that terrorism, unlike
bathtubs, provides no benefit and exacts costs far beyond those in the event itself by damagingly
sowing fear and anxiety and by requiring policy makers to adopt
countermeasures that are costly and excessive. This article finds these arguments to be wanting.
In the process, it concludes that terrorism is rare outside war zones because, to a substantial degree, terrorists don’t exist there. In
general, as with rare diseases that kill few, it makes more policy sense to expend
limited funds on hazards that inflict far more damage . It also discusses the issue
of risk communication for this hazard.
The risk of terrorism is a question of incentives—which is UNLIKELY.
THEIR AUTHOR Kallenborn & Ackerman ’23 [Zachary Kallenborn was a
PhD Student in War Studies at King's College London researching risk analysis, perception,
management, and theories with topical focuses in global catastrophe, drone warfare, WMD,
extreme terrorism, and critical infrastructure. He’s also affiliated with the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), the Schar School of Policy and Government. Gary Ackerman is
an Associate Professor with the College of Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security and
Cybersecurity at SUNY Albany. Prior to taking up his current position, Ackerman held the posts
of Research Director and then Special Projects Director at START and the Director of the Center
for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, a private research and analysis institute. He has also
served as the Director of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Research Program at the
Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif., and chief of operations of the South
Africa-based African-Asian Society. Ackerman received his BA and BA (Hons) degrees from the
University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa and his MA in International Relations from Yale
University. He completed his PhD in War Studies at King’s College London, dealing with the
impact of emerging technologies on terrorist decisions relating to weapons adoption. ‘Existential
Terrorism: Can Terrorists Destroy Humanity?’, pg. 1-2, ‘I. Introduction’ 08/04/2023, Accessed
via Cambridge, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-riskregulation/article/existential-terrorism-can-terrorists-destroyhumanity/5A3724049B1985D8762AACC4DDBB8C0C] kent
Mass-casualty terrorism and terrorism involving unconventional weapons have received
extensive academic and policy attention, yet few academics have considered the broader question of whether such
behaviours could pose a plausible risk to humanity’s survival or continued flourishing. Despite
several terrorist and other violent non-state actors having evinced an interest in causing
existential harm to humanity, their ambition has historically vastly outweighed their capability.
Nonetheless, three pathways to existential harm exist: existential attack, existential spoilers and systemic harm. Each pathway
varies in its risk dynamics considerably. Although an existential attack is plausible, it would require
extraordinary levels of terrorist capability. Conversely, modest terrorist capabilities might be
sufficient to spoil risk mitigation measures or cause systemic harm, but such actions would only
result in existential harm under highly contingent circumstances . Overall,
we conclude that the likelihood of terrorism causing existential harm is
extremely low, at least in the near to medium term, but it is theoretically possible for terrorists to intentionally destroy
humanity.
Other
Cooperation is inevitable.
Hansen 24 [Birgitte Annie Hansen, Bachelor's degree in English Literature and Language from Nord
University, 9/20/2024, ""The Cooperation Between Russia and China in the Arctic Is Still Limited"", High
North News, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/cooperation-between-russia-and-china-arctic-stilllimited] Y$
Symbolic politics
The two senior researchers believe that future cooperation between Russia and China in the Arctic will be even
further characterized by symbolic politics and base itself on declarations of intent to a higher degree than
actual deeper cooperation.
Both parties hold back on developing deeper cooperation in the Arctic. For China, the Arctic is not high enough on its list
of priorities, and it is not worth any possible reactions from the US.
On Russia's part, it is due to a desire to maintain sovereign self-determination in a region that is very important to them. This is particularly
about the increasing power imbalance between the two states, in China's favor, and Russia not wanting interference from such a geopolitical
heavyweight, according to the researchers.
"The most likely scenario for Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic in the near future is that it will continue in the form of letters of intent
and signaling to their shared "enemy" in the West. It is unlikely that any substantial cooperation will develop as long as Russia fears Chinese
influence while also lacking real cooperation partners to act as a counterweight against Chinese influence," states the two IFS researchers.
When asked by High North News whether they consider the cooperation between Russia and China to be exaggerated in the media and other
research, they reply:
"No, we do not necessarily believe that the cooperation is exaggerated. Rather, the attention paid to Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic
shows that this is an important and interesting topic that we should follow, something we agree with."
"At the same time, it is important to put this into context. It is not unnatural that Russia and China cooperate, also in the Arctic. However, even
though there is cooperation between them, it does not mean that China and Russia cooperate well. A lot of the cooperation entails declarations
of intent (of which we have many examples) and have little substance thus far."
"We believe this is a topic deserving of closer examination, particularly regarding which cooperations are (s far) only intentions, which are
substantial, and not least, how the cooperation works in these cases."
Knows no limits
Russia and China have previously described their relationship as "knowing no limits."
So far, the two actors have managed to put their conflicting ambitions aside to cooperate. While China
wants an internationalization of the Arctic, Russia wants to secure sovereign national rights over the largest possible area and as
many resources as possible, the researchers write.
"The big question now is whether Russia and China will expand their cooperation in the Arctic in the coming time
– in light of the geopolitical situation, Russia and China's respective interests in the Arctic, the relationship between them, and their respective
relations to other parties," they conclude.
Cooperation is inevitable, even if there are disagreements. It ebbs and
flows.
Devyatkin 25 – Senior Associate at the Arctic Institute, Lecturer and PhD Fellow at the Higher School
of Economics,
Pavel Devyatkin, “US-Russia Arctic Cooperation: Strategic Ebbs and Flows,” Strategic Analysis, 03-042025, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09700161.2025.2457794
Since the end of the Cold War, strategic priorities regarding Arctic cooperation between the United States and Russia have
fluctuated . Bilateral and multilateral commitments between the two nations in the Arctic have
experienced both positive and negative phases , reflected in the official strategic documents published
by each State and endorsed by their respective presidents. This analysis is structured according to presidential administrations, beginning with
US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Clinton was the first post-Cold War US President to develop an Arctic strategy,
while Yeltsin was the first President of the Russian Federation. The Essay identifies shifts in Arctic strategies across successive
US and Russian administrations, contextualized within broader US-Russia relations and global military interventions, particularly
following the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine.
This Essay contributes to the study of Arctic strategy in relation to international cooperation. Strategic studies typically examine the relationship
between means and ends, often within the context of conflict. However, as T.V. Paul asserts, ‘strategy is not all about war or narrow national
security’, but also encompasses ‘managing the continuation, termination, and absence of war’.1 In this framework, the strategic
priorities underlying US-Russia Arctic cooperation can be linked to the peaceful preservation of regional
security and stability. Furthermore, cooperation can be interpreted as a response to actual or potential conflict, and thus constitutes a
security concern, as it arises when actors perceive their policies to be in conflict.
Failed arms control, Iran war, and NATO expansion thump
AND Trump.
Kempe 7/11 — Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, prizewinning editor and reporter at the Wall Street Journal for more than twenty-five years, 2025 (“Turning
on Putin would fit Trump’s trend of second-term wins,” Atlantic Council, July 11th, Available Online at
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/turning-on-putin-would-fit-trumpstrend-of-second-term-wins/, Accessed 7-11-2025)
It may seem counterintuitive —after years of speculation over US President Donald Trump’s sympathies for Russian President
Vladimir Putin— but the logic of Trump 2.0 suggests that a tightening of US screws on Russia would make
perfect sense.
In his second term thus far, Trump has defied his critics with several major international wins, and he’s relished
the results. His green light for the June 22 US strikes on Iranian nuclear-related targets was a stunning interpretation of what defines
“America first.” At the NATO Summit in The Hague days later, he pivoted from years of lambasting European partners to securing a
historic agreement to lift Alliance-wide defense and defense-related spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product by 2035, while
reaffirming shared security guarantees.
Both the Iran and NATO moves are legacy-defining, peace-through-strength actions. They could transform the geopolitical landscape in the
Middle East and Europe in ways that would have eluded either a more cautious or a more reckless president.
The next link in this potential chain of positive disruption should be Russia. There are signs Trump is steering in that direction. It wasn’t too long
ago that Trump praised Putin’s peace-making intentions, his smarts, and his strength. Then, this week, Trump said at a
cabinet meeting , with media recording every word, “ We get a lot of bullshit thrown at us by Putin, if you
want to know the truth. He’s very nice all of the time, but it turns out to be meaningless .”
Also this week, Trump reversed a brief pause in weapons shipments to Ukraine , which Secretary of Defense
Pete Hegseth reportedly okayed without informing the White House. In the cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the US president praised
Ukraine’s soldiers, for the first time putting US investments in Kyiv in a more positive light. The Ukrainians, Trump said, “whether you
think it’s unfair that we gave all that money or not, they were very brave, because somebody had to operate that stuff. And a lot of people I
know wouldn’t be operating it—they wouldn’t have the courage to do it.”
AND Ukraine.
Harding and Lowell 7/8 — Luke Harding, British journalist who is a foreign correspondent for The
Guardian, holds PhD in Applied Linguistics from the University of Melbourne and is currently a professor
in Linguistics and English Language at Lancaster University, Hugo Lowell, BSc in Economics and
Philosophy from Bristol University, White House Correspondent for The Guardian, 2025 (“Trump
criticises Putin and promises to send Ukraine 10 Patriot missiles,” The Guardian, July 9th, Available
Online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/08/ukraine-russia-us-military-weaponspentagon, Accessed 7-9-2025)
Donald Trump has voiced his frustration with Vladimir Putin and promised to send 10 Patriot
missiles to Ukraine , after announcing on Monday that US weapons deliveries would resume days after they were halted by
the Pentagon, according to an official familiar with the matter.
Speaking at a cabinet meeting on Tuesday, Trump said he was getting increasingly frustrated with the Russian
leader . “We get a lot of bullshit thrown at us by Putin, if you want to know the truth. He’s very nice all
the time, but it turns out to be meaningless,” he said.
Asked if he wanted to see further sanctions against Russia, Trump replied: “I’m looking at it.”
On Monday he said he was “ disappointed” with Russia’s president and would send “more weapons” to
Ukraine.
“We’re gonna send some more weapons we have to them. They have to be able to defend
themselves . They’re getting hit very hard now,” Trump said, alongside a US and Israeli delegation.
Ukrainian officials said on Tuesday they were grateful for the US president’s U-turn but described the
number of Patriots being supplied to Kyiv as “minuscule”. Ukraine’s defence ministry said it was seeking to clarify the
details.
In a statement, the ministry said it not received official notification of the change in policy and it was “critically
important” for Ukraine to have “stability, continuity and predictability” in the provision of arms, especially
air defence systems.
AND BRICs.
Liu and Egan 7/9 — John Liu, News Desk Reporter for CNN International based at the network’s
Asia-Pacific headquarters in Hong Kong, Matt Egan, an award-winning senior reporter at CNN covering
business, the economy and financial markets across CNN’s television and digital platforms, 2025
(“Trump promises more tariff letters and warns BRICS of what’s coming,” CNN Business, July 9th,
Available Online at https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/09/business/tariffs-trump-letters-threat-brics-intlhnk, Accessed 7-9-2025)
BRICS group targeted
At his Tuesday cabinet meeting, Trump said he plans to slap a 10% tariff on imports from the BRICS
economic group of emerging market nations, including Brazil, Russia , India and China . “If they’re a member
of BRICS, they are going to have to pay a 10% tariff, just for that one thing – and they won’t be a member long,” Trump said.
Trump explained the BRICS tariff threat was being driven by a desire to protect the US dollar
from potential threats to its dominance. In 2023, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva floated the idea of a BRICS currency, though it hasn’t
been a focus of the group since then.
“ BRICS was set up to hurt us , BRICS was set up to degenerate our dollar and take our dollar, take it off as
the standard,” said Trump.
He added that the US dollar losing its status as the world’s reserve currency would be as damaging
as “losing a war , a major world war.”
BRICS is an acronym of its early members: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The
economic club has expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. It’s not clear if Saudi Arabia has accepted
an invitation to join BRICS. The group also has 10 lower-level partner countries, including Vietnam.
Trump’s comments came after he delivered a vague threat on Sunday night to impose an additional 10% tariff on countries “aligning
themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS.”
AND Greenland.
Seethi 25 – Director of the Inter University Centre for Social Science Research and Extension and
Professor of Polar Studies and International Relations at Mahatma Gandhi University.
K.M. Seethi, “Polar Realignment: Trump, Putin, and the Future of Arctic Power Politics,” The Geopolitics,
03-11-2025, https://thegeopolitics.com/polar-realignment-trump-putin-and-the-future-of-arctic-powerpolitics/
Trump’s obsession with the Arctic is not new, but in his second term, it has taken a more
confrontational line . In a March 4 address to Congress, he declared: “One way or another, we’re
going to get Greenland .” Citing national security concerns and economic potential, Trump framed
Greenland as an essential asset in securing U.S. dominance in the Arctic. While he paid lip service to
Greenlandic self-determination, his rhetoric sparked an outcry from Greenland’s leadership, who
fiercely rejected any suggestion of annexation.
The controversy over Greenland shows a broader shift in Trump’s Arctic strategy : the move away
from cooperative multilateralism toward unilateral strategic acquisition . This is to be seen in the
context of Trump’s historical discomfort with NATO and his growing readiness to sidestep European
allies in favour of direct bilateral deals. Greenland’s rejection of Trump’s comments has sparked
debates about sovereignty , resource nationalism , and the role of smaller Arctic actors in
shaping their destinies.
Proves reslations are otherwise resilient.
CP
Agent—Canada CP
Canada Fails---2AC
Canada lacks the strategic coherence to follow through on the plan
even when implemented.
Reynolds ’25 [Jeffrey Reynolds, non-resident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Atlantic
Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security]
Jeffrey Reynolds, 05/30/2025, “The frontier is the front line: On climate resilience for infrastructure and supplies in Canada’s
Arctic”, The Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-frontier-is-the-front-lineon-climate-resilience-for-infrastructure-and-supplies-in-canadas-arctic/ //kcbk
Canada’s failure to defend its Arctic territory is not merely a function of limited
resources, but of deliberate strategic neglect . The refusal to acquire nuclear -powered
For Washington,
submarines—essential for year-round under-ice patrols and true sovereignty enforcement—reveals a
deeper aversion to the burdens of great power responsibility. While adversaries invest in undersea dominance and dual-use Arctic infrastructure,
Ottawa opts for half-measures: diesel patrol submarines that can’t operate under the polar ice, minimal surveillance capabilities, and
no permanent military basing north of 60.
The US view is shifting from a posture of “monitor and respond” to one of “prepare and deter.”
Pentagon reports no longer downplay the Arctic as a region of strategic importance. Even smaller powers have taken notice. India published its Arctic
strategy in 2021, emphasizing scientific diplomacy. Turkey signed the Svalbard Treaty to gain access rights to the Arctic in 2023. France and Germany
are also exploring greater footprints in the region.
While the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) Pact with Canada and Finland represents a trilateral effort to rebuild icebreaker capacity and harden
the Arctic industrial base, it is not enough. Canada remains trapped in a peacetime posture and mentality—symbolic patrols and seasonal exercises—
while the region becomes increasingly contested by powers that are, at best, are neutral to Canada’s concerns and, at worst, openly hostile to them.
This inertia is rooted in a political culture that prioritizes accommodation over assertiveness. Successive governments have deferred to progressive
special interest groups whose influence blunts hard security policies. Environmentalist and Indigenous consultations, while important, are often
weaponized procedurally to paralyze decisive action. The result is a government debilitated by process, one that speaks of sovereignty but shrinks from
the instruments necessary to enforce it. Even modest defense initiatives face resistance if they challenge entrenched activist orthodoxies or require
confronting Canada’s internal contradictions. This includes the
legal quagmire of provincial and territorial
jurisdiction in the North, which Ottawa remains unwilling to override or reform.
Perhaps most damning for Washington is Canada’s lack of strategic coherence . Ottawa
provides a strategic framework for the Arctic but fails to dedicate the resources to achieve
the objectives contained therein. Policy and strategy without resource commitments are unseriousness ideas. Moreover,
Canada’s policies do not form a doctrine of Arctic deterrence , convey no idea on how to
mobilize federal will, and fail to weave a unifying narrative that connects Arctic defense to
the survival of Canada as a sovereign nation in an increasingly anarchic world.
America cannot —and will not—permit a soft underbelly to fester in a domain as critical
as the Arctic. It is not inconceivable for US forces unilaterally securing parts of the Canadian
Arctic in the event of a crisis. Such actions, while diplomatically uncomfortable, would be strategically necessary if Canadian gaps
remain unaddressed. To be blunt: if pressed and in a fight with Russia or China in the Arctic, the US will almost certainly be “Elbows Up” in defense of
North America, even if it offends Canadian sensitivities.
Canada Fails---Capacity
Certainty is key and the failures of Canadian capacity mean it can’t
solve.
Østhagen 23 [Andreas Østhagen is a Senior Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI), a Senior Fellow at The Arctic
Institute and an Advisor at the High North Center for Business and Governance at Nord University.]
Andreas Østhagen, 12/02/2023, “Canada and The Arctic”, HeinOnline, Accessed Via Dartmouth Online 07/12/25 //kcbk
Canada’s Arctic development seems somewhat twofold . On the one hand, Canada actively
participates on the international stage in Arctic matters, emphasizing its sovereignty , rights and seabed
claims , in addition to its Arctic Council slogan “Development for the people in the North”. On the other hand, domestic
development and actual investment s are lagging behind its Arctic neighbors, with serious
gaps in infrastructure and local/regional capacity . The Canadian Arctic territories are also
granted less autonomy and self-governance than the rest of the country’s sub-national units, with a slow
process of devolution, in particular with regards to Nunavut.
When comparing Canada to the other Arctic coastal states, the gap between rhetoric and factual
development becomes apparent . Amongst the Nordic countries, the Arctic regions are relatively well enmeshed
in nation building at large, while Russia has placed a considerable emphasis on its Arctic region, both rhetorically and in terms of
investments. The Greenlandic self-government is in the driving seat of its own development, while Alaska has a particular strong
Arctic voice, encouraging Washington to look northwards. Yet, the federal government in Ottawa understands that it needs to
engage its Arctic territories, as can be seen by the inclusion of regional representatives in its delegation to the Arctic Council.
Inclusion and dialogue, however, is one thing. Actual investment s and capacity building is
something else, no matter who owns the North Pole.
Perm---2AC
US/Canada cooperation solves best.
Atlantic Council 25 [It’s a panel of experts talking about the Arctic – try and debate the
quals at your own risk, “Experts react: What Mark Carney means for the US-Canada
relationship”, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-what-markcarney-means-for-the-us-canada-relationship/, DOA 7/10/25, ©©]
Climate change is melting sea ice, making the Arctic more accessible, opening new shipping routes, and creating new opportunities
for resource extraction. Canada’s relatively undeveloped Arctic makes the region an “attractive,
strategic, and vulnerable destination,” for foreign adversaries according to the Canadian
Security Intelligence Services, which notes that enemies will likely be interested in investing in
infrastructure and resources to gain a foothold in Canada’s high north.
With an upcoming election, Carney should make strengthening Canada’s Arctic security a
priority. For his part, Poilievre pledged a substantial increase in Canada’s military presence in the Arctic if the Conservatives are
elected.
The Trudeau government announced last week an investment to build three Northern
Operational Support Hubs, acting as a presence for the Canadian Armed Forces in the region. However, the development
of these hubs will take place over twenty years, far too long a timeframe to meet a real and already present threat, and Carney
would be well suited to expedite this timeline.
In aiming to boost Canada’s Arctic security, Carney should look south. Cooperation with the United States
may seem fraught today, but in the long term it is essential for the security and stability of the
North American Arctic.
The two nations’ continued close cooperation, alongside Finland, is essential to the success of
the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact), which aims to build Arctic and polar icebreakers while sharing
information and knowledge among the three nations.
AT: Canada Soft Power
Canadian soft power is dead – rising geopolitical tensions and a
shifting world order have upended the conditions that allowed
Canada to thrive.
*this card is actually heat*
Nagy 25 [Stephen, Contributing reporter at the Japan Times “Canada's middle power myths
give way to harsh realities”, 6/29/25, Japan Times,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2025/06/29/world/canada-day-2025/, DOA
7/8/25, ©©]
With Canada Day upon us, Ottawa faces unprecedented challenges to the nation's sovereignty
and prosperity, and a stark reality: The international order that enabled Canada’s middle power
diplomacy for seven decades is dead .
The return of great power competition, exemplified by recent American economic
coercion , persistent Chinese economic pressure and foreign interference demands a
fundamental transformation of Canadian foreign policy. The choice is not between
independence and alignment, but between strategic adaptation and irrelevance .
The events of the past six months have crystallized what should have been obvious for years.
When U.S. President Donald Trump imposed his 25% tariffs while musing about Canadian
statehood, he merely articulated what American actions have long implied: that Washington
views allied relationships through a transactional lens where power asymmetries define
outcomes.
Similarly, when Beijing targeted Canadian agricultural exports in response to Ottawa’s criticism
of its Hong Kong policies or the lawful arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou, it made clear
that China’s use of economic power serves the political interests of the Chinese Communist
Party, regardless of World Trade Organization rules or treaty obligations.
These are not exceptions ; they are the new normal. The comfortable and sometimes naive
assumptions that underpinned Canadian foreign policy for decades — such as the belief that
rules-based multilateralism could restrain great powers, that economic ties would ease political
tensions and that middle powers were able to navigate between rival blocs — have proven
dangerously misguided. Canada must now build a foreign policy rooted in the hard
realities of global power politics, not the liberal aspirations of the past.
Alt causes to Canadian leadership.
Talalla 24 [Theo, Staff writer at the McGill Policy Association,
https://mcgillpolicyassociation.com/latest-articles/2024/02/20/destined-to-fail-the-problemwith-canadian-diplomac, “Destined to Fail: The Problem with Canadian Diplomacy”, DOA
7/10/25, ©©]
Mismanagement and confusion within government agencies could be more easily forgiven if
comprehensive plans were clear and detailed. Unfortunately, they too remain vague and in some
instances virtually unattainable. Global Affairs Canada’s Indo-Pacific Plan is strong on paper,
but it hinges on difficult diplomatic successes that appear increasingly unlikely . For
example, a key component of this plan is a strengthening partnership with India, a country that
expelled Canadian diplomats last October following a diplomatic row regarding India’s alleged
involvement with an assassination on Canadian soil. Clearly, they are at best closer to an
acquaintance than a friend or “strategic partner” as is the case with other Indo-Pacific countries
such as South Korea, according to Global Affairs Canada.
Internally, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) reportedly cannot combat or effectively
prevent a serious domestic security threat. At the end of 2023, the United Kingdom increased
the terror threat level for Canada, higher than it has been in numerous years, and curiously,
higher than the federal government of Canada has on its website. While this is merely an
assessment by another nation on Canada’s security situation, it should raise concerns and
questions as to why the Canadian government has not changed its own risk level, and how
prepared Canadian security services are to combat potential threats if they are arising. The
answer to both of those appears to be disorganization
In late 2023, Canada’s own Senate Foreign Affairs Committee deemed diplomatic capacity to be
unsustainably weak due to decades of underfunding and disorganization. It is these exact
shortcomings that have resulted in Canada sitting on the “sidelines” as allied nations work
together and deepen strategic ties. A Policy Options Report examined how over the last twenty
years, seniority among Canadian foreign policy officers was based on administrative capabilities
instead of foreign policy experience within Canadian diplomatic offices. Clearly then, our foreign
policy initiatives appear destined to fall short. As the Global Affairs Canada website states,
the “well-being and security of Canadians is directly affected by events abroad”. It needs to work
to internalize these words, ensuring that proper diplomacy is conducted in an organized fashion,
so as to ensure the safety of Canadian citizens and maximize the effectiveness of Canadian
diplomatic initiatives.
“Middle power” is dead on arrival.
Fadden 19 [Richard, Former Deputy Minister of National Defence of Canada, “Canada’s
place in the world in 2020 and beyond: Richard Fadden for Inside Policy”,
https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/canadas-place-world-2020-beyond-richard-fadden-inside-policy/,
DOA 7/10/25, ©©]
I am not certain the concept of a middle power works today. To be in the middle, we need some
countries “below” us and one or more above us. There are certainly countries below us but
many are now vying for what is left of middle power status – a field possibly so numerous as to
be meaningless. The other requirement is for a “top” power.
China will continue to be more of a world power than the Soviet Union, the United States is no
longer the G-1 power it was when the USSR fell, and many Western countries are pre-occupied
with their internal issues. And some NATO countries are falling to the blandishments of China.
Perhaps one of the greatest issues faced by the West is the lack of a common “threat
assessment.” This issue is especially visible in Canada – we are surrounded by three oceans
and the US, so we don’t really feel threatened.
Now where does all this leave Canada? In particular, what can we do to deal effectively with
these meta-issues? More than anything, we need to shed the blinders of the past and see the
world and our place in it as it is. This is not a G-1 world, so we need to stand on our own with
values and ideas more than we have in the past. And, to do this we must bring to bear patience
and consistency along with the resources to match.
I suggest that Canada’s place is as one among any number of Western countries, without the
special position we enjoyed as a traditional middle power. This means we have to stop
assuming other countries will eventually see issues as we do. We need to work harder and
consistently with other countries on an issue-by-issue basis – sometime leading, sometime not.
And not just assume the US will be able to or want to lead.
In practical terms, we need to recognize our adversaries for what they are. We have to deal with
them but also draw clear limits to what we will accept. The G-1 world with comprehensive US
leadership is gone and is not coming back . We are one among many Western countries
adjusting to this new world. For that reason, we should accept that the meta-issues outlined
require a multinational approach. It is important for Canada to work to develop a common
Western world-view and prioritize where our national interests are greatest.
The counterplan’s signal is either solved by the squo or overridden by
US/Canada coop.
Reuters 24 [It’s a newspaper, “Canada to boost Arctic cooperation with US, cites Russia
threat” https://www.reuters.com/world/canada-boost-arctic-cooperation-with-us-cites-russiathreat-2024-12-06/, DOA 7/10/25, ©©]
Canada plans to work more closely with the United States in the Arctic to ensure regional
security in the face of an increasingly aggressive Russia, Ottawa said on Friday.
As part of a renewed strategy, Canada will appoint an Arctic ambassador and open new
consulates in Anchorage, Alaska and Nuuk, Greenland.
Canada's Arctic covers more than 4.4 million square kilometres and is almost deserted, save for
a few communities and ports. Less than 16 per cent of the waters have been adequately
surveyed.
The 37-page strategy document cites Russian aggression, Chinese ambitions in the region as
well as the "effects of global warming", which could open up shipping channels.
"The North American Arctic is no longer free from tension. Canada must work even closer with
its closest ally , the United States, to maintain a secure North American homeland," it said.
US President-elect Donald Trump met Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau last week and
said they had discussed the Arctic among other topics.
Canada will explore new avenues of cooperation with the United States in areas such as
energy security, supply chains and critical minerals, the document said.
AT: AI Impact
No AI extinction
Richards et al 23, [(By Blake Richards, Blaise Agüera y Arcas, Guillaume Lajoie and
Dhanya Sridhar,) "The Illusion Of AI’s Existential Risk, NOEMA,
https://www.noemamag.com/the-illusion-of-ais-existential-risk/, 7-18-2023, accessed 7-112025] thatcher
That’s because extinction from a rogue AI is an extremely unlikely scenario that depends
on dubious assumptions about the long-term evolution of life, intelligence, technology and
society. It is also an unlikely scenario because of the many physical limits and constraints a
superintelligent AI system would need to overcome before it could “go rogue” in such a way.
There are multiple natural checkpoints where researchers can help mitigate existential AI
risk by addressing tangible and pressing challenges without explicitly making existential risk a
global priority.
Our foremost concern should be preventing massive, unnecessary suffering of the sort that we know is
possible given existing and soon-to-exist technologies. Rigorous studies of real and present AI-induced
harms have been published and potential solutions have been proposed.
For example, facial recognition technology can be used for tracking individuals and limiting basic
freedoms, and generative image technology can be used to create false images or videos of
events that never happened. To address these issues, calls to action have been made, including the
Montreal Declaration on Responsible AI and the World Economic Forum’s Presidio
Recommendations on Responsible Generative AI.
We can and should forecast AI developments in the near term, and deliberate about their
potential harms. But as we forecast farther into the future of this rapidly advancing field, the
unknowns grow exponentially, which makes planning around such forecasts impractical. It is
more constructive to highlight real challenges and debate proposed solutions rather than steer
public discourse toward hypothetical existential risks.
Reality Check
What would actually have to happen for the prospect of extinction by a rogue AI to change from being a purely hypothetical threat to
a realistic threat that deserves to be a global priority?
Harm and even massive death from misuse of (non-superintelligent) AI is a real possibility and extinction
via superintelligent rogue AI is not an impossibility. We believe the latter is an unlikely prospect, though, for
reasons that will become clear in examining the potential paths to extinction by a rogue,
superintelligent AI.
To do so, we must first operate under the assumption that superintelligence is possible, even
though that is far from a consensus view in the AI community. Even defining “superintelligence” is a
fraught exercise, since the idea that human intelligence can be fully quantified in terms of performance on a suite of tasks seems
overly reductive; there are many different forms of intelligence after all.
“It is more constructive to highlight real challenges and debate proposed solutions rather than steer public discourse toward
hypothetical existential risks.”
It seems safe to say that current AI is not superintelligent, although it has already surpassed human performance at
many tasks, and is likely to do so at many more in the near future. Today’s AI models are very impressive, and
arguably they possess a form of intelligence and understanding of the world. They are also
easily fooled, “hallucinate” falsehoods, and sometimes fail to make critical logical
inductions, such as causal inferences.
Still, for the sake of argument, let’s suppose that the impressive speed at which AI is advancing addresses these
shortcomings and, at some point in the future, results in the emergence of a general superintelligence,
e.g. an AI that is generally better than humans at almost any cognitive task.
Even then, we highlight a number of checkpoints that exist along any potential path to extinction from
rogue AI. These checkpoints are red flags that would help identify when the hypothetical risk
becomes more pressing and may need to be prioritized.
Requirements for Speciocide
Discussions about AI’s existential risk often suggest that a superintelligent AI would cause our
extinction because more intelligent species “naturally” cause the extinction of less intelligent
species.
It is true that in Earth’s history, there are examples of one species causing the extinction of another, less intelligent species;
extinctions caused by humans are most often cited. (We are, in fact, unaware of any nonhuman example.)
However, superior intelligence is not the key determinant in such events; there have been
many instances of less intelligent species causing the extinction of more intelligent ones. For
example, in the Late Devonian, the rapid diversification of plants and the changes to the atmosphere that they
induced is believed to have been a cause of one of Earth’s mass extinctions, resulting in the loss of threequarters of all species, many of which were likely more intelligent than plants.
More broadly, interspecies extinction is not a result of some competitive battle for
dominance between two species. The idea of species forming a hierarchy or “Great Chain of Being” is inaccurate; in
reality, relationships between species are complex and form a web or graph of mutual interdependence with no “top” or “bottom.”
When biologists talk about “dominance” in animal interactions, they usually apply definitions
that focus on relationships between individuals of the same species.
Characterizations of evolution as being about interspecies competition and selfishness are a misrepresentation of what evolutionary
biology tells us and may be rooted in our own unique phylogenetic history as primates — and patriarchal assumptions. In
general, mutualism and cooperation between species are very likely to emerge from the
pressures of natural selection.
What we know about extinction events tells us that they are generally caused by changes to the
environment, and when they are a result of one species’ impact on another, extinction is
induced in one of three ways: competition for resources, hunting and overconsumption or altering the climate or their ecological niche such that
resulting environmental conditions lead to their demise. None of these three cases apply to
AI as it stands.
AI is not competing for resources with human beings. Rather, we provide AI systems with their
resources, from energy and raw materials to computer chips and network infrastructure. Without human inputs, AI
systems are incapable of maintaining themselves.
If mining, global shipping, and trade of precious metals, building and maintenance of power plants, chip-building factories, data
center construction, and internet cable-laying were all fully automated — including all of the logistics and supply chains involved —
then perhaps a superintelligent AI could decide that humans are superfluous or a drain on resources, and decide to kill us.
For now, AI depends on us, and a superintelligence
would presumably recognize that fact and seek to preserve humanity since we
are as fundamental to AI’s existence as
oxygen-producing plants are to ours. This makes the evolution of mutualism between AI and
humans a far more likely outcome than competition. Moreover, the path to a fully automated
economy — if that is the goal — will be long, with each major step serving as a natural
checkpoint for human intervention.
Such automation would require major advances in hardware as well as software. But robotics is not developing at a
pace that’s anywhere close to AI’s — and it is unlikely to, since AI’s accelerated progress is tied to the digital
world, where computational power grows exponentially, copying is nearly instantaneous, and optimization is automated.
“For now, AI depends on us, and a superintelligence would presumably recognize that fact and seek to preserve humanity since we
are as fundamental to AI’s existence as oxygen-producing plants are to ours.”
A scenario where a superintelligent AI decides that humans are a drain on resources and should
be eliminated, rather than a key source of its support, depends on technologies and economic structures
(e.g. completely automated production cycles, from raw material extraction to advanced
manufacturing) that don’t exist and are unlikely to exist for the foreseeable future.
AI cannot physically hunt us. A superintelligent AI could, in theory, kill large numbers of
human beings if it had autonomous control over weapons of mass
destruction. However, this scenario also provides humans with natural checkpoints.
If the world’s governments are actively building autonomous weapons systems with mass
destruction or bio-warfare capabilities we should indeed be ringing alarm bells and doing
everything we can to stop them. Such a scenario would be dangerous with or without
superintelligent AI; arguably, using autonomous AI with limited intelligence for military applications could be just as
concerning.
AI’s impact on the climate is up to us. Environmentalists have raised concerns about AI’s
carbon footprint in an era of ever-larger models that can take months to train in power-hungry data centers. These
concerns must be taken seriously, given that accelerating climate change is a real civilizational — perhaps even existential —
risk. We must rise to the challenge of developing clean power, or risk catastrophe, regardless of
AI.
However, the carbon emissions of AI training and inference today are minuscule compared to
the computing sector as a whole, let alone the more carbon-intensive activities of our industrial
civilization, such as construction and transportation, which together account for more than a third of our total carbon emissions.
While the use of AI may continue to grow dramatically over the coming years, its energy
efficiency will also likely continue to improve dramatically, making it unclear whether AI will ever be among
the most significant carbon emitters on a global scale.
It is also worth noting that the current best approach to developing generalist AI is “pre-training” large foundation models like GPT4 or PaLM, which are not specific to any one task but can be quickly adapted to a variety of uses. While pre-training may be energyintensive, it need only be done once, replacing the narrow, per-task training required by previous generations of AI.
The emerging generation of general-purpose, multimodal AI will be capable not only of modeling human language, but many other
complex systems; such AI will likely play an important role in clean power generation, climate
analysis and climate change mitigation. More to the point, any expansion of AI infrastructure, or
effectively AI’s energy footprint, is another checkpoint under human control. After
all, data centers do not build themselves.
One could argue that a superintelligent AI system could manipulate humans into building
power plants or deploying weapons on its behalf. That is, they need not do it themselves. However, the most
obvious approach to addressing this concern lies in focusing on the real and present dangers
of AI social engineering (today, often at the behest of human scammers), or mitigating the risk of humans
falling prey to coherent-sounding hallucinations.
Just as we train people and develop software tools to combat phishing, we should invest in AI literacy and technology
to combat manipulation and misinformation by AI systems. In contrast, while predicting the manipulation
tactics of superintelligent AI might be intellectually interesting — and could suggest avenues for further research — it doesn’t offer
concrete mitigation strategies or regulatory steps.
In sum, AI acting on its own cannot induce human extinction in any of the ways that extinctions have
happened in the past. Appeals to the competitive nature of evolution or previous instances of a more intelligent species causing the
extinction of a less intelligent species reflect a common mischaracterization of evolution by natural selection.
No AI impact – empirics prove no unregulated AI will cause extiction.
Amigud 24 [Alexander Amigud, Professor at International Business University (IBU)]
Alexander Amigud, 04/03/2024, “The Age of the Intelligent Machine: Singularity, Efficiency, and Existential Peril”, Accessed Via:
Philosophy & Technology, vol. 37, number 2 //kcbk
7 Existential Threat of AI
The marriage of technology and society undergoes distinct honeymoon and disenchantment phases. For example, a short
decade ago, consumer-level 3D printers were expected to revolutionize on-demand production
and logistics. The euphoria was soon displaced by the fear of 3D-printed guns that could flood
the streets and catapult society into anarchy . The fears did not materialize , and interest in the
topic subsided, although, some were eager to capitalize on ignorance about technology’s limitations (Associated Press, 2022).
Blockchain technology followed a similar path , from the euphoria of decentralized
finance to the dystopia of digital IDs. E-learning is another vivid example of technology that was
once hailed as “the new paradigm of modern education” (Sun et al., 2008), but when implemented at
scale was described as a “ bad joke ” (Gould, 2020).
In the past few years, AI was in the spotlight as “ the technology ” with transformational
power to better the world through smartification of cities, schools, factories, offices, hospitals,
elevators, bicycle rentals, rice cookers and everything in between. The cycle of euphoria was
again short-lived and displaced by the fear of a looming existential threat . The
concerns were so grave that technology leaders have called for a moratorium on its future
development (Westfall, 2023) and held closed-door meetings to chart a path forward (Jalonick & O’Brien,
2023). The issue has received considerable attention not only from the media establishment, academic institutions, futurists,
politicians, and even international bodies such as UNESCO (2023), which published recommendations on the ethics of AI.
However, much of the discourse on risks of AI ignores the societal context and fails to
explain why the suggested outcome will be more likely than any other . Nick Bostrom
wrote in Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, “If the AI has (perhaps for safety reasons) been confined to an isolated
computer, it may use its social manipulation superpower to persuade the gatekeepers to let it gain access to an Internet port.
Alternatively, the AI might use its hacking superpower to escape its confinement. Spreading over the Internet may enable the AI to
expand its hardware capacity and knowledge base, further increasing its intellectual superiority” (Bostrom, 2014). But, his
“orthogonality thesis suggests that we cannot blithely assume that a superintelligence will necessarily share any of the final values
stereotypically associated with wisdom and intellectual development in humans” and, therefore, it might, with the same degree of
probability, partake in TikTok challenges, write books, gamble online, or self-destruct. The obsession with power, though a common
theme in the literature, is merely one of countless outcomes that AI could pursue. However, considering the moral panic, it would
not be surprising if soon new job titles such as AI misuse officer or AI psychologist, or even an institution like the Federal Bureau of
Singularity, were created to police the AI landscape. It would not be far-fetched to assume that soon a new economy will emerge to
address mental health issues related to the lost sense of reality, such as obsessive behaviors like counting fingers on photographs,
persecution complexes stemming from the feeling of being watched by machines, and body dysmorphia resulting from misalignment
between photo filters and actual appearance. Would these be sufficient to tear the fabric of society?
One may wonder whether AI research will eventually encounter a variation of the Fermi Paradox, where there will be no evidence of
evil deeds produced by intelligent machines, on their own initiative, despite a high percentage of models that
claim to be or are deemed (by some arbitrary metric) to be sentient and capable of causing
harm .
The notions of singularity and superintelligence, and their underlying assumptions,
themselves deserve greater scrutiny . Bostrom (2014) wrote, “If some day we build machine brains that
surpass human brains in general intelligence, then this new superintelligence could become very powerful.” But then the question
arises: powerful for what? Solving puzzles , answering test questions , and following
instructions , or forging a path forward to a brighter future? This definition seems overly
reductionist and ignores creativity, humor, emotions, and other factors that may serve as a proxy for human intelligence, which is not
merely individualistic but cumulative, pluralistic, and has a temporal dimension. To maintain its status as a superintelligent being, worthy of fear or
worship, AI should not only be more intelligent (however that is defined) than the average person but should also outperform the entire human race,
past, present, and future. Any new idea conceived by humans that a machine has not generated and claimed would undermine its status as
superintelligent.
Another definition comes from Vinge (1993), who asserted that “an ultraintelligent
machine…defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man
however clever…it will be the last invention that man need make .” He further defined
singularity as “a point where our old models must be discarded and a new reality rules, a point that will loom vaster and vaster over
human affairs until the notion becomes a commonplace.” For him, singularity is the manifestation of
superhumanity . By this definition singularity is attained when a man becomes a god or, at
the very least, a techno-feudal lord who enslaves higher intellect to do all his work. But could the old models be truly discarded,
considering that humans are creatures of nature—they need to breath, eat, sleep, collaborate, and, according to Blaise Pascal (1910)
have trouble staying quietly in their own rooms? The attainment of singularity would signify the end of humanity. When pursued
deliberately, it would be equivalent to suicide; this warrants the expansion of Durkheim’s nomenclature (Durkheim, 2005/1897) by
adding a new category of “transcendental suicide” to become posthuman.
Furthermore, the existential threat of AI is minimized by economic factors . A shrinking
slice of the economic pie is driving many off the grid , where even basic technologies are scarce
(Vannini & Taggart, 2013). According to a recent press release by The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United
Nations agency for information and communication technologies, as of 2022, approximately 2.7 billion people, or just
over a third of the global population which, do not have access to the Internet . The
document notes that “the chance of connecting everyone by 2030 looks increasingly slim ” (ITU,
2022). There appears to be a digital divide , with developing countries, marginalized communities, and rural areas
in developed countries lacking internet connectivity. Even in Europe, 11 percent of the population is still
offline. Suppose that the rogue AI was successful in leading the internetconnected humanity like lemmings off the cliff ; there would remain a significant
group of survivors who failed to show up because they could not afford the
service or it was not reliable .
When technologies are instrumental in preserving the integrity of societal processes and the functioning of institutions, the
existential threat does not need to come from technologies per se, but from their misuse, abuse, and rudimentary incompetence. The
Peter Principle (Peter & Hull, 1969) is a phenomenon worth paying close attention to, and arguably poses a much greater risk than
rogue AI. To it we owe the ongoing disruption of ecosystems, health problems, and social injustices. The incautious use of
our old technological power over the rest of nature is already catching up with us, raising alarms
about the sustainability of technological progress; this trend is likely to continue due to what Pieper (2024) described as
technological fetishism. While there are many ways to trigger an existential crisis, rogue AI is not
the most potent way .
Canada
Perm do both
US/Canada cooperation solves best.
Atlantic Council 25 [It’s a panel of experts talking about the Arctic – try and debate the quals at
your own risk, “Experts react: What Mark Carney means for the US-Canada relationship”,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-what-mark-carney-means-for-theus-canada-relationship/, DOA 7/10/25, ©©]
Climate change is melting sea ice, making the Arctic more accessible, opening new shipping routes, and creating new opportunities for resource
extraction. Canada’s relatively undeveloped Arctic makes the region an “attractive, strategic, and
vulnerable destination,” for foreign adversaries according to the Canadian Security Intelligence
Services, which notes that enemies will likely be interested in investing in infrastructure and resources
to gain a foothold in Canada’s high north.
With an upcoming election, Carney should make strengthening Canada’s Arctic security a priority. For
his part, Poilievre pledged a substantial increase in Canada’s military presence in the Arctic if the Conservatives are elected.
The Trudeau government announced last week an investment to build three Northern Operational
Support Hubs, acting as a presence for the Canadian Armed Forces in the region. However, the development of these hubs will take place
over twenty years, far too long a timeframe to meet a real and already present threat, and Carney would be well suited to
expedite this timeline.
In aiming to boost Canada’s Arctic security, Carney should look south. Cooperation with the United States may seem
fraught today, but in the long term it is essential for the security and stability of the North American
Arctic.
The two nations’ continued close cooperation, alongside Finland, is essential to the success of
the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact), which aims to build Arctic and polar icebreakers while sharing information and
knowledge among the three nations.
Canadian soft power is dead – rising geopolitical tensions and a
shifting world order have upended the conditions that allowed
Canada to thrive.
*this card is actually heat*
Nagy 25 [Stephen, Contributing reporter at the Japan Times “Canada's middle power myths give way
to harsh realities”, 6/29/25, Japan Times,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2025/06/29/world/canada-day-2025/, DOA 7/8/25, ©©]
With Canada Day upon us, Ottawa faces unprecedented challenges to the nation's sovereignty and
prosperity, and a stark reality: The international order that enabled Canada’s middle power diplomacy
for seven decades is dead .
The return of great power competition, exemplified by recent American economic coercion ,
persistent Chinese economic pressure and foreign interference demands a fundamental
transformation of Canadian foreign policy. The choice is not between independence and alignment, but
between strategic adaptation and irrelevance .
The events of the past six months have crystallized what should have been obvious for years. When U.S.
President Donald Trump imposed his 25% tariffs while musing about Canadian statehood, he merely
articulated what American actions have long implied: that Washington views allied relationships through
a transactional lens where power asymmetries define outcomes.
Similarly, when Beijing targeted Canadian agricultural exports in response to Ottawa’s criticism of its
Hong Kong policies or the lawful arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou, it made clear that China’s
use of economic power serves the political interests of the Chinese Communist Party, regardless of
World Trade Organization rules or treaty obligations.
These are not exceptions ; they are the new normal. The comfortable and sometimes naive
assumptions that underpinned Canadian foreign policy for decades — such as the belief that rules-based
multilateralism could restrain great powers, that economic ties would ease political tensions and that
middle powers were able to navigate between rival blocs — have proven dangerously misguided.
Canada must now build a foreign policy rooted in the hard realities of global power politics, not the
liberal aspirations of the past.
Canada lacks the strategic coherence to follow through on the plan
even when implemented.
Reynolds ’25 [Jeffrey Reynolds, non-resident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s
Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security]
Jeffrey Reynolds, 05/30/2025, “The frontier is the front line: On climate resilience for infrastructure and supplies in Canada’s Arctic”, The
Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-frontier-is-the-front-line-on-climate-resilience-forinfrastructure-and-supplies-in-canadas-arctic/ //kcbk
Canada’s failure to defend its Arctic territory is not merely a function of limited resources,
but of deliberate strategic neglect . The refusal to acquire nuclear -powered submarines—essential for
For Washington,
year-round under-ice patrols and true sovereignty enforcement—reveals a deeper aversion to the burdens of great power
responsibility. While adversaries invest in undersea dominance and dual-use Arctic infrastructure, Ottawa opts for half-measures: diesel patrol submarines
that can’t operate under the polar ice, minimal surveillance capabilities, and no permanent military basing north of 60.
The US view is shifting from a posture of “monitor and respond” to one of “prepare and deter.” Pentagon
reports no longer downplay the Arctic as a region of strategic importance. Even smaller powers have taken notice. India published its Arctic strategy in 2021,
emphasizing scientific diplomacy. Turkey signed the Svalbard Treaty to gain access rights to the Arctic in 2023. France and Germany are also exploring greater
footprints in the region.
While the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) Pact with Canada and Finland represents a trilateral effort to rebuild icebreaker capacity and harden the Arctic
industrial base, it is not enough. Canada remains trapped in a peacetime posture and mentality—symbolic patrols and seasonal exercises—while the region
becomes increasingly contested by powers that are, at best, are neutral to Canada’s concerns and, at worst, openly hostile to them.
This inertia is rooted in a political culture that prioritizes accommodation over assertiveness. Successive governments have deferred to progressive special interest
groups whose influence blunts hard security policies. Environmentalist and Indigenous consultations, while important, are often weaponized procedurally to
paralyze decisive action. The result is a government debilitated by process, one that speaks of sovereignty but shrinks from the instruments necessary to enforce it.
Even modest defense initiatives face resistance if they challenge entrenched activist orthodoxies or require confronting Canada’s internal contradictions. This
includes the
legal quagmire of provincial and territorial jurisdiction in the North, which Ottawa remains unwilling to override or
reform.
Perhaps most damning for Washington is Canada’s lack of strategic coherence . Ottawa provides
a strategic framework for the Arctic but fails to dedicate the resources to achieve the objectives
contained therein. Policy and strategy without resource commitments are unseriousness ideas. Moreover, Canada’s policies do not form
a doctrine of Arctic deterrence , convey no idea on how to mobilize federal will, and fail to weave a
unifying narrative that connects Arctic defense to the survival of Canada as a sovereign nation in an
increasingly anarchic world.
America cannot —and will not—permit a soft underbelly to fester in a domain as critical as the Arctic.
It is not inconceivable for US forces unilaterally securing parts of the Canadian Arctic in the event of a
crisis. Such actions, while diplomatically uncomfortable, would be strategically necessary if Canadian gaps remain unaddressed. To be blunt: if pressed and in a
fight with Russia or China in the Arctic, the US will almost certainly be “Elbows Up” in defense of North America, even if it offends Canadian sensitivities.
Process—Arctic Council
ASF Fails
Any forum or arctic council is STRUCTURALLY UNWORKABLE and
INEFFECTIVE
Heather Pirot ‘19. Pirot has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Calgary. "Form and
Function: The Future of the Arctic Council." The Arctic Institute News. 02-05-2019.
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/form-function-future-arctic-council//KM
Although the Arctic Council has a good foundation, it is constrained in significant ways .
The first of these is funding . While the Arctic Council Secretariat seems adequately funded (1.24 million
USD in 2017, with Norway contributing half), it has very little discretionary funding . Similarly,
the Working Groups rely on one or two states to fund a secretariat but have limited ongoing project
funds. Almost all activities are funded on an ad hoc basis by the states who advocated for them and by individual experts who secure their
own funding through national channels. Thus, all too often it is funding that drives projects, not projects that drive
funding. This makes it difficult to be strategic with planning, or to
organize new activities
beyond a one or two year window . Moreover, funding to support the
capacity and participation of Permanent Participants is a constant source of concern. The establishment of the widely publicized Álgu Fund,
conceptualized as a “capacity-building endowment” has not been successful in addressing this challenge as of yet.
While the Arctic Council has made good progress on becoming more transparent in recent years through its open access archive, it still
struggles to be accountable to stakeholders, northerners, and taxpayers. This is not for lack of effort,
but due to its structure. It has a voluntary character , which prevents
binding commitments . Ministerial Declarations contain many subjective statements that are difficult to account for,
and no formal efforts are made to assess them. A tracking tool, the Amarok, has been established to document life cycle phases of various
projects and initiatives, but there are no resources to systematically measure progress on outcomes, value for money/effort, or
implementation, or to provide ongoing monitoring.
U.S policy can’t rebuild council coop or credibility. Other Arctic
powers key to survival
Marc Jacobsen ‘25. Jacobsen is an associate Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College focused
on Arctic diplomacy and security politics. "The Arctic Council in the Shadow of Geopolitics." The Arctic
Institute’s Center for Circumpolar Security Studies. 05-12-2025.
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-council-shadow-geopolitics//KM
After many years of tug-of-war, it now seems that Denmark , Greenland and the Faroe Islands have
buried the hatchet regarding the division of roles during the chairship, with Greenland now occupying a
very prominent role. This is important both in the short term – where they must ensure a successful
chairship – and in the long term, where it is about the overarching mission of making sure that
the Arctic Council survives.
Three reasons why the Arctic Council must survive
There are many good reasons why the Arctic Council should survive. Here we will highlight three:
First, the involvement of Indigenous peoples as permanent participants in the council is unique in an international context. They do not have
direct decision-making authority, but they are at the table and provide input – and are heard – when decisions are made. If the Arctic Council
does not survive, this unique construct will fall apart, which will create a major challenge for Arctic Indigenous peoples, who are unlikely to gain
the same kind of influence in another regional forum.
Second, the Arctic Council’s working groups are a unique construct: Over three decades, scientists and officials have accumulated knowledge
that has been incorporated into national administration and international convention work. This work has thus helped to make the rest of the
world aware of the enormous climatic and environmental challenges that are extraordinarily noticeable in the Arctic, well exemplified by the
average regional temperature increase which is about three times higher than the global average. Thus, the scientific work under the auspices
of the Arctic Council is not only important for the region, but for the globe at large. If the Arctic Council does not survive the current crisis, these
essential networks will likely collapse, and they cannot be rebuilt overnight.
The third, and related, reason is that the Arctic states and the other actors of the Council face major transboundary challenges that are best
solved jointly. Be it biodiversity issues, the spread of diseases and environmental problems; the risk of the latter is only increasing in step with
the heightened activities in the region.
Our inevitable shared fate in the North
At the moment, it is of course politically and morally difficult to cooperate with Russia,
while the Trump administration’s approach to Greenland – and the Arctic
experiences from his first presidential term – provide negative evidence of what further consequences this could
have for regional cooperation .
The Arctic
Council is in a historically difficult situation , marked by
geopolitical shadows from both the East and the West. An extraordinary responsibility therefore rests
on the other Arctic states – led by the new chairship – to ensure that they together
address our inevitable shared fate in the North .
ASF Bad
ASF counterproductive for solving problems.
Stephen 16 — Kathrin Stephen, Scientific group leader at the Institute for Advanced
Sustainability Studies in Potsdam, Germany; Senior fellow and editor-in-chief at the Arctic
Institute, Center for Circumpolar Security Studies in Washington, D.C., 2016 ("An Arctic
Security Forum? Please, no!", The Arctic Institute, May 26th, Available Online at
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-security-forum-please-dont/, Accessed 06-26-2025)
The most striking fact about all the arguments for a military security component to Arctic
governance is that these calls are all grounded on preemptive arguments—i.e. they try to fix
problems that do not exist. Because thus far, the Arctic has fared pretty well without an explicit
security arrangement. Calls for an ASF thus always refer to an unpredictable future where such a
forum would be necessary to maintain Arctic peace. While being skeptical about an ASF being
able to perform such a role, I would even go a step further and argue that an explicit security
forum for the Arctic—for example within the Arctic Council—would, instead of solving problems,
create them.
Let’s imagine an Arctic Council able to address military security matters back in 2013 when the
Ukraine crisis began to boil over. It can realistically be expected that, due to the ensuing
tensions between “western” countries and Russia, the Arctic Council would have quickly been
paralyzed. This could have taken shape as, for example, countries boycotting high-level meetings
of the Council such as Senior Arctic Officials and Ministerial meetings. The Arctic governance
regime would, in its entirety, have been severely challenged given the Council’s key role as the
central political forum for the region. Since the Council coordinates various interests across a
spectrum of different political, economic, and environmental issues—as exemplified in its
Working Groups, Task Forces and Expert Groups—also all these non-security areas would have
been affected.
A different scenario is what would have happened if in 2013 we would have had an Arctic
Security Council, mirroring the existing Arctic Economic Council. It appears safe to assume that
this body would have been declared dead similarly to the NATO-Russia cooperation when the
Russia-NATO Council was suspended in 2014. As paradoxical as it seems, forums dealing with
military security issues are usually counterproductive in the event of a traditional security crisis,
since these cooperation arrangements are cancelled first because of the sensitive political issues
they address. In contrast, low-level, non-security cooperation mechanisms are more likely to
survive and to provide an open communication channel even in times of strained relationships
in the security sphere.
In reality, in a world with no explicit Arctic security forum, the Arctic governance regime is
repeatedly said to function very well, largely unaffected by major security crises like the still
ongoing Ukraine crisis or the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. One could even argue that the Arctic
provides regular contact and communication between Russia and western states (something
that is in short order at the moment in other forums). Thus, by excluding security matters, the
Arctic Council constitutes a beacon of hope in otherwise severely strained relations. For
example, representatives from all Arctic countries meet regularly on the working level to discuss
and promote shared interests and concerns in relation to the Arctic environment and its people.
There are even regular meetings on high political levels, such as Arctic countries’ ministers
meeting every two years for the hand-over of the chairmanship.
In case this is not convincing enough, let’s consider the concrete security problems
commentators often refer to when proclaiming the need for an ASF. They usually refer to “the
spread of military activity in the Arctic over the past few years“4), whereas studies5) have shown
that these are not of an aggressive nature but rather to be seen in terms of increasing civilianmilitary tasks such as search and rescue and surveillance. This, in some (Arctic) countries, falls
within the realm of military infrastructure.
Furthermore, the Ukraine crisis (and earlier the Russia-Georgia crisis) is said to trigger the need
for an ASF6). However, no study has been able to show solid evidence for the often proclaimed
“spill-over” from Ukraine to the Arctic. While the example of Canada and the US boycotting a
(low level) Task Force meeting of the Arctic Council in April 2014 is regularly forwarded as proof
of this spillover, it is not very convincing. This is because Task Forces are not attended by high
level staff; they are temporary in nature, usually put in place for the duration of one
chairmanship to deal with a very specific issue (the Task Force in this case dealt with measures
to reduce black carbon and methane emissions); and Canada and the US did not attend the April
meeting because it was held in Moscow, not because they wanted to spoil the cooperation effort.
The subsequent meeting of the Task Force was held in Helsinki six weeks later when delegations
from all Arctic states attended again.
Turns solvency and the US wouldn’t support CP
Stephen 16 — Kathrin Stephen, Scientific group leader at the Institute for Advanced
Sustainability Studies in Potsdam, Germany; Senior fellow and editor-in-chief at the Arctic
Institute, Center for Circumpolar Security Studies in Washington, D.C., 2016 ("An Arctic
Security Forum? Please, no!", The Arctic Institute, May 26th, Available Online at
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-security-forum-please-dont/, Accessed 06-26-2025)
And more concretely, which conflicts are supposed to be prevented with an ASF? The Arctic is
unanimously described as a region of peace and cooperation—something that everyone wants to
maintain (see e.g. all Arctic countries’ strategies). An ASF would have no concrete task or
mandate, and what it would actually do remains unclear. In the worst case, such a forum would
create its raison d’être by forging a (formerly non-existent) problem through attempts to look for
its solution.
Above all, we shall not forget that military security issues were excluded from the Arctic Council
for a reason. The US would not have consented to the Arctic Council otherwise, and it appears
safe to assume that the US is not the only one favoring a non-security focus of the Council. It is
thus unlikely that an ASF would find consensus among all Arctic states, many of which are eager
to protect this realm of strong national sovereignty. Alternatively, if countries in favor of such a
forum (like Denmark, apparently) went ahead with such an initiative, it would create yet
another rift between Arctic states on security matters in addition to the divide that NATO
currently represents.
ASF bad for cooperation and won’t last
Schaller 16 — Benjamin Schaller, Ph.D. candidate and research fellow at the Centre for
Peace Studies at the Arctic University of Norway in Tromsø, graduated from Arctic University of
Norway in Tromsø, 2016 ("An Arctic Forum for Security Co-operation?", Arctic Yearbook,
August 25th, Available Online at https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2016/2016commentaries/196-an-arctic-forum-for-security-co-operation, Accessed 06-28-2025)
So far, one of the main arguments of those opposed to an Arctic security forum has been that
because the work of the Arctic Council only focuses on non-military issues of mutual interest,
the Arctic states have little appetite for spoiling the existing co-operation in the region by
discussing controversial issues of military security.
Drawing from the example of e.g. the NATO-Russia Council, they continue their argument by
stating that forums dedicated to dealing with military security are usually the first ones that are
suspended after a crisis has emerged. Thus they argue that by keeping the Arctic Council free
from issues of military security, the regional good co-operation can be preserved and the Council
can even serve as a platform for a substantia dialogue to overcome the dividing lines of the
crisis.
ASF Bad---Indigenous Groups
ASF bad for indigenous bodies
Stephen 16 — Kathrin Stephen, Scientific group leader at the Institute for Advanced
Sustainability Studies in Potsdam, Germany; Senior fellow and editor-in-chief at the Arctic
Institute, Center for Circumpolar Security Studies in Washington, D.C., 2016 ("An Arctic
Security Forum? Please, no!", The Arctic Institute, May 26th, Available Online at
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-security-forum-please-dont/, Accessed 06-26-2025)
Importantly, an ASF would most likely exclude non-state actors, especially the Indigenous
peoples of the Arctic, who are traditionally not at the table when security issues are discussed.
Similarly, a military security focus at the Arctic Council would take time and resources away
from the concerns and needs of Arctic inhabitants and Indigenous peoples. For many citizens of
the circumpolar north, non-traditional security issues like environmental protection, economic
opportunities, cultural heritage, and health issues are much more salient. Setting up an ASF
would thus not help dissipate any alleged tension but rather create disagreement and divide
Arctic actors.
Say No---Security Forum
The Arctic Council won’t like security
Groenning 16 — Ragnhild Groenning, Research Advisor at Arena Centre For European
Studies, formerly worked as a senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute, graduated with a Bachelor's
in Political Science from University of Oslo, 2016 ("Why Military Security should be kept out of
the Arctic Council", The Arctic Instituete, June 2nd, Available Online at
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/why-military-security-should-be-kept-out-of-the-arcticcouncil/, Accessed 06-26-2025)
A footnote in the Ottawa Declaration establishing the Arctic Council in 1996 states that the
Council should not deal with matters related to military security.13) In 2008 the five Arctic
coastal states (US, Canada, Russia, Norway and Denmark) reaffirmed their commitment to the
current institutional framework in the Arctic through the Ilulissat Declaration, declaring that
they see “no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the
Arctic region.”14) Additionally, the official Arctic policies of all of the Arctic coastal states
underline strong commitment to international cooperation and law in the region—including
those of the US15) and Russia.
Squo Solves
Arctic Security Forum Already Exist
USEC 23 — United States European Command, Commander of United States European
Command, formerly worked as a commanding General of United States Army Europe and
Africa, graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in Biology from Princeton University, 2023 ("Arctic
security takes center stage during military talks", United States European Command, October
4th, Available Online at https://www.eucom.mil/article/42511/arctic-security-takes-centerstage-during-military-talks, Accessed 06-26-2025)
The Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR), held virtually today, brought together 13 senior
military leaders from 10 European and North American nations to discuss current and emerging
security issues facing the world’s High North.
Hosted by the U.K.’s Ministry of Defence, this 15th running of the Arctic-focused gathering
continued the forum’s legacy of building and enhancing Arctic awareness and cooperation, while
promoting collective efforts to promote security and stability across the Arctic region. ASFR is
co-chaired by the Norwegian Defence Staff and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)
“Against the backdrop of Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine, it’s imperative for
likeminded Arctic nations to show cohesion in our common efforts to keep the Arctic region safe
and secure,” said Army Maj. Gen. Ingrid Margrethe Gjerde, Norwegian Armed Forces’ deputy
chief of staff for plans and ASFR co-chair. “ASFR serves as one of the instrumental ways in
which we maintain security cohesion and continue all important dialogue.”
ASFR conducts two meetings each year, alternating between in-person gatherings hosted by
Arctic nations Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the U.S. and virtual
gatherings hosted by observer nations France, Germany, the Netherlands or the U.K.
"The U.K.'s Arctic strategy is quite clear," said Sebastian Carr, U.K. Ministry of Defence’s head of
Europe and Canada policy team and host of the day's gathering. "We will defend our Arctic
Allies should the need arise, and contest malign and destabilizing activity that threatens our
interests, the interests of our Allies and the stability of the region." The UK published “The
U.K.'s Defence Contribution to the High North” in March 2022 and renewed the nation’s Arctic
Framework in February 2023.
Established and co-chaired by Norway and USEUCOM since 2010, the ASFR is a flag-andgeneral-officer level, military-to-military forum designed to promote regional understanding
and enhance multilateral security cooperation in the High North. ASFR is the longest running
military forum focused on the Arctic’s uniquely challenging security dynamics.
“Together with a full range of bilateral and multilateral exercises and operations spanning the
High North’s air, land, sea and space, ASFR serves a critically important role ,” said
U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Daniel Lasica, USEUCOM’s director of plans, policy, strategy and
capabilities and ASFR co-chair. “This forum continues to be a long-standing example of the
strength and unity of purpose shared by European and North American Ally and partner nations
alike.”
Trump Thumps
Trump bad for the AC
Huebert 25 — Rob Huebert, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science,
University of Calgary; Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, formerly worked as a
associate Director, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary; Member,
Canadian Polar Commission (2010–2015), graduated with a B.A. in Political Science from
University of Manitoba, 2025 ("Can the Arctic Council survive the Trump administration?
Probably not.", Arctic Today, March 3, Available Online at https://www.arctictoday.com/canthe-arctic-council-survive-the-trump-administration-probably-not-heres-why/, Accessed 0627-2025)
The havoc caused by the new American administration has been devastating on a wide range of
fronts. We are quite possibly witnessing the end of the western rules-based international order
that has lasted since the end of World War II.
While Trump’s attention hasn’t yet shifted to the Arctic Council, it should be apparent to all that
this is just a matter of time. When he does, the outcomes will be devastating. He will probably
take three steps that will combine to either gut the key works of the Council, or possibly end it
altogether.
First, Trump’s elimination of international aid demonstrates his policy of selfish isolationism.
His decision to stop much of the assistance provided under the USAID program shows that he
has no inclination to understand the benefits of a cooperative multilateral system, or a desire to
continue a policy that every U.S. president since Kennedy has supported
In addition, he has openly criticized NATO and the ICC, along with many of the U.S. economic
agreements with other nations. In both his first term and now his second, Trump has shown a
clear lack of support for international organizations and multilateral agreements. Specifically, he
seems intent on either ending American participation or upending the agreements solely for
American benefit.
Trump has already demonstrated that even if he doesn’t withdraw from the Arctic Council, he
would actively gut some of the most important achievements in line with his own goals. First, he
doesn’t “believe” in climate change. During Trump’s first term, the Arctic Council ministerial
meeting in Rovaniemi in 2019 failed to produce a final declaration for the first time since the
organization was created. This was because the U.S. delegation – under the leadership of
Secretary of States Mike Pompeo – objected to the term “climate change” or any reference to the
Paris Accord. There is nothing to suggest that the American position on climate change will be
altered. If anything, it will probably get more strident.
Trump has also moved quickly to end American programs that are in any way associated with
the issues surrounding Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI). It is highly unlikely that as part of
this process to reshape American society, his administration would support any of the important
initiatives supporting the northern Indigenous Peoples under the Arctic Council. His
administration has had no qualms about ending the support that the U.S. had provided to the
developing world, so he will almost certainly be unwilling to continue to provide any support of
the Permanent Participants or any of the Arctic Council programs that support them.
Third, Trump has directly attacked two of the core state members of the Arctic Council. Since his
second term began, he has repeatedly threatened to “take over” both Greenland and Canada.
While some at first thought he was just joking, Trump has continued to say that these are his
intentions. He has begun to take active steps, through the threats of a trade war to critically
weaken Canada in order to make it more amendable to “joining” the U.S. Again, even if he
doesn’t move to directly destroy the Arctic Council, how could Canada and Denmark work with
the U.S., knowing that the Americans are actively moving to weaken or even cripple them as a
state?
Fourth, the one Arctic state that Trump has attempted to improve relations with – Russia –
remains also problematic for the Arctic Council. Trump’s effort to work with Russia will make
the existing issues that the Arctic Council had with Russia even more difficult. Trump has
already called for the Russians to be readmitted to the G-7. If he doesn’t move to end the Arctic
Council, he will undoubtedly call for any sanctions against Russia to be eliminated and for the
country to be fully integrated.
At the same time he is actively moving to directly be involved in assisting Russia to complete its
conquest of Ukraine. In a move that is reminiscent of the conquest of Czechoslovakia through
the capitulation of the U.K. and France to Germany in 1938, Trump has begun direct
negotiations with Russia without the involvement of the Ukrainians. Putin now knows that it
has the support of Trump.
AT: Exclude Russia
Excluding Russia dooms solvency.
Dyck 24 – Doctoral student in Faculty of Law at Western University. Master’s in
Biodiversity, Oxford. LLM, Environmental Law, Uni of Kent.
Carol Dyck, “On thin ice: The Arctic Council’s uncertain future,” Marine Policy, Volume 163,
May 2024, sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X24000587
The question remains to what extent the Arctic seven are open to trust Russia at this time. Kal Kornhuber et al. argue that,
“[r]esuming key elements of critically needed scientific and political cooperation is dependent on the end of Russian aggression
against Ukraine.”50; Indeed, the Russian State’s readiness to violate international law and escalate conflicts, signals that
disagreements with Russia “must now be viewed in a new light.”51; However, for Ambassador Høglund, “functioning cooperation
between all Arctic countries is important” and “[t]he best answer to possible challenges with such cooperation is that we hold on to
the Arctic Council as the most important forum for Arctic issues.”52; With military activity steadily rising in the north53 and
alliances crumbling, a situation reminiscent of the Cold War, soft power outlets are needed more than ever. While the Russian
invasion of Ukraine has broken trust, an Arctic Council without participation of Russia would
be severely impaired ; the global community would likely have real doubts about its
legitimacy . Rebuilding that trust is critical as the Arctic experiences rising ecological, economic and geopolitical stressors
associated with accelerated warming; principally focusing on common environmental challenges, through the resumption of
scientific collaboration with Russia, could serve as that first key goodwill step.
Without Russia, no one will take the forum seriously.
Dyck 24 – Doctoral student in Faculty of Law at Western University. Master’s in
Biodiversity, Oxford. LLM, Environmental Law, Uni of Kent.
Carol Dyck, “On thin ice: The Arctic Council’s uncertain future,” Marine Policy, Volume 163,
May 2024, sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X24000587
The question remains to what extent the Arctic seven are open to trust Russia at this time. Kal Kornhuber et al. argue that,
“[r]esuming key elements of critically needed scientific and political cooperation is dependent on the end of Russian aggression
against Ukraine.”50; Indeed, the Russian State’s readiness to violate international law and escalate conflicts, signals that
disagreements with Russia “must now be viewed in a new light.”51; However, for Ambassador Høglund, “functioning cooperation
between all Arctic countries is important” and “[t]he best answer to possible challenges with such
cooperation is that we hold on to the Arctic Council as the most important forum
for Arctic issues.”52; With military activity steadily rising in the north53 and alliances crumbling, a
situation reminiscent of the Cold War, soft power outlets are needed more than ever .
While the Russian invasion of Ukraine has broken trust, an Arctic Council without
participation of Russia would be severely impaired ; the global community would likely
have real doubts about its legitimacy . Rebuilding that trust is critical as the Arctic
experiences rising ecological, economic and geopolitical stressors associated with accelerated warming;
principally focusing on common environmental challenges, through the resumption of scientific collaboration with
Russia, could serve as that first key goodwill step.
China will refuse to cooperate.
Dyck 24 – Doctoral student in Faculty of Law at Western University. Master’s in
Biodiversity, Oxford. LLM, Environmental Law, Uni of Kent.
Carol Dyck, “On thin ice: The Arctic Council’s uncertain future,” Marine Policy, Volume 163,
May 2024, sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X24000587
If the remaining seven Member States go forward with a different institution, it is unclear whether China would
recognize its legitimacy.34 China may also decline to participate as an Observer in the Arctic Council if
Russia is barred from meetings and collaborative research projects. At the same time, it appreciates
that it must not adversely affect its relationships with the other Arctic Council Member States.35 Given that China is
proving itself a significant and formidable player in the Arctic, its absence from the Arctic Council, or a
new regional forum without Russia, could undermine efforts to address Arctic shipping, fishing, and
other economic and environmental concerns. China may see this current crisis as an opportunity to double down on
its efforts to open governance to the international community and increase its influence.
K
General
Extinction outweighs
Extinction outweighs.
Burke '16 [Anthony D; 7 April 2016; Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University
of New South Wales; Millennium: Journal of International Studies; “Planet Politics: Manifesto from the
End of IR”; https://doi.org/10.1177/030582981663667; Vol. 44 No. 3]
8. Global ethics must respond to mass extinction . In late 2014, the Worldwide Fund for Nature reported a startling statistic:
according to their global study, 52% of species had gone extinct between 1970 and 2010.60 This is not news: for three decades, conservation
biologists have been warning of a ‘sixth mass extinction’, which, by definition, could eliminate more than three quarters of currently existing life
forms in just a few centuries.61 In other words, it could threaten the practical possibility of the survival of earthly life.
Mass extinction is not simply extinction (or death) writ large: it is a qualitatively different phenomena
that demands its own ethical categories . It cannot be grasped by aggregating species extinctions, let
alone the deaths of individual organisms. Not only does it erase diverse, irreplaceable life forms, their unique
histories and open-ended possibilities , but it threatens the ontological conditions of Earthly
life .
IR is one of few disciplines that is explicitly devoted to the pursuit of survival, yet it has almost nothing to say in the face of a possible mass
extinction event.62 It utterly lacks the conceptual and ethical frameworks necessary to foster diverse, meaningful responses to this
phenomenon. As mentioned above, Cold-War era concepts such as ‘nuclear winter’ and ‘omnicide’ gesture towards harms massive in their
scale and moral horror. However, they are asymptotic: they imagine nightmares of a severely denuded planet, yet
they do not contemplate the comprehensive negation that a mass extinction event entails. In
contemporary IR discourses, where it appears at all, extinction is treated as a problem of scientific management and biopolitical control aimed
at securing existing human lifestyles.63 Once again, this approach fails to recognise the reality of extinction ,
which is a matter of being and nonbeing , not one of life and death processes.
Confronting the enormity of a possible mass extinction event requires a total overhaul of human
perceptions of what is at stake in the disruption of the conditions of Earthly life. The question of what is
‘lost’ in extinction has, since the inception of the concept of ‘conservation’, been addressed in terms of financial cost
and economic liabilities.64 Beyond reducing life to forms to capital, currencies and financial instruments, the dominant neoliberal political
economy of conservation imposes a homogenising, Western secular worldview on a planetary phenomenon. Yet the enormity,
complexity, and scale of mass extinction is so huge that humans need to draw on every possible
resource in order to find ways of responding . This means that they need to mobilise multiple worldviews and lifeways –
including those emerging from indigenous and marginalised cosmologies. Above all, it is crucial and urgent to realise that extinction is a
matter of global ethics . It is not simply an issue of management or security, or even of particular
visions of the good life . Instead, it is about staking a claim as to the goodness of life itself. If it does not fit within the existing
parameters of global ethics, then it is these boundaries that need to change.
Set Col
Scenario planning is good in the Arctic context.
Flynn et al 18, Melanie Flynn, holds a BA in geography and a M.Sc. in Geography of Environmental
Risk and Human Security; James D. Ford, Professor and Priestley Chair in Climate Adaptation at the
University of Leads; Tristan Pearce, Associate Professor and Canada Research Chair in the Cumulative
Impacts of Environmental Change at the University of Northern British Columbia; Sherilee L. Harper
Assistant Professor at the University of Guelph. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Epidemiology from the
University of Guelph.; IHACC Research Team. Indigenous Health Adaptation to Climate Change Research
Team. It’s the research team they worked with. “Participatory scenario planning and climate change
impacts, adaptation and vulnerability research in the Arctic” January 2018,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1462901116309212#sec0060, JLB, DOA: 7/12/25.
While participatory scenario planning (PSP) has been widely promoted in the general literature, its
utilization remains nascent in the Arctic. With the Arctic projected to experience accelerated climate
change this century, PSP is important for informing decision making to manage expected future
risks and take advantage of new opportunities. Here, we discuss opportunities and challenges for the application of PSP in IAV work in the Arctic.
the importance of involving community members and decision makers in IAV is widely recognized,
with PSP work cited as having many potential advantages in creating outcomes that are locally relevant
and appropriate for adaptation planning (Wesche and Armitage, 2014, Kok et al., 2006, Carlsen et al., 2013). However, few studies reviewed here were fully
First,
participatory in nature, with several challenges to effective participatory methodologies reported, including significant time commitments. Workshop sessions, for instance, in the reviewed
studies were recorded to last from four hours (17% of studies) to up to a week (8% of studies), with 42% of studies utilizing a one-day workshop format, and 17% of studies using three-day
workshops. An increased number of workshops was linked to higher participation and reported to underpin effective collaboration of communities. These multiple day workshops are a
substantial time burden and require a high degree of community buy-in, resources, and logistical organization.
Second, the scenarios created during PSP are highly contextual ‘snapshots’. The inclusion of different stakeholders (even from the same recognized stakeholder group) or the timing of a
Decision making
and adaptation planning occur in a world of imperfect knowledge and where a stakeholder’s socioeconomic status, experiences, and ideological views will influence their risk perception and decision
making. Additionally, the vulnerability of individuals and even entire communities also fluctuates over time (Penn et al., 2016, Fawcett et al., 2017). Despite this lack of
reproducibility in scenario creation, the approach still offers a robust process for incorporating
workshop during a moment of political upheaval, or after a major local event, such as a flood or fire, can influence the outcome of the scenario workshop.
stakeholders into decision making, which can improve trust and social learning between researchers
and local community members. Treating this process as iterative and flexible can also go some way to
minimizing this challenge.
Third, future climate change projections are underutilized in Arctic PSP work, with 42% of the reviewed studies not including them. In some
cases, for example, if scenarios are created for the short term (the next 30 years or less) utilizing climate projections may not make sense. However, in the reviewed studies, those cases which
did not utilize climate projections were not clearly divided into categories where short-term projections (the next 30 years) did not use projections and long term (the next 51–100 years)
scenarios did use projections. We found that 11 studies creating short and medium-term scenarios (those considering up to 50 years in the future) did in fact utilize projections in their work.
Thus, we do not believe that a short-term scenario timeline is the limiting factor in the limited use of projections. Instead, we believe this underutilization likely reflects several factors,
including: i). Uncertainties surrounding climate projections, which increase dramatically at a local scale, exacerbated by an absence of long-term reliable datasets on local climatic conditions in
many Arctic regions and wide variation in factors affecting local climatology (Ford et al., 2016); ii). Limited capacity to utilize projections, reflecting a lack of technical expertise to work with and
interpret the output of climate models, or limited capacity at the local level to consider the global drivers which may affect local impacts (Wesche and Armitage, 2014, Wesche and Armitage,
2010). Notwithstanding this challenge, user-friendly climate projections are available for some Arctic regions (e.g. Scenarios Network for Alaska and Arctic Planning (SNAP) which are freely
available online); iii). Reticence to discuss possible future events by some Arctic Indigenous populations (see below) (Bates, 2007, Natcher et al., 2007, Krupnik and Jolly, 2015); and iv). Climate
projections are still limited in producing future projections on key Arctic environmental factors including, future extreme weather and storms and wind strengths and directions (Hovelsrud et
al., 2010). It is also noteworthy that alternative approaches to the use of climate projections have been used in Arctic PSP work, including extrapolating current trends and using observations
of present-day vulnerabilities as indicative of future risks and drivers. While offering important insights, focusing on the present-day risks potential maladaptation given the magnitude of
difficulty in
integrating traditional and local knowledge was listed as a barrier in 18% of cases and necessitates
careful consideration and reflection. Arctic governance involves a broad range of stakeholders, at the
local level this includes Arctic Indigenous peoples, who can be considered rightsholders rather than
merely stakeholders. Their participation in the decision making processes is required and they hold these rights based on national treaties, such as The Nunavut Land Claims
climate change projected for the Arctic (e.g. investment in coastal defenses to combat current erosion which may be overwhelmed by future sea level rise). Fourth,
Agreement (NTI, INAC and OFI-MSNI, 2010) and international agreements, such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (United Nations, 2017). In addition to
Indigenous Arctic peoples, other key stakeholders include, non-Indigenous Arctic residents, municipal or community governments, federal organizations (e.g. National Park staff), international
These diverse stakeholders have
contrasting priorities for the region and participatory scenario planning outcomes are likely to vary
organizations such as the Arctic Council and private businesses with Arctic interests including fisheries and shipping companies.
significantly based on the make-up of the participant workshop. Ernst and van Riemsdijk (2013), for example, discuss the implications of
having a limited mix of Arctic stakeholders in workshops, noting that when the majority of the group belonged to one particular stakeholder group, this led to a less varied discussion of
options, and a tendency to defer to those stakeholders who were perceived as authorities (in this case, National Park officials). Other studies discussed strategies to manage the power
differentials that can exist within these stakeholder groups. The Sustainable Iqaluit City Plan, addressed the potential for power imbalances in local group dynamics by hosting separate
stakeholder group meetings. Balancing local level input with broader goals of PSP was also reported to be challenging in a climate change context, with local stakeholders more likely to identify
local drivers which directly impacted their day to day lives, and to the neglect external and longer term drivers of change, which were more abstract and less clearly linked to local impacts
(Wesche and Armitage, 2014). Van Oort (2016) countered this by integrating global context into the scenario process but participant feedback described this process as challenging and some
felt it took away from the discussion of pertinent local issues.
Finally, while many PSP studies focused on integrating western science and traditional knowledge (TK), cultural factors may impact the utility and appropriateness of the approach in
Indigenous communities.
Integration of knowledge is acknowledged as a key strength of PSP (Bizikova et al., 2011, Pahl-Wostl,
The majority of studies reviewed (67%) had some evidence of the inclusion of TK
through stakeholder discussions with Elders and other community members who were asked to provide
context and background for baseline information prior to scenario creation (e.g. in identifying
availability and use of freshwater sources, discussing subsistence hunting patterns to provide model
validation through focus groups), were consulted on how development should occur in their town or
hamlet, and/or were asked to review and add insight to researcher created scenarios. In many cases, however, it was
2015, Rounsevell and Metzger, 2010).
difficult to determine what components of TK were included in the study (see Usher 2000) and to what extent. This is problematic as studies often claim to engage TK, but participation is not
necessarily synonymous with knowledge sharing. Thought needs to be given to the design of PSP to avoid creating a structure and approach that is incongruent with the sharing of TK. For
example, sector-specific workshops held in abstract environments (e.g. meeting rooms) may not be suitable to capture the holistic nature of TK that is generated and shared through stories
and interactions with the natural environment. Researchers may need to re-consider their approach and methods for PSP if they wish to include TK, including providing communities with the
necessary information and resources to facilitate PSP processes themselves.
Although the inclusion of TK is encouraged in PSP work and IAV research more generally, there are also tensions associated with this in an Arctic context. A number of Arctic Indigenous
populations perceive and record time as a cyclical process, usually reflecting the passing of the seasons in one year periods with limited consideration given to long-term futures, contrasting to
Western understandings of time as linear (Natcher et al., 2007). This has implications for futures research and can create situations where researchers are imposing Western worldviews and
perspectives on communities. In the context of Inuit communities, Bates (2007) identifies contrasting philosophies in Inuit and Western understandings of planning for the future. Inuit
philosophies are often based on knowledge and understanding of current conditions and an acceptance that the future will be uncertain, where an overreliance on planning can be seen as
reducing the ability to prepare and react flexibly to situations. There are also taboos that can impact the discussion of future environmental conditions and the creation of scenarios. For some
Inuit philosophies, for instance, it can be seen as arrogant to assume you can predict the behavior of animals and the environment (Bates, 2007). Additionally, some Indigenous cultures have
belief systems which interpret some natural phenomena as sentient (Natcher et al., 2007, Ford et al., 2008), where thoughts and words are believed to be able to influence the future, and
therefore, people are reluctant to ‘tempt fate’ by talking about negative future possibilities.
Whilst these contrasting ways of knowing present significant difficulties in navigating PSP in Indigenous
communities, this review has identified several successful strategies to ensure meaningful and
respectful participation in futures research. Successful approaches include the utilization of Inuit artists
in the visualization of scenarios (Wesche and Armitage, 2014, Wesche and Armitage, 2010), the utilization of positive visioning exercises where communities are
asked to express hopes and wishes for the future (Collaborative for Advanced Landscape Planning, 2016, The Municipal Corporation of the City of Iqaluit, 2016). Additionally,
community-based research can help in addressing potential tensions in Worldviews through ensuring
that Indigenous researchers and community members are involved from the planning stages of the
process (Harper et al., 2012, Willox et al., 2013).
3. Russia hegemony is worse—prevent indigenous communities from
voicing abuses and suppresses dissent.
Pavel Sulyandziga & Dmitry Berezhkov 24, Sulyandziga is President of the International
Indigenous Fund for Development and Solidarity "Batani", PhD in Economics, First Vice-President of
RAIPON 1997-2010; Berezhkov is Editor of the Indigenous Russia website, Vice President of RAIPON
2004-2013, "Indigenous Peoples as a Tool for Russia's International Publicity in the Arctic Region," Ocean
and Coastal Law Journal, 07/01/2024,
https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1436&context=oclj
In this Article, an intentional focus on propaganda and the utilization of indigenous agents for this purpose
omitted other significant aspects of the current state of indigenous peoples in the Russian Arctic. These other
significant aspects include the impact of the war with Ukraine, forced mobilization of indigenous representatives into the army, rupture of relations with the West, and interruption of
partnerships and family ties among related peoples living in different countries, including the Sami, Aleut, and Inuit, among many others.
this Article sought to shed light on the
falsification of the real situation of indigenous peoples in Russia and the exploitation of indigenous
representatives themselves for propaganda purposes. However, even to fully elucidate the extent of RAIPON’s and other Russian agents’
While we have touched upon these topics previously and plan to delve deeper in future publications,
involvement in propaganda, such as KNMSOyuz or Barents News, one Article is insufficient. A comprehensive study is needed.
Traces of such propaganda, along with generous sponsorship from Russian mining companies,
particularly Norilsk Nickel, can be found in United Nations documents,108 where Russian government lobbyists like Alexey Tsykarev
(formerly an expert at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues) and Antonina Gorbunova (a member of the United Nations Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) have
been actively engaged.
[Footnotes Omitted]
Regrettably, representatives of the international community often fall prey to the Russian propaganda machine. For instance, prior to the fullscale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February
Russian
public relations specialists misrepresented the words of Silje Karine Muotka, chairperson of the Sami
Parliament of Norway. The specialists distorted and disseminated her statement regarding Russian Sami, associating her with individuals like Andrei Danilov (leader of the
2022, indigenous peoples from other Arctic countries frequently participated in Russian events dedicated to the Arctic and indigenous peoples. During one of these events,
Sami Heritage Foundation), self-nominated activist Alexandra Artieva, Valentina Sovkina (chairperson of the Sami Parliament of the Kola Peninsula), and Alexander Slupachik (head of the
Most of these individuals have repeatedly demonstrated anti-Russian rhetoric,
attempting to make statements as representatives of the Sami of Russia. Silje Karine Muotka, has
already labeled such statements as “individual extremism and speculation.”109 “In our system, it’s
inconceivable for any imposter to claim the authority to represent an entire nation’s voting rights! Decisions
Murmansk Oblast ‘Sámi Association).
are exclusively made by the parliament, comprising representatives from all Sami communities! Otherwise, it amounts to individual extremism and speculation,” she asserted.110
Silje Karine Muotka subsequently provided a separate interview upon grasping the intricacies of the scandal. Regrettably, the interview was solely for Norwegian audiences, in Norwegian, and
accessible only through subscription-based media outlets.111
[Footnotes Omitted]
Russia’s tenure as chair of the Arctic Council has concluded, and many of the aforementioned public relations organizations have fallen into disrepute as authorities ceased allocating the
necessary funding. Some websites were shut down,112 and some have stopped updating.113 Furthermore, Andrey Patrushev, the previously mentioned son of the Secretary of the Russian
Security Council, left his position at the Arctic Initiatives Center.114
However, the Kremlin’s propaganda machine itself has not dissipated. Operations continue both within
Russia and internationally. Russian officials and their proxies continue to assert that reduced contact
within the Arctic Council between Russia and other countries primarily harms indigenous peoples .115
This Article demonstrates that these assertions do not voice the genuine concerns of indigenous
peoples, who currently lack the freedom to openly address violation of their rights in Russia due
to fear of persecution by the authorities.116
4. Their alt is totalizing and unproductive for the decolonization of
knowledge.
Michael Robert Seats, 11-6-2019, "The voice(s) of reason: conceptual challenges
for the decolonization of knowledge in global higher education", Taylor &
Francis,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13562517.2020.1729725
This discussion of some theoretical challenges in conceptualizing the role of reason in knowledge
decolonization allows three provisional conclusions to be drawn. Firstly, that the outward-facing
contemporary university imagines itself at the interstices of a global ‘eduscape’ marked by fluidity and
trans-nationality, while being both incentivised and constrained by the contradictory rationalities of a burgeoning
academic capitalism and nascent endo-colonialism. Secondly, that regardless of wide variations in their
form, reason and rationality undergird the fundamental epistemologies that enable and drive teaching,
learning and research in the academy. Thirdly, that both universal and particular forms of reason can
coexist across putatively distinct linguistic and cultural boundaries, and it can be surmised that such
diversity could productively inform knowledge decolonization and radical curricular reform. Apart from these tentative
conclusions, the following kinds of perplexing questions have emerged from this discussion and will need to be addressed in future research: (i)
what is the officially sanctioned academic status of the decolonized knowledge(s) vis-à- vis the displacing knowledge(s) of the colonizers?; (ii) to
what extent are universally defined forms of reason obstacles to genuine and enduring decolonization?; (iii) which ontological and
epistemological frames can best inform research into establishing the new curricula?; (iv) how can those knowledge(s) subjected to
‘epistemicide’ be identified and reinstated in the curriculum? (v) because forms of reason cannot be separated from the languages in which
they are (re)presented, to what extent can the language(s) of the former colonizers be used to decolonize the curriculum without causing a
recolonization? It is clear that knowledge decolonization requires not simply an overcoming or negation of
Western forms of reason, but an approach that can creatively utilize difference, incommensurability
and epistemic complexity. This would enable the dialogical impetus inherent in the clashing of the diverse voices of reason to be
creatively harnessed through the realpolitik of curricular reform. It is also apparent that the fundamental role of reason in
the university needs to be recast in terms of openly contested and agonistic rationalities which sidestep
the binary conceptual sare of universal and particular, but also avoid sliding into bland cultural
relativism. The substantive conclusion of this paper is that in order to engender an authentic pragmatics of knowledge decolonization in the
contemporary global academy, the role of reason in curriculum reform needs to be more fully conceptualized and articulated.
6. The alt cannot prevent rights violations against Indigenous people
in the Arctic.
Bronen 22, Robin Bronen is the co-founder and served as the long-time Executive Director of the Alaska Institute for Justice, a nonprofit agency which is located on Dena’ina lands and in Anchorage, Alaska. (Bronen, Robin. “Climigration: Creating a National
Governance ...” Socialchangenyu, May 2022, socialchangenyu.com/wpcontent/uploads/2022/05/Bronen_45.4_Climmigration-National-Governance-Framework.pdf.) //SSK
WHS 
Population displacement is the greatest human rights challenge created by the climate crisis. People are already
losing the places they live and love because of extreme weather events and slow ongoing environmental change, such as sea level rise, and are having to make the
extraordinarily difficult and painful decision about whether to stay or leave. Newtok, Alaska is one of the communities that decided
more than two decades ago to leave . Tribal, state, and federal government and non-governmental
agencies agree that a community-wide relocation is their best long-term adaptation strategy. Yet, despite the
tremendous efforts of the Tribe and these agencies for the last 15 years, relocation has not occurred. The policy and practical
challenges have been enormous. The U.S. government has written numerous well-documented reports highlighting
these challenges yet continues to provide completely inadequate assistance to prevent the
ongoing human rights violations which are being caused because people in Newtok are currently living in a humanitarian crisis. This article
explains in detail these challenges and then proposes a path forward. The laws governing disaster relief and response, land use,
and human settlements are anachronistic to the ways the climate crisis is making the places where
people live and maintain livelihoods uninhabitable. The U.S. government urgently needs to create a relocation governance framework
based in human rights protections. This article provides a template about how to create this framework
7. So, any alternative to the plan abandons native communities.
Bronen 22, Robin Bronen is the co-founder and served as the long-time Executive Director of the Alaska Institute for Justice, a nonprofit agency which is located on Dena’ina lands and in Anchorage, Alaska. (Bronen, Robin. “Climigration: Creating a National
Governance ...” Socialchangenyu, May 2022, socialchangenyu.com/wpcontent/uploads/2022/05/Bronen_45.4_Climmigration-National-Governance-Framework.pdf.) //SSK
WHS 
In Alaska, the only Arctic state in the United States,50 the combination of decreased arctic sea ice extent, thawing
permafrost, and repeated extreme weather events threatens the lives and livelihoods of dozens of
Alaska Native communities and is forcing entire communities to relocate. Less sea ice covers the Arctic Ocean today than at any time in recent
geologic history (the last few thousand years).51 Without arctic sea ice, storms regularly inundate communities throughout the win- ter months, exacerbating
permafrost thaw, erosion, flooding, and usteq, a Yupik word defined in Alaska’s 2018 Hazard Mitigation Plan as “catastrophic land col- lapse.”52 Numerous
reports have documented the dangers accelerating environmental change poses to Alaska Native
communities.53 In 2019, three entities working closely with the Denali Commission published the most recent report, a statewide environmental threat
assessment of 187 Alaskan communities.54 The report highlights the most vulnerable communities in Alaska and provides a critical up- date to the 2009
Government Accountability Report which found
31 imminently threatened communities with 12 seeking to
possibly relocate .55 While the Govern- ment Accountability Office and the Denali Commission identified communities at risk, few protective
measures have been implemented in these communities and neither report identified risk reduction
strategies or funding for adaptation.
56 In- stead, in 2020 the GAO, highlighting the relocation barriers for several communi- ties in the United States, including Newtok, recommended that the federal govern- ment create a
climate migration pilot program to address the lack of federal leadership on this issue.57 Both Newtok, ranked seventh in the Denali Commission report, and Quinhagak, ranked at 38th, are located in the geographically remote coastal Yu- kon-Kuskokwim Delta and are federally
recognized indigenous tribes.58 Small airplanes are primarily responsible for their year-round transportation and importation of goods to and from Quinhagak and Newtok.59 There are no roads to facilitate travel to or from both villages.60 “Subsistence hunting and gath- ering are central
to [the] culture and survival” of both villages.61 “Village life re- volves around these activities, with the resources obtained from the natural envi- ronment forming the basis for community cohesion, social identity, livelihoods, and cultural events.”62 The building of permanent
infrastructure, including schools, housing and sewage, water, and electricity utilities led to a change from seasonal migration to establishment of permanent communities.63 Thawing permafrost, erosion, and usteq now exacerbate deterioration of this aging infrastructure.64 Newtok
urgently needs funding to finalize its community-wide relocation because it is predicted to become uninhabitable in the next few years.65 Quinhagak is currently in a deci- sion-making process assessing whether protection in place and the migration of infrastructure away from eroding
coastlines and riverbanks is their best long-term adaptation strategy.66 The community is one of 15 Alaska Native communities working with the Alaska Institute for Justice, a community-based non-profit or- ganization, to create a replicable model of community-led relocation based in
hu- man rights doctrine.67 The foundation of this work is to design and implement community-based environmental and social monitoring to dynamically assess how environmental change is impacting community health and well-being of com- munity members.68 This collaborative and
multilevel documentation is critical for several reasons. First, by integrating community-based monitoring, government agencies can better provide predictive rates of local environmental change so that communities have the information they need to determine whether protection in
place is possible. Second, understanding environmental risk and its impact on community health and well-being is critical in order for local governing entities and community residents to make adaptation decisions.69
Cap K
The role of the ballot is to evaluate the consequences of the aff versus
the status quo. Hold them to the consequences of their material
implementation---current models are too entrenched to critique away
without a feasible alternative.
Russi '15 [Luigi; 28 April 2015; Research supervisor with the Schumacher Society, Ph.D. in Sociology at
University of Exeter; Social Science Research Network; "Heterodox Approaches to Consumption
Oriented Models of Legislation"; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2600335]
to
think outside of consumption seems in some ways to border on a theological aspiration, to be ushered into the
The difficulty of following these critiques from American Legal Realists and these other heterodox authors to any normative conclusion, however, seems two-fold. On the one hand,
responsibility of remaking society according to some almost other-worldly dimensions: an economic order that conceives progress beyond growth, a socio-political structure that allows for
systemic change without reducing the possibilities of human freedom, the normative agenda to substantiate egalitarian relationships, a global order that preserves the victories of industrial
capitalism while simultaneously transcending its costs (ecological, human, etc.). On the other hand,
critiques of consumption -led governance
seem both anachronistic and violent. They are anachronistic because they either too readily rely on the possibilities of the Enlightenment
assumption that there is a clear set of ‘ truths’ that once disseminated to the population will enact meaningful change (e.g., if particular industries or
products are demonstrated to be unsustainable to the environment, populations will demand
alternatives) or they overly invest in the possibility of some benevolent, universalizing spirit that is capable of trumping
the politico-economic exigencies of personal well-being (e.g., individuals are naturally willing to collectively do the right thing for the greatest amount of
people even at personal cost in a consistent manner). They are violent because in calling for systemic change , such reversals would almost
undoubtedly entail significant and most likely intensely hostile opposition from entrenched actors who benefit from the
current economic legal arrangements. A liberal mode of economic management (e.g., consumerism) is itself undoubtedly more coercive and violent than its advocates tend to admit (e.g., it is
the fundamental point of disagreement arises is over the question whether the current
lost opportunity costs that warrant the effort and violence most likely necessary to enact an
alt ernative mode of political life. Furthermore, if we accept the proposition of the necessity of coercive change, it still begs the question to what extent its
part of the very problems it claims to address), but where
trajectory is occasioning a level of
proponents within intellectual circles are really willing to fully participate and accept the potential costs of radical struggle - they may, to put it vulgarly, simply have too much comfort to lose.
To what extent, in short, are current left-oriented calls within academia and policy circles merely reflecting the more general postmodern crisis of identity versus the partisan militant residing
at any revolutionary core? In giving normative bite to any alternative model, as the American Legal Realist Robert Hale pointed out, it seems undoubtedly the case that
any future
system would only find new constraints and forms of violence to sustain its cohesiveness.
[T]he systems advocated by professed upholders of laissez-faire are in reality permeated with coercive restrictions of individual freedom, and with restrictions, moreover, out of conformity
with any formula of “equal opportunity” or of “preserving the equal rights of others.” Some sort of coercive restriction of individuals, it is believed, is absolutely unavoidable, and cannot be
made to conform to any Spenserian formula.161
If fundamental reform to consumer-centric governance is inherently violent - in that it will necessarily create only new winners and losers, and not
without potentially violent conflict and disruption -the challenge is therefore not just a question of ethics or political will (e.g., the current distribution of
resources is unjust/violent), but the feasibility of re-conceptualizing efficiency, both in terms of strategy and tactics: in
other words, upon what standard might we measure progress (or stated differently, what are the lost opportunity costs of continuing on the
current trajectory versus an alt ernative economic model), and how might this be actually accomplished.162 To set out on such a task is
exactly the stakes of future progressive scholarship, and upon which we wish to close our study with a brief reflection.
Do both. Mutual exclusivity precludes effective socialist organizing.
Martell, 23—Teaching Fellow and Professor of Sociology at the University of Sussex (Luke,
“Conclusion,” Alternative Societies: For a Pluralist Socialism, Conclusion, pp. 180, dml)
Fuchs (2020b) talks about ‘class struggle social democracy’. This aims to move to democratic socialism and involves: a pluralist
convergence of radical reforms and the gradual transformation of institutions; trade union industrial action with
working-class struggle (trade unions are another topic that could get more attention when discussing alternative societies and routes to them); new social
combinations across classes and other divisions and identities; electoral parliamentary politics, social movements and movement parties;
organization spontaneity and new prefigurative forms of social co-operation; the building of democratically controlled
commons within as well as beyond capitalism; leadership and mass action; both conflict antagonistic politics and taking power. This
includes different but complementary political strategies and rejects seeing these as
contradictory or mutually exclusive . There are parallels here with what I am advocating in this book. I may not use the term ‘social
democracy’ for this approach as that implies staying within capitalism, although in this context it refers to building from
political
reformism within capitalism to something beyond . Fuchs discusses thinkers as diverse as Rosa Luxemburg (2008), Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri (2017), and Bhaskar Sunkara (2019) as advocating change along these lines. Likewise, Eagleton (2022: 191), discussing a post-Corbyn Left in the
UK, argues that the ‘the priority must be to grow this movement through
every available channel ’, numerous
existing and thriving examples of which he gives.
Cap is sustainable, self-correcting and innovative - pursuit inevitable
Bourne 15—Head of Public Policy at the Institute of Economic Affairs (Ryan, “In defence of rampant
consumerism”, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11346635/In-defence-of-rampantconsumerism.html, dml)
Some worry about the effect of growth and consumption on the environment, or on economic
inequality. For others, it’s the sheer vulgarity of desire for stuff which perturbs – as evidenced by the backlash against the supposedly
barbarous hordes fighting over flat-screen TVs on the shopping day ‘Black Friday’. But in the public discourse, these views always come
together in a predictable narrative: ever-rising demand for material things, and political obsession with GDP, have caused us to lose sight of
what matters – community, family, and the duties we have to each other. In particular, thereplacement over the past three decades of what
Dr Sentamu calls the "solidaristic" state with one which leaves more room for markets is blamed for eroding those values and
dehumanising the poor. Wouldn’t it be better for all of us if we placed less emphasis on growth, and instead
re-shaped an activist state to target other concerns? No. Every single one of these claims and hopes are
mistaken. Material advances are crucial toour well-being. Just three centuries ago, average labourers
earned just £2 a dayin today’s money. Life was tough. Life expectancy at birth was 36. Most of the world was
equivalent to the poorest parts of Bangladeshtoday. At that time it might have been considered
materialistic to desire things that we now take for granted, such as central heating, decent sanitation
and cheap clothes and food. Even in 1973, 2 million people in the UK lived without either an indoor toilet, a bath or hot running
water. It istherefore impossible to draw a line across 2015 and suggest thatour material goals are
satisfiedand further consumption frivolous. Even Keynes recognised the folly of those who claimin each
generation that we’ve reached the limits of progressand should simply be content with our lot. Is it ‘consumerist’ to desire the
washing machine, the refrigerator, and the computer, which have all, in so many ways, enriched our lives? Few would wish to
reversethese innovations, and the idea that their development – or desire for them – created an
individualistic, materialistic culture which eroded social solidarity is difficult to imagine. Far from being
frivolous, we can see with hindsight that they contributed to smashing the poverty and poor hygiene which had
hitherto characterised all human history. In fact, consumerismin itself is a crucial driverof
the innovationsthat have improved the well-being of the poor. Their refusal to be satisfied with their lot
created the conditions for labour-saving devices to take off, first here, and now elsewhere. Asthe economiesof
developing countriessuch as India and China have moved closer tothe‘market’ societiescriticised by the clerisy, what Marx
described as the “absolute desire for enrichment” has reduced poverty to a greater degree than any other
economic systemknown to humankind. In two decadessince 1990 the global rate of absolute poverty
has halved. You’d be hard-pushed to think these results were somehow immoral. But clergy in rich countries only
see what they want to see. While denouncing the desire for expensive gadgets, they ignore how wealth is used
for philanthropic and charitable causes – and all the future good that could come from consumer
products, from “stuff”. We can imagine a world where new gadgets allowold people who are ill to stay with
their families, monitored by devicesrather than confined in hospital, or one where even the poorest can access
the expertise of the world’s best teachers. If the clerisy’s agenda was just an articulated distaste for the desire for possessions, it
would be one thing. But their generalised denunciations of consumerism and growth in themselves are
increasingly becoming a demand fornew government action. In particular, many now suggest we should give up on ‘going for
growth’ altogether, and instead embrace so-called "solidaristic" aims, such as reducing inequality.These are more
commonly understood as "socialistic". This view is dangerous, and based on a falsehood. No government ever has
had the aim of maximising GDP above all. Were they doing so, we would have much smaller
government, huge tax cuts, no planning system, no carbon-reduction targets, legalised drugs, no
immigration controls whatsoever and extremely limited regulation. Suggesting growth at all costs has
been the mantra of recent governments is to erect a giant strawman[person]. Every government
recognises values beyond the market.Yet it is precisely when governments pursue other aims that their actions detriment the
poor whom the clerisy purport to represent. Planning restrictions have raised house prices. Green taxes have raised energy bills. Childcare
regulations have made it much more expensive. Sin taxes have been jacked up. All of these regressive measures hit the poor hardest. In any
case, inequality is not a useful measure of anything. You can have more equality by having fewer rich
people, but doing so does nothingto help reduce poverty - in fact, it worsens it.Living standards
arewhat matters, and all the evidence shows they are far higher in freeenterprise economiesthan in
highly socialistic ones.Over time, their growth is faster, and their labour markets perform better.
Compare unemployment rateshere or in the US to Greece or Spain. Compare our growth in the last two
decades to that of Chile to Venezuela. Compare China now to China two decades ago. Nor does a
socialistic state guarantee social harmony; think of Britain in the 1970s, or Venezuela today. Ironically for the
clerisy, if anything is to blame for individualism and a dehumanisation of the poor, then it is the rise of the welfare state which they now want
to strengthen. Whereas civil society institutions like friendly societies, trade unions and charitable organisations flourished prior to 1945,
embedded in communities, the centralised bureaucratic welfare state has now usurped them. This state provides essential services irrespective
of contribution and without reciprocity; it tells those in need to take a cheque and get on with it. This, too, drives consumerism: state provision
of health, education and pensions means less need to save and more money spent in consumption of life’s luxuries. Money may not be
everything. Relationships, our conduct toward our fellow beings, and all the non-market actions we take to assist our friends and families are
crucial to our well-being. But the desire for enrichment is a natural human ambition, and the best way to
achieve it in future is to embrace precisely the values and economic liberty which enable robust
economic growth- and which the anti-consumerist, anti-growth brigade lament. Conversely, a bigger state, and a
turn away from growth, risks hurting thepeoplethe clerisy claim to support. It is very rarely those at the bottom
of the pile who moan about an abundance of stuff.
Cap is key to solve climate change – total breaks with existing
institutions are impossible – only regulated markets can resolve
environmental destruction
Hoffman 16
(Andrew J Hoffman, Holcim (US) Professor at the Ross School of Business and Education Director at the
Graham Sustainability Institute, University of Michigan, “The Invisible Hand Won’t Solve the Climate
Crisis. Capitalism Must Evolve,” February 15, http://evonomics.com/the-invisible-hand-wont-solve-theclimate-crisis-capitalism-must-evolve/)
How will we get to the solutions for climate change? Let’s face it. Installing efficient LED light bulbs, driving the latest Tesla electric car and recycling
our waste are admirable and desirable activities. But they are not going to solve the climate problem by reducing our collective emissions to a
necessary level. To achieve that goal requires systemic change. To that end, some argue for creating a new system to
replace capitalism. For example, Naomi Klein calls for “shredding the free-market ideology that has dominated the global economy for more than three decades.”¶ Klein
is performing a valuable service with her call for extreme action. She, like Bill McKibben and his 350.org movement, is
helping to make it possible for a conversation to take place over the magnitude of the challenge before us through what is called
the “radical flank effect.” ¶ All members and ideas of a social movement are viewed in contrast to others,
and extreme positions can make other ideas and organizations seem more reasonable to movement opponents. For example, when
Martin Luther King Jr first began speaking his message, it was perceived as too radical for the majority of white America. But when Malcolm X entered the debate, he pulled the radical flank
further out and made King’s message look more moderate by comparison. Capturing this sentiment, Russell Train, second administrator of the EPA, once quipped, “Thank God for
But the nature of social change never allows us the clean
slate that makes sweeping statements for radical change attractive. Every set of institutions by which
[environmentalist] Dave Brower; he makes it so easy for the rest of us to be reasonable.”
society is structured evolved from some set of structures that preceded it. Stephen Jay Gould made this point quite
powerfully in his essay “The Creation Myths of Cooperstown,” where he pointed out that baseball was not invented by Abner Doubleday in Cooperstown New York in 1839. In fact, he points
out, “no one invented baseball at any moment or in any spot.” It evolved from games that came before it. In a similar way, Adam Smith did not invent capitalism in 1776 with his book The
Wealth of Nations. He was writing about changes that he was observing and had been taking place for centuries in European economies; most notably the division of labor and the
we cannot simply invent a new system to replace
capitalism. Whatever form of commerce and interchange we adopt must evolve out of the form we have at the
present. There is simply no other way.¶ But one particularly difficult challenge of climate change is that, unlike Adam Smith’s
proverbial butcher, brewer or baker who provide our dinner out of the clear alignment of their self-interest and our needs, climate change breaks the link
between action and outcome in profound ways. A person or corporation cannot learn about climate
change through direct experience. We cannot feel an increase in global mean temperature; we cannot see, smell or taste greenhouse gases; and we cannot link
an individual weather anomaly with global climate shifts.¶ A real appreciation of the issue requires an understanding of large-scale
systems through “big data” models. Moreover, both the knowledge of these models and an appreciation
for how they work require deep scientific knowledge about complex dynamic systems and the ways
in which feedback loops in the climate system, time delays, accumulations and nonlinearities operate within them. Therefore, the
evolution of capitalism to address climate change must, in many ways, be based on trust, belief and faith in
stakeholders outside the normal exchange of commerce. To get to the next iteration of this centuries-old institution, we must
envision the market through all components that help to establish the rules; corporations,
government, civil society, scientists and others.¶ The evolving role of the corporation in society¶ At the end of the day, the solutions to
climate change must come from the market and more specifically, from business. The market is the most powerful
institution on earth , and business is the most powerful entity within it. Business makes the goods and services we rely upon:
the clothes we wear, the food we eat, the forms of mobility we use and the buildings we live and work in.¶ Businesses can transcend national
boundaries and possess resources that exceed that of many countries. You can lament that fact, but it is a fact. If
business does not lead the way toward solutions for a carbon-neutral world, there will be no solutions.¶ Capitalism can, indeed
it must, evolve to address our current climate crisis. This cannot happen through either wiping clean the
institutions that presently exist or relying on the benevolence of a laissez faire market. It will require
thoughtful leaders creating a thoughtfully structured market.
improvements in efficiency and quality of production that were the result.¶ In the same way,
Cap solves war better than any alternative – trade and
contractualism, neg studies are cherrypicked.
Wright 20 [Walker Wright, Johns Hopkins University, AAP Government Department, Graduate
Student, “Commerce and Gentle Mores: Assessing the Empirical Validity of Doux Commerce,” 2020,
Thesis, http://jhir.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/63839, EA]
Interstate Violence -- Part A: International Trade and Economic Interdependence
International trade currently receives the greatest attention when it comes to the capitalist peace theory and an abundance of
empirical studies finds that economic interdependence indeed reduces interstate military
conflict .57 As one pair of scholars states, “The positive relationship between economic interdependence and peaceful relationships is so
well established that research now focuses on the conditions that cause variations.”58 Collen Goenner’s research appears to solidify the
adversarial relationship between trade and violence: not only does trade reduce conflict, conflict in turn reduces trade.59 Blomberg and Hess
similarly find that “violence is equivalent approximately to a 30% tariff” on trade.60 This further establishes that trade and conflict are to some
degree antithetical to each other.
A few studies offer qualifiers when it comes to trade’s pacific nature. Patrick McDonald finds that it is not merely trade that reduces conflict,
but free trade:
Free trade , and not just trade, promotes peace by removing an important foundation of domestic privilege-protective barriers to trade --that enhances the domestic power of societal groups likely to
support war , reduces the capacity of free-trading interests to limit aggression in foreign
policy, and creates the mechanism by which the state can build supportive coalitions for war . A
series of statistical tests supports these claims by showing that lower regulatory barriers to trade were
associated with a reduction in military conflict between states during the post-World War II
era.61
Aaronson, Abouhard, and Wang find no evidence that mere membership in GATT/WTO reduces conflict. However, trade between members in
which both countries benefit is shown to reduce military conflict.62 Han Dorussen finds that trade overall reduces conflict, but the pacific
effects tend to be industry specific. Trade in manufactured goods has a stronger pacifying effect than agricultural trade or trade in raw
materials.63 Gelpi and Grieco find that trade reduces the use of military force, but only when the trading nations are democratic. They explain
that “trade may represent part of the glue that cements the ‘liberal peace’ together,” but “increased trade dependence cannot by itself create
a ‘zone of peace’.”64 Bell and Long find a conditional pacific effect of trade.65 When it comes to territorial disputes or military-diplomatic
strategies, trade decreases the likelihood of military force. However, when it comes to regime issues, domestic policies, or state conditions,
economic interdependence increases the chance of military intervention (e.g., the U.S.-backed coup in trade partner Guatemala).
Lee and Rider confirm Bell and Long’s findings specifically about trade and territorial disputes: “Economic interdependence decreases
the likelihood of militarized disputes and arms races .”66 However, Lu and Thies go beyond both Lee and Rider and
Bell and Long: between 1885 and 2000, their dataset shows that trade interdependence reduced militarized conflicts over
territory , policy , and regime .67
A handful of studies have questioned the pacific effects of economic interdependence,68 but the scholarly community has responded in
force.69 As Erich Weede explains in his review of the literature,
[These skeptical studies] suffer from at least one of the following defects. Either they do not adequately
control for conditions that raise the risk of war in a dyad, such as contiguity, distance, power
balance, or one of them being a big power…Sometimes it is useful to distinguish between those military conflicts that remain at
the level of exchanging threats and those that lead to fatalities. In case of divergent findings, I prefer conflict involvement
rather than initiation as the dependent variable. In my view, coding “initiation” is nearly as difficult as coding “war
guilt.” If one compares conflict escalation to climbing a ladder, then initiation rarely justifies a 0 or 100% attribution to one party
while absolving the other one. That is why reference to guilt or initiation should be avoided in large-N studies. In addition, dyadic
trade should not be standardized by foreign trade instead of GDP. If all of these shortcomings are
avoided, then almost all studies support the proposition “ peace by free trade .” There is a rather
strong case for a commercial peace or peace by trade.70
One potential, oft-cited hole in the capitalist peace theory is the outbreak of World War I. However, as Gartzke and Lupu note,
“focusing on the outbreak of World War I to test this theory is problematic because it is a case chosen based on the
dependent variable , the outbreak of war.”71 More importantly, they point out that the Great War actually started with
two less economically interdependent nations : Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Military alliances with more
interdependent (e.g., Germany and Russia) powers essentially dragged these other countries into the conflict. “Economic integration
was incapable of forestalling conflict where integration had yet to occur. ”72
Interstate Violence -- Part B: Market Systems
“International trade is just one facet of a country’s commercial spirit,” writes Pinker. “Others include an openness to foreign investment, the
freedom of citizens to enter into enforceable contracts, and their dependence on voluntary financial exchanges as opposed to self-sufficiency,
barter, or extortion.”73 Beyond economic interdependence, numerous studies have examined how economic systems impact militarization.
Drawing on the EFW Index, Erik Gartzke finds that higher levels of economic freedom predict a lower probability of
militarized interstate disputes .74 Gartzke shows elsewhere that more open economies with globally-integrated markets are
less likely to experience interstate conflicts.75 Patrick McDonald similarly examines the domestic economy and finds that economies with
higher levels of public property—i.e., greater governmental fiscal autonomy—have governments that are more
willing to engage in military conflicts .76
Over the last two decades, political scientist Michael Mousseau has mounted an avalanche of evidence in favor of what he calls the
contractualist peace. 77 “Contractualist economy,” write Michael Mousseau and Xiongwei Cao, “is market-oriented
development , characterized with extensive and regularized transactions among strangers that require an
element of trust …It is the pursuit of foreign markets that lie at the root of the contractualist peace. With deeply embedded norms of market
exchange at home, individuals in market cultures are more likely than clientelist ones to roam the world seeking contracts of exchange…Since
the foremost goal of contractualist leaders is market growth at home, among them there can be no
war .”78 Mousseau describes contractualist economies as “social markets” rather than “free markets.” This is because governments in
contractualist economies “are under constant pressure from the public to maintain a highly inclusive marketplace, particularly as regards labor.
The “social-market” label applies to the social democracies of Scandinavia as well as to the supposed freer-market democracies such as
Switzerland and the United States.”79
Mousseau uses a wide-range of proxies for contractualist norms. In some of his earliest studies, GDP per capita serves
as a proxy “since developed democracies should be the democracies with the highest intensity of contract norms.”80 One of the more
interesting proxies is life insurance per capita. “Life insurance contracts are perhaps the most-reliably non-self-enforcing type of contract
there is because the delivery of service is expected only after the death of the policyholder: Being deceased, the policyholder cannot possibly
sanction the insurance company for failure to comply.”81 Mousseau also uses investment contracts per capita as a proxy for
contractualist economies. “Like insurance contracts, investment contracts are reliably dependent on third-party (state) enforcement, since they
have strong inter-temporal dimensions.” Finally, Mousseau employs migration data as a proxy for contract-intensive economies. “By
definition a nation with a contractualist economy must have a robust labor market...and the quest for economic opportunity is the most basic
motive for migration.”82 In each of these studies, the contractualist economy emerges as the arbiter of peace.
Mousseau also finds in an analysis of UN voting patterns from 1946 to 2010 that “states with contractualist and export-oriented economies
tend to agree on issues voted on in the United Nations General Assembly, regardless of their power status or capability, because they have
common interests in a global order based on self-determination.” This can account for “the decline of war” and “why the probability of war
among market democracies is practically zero.”83 Perhaps controversially, Mousseau claims in one of his latest studies:
the state of evidence does not support the existence of a correlation of democracy with peace, in four simple
ways: (1) no one has been able to show democracy significant in a clear-cut regression in analyses
of fatal MIDs, crises, or wars ; (2) every empirical defense of democracy has been rebutted , and
the rebuttals remain uncontested despite multiple opportunities to contest them; (3) there is no
democratic peace in the nineteenth century , when there were no contractualist dyads; and
(4) new analyses with new data show, again, that democracies without contractualist economies
are not in peace. With this study, a total of thirty regressions are now in print documenting that the
contractualist peace supersedes the democratic peace .84
Critics of Mousseau spend most of their time defending the pacifying effects of democracy or recommending a tightening of capitalist peace
definitions and methodologies.85 However, they concede that “many liberal economic factors could be important in reducing the incentives
and tendency for states to wage war against each other, including secure property rights, enforceable contracts, high human capital, gains from
trade and labor mobility, economic freedom induced growth, capital openness, and greater mobility of capital. These factors also largely seem
to be mutually reinforcing, and are deeply historically entwined in the formation of early institutions.”86 In short, even if some scholars (such as
Mousseau) overstate the case for capitalist peace, this in no way detracts from the evidence that it at least plays some role in the promotion of
peace. Essentially, the academic literature strongly supports the pacifying effects of economic liberalization
and interdependence. This is one-step toward giving empirical validity to the doux commerce thesis.87
Transition kills two-thirds of the world within two weeks---ONLY
gradual transition via reformism is possible in the modern world--prefer ev from the world’s most famous living Marxist.
Harvey ’20 [David Harvey; 2020; Distinguished Professor of Anthropology & Geography at the
Graduate Center of the City University of New York; The Anti-Capitalist Chronicles, Pluto Press: London]
Global Unrest
There are many contradictions in the capitalist system, and some are more salient than others. The incredible class and social inequalities and
collapsing environmental conditions are obvious priorities. But then comes the “too big to fail, too monstrous to survive” contradiction. Neither
the social inequality nor environmental degradation issues can be addressed without taking on this underlying contradiction. A socialist
and anti-capitalist program will have to negotiate a knife-edge path between preserving that which
services the world’s population and which appears too big and foundational to fail while confronting the
fact that it is becoming too monstrous to survive without sparking geopolitical conflicts that will likely
turn the innumerable small wars and internal struggles already raging across the planet into a global
conflagration .
This is the core of the problem. In Marx’s time , if there was a sudden collapse of capitalism , most people in
the world would still have been able to feed themselves and reproduce. They were reasonably self-sufficient in their
local area procuring the kinds of things they needed to live and reproduce. People could put some sort of breakfast on their
table irrespective of what was going on in the global economy and in global markets . Right now,
that’s no longer the case in many parts of the world. Most people in the U nited S tates, in much of Europe, in
Japan, and now increasingly in China, India, Indonesia, and in Latin America are depending more and
more on the delivery of food through the circulation of capital. In Marx’s time, perhaps 10 percent of
the global population was vulnerable to disruptions in the circulation of capital, as opposed to many
more who were subject to famines, droughts, epidemics, and other environmental disruptions. The crisis of
European capitalism in 1848 was part a product of harvest failures and part produced by a speculative crash focused on railroad finance.
Since then, capital operating in the world market has largely eliminated the prospect of starvation due
to supposedly natural causes. If there is famine the underlying causes (as opposed to the immediate triggers) can
invariably be traced to failures in the social and political system of capitalist governance and
distribution. Much of the world’s population is now dependent upon the circulation of capital to procure
and ensure its food supply, access the fuels and the energy required to support daily life, and to
maintain the elaborate structures and equipment of communication that facilitate the coordination of
basic production requirements.
Capital, right now, may be too deeply implicated in the reproduction of daily life to fail. The economic
consequences and social impacts and costs of a massive and prolonged failure in the continuity of
capital circulation will be catastrophic and potentially lethal for a significant portion of the world’s
population. To be sure, indigenous and peasant populations in the Andean highlands may survive quite well, but if the flow of
capital shuts down for any prolonged period, then maybe two-thirds of the world’s population would
within a few weeks be threatened with starvation, deprived of fuel and light, while being
rendered immobile and deprived of almost all capacity to reproduce their conditions of existence
effectively. We cannot now afford any kind of sustained and prolonged attack upon or disruption of
capital circulation even if the more egregious forms of accumulation are strictly curbed . The kind
of fantasy that revolutionaries might once have had---which was that capitalism could be destroyed and
burned down overnight and that something different could immediately be built upon the ashes--- is impossible today even
supposing there ever was a time when such a revolutionary overthrow might have happened. Some form of
the circulation of commodities and therefore of money capital has to be kept in motion for some considerable time lest most of us starve. It is
in this sense that we might say that capital appears to be now too big to fail. We may aspire to make our own
history, Marx observed, but this can never be done under conditions of our own choosing. These
conditions dictate a politics that is about sustaining many existing commodity chains and flows while
socializing and perhaps gradually modifying them to accommodate to human needs. As Marx noted in his
commentary on the Paris Commune,
in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it the higher form to which present society is irresistibly tending by its own
economical agencies, they [the working classes] will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, transforming
circumstances and men. They have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois
society is pregnant.
The task is to identify that which lays latent in our existing society to find a peaceful transition to
a more socialist alternative . Revolution is a long process not an event .
Fem IR
They’re wrong about “root cause” and can’t solve --- prioritizing the
moral over the material is doomed to failure
Dean 19 [Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Jodi, “Against
Gyno-pessimism,” 2019, https://publicseminar.org/essays/against-gyno-pessimism/, dml]
I love Liza Featherstone’s essay, “Moving Beyond Misogyny” (The New Republic, November 4 2019), an essay that highlights the current
popularity of misogyny as liberal feminism’s basic category for analyzing social problems . Hatred of women is
offered up as the explanation for everything from domestic violence, campus rape, and sexual harassment, to Hillary
Clinton’s failure to win the presidency in 2016. Women are kept down, abused, and murdered because men hate them. It’s as simple as that.
But it’s not just that hate doesn’t explain everything – it doesn’t explain anything .
Offered up in the context of a social or political analysis, misogyny is the attribution of a feeling that covers over the
absence of an explanation . An event or phenomenon is positioned as the effect of an aversion
that is attributed to a group. The group is constituted as a group by virtue of the attribute and the
attribute is treated as a cause – empirical evidence be damned . For example, violence against women is explained
as evidence of misogyny. But according to the most recent federal statistics, except for rape, more men than women are likely to be victims of
violent crime. To complicate matters further, men are more likely to be victims of offenses committed by men than women are, and women are
more likely to commit offenses against women than they are against men. If misogyny accounts for violence against women,
does misandry account for violence against men? Or are these categories too crude to tell us much at
all?
Misogyny’s analytical weakness does not diminish its contemporary popularity. It might even increase it. In the affective networks of
communicative capitalism, outrage circulates more easily than critical analysis. Moralism substitutes for
explanation , and moral outrage doesn’t require reading anything too long . We know how to trigger each
other enough to like and share and deploy the appropriate GIF.
The outrage of the hated can produce a momentary sense of unity . Being hated inspires ferocity ,
self-righteousness , cancel culture : “I’m unfriending anyone who thinks violence against women is okay.” So rather than
telling us something about the haters, misogyny is an inverted or reactive social diagnosis for creating an identity among the hated. After all,
haters gonna hate (and even Taylor Swift advises us to shake it off).
But what are women supposed to do about being hated? The options that the misogyny diagnosis
presents repeat the traps of fairytales : be the witch who draws power from her outcast position or
the passive princess dreaming of love. Poison men or win them over . Mirroring the compressed
possibilities of the world it claims to critique , the misogyny diagnosis compels us to accept a world
of false choices . In so doing, it avoids the perplexing dilemma of how women are to wage a struggle
against an aversion by side-stepping politics altogether .
In fact, the point seems to be that we can’t do anything about being hated. Misogyny supplies an account of the world wellsuited for the circulation of rage as a commodity . One gets a bit of a charge , a flash of
indignation , while remaining free of any obligation to act . The situation women face is moral ,
perhaps even ontological . Political struggle can’t improve women’s lives when the deepest
problem we face is misogyny . No wonder liberal feminists find misogyny a compelling lens for
understanding the contemporary world. It reflects it back to them while getting them off the hook
for failing to fight to change it.
Featherstone astutely draws out the core problem with the misogyny lens: it “ forecloses big dreams of political
change .” Not only does virtue signaling substitute for politics , but mirroring the dominant order
conserves that order . Margaret Thatcher — no one’s feminist icon despite having broken the political glass ceiling in the UK — told
us that there is no alternative to capitalism. Liberal feminists tell us there is no alternative to misogyny. Their argument takes a form familiar in
the academic humanities as Afro-pessimism, the hatred of the black theorized as the root of European modernity. Corey Robin identifies the
same logic in the jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas: racism is ineradicable. And we are seeing a similar eco-pessimism in writers such as Roy
Scranton and Jonathan Franzen. The climate catastrophe is here and hoping that we might enact changes big enough to ward off the worst is as
delusional as it is dangerous. Public funds have to be saved for disaster relief. Critical energies should be directed to learning how to die.
Gyno-pessimism is another iteration of the same story. By diagnosing the primary political problem as an
attitude , an aversion that persists transhistorically and transculturally , the liberal feminist
assumes the inadequacy of politics from the start . Material struggles over the division of labor, property, and
the wage are neglected and the capitalist system taken for granted as the basic economic condition of our lives. The lens of
misogyny prevents us from seeing the broad history of women’s political movement. It can’t focus
on women’s leadership in anti-slavery, anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist struggles, or on their
victories. It fails to place contemporary defeats in the historical context of the defeat of unions, labor, the
Soviet experiment, and the communist dream of an emancipatory egalitarian society characterized by solidarity and comradeship.
The classical feminist critique of IR is a straw person and using
diplomatic approaches to socialize and engage in behavioral learning
does not link
Aydin 16 [Gülşen Aydın Assistant Professor, Atatürk University, Department of International
Relations. "Feminist Challenge to the Mainstream IR."
http://journals.euser.org/files/articles/ejms_may_aug_16/Gulsen.pdf]
Ann Tickner argued that whereas the Feminists are inclined to critical theory, mainstream IR is oriented towards
problem solving theory . As a result, Tickner argued that Realism takes the world as it finds it and accepts
the current order as its framework. Moreover, Tickner argued that whereas Feminists reject prefer humanist and philosophical
traditions taking spatial and temporal attributes into account, Realists rely on positivist epistemologies taking the
natural sciences as the models to follow. Lastly, Tickner argues that whereas Feminism is associated with
the social construction of reality whereas Realists opt for an atomistic, asocial conception of behavior
determined by the laws of nature (Tickner 1997). Against the criticisms of Ann Tickner, Robert Keohane argued that only a
limited number of major IR theorists are oriented towards problem-solving , positivist and asocial
(Keohane 1998, 194). Keohane focuses on Morgenthau since most of the criticisms of Tickner concentrates on him.
Keohane argues that since Morgenthau was a refuge from Nazism , he was not satisfied with the prevailing
world order of the late 1930’s and 1940’s as a framework of analysis. Moreover, Morgenthau had an intensely
normative purpose : to prevent the reoccurrence of war generated by ideologies such as fascism and
communism . Kenneth N. Waltz, the leader in Neo-Realist Theory, underlined the importance of socialization in
the world politics and as a result it not appropriate to regard him an advocate of asocial theories
(Keohane 1998, 194). Against the last criticism of Tickner, Keohane argued that “no serious student of international
relations expect to discover meaningful universal laws that operate deterministically , since they
recognize that no generalization is meaningful without specification of its scope conditions . One
can recognize that knowledge is socially constructed without giving up the efforts to widen
intersubjective agreement on important issues ” (Keohane 1998, 194).
Associating gender norms with state behaviors or ecological patterns
is a false retroactive universalization.
Oeindrila Dube & S. P. Harish 17. Professor, University of Chicago. Post-doctoral Fellow, McGill
University. 04/01/2017. Queens. SSRN Scholarly Paper, ID 2957313, Social Science Research Network.
papers.ssrn.com, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2957313.
Does female leadership lead to greater peace? On the one hand, it is commonly argued that women are less violent
than men , and therefore, states led by women will be less prone to violent conflict than states led by
men. For example, men have been held to “plan almost all the world’s wars and genocides [Pinker, 2011,
p.684]”, and the democratic peace among the developed nations has been attributed to rising female
leadership in these places [Fukuyama, 1998]. On the other hand, differences in individual aggression may
not determine differences in leader aggression . Female leaders, like any other leader, ultimately have
to consider how war affects their state as a whole . And, setting overly conciliatory war policies
would weaken their state relative to other states. As a consequence, war policies set by female leaders
may be similar to war policies set by male leaders.1 A state’s aggression in the foreign policy arena, and its decision to go to
war, is arguably one of the most consequential policy outcomes, and one in which the national leadership plays a critical role. Despite its
importance, there is little definitive evidence of whether states vary in their tendency to engage in conflict under female versus male
leadership. This stands in contrast to other arenas such as economic development, where a growing body of evidence has documented policy
differences arising as a consequence of female leadership [Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004, Beaman et al., 2012, Clots-Figueras, 2012, Brollo
and Troiano, 2016]. The existing studies that do relate female leadership to external conflict focus exclusively on the modern era [Koch and
Fulton, 2011, Caprioli, 2000, Caprioli and Boyer, 2001, Regan and Paskeviciute, 2003], and are also difficult to interpret since women may gain
electoral support and come to power disproportionately during periods of peace [Lawless, 2004]. In this paper, we examine how female
leadership affected war among European states historically, exploiting features of hereditary succession to surmount this identification
challenge. We focus on the 15th-20th centuries and polities that had at least one female ruler during this period. As with electoral systems,
women in hereditary systems may have gained power more during times of peace, or when there was no threat of imminent war [Pinker,
2011]. However the way in which succession occurred also provides an opportunity to identify the effect of female rule. In these polities, older
male children of reigning monarchs were given priority in succession [Monter, 2012, p. 36-37]. As a result, queens were less likely to come to
power if the previous monarchs had a first-born child who was male; and, more likely to come to power if previous monarchs had a sister who
could potentially follow as successor. We use these two factors as instruments for queenly rule to determine whether polities led by queens
differed in their war participation relative to polities led by kings. Importantly, our paper analyzes the question of whether states led by women
are less prone to engage in conflict than states led by men. This is conceptually distinct from the question of whether women, as individuals,
are less violent than men,2 in part because war policies are set by leaders based on broader strategic considerations beyond personal
inclinations toward violence. To conduct our analysis, we construct a new panel dataset which tracks the genealogy and conflict participation of
European polities during every year over 1480-1913. Our primary sample covers 193 reigns in 18 polities, with queens ruling in 18% of these
reigns. We include polity fixed effects, holding constant time invariant features of a polity that affect conflict, and exploit variation over time in
the gender of the ruler. Using the first born male and sister instruments, we find that polities ruled by queens were 27% more likely to
participate in inter-state conflicts, compared to polities ruled by kings. These estimates are economically important, representing a doubling
over mean war participation over this period. In contrast, we find that queens were no more likely to experience civil wars or other types of
internal instability. An obvious concern with our IV analysis is that the lack of a first-born child who is male may itself trigger conflicts over
succession, regardless of whether a woman comes to power. However, we conduct a number of falsification tests which show that the a firstborn son does not affect war participation in the contemporaneous reign, or in an auxiliary sample of 18 polities that never had queens over
this period. Thus, if there are other ways in which first born males affect conflict, they do not manifest under these circumstances. A second
concern is that the presence of a sister among previous monarchs (an aunt, from the stand-point of the current period monarch) may be
correlated with the presence of other siblings (i.e., other aunts and uncles) who may also have fought for the throne. However, we are able to
control for all of the total siblings of the previous monarchs and show that the results are unaffected if we remove wars of succession from the
sample. Importantly, we demonstrate that the results are insensitive to dropping any particular queen, and any particular polity. In addition, we
show the robustness of our results to numerous other controls and specifications, including a reign level specification which collapses the
annual data to the reign level, as well as a dyadic specification. We examine two potential accounts of why female ruler may have increased
war participation. The first account suggests that queens may have been perceived as easy targets of attack. This perception—accurate or not—
could have led queens to participate more in wars as a consequence of getting attacked by others. The second account builds on the
importance of state capacity. During this period, states fought wars were primarily with the aim of expanding territory and economic power
[Mearsheimer, 2001, Goertz and Diehl, 2002, Copeland, 2015]. Wars of this nature demanded financing, spurring states to develop a broader
fiscal reach [Besley and Persson, 2009, Karaman and Pamuk, 2013, Gennaioli and Voth, 2015]. As a result, states undertaking wars required
greater capacity. Queenly reigns may have had greater capacity than kingly reigns for two reasons, both of which themselves reflect prevailing
gender norms from this period. First, queenly reigns may have been able to secure more military alliances. While marriage brought alliances for
both male and female monarchs, male spouses were typically more involved with the military of their home countries (than female spouses).
This was a direct reflection of taboos on female military leadership during this time period. As a consequence, male spouses were also plausibly
better positioned to cement alliances on behalf of queens. Second, queens often enlisted their spouses to help them rule, in ways that kings
were less inclined to do with their spouses — an asymmetry again reflects gender identity norms. For example, queens put their spouses in
charge of the military or economic reforms, which effectively meant there were two monarchs overseeing state affairs, as compared to one.
This greater spousal division of labor may also have enhanced the capacity of queenly reigns, enabling queens to pursue more more aggressive
war policies. To test these accounts, we disaggregate war participation by which side was the aggressor, and examine heterogeneous effects
based on the monarch’s marital status. We find that among married monarchs, queens were more likely than kings
to fight as aggressors , and to fight alongside allies. Among unmarried monarchs, queens were more likely than kings to
fight in wars in which their polity was attacked. These results provide some support for the idea that queens were targeted for attack:
Unmarried queens, specifically, may have been perceived as weak and attacked by others. But this did not
hold true for married queens who instead participated as aggressors . The results are consistent with
the idea that the reigns of married queens had greater capacity to carry out war , and asymmetries
generated by gender identity norms played a role in shaping this outcome [Bertrand et al., 2015b].3 We also consider and present evidence
against several alternative accounts. Queens may also have fought to signal they were militarily strong, which is a type
of signaling implied by the influential bargaining model of war [Fearon, 1995]. However, if queens were signaling, there
should be larger effects on war participation earlier in their reigns, when it would have been most
valuable to send signals to maximally discourage future attacks. Yet, we observe no such differential
effect . A second alternative account suggests that it was not the queen, but a persuasive male
advisor (such as a foreign minister), who was actually responsible for setting war policy in queenly reigns. In this were the
case, the gender effect on war should be even larger among monarchs who acceded at a younger age,
since these monarchs are more likely to be influenced by advisors. However, we observe no
differential effect based on age of accession, which casts doubt on the idea that war participation was
driven by advisors . Rather we interpret our results as reflecting the direct consequence of having a queen, and associated decisions
made by the monarchs themselves. In broad terms, we see our results providing evidence for the idea that leaders
matter [Jones and Olken, 2005, Pande, 2003], including in shaping policy outcomes. Most proximate to our paper are
studies that examine female leadership and inter-state war . These studies have found mixed results. For example,
Koch and Fulton [2011] find that among democracies over 1970-2000, having a female executive is
associated with higher defense spending and greater external conflict , while having a higher fraction of
female legislators is associated with lower defense spending and conflict. Other studies have also found that more female legislators are
associated with less external conflict [Caprioli, 2000, Caprioli and Boyer, 2001, Regan and Paskeviciute, 2003]; that female voters are less likely
to support the use of force internationally [Conover and Sapiro, 1993, Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986, Jelen et al., 1994, Wilcox et al., 1996,
Eichenberg, 2003]; and that female leaders and greater gender equity is correlated with lower rates of internal conflicts [Caprioli, 2000,
Melander, 2005, Fearon, 2010]. These results may partly reflect the greater willingness to elect female leaders during times of peace. Owing to
this concern, we exploit a plausibly exogenous source of variation in female rule. By focusing our analysis on war over the 15th-20th centuries,
we also take an identification-based approach to analyzing history [Nunn, 2009]. Our paper fits into the broader literature of how female
political leadership affects public policies, including spending patterns [Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004, Breuning, 2001] education [ClotsFigueras, 2012, Beaman et al., 2012] and corruption [Brollo and Troiano, 2016]; as well as how female corporate leadership affects firms
outcomes [Matsa and Miller, 2013, Bertrand et al., 2015a, Ahern and Dittmar, 2012].
Anti-patriarchal activism should pragmatically engage the law, as
particular tactic informed by feminist jurisprudence --- this
recognizes that the law can be a tool in the toolbox on a case-by-case
basis
Harriet Samuels 14, A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the University of
Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Feminist engagement with law in the new
millennium, February 2014
It appears to have a very clear message and poured a bucket of very cold water over second wave feminists’ enthusiasm for trying to use law
for women.70 This has led to a disjuncture between feminist theorising and practice, which is regretted by many feminists.71 It is my disquiet
about this call to turn away from law, and the belief that legal feminists, both scholars and activists, have a
responsibility to engage with law that underpins the thesis. Critique of law is insufficient. There
is a need to use law’s tools in traditional and imaginative ways not only to expose its gendered
character but to find new ways of doing law.
This aligns the thesis alongside feminists who seek to reconstruct liberal values rather than reject them outright.72
Feminists have interrogated liberalism and found it wanting. They have critiqued the individualistic and autonomous nature of the liberal
subject, the dualism that liberalism presents in its divisions between the rational versus the emotional, its formal view of equality, the vision of
the neutral state and its separation of the public and the private realm. 73 Jaggar concludes that feminism has often relied on liberal ideas and
has many reasons to be grateful to liberalism, but that it is incapable of bringing about the changes desired.74 Nussbaum, on the contrary,
accepts much of the critique of liberalism, but she has famously mounted a spirited defence of its principles of ‘personhood, autonomy, rights
dignity [and] self respect’.75 She has pointed out the diversity of liberal thinking, and notes that it has attempted to respond to feminist
criticisms. She tries to persuade the reader that, ‘[t]he deepest and most central ideas of the liberal tradition are ideas of radical force and great
theoretical and practical value’.76 Nussbaum’s own project, based on human capabilities, articulates a set of needs necessary for autonomy
and human flourishing.77 My concern that Smart’s exhortations to desist from legal engagement, are overly
dismissive of law’s possibilities , are shared by other legal feminists and critical theorists. Sandland criticizes Smart for creating
a dichotomy between politics/philosophy and between deconstruction/reform thus closing down all political and legal options.
78 Being outside the system as a form of resistance is, according to Sandland, a strategy of ‘no
resistance’ . He sees Smart as being overly pessimistic, by dismissing the significance of cases such as R v R,
where the judges removed the marital rape exemption, there is a danger of feminism ‘understating its
own political and jurisprudential purchase as a subversive force interrupting the “unmodified” liberal
paradigm’.79 Feminism needs to use the tension between recognition and denial of law to evaluate the merits of legal
intervention on a case-by-case basis. Sandland sees there being value in finding the gaps in law that provide a space to struggle
over law’s meaning.80Lacey appears sympathetic to Smart’s theoretical project, and to Smart’s insight that law’s belief that it is objective, true
and impartial inflates its status so that it appear superior to other forms of knowledge. This makes it harmful to women.81 But she also has
reservations about Smart’s political strategy and argues that it would be unfortunate to give up attempts at legal reform.
She notes that it is unclear that other institutions such as the family, religion or politics are more susceptible to reconstruction than law.82
Writing just under ten years later Munro argues that feminism should not relinquish its attempts to reconstruct law. She
is not uncritical of liberal values, but given law’s resistance to competing discourses she thinks there are pragmatic
reasons for using law rather than remaining silenced by an oppositional stance.83
NOT the root cause of our impacts – NOR any others – prefer
empirical testing
Levy 98 (Jack S. Levy, Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, and Senior
Associate at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, former president of the
International Studies Association, and of the Peace Science Society, “The Causes of War and the Conditions of
Peace,” Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 1, 1998, http://faspolisci.rutgers.edu/levy/1998%20causes%20of%20war%20&%20conditions%20of%20peace.pdf)
Despite this consensus on what we are trying to explain, the question of what causes war can mean several different things
(Suganami 1996). It can refer, first of all, to the question of what makes war possible, to the permissive or logically
necessary conditions for war. These fundamental or primary causes of war explain why war repeatedly
occurs in international politics, why war can occur at any moment. Thus scholars trace war to human
nature, biological instincts, frustration, fear and greed, the existence of weapons, and similar factors.
Peace, however, is far more common than war, though as a “non-event” peace is difficult to measure. At
the systemic level there may be more years characterized by war than by peace, but in nearly all war years most states are at peace, and at the dyadic level war is
rare (Bremer 1992). This makes it hard to argue that human nature and related factors are causes of war. The
point is that these factors are constants and cannot explain the variations in war and peace over time
and space (Waltz 1959, Cashman 1993). If human nature varies, as some argue, then it is the sources of that
variation, not human nature itself, that explain behavior. Moreover, even if human nature or biologically
based instincts could explain aggressive behavior at the individual level, they cannot explain when such
aggression leads to domestic violence , when it leads to scapegoating or other outlets, when it is
resolved , and when it leads to international war . The question of how to explain variations in war
and peace is the second meaning of the broader question of what causes war. Why does war occur at
some times rather than other times, between some states rather than other states, under some political
leaders rather than others, in some historical and cultural contexts rather than others, and so on? This differs from
still a third question: How do we explain the origins of a particular war? Most international relations scholars (and particularly those in North America) focus
primarily on the second question, explaining variations in war and peace. They leave the question of why war occurs at all to philosophers and biologists and leave
the question of why a particular war occurs to historians. This is not to pass judgment on the relative importance of the three questions, only to say that they are
different and that their investigation may require different theoretical orientations, different conceptions of causation and explanation, and different
methodologies. One important exception to this focus on variations in war and peace is the argument by Waltz (1979) and other neorealists that the fundamental
cause of war is the anarchic structure of the international system. Anarchy, defined as the absence of a legitimate governmental authority to regulate disputes and
enforce agreements between states, “causes” war in the sense that there is no governmental enforcement mechanism in the international system to prevent
wars.5 Although anarchy may provide one persuasive answer to the question of the permissive causes of war, it is generally treated as a structural constant and
consequently it cannot account for variations in war and peace. Waltz (1988, p. 620) seems to concede this point and argues, “Although neorealist theory does not
explain why particular wars are fought, it does explain war’s dismal recurrence through the millennia.” Other neorealists also recognize this limitation and have
begun to incorporate other variables, including the polarity of the system and the offensive/defensive balance, in order to explain variations of war and peace in
anarchic systems. Another exception to the focus on variations in war and peace can be found in some feminist theorizing about the
outbreak of war, although most feminist work on war focuses on the consequences of war, particularly for women, rather than on the outbreak of war
(Elshtain 1987, Enloe 1990, Peterson 1992, Tickner 1992, Sylvester 1994). The argument is that the gendered nature of states,
cultures, and the world system contributes to the persistence of war in world politics. This might provide
an alternative (or supplement) to anarchy as an answer to the first question of why violence and war
repeatedly occur in international politics, although the fact that peace is more common than war makes
it difficult to argue that patriarchy (or anarchy) causes war. Theories of patriarchy might also help answer the
second question of variations in war and peace, if they identified differences in the patriarchal
structures and gender relations in different international and domestic political systems in different
historical contexts, and if they incorporated these differences into empirically testable hypotheses about
the outbreak of war. This is a promising research agenda, and one that has engaged some anthropologists. Most current feminist
thinking in political science about the outbreak of war, however, treats gendered systems and
patriarchal structures in the same way that neorealists treat anarchy, as a constant.and consequently it
cannot explain variations in war and peace. The Levels-of-Analysis Framework Ever since Waltz (1959) classified the causes of war in
terms of their origins in the individual, the nation-state, and the international system (which he labeled first-, second-, and third-image explanations, respectively),
international relations theorists have agreed on the utility of the levels-of-analysis framework as an organizing device for the study of war and international
behavior more generally. Some scholars have modified Waltz’s framework by collapsing the individual and nation-state levels to create a simplified dichotomy of
nation (or unit) level and system level (Singer 1961, Waltz 1979), while others have disaggregated the nation-state level into distinct governmental and societal-level
factors (Jervis 1976, Rosenau 1980), a practice that I follow here. Following Waltz (1959), most scholars use the levels of analysis as a framework for classifying
independent variables. This leads to such questions as whether the causes of war derive primarily from the level of the international system, national societies or
bureaucracies, or individual decision-makers. Although the question of which level is most important has stimulated useful debate, until recently it distracted
attention from the equally important issue of how variables from different levels interact in the foreign policy process. The levels-of-analysis concept is sometimes
used differently, to refer to the dependent variable, or to the type of entity whose behavior is to be explained. In this sense the systemic level of analysis refers to
explanations of patterns and outcomes in the international system; the dyadic level refers to explanations of the strategic interactions between two states; the
national level refers to explanations of state foreign policy behavior; the organizational level refers to explanations of the behavior of organizations; and the
individual level refers to explanations of the preferences, beliefs, or choices of individuals. The failure of scholars to be explicit about exactly how they are using the
levels-of-analysis concept is a source of confusion in the field. Some have erroneously interpreted Singer.s (1961, p. 92) comment that the various levels “defy
theoretical integration...[and] are not immediately combinable” to suggest that analysts should not combine variables from different levels of analysis to explain
foreign policy decisions or international outcomes. But Singer.s statement makes sense only if the levels of analysis are conceptualized in terms of the dependent
variable. This is the familiar micro-macro problem of aggregation across levels. We cannot assume that correlations or causal connections at one level of analysis are
necessarily valid at another level. It is conceivable, for example, that concentrations of power may promote peace at the dyadic level but war at the system level.
This has important implications for theories of war and peace. Although it is possible that individual- or national-level variables
could be the primary causes of war, these variables do not constitute a logically complete explanation
because they do not explain how individual beliefs and preferences are translated into state decisions
and actions or how the strategies or behaviors of states interact to lead to war as a dyadic or systemic
outcome. To the extent that most wars involve the mutual and interactive decisions of two or more adversaries, an explanation for the outbreak of war
logically requires the inclusion of dyadic- or systemic-level variables. This does not necessarily mean, however, that these variables are the most important in terms
of amount of variation explained. The levels-of-analysis framework is not the only way to organize the literature on the causes of war or on international politics
more generally. It has long been fashionable for international relations theorists to frame debates in terms of the so-called paradigm wars between realism and
liberalism (Baldwin 1993). In contrast to the realist focus on the struggle for power and security in an anarchic and conflictual Hobbesian world, the liberal tradition
sees a more benign Grotian international society or Lockean state of nature where anarchy does not imply disorder. States have common as well as conflictual
interests, aim to maximize economic welfare as well as provide for security, and create international institutions that help regulate conflict and promote
cooperation (Keohane 1989). Although the paradigmatic debate between realism and liberalism has imposed some order on a chaotic field, it distracts attention
from significant variations within each paradigm, variations that often lead to conflicting hypotheses. It also detracts from the important task of systematically
integrating key components from each approach into a more complete and powerful theory. Furthermore, the “paradigm wars” ignore important hypotheses
associated with the Marxist-Leninist tradition and saddle liberalism with charges of the neglect of power that are better associated with the utopianism of Thomas
Paine and others (Walker 1998). As a field, international relations needs to shift its attention from the level of
paradigms to the level of theories, focus on constructing theories and testing them against the
empirical evidence , and leave the question of whether a particular approach fits into a liberal or realist framework to the intellectual historians.
THEORIES OF THE CAUSES OF WAR Systemic-Level Theories The realist tradition has dominated the study of war since Thucydides, and includes Machiavellians,
Hobbesians, classical balance of power theorists, Waltzian neorealists, and hegemonic transition theorists.6 Although different realist theories often generate
conflicting predictions, they share a core of common assumptions: The key actors in world politics are sovereign states that act rationally to advance their security,
power, and wealth in a conflictual international system that lacks a legitimate governmental authority to regulate conflicts or enforce agreements. For realists, wars
can occur not only because some states prefer war to peace, but also because of unintended consequences of actions by those who prefer peace to war and are
more interested in preserving their position than in enhancing it.7 Even defensively motivated efforts by states to provide for their own security through
armaments, alliances, and deterrent threats are often perceived as threatening and lead to counteractions and conflict spirals that are difficult to reverse. This is the
“security dilemma,” the possibility that a state’s actions to provide for its security may result in a decrease in the security of all states, including itself (Jervis 1978).
Realists do not assume that international relations are always conflictual, and they have recently focused on the question of the conditions for cooperation under
anarchy, often through the use of iterated Prisoner.s Dilemma models (Jervis 1978, Axelrod 1984, Grieco 1990). The iterated models are more appropriate for most
situations than single-play Prisoner.s Dilemma models, and the iterated Prisoner.s Dilemma framework has generated some useful hypotheses regarding the rather
restrictive conditions under which cooperation is likely. The assumption that the same game is repeated over and over is often problematic, however, particularly
for security issues, because one play of the game (preemption, for example) can significantly change power relationships and affect payoffs in the next iteration.
Nor is it clear that unilateral defection is always preferred to mutual cooperation; stag hunt models, in which mutual cooperation is both sides. first preference, may
be more applicable in many situations (e.g. where each side fears both war and preemption by the other). There has been a tendency to apply Prisoner.s Dilemma
models to many situations in which the assumptions of the model are not satisfied. The core proposition of realist theory is that the distribution of power,
throughout the system or within a dyad, is the primary factor shaping international outcomes. But different versions of realist theory generate different, sometimes
contradictory explanations and predictions of foreign policy choices and international outcomes, based on different assumptions about the motivations of states,
the nature of power, and the identity and boundaries of the system. Given the variety of realist propositions and predictions, it is possible to interpret nearly any
foreign policy behavior or international outcome as consistent with some version of realism. This is not particularly helpful, for if theories
are not falsifiable they have little explanatory power . We should treat realism as a paradigm
rather than as a theory, and focus instead on specific theories that generate more determinant, testable
propositions. The key division in the realist literature on war is not the standard one between classical realism and neorealism8,
but rather between balance of power theory and hegemonic theory. Balance of power theory includes numerous variations on the
classical realism of Morgenthau (1967) and the more systemic structural realism of Waltz. Hegemonic theory is a structural theory that
incorporates power transition theory and hegemonic stability theory and that downplays the
importance of anarchy. Balance of power theory posits the avoidance of hegemony as the primary goal of states and the maintenance of an
equilibrium of power in the system as the primary instrumental goal. The theory predicts that states, and particularly great powers, will balance against those states
that constitute the primary threats to their interests and particularly against any state that threatens to secure a hegemonic position.9 Balance of power theorists
argue that the balancing mechanism.which includes both external alliances and internal military buildups.almost always successfully avoids hegemony, either
because potential hegemons are deterred by their anticipation of a military coalition forming against them or because they are defeated in war after deterrence
fails. In balance of power theory, serious threats of hegemony are a sufficient condition for the formation of a blocking coalition, which leads either to the
withdrawal of the threatening power or to a hegemonic war. Balance of power theory is more concerned with explaining national strategies, the formation of
blocking coalitions, the avoidance of hegemony, and the stability of the system than the origins of wars, which are underdetermined. All balance of power theorists
agree that some form of equilibrium of military capabilities increases the stability of the system (generally defined as the relative absence of major wars), and that
movements toward unipolarity are destabilizing because they trigger blocking coalitions and (usually) a hegemonic war to restore equilibrium. There is a major
debate, however, between classical realists, who argue that stability is further supported by the presence of a multipolar distribution of power and a .flexible.
alliance system (Morgenthau 1967, Gulick 1955), and neorealists, who argue that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity (Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 1990).
Although neorealists rely heavily on polarity as a key explanatory variable, they do so with very little supporting evidence. They overgeneralize from the Cold War
experience, where bipolarity is confounded with the existence of nuclear weapons and other key variables, and fail to demonstrate the validity of their arguments
with respect to earlier historical eras. Although bipolarity is less common than multipolarity, it has occurred before, as illustrated by the Athens-Sparta rivalry in the
fifth century BC and the Habsburg-Valois rivalry in the early sixteenth century, both of which witnessed numerous wars. Neorealists also ignore a number of
quantitative studies that suggest that bipolarity is no less war-prone than multipolarity, that wars occur under a variety of structural conditions, and that polarity is
not a primary causal factor in the outbreak of war (Sabrosky 1985). An important alternative to balance of power theory is power transition theory, a
form of hegemonic theory that shares realist assumptions but emphasizes the existence of order within
a hierarchical system (Organski & Kugler 1980, Gilpin 1981, Thompson 1988). Hegemons commonly arise and use their
strength to create a set of political and economic structures and norms of behavior that enhance the
stability of the system while advancing their own security. Differential rates of growth, the costs of imperial overextension, and the
development of vested domestic interests lead to the rise and fall of hegemons, and the probability of a major war is greatest at the
point when the declining leader is being overtaken by the rising challenger . Either the challenger
initiates a war to bring its benefits from the system into line with its rising military power or the
declining leader initiates a “preventive war” to block the rising challenger while the chance is still
available (Levy 1989b, pp. 253.54). The resulting hegemonic war usually generates a new hegemonic power, and the irregular hegemonic cycle begins anew.
Power transition theorists disagree somewhat on the precise identity of hegemonic wars and the particular causal dynamics from which they arise; for comparisons
of the wars and critiques of the theories see Levy (1985) and Vasquez (1993). Although many of the theoretical analyses of power transition theory focus on
transitions between the dominant state in the system and a challenger, and include conceptions of a broader international system and hierarchy, some applications
of power transition theory are dyadic in nature and apply in principle to any two states in the system. The dyadic-level “power
preponderance” hypothesis, which holds that war is least likely when one state has a preponderance
of power over another and is most likely when there is an equality of power, has received
widespread support in the empirical literature (Kugler & Lemke 1996).
Feminist foreign policy is undertheorized---only analyzing specific
contexts via a pluralistic lens effectuates change.
Bethany L. McGann 20, Program officer at the United States Institute of Peace, leads the Africa
research portfolio with the RESOLVE Network, master’s in Security Policy Studies from The George
Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, 2020 Shawn Brimley Next Generation
national security fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “U.N. Security Council Resolution
1325: An Imperfect Catalyst for Important Reform,” Texas National Security Review, 10-27-2020,
https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-gender-and-security/#essay5
In 2014, Sweden became the first country to establish a “feminist” foreign policy framework.163 It was followed by Canada
in 2017,164 and Mexico, the most recent adoptee, in 2020.165 As a new frontier in the gender-and-national security (or
“gendering national security”) journey, these feminist foreign policies demand examination.
In articulating the contributions women make to peacebuilding — or how a women-focused policy agenda will lead to less aggressive,
militarized, or oppressive and exclusionary outcomes — both the Canadian and Scandinavian frameworks are undergirded by
the enduring narrative of women as inherently peaceful, conciliatory, and exclusively communityoriented. This implies that women’s interests are uniform, and consistent with the “common
good.” The feminist agendas are largely concerned with traditional interventions in women’s lived experiences:
sexual and gender-based violence, reproductive and maternal health, education, and so forth. Seeking to address challenges in these areas is an
admirable, necessary goal. However, there is not just a conceptual glass ceiling governing our understanding of a
woman’s place in policy and the place of women’s issues on the national security agenda. Rather, the
endeavor itself resembles a glass doll house — a prettier rendering of the pink ghettos that
maintains much of the same intellectual architecture of previous, failed approaches to genderinformed policymaking.
The effort to promote feminist foreign policy unintentionally lionizes an archetypical femininity that plays
into essentialist gender tropes, erases the diversity of women’s lived experiences within existing foreign
policies, and provides little ev idence as to how it is substantively better than a traditionally masculine
foreign policy approach when it comes to meeting complex 21st-century threats.
These dynamics can also be found within state bodies and processes focused on domestic issues. Pursuing
an agenda that promotes shallow, stereotyped conceptions of women’s roles in peace and security processes has the
potential to reinforce problematic systems of power, however well-meaning the original intent. Thin conceptions
of gender inclusion obscure how empowered (or elite) women can take advantage of identityneutral institutions and policies for their own benefit , rather than moving to substantively change the livelihoods
of marginalized women or the governance challenges that necessitated the policy in the first place.
In Iraq, implementing the internationally endorsed quota system provided an opportunity for political elites to further capture the state
apparatus while generating political capital and positive perception from external actors.166 In considering post-conflict Rwanda, Jennie E.
Burnet notes that “the increased political participation of women … represents a paradox in the short-term: as their participation has increased,
women’s ability to influence policymaking has decreased.”167 Despite high levels of women’s participation,168 Rwanda
has all the markings of a predatory, authoritarian regime.169 Given these examples, the assumption that women’s
inclusion changes the outcomes or nature of a policy process or governance system is sorely tested.
The post-conflict dynamics in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, illuminate the peril of pursuing parity in the place of
substance, while simultaneously illustrating the ease with which this thin approach to gendered and inclusive policy satisfies the metrics and
indicators of progress.170 In 2010, Bougainville was in the lead-up to its third election following a devastating internal conflict. Election
monitors were dispatched to conduct qualitative assessments of the impact of the newly instituted quota system on women’s political
participation.171 Though the peace convention of 2001 created space for women in government,172 and there had been progress in increasing
the number of women involved in governance, civil society and non-government organization practitioners feared that the next cycle would see
an overall decrease in women’s political participation. Why? UNSCR 1325 makes no requirements of the types of women included in the
representative sample, or how to practically change the processes of decision-making to prevent backsliding or proactively enforce changes in
the post-conflict social order. Upon entering political service, the women of Bougainville encountered a systematic stripping of substantive
power and the siloing of their political activities and speech into areas consistent with “women’s” interests.173 In this and many other cases,
progress via rhetorical or parity-based inclusion often masquerades as a step forward, when
it has the practical result of serving as a well-intentioned obstacle to substantive women’s
inclusion.
Ironically, terrorist groups and other nonstate actors have occasionally been more adept than U.S.
policymakers at leveraging women’s contributions to advance their objectives.174 One need only acknowledge
the ease with which groups like ISIL and far-right extremists leverage relative deprivation to convince women that they could either transgress
social norms or be the upholders of an ideal archetypal womanhood through their participation. In the Islamic State, women served as morality
police and enforcers of the group’s interpretation of appropriate gender roles.175 Western countries — from France to the United
States, Australia, and the United Kingdom — have see n women identify with far-right ethnonationalist movements
defending normative conceptions of women’s natural freedom and economic autonomy (the tenets of liberal
feminism) but reclassed into a racial, religious archetype.176
In order to combat these threats, policy personnel need to be literate in the complex, intersecting
identities that shape individual responses. They should be aware of the implications of
intersectional identities for policy formulation and implementation. Most importantly, they need to be
conscious of the social contexts they seek to change. Otherwise, they risk compromising the
comparative advantages women can bring to the security conversation by sidelining their
core concerns and potentially driving them into the arms of adversaries.
Psycho
there is zero empirical basis for psychoanalysis and it’s non-falsifiable – their authors
either grossly misrepresent empirical data or hubristically extrapolate single events
into broad theories
Paris 17 [Dr Paris is Professor, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, and Research Associate,
Department of Psychiatry, Jewish General Hospital. "Is Psychoanalysis Still Relevant to Psychiatry?"
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5459228/]
In an era in which psychiatry is dominated by neuroscience-based models, psychological constructs tend to
be neglected and may be taken seriously only when they have neural correlates.37 Some psychoanalysts
have sought to link their model with neurobiological research and to claim that newer methods of
studying the brain can validate their theories.5,6¶ Mark Solms, a South African neuropsychologist, is the founder of
“neuropsychoanalysis.” This new field, with its own society and its own journal, proposes to use neuroimaging to confirm analytic theories. Its
key idea is that subjective experience and the unconscious mind can be observed through neuroimaging.5 It is known that brain processes can
be seen on brain imaging even before they have entered consciousness.38 However, claims that neuroimaging validate Freud’s
model of the unconscious can be based only on “cherry-picking” the literature. The observed
correspondences are superficial and hardly support the complex edifice of psychoanalytic theory.¶ Solms39
has also suggested that Freud’s ideas about dreams are consistent with neuroscience research based on rapid eye movement (REM) activity.
This attempt to rescue a century-old theory met with opposition from dream researchers who consider Freud’s clinical speculations to be
incompatible with empirical data.40,41¶ The proposal to establish a discipline of neuropsychoanalysis also met with a
mixed reception from traditional psychoanalysts, who did not want to dilute Freud’s wine with neuroscientific water.42
Neuroscientists, who are more likely to see links to psychology as lying in cognitive science,43 have
ignored this idea. In summary, neuropsychoanalysis is being used a way to justify long-standing models,
without attempting to find something new or to develop an integration of perspectives on psychology.¶
However, Eric Kandel,44 influential in the light of his Nobel Prize for the study of the neurochemistry of memory, has taken a sympathetic view
of the use of biological methods to study psychoanalytic theory. Kandel had wanted to be an analyst before becoming a neuroscientist.45 But
Kandel, who does not actively practice psychiatry, may be caught in a time warp, unaware that
psychoanalysis has been overtaken by competitors in the field of psychotherapy.¶ Another attempt to reconcile
psychoanalysis with science has come from the literature on neuroplasticity.46 It is now known that neurogenesis
occurs in some brain regions (particularly the hippocampus) during adulthood and that neural connections undergo modification in all parts of
the brain. There is also evidence that CBT can produce brain changes that are visible using imaging.47 These findings have not been
confirmed in psychoanalytic therapies. However, Norman Doidge, a Canadian psychoanalyst, has argued that
psychoanalysis can change the brain.48 This may be the case for all psychotherapies. However, more
recently, Doidge49 has claimed that mental exercises can reverse the course of severe neurological and
psychiatric problems, including chronic pain, stroke, multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, and autism. While these books
have been best-sellers, most of their ideas in the second volume,49 based on anecdotes rather than on
clinical trials, have had little impact in medicine. This story underscores the difficulty of reconciling the
perspectives and methods of psychoanalysis with scientific methods based on empirical testing.¶
Psychoanalysis and the Humanities¶ Psychoanalysis claimed to be a science but did not function like one. It failed
to operationalize its hypotheses, to test them with empirical methods, or to remove constructs that
failed to gain scientific support.1 In this way, the intellectual world of psychoanalysis more closely
resembles the humanities. Today, with few psychiatrists or clinical psychologists entering psychoanalytic training, the door has been
opened to practitioners with backgrounds in other disciplines, including the humanities.¶ This trend is related to a hermeneutic mode of
thought,50 which focuses on meaningful interpretations of phenomena, rather than on empirical testing of hypotheses and observations. Since
the time of Freud, the typical psychoanalytic paper has consisted of speculations backed up with illustrations, similar to the methods of literary
theory and criticism.¶ One model currently popular in the humanities is “critical theory.”51 This postmodernist
approach uses Marxist concepts to explain phenomena ranging from literature to politics. It proposes
that truth is entirely relative and often governed by hidden social forces. In its most radical form, in the
work of Michel Foucault,52 critical theory and postmodernism take an antiscience position, denying the existence of objective
truth and viewing scientific findings as ways of defending the “hegemony” of those in power
Alt fails – there’s no ultimate solution to the lack, and the best we can do is develop a
more active relationship to it – try or die for perm do both: pass the plan, and remain
open to the anxiety that what comes next is unpredictable.
Ruti 2017 [Mari Ruti is Distinguished Professor of Critical Theory and of Gender and Sexuality Studies; Graduate Faculty; Undergraduate
Instructor, University of Toronto Mississauga. The Ethics of Opting Out, Columbia University Press 2017. Pp. 111-4 ghs-rodz]
This dispute will gain prominence in the next chapter. But first I want to illustrate that though the reading of death-dealing negativity that
Edelman extracts from Lacan is available in Lacan’s work, so is a very different reading of negativity. More specifically, though it is true that
Lacan connects the death drive to the suicidal act, presenting Antigone as a heroine who is unwilling to cede on her desire even when she
knows that this desire will lead to her demise, he also explicitly links the death drive to a “will to make a fresh start,” “a will to create from zero,
a will to begin again” (1959–1960, 212). He in fact suggests that insofar as the death drive “challenges every- thing that exists” (212), it can
make visible what is invisible from the point of view of the social order, thereby inviting a fundamental reconfiguration (rather than simply a
destruction) of that order. The same logic can arguably be applied to the subject, so that the death drive’s “will to make a fresh start” might
productively be taken to gesture toward the kind of psychic rebirth that clinical practice, in Kristeva’s opinion, can bring about (see chapter 2).
In other words, although Lacan certainly does not imply that acts of subjective destitution invariably result in collective or personal
revitalization, the possibility of such revitalization—a possibility that Edelman studiously ignores—is nevertheless present in his account. This
possibility of revitalization is what Badiou has explored through his notion of the truth event as a sudden revelation that erases the individual’s
status quo—her “business as usual”—and brings into being the so-called subject of truth, a subject who, through its fidelity to the
unanticipated insight offered by the event, engenders a new (collective or personal) order of things. Žižek, whose reading of Lacan is closer to
that of Edelman, routinely takes issue with Badiou’s interpretation, accusing Badiou of not fully grasping the destructive power of the death
drive. Yet Žižek himself at times also views subjective destitution as a spur for a new order of things, as when, for instance, he observes that
“the act differs from an active intervention (action) in that it radically transforms its bearer (agent). . . . in it, the subject is annihilated and
subsequently reborn (or not)” (2001, 44). Unlike Edelman, Žižek here seems to recognize that even though the act may not consciously aim at
rebirth, and even though it may not inevitably lead to such rebirth, it can under certain circumstances have this effect. I suspect that the
ambivalence regarding the matter arises precisely from the fact that both readings are available in Lacan, so that where one ends up—at
destruction or rebirth—depends on what one chooses to highlight. Even Lacan’s statement about the death drive
functioning as “a will to begin again” is wrought with ambiguity. One can argue—as Philip Sayers (2014)
skillfully does—that the “will to begin again,” the “will to make a fresh start,” refers to the will to return to the
beginning of the repetition compulsion, to start “afresh” the process of pursuing the thread of this compulsion, the thread of
one’s fundamental psychic destiny. Read in this way, the will to begin again suggests that the subject defends
against rebirth—understood as a reconfiguration of life—by opting for the familiar trajectory of the repetition
compulsion. Sayers’s reading is also compatible with McGowan’s analysis of the drive as what enjoys by enjoying
“nothing,” by never attaining its goal. Translated into my vocabulary, it implies that the death drive causes the subject to
repeatedly recommence its circling around the traumatic kernel of the lost Thing. Yet even within this
interpretation, there is room for a degree of “rebirth” in the sense that each new cycle of the repetition
compulsion repeats slightly differently—draws new elements, new debris of life, into the groove of the compulsion—so that
even when the repetition is largely predictable, it is always also somewhat unpredictable; to the extent that something new is
added to the repetition compulsion with every new enactment, one can still speak of a “fresh start” of sorts. This interpretation
agrees with the conclusion regarding the repetition compulsion that I arrived at in the last chapter, namely, that the compulsion is
usually impossible to break in any definitive sense, that the best the subject can do is to develop a more active—
and ideally more satisfying— relationship to it. This is one reason that one cannot, in the Lacanian con- text, speak about
an analytic “cure,” about an ultimate solution (what Lacan mockingly calls “the Sovereign Good”) that would, once and for all, release
the subject from its suffering; the best clinical practice can accomplish is to facilitate the subject’s capacity to enter
into the cycle of the repetition compulsion in less injurious ways. This may, for instance, entail developing a greater
degree of critical distance from the compulsion so that moments of intervention—moments when the subject decides against its “usual”
manner of going about the process of living—become possible. Starting “afresh” in this sense is merely a matter of starting from a slightly
different perspective. Although I find this interpretation persuasive, I am also inclined to read Lacan’s statement about the
“will to create from zero, a will to begin again” alongside his famous musings about a potter who creates
a vase around a void, “creates it, just like the mythical creator, ex nihilo, starting with a hole” (1959–1960,
120). In both cases, Lacan suggests that absence (zero, a hole) is a source of creativity. The zero of the death
drive and the hole of the vase are far from being inert spaces of lack. Rather, they give rise to the desire to
play with lack; they—to return to my wording in chapter 1— generate the impulse to work with negativity. Essentially,
Lacan stresses that emptiness and creativity—the zero of the death drive and the will to begin again; the void of the vase
and the fashioning of the vase that comes to enclose it—arise simultaneously. This is Lacan’s figurative means of conveying one of his
most fundamental insights about human subjectivity, namely, that our sense of lack and our capacity to signify come into
being in tandem: the signifier causes our lack but our lack, in turn, causes the urge to signify. Or to state the
matter con- versely, it is because we lack that we are prompted to signify (create) yet it is our significatory (creative) activity
that allows us to (sort of) handle our lack. This is arguably what we do when we write books (yes?). In this sense, there is a direct
connection between our alienation on the one hand and our capacity to envision imaginative ways of
coping with this alien- ation on the other. In addition, because our alienation can never be definitively
redeemed, because we have no way of turning our negativity into a definitive form of positivity, our significatory endeavors are
transient at best, giving us access to no permanent meaning, no solid identity, no unitary narrative of
self- actualization. Any fleeting state of positivity that we may be able to attain must always in the end dissolve back into negativity; any
attempt to erase lack produces new instances of lack. This means that the process of working with negativity must be
continually renewed, which is why we start writing a new book the minute the old one is finished. Or at
least I do. The hope is that if I work through the same ideas one more time, maybe I will finally be able to
put them to rest. But they do not rest. Some of them insist on remaining wide awake, asking for yet another articulation: thus
the endless recycling of thoughts, the endless “will to begin again.” In the same way that no object of desire can ever fully
gratify, our every attempt to fill our lack unavoidably falls short of its goal: there will, quite simply, never be
a perfect book, the book of books that extinguishes the desire for a better book. However, as I have observed, the lack of
complete satisfaction does not mean that there is no satisfaction to be had. If any- thing, the intrinsic
impossibility of complete satisfaction is what sustains us as creatures of becoming and what allows us,
over and again, to take up the inexhaustible process of producing meaning, including the process of
signifying beauty. As Kaja Silverman states, “Our capacity to signify beauty has no limits. It is born of a loss
which can never be adequately named, and whose consequence is, quite simply, the human imperative
to engage in a ceaseless signification. It is finally this never-ending symbolization that the world wants
from us” (2000, 146).
The death drive doesn’t exist, but their continued use of it to
mimetically explain all violence means they link more
Jonathan Dollimore 13, Professor in the School of English and American Studies at the University of
Sussex, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, googlebooks
The death-drive theory has not found wide acceptance among Freud's followers. With significant exceptions
like Melanie Klein, it has been explicitly denounced as misconceived biology, unsubstantiated
speculation, logically incoherent and /or without evidence . It has also been attributed to
Freud's own painful personal circumstances: the death of his daughter, the death of a
grandson, his own illness (cancer), and his lifelong preoccupation with death . Of those
who have been sympathetic to the idea, most have tended to tame it - as indeed did Freud himself.
One move was to rewrite the instinct as largely an instinct of aggression. But for Freud the
aggressive aspect of the death drive had been secondary; the instinct was primarily self-destructive. Sadism derives from a more primordial
masochism, which means in effect that human aggression is, originally, self destructiveness. Of all subsequent theorists of psychoanalysis,
Jacques Lacan takes the death drive most seriously, and most contemporary psychoanalytic attention to it comes via him. To his credit, Lacan
does not underplay or tame the death drive, and he locates Freud firmly within the Western tradition when he remarks that Freud questioned
life as to its meaning and his answer was not that it had none 'which is a convenient way of washing one's hands of the whole business' - but
that life has 'only one meaning, that in which desire is borne by death' (Ecrits, p. 277). According to Lacan, the Freudian world is one not of
things, nor even of being, but rather of desire. More so even than Freud, Lacan finds in desire 'the paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric, even
scandalous character by which it is distinguished from need'. Although this distinction has been 'always obvious to moralists worthy of the
name', psychoanalysis nevertheless misses the point by pursuing an obscurantist reduction of desire to need (p. 286). And that, for Lacan, is a
cardinal error. This distinction belween desire and need leads him to dwell on something else in both Freud and earlier writers, moralists and
otherwise: the relation between desire and lack. In modern psychoanalysis we find a secularized, intensified version of an existential perception
that goes back a long way, even though the immediate influences here are Heidegger and Kojeve: Desire is a relation of being to lack. This lack
is the lack of being properly speaking. It isn't the lack of this or that, but lack of being whereby the being exists. (Lacan, Seminar, 11.222-3) For
Lacan, death is the name for a primordial absence intrinsic to presence; as John Forrester puts it, 'presence includes as its very condition the
limit beyond which is its absence' (p. 176).16 To bind desire so resolutely into lack and absence means that it inevitably becomes a kind of
essential negativity (Lacan, Seminar, 1.146)*' - something premised on an initial failure of satisfaction and which, as such, comes to exist only by
virtue of its own alienation; as Juliet Mitchell puts it, 'Desire persists as an effect of a primordial absence and it therefore indicates that, in this
area, there is something fundamentally impossible about satisfaction itself (Lacan. Feminine Sexuality, p. 6). One consequence of this is a
radical fragmentation of the human subject.18 In one respect Lacan recasts the familiar metaphysical idea that life is rooted in death: 'it is
death that sustains existence' (Ecrits, p. 300). In his development of this idea he combines diverse elements of the Western tradition of desire's
impossibility: a theology of desire as death, crossed with something more romantic if no less severe - desire as annihilating excess, a primordial
discord. The two elements are fused in those places where, for example, he speaks of 'that desperate affirmation of life that is the purest form
in which we recognize the death instinct' (p. 104). These ideas then get reworked according to structuralist and linguistic preoccupations, as
when he speaks of the 'frenzy' of desire 'mocking Ihe abyss of Ihe infinite', and of how this amounts to 'no other derangement of instinct than
that of being caught in the rails - eternally stretching forth towards the desire for something else - of metonymy. Hence its "perverse" fixation
at the very suspension-point of the signifying chain where the memory-screen is immobilized and the fascinating image of the fetish is petrified'
(p. 167). In the same vein Lacan suggests that it is from death that existence takes on all the meaning it has; the lack which is at the heart of
desire is also the price that human beings pay for their admission to language and culture. Death makes life possible in that it makes meaning
and representation possible; it is not only before speech but 'primordial to the birth of symbols' (pp. 104-5, 300). Hence Lacan's most wellknown formulation, that the unconscious is structured like a language, and his claim to have demonstrated 'the profound relationship uniting
the notion of the death instinct to the problems of speech' (Four Fundamental Concepts, p. 20; Merits, p. 101). Richard Boothby regards this as
the most radical and innovative aspect of Lacan. I remain unconvinced.19 Lacan's invocations of death's centrality to life are more derivative
than their complex, often obscure, formulations suggest.20 When he declares that All that life is concerned with is seeking repose as much as
possible while awaiting death. This is what devours the time of the suckling baby at the beginning of its existence... Life is concerned solely with
dying {Seminar. 11.233) we can hear Freud and Schopenhauer most closely, but also Montaigne (especially in that last assertion - 'Life is
concerned solely with dying'), who also, incidentally, consolidated his own perception of this truth with extensive citation of classical sources. In
the giving over of the newborn child to death we might hear too the early Christian Fathers. Lacan does not exactly disguise his precedents; the
passage just cited continues with a reference to Hamlet's 'to die, to sleep, perchance to dream' and to the idea developed by philosophers in
antiquity that it would have been better not to have been born. But (and this recalls Freud's own evasive acknowledgment of his influences) in
allusions to the past are fleeting, in passing, almost secretive; the implication is
that these past writers anticipate something which can only properly, and only now, be
understood through the lens of Lacanian psychoanalysis, whose complexity is, at the same
time, almost guaranteed to defeat the attempt. Some at least of that complexity is
Lacan these
obscurantist . In the wake of contemporary cultural developments, including the perceived failure of sexual radicalism and the trauma of
AIDS, there are those who have turned to Lacan for a more honest view of desire, and, via him, are reconsidering a severe account of human
what I find in Lacan is an overtheorized expression of something more significantly
and relevantly expressed elsewhere (in Freud and before). It this respect I believe he is symptomatic of a much wider
tendency in (post-) modern theory. But in terms of his influence alone Lacan remains significant for this study. By crossing
desire. I should not speak for them;
Freud's death drive with the philosophy of lack and nothingness derived from Kojeve's version of Hegel (itself influenced by Heidegger), he
continues to drive death ever further into being; now, perhaps more inexorably than ever before, death is the lack which drives desire. In doing
the antihumanist
wish to decentre 'man' in the name of a philosophy which is truly adequate to the
complexity of being, yet which seeks to retain a residual human mastery in the very
effort of articulating this complexity. As we have seen, the philosophical bid to comprehend the truth of being was
that he also exemplifies another significant tendency in modern thought which I have already remarked, namely
always a form of intellectual empowerment - even, or rather especially, when issuing in the declaration that life, desire and the world have to
modern theory, having lost faith in older philosophical notions of truth, now
half-settles for the mastery of a new kind of complexity which it partly produces in order
to enable this performance of mastery. Phoenix-like , the omniscient, masterful and
above all complex analytic of the modern theorist rises above his sacrifice of 'man' to
death.
be renounced. But
Reject their psychoanalytic claims – lacks scientific basis
Ferreira 21 Clarice De Medeiros Chaves Ferreira, Student of the Psychology Course of FUMEC
University, 2021, "Is psychoanalysis a pseudoscience? Reevaluating the doctrine using a multicriteria
list," Is Psychoanalysis A Pseudoscience? Reevaluating The Doctrine Using A Multicriteria List,
https://revistardp.org.br/revista/article/view/58 // ella
ABSTRACT: Introduction: In the past, psychoanalysis was classified as a pseudoscience. Karl Popper was one of those who objected to the idea that psychoanalysis is a science, using falsifiability. However, falsifiability cannot be considered sufficient anymore, since it carries major weaknesses and better alternatives to address the issue are available. Objective: This article intends to evaluate the scientific status of psychoanalysis concerning the demarcation problem. Method: In order to do so, Sven Ove Hansson’s criteria was used: It consists of a set of sufficient and
Conclusion: In the end, the conclusion was that even if falsifiability was to
be dismissed, the evidence suggests that there are still enough reasons to affirm that psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience, since it significantly deviates from scientific quality standards.
necessary conditions which is complemented by a multicriteria list that helps identifying pseudosciences. It was analyzed how much psychoanalysis fits each of Hansson's seven items, besides proposing the addition of an eighth. Results: The results showed that psychoanalysis was compatible with all eight demarcation of pseudoscience’s items.
Keywords:
Psychoanalysis, Psychology, Science Artigo de Revisão Será a Psicanálise uma Pseudociência? 2 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 RESUMO: Introdução: A psicanálise já foi classificada como pseudociência no passado. Karl Popper foi um daqueles que traçou objeções à doutrina psicanalítica, usando do critério da falseabilidade. Entretanto, a falseabilidade não pode mais ser considerada suficiente para resolver o problema, já que implica em dificuldades consideráveis, e melhores alternativas para abordar
a questão estão disponíveis. Objetivo: Este artigo tem por objetivo avaliar o status científico da psicanálise em relação ao problema da demarcação. Método: Para fazer isso, o critério de Sven Ove Hansson foi utilizado: este consiste em um conjunto de condições suficientes e necessárias, que é complementado com uma lista de multicritérios que auxiliam a identificar pseudociências. Foi analisado o quanto a psicanálise se encaixava em cada um dos sete itens da lista de Hansson, além de ser proposta a adição de um oitavo item. Resultados: Os resultados mostraram que a
psicanálise era compatível com todos os oito itens da lista de demarcação de pseudociências. Conclusão: Ao final, a conclusão foi de que mesmo que a falseabilidade deva ser descartada, as evidências sugerem que ainda temos motivos suficientes para afirmar que a psicanálise é uma pseudociência, já que ela se distancia significativamente dos padrões de qualidade científicos. Palavras-chave: Psicanálise, Psicologia, Ciência RESUMEN: Introducción: En el pasado, el psicoanálisis fue clasificado como una pseudociencia. Karl Popper fue uno de los que objetó la doctrina
psicoanalítica usando el criterio de la falsabilidad. Sin embargo, ya no se puede considerar la falsabilidad como suficiente para resolver el problema, ya que implicaría dificultades considerables y existen mejores alternativas para abordar este asunto. Objetivo: Este artículo pretende evaluar el estatus científico del psicoanálisis con respecto al problema de demarcación. Método: Para ello fue utilizada la propuesta de Sven Ove Hansson: ésta consiste en un conjunto de condiciones suficientes y necesarias, complementado con una lista multicriterios que ayuda a identificar
pseudociencias. Se analizó que tanto el psicoanálisis se encaja en cada uno de los siete ítems de la lista de Hansson y además, se propone Ferreira CMC 3 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 la adición de un octavo. Resultados: Los resultados mostraron que el psicoanálisis es compatible con todos los criterios de demarcación de pseudociencia. Conclusión: Al final, se concluyó que aún teniendo que descartar la falsabilidad, las evidencias sugieren que hay motivos suficientes para afirmar que el psicoanálisis
es una pseudociencia, ya que ésta se desvía significativamente de los estándares de calidad científica. Palabras clave: Psicoanálisis, Psicología, Ciencia How to cite: Ferreira CMC - Is psychoanalysis a pseudoscience? Reevaluating the doctrine using a multicriteria list. Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33. https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 Disclosure of potential conflicts of interest: none Funding: none Approval Research Ethics Committee (REC): not applicable Received on: Feb 8, 2021 Accepted on: Apr 30, 2021 Published on: Sept 13, 2021
Será a Psicanálise uma Pseudociência? 4 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 Introduction Laplanche and Pontalis [1] present the definition of psychoanalysis as follows: founded by Sigm und Freud, psychoanalysis is a psychotherapeutic treatment and an investigation method (upon which psychotherapy rests) that has as its object of study the unconscious meaning of human productions (words, actions, thoughts, dreams, and others). Besides that, psychoanalysis is a conglomerate of psychological and
psychopathological theories, which has its basis on the experiences that come from the psychotherapy and the investigative method. One of the most famous authors who objected to the doctrine, more specifically by questioning its scientific status, was the philosopher of science Karl Popper. About psychoanalysis, Popper [2] argued that regardless of any occurrence that is related to human behavior, the Freudian psychoanalysis adepts could interpret it in the light of their own theory. Even though intuitively, a theory compatible with all kinds of predictions and scenarios
could sound attractive, that would not be a quality for the author; only a theoretical weakness. In his view, a theory that applies to the world regardless of the scenario in question does not say anything relevant about it, because even if reality were utterly different from how it is today, it would still sound as accurate as if it were not. To judge a theory that behaves like that, Popper [2] used falsifiability, that works as a demarcation criterion for what is scientific and what is not. Falsifiability determines that, for a theory to be scientific, there must be a possibility that it
could be wrong and eventually be refuted by new evidence. It is not enough that a theory can explain the world; means to check if its explanations are appropriate must exist, and that would only be achievable if there were a possibility for the t heory to be wrong in at least one scenario. For the author, psychoanalysis would be applicable in every conceivable circumstance, and there would not be a possibility to check if its explanations were really adequate [2 p. 64-65]. So, falsifiability is proposed to demarcate science, and psychoanalysis would not fit in the category.
Popper's comments did not go unnoticed, and he was criticized for the way he characterized psychoanalysis. About this debate, Grünbaum [3] used Ferreira CMC 5 Debates em Psiquiat ria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 the paranoia example to defend that the theory would be falsifiable. Grünbaum argued that, for the Freudian theory, every paranoid had repressed sexual desires towards other individuals of the same sex; so, if hypothetically a paranoid that did not repress his desires were found, the theory would have
been falsified, that is, a situation which it could not explain existed. About that, Cioffi [4] counterargued that, even if that was the case, this topic is peripheral for psychoanalytic theory, and by using it as the final argument, it is easy to forget more critical candidates to face the Popperian criterion, for example, the sexual etiology of neurosis. The paranoia case is insufficient for taking down Popper's criticism, for not being part of the major suppositions of the doctrine. Besides his psychoanalysis criticisms, Popper's science view in general was also objected to. This article
has no intention to reach an exhaustion of possible counterarguments. However, considering some examples given by Newton-Smith [5 p. 44-76]: Popper rejected that inductive reasoning (non-deductive predictions or generalizations whose validity does not depend on their logical form) should be used in science, defending that it should operate with deductive reasoning only (of which the validity or invalidity depend exclusively on its logical form), and therefore, confirming a theory would be impossible. It is only possible to know that, if the theory is falsified, then it is
false. However, even if a theory is falsified, if there is no better option to explain certain phenomena that could replace it, and considering that the first possesses reasonable assertions, it would probably not be wise to discard it just because it was falsified. Despite that, his conception of science inadvertently requires induction to justify itself, what shows a failure in his proposal. These and other difficulties in the adoption of falsifiability as a demarcation criterion turn it insufficient, and this creates a demand for a different one. Methods Sven Ove Hansson is a philosopher
who had an important impact on the debate of the demarcation problem, by creating an alternative proposal: a criterion with two conditions that are jointly sufficient and necessary for a doctrine to be pseudoscientific [6], and a multicriteria list that helps identifying pseudosciences, the latter being based on seven items [7]. It Será a Psicanálise uma Pseudociência? 6 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 has the advantage of not needing to face the same problems as the previous ones faced, like Popper's
falsifiability. Before discussing it, it is beneficial to understand his way of defining science: “Science (in the broad sense) is the practice that provides us with the most reliable (i.e., epistemically most warranted) statements that can be made, at the time being, on subject matter covered by the community of knowledge disciplines (i.e., on nature, ourselves as human beings, our societies, our physical constructions, and our thought constructions)” [7, p. 70]. It is common to consider that science only entails the natural sciences, and that notion excludes linguistics,
mathematics, philosophy, history, and other humanities from the category. However, as Hansson [7] shows, this is not an adequate perspective because both science (in the traditional sense) and humanities aim to provide the most reliable statements regarding their object of study. Therefore, they can be understood as the theories that present the most robust evidence regarding what they investigate. Together, they form a community, and the disciplines that are part of it cooperate and depend on each other to fulfill this goal. A recurrent argument is that
Even if it is recognized by the academy, this does not make it a
even in the field of humanities extremely dubitable theories are also
psychoanalysis is a science, since it is inserted within the academic realm, in research, and in departments of many higher education courses. It would therefore be part of the scientific community. However, "It is not the academic status but the methodology and the type of knowledge that should determine whether a discipline is scientific (in the broad sense)" [7 p. 64].
science
present; for example, the holocaust deniers and the ancient astronaut theorists
When a statement is supported by
evidence, it is
justified
. If homeopaths or creationists, for example, started creating academic courses, published papers about their theories, and organized formal congress meetings to assemble their community, that would not be the factor for turning homeopathy and creationism into sciences; the same is true for other doctrines. Hansson [7] also mentions that
. To avoid a division between pseudohumanities and pseudosciences and accurately acknowledge the endeavor that aims to provide us with the most reliable statements that can be made in our time, the broad definition of science is suitable. Ferreira CMC 7 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1 -33
https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58
a sufficient amount of
epistemically
. Sufficient evidence is what makes a belief reliable, as it provides good reason to think that the proposed hypothesis is probably true. The fact that science is the practice that provides the most reliable statements means that it is the one that presents the best and most robust evidence regarding its objects of
study. Controls and adjustments are constantly being made to get closer and closer to an adequate description of reality. For example, when someone wants to conduct an empirical investigation about whether or not some new treatment works, a randomized doubleblind placebo-controlled trial is more reliable than an anecdotal case report, as it is more likely to show results that actually reflect reality than the anecdote. With the first, there is a systematization of its investigations and control of biases, which is absent in the second. In this case, for hypotheses that
require empirical analysis of that kind, it is more appropriate to use the first type of study precisely because it is the one that provides the best evidence, and its proper use makes that investigation scientific. On the other hand, using met hods with low standards of investigative quality, such as anecdotal cases, would not be scientific. Therefore, for Hansson [7], pseudosciences can also be failed versions of sciences within humanities, and not only within sciences in the traditional meaning of the word. He defines pseudoscience in the following way: “A doctrine is a
pseudoscience if and only if it satisfies the following two conditions: A. It includes at least one statement which (A1) pertains to an issue within the domains of science in the broad sense (the criterion of scientific domain), and (A2) suffers from such a severe lack of reliability that it cannot at all be trusted (the criterion of unreliability). B. Its major proponents try to create the impression that it represents the most reliable knowledge on its subject matter (the criterion of pretence)” [6 p.49- 50]. Hansson tries to distinguish disciplines from doctrines. Not every doctrine is
pseudoscientific, but every pseudoscience is a doctrine. He defines a doctrine using the Oxford English dictionary, as follows: “a set of interconnected statements that is ‘taught or laid down as true concerning a particular subject or department of knowledge” [6 p. 49]. In a doctrine, Será a Psicanálise uma Pseudociência? 8 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 methodologies and statements are based on assumptions, and without them, there is no doctrine. In some cases, these statements may be
wellfounded by evidence, an example being the theory of the evolution of species, while in others they may not, such as for psychoanalysis, which will be shown in the following sections. Similarly as what Hansson argues [6], If its most central ideas were removed from the psychoanalytic doctrine, as for example, about the existence of a psychodynamic unconscious, there would be no more psychoanalysis. The same would happen for the theory of the evolution of species: if the statements that living beings undergo natural selection, that more adapted individuals are
more likely to survive, or their other claims were removed from it, then nothing would be left. This is different from a discipline: in disciplines, there are no presupposed methodologies or statements. Usually, disciplines refer to a field of study. Two examples could be psychology (when a specific psychological approach is not assumed beforehand), and biology, regarded as "the study of behavior" and "the study of life", respectively. It is important to notice that psychoanalysts do not need t o claim that psychoanalysis is a science; certainly, part of the community agrees,
while the other part disagrees with this statement, but what is explicitly said about the scientific status is not relevant at all. If a doctrine behaves as if it was a science — that is, if their proponent’s attitude implies that the assertions of the doctrine about the world are the most reliable in regard their object of study— regardless if it is explicitly presented as a science or not, it is already qualified to be judged by the demarcation criteria. Even after this explanation, defining the meaning of science and pseudoscience does not show what one should investigate regarding a
specific doctrine in order to check if it is pseudoscientific.
Hansson
[7] addressed that previous demarcation proposals could not solve the problem and suffered a series of criticisms. Then, he proposed an alternative: a
multicriteria list
, constructed as a list
of mistakes
that can be
made by pseudoscientific theories
, but, unlike a sufficient and necessary criterion, it is not exhaustive. That means that a theory or assertion can be
“1.
Belief in authority: it is contended that some person or persons have a special ability to determine what is true or false. Others have to accept their judgments. 2. Unrepeatable
experiments: reliance is put on experiments that cannot be repeated by others with the same outcome. 3. Handpicked examples: handpicked examples are used although they are not
representative of the general category that the investigation refers to. 4. Unwillingness to test: a theory is not tested although it is possible to do so. 5. Disregard of refuting information:
observations or experiments that conflict with a theory are neglected. 6. Built-in subterfuge: the testing of a theory is so arranged that the theory can only be confirmed, never
disconfirmed, by the outcome. 7. Explanations are abandoned without replacement: tenable explanations are given up without being replaced, so that the new theory leaves much more
unexplained than the previous one” [7, p. 72-73; 8].
the addition of an eighth will be proposed: obscurantism This new demarcation of
pseudoscience proposal, supported by the multicriteria list, makes it possible to evaluate if psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience or not, by analyzing how it relates to each of the items described.
Belief in Authority
Psychoanalysis is a “testimonial science its theoretical concepts rely on its major proponents' clinical case
interpretations. However, the authority argument is not sound if the authors do not have sufficient proof about what they say. Freud did not make use of systematic and controlled scientific
investigations and not even statistics to achieve his conclusions
pseudoscientific even if it does not fit in all of the rules, and there is a possibility for it not to be despite classifying as one of them. It would work Ferreira CMC 9 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 as a tool that makes practical doctrine evaluation possible, besides the sufficient and necessary definition. It is important to notice that in most cases, if at least one of the items from the list matches the evaluated theory, then it is probably pseudoscientific. Hansson’s proposal is the following:
At the end of the seventh item, for considering it to be insufficient in addressing other problems concerning the behavior of certain theoretical explanations ,
Results and Discussion
Será a Psicanálise uma Pseudociência? 10 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58
.
” [4];
[9], making it imperative for the reader that consults the foundations of the theory to trust that he possessed both different and special capabilities to find out the truth about how hum an psychology works. However, there are no reasons to believe that a human being that resorts only on his personal experience and decides not to use scientific tools would have the means to
The other major psychoanalytic authors have also followed Freud's steps. For one to
believe in Lacan's discourse, for example, it is necessary to first take it as true and attribute him an authority
role, since the reader has neither a way to verify its claims independently, nor the resources to explicitly
understand its meanings [10]. Besides that, in the founder's case, reasons to take his narratives into
consideration might not even exist. When the topic is psychoanalysis, its proponents' honesty is an
important aspect to be observed, precisely because the theory is based on their authority [4]. If there is
no honesty, there should not be any reasons, even for those unaware of the problems related to
anecdotal evidence, to continue adopting their assumptions. Dersken [11] demonstrates that Freud frequently used a variety of rhetorical
formulate the most epistemically warranted psychological theory.
strategies to avoid criticism and keep his theory's good appearance in front of the public, and he succeeded. The psychoanalyst affirmed several times that his theory did not consist of
speculation, in an attempt to convince his reader that a solid empirical basis supported his conclusions, even while having none. To deal with the most severe counterarguments, he inverted
the speech roles: Freud himself presented objections to his own doctrine in the most threatening way possible, and by doing so, it sounded like he was aware of the problems and would know
how to reply to them. What other reason would he have to bring up all the criticism without knowing how to defend his theory from it? Even so, at the end of his discourse, the supposed reply
was only evasive, the original Ferreira CMC 11 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 topic was altered, the burden of proof
was inverted, or absolutely no answer was given, maintaining the original critiques still untouched. Crews [9] argues that during several moments Freud adjusted his narratives in order for
them to fit in the result he previously aimed to achieve, no matter if what he was saying was really true. Many of his clinical cases developed in ways that were distinct from what was declared
by him, went through a biased interpretative process, or did not obtain promising results. Anna O. was not someone with hysteria; in fact, she suffered from a chemical dependency of
Dora, a young victim of sexual
harassment, was reported as a protagonist of a hysteria case for not desiring to be involved with her
abuser and feeling repulsed by his advances [9, p. 590-600]. In the Little Hans case, a five-year-old, Freud did
not hesitate to give him a diagnosis even before knowing him personally: his fear of horses was in fact a
fear of being castrated by his father, since Freud believed he sexually desired his mother [9, p. 645]. The Wolf Man
substances like morphine and chloral hydrate, and all her symptoms could be listed as possible effects of these [9, p. 354-360].
was declared as cured by Freud; however, he kept being treated by several different analysts for decades, not obtaining any results [9, p. 651; 12]. Those are just some examples of famous
clinical cases, but others suffer from the same problem [9]. The success of these kinds of adulterations and other rhetorical strategies contributed to the building and widespread recognition of
masking how fragile his proposal was. Unrepeatable experiments As discussed earlier, the theoretical
concepts in psychoanalysis are sustained by Freud and the other major proponents’ clinical case reports, who also followed his tradition of producing
anecdotal evidence. Until today, they maintain their authority over contemporary analysts: “André Green, when asked about what was new in psychoanalysis,
Freud's authority role, as well as
answered: Freud. To this playful, but nonetheless very accurate answer, we could add the list of the great thinkers and practitioners of psychoanalysis who were
essential to the several traditions in which the psychoanalytic movement was divided since Será a Psicanálise uma Pseudociência? 12 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de
Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 the '40s. Decades after their deaths, they continue to be what exists of new, as long as we
know how to read them” [13, p. 10]. Although anecdotal evidence is still being used, in most cases, as the major means of psychoanalysis dissemination and
production [14], important obstacles are placed when they are employed. A psychoanalytical clinical case is a type of process that cannot be
replicated because it addresses a single subject individually. However, as Schmidt [15] argues, replication is one of the most
central processes within empirical sciences, and sadly not even psychology gives proper attention to the matter. It possesses five major functions:
control sampling errors, by verifying if the results obtained happened by chance alone; control internal validity, that is, if the procedures adopted
were adequate to answer the research’s question; control the possibility of scientific fraud; allow a generalization of the findings to a larger/different
population; and finally, verify if the first hypothesis of the experiment was correct. In the case of an unrepeatable experiment, the possibility of performing
these analyses is thrown away. Besides the impossibility of replication, there are other problems, now related to human psychology: People are commonly victims
of cognitive bias that distorts their judgment and leads to irrational interpretations more frequently than they usually notice [16], and therapists are not immune.
An example could be confirmation bias: someone’s initial belief significantly impacts how they remember situations and how they interpret them, giving more
importance to what apparently confirms their world view rather than paying attention to what could contradict it. In the case of a psychoanalyst, this could bring
them to understand exactly what they yearned to, that is, what would supposedly confirm the analytic hypothesis, regardless if that was or was not the case [14, p.
139-140]. Even if a case report is not a good evidence, it would sound like a source of theoretical confirmation for an adept, as it is expected that it would reflect
their own preconceptions. As Spence [17] shows, even if someone wished to analyze the veracity of the reported clinical phenomena, the person still has to face the
fact that they are frequently replaced by fictional narrative. Their contents could be partially reported, omitted, distorted, and mixed with other case contents, even
in a non-intentional way, precisely because they are based on the Ferreira CMC 13 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33
https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 therapist's memory. Psychoanalytical clinical case reports are not sufficiently controlled, so when they aim to
support a human psychological theory, they end up being just fuel for a system of self-confirmations. There is no way to generalize a human psychological theory
based on anecdotal clinical evidence, neither to guarantee its reliability, because a nonsystematized process does not aim to control variables that can interfere
with the conclusions. At the same time, there are reasons to expect that distortions are going to happen. Handpicked examples As already discussed in
previous sections, the widespread use of anecdotal evidence would be an excellent example to fulfill this third criterion, precisely because those cases are
isolated and exposed to bias. However, along with them, another endeavor of contemporary psychoanalysis is neuropsychoanalysis. Neuropsychoanalysis is a movement
that looks for an integration between neuroscience and psychoanalysis, and despite being rejected by part of the psychoanalytic community that wants no part in it, some others consider it to
be a contemporary version of the theory. Callegaro [18, p. 207-20] argues that, instead of what the neuropsychoanalytical movement declares, the scientific literature shows something
opposite to union: The evidence from neuroscience either refutes or directly conflicts with psychoanalysis. It is not as if it was plausible to use psychoanalysis as a reference model; it is in the
new unconscious model that neuroscientists rely on, and not on the psychodynamic one. Paris [14, p. 94-99] argues that neuropsychoanalysis is not operating in order to evaluate Freudian and
neuroscientific theories in an unbiased way, but rather starts from the principle of validating Freud's model beforehand, even though it showed not to have a consistent hypothesis with
modern neuroscience. The author lists some reasons that show why neuropsychoanalysis is far from science: In this doctrine, it is previously assumed that Freud was right, and research would
serve the only purpose of proving what was already obvious from the psychoanalytic point of view; the majority of neuropsychoanalysis papers do not present concrete data, Será a Psicanálise
uma Pseudociência? 14 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 but theoretical speculations; methods used to measure basic
psychoanalytic concepts are still pretty rudimentary; and, finally, there are many difficulties and problems, even in neuroscience itself, to adequately locate mental functions in specific brain
areas. In the end, it is noticeable that neuropsychoanalysis consists in a great cherry picking of data, in which its proponents “attempt to systematically associate almost every neuroscientific
concept or finding with a quote from Freud” [19, p. 170], giving the impression that when neurological phenomena such as anosognosia, memory problems, brain damage and others are
associated with concepts from the Freudian model, that would mean that they were, from the beginning, an adequate theoretical explanation given by its founder, but that is not the case.
Unwillingness to Test Most psychoanalysts assume as true that human subjectivity is above all possible scientific analysis [20-21]. Thus, since the
foundation of psychoanalysis and until the present day with its contemporary version, psychoanalysts carry on the tradition of being resistant to
testing their hypothesis, whether they are about clinical effectiveness or theoretical constructs. Melanie Klein, for example, can be “dismissed (…) from
the point of view of empirical science (…) while many of Klein’s ideas were based on what she called ‘infant observation’, they actually consisted only of
speculations about what infants might be thinking” [14, p. 55]. Also, “there has never been empirical research on any of the
constructs that Lacan proposed”
[14, p. 122], and “neither neo-Freudian models, nor ego psychology, nor relational psychoanalysis, nor self-psychology, have ever conducted empirical investigations of their theories, or of the process
and outcome of the treatment approaches derived from these ideas” [14, p. 55-56]. Despite the different opinions in the psychoanalytic community about the scientific status of the doctrine, it is possible to observe that the majority of adepts have great resistance towards the adoption
of systematized tools and processes for data collection, under the argument that their object of Ferreira CMC 15 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 study, humans, are too singular and unique to be understood by a
supposed “positivistic science”, in which only empirical experiments are allowed [22]. It is explicitly said by psychoanalysts, for example, that they believe “that today it is essential to demonstrate that psychoanalysis does not need new scientific foundations that would be provided in a
'systematic' and 'safe' way” [23, p. 15], that the psychoanalytic cure could not be apprehended in terms of efficacy criteria, as would be done in psychiatry [24], and that the establishment of criteria for assessing psychotherapeutic effectiv eness would be considered a threat to subjectivity
[20]. There is even a clear opposition to those who seek these objectives: “What we can perceive in contemporary times, is that many professionals in the psi field, when they come across the symptom presented by the individual, seek to annihilate it, not taking into account the ethical
dimension through which the symptom manifests itself. This means that the vast contemporary psychotherapeutic proposals that announce to the world a way of treatment increasingly supported by science, in addition to the current proposal in the field of mental health that plays
insistently with the possibility of defining a common norm, are not committed to the experience revealed by psychoanalysis (...). We will see that psychoanalysis poses itself as an obstacle to this psychological and medical attitude” [25, p. 242]. As previously seen, using the broad
definition of science, disciplines such as philosophy, history, linguistics, and other humanities can be considered sciences, even without using traditional experimentation, because the most adequate methods to look for truth in those particular circumstances are being employed.
However, psychology and psychiatry are not in the same situation: There is no reliable way to acquire the most epistemically justified beliefs about human behavior without resorting to systematic empirical methodologies. Humans do not have the ability to, using only speculation,
develop reliable enough beliefs about these topics. Therefore, while psychoanalysis rejects those methods, it cannot be the most reliable psychological doctrine of our time. Instead, some of its adepts are aligning it to relativistic positions. This fuels the notion that science is only one
The fact remains that science is a discourse
more discourse, and it could not claim to have better interpretations about reality than any other: “
. As banal as that statement may seem, it implies a dethroning of Science and a reassessment of
science as one Será a Psicanálise uma Pseudociência? 16 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 discourse among many. Freud may be interpreted as translating ‘rationality’ into ‘rationalization’, and Lacan's discourse theory
suggests that there are as many different claims to rationality as there are different discourses” [26, p. 138]. Science is a ccused of being the real dogma, and psychoanalysis then comes to break it [27]. Therefore, it does not have to bow to its methods, including systematic testing [22]. In
Psychoanalysis
requires the unreasonable: it demands special protection and would not admit being judged like any other scientific doctrine should be,
while also aims to have a similar status that any other would have. However, if the same level of recognition and appreciation is demanded,
then it must be evaluated by similar requirements for rigor and presentation of evidence. Despite the majority of the community being averted to hypothesis testing, there are some exceptions
fact, some aspects of the psychanalytic doctrine have the stated purpose of serving “as an epistemological obstacle to the attempt of scientifically addressing the psyche” (p. 237), and also to the evidence based treatments of mental health disorders [25].
to this rule. Attachment theory is probably the most promising contemporary revision of psychoanalytic theory, for being the only one that is more open to the testing of hypothesis and empirical research [14, p. 62], and for the same reason it is rejected by other psychoanalysts as
while
psychoanalysis places the major causes of adult psychopathologies precisely in the childhood. About psychoanalysis as a treatment: even though there was great resistance from the community,
something that is not legitimately part of the doctrine [14, p. 56-57]. Unfortunately, attachment theory does not consider genetic and temperamental aspects [14, p. 58], and its predictions between child attachment patterns and adulthood are very weak [28],
some studies on its psychotherapeutic efficacy were conducted. Nowadays, long-term psychotherapies usually do not have convincing evidence for their effectiveness, and in this category long-term psychodynamic psychotherapy is included [14]. One example can be observed with the
Leichsenring and Rabung meta-analysis [29]. Despite being one of the most cited works done to evaluate this kind of psychotherapy, it was severely criticized for failing in all the quality criteria required of meta-analyses [30]. One of the common strategies that Ferreira CMC 17 Debates
em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 psychoanalysts adopt to deal with the lack of good evidence is turning to their personal experiences, and this can be observed in the following report published by the International
Psychoanalytical Association: “It is easy to be critical of psychoanalytic studies. There are no definitive studies which show psychoanalysis to be unequivocally effective relative to an active placebo or an alternative method of treatment. There are no methods available that might
definitively indicate the existence of a psychoanalytic process. Most studies have major limitations which might lead critics of the discipline to discount their results. Others have limitations that are so grave that even a sympathetic reviewer might be inclined to discount the findings. (...)
As psychoanalysts we all know that psychoanalysis works. Our own analytic experience is probably sufficient in most instances to persuade us of its effectiveness” [31, p. 283]. When compared to long-term psychodynamic psychotherapy, the shortterm psychodynamic one has a higher
number of studies reported in the literature, with mostly favorable results [14]. However,
psychotherapy in general faces problems with higher complexity than this article can cover. The majority
. Dragioti [32]
conducted an umbrella review of meta-analyses about various types of psychotherapy (including
psychodynamic). They realized that only 16 of 247 meta-analyses (7%) were capable of providing good evidence
without bias, and none were from psychodynamic or psychoanalytic approaches. Besides the discussion about
psychoanalysis's scientific status, this is undoubtedly a topic that requires more attention from clinical professionals, psychologists and psychiatrists. Disregard
of refuting information There is evidence that many of the key concepts of psychoanalysis are wrong, but notwithstanding, they keep being adopted
of results on the topic, no matter what type of psychotherapy is investigated, tend to show positive effects, with few exceptions. Although, there is evidence that, in many cases, those results are biased or have questionable methodology
in Brazilian universities and as a theoretical basis for clinical practice. The empirical literature did not support the psychoanalytical theory about dreams [33],
memory or repression [34]. The brain does not work making permanent Será a Psicanálise uma Pseudociência? 18 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021;
11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 recordings about situations that are then repressed [14, p. 30]. Despite recognizing that
unconscious processes exist and significantly impact human beings, the psychodynamic unconscious
that is governed by repressed desires and drives does not receive empirical support [14, p. 29- 30]. As an
alternative, the new unconscious theory is more coherent with contemporary discoveries in the field of neuroscience [14, p. 29-30; 18]. Psychoanalysis
ignores other possible variables, like genetics, social class, and more, treating a single and specific
traumatic event that happened during the subject’s childhood as the causation of present disorders.
However, there is no good evidence of causal links between specific, traumatic childhood experiences and disorders in adult life Other stressing
[35].
events that happen during an individual's life are much more impactful than the infancy ones, and social disadvantages could better explain the worse mental health outcomes of these groups
There is no good evidence that remembering past events would be a good route to cure psychopathological symptoms, despite it being the usual route of analysis
Built-in subterfuge
no
confirmation
[35].
view, those concepts are kept alive until the present day.
[14, p. 107]. Even with all those disparities between scientific data and the analytic
This item covers similar aspects to Popper’s criticism. However, it is not the same as the falsifiability criterion, since what matters for falsifiability is the possibility of a given theory to be proven false. For Popper, there is
such thing as “
” by induction. This item proposed by Hansson better encompasses theory designs that are always confirming, or that can only confirm the original hypothesis, in which alternative
outcomes are not possible. About the topic, Rillaer [36] provides a group of examples of why psychoanalysis cannot be disconfirmed, only continuously confirmed. With it, everything could be explained in the light of unconscious processes, and finding contrary evidence would be inconceivable: “Have you forgotten your umbrella in a friend's house? You want to come back to his house. (…) Does he react badly to your interpretation? ‘He is defending Ferreira CMC 19 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58
himself’, he is resisting to the ‘id’ that talks inside him, ‘without the ego noticing’. Does he criticize Freud or Lacan? He is revolting against the Father. (…) Does your son fear horses? He fears being castrated by his father because he desires his mother. Does your analysis make you suffer more each day? You are finally entering the deepest layers of your unconscious. Do the analyst's prices seem excessive? You are having a ‘negative transference’ or a ‘regression to the analsadistic stage’. After five years of analysis, do you still feel painful symptoms? You have not dug deep
enough, you desire to suffer because your superego is excessively strong” [36, p. 154]. A psychoanalyst could counterargue that this would be a case of wild psychoanalysis, and within the clinical context they would not impose interpretat ions, but instead would build them in a unique relationship between therapist and client, reserved for the clinical environment [37]. However, this does not refute the objection that psychoanalysis is a system that operates by those rules. It is not for the depth of the dialogue or the time of interaction that it would happen differently.
Boudry and Buekens [38] argue that psychoanalysis operates similarly to a conspiracy theory, in which criticism can always be labeled as derived from resistance, and in the case of psychoanalysis, it is an unconscious resistance. Not even a critic or patient’s rejection of the analytic explanations could be seen as a possible counterexample: It would only be a major confirmation that unconscious and unobservable processes are happening. Also, if they agree with the offered interpretations, the explanation stays the same: It was a process originat ed from the unconscious. In
the end, when dealing with the psychodynamic unconscious, there is no possibility to accept contrary evidence. In relation to psychoanalysis, for all circumstances “interpretation can be a weapon” [39, p. 12]. Therefore, the excessive number of explanations that would fit all the possible cases is not really explicative; it only seems to be. The chosen interpretations to deal with the variety of human psychological phenomena are not based on good and carefully collected scientific evidence. Instead, those are concepts that lack empirical support, used to explain every
behavior and also its opposite. "Psychoanalysis is indeed irrefutable, because it can say everything and its opposite — summoning up the Será a Psicanálise uma Pseudociência? 20 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 'servile' unconscious testimonial is enough, as it is always ready to bow to the circumstances’ demands" [40, p. 140]. Explanations are abandoned without replacement The definitions given to the concepts of "cure", "health" and "disease" in psychoanalysis fit this criterion. Neves [23] says
that the discussion about the cure in contemporary psychoanalysis cannot occur if it does not start with a critique of the traditional meaning of the term, and the same goes for the other two concepts. The author argues that psychoanalysis understands that, according to medical point of view, which adopts the traditional use of these, a state of health should refer to a harmonious state, completely free of diseases and pathologies. In addition, unlike medical objectives, Priszkulnik [41] states that "psychoanalysis is opposed to the objective of mental health to reintegrate
Considering the
traditional definition, psychoanalysis would accuse the existence of hidden intentions behind the goal of curing people in distress: this would, in reality, be an attempt to exert social control
Therefore, it would make more sense to be helpless instead of cured
For
some, like Nasio, it would not even make sense to conceive healing as a concept:
the individual into the social community". Still according to Neves [23], psychoanalysts understand that in medicine “cure” would mean conforming to an idealized mode of operation based on ideas of normality that are socially accepted and expected, starting from the elimination of diseases and the reestablishment of the previously present health state. Or, more succinctly, it would be "the realization of an experience that leads the individual to health through the elimination of the disease" [23, p. 33].
[23, p.
16].
, since: “We must not forget that being helpless, from both psychoanalytic and political points of view, means to a large extent having crossed the ghost of infinite protection by the instituted power. To be helpless (...) is to sustain the political action as an action that forces the impossible not to cease not writing itself in the situation" [23, p. 28].
Ferreira CMC 21 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 “We cannot say that the cure, understood as a reduction or disappearance of suffering linked to symptoms, is a psychoanalytic concept. We also cannot say it is an objective towards which the treatment should
aim, or a criterion that allows us to evaluate its progress (...) we cannot make cure a concept, or an objective, or a criterion, and that is equivalent to not giving in to the influence of the medical model, which tends to hypostasize this cure, to give it a status, to elevate it to the dignity of a concept (...) there is no psychoanalytic concept of cure, and that cannot be a goal that the analyst should pursue in their practice, differently from how it happens in medicine” [42, p. 160]. Even with these considerations, some proposals for new definitions were supposedly made, in order
to replace the traditional ones; however, they are usually empty and worse than the previous ones. "Health in psychoanalysis can only be understood as a normativity that becomes individualized, so it is impossible to think of it as the expression of an absolute value, that is, of a general norm" [23, p. 28]. It could also be added the observation that "it is true that psychoanalysis does not take health as a constitutive element of its ethics and cure policy" [43, p. 23]. Regarding the definition of disease, we can understand it in psychoanalysis as being "a productive experience
of indeterminacy" [23, p. 18], while also considering that "the disease, whether it be psychic or organic, does not mean anything other than the reduction of the tolerance margin for changes in the environment" [23, p. 28]. In fact, they affirm that there is something special within the field of disease: "being sick is, initially, assuming an identity with great performative force" [44, p. 293], and the curative ideal "aims to weaken the power that inhabits the experiences of the pathological, the abnormal, the inhuman and of helplessness" [23, p. 21]. As for the cure, several
options are offered in psychoanalysis. Some of them are as follows: "getting cured is, therefore, to build and experience a new order, that is, the cure involves experiencing unprecedented ways of adjusting to the environment" [23, p. 18]. Or also, “to carry out an experiment that is nowhere and cannot be registered in the situation” [23, p. 8]. For psychoanalysts, "the cure in psychoanalytic experience can be defined, fundamentally, by the idea of transformation, that is, the realization of a subjective experience that is not the reestablishment of the norm nor the expected
Lacan's works have
According to Nasio “the cure is an imaginary value, an opinion, a prejudice, a preconception, just as
result of performing a treatment method" [23, p. 84]. Dunker and Peron [24, p. 89] argue that the concept of cure can have Será a Psicanálise uma Pseudociência? 22 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1 -33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 different interpretations based on Freud's work, in addition to not being related to traditional medicine. One of them could be that the "cure coincides with the knowledge of the causes of the symptoms" [2 4, p. 86]. In Neves's [23] view, Freud and
as their legacy the definition of cure as an experience that touches the impossible
nature, happiness or justice are
[23, p. 25].
” [42, p. 160]. Not only that, but according to the definitions given in psychoanalysis, "the cure as the realization of a singular experience will not be identical to anything" [43, p. 24]. In any case, it is important to be aware of the fact that even if it is understood in these ways adapted by the doctrine and even by Freud himself as a “reorganization of the Ego”, it remains as an ideal that is “harmful to the analysis and to the psychoanalyst” [42, p. 167]: a therapist who seeks the cure
of his patient would possibly be under the influence of feelings of pride and narcissism [42, p. 168]. Psychoanalysis, even though it is treated as a psychotherapy, does not have curing as a goal as seen in Lacan’s words, quoted by Nasio: "(...) the mechanism (of analysis) is not oriented towards the cure as a purpose. I am not saying anything that Freud has not already powerfully formulated: every inflection towards the cure as a purpose — making the analysis a pure and simple means to a precise end — gives something that would be linked to the shortest path which could
only falsify the analysis" [42, p. 159]. For psychoanalysis, the definition of cure as an experience that leads to health must be replaced by an experience that is nowhere, does not concern any possible situation, has nothing to do with the objectives proposed by a treatment, and is impossible. It would not be identical to anything, and if it is not identical to anything, it could not even be identical to itself, and t hat would constitute a logical contradiction. In psychoanalysis, the cure is imaginary, and even harmful. In the case of health, this would be an individualized
normativity that is not included in the ethical demands of the doctrine. Meanwhile, attempts to treat illness are accused of being attempts at social control, and influenced by narcissism and pride.
they are classified as sources of some kind of renegade power,
Diseases and pathologies could not, in psychoanalysis, be considered as a deviation from the organic standard, but instead
Ferreira CMC 23 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 instead of suffering. These concepts, in their many variations, are supposedly presented as possible replacements for the traditional concepts of "cure", "health" and "disease". However, even though the traditional definitions can be criticized and have gaps, the
In this situation, there are at least two problems: in addition to having explanations
abandoned without a good replacement, this is a case of obscurantism
Obscurantism The theoretical concepts or statements of a theory have a nonexistent or nebulous meaning to the understanding, which allows the
realization of arbitrary changes, that is, without plausible justifications for doing so.
a communication style, commonly adopted by pseudoscientists as a rhetorical strategy, that happens when the presentation of the assertions or concepts in a theory is done in a significantly
imprecise way, preventing an adequate comprehension of its proposal.
it is always possible to accuse the critic of not
comprehending it, as well as alternating the definitions in order to adopt or abandon its numerous meanings, using them respectively in the most opportune moments.
in the obscurantism case, an impression of scientificity is created when in fact there is a considerable distance from science
In some obscurantism cases, a series of claims are made, but in reality, they are proclaimed as phrases that lack truth value, that is, phrases that cannot be true or false. In others, even if
some meaning could be salvaged, an unclearness is imposed under their real definition by the own author, preventing readers from tracing precise or consensual interpretations about what
they intended to say
It is harder to criticize a position that one cannot adequately comprehend compared to another that exposes its arguments explicitly and clearly.
In the case of psychoanalysis
The great psychoanalytical theories of
definitions adopted in psychoanalysis make these concepts much more vague and distant from reality than their original versions, with some of them to a point where they are no longer comprehensible. This makes the new proposal much less explanatory than the traditional one.
(in this case, definitions)
. Considering this aspect of the doctrine, which is not restricted to the definitions of the three concepts presented in this section, this may suggest that the seventh criterion in Hansson's list may be insufficient to capture other problems related to the way in which explanations of a pseudoscientific doctrine are treated. Taking this into account, in this article a
new item will be proposed, introduced with an eighth item to be added to the original list. It could be described like this: 8.
:
Obscurantism A lot could be said about the obscurantism problem, its relations with pseudoscience, and its pertinence as a part of a demarcation criteria. However, there is not a claim of being exhaustive in this section, despite being offered the following explanations for the introduction of this new item: Obscurantism is
This protects it from objections: Since its definitions are Será a Psicanálise uma Pseudociência? 24 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 excessively vague,
An obscurantist text, despite appearing to bring a robust content about
a topic, in fact does not [10]. This seems relevant especially when comparing it to the definition of pseudoscience: Similarly,
(in the broad sense). For that reason, the introduction of this item seems
justified.
. This creates more difficulties for placing objections:
Also, it is important to
notice that, under many circumstances, concept changes are welcome in science, but in order to do so, reasonable justifications must be presented. This is not taken into account by the obscurantist.
, some things have changed from Freud's times to the present day, but despite not being many, they also were not adopted based on the emergence of good evidence.
changes were arbitrary and probably aimed
just to adapt to each age’s cultural climate. An example of this could be the change in the pathological
status regarding the sexual orientation of gays and lesbians, as well as penis envy [4]. A theory supposedly evolving
and changing its concepts over time only has merits if those changes are made based on good evidence,
and not only by cultural influence; after all, even religious movements change their explanations about
the world as the centuries go by, and this is no reason to classify them as scientific. Ferreira CMC 25 Debates em
the present are still used, adopted and taught without going through empirical testing showing that the
[14],
Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33 https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 Cioffi [4] points out that the etiological role of sexuality suffered with an opportunistic change of
meanings. Ideas about sexuality, eroticism, and libido had their definitions chosen arbitrarily by Freud according to the context: When questioned by the skeptic, they became something that
would represent fraternal love, affection, or in the case of sexual drives they would be desires that could be satisfied by using a variety of senses, including non-genital ones. Meanwhile, in
As psychoanalytic theory is entirely
empty, it is also, at the same time, supremely adaptable. When some concept of the theory shows to
be hard to sustain, or even downright embarrassing (…) it is enough to silently abandon it and take a
new theoretical rabbit out of the immense top hat of the unconscious. This is what psychoanalysts like
to describe as the ‘progress’ of psychoanalysis (…). What is given as progress in psychoanalysis is nothing
but the ultimate interpretation, that is, the most acceptable in a specific institutional, historical or
cultural context” [40, p. 140-141]. Buekens and Boudry [10] show that Lacanian psychoanalysis is another example of
obscurantism. Lacan assumes that the unconscious is structured as a language, and defends that his
writings are equivalent to the expression of his own unconscious. The adherence to an obscurantist style is, therefore, justified
from his point of view. In this way, any systematic effort to interpret him would be destined to fail, and this
immunizes the doctrine against any possible criticism. Even if Lacan gave the impression of being an
authority about human psychology that would transmit his ideas through occult means, it would be up
to the reader to interpret him (in the countless ways of doing so), while still being susceptible to possible accusations of
not really understanding him. Buekens and Boudry [10] argue that since it is not possible to trace definitive conclusions
about what Lacan really meant to say, the only thing left for the reader is to subjectively interpret him
according to their personal experience, what creates a significant divergence of interpretations by the
adepts themselves. The psychoanalyst not only used an obscurantist language in his works, but also
assumed and defended its use explicitly: Será a Psicanálise uma Pseudociência? 26 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33
safer and more receptive environments, those conveniently change back to mean "sexual" in the traditional sense. “
https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 “I would say that it is with a deliberate, if not entirely deliberate, intention that I pursue this discourse in such a way as to offer you the
This margin enables you yourselves to say that you think you follow me, that is, that
you remain in a problematic position, which always leaves the door open to a progressive rectification”
[45, p. 164]. Conclusion This article pointed out that psychoanalysis — not only on its classic, but also with its contemporary version — ends up
checking all of the seven items in Hansson’s multicriteria list. It also fits the eighth item that was
introduced in this work. So, in this way, psychoanalysis checks eight out of eight demarcation of
pseudoscience’s items. The evidence presented in this article suggests that with both Popper and Hansson’s demarcation proposals, and taking into
opportunity to not quite understand.
account its traditional and contemporary versions, psychoanalysis is indeed a pseudoscience. Even if the impression that it represents the most reliable human
psychological theory is created by its proponents, that is not the case, because it considerably deviates from scientific standards of quality. Although research in
psychoanalysis is widespread in Brazil, its objections are not being discussed in the literature, and this may be an indicator of alienation [46]. The
maintenance of a dogmatic approach on a doctrine inserted in the academic environment is dangerous,
since it can lead to scientific stagnation and prevent the full development of its disciplines, which in the
case of psychoanalysis are psychology and psychiatry. It is important to further discuss criticisms of psychoanalysis, given that it is still
treated as one of the main theoretical and clinical models for the comprehension of human behavior inside the academy. Even from an ethical
perspective, it is important to carry out practices and build theories that are compatible with the best
scientific evidence. There is no good moral justification for believing in whatever the theory, if it does
not have enough evidence in its favor [47]. Ferreira CMC 27 Debates em Psiquiatria, Rio de Janeiro, 2021; 11:1-33
https://doi.org/10.25118/2763-9037.2021.v11.58 Acknowledgments There are no conflicts of interest associated with the publication of this article. Financial
support sources are nonexistent. I would like to thank Alícia Cristina de Sales Braga, Vitor Douglas de Andrade and Caio César de Souza Barbosa for various types of
incentives and support received on different phases of the development of this article.
Just imagining possible changes is necessary and can motivate action.
Elizabeth SHOVE Sociology @ Lancaster AND Gordon WALKER Geography @ Lancaster ‘7
“CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management” Environment
and Planning C 39 (4)
For academic readers, our commentary argues for loosening the intellectual grip of ‘innovation studies’, for backing off from the nested, hierarchical multi-level
model as the only model in town, and for exploring other social scientific, but also systemic theories of change. The more we think about the
politics and practicalities of reflexive transition management, the more complex the process appears: for a policy audience, our words
of caution could be read as an invitation to abandon the whole endeavour. If agency, predictability and legitimacy are as limited as we’ve suggested, this might be
the only sensible conclusion.However, we are with Rip (2006) in recognising the value, productivity and everyday
necessity of an ‘illusion of agency’, and of the working expectation that a difference can be made even
in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. The outcomes of actions are unknowable, the system
unsteerable and the effects of deliberate intervention inherently unpredictable and, ironically, it is this
that sustains concepts of agency and management. As Rip argues ‘illusions are productive because they
motivate action and repair work, and thus something (whatever) is achieved’ (Rip 2006: 94). Situated inside the
systems they seek to influence, governance actors – and actors of other kinds as well - are part of the dynamics of
change: even if they cannot steer from the outside they are necessary to processes within. This is, of
course, also true of academic life. Here we are, busy critiquing and analysing transition management in the
expectation that somebody somewhere is listening and maybe even taking notice. If we removed that
illusion would we bother writing anything at all? Maybe we need such fictions to keep us going, and
maybe – fiction or no - somewhere along the line something really does happen, but not in ways that we can
anticipate or know.
Psychoanalysis fails in the context of the aff cuz states aren’t people.
Gusterson 96 [Hugh. Associate Professor of Anthropology and Science and Technology Studies @ MIT.
1996. Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War. University of California Press.]
The psychological critique of the arms race also tends to confound psychological and social processes.
Although some psychologists embroider their analyses with caveats that individual and collective
processes are different, the incessant discussion of international relations in terms of individual
pathology and the frequent comparisons of national politics and personal psychology encourage the
reduction of national and international politics to individual psychology. However, the individual and
the national are not only, as the jargon of political science would phrase it, different "levels of analysis";
they also involve different processes requiring different kinds of analysis. Understanding the psychology
of Edward Teller, the "father of the hydrogen bomb," may illuminate the arms race, but it does not
explain it.23 Although institutional processes are enmeshed with individual psychological processes,
neither kind of process can be reduced to the other, and societies cannot be analyzed as if they were
giant personalities. In this book, proceeding more in the spirit of Emile Durkheim than of Sigmund
Freud, I show how institutions and processes of cultural production act on individuals to produce certain
normative structures of feeling while at the same time I try to respect the partial autonomy of individual
psychological processes.24
IR K
Permutation
Perm do both – IR is not monolithic.
Bustamante 24 [Kevin E. Bustamante, Stanford University's Center for International
Security and Cooperation (CISAC) as the MacArthur Hennessy Fellow in Fall 2025. Postdoctoral
fellow in the Department of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. December 2,
2024. Security Studies, Vol. 33, No. 5, Pg. 742-767, “Waltz with Me: Structural Realism and
Structural Racism in International Politics”]
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2024.2420061 GabOL
ABSTRACT A chasm separates international relations (IR) scholars who study race and racism. Conventional scholars treat the
topic in a reductionist manner, focusing on unit-level factors such as racial attitudes and
identities. In contrast, critical scholars adopt more structural approaches but reject traditional
causal explanations. I argue that Waltzian theory bridges these two approaches , offering
structural causal arguments with broader policy relevance . The essay reckons with critical critiques of
Waltzian theory and outlines structural realist approaches to understanding structural racism. (Anti)racism has been a central feature of international
politics for centuries. In 1890, African colonial rebellion facilitated European imperial cooperation and prompted the first global arms control
agreement. The agreement limited the sale of firearms to Africans and Arabs but allowed their transfer to white settlers and junior partners.3 In 1924,
Marcus Garvey’s United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) attracted millions of adherents from Australia to Central America through its
anticolonial appeal. The UNIA is still deemed “the largest Black mass movement in history.”4 The world is a complicated place. Everything is constantly
moving everywhere all at once. Theories help us gather our bearings and make sense of this messy reality. As a theory of international politics,
structural realism offers a theoretical baseline of how states will tend to behave.55 If we assume that states care chiefly about their security and that the
international system will punish them for deviating from that goal, then we would expect state behavior that is generally self-reliant and prudent.56 Yet
Part of the
value of the structural realist baseline is that it provides scholars from
across orientations with a common set of expectations against which to
compare their arguments. Engaging with structural realism is thus useful
for IR race scholars since it gives them the means to position themselves in
broader conversations within the field. Consider the following examples. Treating structural realism as a
states often behave contrary to what structural realism would expect due to domestic, ideational, and idiosyncratic factors.
theoretical lens helps put the causal importance of unit-level variables into perspective. Structural realism is the perfect sparring partner: it can take a
punch, but it also packs one. This section focuses on the former, and the following two sections turn toward the latter. The systemic and structural
nature of racism requires theories attuned to such dimensions.76 Racism is about power—in all its guises—and using a
framework like structural realism, which centers on material power makes sense .
Doing so allows us to see the big picture: how racial hierarchy is maintained and the ends that
such an arrangement serves. Sidelining the importance of material power risks missing this picture while undertheorizing causal
arguments and overstating domestic racial factors. From an institutional standpoint, a return to Waltz contrasts with demands for diversifying the
discipline.138 Doing so risks perpetuating the marginalization of historically excluded voices. I acknowledge these concerns, and I agree with them.
My position is that embracing Waltzian theory can bring a neglected topic like race into the
mainstream if applied properly. Situating race and structural realism alongside each other is one
way to do that. To separate conventional IR theory from race
scholarship is to ghettoize the latter and reinforce the
mistaken notion that racism is somehow marginal to
international politics. 139 Furthermore, a return to Waltzian theory helps create space for recovering structural
thinkers like Merze Tate.140 Tate was the first Black woman to obtain a PhD in government from Harvard, a Bancroft Prize frontrunner, an eminent
scholar of arms control, and a realist who investigated the material foundations of white supremacy. Tate’s writings avoided the Eurocentric and racist
critiques that plague conventional and critical IR today.141 However, Tate would arguably not have a place in today’s IR. Her structural arguments
would be out of step with conventional IR’s reductionism. A return to Waltzian theory helps carve out a place for Tate
and future scholars like her.142 Policy and scholarship are best advanced when there are a
wide range of voices in the discussion. If I call for a return to Waltz, it is only because I stand on critical shoulders. These
scholars never let the study of race in international politics fade away and the rest of the discipline should (re)turn to their insights. Likewise, my call
for structural arguments rests on the prediction that there will be no shortage of unit-level race scholarship. Racism operates at different levels, and we
need to understand each systemically and systematically. This requires a plurality of voices, as each is individually inadequate. Black political theorists
and activists have long known this. They have long been aware that structures of domination can only be abolished via structural transformations. For
them, the centrality of material factors is crucial to this process.143 As the philosopher Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò writes, a just world requires that we first
satisfy the “need to eat and protect ourselves from premature death and suffering,” which he notes depends on a redistribution of resources.144 To skip
material redress and jump to projects of recognition and remembrance risks treating ongoing problems as the troubles of yesterday.145 A structural
realist orientation aligns with this sentiment. Fortunately, the minimalism of Waltzian theory lends itself well to constructivist and liberal approaches.
A constructivist argument could investigate how shifts in the international social structure cause states to pursue different “acceptable” forms of racial
oppression as states seek to maintain their ontological security.146 In the United States, for example, atrocities against Black Americans used to be
openly accepted and celebrated. Today, these forms of violence have transformed, and now the main front is mass incarceration and punitive policies
against predominantly Latino migrants.147 A liberal institutionalist argument could consider how racialized commonalities among states affect the
creation and functioning of international institutions. Such an approach would illuminate the racial foundations of Robert Keohane’s argument that
common interests are central to joint action.148 Race has returned to the forefront of power politics, and China’s rise presents familiar and unique
challenges. Like previous iterations of great power politics, China and the United States have traded accusations of domestic racism to embarrass the
other in front of the international community. China has cited Floyd’s murder as evidence of human rights abuse and has attributed anti-Asian violence
to the Trump’s administration’s “xenophobic remarks.”149 The United States has responded in kind, playing economic hardball against China for their
subjugation of Muslim Uighurs.150 What distinguishes now from previous eras of racialized competition is that we live in a period marked by formal
racial equality. Historically, race has often formed the basis of major domestic American cleavages. Elites have often dampened or resolved these
conflicts by accepting the further subjugation of racial minorities.151 Today, racism underpins American economic inequality, political polarization,
and social division, but further racial subjugation no longer seems to be a viable solution. China’s rise may exacerbate
these tensions as white Americans deal with their falling status both at home and abroad, with evidence linking status threat to greater support for
conservative policies.152 Academics need all the intellectual firepower that they can muster to
understand power politics in a world where power is shifting toward non-white countries and
whites increasingly struggle with the fact that their racialized social standing no longer signifies
“ownership of the earth.”153 So, let’s dance.
The perm solves. State level analysis isn’t mutually exclusive with
considering non-state actors.
Rob Huebert 21, Associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Calgary and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, “Breaking
Through: Understanding Sovereignty and Security in the Circumpolar Arctic,” Chapter 3,
“Understanding Arctic Security: A Defence of Traditional Security Analysis,” Edited by Wilfrid
Greaves and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, University of Toronto Press, February 2021, Accessed 628-25, ILake-JS
The next question is, what are the main elements of the narrow or traditional security approach ?
There is a wide literature on this subject, and space limitations prevent a thorough consideration of all of the elements of the modern
understanding of the term, but certain key elements can be identified. First, it remains rooted in the theoretical
framework of realism. Many supporters of this approach point out that while realism remains the dominant approach
to considering traditional security, it has modified some of its more dogmatic elements from the Cold War era. Traditional
security still focuses on states’ actions and efforts to maintain security through military
power. However, as Lawrence Freedman puts it: “[T]here is room for a non-dogmatic realism that
would acknowledge the significance of non-state actors, the impact of social , economic ,
cultural , and local political factors on state behaviour, the importance of values and
mental constructs , and can be sensitive to the epistemological issues raised by
presumptions of objectivity .”10 He goes on to say that the second element of the new thinking
about traditional understandings of security continues to focus on armed forces. This includes the
use of force to achieve state objectives for the defence of the state but also actions that
can be seen as going beyond the state as means for “improving the human condition.”11
Let us accept the basic review provided by Freedman as a sound basis for understanding current thinking. The following
observations can now be made about traditional security studies. They still focus on the actions of
states and their armed forces to achieve policy objectives. This means they focus on
understanding the impact of military actions on the international system. However,
other actors beyond the state are now accepted as important players in the overall
security of the international system. There is a continuing assumption that actors within
the system will often act in a negative manner that threatens the security of states. This suggests in
somewhat reductionist terms that there is a continued acceptance of the darker elements of human nature. However, it is difficult to
find many supporters of this approach who explicitly make this point.
Dogmatically treating every speech act as political is worse – it
precludes contributions from any state centered analysis.
Rob Huebert 21, Associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Calgary and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, “Breaking
Through: Understanding Sovereignty and Security in the Circumpolar Arctic,” Chapter 3,
“Understanding Arctic Security: A Defence of Traditional Security Analysis,” Edited by Wilfrid
Greaves and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, University of Toronto Press, February 2021, Accessed 628-25, ILake-JS
Any discussion of Arctic security inevitably leads to a discussion of what security means.
Specifically to this chapter, what does it mean for the Arctic? How is it understood, and what does that understanding mean for the
region? These seemingly straightforward questions have generated significant debate among Arctic analysts. At the heart of
that debate is a divide between traditional or military security studies (also known as strategic
studies) and expanded security studies, which encompass such categories as human
security , environmental security, gendered security, and health security. At one level, this debate is
about the best analytical means of understanding Arctic security in the current international system. However, there is
another consideration that complicates the discussions about which of these approaches
best explains the new Arctic security environment. For some commentators, the choice is not just
about understanding the system; it is also about influencing the security environment
itself. For these participants, it is not just about deliberating on the best theoretical
approaches to apply; it is also about demonstrating that choosing a traditional/narrow understanding of
security serves a political process of legitimizing the existing state system . This is
then assumed to prevent a proper understanding of Arctic security, which in turn
results in the marginalization of many of the voices of people who live in the Arctic. Thus, the
issue becomes not only that a traditional/narrow understanding of Arctic security results in a
faulty intellectual approach, but also that this very understanding is part of the problem .
Efforts to delegitimize a particular intellectual approach instead of attempting to show it is
wrong or incapable of explaining the various factors that now shape the Arctic security
environment threaten a robust debate. It may well be that an overly narrow
understanding of security misses important elements of the new Arctic security environment.
It is also possible that such an approach is inappropriate for understanding the current international system. In the practices of
scholarly thought, however, it is generally accepted that the means of determining such evaluations can only come about as
proponents of the various approaches debate and discuss their differing understandings of security and thereby determine the best
means of proceeding. To dismiss one side of the discussion as mere politics is to
delegitimize the efforts of those who use such an approach, thereby blocking them from
even engaging in the overall debate.
There are two serious consequences here. First, efforts to delegitimize a specific approach can
have a chilling effect within the newer academic community. Emerging scholars never
want to think of themselves as being a source of the problem, which can happen when they
employ a narrow understanding of Arctic security. The second issue pertains to the
outcomes that emerge when a narrow understanding of Arctic security is employed. What if an
approach should not have been ignored or excluded from the general debate? What if it could have provided
insights and understandings regarding the current Arctic security environment? What
if it is right on some issues? If it is not included or if it is delegitimized, could key elements of Arctic security be missed?
AT: IR Racist
IR isn't anti-black -- it's a minimalist theory to explain the occurrence
of interstate war -- purity in scholastic exercises have zero concrete
solvency.
Wæver & Buzan ’20 [Ole and Barry; May 15th; Professor of International Relations at
the University of Copenhagen; Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London
School of Economics; KU, “Racism and Responsibility -- The Critical Limits of Deep-Fake
Methodology in Security Studies: A reply to Howell and Richter-Montpetit,” Racism and
Responsibility -- The Critical Limits of Deep-Fake Methodology in Security Studies: A reply to
Howell and Richter-Montpetit]
Racism is a powerful, malignant force in world politics, and our discipline, IR, has deeply problematic entanglements with it. It is a serious matter both
to come intellectually to grips with this and to find the most effective strategies to act on it. We worry that more serious
problems and possibilities are marginalised by an ultimately very inward-looking
and scholastic exercise where a particular definition of racism and a specific theoretical
perspective makes it possible to deem the vast majority of scholarship in IR ‘racist’,
‘methodologically white’ and ‘antiblack’- every work that does not explicitly follow one exact
version of anti-racist scholarship. Especially, the role played in H&RM’s argumentation by our sins of
omission does ultimately seem to rest on the premise that only their distinct form of
scholarship can be redeemed, because even post-colonial scholarship and critiques of euro-centrism are not enough; you are a
racist if you do not follow exactly this particular route. It is not important whether your scholarship actually supports or
hinders anti-racist analysis or political engagement; it is all about who you cite and what declarations you
make . Here , a theory is not judged by what can be done with it , but by the question
whether self-appointed anti-racists can find supposedly problematic sentences
somewhere in its key texts. In this section, we will first point out that the H&RM article is a personal attack on us for racism, despite
their reassurances about the opposite. Then, we discuss what an analysis of structural racism (systems of power) could amount to, given that they claim
to do one but utterly fail to do so, resorting instead to a pretend examination of the foundations of ST. Next, we discuss what could be methodological
guidelines for actually proving whether or not a theory like ST is racist.
H&RM’s usage of the term racism for all scholarship that does not foreground race as the
primary theme, means that 99% of IR will be ‘racist’ . There will be no room for any
other scholarship (unless you will live with the moniker of being racist). Not only does this seem very
unproductive in terms of disciplinary conversations, not to talk of diversity and
pluralism , it also means that it becomes very hard to use the category of ‘racism’ for
critical purposes for those cases where it actually is at stake in a sense closer to what the rest of the
discipline, and indeed the public discourse, means by it. It has been watered down by the fact that everyone but
those in critical whiteness studies have been deemed racist, one by one, where we just happened to get the special
honour of being among the first. H&RM might protest that this is not their plan, but we fail to see how
this can be avoided when the logic they apply is that the term racist can be based primarily
on sins of omission in the sense of a theory being focused around other categories.
As documented above, they claim numerous times that ST ‘occludes’ or ‘refuses’ various dynamics relating to race that they find
important, but they never offer any basis for concluding that the theory makes it harder to see these things, only that it does not as
such zoom in on them. This does not have to do with a choice particularly regarding race but the structure and nature of the theory
as a general analytical apparatus that can be applied to all instances where actors try to securitize or desecuritize something, and the
user is free then to include race more or less in this analysis, just as the theory is not deciding how important nationalism is or
gender51, but it enables the analysis of the way different categories and distinctions become politically mobilised in security
struggles.
H&RM will probably argue that if you do not mention race in these contexts, you ‘ hide’ it .
Three answers : 1) no , there is a difference between not mentioning and hiding , it
takes a step more of the critic to show that the theory prevents something from being
articulated or that it uses abstractions that stand in the way of articulating race; that certainly is the case for some theories, so it is a legitimate
avenue of critique, but they haven’t shown this, 2) the theory is intentionally (as we have explained numerous times)
minimalist in having a clear conceptual core and then not putting all kinds of factors like the role of media or
populism into the theory -- not because we haven’t noticed these factors but because they
belong in applications , and the theory exactly allows you to study these phenomena, 3) we
are very explicit that one of the advantages of a minimalist theory is the ability to
combine it with other theories especially general theories about the nature and structures of society; one
should not build out ST to become a general theory of society or international relations, better in any specific usage of the theory combine it with the
theories one finds productive for the particular research project. (Wæver 2011, 2015) The latter point has come up in replies to the ‘sociological’ version
of ST (Balzacq), which has more of a tendency to add all relevant factors to the theory, while the classical Copenhagen version is tight and invites
combination with theories that complement it, which could exactly be theories of race and racism. Our ultimate concern here is: how do we actually get
to study racism in world politics in a practically and politically helpful way?
care to make sure it could do critical work in concrete
analyses, in our view on racism as well, and H&RM fail to show that this is not the case. In addition, we have then on a more
When developing our own framework, ST, we took
mundane, human level engaged ourselves in various ways to foster non-Western scholarship and theories in IR (Tickner & Wæver 2009; Acharya &
Buzan 2010, 2019). One has for instance co-founded a book-series with the aim to identify “alternatives for thinking about the ‘international’ that are
more in tune with local concerns and traditions outside the West” and “provincializing the West” (quoting from the Routledge homepage of the book
series); the other has amongst many other things re-written this history of the IR discipline to show both that it has ignored non-Western contributions
and that the Western part of it is indebted to ‘scientific racism’ (Buzan & Lawson 2015; Acharya and Buzan 2019). Closer to ST, the project in Buzan &
Wæver 2003 was to a large extent to challenge the euro-centrism enshrined in dominant conceptions of polarity and of the relationship between global
and regional, to enable theories to be more attentive to actual security dynamics in ‘most of the world’.
Surely, all of these efforts can be critically assessed as to what has been helpful and what hasn’t. But we find it strange that H&RM choose to ignore
completely the possibility of assessing the ability of ST to form the basis for helpful analyses of racism. They neither look at those analyses that have
actually been done, nor do they show systematically why it would be impossible to do so. On the contrary, they limit themselves to
highly abstract and indirect attributions of racism to the theory as such through various
unconvincing routes. From this they deduce (without any discussion) that ST can’t inform studies of racism (and when it has actually done
it, they presumably are able to magically make those publications go away) (see section 6 below).
H&RM offer no explanation as to how their type of analysis helps in combating racism. It is
unclear if it is a kind of ground clearing operation to be followed up by new and better
theories after getting us out of the way. Or whether they believe that we are so much a part of the
oppressive structures that attacking us is in itself liberating. Or -- as we will consider below in more detail -- the whole
exercise is more about making universities more inclusive and hospitable to students and scholars of colour. Closely linked to the latter option, their
rationale could be that the attack is meant more as a kind of ‘happening’ drawing attention to
the question of race. Especially in the latter case, it would be intentional that the article plays
ambiguously with making a very personal attack while pretending not to.
There is no monolithic IR – the field is reflexive and effective – its
track record of prediction proves. AND, sweeping criticisms of a
fragmented field of research don’t answer the specificity of our
studies.
Dan Reiter 15. Professor of Political Science at Emory University. “Scholars Help
Policymakers Know Their Tools.” War on the Rocks. 8-27-2015.
https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-help-policymakers-know-their-tools/
This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign policy
choices are not sui generis , there are patterns across space and time that inform
decision-making . Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy
decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more
general studies to craft policy. And, broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance,
as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own work to predict
outcomes , including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and
insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s. But, even if one were to accept the limits of general
work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These
studies ask questions such as whether: Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes reduced
insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone
towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector
reform in Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can
understand peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants. This is not by
any means a dismissal of professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to
contemporary intelligence data, nor are they generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean
nuclear activities and make judgments about North Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can
never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work
that has a more general perspective. A third critique is that much of this academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by
policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point made by Erik Voeten, there is a
danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research design ,
including sophisticated quantitative techniques , for crafting effective policy .
Sophisticated research design is not the enemy of effective policy, it is critically
necessary for it. Certainly, the current academic focus on building research designs that permit
causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a
certain policy will cause the desired outcome. Or, put differently, bad research designs make for
bad public policy . A classic example is school busing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, some cities
adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools, in which families could volunteer to bus their
children to schools in neighborhoods with different racial majorities. Policymakers used the favorable results for
the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would
also work. The result was bad public policy and violence in the streets. Sophisticated technical
methods can improve our ability to make causal inferences , and can help solve other
empirical problems . Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine,
winning the support of the population. Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires
collecting opinion data. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in
insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety.
Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our
ability to measure public support for the government in these areas. These techniques have been used to
assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Going
forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions .
Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this commitment will be best informed if it
rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which mixed gender units
engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion in
combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by
troops against civilians? Certainly, other areas of public policy understand the importance of
rigorous research design. Economic and development policy communities read the work of and
employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of sophisticated studies on
policy areas such as microfinance , gender empowerment , and foreign aid ,
knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings. Or consider public health
policy. Lives are literally on the line as decision-makers must make decisions about issues
such as vaccinations , nutritional recommendations , and air quality .
Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by epidemiologists
and other public health academics to craft the best policies. Critics will argue that some U.S. policymakers
remain alienated from contemporary academic IR work, with the suggestion that if IR academics let go of an obsession with
technique, they will then be better able to connect with policymakers and help them craft better policy. I agree that IR academics
need to find ways to communicate their results in clear, non-technical language. But the technical components of
the work need to be there . Stripping them out directly undermines the ability of the
research to give the right kinds of policy recommendations . Let me conclude by noting that I am
sympathetic to the concern that IR academics should think about the big picture as well as smaller questions, the forest of grand
strategy as well as the trees of foreign policy tools. IR academics have the potential to make real
contributions to big picture debates , to think hard about the essence of grand strategy by assembling a
framework that effectively integrates foreign policy means and ends. The nature of the IR subfield and its
integration of political economy and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as
units, make it especially well positioned to consider these broad questions. The ability of IR academics to
contribute to contemporary foreign policy debates is one of many reasons why political science should retain the subfield
of IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields of IR, comparative, and
American with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and institutions . Like good
carpenters, foreign policymakers need to know their tools. Rigorous IR research is the only
way to evaluate them effectively .
AT: Fem IR
Fem IR fails to explain structural conditions
Rahman '22 [Eirliani Abdul; Doctoral student, Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health,
Harvard University, and Founding member, Global Diplomacy Lab; Jesse Bump; 9-29-2022;
Chatham House; "Feminist foreign policy needs an upgrade,"
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2022-10/feminist-foreignpolicy-needs-upgrade; LASA-SC]
Second, a feminist foreign policy does not explicitly account for intersectionality , making it
ineffective for issues with multiple dimensions or power differentials . If it overtly
focuses on women and girls, as in Sweden, it may fail to capture complexities of race , ethnicity ,
religion , or age , and does not account for other vulnerable or marginalized groups.
In Sweden’s model, it is unclear whether intersectionality is actually implemented. For instance, it is insufficient in Europe to focus
on women and girls without examining how Roma people may be excluded. Thus far, only Mexico and Spain have explicitly focused
on intersectionality.
Third, FFP is specifically concerned with an outward-looking mandate and does not address domestic policies, leaving
implementing governments open to accusations of hypocrisy and policy incoherence. One of only two southern adopters of a
feminist foreign policy, Mexico, has been criticized by activists for failing to apply feminist principles to domestic issues, including
femicide. If a feminist approach centres on the needs of women and girls – and the marginalized in some interpretations – policy
coherence would imply the need to align domestic policies in the same way, but this is not part of FFP.
Fourth, feminist foreign policy debates sometimes oversimplify militaristic versus feminist ,
or weapons versus peace into false binaries . Military capacity building, weapons stockpiling,
other acts of deterrence or even self-defence in the face of attack have been conflated with
aggressive dominance.
In Germany, feminist Alice Schwarzer’s open letter to Chancellor Olaf Scholz warned that responsibility for nuclear conflict lay not
only with the aggressor but also with those who resisted the aggressor’s demands. Thus, some advocates for a feminist foreign
policy would not allow a country to respond militarily, even if attacked.
AT: Reps Shape Reality --- Arctic
Realist academic discourse doesn’t make states militarize – Arctic
buildup happened when consensus disregarded it.
Rob Huebert 21, Associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Calgary and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, “Breaking
Through: Understanding Sovereignty and Security in the Circumpolar Arctic,” Chapter 3,
“Understanding Arctic Security: A Defence of Traditional Security Analysis,” Edited by Wilfrid
Greaves and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, University of Toronto Press, February 2021, Accessed 628-25, ILake-JS
The Arctic is no longer a region of “exceptional” peace and cooperation. Instead, there are indications that the forces of international
competition have returned. This is not about conflict over the Arctic, but is about the Arctic
being key to the defence interests of the Arctic states, and increasingly of non-Arctic
states such as China. Serious questions need to be asked in order to understand how the changing international security
environment will affect the Arctic region. Those questions can only be addressed through a traditional
security theoretical approach.
The lack of traditional security analysis did not stop state-based military actions in the
North from re-emerging . A review of the existing literature on Arctic security throughout the
post-Cold War era demonstrates that very few analysts employed that theoretical
framework. Only a handful of analysts, such as myself and Borgerson, have embraced this approach; the literature has
largely and explicitly rejected it. It is difficult to understand why, if a realistbased traditional security understanding amounts to a political act , so few realist
understandings caused the Arctic to return as a geopolitical space of strategic importance. If
the writings of Borgerson and others are so powerful, the critical theorists who contend that this is a political act need to explain
how. They need to explain more clearly how the writings of so few can be so powerful in influencing the system.
Securitization Good --- Arctic
Realist securitization is inevitable in the Arctic and traditional statecentric approaches are necessary to respond to it. It is not the only
valid theoretical framework but must be included.
Rob Huebert 21, Associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Calgary and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, “Breaking
Through: Understanding Sovereignty and Security in the Circumpolar Arctic,” Chapter 3,
“Understanding Arctic Security: A Defence of Traditional Security Analysis,” Edited by Wilfrid
Greaves and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, University of Toronto Press, February 2021, Accessed 628-25, ILake-JS
This perception that the Arctic is exceptional has caused many to ponder the meaning of
international security there. Questions have re-emerged regarding whether traditional
security is adequate or helpful in understanding today’s Arctic. Building on the debates within strategic
studies and security studies, many of these commentators and analysts have sought new understandings of
what security means in terms of the Arctic. Some, such as Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv,19 Lassi Heininen,20 and
Wilfrid Greaves,21 have attempted to expand the concept to include elements such as
environmental and human security. Others point to the need to focus on cultural security, with a
focus on the well-being of the northern Indigenous peoples.22 Still others have argued for a
gendered understanding of security.23 Others suggest that there is a need to reconsider some of
the epistemological assumptions that inform traditional understandings of
international security and move away from its positivist elements to refocus on security as a
largely social construct.24 There is no question that all of these approaches and
considerations are valid . In any field, the essence of a healthy debate is normally found in a
proliferation of understandings of its key ontologies , epistemologies , and focuses .
Understanding Arctic security is no different .
When proponents of an expanded definition of security engage those who propose that it is
necessary to retain a field that addresses the issue of traditional security, there is a tendency to
set up traditional security as a straw man that is then easily discarded . These authors have
a strong tendency to resort to the writings of critics of traditional security . The common
approach is to turn to the works of Buzan and colleagues, who have pioneered the development of securitization to provide an
understanding of international security.25 Seldom do we see used the writings of realists such as John Mearsheimer26 and Colin
Gray,27 even though their works provide the theoretical foundations for current traditional security studies. Thus, the
theoretical basis of narrow or traditional security tends to be presented through the lens of
critiques of this approach. On the rare occasions when realists are cited, it is inevitably a
precursory mention without any explanation of realist understandings of the concept.28
A more significant problem is the embedded normative assumptions that colour efforts to
engage in debate. Echoing the arguments of Rapoport and Green, many proponents of an expanded
understanding of Arctic security suggest that traditional understandings of security
not only need to be challenged but also are part of blocking progress toward a more
cooperative Arctic. Often, the analyst who utilizes a traditional security approach is
said to be engaging in a scholarly and political act. As stated by Hoogensen Gjørv (see chapter 9), “when
security analysts ‘observe’ acts of security or security moves, the analyst has immediately contributed to the politics of the process by
recognizing (or not recognizing) an actor as a security actor and a securitizing move as being successful or not.”29 In other
words, the focus of security analysts helps to shape the actual security environment that
they are examining . By focusing on issues related to competition rather than
cooperation, they are both validating and creating the conditions in which the core
actors will act in a competitive manner .
The implication of this understanding of traditional security is clear. Not only do
critiques of traditional security contend that this approach is too narrow and misses many
key issues and actors, but the very act of taking such an approach is morally problematic ,
for it confirms the existing power structure that ultimately threatens the human security of
the individuals within the Arctic system. Thus it is no mere academic debate between different
understandings of Arctic security; it is also a debate in which traditional security analysts
themselves become part of the “problem.” This argument then goes on to suggest that an
analytical framework that fails to include the core issues of human security or
environmental security or any of the other expanded security approaches will lead to
policies that cause policy-makers to ignore these elements. In effect, the traditional security understandings
with their emphasis on state security will be favoured, resulting in policies that focus on military and foreign policy rather than on
policies that serve the people of the region.
A second element of this argument is that there has been a significant expansion of the
understanding of Arctic security since the end of the Cold War. There is a growing community of scholars
who utilize the expanded understanding of Arctic security. In the eyes of some of these analysts, however, the
problem remains that “popular and official security discourses still tend to focus on
state-centric security issues, ignoring or downplaying the wants and fears of Arctic
residents.”30 Thus, despite the efforts of this academic community, the public and governments of the region remain wedded to
a more traditional understanding of security in the region, resulting in the neglect of the local inhabitants’ security needs. The
suggestion is that those with the “power” to apply the traditional basis of security, with its
focus on the state and military competition , maintain a hold over both government officials
and the public.
Critics of the traditional security approach argue that it is too narrow to properly explain or account for the current Arctic security environment. The Arctic had been a site of
strong tensions when the dangers of nuclear war were extreme, but the core issues that led to that danger have been resolved.31 Throughout the Cold War, the Arctic had been
the site of the some of the most dangerous confrontations in that conflict. The geographic realities of the Cold War and the harsh logic of nuclear deterrence were such that the
bulk of the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States were arrayed across the Arctic.32 For deterrence to work, each side needed to convince the other
that should one side launch a nuclear strike, the other would both have the capability and intent to respond. This knowledge would keep either side from launching in the first
place, thereby guaranteeing the “cold” peace between the two sides. The two main belligerents were the Soviets and the Americans, which meant that the nuclear-armed
warheads, carried by land-based missiles, submarines, and long-range bombers, would have to fly over the Arctic to strike their designated targets. This meant that the military
forces maintained in the region needed to be credible and to carry the most destructive weapons known to humankind.
Key to the Arctic’s role in the Cold War security environment was that the deployments and expansion of the Soviet and NATO forces were not about seizing territory in the
Arctic (northern Norway being the exception) but about employing the Arctic as a critical transit point for the vast forces arrayed to preserve nuclear deterrence – and as a
battleground in a total war if deterrence failed. However, this stand-off prevented any form of cooperation in the region.33 When the Cold War ended, the need to maintain such
weapons systems was understood also to have ended. Thus, in 1989 the Arctic began to undergo a substantial demilitarization.34 The military forces that had dominated the
region were dismantled or substantially reduced. This reduction further strengthened the argument that the Arctic was a new zone of cooperation.
This transformed discussions about international Arctic security: the focus shifted from traditional military security to environmental and human security.35 To cement the new
era of cooperation, the former antagonists moved to create new forms of governance that would allow new forms of cooperation. Thus, under the leadership of Finnish and
Canadian officials, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was created.36 This brought together the eight Arctic states – the Soviet Union (now Russia), the United
States, Canada, Norway, Iceland, Denmark (for Greenland), Sweden, and Finland – to develop a joint understanding of the environmental problems facing the region. At the
same time, Canadian officials succeeded in ensuring that northern Indigenous peoples were recognized and given specific and separate seats at the table. The Inuit of Canada,
Alaska, Greenland, and Russia, the Saami of Scandinavia, and the Russian northern Indigenous peoples were all welcomed. As this body morphed into the Arctic Council in
1996, the cooperative efforts to understand and respond to the region’s environmental problems meant that the entire region was increasingly held up as an example to the
entire international system on how cooperation could be successfully employed.37
What seemed to truly mark the end of the traditional understanding of military security in the region occurred when the United States, Norway, and the Britain – and, later,
Canada – came together to provide substantial resources (in the billions of dollars) to help the Russian government safely decommission most of its Cold War–era nuclearpowered and -armed submarine fleet.38 The dissolution of the Soviet Union had left its successor state, the Russian Federation, in economic straits so dire that it was unable to
properly dispose of many of its older submarines. They had been left to literally rot in northern Russian ports, where they posed an increasing danger both to Russia and to its
northern neighbours, in the form of a nuclear meltdown or spill (or both).39 Overall, it was clear why so many of the leading experts in the field came to accept that the Arctic
had emerged as an “exceptional” region characterized by threats to environmental and human security and by responses to them.
Some analysts, however, such as Borgerson40 and myself,41 have not accepted the view that the Arctic
is exceptional or that the application of a traditional security framework has contributed
to competition and/or tensions in the region. Instead, this school of thought argues that there is nothing
intrinsically different between the Arctic and any other region of the world. Rather, the
region’s relative isolation and extreme climate have left states unable to pursue their
self-interests in a normal manner. Thus a façade of cooperation has developed. The
reality is that, as soon as they can, the Arctic states will allow their national interests prevail
when it suits their agendas. There is nothing “exceptional” about the Arctic, and to think
otherwise raises the real danger of ignoring or dismissing security threats when they do
arise. This is not to suggest that the achievements in cooperation that were achieved in the immediate post–Cold War years were
unimportant. Environmental cooperation and the empowerment of the North’s Indigenous peoples have been considerable
achievements. The central argument of the Huebert/Borgerson school of thought, however, is that as the Arctic becomes more “like”
the rest of the world, developments there will begin to include competition as well as
cooperation. According to this school of thought, the return of traditional security concerns in the region
is likely to be triggered by resource development and the concomitant geopolitical
implications. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the emergent state of Russia had
been temporarily weakened , but there are few indications that its desire to continue
as a “great power” has weakened as well or that its long-term national interests have become
perfectly aligned with those of the Western states. Thus as new resources are discovered
in the region and the means to exploit them are developed, the focus on protecting the
environment is likely to be complemented and perhaps even replaced by competition over those
resources.
Neither school of thought initially appreciated the impacts of climate change. After the Cold War, commentators assumed that the
Arctic would remain an isolated region where the permanent ice cover meant that only the northern Indigenous peoples would be
truly comfortable living there. The cooperation that developed during this era provided evidence to alter this view. An international
study of the Arctic region gave rise to a truly global understanding of the impact that climate change was having on the entire world,
and specifically on the Arctic, and of the speed of that impact. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), commissioned by the
Arctic Council in the early 2000s, established that world temperatures were rising at an unprecedented rate and would
fundamentally change the region.42 At the heart of this transformation was the melting of the permanent ice cap –
an observation that initially met with disbelief but is now accepted as reality. This in turn has led to an understanding
that the Arctic is becoming accessible to the outside world to a degree that no one had
ever thought possible.
Thus the return of geopolitics to the region is understood as linked to the development
of its resources, which is being accelerated by the warming Arctic. Russia’s economic
prosperity hinges on its exploitation of its natural gas and oil resources, and as
Russia has regained its prosperity, it has regained its strength.43 There are two main locations for these
resources. The more established region is around the Caspian Sea; the newer sources are in the north. Thus, as Russia has
moved to recover economically, it has moved northward. Vladimir Putin’s consolidation of
power and his intention to return Russia to “great power” status has thus
accelerated the return of geopolitics to the Arctic. Until 2014, however, Russia’s renewed strength
did not seem to weaken the argument that the Arctic remained an exceptional region in terms of international cooperation.
The Ukrainian crisis of 2014 catalysed the return of “great power” geopolitics to the Arctic.
Seemingly unconnected to the Arctic, the crisis crystalized the growing divide between the Americans,
Canadians, Norwegians, and Danes on one side and Russia on the other. The fall of the pro-Russian government of Viktor
Yanukovych and its subsequent replacement by a pro-Western government resulted in Russian forces seizing parts of the eastern
Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula. The use of military force to redraw European borders led to the Western states imposing
sanctions on Russia. Relations between Russia and the other Arctic states have deteriorated
significantly since then.
The Return of Hard Politics and the Need for a Traditional Understanding of Arctic Security
There have been efforts to maintain Arctic regional cooperation since 2014, and there have been
some significant successes at this, such as the Arctic Ocean Fishing Agreement reached in 2017.44 But the conflict has
illustrated that three core processes were largely ignored until the crisis demonstrated
that the region had lost much of its “exceptional” status. These forces have brought the Arctic
back under the ambit of military security in the conduct of international relations. These
forces existed before the 2014 crisis, but as long as political cooperation had dominated the region, most observers either ignored or
did not understand their significance. With the deterioration of relations as a result of the Ukraine
crisis, these forces have become apparent to all.
First, the Arctic remains vital to national security for both Russia and the United States. For
the Russians this means protecting their nuclear deterrent, which is still based primarily in
their Arctic region. While many commentators had assumed that the Russians had abandoned
nuclear deterrence as the key to their security, a reading of their core security policies
and an examination of their defence expenditures throughout the 2000s demonstrate
that this is not true . Russian defence documents produced after the Cold War always listed the
maintenance of nuclear stability , aka nuclear deterrence, as their principal defence
requirement .45 Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, despite their economic collapse , the
Russians persevered in their efforts to rebuild the submarine element of their
deterrent. They encountered significant setbacks in the development of their most modern nuclear-armed submarine-launched
missile. The fact that they persevered demonstrates their determination to rebuild
and maintain their nuclear deterrent.
Likewise, many observers suggested that Russia’s resumption of long-range bomber patrols in the Arctic in August 2007 was for
domestic audiences and should not be seen as marking a return to the challenges of the Cold War.46 In 2008, there were similar
dismissals of the Russia’s decision to resume patrols by its nuclear-powered and -armed submarine fleet (SSBN). The long
timelines that the Russian armed forces faced in rebuilding this capability strongly
suggest that they never lost sight of the importance of military force in the Arctic for
their security. As long as relations remained good with the West, Russia’s efforts to rebuild its deterrent – primarily through its
Northern Fleet and bomber command – could be ignored. When relations worsened, however, it became clear
that Russia had significantly rebuilt its northern capabilities to the point that it now can be
considered the regional hegemon in terms of military power.47 This means that despite the best
efforts of most Arctic security analysts to move away from a focus on state-based hard power in
the region, the Russian government is still moving ahead with that agenda. So it is
important not to ignore that Russia is determined to use military power to achieve
its core objectives.
Second, as Russia has moved to strengthen its Arctic military capabilities, so have the West’s
Arctic states, largely through the NATO and NORAD alliances. Canada and the United States
have been developing means to modernize NORAD with a focus on improving its
surveillance capabilities.48 At the same time, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and the United States are
developing means to strengthen the alliance’s ability to protect it northern flanks.49 Further complicating this
development are the closer relations that are now developing between the NATO alliance
and Finland and Sweden.50 While neither state is a full member, both have dramatically increased their military
cooperation with NATO. In part, this has been spurred by increased Russian military actions that are
violating their air and maritime spaces.
Space limitations preclude a detailed examination of NATO’s relationship to the Arctic, but there is evidence that
some NATO countries, such as Norway, concluded that Russian military expansion in the
region demanded a NATO-based response.51 Other NATO states, such as Canada under Stephen Harper, were
concerned that any indication that NATO was expanding into the Arctic would cause the Russians to feel that they were being
encircled, so they did not initially approve of such moves.52 The Canadian government under Justin Trudeau has been
abandoning this reluctance, and its 2017 defence policy signalled a willingness to consider a stronger
NATO presence in the Arctic.53 Meanwhile, the most recent US strategic document identifies
Russia and China as the most direct threats to American security.54 Before this, in the aftermath of the
9/11 attacks on the United States, the Americans had consistently identified terrorist organizations as the greatest threat. All of
this demonstrates the importance of utilizing a state-based analysis of the military
measures that are now taking place.
Third, since 2014, China has begun developing its military capability in the region. While these
efforts are currently low-level, they do represent a new security development. Thus, in 2015 a five-ship Chinese
naval task force sailed around the Aleutian Islands and into the Bering Sea.55 At the same time, the Chinese navy made its first
official visit to Finland, Sweden, and Denmark.56 In 2017, a three-ship task force held joint exercises with Russian forces and
China’s one icebreaker sailed through the Canadian Northwest Passage.57 Clearly, China is now beginning the
challenging task of learning how to deploy to the region. In January 2018, the Chinese issued an Arctic
policy document, which focused on demonstrating to the greater international community the cooperative nature of Chinese actions
in that region.58 But it is important to note that the Chinese government seldom issues
documents that provide detailed considerations of their policy. The fact that the Chinese
took the effort to produce and disseminate this policy document is a clear indication
of how seriously they take their involvement in the region.
Conclusion
The Arctic is no longer a region of “exceptional” peace and cooperation. Instead, there are indications that the forces of international
competition have returned. This is not about conflict over the Arctic, but is about the Arctic
being key to the defence interests of the Arctic states, and increasingly of non-Arctic
states such as China. Serious questions need to be asked in order to understand how the changing international security
environment will affect the Arctic region. Those questions can only be addressed through a traditional
security theoretical approach.
The lack of traditional security analysis did not stop state-based military actions in the North from re-emerging. A review of the
existing literature on Arctic security throughout the post-Cold War era demonstrates that very few analysts employed that
theoretical framework. Only a handful of analysts, such as myself and Borgerson, have embraced this approach; the literature has
largely and explicitly rejected it. It is difficult to understand why, if a realist-based traditional security understanding amounts to a
political act, so few realist understandings caused the Arctic to return as a geopolitical space of strategic importance. If the writings
of Borgerson and others are so powerful, the critical theorists who contend that this is a political act need to explain how. They need
to explain more clearly how the writings of so few can be so powerful in influencing the system.
Changes in the international system since 2014 have resulted in a significant spillover
of traditional security issues into the Arctic region. This is not to suggest that the region is returning entirely
to the dangers of the Cold War era, but traditional security affects it, and that impact must be analysed accordingly. The recent
agreement on commercial fishing in the central Arctic Ocean affirms that cooperative forces remain at
work that can be explained through an expanded security framework. Likewise, pressing issues related to the
societal, gendered, and individual frameworks of security need to be understood. Nevertheless, issues related to the
state use of military power are still explained best using traditional security
analysis.
Constructivism Wrong
Constructivism in the context of IR is inherently flawed, contradicting
itself by attacking the basis on which it was built, only a noncontradicting ideology could effectively uphold policies.
Palan 01 { Ronen Palan is an Israeli-born economist and Professor of International Political
Economy in the Department of International Politics at the City University London.} - (“A world of their
making: an evaluation of the constructivist critique in International Relations,” Cambridge Core,
published 1-2-2001, accessed 7-11-2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-ofinternational-studies/article/world-of-their-making-an-evaluation-of-the-constructivist-critique-ininternational-relations/AEF449AACE997A147DDEA93E3621915A)//Castro
IR constructivism borrows from social theory in order to argue that a proper understanding of
the way subjects interact with the world and with each other alerts us to the fallacy of
conventional IR theory. And yet, as Wendt notes, constructivism is a counter-intuitive theory.13
IR constructivists cannot appeal therefore to some notion of ‘commonsense’ (presented
erroneously by realists as the philosophy of ‘scientific realism’) to back up their argument but
advance what amounts to a theoretical argument based on their reading of social theory. It is, of
course, one thing to begin from the premise that ideas and norms are the principal agent of
change; it is an entirely different proposition to demonstrate the inherent necessity of this to be
the case, and in addition outline the specific form by which the ‘construction’ of the
international environment, on its opportunities and constraints, takes place. And yet, for a
theory that is so obviously dependent upon a rigorous working of the relationship between social
theory and its IR variant, it is curious that, with one or two exceptions, IR constructivists often
advance positions that conventionally are viewed as either incompatible or at least highly
debatable. It is not appreciated enough, for instance, that IR constructivists draw on a number
of different, and often incompatible, social theories. For example, Wendt acknowledges his debt
to Symbolic Interactionism, while Onuf borrows primarily from Wittgenstein whose theories
evolve in part in repudiation of Symbolic Interactionism. Wendt like Ruggie takes the view that
constructivism opposes the ‘individualist’ view, and yet Symbolic Interactionism and Weberian
interpretative sociology are both variants of methodological individualism.
Constructivism Fails realism/rationalism is more common and more
desireable.
Palan 01 { Ronen Palan is an Israeli-born economist and Professor of International Political
Economy in the Department of International Politics at the City University London.} - (“A world of their
making: an evaluation of the constructivist critique in International Relations,” Cambridge Core,
published 1-2-2001, accessed 7-11-2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-ofinternational-studies/article/world-of-their-making-an-evaluation-of-the-constructivist-critique-ininternational-relations/AEF449AACE997A147DDEA93E3621915A)//Castro
Constructivism is not a well-defined sociological approach. Terms such as constructivism,
constructionism, and constitutiveness are frequently used in different branches of the social
sciences and are, unfortunately, used by different people to describe different things. To
complicate matters further, the branch of constructivism that has made the deepest impact in IR
draws primarily on a position which has developed as an extension of ‘Chicago style’ symbolic
interactionist methodology (or latterly known better as ethnographic research), and only some
of its adherents describe themselves as constructivists or constructionists.16 The term
‘constructivism’ was coined in the early 1920s by a group of Soviet artists and architects to
describe a new artistic movement. Today, however, constructivism is most commonly used to
describe an epistemological position that bears little resemblance to Soviet constructivism.
Drawing inspiration from Immanuel Kant’s theory of synthetic knowledge, constructivist
epistemology maintains that what is known cannot be the result of a passive receiving, but the
product of an active subject’s activity.17 In this view, we do not apprehend the external world ‘as
it is,’ but our biological and psychic properties determine our knowledge of the world.
Constructivists do not deny external or objective reality; they deny the orthodox supposition of a
‘natural connection between word and thing and a further natural connection between the
symbol and the thing symbolized’.18 Prior to Kant, the generally accepted idea was that objects
of knowledge were known and the given, consequently, to paraphrase Cassirer, methodologically
the road leads solely from ‘data’ to ‘laws’.19 Echoes of such views are found, for instance, in
Hans Morgenthau, who, confusingly, on the one hand prioritizes the concept of interest, but in
the same breadth also claims to draw conclusions from raw data. In his words: ‘[w]e look over
his [the statesman’s] shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on conversation with
other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts. Thinking in terms of interest defined
as power’.20 Theories that treat data in such a manner are viewed in IR as ‘realist’. Kant brought
about a revolution in methodology arguing that instead of starting from the object as known we
must begin with the laws of cognition, which alone are accessible to us. Implicit in this is an
idealist position, namely, that the ‘object of knowledge can be defined only through the medium
of a particular logical and conceptual structure’.21
Heg Reps Good
Critiques of hegemony fracture it from within – communicating the
message that hegemony is good is key to avoid global war and shore
up assurances
Robert M. Gates 23. PhD in Russian and Soviet History at Georgetown University, MA in
History at Indiana University, former US Secretary of Defense. “The Dysfunctional
Superpower.” Foreign Affairs. November/December 2023.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/robert-gates-america-china-russiadysfunctional-superpower
MEETING THE MOMENT
The epic contest between the United States and its allies on one side and China, Russia, and their
fellow travelers on the other is well underway. To ensure that Washington is in the strongest possible position to deter its adversaries from
making additional strategic miscalculations, U.S. leaders must first address the breakdown in the decades-long bipartisan agreement with respect to the United States’ role in
the world. It is not surprising that after 20 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, many Americans wanted to turn inward, especially given the United States’ many problems at
job of political leaders to counter that sentiment and explain how the country’s fate is
inextricably bound up in what happens elsewhere. President Franklin Roosevelt once observed that “the greatest duty of
home. But it is the
a statesman is to educate.” But recent presidents, along with most members of Congress, have utterly failed in this essential responsibility.
Americans need to understand why U.S. global leadership, despite its costs,
is vital to preserving peace and prosperity. They need to know why a successful
Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion is crucial for deterring China from invading
Taiwan. They need to know why Chinese domination of the Western Pacific endangers U.S.
interests. They need to know why Chinese and Russian influence in the global South matters to American pocketbooks. They need to know
why the United States’ dependability as an ally is so consequential for preserving peace. They need to know
why a Chinese-Russian alliance threatens the United States. These are the kinds of connections
that American political leaders need to be drawing every day.
It is not just one Oval Office address or speech on the floor of Congress that is needed. Rather, a
drumbeat of repetition is required for the message to sink in.
communicating to
Beyond
people directly
regularly
the American
, and not through spokespersons, the president needs to spend time over
drinks and dinners and in small meetings with members of Congress and the media making the case for the United States’ leadership role. Then, given the fragmented nature of
modern-day communications, members of Congress need to carry the message to their constituents across the country.
that message? It is that American global leadership has provided 75 years of
great-power peace—the longest stretch in centuries . Nothing in a nation’s life is
costlier than war , nor does anything else represent a greater threat to its security and prosperity. And nothing makes war
likelier than putting one’s head in the sand and pretending that the United
States is not affected by events elsewhere , as the country learned before World War I, World War II, and 9/11. The
What is
the United States possesses, the alliances it has forged, and the international institutions it has
designed are all essential to deterring aggression against it and its partners. As a century of
military power
evidence should make clear, failing to deal with aggressors only encourages more
aggression. It is naive to believe that Russian success in Ukraine will not lead to further Russian aggression in Europe and possibly even a war between NATO
. And it is equally naive to believe that Russian success in Ukraine will not significantly
increase the likelihood of Chinese aggression against Taiwan and thus potentially a war between
the United States and China.
A world without reliable U.S. leadership would be a world of authoritarian predators,
with all other countries potential prey . If America is to safeguard its people, its security, and its liberty, it must
and Russia
continue to embrace its global leadership role. As British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said of the United
States in 1943, “The price of greatness is responsibility.”
Rebuilding support at home for that responsibility is essential to rebuilding trust
among allies and awareness among adversaries that the United States will fulfill its
commitments. Because of domestic divisions, mixed messages , and political leaders’
ambivalence about the United States’ role in the world, there is significant doubt abroad about
American reliability. Both friends and adversaries wonder whether Biden’s engagement and alliance-building is a return to normal or whether
Trump’s “America first” disdain for allies will be the dominant thread in American policy in the future. Even the closest of allies are hedging their bets about America.
In a
world where Russia and China are on the prowl, that is particularly dangerous.
Restoring public support for U.S. global leadership is the highest priority,
but
the United States must take other steps to actually exercise that role. First, it needs to go beyond “pivoting” to Asia. Strengthening relationships with Australia, Japan, the
Philippines, South Korea, and other countries in the region is necessary but not sufficient. China and Russia are working together against U.S. interests on every continent.
Washington needs a strategy for dealing with the entire world—particularly in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, where the Russians and the Chinese are fast outpacing
the United States in developing security and economic relationships. This strategy ought not to divide the world into democracies and authoritarians. The United States must
always advocate for democracy and human rights everywhere, but that commitment must not blind Washington to the reality that U.S. national interests sometimes require it to
work with repressive, unrepresentative governments.
LIO Good
LIO uses norms to decrease risk of violence
Gill-Tiney 21 Patrick Gill-Tiney: Department of Politics and International Relations,
University of Oxford, United Kingdom (9/29/21, “A Liberal Peace?: The Growth of Liberal
Norms and the Decline of Interstate Violence,” Peace Science Society,
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00220027211035554)
Previous scholarship has explained the onset and hostility level of interstate disputes in terms of
power relations, trade dependency, regime type, and nuclear weapons. What these works have
missed, discounted, or been unable to operationalize, is the normative environment of
international society, that is, what behaviors are considered (in)appropriate. I find this
normative environment to not only have significantly changed since 1970, but to also have
significant leverage in explaining patterns of interstate disputes. I find strong evidence that a
dispute participant’s likelihood of resorting to hostile action has diminished as
liberal interpretations sovereignty have proliferated. This is not an effect explained by the end of
the Cold War, nor is it one limited to only democracies or liberal states. Furthermore, normative
change appears to have been evolutionary, rather than a tectonic change.
The findings have important implications for understanding the risk of violence in interstate
disputes and for scholars interested in norms. Firstly, much of the policy focus has been upon
domestic political institutions and interstate economic ties. This is illustrated by debates over
the success of the European Union in preventing conflict between its member states. The
organization is argued as having bolstered transitions to democracy from formerly fascist and
communist regimes, whilst the common market has raised standards of living and provided
common economic interests reducing economic competition. The findings presented here
suggest that just as important is the normative framework for understanding disputes,
and that as interdependence, international law, and individual rights and freedoms have been
emphasized over territory, that escalation has diminished. In an era of apparently increasing
tensions between major powers, and deep tensions over much of the liberal intergovernmental
architecture, policymakers should be wary of what the weakening of this framework may mean
for the escalation of disputes . These findings suggest that this is a dangerous path to
tread.
LIO prevents escalation of conflict
Gill-Tiney 21 Patrick Gill-Tiney: Department of Politics and International Relations,
University of Oxford, United Kingdom (9/29/21, “A Liberal Peace?: The Growth of Liberal
Norms and the Decline of Interstate Violence,” Peace Science Society,
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00220027211035554)
Escalation then, is a political decision. In making the choice to escalate, or not, policymakers are
impacted by a range of strategic factors, but crucially, are also constrained by norms . The
use of force in international relations must be justified, and since 1945 the UN Charter specifies
just two: self-defense and collective peace enforcement. To this, we might also add humanitarian
intervention, though this remains contested. As a baseline, therefore, when faced with dispute
onset, policymakers must justify their actions with reference to one of these reasons.
Moreover, in making the decision to escalate, policymakers are also constrained by liberal values
which emphasize diplomacy, cooperation, international law, international organizations, the
rights of the individual, and to question the legitimacy of the march to war. Taken together, this
slows the decision to escalate, since legal justification is needed, diplomacy is necessary, and
potential economic and human costs understood, calculated and defended. A shift toward liberal
interpretations thereby means a reduced probability of escalation to violence, tacitly
assuming that the risk of a dispute arising in the first-place is unchanged. This leads me to my
first hypothesis, which relates to the evolution mechanism of change:
Hypothesis 1: Given an international dispute, the risk of escalation decreases as liberal
interpretations increase.
Rationalism True/Good
Rationalism decides triggers of conflict and has explained why Arctic
conflict has not escalated, which means its true and accurate.
Benda 23 [Lukáš Benda, Study programme: Security Studies Supervisor: Mgr. Anzhelika
Solovyeva, Ph.D. Year of the defence: 2023. CHARLES UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES, Institute of Political Studies, Department of Security Studies. July 31, 2023.
Master’s Thesis, “The Nature of Conflict in the Arctic: A Rationalist Approach to the Conflict
Triggers”] https://dspace.cuni.cz/handle/20.500.11956/186839?locale-attribute=en GabOL
*Equation in GREEN*
This Master’s thesis explores the triggers of the conflict in the Arctic between the littoral states. Its goal is to identify key conflict drivers, based on the existing literature, then
By using the theory of rational
choice and the bargaining model of war, it is studied why and how has the Arctic issues not
escalated into armed confrontation, a topic which has been prominent in the literature at one
time. By applying the aforementioned theories, this thesis links the conflict triggers to an intensity level, while applying the bargaining model of war on a non-violent
assess their intensity, based on the existing framework and supplemented by this thesis’ own definition of conflict.
conflict. The conclusions should determine the intensity of each conflict trigger, while explaining the changes in the conflict, including the external influencing factors.
Developing its own definition of conflict and an intensity scale, this thesis aims to fill the gap in the existing literature, which usually focuses on the conflict as a singular topic,
James Fearon, rational
choice theory provides a framework for explaining why states do or do not resort to war rather
than peaceful alternatives. Fearon argues that rational actors operate on two main principles.
First, given that the cost of war is high and its outcome is not always certain, there should exist
agreements that are for rational states preferable to war (Fearon, 1995). Second, sometimes
states are unable to achieve a mutually agreeable bargain, because of misinterpreting
information about capabilities and other factors, and because of occasional inability of a state to
commit to uphold a deal in certain circumstances (Fearon, 1995). Fearon’s understanding of rational choice works with
while introducing and exploring different layers of the conflict derived from identification of the conflict triggers. According to
states engaging in a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the potential gains from engaging in war against the expected costs of such venture. The theory works with realist
assumptions, such as international anarchy, because Fearon’s assumption that states may have a commitment problem is recognized as its central feature (Walt, 1999).
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita in his 1981 Risk, Power Distributions and the Likelihood of War focuses on states as decision-making actors seeking utility, while
mitigating risks. He presents generally agreed assumptions, the two most important being “Each state prefers expanding its power to maintaining its power, but prefers
maintaining its power to losing power” and “States act to prevent other states from gaining a preponderance of power” (de Mesquita, 1981, p. 543). Based on this he presents a
formula {E(U)w = [PsUe + (1-Ps)Ul]} ≥ E(U)m, where the expected utility from war (E(U)w) has to be larger or equal to expected utility from maintaining power, to persuade
de Mesquita’s thoughts are used to elaborate on
conflict triggers and their potential to trigger (or not trigger) an armed conflict in the region.
Firstly, it is necessary to acknowledge James Fearon and his three conditions under which war is
possible, as noted by Dan Reiter as well. First condition is the existence of divergent view on the
likelihood of war (Reiter, 2003, p. 29). Actors (states) overestimate their own capabilities or
underestimate the capabilities of the opponent. This leads to unwillingness to compromise and
avoid war. Second condition states that states cannot commit to not fight in the future,
stemming from the advantages of striking first (Reiter, 2003). Rooted in anarchic view of the
world order, possible change in power of one side leads the growing side to believe that the
possible outcome of war has changed in its favour, thus discouraging it from finding a solution
through agreement (Reiter, 2003). The third Fearon’s condition touches upon the indivisibility
of a disputed item. Similar to zero-sum game, there is only one winner and one loser, nothing in
between. The indivisibility prevents actors from preferring and reaching a mutually acceptable
bargain (Reiter, 2003). James Fearon also argues that “there always exists a set of negotiated
settlements that both sides prefer to fighting” (Fearon, 1995, p. 387). Reinforcing this argument
with a simple graph showing the favourite outcomes of two parties, their values for war, and values for
states’ decision-makers to engage in a war (de Mesquita, 1981, p. 544). In this thesis
outcomes, he concludes that war is basically a costly lottery and the risk-neutral or riskavoiding states are very often better off with reaching a mutual agreement, rather than
engaging in a war with an uncertain outcome (even though the perception of outcome may differ on various conditions – lack of information, political and military
overestimation et cetera) (Fearon, 1995, p. 388). For Fearon’s Bargaining Range, see the Appendix no. 1. States’ behaviour is also linked to risk and expected utility. In Risk,
Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War Bruce Bueno de Mesquita presents important hypotheses and assumptions. He highlights the links between risk, expected utility
maximization, and war (de Mesquita, 1981, p. 542). First, the following assumptions about the states’ behaviour are agreed by most of the scholars of rationalism:
1. Each state is a rational, purposive, unitary actor;
2. Each state prefers expanding its power to maintaining its power, but prefers
maintaining its power to losing power;
3. States act to prevent other states from gaining a preponderance of power. (de
Mesquita, 1981, p. 543).
De Mesquita then goes further, assuming that in the decision-making process of those in power,
there is a formula to help the decision-maker to determine whether to engage in a war or not,
based on the assumption that the decision-maker is seeking to maximise utility:
{E(U)w = [PsUe + (1-Ps)Ul]} ≥ E(U)m
Where:
• E(U)w – expected utility from war;
• E(U)m = PmUm – expected utility derived from maintaining one’s power;
• Ps – probability of succeeding, resulting in an expansion of power;
• 1-Ps – probability of failing, resulting in a loss of power;
• Ue – utility to expansion of power;
• Ul – utility to loss of power;
• Um – utility to maintaining power;
• Pm = 1 – probability of maintaining power during peacetime;
• And it is assumed that Ue > Um > Ul (de Mesquita, 1981, p. 544)
The formula above states that the states would engage in war if their expected utility from war exceeds the expected utility from maintaining power. This leads to calculating the
cost of war, which is outside the scope of this thesis. But it circles back to what James Fearon demonstrates on his example of dividing 100 dollars between two actors, they can
either reach a mutual agreement or they can go to war. Given that the cost of war is 20 dollars, the chance of winning the whole 100 dollars is 50 percent (Fearon, 1995, p. 388).
Each side can then expect the value of the war option to be 30 dollars (0,5 x 100 + 0,5 x 0 – 20), and assuming that both sides are risk-neutral, they should not accept less than
30 dollars in the bargaining process (Fearon, 1995, p. 388). However, there are plenty of peaceful options where both parties agree to some split of the 100 dollars, from 31:69 to
The limitations of the Arctic conflict
are thus following: lack of utility gained from armed conflict, overall deterrence based on
ownership of nuclear weapons and the existence of NATO alliance, long-term cooperation
between the littoral states, and the existence of international framework designed to process the
issues related to territorial disputes. Regarding the suggestions of armed clash suggested by existing literature, this thesis argues that the issues are
69:31, which gives them higher utility than the war option with uncertain outcome (Fearon, 1995, p. 388).
of low to medium intensity, yet still under the threshold of violent conflict. The most intense conflict trigger is the disagreement over the regime for the Northern Sea Route,
which is related to deteriorating relations of Russia with other countries, mainly because of the ongoing war in Ukraine. These circumstances cause Russia to be more assertive
in protecting its assets in the region. From the perspective of rationalism, the possibility of an armed conflict, based on the conflict triggers, is diminished by James Fearon’s
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s theory of utility also excludes violent
clash, as the states would not gain enough utility to offset the cost of war. In other words, war over resources,
conditions for war, which are not fulfilled in the Arctic.
shipping lanes or continental shelves is not worth it. That said, the Arctic plays a significant role in the broader power competition between Russia and the West, because of the
strategic military assets and the geographical proximity of the actors. In case of armed confrontation between the Great Powers, the Arctic would play an important role, which is
why NATO and Russia both conduct military exercises in the region, which raise the tensions and worsen the regional situation. This is tied to the increasing militarization of the
region and brings a risk of unintentional clash, in a form of military incident for example. The entry of China into the region has been a significant change in the overall balance
of power in the region, but otherwise it has not affected the ongoing conflict. The impact of the War in Ukraine had no effect on the conflict triggers, but it has contributed to
worsened international relations of the actors, based on the animosity between Russia and the West. From the perspective of conflict definition introduced in this thesis, the
intensity of the conflict triggers fulfils the criteria of dispute/contest, latent conflict, and non-violent crisis. The situation over the Northern Sea Route ranks the highest on the
conflict scale, mainly because of the current geopolitical situation with Russia increasing its security measures in the Arctic, backed by threatening proclamations towards
mainly the Western countries. So why has the conflict remained non-violent? It is because the intensity of the conflict triggers is generally not very high. Despite the initial
The utility of keeping the region peaceful is
higher, than an armed clash with uncertain outcome. Despite the longstanding disagreements
and deteriorating relations over the past years, the region has experienced a long period of
stability, and the concerns about violent clash have been dampened by several successes in the
form of delimitation treaties or continuous adherence to established international frameworks by all actors.
alarmism of the late 2000s, the Arctic has seen a lot of cooperative efforts of all the littoral states.
Dismissing all of IR makes the perfect the enemy of the good, we can
make rational decisions without sweeping theorizations.
Klasche & Selg 20 [Benjamin Klasche, PhD, is a Lecturer of Politics and International
Relations at Tallinn University. He is also a Senior Researcher at the European Horizon
Twinning Project, "A critical relational perspective on peace & security in CEE", and Co-Director
of the Central and Eastern European Securit Hub. Peeter Selg, professor of Governance and
Political Analysis, Tallinn University, Estonia. His main research interests include theories of
power, social science methodology, and relational social sciences. His work has appeared in
journals such as Sociological Theory, PS: Political Science and Politics, and Journal of Political
Power. March 17, 2020. International Relations, Vol. 34, Issue 4, “A pragmatist defence of
rationalism: Towards a cognitive frames–based methodology in International Relations”]
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0047117820912519 GabOL
The endeavour to explain and predict international affairs is getting harder since it is ever more widely accepted that heterogeneous and fluid actors are
making international politics. Positivists of various types have dominated the discussion on knowledge creation in the discipline of International
Relations (IR), but the increasing acceptance of the dynamic character of international politics has led to the support and use of constructivist, postWestern or feminist approaches. There has also been an uptick in methodological discussions on these critical, non-positivist approaches. This article
contributes to these debates by offering the first steps towards a cognitive frames–based methodology for IR. With a pragmatist ontology as its
foundation, the approach re-sets the focus of analysis to the rationality of the international actors. The article, offers an initial description, by relying on
illustrative examples, of the creation, the reach, durability and the organisational structure of cognitive frames in the global arena. In recent years,
numerous global political developments have caught many of us by surprise. Basing our assessment on what is rational, international events such as the
Brexit, Trump’s victory in the last US presidential election, previous ‘Black Swan’ events such as the Iraq War in 2003 and before that the dissolution of
the Soviet Union were hard to forecast and questioned the realist worldview with its premise of rationality of action. The rules of international politics
appear to be changing and the assumption that weighty decisions are made primarily from the standpoint of rationality seems to be outdated. This
realisation is also increasingly present in International Relations (IR). Within it, we witness the steady decline of the realist paradigm revolving around
the notion of rational actors1 and see increasing sedimentation of constructivist, critical and post-Western approaches explaining what is happening in
However, it is our crucial claim that the concept of
rationality is still beneficial for IR if one is willing to accept that the notion
does not have universal content and needs to be reconsidered as a contextbound concept. Consequently, in IR, one should not talk about rationality but rationalities. To
the world of international politics.2
introduce this type of perspectivism,3 we bring forward a cognitive frames–based methodology with recourse
to pragmatist social theory and argue for one route of such reconsideration that will help to
understand the new notion of rationality. This approach is clearly non-positivistic and
interpretivist. Non-positivist approaches had since the late 1950s, with the beginning of the
‘second great debate’ in IR, the reputation of being non-scientific.4 Based on the Weberian idea of Science, Patrick
Jackson concludes, however, that any type of ‘systemic inquiry designed to produce factual knowledge’5 should be considered science. The
methodology (or better research strategy) introduced below is aimed at providing a conceptual scheme for utilising various interpretative research
methods (more on the methods at the end of the article) to study the rationality and therefore the decision-making of international actors. We argue
that there is no rationality as such to be found, and that rationality of various decisions is intelligible within the reach, durability and organisational
structure of specific cognitive frames. The theoretical underpinnings of this approach draw heavily on Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis6 (and its
various interpretations) whose potential is not yet opened up for IR. Consequently, our article makes a case for more interdisciplinarity by
demonstrating the usefulness of sociological concepts in IR. It also adds to Friedrichs’ and Kratochwil’s call for ‘a pragmatic turn in [IR]’7 and
strengthens it by using pragmatist philosophy to support a methodological project in IR. Besides that, even though it is not explicitly explored in this
article, it can be understood as a methodological response to the call for non-Western8 or global9 IR theorising, as it aims at proposing a research
strategy for reconstructing individual rationality-shaping cognitive frames that affect every international actor. When encountering
irrational behaviour, we assume that actors make these decisions without adhering to guidelines
for rational acting. We believe that even in such extreme cases as North Korea or Iran, this is not
the case and that actions are taken based on consideration of imperfect rational choices.
Furthermore, it is well-documented that thoroughly Western concepts and ideals like human
rights, economic growth and the like are not necessarily considered reasonable goals in other
cultural contexts. This leads to the assumption that objectivity and with that, rationality can look
very different in different situations and settings. Once this has been accepted, we are again able
to base our analysis on the idea of rational (or predictable) decision-making. Very robustly put:
most political decisions are based on rationality, but the content of rationality differs from actor
to actor, from perspective to perspective and from setting to setting. After understanding the
dynamic nature of rationality, we need a tool that would enable us to understand the specific
conditions that create rationality. We suggest that the behaviour and actions of all actors
(individuals, states) are based on underlying cognitive frames. Therefore, a careful analysis of
these frames would allow access to the rationality of such actors and help to explain and forecast
their actions. The application of a cognitive frames–based methodology should provide a
conceptual tool for that. However, at the foundation of every methodology lie ontological and
epistemological presumptions, even if often left tacit in social/political research. For making
them explicit, we turn to the pragmatist tradition in social philosophy. In the twenty-first
century that saw the slow decline of the unilateral world order, the analysis of international
politics requires the consideration of a multitude of different actors. IR as a discipline has been searching for
mostly theoretical advancements to address this development. Above we have introduced a methodological approach that could help us out of this
predicament. Our approach assists in identifying so-called imperfect rationality, which can help us understand and explain any decisions of
international actors. Naturally, this is not something new to psychological and constructivist approaches to rationality, but we have endeavoured to
bring to the prominence a methodology that allows us to systematically gain access to the foundation of the thinking of the actors in question.
Consequentially, this article should be considered as the first stepping stone in establishing a cognitive frames–based methodology for IR. It delivered a
brief but concise introduction to the pragmatist notions of truth and reality which lays the ontological foundation for the methodological approach.
Again, our methodology must be seen as more of a research strategy that manages to streamline different methods and also other methodologies into
one system. Some possible matches have been brought forward in this article, but many other combinations with interpretivist and post-positivist
approaches are conceivable. Furthermore, after introducing the nature of cognitive frames, an initial description of the properties of cognitive frames in
a globalised world has been brought forward. Here, their creation, their reach and durability, and organisational structure have been highlighted to
allow for the navigation and identification of cognitive frames in the international arena. It has been shown that they are created through public or
political discourse and rely here on their ability to garner continuous attention and provide any benefit to the frame subjects . Important is
here also the acceptability and compatibility of the newly created frame with the existing
paradigmatic and structural pre-conditions which allow the successful adoption of a new
cognitive frame. Furthermore, the reach of a frame is solely dependent on discourse, which in the digital twenty-first century means that the
frames are no longer bound by geographical or even political barriers and can stretch from the local to the global. Finally, these findings suggest that
multiple cognitive frames must exist at the same time and that every individual is subject to many different frames, which are arranged following
different organisational principles. They can be organised hierarchically or horizontally, some are more dominant at a time, some dilute into the
background. More practically, this methodological approach has proven to be useful to explain sudden changes of directions like in the case of
Germany’s migration policy, but we also see great potential in its ability to overcome theoretical shortcomings.
Rationalistic ideologies assume that actors make the best rational
decision to benefit the population, not only materialistically but from
a co-operational ontological standpoint.
Schmidt 23 {Brian C. Schmidt is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the State
University of New York at New Paltz. Prior to that, he was Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department
of Political Science at the University at Albany, State University of New York.} - (“Rationalism and the
“rational actor assumption” in realist international relations theory,” Sage Journals, published 1-16-2023,
accessed 7-11-2025, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/17550882221144643)/MC/
A second major use of the term rationalism in IR comes from the work of Keohane (1988).
While there are similarities between Keohane’s usage and that of Morgenthau, there are clear
differences. Keohane uses the term rationalism to group together those approaches that he sets
in opposition to what he calls the reflectivist tradition.3 Although Keohane recognizes the
differences among the various rationalist approaches, he thinks there are elements that bind
them together and which set them apart from reflectivist approaches. There are three aspects to
Keohane’s account of rationalism that are worthy of consideration. First, is the importance of
what he (Keohane, 1988: 381) calls a substantive theory of rationality. Here he (Keohane, 1988:
381) draws on Herbert Simon, who argued that substantive rationality characterizes “behavior
that can be adjudged objectively to be optimally adapted to the situation”. As such, it is clear
that a significant aspect of Keohane’s use of the term rationalism is dependent on rational choice
theory and by extension the “rational actor assumption” (Green and Shapiro, 1994). Rational
choice theory uses a specific definition of “substantive rationality” to mean that individuals act
“as if” balancing costs against benefits to arrive at outcomes that maximize personal advantage.
In rational choice theory, all decisions, crazy or sane, are postulated as mimicking such a
“rational” process. The “as if” is important in this formulation. Rational choice theorists do not
actually have to believe that this is how individuals make decisions; they can, and often do, use
this as an analytical device to help simplify the process of inquiry. This approach has been
influential in economics and political science, and Waltz explicitly embedded his structural
theory of international politics in microeconomic theory. As Williams (2005: 138) notes, “as has
often been noted, despite its structuralist language, Waltzian neorealism was actually grounded
in rationalist, microeconomic assumptions that place it clearly within the tradition of liberal
rationalism, a foundation that provided a fertile basis for what Ole Weaver usefully dubbed the
‘neo-neo synthesis’”.
The second aspect to note about Keohane’s concept of rationalism is that it is not dependent
upon a materialist ontology. This runs counter to William’s account of rationalism, which
suggest that rationalist approaches are embedded within a materialist ontology. This might be
the case with Waltz, but not with Keohane. In fact, Keohane’s (1988: 382–386) definition of
institutions is embedded in an ontology of rules, practices, perceptions, cognition, and
cooperation, and these are clearly not exclusively materialist in form. Third, there is no
necessary commitment in Keohane’s treatment of rationalism to an empiricist epistemology,
which again, is an essential feature of rationalism in Williams’s account. Indeed, given his
account of institutions, an empiricist epistemology will be wholly inadequate to deal with them;
rules, perceptions, and cognition, are not directly available to the senses.
Rationalist Choice Theory employs human logic to choose the BEST
possible outcome, Aff doesn’t link to K since we assume the actor will
make the BEST possible choice.
Bouchrika, 25 { Professor Imed Bouchrika, PhD is the chief data scientist contributing to the
foundation of the academic research portal Research.com, where he is responsible for the categorization
of academic entities into various academic disciplines using machine learning methods.} - (“Introduction
to Rational Choice Theory in Social Work With Examples for 2025,” Research, published 7-10-2025,
accessed 7-11-2025, https://research.com/education/introduction-to-rational-choice-theory-in-socialwork)//Castro
Rational choice theory is a framework for understanding and modeling social and economic
behavior. It is based on the assumption that individuals make decisions by rationally weighing
the costs and benefits of each possible action. The goal is to maximize personal advantage or
utility. This theory is often used to predict human behavior in various scenarios, from everyday
choices to complex economic decisions.
In layman's terms, rational choice theory suggests that people are logical and systematic in their
decision-making. They consider the available options, evaluate the potential outcomes, and
choose the action that offers the greatest benefit or least harm. This approach assumes that
individuals can access all necessary information and process it effectively to make the best
possible choice.
How does rational choice theory explain human behavior?
Rational choice theory explains human behavior by suggesting that people decide by weighing
the costs and benefits of different options. Essentially, it assumes that individuals act in their
best interest, choosing the option that provides the most significant benefit or the least cost.
For example, if someone is deciding whether to take a job offer, they will consider factors like
salary, job satisfaction, commute time, and work-life balance. They will then compare these
factors to other job offers or staying in their current position. According to rational choice
theory, the person will choose the option they believe will benefit them most.
The theory provides a valuable framework for understanding decision-making, highlighting the
importance of considering costs and benefits. By applying rational choice theory, we can gain
insights into the motivations behind human actions and design interventions that promote
better decision-making.
Realism Good
Realism is true – Ukraine proves
Smith and Dawson 22. Nicholas Ross Smith is a Senior Research Fellow at the University
of Canterbury’s National Centre for Research on Europe and has a PhD in Politics &
International Relations; Grant Dawson is an Assistant Professor in Social Science and
International Politics at the University of Nottingham. (August 2022, “Mearsheimer, Realism,
and the Ukraine,” Journal Analyse & Kritik. 193-195.
The point of this article was to illustrate how structural realists, like Mearsheimer, can offer basic—largely common-sense—insights
into why Russia’s invaded Ukraine but, invariably, these theorists are incapable of offering a deeper and more convincing
explanation. However, it is important not to conflate structural realism with realism in
general—a bad habit of both journalists and scholars in the public intellectual discourse on the war in Ukraine. As was
demonstrated, realism is more than just the structural variant and much of the public intellectual
discourse belies the richness of realism. While structural realist accounts ostensibly predicted the destabilizing effect
of the changing geopolitical situation, they are unable to offer any intricacy as to why Russia chose to invade Ukraine when it did.
Consequently, to expand the scope of Russia’s decision making, two key, interlinked arguments from non-realist studies were
engaged: civilizational thinking and ontological security. Although structural realism is theoretically incapable
of incorporating such ideas, it was shown that other variants of realism—namely classical
realism and neoclassical realism—are adept and can help demonstrate more convincing realist
arguments for explaining Russia’s actions against Ukraine.
Classical realism shows that social entities—the focus here has been on Russia—have an ontological need to see their requirements
for self-flourishing affirmed. The psychological-emotional substance of this need is often overlooked by offensive realism accounts.
Classical realism concentrates on power politics, but is open to social constructions , such as identity;
psychological-emotional beliefs, such as nationalism, civilizationism, and status/prestige; and emotions, including but not limited to
fear. Morgenthau’s theorizing relies on practitioners to exercise good judgment, and arguably he
would have faulted Russia’s (and the United States’) foreign policy decision making on Ukraine
for excessively indulging in the assertion side of ‘lust for power’. His realism is prescriptive and enshrines
prudence (moderation) as the supreme virtue, equally for the scholar and the foreign policy decision maker (Barkin 2009, 238).
Therefore, classical realists would agree that Mearsheimer’s theorizing (as distinct from his punditry) on survival in anarchy is a
piece to the Ukraine puzzle, but only a piece and not the most valuable.
Neoclassical realism, in this case, its type II variant, is able to take the useful structural
observations of structural realists and add more by incorporating domestic variables . Although type
II neoclassical realism requires significant ad hoc input by the researcher, when used in a problem-driven way it can produce a rich
realist analysis of a given international political event or situation. In the context of the war in Ukraine and the need to bring in the
concepts of civilization and ontological security, a type II neoclassical realist framework that operationalizes
identity and perceptions can help produce a multivariate explanation for why Russia has
undertaken the action it has against Ukraine. The changing geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe, combined with
the narrowing role of Russia’s changing identity—as part of its civilizational turn—and the skewing nature of its changing threat
perceptions—the adoption of a kind of zero-sum survivalism—produced a situation where Ukraine was elevated to an existential
national interest for the Kremlin. Thus, neoclassical realism in this way takes Mearsheimer’s basic observation and attempts to add
significant richness to it.
While structural realists will likely point out that both the classical and neoclassical realist frameworks sketched out here cannot
claim the same scientific verifiability as their structural realist frameworks, such positivistic underpinnings are a relic of the
behavioural revolution and should be confined to the sands of time. Indeed, neither classical realism nor type II
neoclassical realism is a strict theory of IR; they are more theoretically informed analytical
frameworks. But, embracing humbler ontological and epistemological positions is something which could not only improve
realist thought by expanding its aim and scope but also by opening up realism to influence from other IR
traditions, such as ideational variables cultivated by constructivism (Barkin 2010; Rynning 2011; Smith
2014). To this end, both classical and neoclassical realism convincingly demonstrate the potential to incorporate newer ideas into
realist theoretical frameworks.
Ultimately, like it or not, great power competition is back at the forefront of international politics and, because of this, realism
will remain one of the dominant strands of IR moving forward. However, while structural realists may still
grab the headlines in the public discourse when major international events like the war in Ukraine occur, it is important that
simple caricatures that conflate structural realism with realism in general are challenged and
that more classical and neoclassical realist frameworks are developed and forwarded to offer
compelling explanations. Because, once again, for the record: there is not a single realist
theory of IR, but numerous realist theories. And although structural realism has had a long period in the sun, the
war in Ukraine demonstrates that it is time to move on to greener pastures elsewhere within the tradition of realism.
Realism is the most objective lens for foreign policy grounded in
historically proven rationalism – any other model fails to inform
states.
Mearsheimer & Rosato 23 [John J. Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato; 9/5/2023;
John J. Mearsheimer Is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor Of Political
Science At The University Of Chicago, Sebastian Rosato is Professor of Political Science at the
University of Notre Dame; Yale University Press, " how states think, the rationality of foreign
policy",
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=3dDPEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=how+
states+think+the+rationality+of+foreign+policy&ots=_3_owPVRgv&sig=6TrZaFv74gycVHvm
GI7HAe9oRz0#v=onepage&q=how%20states%20think%20the%20rationality%20of%20foreign
%20policy&f=false] eh
Much of modern international relations theory—especially the liberal and realist theories that
dominated academic discourse in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s— is based on the notion that states are
rational actors, meaning their leaders act in a purposive way when making foreign
policy. To be sure, scholars in those traditions did not devote much attention to defining and defending the rational actor
assumption, and it is striking that there is no major work on the subject. Yet there was a loose consensus that rational states
thought in terms of the pros and cons of different policies when de-ciding how to
navigate the international system. Criticism of the rational actor assumption has come in
two waves. Many early critics drew on the insights of psychology to ar-gue that policymakers, like
all human beings, have cognitive limita-tions that often prevent rational decisions.1
Other critics, who worked in the rational choice tradition, assumed that states could be
treated “as if ” they acted rationally for the purposes of explaining their behavior but
noted that their leaders were not actually rational if that term meant they thought in terms of maximizing
their expected utility.2 In short, political psychologists and rational choice scholars agreed—for different reasons—that states are not
routinely rational in practice. In the last two decades, challenges to the rational actor as-sumption have intensified with the coming
of a second wave of crit-ics. Drawing on new empirical research about preferences, beliefs, and decision-making, political
psychologists, much like behavioral economists, have rejected the claim that state leaders are routinely rational.3 At the same time,
rational choice theorists have focused on explaining how states would make decisions about competition, co-operation, war, and
peace if they were rational, suggesting either im-plicitly or explicitly that they often are not.4 If the critics are right,
theorists and practitioners of interna-tional politics are in trouble . Since most liberal
and realist interna-tional relations theories rely on a rational actor assumption, a
finding that states are frequently nonrational would cripple those theoretical
approaches, leaving them with little to say about how the world works. At a practical
level, it would be especially difficult for states to formulate strategies if they could not
expect other states to think and act rationally. After all, they would have no reliable way
of predicting how other states might react to their policies .5 In marked contrast to the emerging
conventional wisdom, we find that states are routinely rational. To say a state is a rational actor
means that it bases its policies on credible theories and makes deci-sions through a
deliberative policymaking process. By this standard, the historical record reveals that
most states are rational most of the time. The consequences are profound. Inside the academy,
realism and liberalism are alive and well .6 In the policy world, states have a sound
basis for making foreign policy. One final point is in order. Many scholars associate rationality with interstate peace.
Their argument, in brief, is that rationality tells states that security competition and war
make little sense and that they have a vested interest in cooperating with each other.
Some go so far as to argue that if states routinely employ their powers of reason, war will go
the way of other violent “practices that passed from unexceptionable to controversial to
immoral to unthinkable to not-thought-about.”7 This perspective confuses rationality
with mo-rality . Rational decision makers simply try to figure out the most effective
strategy for dealing with other states, and as should be ap-parent by now, threatening or
initiating violence sometimes makes sense. This message is hardly uplifting, but such is
the reality of international politics.
Neoclassical realism is the most comprehensive theory of IR –
especially for understand great-power balancing.
PİRİ 23 [BURAK PİRİ; February 2023; BA in international relations from Bilkent
University, thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a MS in Eurasian studies at
Middle East Technical University; Middle East Technical University; “CHINA’S FOREIGN
POLICY TOWARDS POST-SOVIET RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA: A NEOCLASSICAL
REALIST ANALYSIS”, https://www.proquest.com/docview/3122681094?pqorigsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true&sourcetype=Dissertations%20&%20Theses] eh
Neoclassical realism can provide a better analysis when China’s relations with Russia
and Central Asia are considered. It is similar to neorealism, where system level considerations
are important, but unit level and domestic factors are also an important part of neoclassical
realism, which provide a better picture in the context of this thesis. As Rose stated: [Neoclassical
Realism] explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables , updating and
systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the
scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and fore most by its place in the
international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities . This is why they
are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy
is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening
variables at the unit level.45 While other theories provide useful insights, they are not complete
in the context of this thesis. While considering material capabilities, interests of the leaders also need to be
considered. Hence, while material capabilities of a state, such as size of territory, population,
GDP, military spending, and innovation are important for a state to be considered a great power,
the vision and goals of the leadership is equally important, and with Xi Jinping’s rise as the leader, he made the
changes necessary to China’s foreign policy. 46 Neoclassical realism is a more useful theory to understand
China’s interests and foreign policies in the region because neoclassical realism can
be used to explain economic and security relations over a period. Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman
state: Neoclassical realism seeks to explain variation in the foreign policies of the same state over time or
across different states facing similar external constraints. It makes no pretense about
explaining broad patterns of systemic or recurring outcomes . Thus, a neoclassical realist
hypothesis might explain the likely diplomatic, economic, and military
responses of particular states to systemic imperatives, but it cannot explain the systemic
consequences of those responses.47 This differs from neorealism, where it explains “recurring patterns of international
outcomes” which is defined as the likely outcomes of the interaction between two or more states in an anarchic environment.48
Combined with China’s position vis-à-vis the US, China tries to exert more influence to its
neighboring states, both bilaterally and multilaterally, through bilateral relations, and
multilateral organizations and initiatives, in line with Rose’s statement that states try to control
and shape their external environment in accordance to their relative power, as a response to the
international anarchy . 49 Within neoclassical realism, scholars use different intervening
variables as well, as Meibauer states, these include “strategic interaction, regime type, extraction
and mobilization capacity, public opinion and media pressures, culture and identity , and
perceptions, ideas, and beliefs.”50 As mentioned below, China’s grand strategy has evolved with its rising capabilities
and each leader. Because the leader is so influential in China, it is important to note the influence the leader exerts when directing
the country’s new grand strategy. In China, economic development and restoring China’s place in
the world has been important , which led to the increasing Chinese influence in the
resource-rich post-Soviet Central Asia, but leaders had different ways to exert influence. China
started to exert its influence in accordance with its rising capabilities to the post-Soviet territory through SCO, and lately with BRI.
This was in accordance with China’s grand strategy of hiding and biding time and peaceful development, and more recently, striving
for achievement, where China aimed to avoid conflict with the US; because a possible conflict with the US would go against the
development goals of China and endanger China’s security. 51 As Korolev also argues, China and Russia are
balancing against the US when system level variables are considered, but when regional
aspects of the relationships are considered, they are hedging against each other in the region. 52
AT: Political Psychology Proves
Political psychologists don’t assume consequentialism---can’t
replicate real-world scenarios
Mearsheimer & Rosato 23 [John J. Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato; 12-122023; John J. Mearsheimer Is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor Of Political
Science At The University Of Chicago, Sebastian Rosato is Professor of Political Science at the
University of Notre Dame, "Thinking Like a State", Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/responses/thinking-state-mearsheimer] eh
Yarhi-Milo seeks to buttress her claim about the ubiquity of irrationality by arguing that it is
supported by an impressive body of literature “that draws from psychology and behavioral
economics, uses primary source materials, and features experimental data on elites.” We do not dispute that many political
psychologists, including Yarhi-Milo, have produced careful historical studies on how leaders
think and especially on how they form their beliefs and how those beliefs affect their behavior.
But those studies do not directly address the question on the table: whether states are rational in
formulating grand strategy and navigating crises.
To be sure, some political psychologists do speak to the question at hand, but they merely rely on
anecdotes. They do not offer systematic evidence that mental shortcuts were at work even in
their canonical cases of supposed irrationality: Germany’s decision to go to war in 1914, the United Kingdom’s
decision to appease the Nazis at Munich, Germany’s decision to invade the Soviet Union in 1941, and Japan’s decision to attack Pearl
Harbor that same year.
As for experimental data, political psychologists themselves acknowledge that there are
fundamental differences between how subjects behave in low-stakes experiments and how
leaders behave in the real world when faced with truly consequential decisions. Individuals answering
survey questions for a small reward will act more blithely than state leaders making life-and-death
choices for their country. Such data are a poor substitute for historical evidence.
AT: Yarhi-Milo
Milo’s characterization of rationality is flawed---it falsifies rationality
based on the individual, not the collective group.
Mearsheimer & Rosato 23 [John J. Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato; 12-122023; John J. Mearsheimer Is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor Of Political
Science At The University Of Chicago, Sebastian Rosato is Professor of Political Science at the
University of Notre Dame, "Thinking Like a State", Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/responses/thinking-state-mearsheimer] eh
Surprisingly, for an article assessing the prevalence of rationality in international politics (“Why Smart Leaders Do Stupid Things,”
November/December 2023), Keren Yarhi-Milo’s review of our book, How States Think, never offers its
own definition of the term. Yarhi-Milo does, however, argue that irrational leaders resort to mental
shortcuts, otherwise known as heuristics, or succumb to their emotions. But even this description of
irrationality is wanting because it focuses on individuals and says nothing about irrationality at
the collective or state level.
For us, rationality has both an individual and a collective dimension. Rational leaders are homo
theoreticus. They employ credible theories about the workings of the international system and
use them to understand their situation and determine how best to navigate it. Rational states aggregate
the views of key policymakers through a deliberative process, one marked by vigorous and uninhibited debate.
China Revisionist
China wants to become the dominant world power
Gates ’23 Robert Gates: U.S. Secretary of Defense from 2006 to 2011 - (9/29/23, "The
Dysfunctional Superpower," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/unitedstates/robert-gates-america-china-russia-dysfunctional-superpower)
Xi’s call for “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” is shorthand for China becoming the
dominant world power by 2049, the centenary of the Communists’ victory in the Chinese
Civil War. That objective includes bringing Taiwan back under the control of Beijing. In his
words, “The complete unification of the motherland must be realized, and it will be realized.” To
that end, Xi has directed the Chinese military to be ready by 2027 to successfully invade Taiwan,
and he has pledged to modernize the Chinese military by 2035 and turn it into a “world-class”
force. Xi seems to believe that only by taking Taiwan can he secure for himself status
comparable to Mao Zedong’s in the pantheon of Chinese Communist Party legends.
Xi’s aspirations and sense of personal destiny entail significant risk of war. Just as Putin has
disastrously miscalculated in Ukraine, there is a considerable danger Xi will do so in Taiwan. He
has already dramatically miscalculated at least three times. First, by departing from the
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s maxim of “hide your strength, bide your time,” Xi has provoked
exactly the response Deng feared: the United States has mobilized its economic power to slow
China’s growth, begun strengthening and modernizing its military, and bolstered its alliances
and military partnerships in Asia. A second major miscalculation was Xi’s leftward swing in
economic policies, an ideological shift that began in 2015 and was reinforced at the 2022
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. His policies, from inserting the party into
the management of companies to increasingly relying on state-owned enterprises, have
profoundly harmed China’s economy. Third, Xi’s “zero COVID” policy, as the economist Adam
Posen has written in these pages, “made visible and tangible the CCP’s arbitrary power over
everyone’s commercial activities, including those of the smallest players.” The resulting
uncertainty, accentuated by his sudden reversal of that policy, has reduced Chinese consumer
spending and thus further damaged the entire economy.
If preserving the power of the party is Xi’s first priority, taking Taiwan is his second. If China
relies on measures short of war to pressure Taiwan to preemptively surrender, that effort will
likely fail. And so Xi would be left with the option of risking war by imposing a full-scale naval
blockade or even launching an all-out invasion to conquer the island. He may think he would be
fulfilling his destiny by trying, but win or lose, the economic and military costs of provoking a
war over Taiwan would be catastrophic for China, not to mention for everyone else involved. Xi
would be making a monumental mistake.
Despite Xi’s miscalculations and his country’s many internal difficulties, China will continue to
pose a formidable challenge to the United States. Its military is stronger than ever. China
now boasts more warships than the United States (although they are of poorer quality). It has
modernized and restructured both its conventional forces and its nuclear forces—and is nearly
doubling its deployed strategic nuclear forces—and upgraded its command-and-control system.
It is in the process of strengthening its capabilities in space and cyberspace, as well.
Beyond its military moves, China has pursued a comprehensive strategy aimed at increasing its
power and influence globally. China is now the top trading partner of more than 120 countries,
including nearly all of those in South America. More than 140 countries have signed up as
participants in the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s sprawling infrastructure development
program, and China now owns, manages, or has invested in more than 100 ports in some 60
countries.
Complementing these widening economic relationships is a pervasive propaganda and
media network. No country on earth is beyond the reach of at least one Chinese radio station,
television channel, or online news site. Through these and other outlets, Beijing attacks
American actions and motives, erodes faith in the international institutions the
United States created after World War II, and trumpets the supposed superiority of its
development and governance model—all while advancing the theme of Western decline.
Xi is a revisionist. He’s concluded that antagonism is more effective
than cooperation.
Kroenig and Negrea 22, [(Matthew, a columnist at Foreign Policy an vice president
and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security ; Dan,
senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.) "Against China, the
United States Must Play to Win, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/06/24/usachina-biden-xi-taiwan-competition-ccp-war/, 3-31-2022, accessed 7-11-2025]//UT
As the United States and its allies strengthen themselves and counter China, the balance of
power could shift in the former’s favor, and China’s capability to threaten the United States would
be diminished, even if Beijing’s leadership remains antagonistic. After all, many autocracies—such as Iran,
Venezuela, and Cuba—are hostile to the United States but lack the capability to harm its vital national interests.
Nuclear-armed rogue states, such as Russia and North Korea, pose a military threat, but unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold
War or China today, they lack the ability to systematically threaten a broad range of vital U.S. interests or vie for regional or global
dominance. Arriving at a similar place with China in the future would signal the end of the current era of strategic competition.
A second path to victory could come about through a change in Chinese intent. In other words, the United States could compete in
order to persuade China’s leaders to change their minds. Xi’s views are set, but a future generation of Chinese leadership
might conclude that challenging the United States and its allies proved too difficult and costly
and decide that Beijing would be better off following a more cooperative path .
This second pathway to victory could be facilitated by the first. As China’s leaders come to understand that their
aggressive approach is failing, they will be more likely to decide that a new direction is needed.
Some may argue that this outcome is unlikely because Xi and the CCP are dead set on supplanting the United States. But so too
were Soviet leaders dead set on burying the West, only to fail. Similarly, reality could force China’s leadership to
search for a Plan B when Plan A fails.
Neither of these outcomes requires regime change in China. The United States can win the new cold war, therefore, even if Beijing
continues to fly a communist banner.
A third possible pathway to U.S. victory does end in regime change, but, perhaps surprisingly, this outcome should be viewed
primarily through the lens of power politics, not ideology. Regime change can help the United States not because it would
necessarily bring democracy and human rights to the Chinese people (although that would be desirable), but because, like in the first
two scenarios, it would undermine Beijing’s capacity and intent to threaten the United States.
Autocratic regimes are brittle, and they often disintegrate, especially at times of leadership transition. Like most dictators, Xi
believes the greatest threats to his rule are internal, not external. If you do not believe us, just follow the
money. China spends more on internal policing than on its military. (U.S. spending runs 2:1 in the other
direction).
The collapse of the CCP would likely lead to a period of domestic instability and a decreased will to systematically challenge the U.S.led order. A new Chinese government would be weakened and inward-looking as it sought to consolidate power. And a new Chinese
government, whether a new variety of autocracy or—less likely but possible—a fledgling democracy would almost certainly act less
aggressively than Xi’s CCP.
China could even break up into several states as its multinational empire crumbles. Restive regions tired of Beijing’s harsh rule, such
as Tibet and Xinjiang, could declare independence. China’s long history is pockmarked by civil wars and revolutions, with the last
one ending a mere 75 years ago.
To be sure, a rump, nationalistic China armed with nuclear weapons could still be problematic in many ways, but an enfeebled
country chastened by defeat in strategic competition is more likely to be cooperative or quiescent for a period of time, and it
certainly would no longer possess the ability to systematically threaten U.S. vital interests or otherwise qualify as a strategic
competitor.
These three scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they are mutually reinforcing. The first Cold War ended in a combination
of these outcomes. By the 1980s, the Soviet Union had been bested by the West in a half-century rivalry. Mikhail Gorbachev was
brought to power with the goal of reforming the Soviet system and reducing tensions with the West. The process resulted in
uprisings and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.
Some object that the United States never really won the Cold War because Russia has subsequently reemerged as a threat under
President Vladimir Putin, but this is a mistaken view. Washington’s Cold War victory brought the world a 25-year respite from greatpower rivalry, and Russia today is much less powerful—and therefore less threatening—than the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Similarly today, a quarter-century break from strategic competition followed by the possible reemergence of challenges
from a diminished China would certainly be much more desirable than an unrelenting U.S.-China
great-power confrontation, teetering on the brink of major power war , forever.
Any good strategy starts with a clear goal in mind, and these three visions of victory should inspire and inform U.S. strategy. The
United States and its allies should work to strengthen themselves as well as counter and weaken
China (including by working to loosen the CCP’s grip on power) while simultaneously engaging in toughminded diplomacy to show China’s leaders that there is a better way forward if they are willing to end
their hostile policies.
Some will argue that a tougher approach that threatens the CCP will only cause Beijing to become even more hostile, but in fact,
China’s current aggression has been enabled by an inconsistent Western approach that
has failed to impose adequate costs on Beijing for its malign behavior. A more resolute policy of
confrontation is necessary now to bring about a less threatening China in the future.
Coercion and invasion in Bhutan and Tibet.
Anchal Vohra 24. Brussels-based columnist at Foreign Policy who writes about Europe, the
Middle East, and South Asia. She has covered the Middle East for the Times of London and has
been a TV correspondent for Al Jazeera English and Deutsche Welle. She was previously based
in Beirut and Delhi and has reported on conflict and politics from over two dozen countries.
“China Is Quietly Expanding Its Land Grabs in the Himalayas.” Foreign Policy. 2/1/2024.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/01/china-is-quietly-expanding-its-land-grabs-in-thehimalayas/#cookie_message_anchor
As the U.S. government has spent ever more of its time in recent years preparing to respond to any potential Chinese invasion of
Taiwan, Beijing has been busy slicing away parts of the tiny Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan. Over the
last few years, China has built massive infrastructure with hundreds of concrete structures, military
posts, and administrative centers in the region of Beyul Khenpajong, some 12,000 feet in the northern
Himalayan mountains. The so-called “hidden valley” is deemed sacred by Bhutanese, with the country’s royal family tracing its
ancestral heritage to the area.
China’s blatant land grab of Bhutanese territory is just its latest move to control areas of
significance in Buddhist culture, exploit a far less resourceful neighbor, and challenge its
regional rival India in the Himalayas.
China’s expansion in the Beyul was first reported in Foreign Policy in 2021 by Robert Barnett, an expert on Tibet and the ChinaBhutan border. Barnett wrote that while China had announced the settlement of a single village called Gyalaphug in the contested
valley back in 2015, tens of miles of road and several key military buildings were in place in the Beyul and the neighboring
Menchuma Valley by 2021.
He spoke to Foreign Policy from Paris last week and said that over the last two years, construction in the valley “more than doubled.”
In his 2021 report, Barnett and his team of researchers spotted 66 miles of new roads, a small hydropower plant, a communications
base, five military or police outposts, and a major signals tower, among other edifices, in the Beyul and the Menchuma Valley.
According to a report on an Indian news channel, those scattered buildings now lie in fully established strips of townships with
hundreds of multistory structures. The cars parked outside the buildings give the impression that the areas are inhabited, even
though in 1998 China agreed with Bhutan to stick to the status quo until a final border settlement could be reached.
Bhutan, however, is a nation of just 800,000 inhabitants and a humble $3 billion economy. It has neither the economic nor the
military means to respond to Chinese encroachments.
A Chatham House report published last month said that despite the cultural significance of the region, the
Bhutanese government has been “powerless to stop Chinese settlement.” Experts worry that Bhutan may
have to cede territory to avoid a confrontation between nuclear-armed India and China.
“The new outposts in Bhutan’s remote Jakarlung Valley, part of the Beyul Khenpajong region,
may become permanent Chinese territory after an announcement on a border deal between the
two countries expected soon,” John Pollock and Damien Symon warned in the Chatham report.
The 25th and latest round of talks between Thimphu and Beijing were held in October, four decades after negotiations to resolve the
border dispute started. China claims 495 square kilometers (191 square miles) of territory in north-central Bhutan in the Jakarlung
and Pasumlung valleys (Jakarlung is part of the Beyul) and 269 square kilometers (104 square miles) in the Doklam plateau in the
west on Bhutan’s border with India. In 2020, China added Sakteng in the east to its list reportedly to seek advantage in negotiations.
The fact that China’s claims in Bhutan are based on the assertion that these regions are a part of the Tibet Autonomous Region
(TAR) has left the Tibetans flabbergasted. They are offended that China is pushing forward its imperialist agenda
in their name.
Lobsang Sangay, a former Tibetan leader in exile and currently a senior visiting fellow at Harvard Law School’s East Asian legal
studies program, said that “history is complex and details matter,” dodging Foreign Policy’s question if Tibetans claim this territory
and acknowledge a border dispute with Bhutan. But he added that it was “pretty clear Chinese troops have no right
to be in the area because Tibet itself was illegally invaded and continues to be under
occupation.”
A Bhutanese source who is aware of the thinking in the Bhutanese government and who spoke to Foreign Policy on the condition of
anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter said Bhutan is desperately trying to “avoid a full-scale war” between New Delhi and
Beijing.
The Chinese expanded in the Beyul to coerce Bhutan into ceding control of a more strategic area
near India, the Doklam plateau, but it has since expanded in both regions and upped the ante
without any repercussions or costs.
“It’s not surprising that China is claiming Khenpajong and Doklam areas,” Sangay said. “China is implementing what it
said in the 1950s, that Tibet is the palm and Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Arunachal are
five fingers. First occupy Tibet, then we occupy five fingers,” he added in reference to Mao Zedong’s
imperialist vision for three Indian states and Nepal and Bhutan.
Back in the 1990s, Beijing had offered Thimphu a package deal under which it would give up its claim in the northern parts in
exchange for Doklam. But Bhutan refused, owing to deep historic and economic ties with India. (Some 70 percent of Bhutanese
imports come from India, the local currency is pegged to the Indian rupee, and India controlled Bhutanese foreign affairs under a
treaty signed in 1949 that was replaced with a much lighter version only in 2007.)
Bhutan believes that refusal led to Chinese expansion in its sacred areas. “This is basically a
price Bhutan is paying for not budging over the demand on the western sector and because
border talks dragged on for too long,” the Bhutanese source said. “That is what China is making us pay
for.”
China is a fascist state that will invoke mass racism and nationalism
following expansion.
Melissa Chan 22. Melissa Chan is an Emmy-nominated journalist based between Los Angeles and Berlin. She has reported everywhere from Cuba to Canada,
Mongolia to Moscow, North and South Korea. These days she focuses on transnational issues, often involving China’s influence beyond its borders, as well as the rise of global
authoritarianism and ebb of democracies. She is also currently writing a graphic novel, a speculative fiction, entitled YOU MUST TAKE PART IN REVOLUTION with Chinese
Australian artist Badiucao, for publication in 2024. She has written for The New York Times where she was nominated for a Loeb Award — business journalism’s highest honor
— and for The Atlantic, The Washington Post, Time, The Guardian, Foreign Policy, and more. As a contributor to the Vancouver-based Global Reporting Centre, she investigates
the complexities of global trade and its costs on ordinary people. As a television journalist, she takes viewers on investigative journeys through long format news documentaries,
including with the award-winning Fault Lines series. She has reported from Europe as a correspondent for VICE News Tonight, and also presents European broadcaster DW’s
news program on Asia. From 2013 to 2016, she was a correspondent for Al Jazeera America, specializing in enterprise reporting particularly in the rural American West. This
meant interviewing everyone from farmers to members of white nationalist militias. With Al Jazeera English, she served as China correspondent before her expulsion from the
country for the channel's reports. Her work there received awards, including two Human Rights Press Awards from Amnesty International and a citation from the Overseas
Press Club. She was listed in Foreign Policy’s Pacific Power Index, a list of 25 people shaping the future of US-China relations. Chan is a member of the British American Project,
and a former term member at The Council on Foreign Relations. She was also a Knight Journalism Fellow at Stanford University, a Bosch Fellow in Berlin, and a Young Leader
of The Council for the United States and Italy. She is a speaker / moderator, having led or participated in discussions at South by Southwest (SXSW), UNESCO, the Oslo
Freedom Forum, the US State Department, on the invitation of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, at the Sydney Opera House, UC
Berkeley’s Logan Symposium on Investigative Reporting, and more. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Yale University, she co-founded and was editor in chief of the Yale Journal of
Human Rights. [Opinion China isn’t just ‘authoritarian’ any more. It’s scarier, The Washington Post, 1-31-22, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/01/31/chinaauthoritarian-fascism-totalitarian-uyghurs-surveillance/
In 2009, when I began to more frequently describe China as “authoritarian” as a broadcast correspondent for Al Jazeera English, some editors pushed
back, believing it was too much editorializing. We have since become more comfortable with regularly using the designation, in media coverage and
beyond. But as journalists and athletes head to Beijing for the Winter Olympics, it may be time to
reassess and consider calling the Chinese state what it is fast becoming: a fascist one.
When the facts change, it’s time to change our minds — and our language . Ahead of the 2008 Summer
Games in Beijing, international media knew China was authoritarian and described it as such when necessary, but entire articles concerning China’s
political system were written without mentioning it. The government had issued regulations allowing the foreign press corps to travel freely around the
country, a departure from years of tight control. And the people we met on these trips, many working as labor campaigners or rights lawyers, pointed
the way to a new, transformative Chinese generation.
Authorities then started locking up the activists they once championed. The country
decoupled from the world’s popular social media platforms, blocking Facebook,
Google, Twitter and others. Police began aggressively surveilling news teams , sometimes
waiting in cars at the airport before we even landed. My decision to regularly use “authoritarian”
reflected that shift.
Now, we should consider nomenclature once again.
Some will argue the country’s communist foundation makes it fundamentally incompatible with
fascism’s right-wing roots. The respected Chinese legal scholar Teng Biao prefers calling the
country totalitarian .
But consider the hallmarks of fascism: a surveillance state with a strongman
invoking racism , nationalism and traditional family values at home, while
building up a military for expansion abroad .
Xi Jinping, a leader who has elevated himself to the level of Mao Zedong, has built a cult of personality around him,
complete with portraits in public and private spaces. Propaganda recalls China’s glorious
history while bewailing its past treatment by Western imperial powers, allowing Beijing to
play both the nationalism and victim cards . As a correspondent formerly based in China and now writing from
Berlin, I find it difficult to ignore how much China’s present echoes Germany’s past.
To right perceived wrongs, Xi has a clear revanchist agenda . Taiwan has become his AlsaceLorraine, the Himalayan border with India his Polish Corridor , and Hong Kong
his Sudetenland . With military or strong-arm tactics, he has made clear that moves to
control these areas are not off the table . In addition, Beijing has reportedly moved into Bhutanese territory. China
also claims most of the South China Sea, where it has built military outposts marked by its
own “nine-dash line” that, on a map, protrudes far beyond Chinese land borders in a Lebensraum-like expansion.
21st-century technology has provided the Chinese Communist Party surveillance
capabilities that 20th-century fascists could only dream of. Facial recognition cameras
work to track 1.4 billion people, invading even public bathrooms to stop toilet paper
theft. The state, with coordination from its technology giants , controls and tracks
messages and content shared between smartphones.
No entity operates freely from the CCP, including these technology champions . Companies
may chase profit margins like other capitalist enterprises, but party officials step in when they
see an overriding state interest. Those who fail to fall in line are felled — the most spectacular example being billionaire tech magnate
Jack Ma, who disappeared for months after criticizing the country’s financial regulators. Together with Beijing’s anti-union ,
anti-labor stance, the Chinese economy today recalls Mussolini’s corporatist
fascism.
The state has also become fixated on machismo , another fascist obsession. It bans what it
considers “ effeminate ” behavior, which it associates with the LGBTQ community,
where activists have also faced increasing government reprisal. It exhorts men and women to
procreate, in a sharp reversal of Beijing’s decades-long one-child policy. It has invaded citizens’ most private
spheres to do so, even attempting to bolster male virility by clamping down on
vasectomies .
Critically, Beijing targets ethnic Han Chinese in this campaign — in its eyes, the “ master race.”
Against minorities , most troublingly against Muslim Uyghurs, the state has sought to
prevent births , including by using extreme measures such as forced sterilization . Its
treatment of Uyghurs , not as citizens but rather a problem to be dealt with , has led
to the establishment of hundreds of reeducation camps that experts say constitute
the largest detention of ethnic and religious minorities since World War II. The
legislatures of several democracies have called what’s happening genocide.
Taken together, “authoritarian” — used to also describe declining democratic states such as Hungary and Turkey — hardly feels
enough, nor does it feel accurate. That is a disservice to the public. Journalists, politicians and others should
consider calling elements of the Chinese state fascistic, if they are not entirely comfortable
describing the state writ large as fascist.
China Securitization Good
No self-fulfilling prophesy---securitizing the danger of US-China war
creates the caution and risk-aversion necessary to avoid it.
Wang 20, Professor of Political Science at Western Michigan University. He holds a Ph.D. in
political science from the University of Chicago. (Yuan-kang, 11/9/20, "Roundtable 12-2 on
Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of SinoAmerican Relations", H-Diplo | ISSF, https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-2-thucydides)
Throwing the Baby Out with the Bathwater? Chan warns that the discourse on Thucydides’s Trap and
power transition can create a self-fulfilling prophecy . If leaders believe in
Thucydides’s Trap and act accordingly, it may create the anticipated conditions that make
war more likely . Talking and thinking in terms of Thucydides’s Trap will influence the
state’s construction of its identity as well as its definition of interests and preferences. The discourse is
harmful because it encourages ‘othering’ the opponent and contributes to confrontation. Should we, then, throw out the proposition that war is more
likely when the system is undergoing a power transition? It might be worthwhile to go back to what Thucydides’s Trap refers to: “the severe structural
stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one. In such conditions, not just extraordinary, unexpected events, but even ordinary
Instead of creating a self-fulfilling
prophecy , this statement should induce caution from leaders in Beijing and
Washington . Understanding the danger of war is the first step to
avoid being trapped in it . Like Chan, Allison seeks to offer “a set of principles and strategic
options for those seeking to escape Thucydides’s Trap and avoid World War III.”[113] Obviously,
flashpoints of foreign affairs, can trigger large-scale conflict.”[112]
historical analogies cannot completely capture an ongoing event. Allison himself cautions against “facile analogizing”
and emphasizes that “the differences matter at least as much as the similarities.”[114] The purpose of analogizing
Thucydides’s Trap is not to shoehorn China and the United States into the roles of
Athens and Sparta respectively, as Chan suggests (17-18), but to underscore the enduring feature of
international politics thr