andMichaelWoodford
Julio
J.Rotemberg
ANDPRINCETON
INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY;
MASSACHUSETTS
UNIVERSITY
Econometric
An Optimization-Based
Framework
of
fortheEvaluation
Monetary
Policy
1. Introduction
In thispaper,we developa small,structural
econometric
modelto be
evaluationofproposedrulesformonetary
used in thequantitative
polevaluationof monetarypolicyrules has gained
icy.The quantitative
increasedattentionin recentyears(see, e.g., McCallum,1988,1997;
Taylor,1993a;Bryant,Hooper,and Mann, 1993;Hendersonand McKibbin,1993;Feldsteinand Stock,1994;Leeperand Sims,1994;Levin,
fromthesestudiesin that
1996;and Fuhrer1997a).Our approachdiffers
an explicitmodelof inwe deriveour econometric
from
specification
on
of
both
the
the
tertemporal
optimization
part
suppliersand thepurchasersofgoods and services.1
inoptimizing
ourstructural
relations
individual
Rigorously
grounding
behaviorhas twoimportant
The
that
we
first
is
are
able to
advantages.
to
the
well-known
Lucas
of
econometric
(1976)critique
respond
policy
evaluation.Our analysisofhypothetical
policyrulestakesfullaccountof
theway thatan understanding
ofthechangein policyregimeoughtto
affect
thedecisionrulesofprivateagents,and makethemdifferent
than
those thatunderliethe statistical
correlations
observedin past data.
We wish to thankEduardoLoyo forsuperbresearchassistance,Ben Bernanke,Frank
and the
Diebold,Jeff
Fuhrer,BennettMcCallum,and ChrisSimsforhelpfulcomments,
NSF forresearchsupport.
1. Leeperand Sims(1994)madean ambitious
effort
ofthiskind,although,
unlikeus, they
do notderivetheirpricedynamics
fromproducer
Ireland(1997)is another
optimization.
recentstudywithan aimsimilartoours,althoughourapproachesdiffer
in
considerably
theirdetails.
& WOODFORD
298 ROTEMBERG
"
Muchoftherecentworkcitedabovedoes respondto theLucas critique
to at leastsome extent,by incorporating
forward-looking
specifications
of at least some of the models' structural
relations,and assumingrational(or model-consistent)
in analyzingalternative
expectations
policies. Butbecause no attemptis made to derivethecompletestructural
consistent
intermsofindividualoptimodelfrominternally
foundations
relamization,doubtsmustremainas to whetherthepositedstructural
tionsshouldgenuinelybe invariant
to changesin thepolicyregime.
relationsbe derivedfromindividual
Demandingthatone's structural
has
also
the
advantagethatevidencefromothersources
optimization
about the natureof the problemsthatindividualsfacecan be used to
thatare used to explainthe
corroborate
the quantitative
specifications
thisis theonlywayin
relationsamongaggregatetimeseries.Ultimately,
whichthe"observational
of
a
multitude
ofalternative
equivalence"
possiof
the
of
seriescan
ble structural
comovements
interpretations
aggregate
be resolved.We makelittleattempthereat suchvalidationofour proBut because our model parametersreferto conposed specification.
the
of firms'demandcurves,or the average
as
such
elasticity
cepts,
remain
time
that
of
fixed,thathave clearreferents
prices
apart
length
inourstructural
relations
interfromtheroleoftheseparameters
linking
and outputin theeconomyas a whole,itbecomes
est rates,inflation,
thereasonableness
on grounds
ofourspecification
to
consider
possible
measuresofgoodnessoffit.
otherthansimplestatistical
The secondadvantageofan optimization-based
approachis thatthe
that
is
decision
used toexplainthe
of
individuals'
problems
specification
effectsof monetarypolicycan also be used forpurposesof welfare
analysis.Of course,the analysisof the deadweightlosses associated
thatacwithalternative
policiesin termsof theindividualpreferences
count forthe predictedresponsesto a policychangeis by now the
Butthismethodhas
literature.
standardmethodof the public-finance
been littleappliedto problemsof monetary
policy,themainexception
ofsteadyinflation
the
issue
the
costs
of
of
(e.g.,
special
beinganalyses
of
Lucas,1993).Analyses optimalmonetary
policy-oratleastthosethat
models-considerinsteadtheproblemof
are based upon econometric
function
or another.Herewe show,instead,
ad
hoc
one
loss
minimizing
measureof the deadweightloss associatedwith
how a utility-based
can
canbe derived,and howmostofitsparameters
instability
price-level
We
can
use
this
fromourestimatedstructural
be determined
equations.
that
measureto addressquestionssuchas Summers's(1991)suggestion
is desirablein orderto makeitpossia positiveaveragerateofinflation
ratestobe loweredas necessaryforstabilization
ble fornominalinterest
model allow us to discuss
our econometric
Not
does
only
purposes.
Econometric
299
Framework
Optimization-Based
.
rateswouldbe
ofnominalinterest
how muchvariability
quantitatively
in principle
welfare
measure
but
our
for
full
stabilization,
necessary
allows a directcomparison,in comparableunits,of the deadweight
on the one hand and
losses associatedwithincompletestabilization
other.
on
the
inflation
higheraverage
Our analysisproceedsin fivedistinct
steps.In thefirststep,we estimatea vectorautoregression
(VAR)modelofthejointprocessofinterest
and output.Weuse thisVARfortwopurposes.Thefirst
rates,inflation,
is to identifythe actual monetarypolicyrule employedby the Fed.
function
FollowingTaylor(1993b),we supposethatthisruleis a reaction
and pastvaluesofoutput
ofcurrent
thatsetsinterest
ratesas a function
and inflation.
The secondpurposeof thisVARis to estimatetheway
ratesrespondto a stochastic
disturbance
and interest
inflation,
output,
the
we
learn
how
to themonetary
rule.
Thus
economyresponds
policy
toa monetary
shockunderthecurrent
monetary
policyrule,usingfairly
VAR"methodology
standard"structural
(e.g., Cochrane,1994;Leeper,
Sims,and Zha, 1996).
In thesecondstep,we postulatea simpletheoretical
modelthatcan
accountfortheestimatedresponseofoutputand inflation
to monetary
that
In
there
this
we
assume
are
to
shocks.
model,
impediments
policy
we considera variantofthe
thefreeadjustment
ofprices.In particular,
to changeits price
Calvo (1983) model in whicha firm'sopportunity
and where,ifthisopportunity
does notarise,the
arrivesstochastically
firmmustkeep its priceconstant.We choose the parametersof this
stylizedmodel so thatthe model'spredictedresponsesto
extremely
monetarypolicyshocksmatchas closelyas possiblethe estimatedresponsesfromtheVAR.
In thethirdstep,we combinethequantitative
ofthestrucspecification
turalmodel(withtheparameters
obtainedin steptwo)withthevector
theshocksto thestructural
modelto identify
autoregression
equations.
The failureoftheVARtocontainanystochastic
singularities
impliesthat
the model's structural
equationshave residualsas well,whichwe can
in
ofthemodelas indicating
the
context
stochastic
in
variation
interpret
and
We
what
these
disturbances
have
preferences technology. compute
been overour sampleperiod,and use theVARrepresentation
to determinethestochastic
the
real
followed
disturbances.
One
process
by
importantadvantageof our methodof analysesis that,once we take into
accounttheseconstructed
ourmodelfitsthedatanearlyas
disturbances,
wellas an unrestricted
vectorautoregression.
Thisgood fitprovidesan
additionalrationaleforbeinginterested
in themodel'simplications
concerningmonetary
policy.
In the fourthstep, we use the quantitative
modelwithparameters
300-ROTEMBERG
& WOODFORD
estimatedin step two and shockprocessesestimatedin step threeto
simulatetheconsequencesofhypothetical
monetary
policyrules.Using
theestimatedhistorical
shockseries,we can simulatealternative
historical pathsfortheU.S. economy.
In particular,
we cancomputetherealizaand interest
tionsofoutput,inflation,
ratesundercounterfactual
rules.
Whatis particularly
attractive
aboutthisexerciseis that,undertheactual
monetaryrule estimatedin step one, the simulatedpathsof output,
and interestratesare identicalto theactualpaths.Thus,the
inflation,
withcounterfactual
rulesprovidealternative
simulations
historical
paths
fortheU.S. economy.
In thefifth
and finalstep,we use theparameters
in steptwo
estimated
tocomputethewelfareconsequencesofdifferent
rules.
Moremonetary
we
the
rule
that
have
the
of
derive
would
maximized
over,
utility our
in step
households
the
shock
obtained
processes
given
representative
three.
2. TheEffects
undertheCurrent
ofMonetary
PolicyShocks
Policy
Regime
In thissection,we describeoureconometric
characterization
ofthecurofmonerentmonetary
policyregime,and ourestimatesoftheeffects
tarypolicyshocksunderthatregime.By monetaryshockswe mean
exogenousstochasticshiftsin thefeedbackruleused by theFed to set
in theeffects
ofsuchshiftsdoes not
theFederalfundsrate.Our interest
role in the
derivefroma beliefthattheyhave played an important
in theperiodwith
in eitheroutputorinflation
offluctuations
generation
in thembecausethey
we areinterested
whichwe areconcerned.Rather,
withoutour havingto commitouridentified
can be econometrically
relationsthat
selves to detailedassumptionsabout the truestructural
determine
outputand inflation.
The monetarypolicyshocksand theireffects
cannot,of course,be
In particular,
withoutat leastsomeweaka priori
identified
assumptions.
we assume thatrecentU.S. monetarypolicymay be describedby a
feedbackruleforthefederalfundsrateoftheform
rt
= r* +
nr
Y,
k=1
+
k(rt-k r*)
>
rnir
k=0
k(t-k
-
')
+
ny
k=0
+
OkYt-k et,
(2.1)
wherertis theFederalfundsrateinperiodt,and ir,is therateofinflation
deviationofrealGDP
betweenperiodst - 1 and t, Y is thepercentage
values
forthefundsrate
fromtrend,and r*and n*arelong-run
"target"
Econometric
Framework301
Optimization-Based
and therateofinflation
Thee,'srepresent
respectively.
exogenousmoneIn
tarypolicyshocks,whichare assumedto be seriallyuncorrelated.
withmoveassumingthatmonetarypolicyshocksmaybe identified
mentsin the federalfundsratethatcannotbe predictedgiventhehisand pastvaluesofothermacrotime
toryofthefundsrate,orbycurrent
seriessuchas outputand inflation,
we followa largepartoftherecent
"structural
VAR" literatureon the identification
of monetarypolicy
withBernanke
and Blinder(1992)and including
Cochshocks,beginning
rane (1994)and Leeper,Sims,and Zha (1996).In our assumptionof a
feedbackrule of the specificform(2.1) as a representation
of current
"reaction
function"
esliterature,
policy,we followthemonetary-policy
peciallyTaylor(1993b).Taylor(1993b)assertsthat,at least underthe
ofAlan Greenspan(i.e., at leastsincelate1987),Fed polchairmanship
icyhas been welldescribedbya ruleofthiskind.2
Identification
ofthemonetary
and estimation
ofthe
policyshocks{JEt}
in (2.1) requirea further
coefficients
about
the
identifying
assumption
correlation
betweenEtand the period-tendogenousvariables.Our ason either
sumptionis thata monetary
policyshockatdatethas no effect
outputor inflationduringperiodt; the idea is thatbothpricingand
decisionsforperiodt aremadepriortotherealization
ofthe
purchasing
fundsrateis observed.(In thetheoretical
shock,i.e., beforetheperiod-t
model proposedin the nextsectionas an interpretation
of our VAR
results,thisassumptionis made explicit.)An alternative
interpretation
ofourrestriction
is thatpricingand purchasing
decisionsforperiodtare
made duringperiodt, but on thebasis ofincomplete
information-in
withoutinformation
aboutcurrent
conditions.
particular,
money-market
The use ofsuchdecision
as
an
is
common
in
lags
identifying
assumption
the structural
VARliterature,
with
Sims
Under
this
(1986).
beginning
assumption,equation(2.1) can be estimated
usingOLS.3
Note thatthisidentifying
assumptionrequiresthatwe interpret
any
correlation
betweentheperiod-tinnovations
in inflation
or outputand
theperiod-tinnovation
in thefundsrateas due to thewayin whichthe
Fed reactsto variations
in inflation
and outputin settingthefundsrate.
2. According
toTaylor'smuch-discussed
accountofrecentpolicy,
n,= 0, n, = 3,
= 0,
r*
= 2%/year,r* = 4%/year,and the coefficients
are given by 4k = 1.5/4fork = nY
0 1, 2, 3,
and 00 = 0.5. Taylorpresentsthesevaluesas a roughruleofthumbrather
thana precise
It is clearthatactualpolicyinvolvesa greaterdegreeof
quantitative
specification.
interest-rate
thanthesimple"Taylorrule"wouldpredict;
henceourallowsmoothing
anceforlaggedfunds-rate
termsin ourgeneralization
(2.1)ofTaylor'srule.
3. Note thatthe constantsr*and cannotbe separately
estimatedfromthisequation
r* whenwe estimateour
alone. We are able to estimatethem
completeVARmodel,by
VARmodelcontainsa constant
assumingthatno equationofthethree-variable
term,if
thethreestatevariablesareallwritten
intermsofdeviations
fromtheirlong-run
values.
302 ROTEMBERG
& WOODFORD
Itis therefore
of"information
necessarythatwe denytheexistence
lags"
in the monetarypolicyrule, if we are to avoid imposingany overat thisstagein our characterization
restrictions
ofthedata.
identifying
Thisis whythecoefficients
00 and 00areallowedtobe nonzeroin (2.1).
Wefind,in fact,a significant
00.Thisis becausethere
positivecoefficient
betweenthe funds-rate
is a significant
innovation
positivecorrelation
and thecontemporaneous
outputinnovation.Sincewe wouldexpecta
ifany,ifthecurrent
had no effect
outputrealization
negativecorrelation,
on monetarypolicy(whilea positivecorrelation
is entirelyplausible
undertheassumptionthatpolicydoes respondto an outputinnovation
withinthe quarter),the assumptionof a decisionlag forthe Fed is
at leastas regardstheresponseto outputinnovations.4
unattractive,
VARmodel,
Weestimate(2.1) as partofa three-variable
just-identified
wherethevariablesincludedare thefundsrate,theinflation
rate,and
a completesystemofthiskind,so that
detrendedrealGDP.5Weestimate
butalso estiwe obtainnotmerelyan estimatedFed reactionfunction,
matedimpulseresponsesto monetary
policyshocksunderthe policy
The threevariablesinby thatreactionfunction.
regimecharacterized
cludedrepresenta minimalset forour purposes:theyare theminimal
set needed to allow us to estimatea monetary
policyruleof thekind
to
of
and
allow
us
modeltheeffects
(1993b),
they
proposedby Taylor
that
banks
in
the
three
variables
central
on
fluctuations
monetary
policy
are mostoftensupposed to concernthemselveswithas ultimategoal
variables.
of(2.1)runsfrom1980:1through
Thesampleperiodforourestimation
1995:2.We beginour samplein thefirstquarterof 1980,because it is
policy
changein theU.S. monetary
widelyrecognizedthata significant
our
one
of
that
thus
at
least
around
occurred
time;
equation
regime
model,the monetarypolicyrule (2.1), cannotbe expectedto have remainedinvariantovera longertimeperiodthantheone thatwe use.
policyrulehasremained
Many,ofcourse,woulddoubtthatthemonetary
thesuccessionofU.S.
of
accounts
then.
Conventional
since
unchanged
often
regime
important
changesinlate
identify
monetary
policyregimes
of nonborrowed
withtargeting
1982(the end of the Fed's experiment
fromVolckerto Greenspan)as
reserves)and late 1987 (the transition
has littleeffect
innovations
4. The assumptionmade withregardto inflation
upon our
coefficient
results.Table1 showsthattheestimated
40is in anyeventbothsmalland
statistically
insignificant.
data. Our {r,}seriesis thefederal
5. Our desireto modelGDP leads us to use quarterly
fundsrate,annualizedand averagedoverthequarter.Our {ir,}seriesis thequarterly
our seriesis thelogof
alsoannualized.Finally,
changeinthelogoftheGDP deflator,
{yt}
realGDP,witha lineartimetrendremoved.
Econometric
303
Optimization-Based
Framework.
well.6Our choiceofthelongestamongseveralpossiblesamplesis deter-
minedbya desiretohavelongenoughtimeseriestoallowestimation
of
an unrestricted
VARmodel.In fact,mostVARstudiesoftheeffects
of
monetary
policyshocksmakeuse ofmuchlongerdatasamplesthanours.
a compromise
Our choiceofa sampleperiodrepresents
betweenthese
twoconcerns.
Estimation
ofa VARthatincludes(2.1) as one equationcouldbe carriedoutinvariousways.Perhapsthemostobviouswouldbe toestimate
a recursiveVAR withstatevector[irt,Yt,rt]',in whichthecausal ordering
ofthevariablesis theorderin whichtheyarelisted.An alternative,
that
we followhere,is to estimatea recursive
VARwithstatevector
Zt = [r1,irt+~,Yt+] ',
(2.2)
withthe interestratenow firstin thecausal ordering.Specifically,
we
estimatea systemoftheform
TZt = AZt_+ et,
(2.3)
wherethe vector is the transposeof [Z', Z'1I, Z-2], T is a lower
Zt ones on the diagonaland nonzerooff-diagonal
matrixwith
triangular
elementsonlyin thefirst
threerows,and A is a matrix
whosefirst
three
rowscontainestimated
coefficients
fromtheVAR.Thefirst
threerowsof
Ft'scontaintheVARresiduals,whiletheotherelementsarezero.7
This notationis unfamiliar
in thatsome data forperiodt + 1 are
includedin theperiod-tstatevector.Thereasonis that,according
toour
about
decision
these
which
are
variables,
assumption
lags,
only observedin period t + 1, are nonethelessdetermined
on the basis of
information
that,accordingto our model,decisionmakershave in periodt. We preferthischoiceofnotationbecauseitallowsus to describe
theinformation
used by decisionmakersin termsofthehistory
ofthe
vector
we
can
refer
to
the
information
set
of
Specifically,
consisting
{Zt}. {Z,_1}forall j > 0 as the period-t
the history
set.
Then
the
information
used in choosingpricechangesthattakeeffect
information
in periodt +
1 and quantitiesto be purchasedin periodt + 1 maybe takento be
theinformation
used in
set; similarly,
exactlythe period-tinformation
6. See, e.g.,Strongin
and Mihov(1995).Taylor(1993b)proposeshis
(1995)and Bemrnanke
feedback
ruleonlyas an accountofFed policysincelate1987.
7. Threelagsin (2.3) suffice
to eliminate
serialcorrelation
in theresiduals,
anysignificant
and theestimated
coefficients
on longerlagsarealso insignificant.
Notethatthisform
differs
fromtheother,morefamiliar
forminthenumbers
oflagsofthevariousvariables
at thepointoftruncation.
304 ROTEMBERG
& WOODFORD
"
set,
settingthe fundsratein periodt + 1 is the period-tinformation
exceptthattheFed's actioninvolvesa randomdisturbance
Et+,as well.
The firstrow of theestimatedsystem(2.3) corresponds
to themonand
the
first
of
feedback
rule
element
the
residual
(2.1),
etary-policy
of the monetaryshockEt.The
vectorFt representsour identification
coefficients
of the estimatedpolicyruleare displayedin Table 1. The
estimatedrulemaybe describedas a generalized"Taylorrule,"though
the dynamicsare morecomplexthanin Taylor'ssimplespecification.
of the fundsrateto
One way to measurethe overallresponsiveness
in inflation
and outputis in termsoflong-runmultipliers,
fluctuations
whichindicatetheeventualincreasein thefundsratethatwouldresult
and output.
in thecase ofa permanent
changein thelevelsofinflation
are
Theselong-run
multipliers givenby8
r - r* = 2.13(ir - ir*)+ 0.47y.
(2.4)
totrendraisesthe
Thus,as inTaylor'srule,an increaseinGDP relative
thesame
fundsrate(and ourestimated
is
long-run
multiplier essentially
relativeto its
as thatindicatedby Taylor),and an increasein inflation
"target"levelraisesthefundsrateby an even greateramount(so that
realinterest
ratesrise).Our estimateofthesensitivity
ofthe
short-term
is even stronger
thanTaylor'scoeffifluctuations
fundsrateto inflation
cient;thismaywell be due to ourinclusionoftheVolckeryearsin our
includeourfindingof
in ourdynamicspecification
sample.Differences
are all positive,
coefficients
interest-rate
significant
smoothing(the
/k does not
thatan increasein inflation
and sum to 0.7), ourfinding
begin
to increasethe fundsrateuntilthe following
quarter,and our finding
multiforoutputis largerthanthelong-run
thattheshort-run
multiplier
value
for
to
the
02).
plier(owing
negative
The completeestimatedsystemalso allows us to computethe response of output,inflation,and interestratesto a monetarypolicy
shock.Theseimpulseresponsesareplottedin thethreepanelsofFigure
1. In each panel,thecentraldashedlineindicatesthepointestimateof
whilethetwoouterdot-dashlinesinditheimpulseresponsefunction,
foreachcoefficient
interval
catea confidence
(plusand minustwotimes
oftheresponseswith
thestandarderror),based on analyticderivatives
matrix
ofthe
the
variance-covariance
and
on
to
the
parameters
respect
parameters.
8. Though these cannot be read offfromthe regressionreportedin Table 1 alone, we
estimate long-run values ir* = 3.26% and r* = 6.25%. We thus estimate a long-run
average real funds rate of 3%. These values compare with Taylor'sassumptionof a 2%
real rate and a 2% inflationtarget.
Econometric
305
Optimization-Based
Framework.
Table 1 THE VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION
SAMPLE: 1980:1-1995:2a
Independent
variable
Rt
rt+1
Yt+1
0.111
0.109
7rt+1
Rt
-0.085
0.133
-0.030
0.104
Rt1
0.507
0.129
-0.078
0.141
-0.316
0.110
Rt-2
0.023
0.145
0.194
0.139
0.382
0.110
Rt-3
0.158
0.109
-0.096
0.106
-0.086
0.083
"t
-0.062
0.130
0.540
0.125
-0.099
0.113
rt-1
0.427
0.152
0.077
0.156
0.174
0.121
rt-2
0.300
0.157
0.379
0.156
-0.135
0.128
Yt
0.624
0.175
0.260
0.187
1.335
0.148
-0.059
0.306
-0.297
0.293
-0.163
0.230
Yt-2
-0.418
0.189
0.143
0.189
-0.258
0.148
R2
0.947
0.834
0.933
D.W.
2.07
2.13
1.83
Yt-1
aStandarderrorsbelow estimates.
306*ROTEMBERG& WOODFORD
2
Figure1 ESTIMATEDAND THEORETICALRESPONSESTO A MONETARY
POLICY SHOCK
1 1---I--
1 1I
Output
x 10-3
-2
-4
-6 -
-81
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Rate
Inflation
x 10-3
0
-3
-41
1
0
15
2
3
4
x 10-3
=-I0
\
10
8
9
10
8
9
10
7
I
I
5
6
7
I
I
5
6
7
8
N/
1
i'
2
I
3
4
-5
0
9
6
5
InterestRate
1
2
3
4
Econometric
307
Optimization-Based
Framework.
shockthatraises
Responsesare plottedfora one-standard-deviation
0.8%.
The
estimated
about
the fundsrateunexpectedly
responses
by
wisdom:interestratesare raisedonly
largelyagreewithconventional
(accordingour estimates,onlyforthe firsttwo quarters);
temporarily
untiltwo quarterslater),
outputsubsequentlydeclines(notnoticeably
also declineswitha lag
buteventuallyreturnsto normal;and inflation
two
the
decline
(with
occurring quarterslater).These effects
greatest
on inflacannotbe estimatedwithmuchprecision(especiallytheeffects
the
features
that
our
an
idea
of
strucus
tion).Nonetheless,theygive
withthedata. In
turalmodelshouldpossess in orderto be consistent
lowerbothoutput
shouldtemporarily
a monetary
particular,
tightening
and inflation;
and theseeffects
shouldoccuronlywitha lag ofa couple
ofquarters-so thattheeffects
on outputand inflation
largelyoccurafter
rateshavereturned
to theirnormallevel.
interest
short-term
withthosethatemergefromseveral
These resultsagreequalitatively
recentVAR exercises,includingChristiano,Eichenbaum,and Evans
VAR
(1994)and, morerelevantly
(becausehe considersa three-variable
similarto ours),Cochrane(1994).In one ofthemanyexercisesreported
in his paper,Cochrane(1994)estimatesa VARovertheperiod1959to
of the federalfundsrateas
1992thatincludesquarterly
observations
well as of the logarithms
of outputand of the pricelevel.9Whenhe
includesa trendand computesthe monetary
policyshockby supposing thatthe systematic
componentofpolicyletsthefederalfundsrate
at t reactto outputand thepricelevelat t,he getsverysimilarimpulse
responses.
3. A SimpleModelofOutputandInflation
Determination
In thissectionwe developa simpleequilibrium
macroeconomic
model,
thatwe proposeto use to interpret
the fluctuations
in the threetime
seriesof our VAR. The modelis extremely
we have rerudimentary;
duced it to the essentialelementsnecessaryfora general-equilibrium
accountofthedetermination
ofoutput,inflation,
and interest
rates.The
modelpresentedhereis intendedmoreas an illustration
ofthemethod
thatwe advocatethanas a completemodeloftheU.S. economy.Nonetheless,we believethatit shows thatit is possibleto accountforthe
9. Wegetverysimilarimpulseresponseswhenwe considera longersamplethatis similar
to his. Whiletheresponsesofoutputand inflation
aremoremuted,we obtainqualitaof1982.Ifthe
tivelysimilarresponsesif,instead,we startoursampleat thebeginning
VARincludesonlymorerecentobservations,
theeffects
ofmonetary
shockson output
andinflation
aremuchweakerand morepoorlydetermined.
Thisis probably
due tothe
absenceofsignificant
in themorerecentperiod.
disturbances
monetary
& WOODFORD
308-ROTEMBERG
main featuresof these timeseriesin termsof a model derivedfrom
behaviorunderrationalexpectations.
optimizing
The modelwe use is an extensionoftheone used in Woodford
(1996)
to analyzetheconsequencesofinterest-rate
feedbackrulesformonetary
withadditionaldecisionlags (bothforpriceand quantityvaripolicy,10
in orderto allow a betterfitwiththe predictions
added
of the
ables)
VAR. The optimizingdecisionmakerin our modelis an infinite-lived
household,whichis botha consumerof all the goods
representative
in
the
produced
economyand a producerofa singledifferentiated
product.Weindexeach householdbyi and leti varycontinuously
fromzero
to one. The objectiveofhouseholdi, lookingforward
fromdatet = 0, is
to maximize
Eo
t=0
p'[u(C;) - v(yt;0t)],
/(
(3.1)
p is a discountfactor,
y' is theoutputofthegoods producedby
where/
is
a
i
at
and foreach
time
household
vectorofrandomdisturbances,
t,f
and v is an increasing,
value of t,u is an increasing,
concavefunction,
an indexof thehouseconvexfunction."The argumentCl represents
hold's purchasesof all of the continuumof differentiated
goods producedin theeconomy,
givenby
C1=
(1
/(0-1)
t(z)(/'O)dz
(3.2)
as in Dixitand Stiglitz(1977),wherect(z)is thequantitypurchasedof
0 is assumedto be
of substitution
good z, and the constantelasticity
greaterthanone.
Forexpositional
purposes,itis easiestto thinkofthesepurchasesby
thehouseholdas purchasesofnondurableconsumption
goods,and our
and
conall
nondurable
modelas one in which outputis
immediately
If
sumedeitherby householdsorbythegovernment. capitalgoods are
and
used in production,
theyarein fixedsupply(and nondepreciating),
Howbe
firms
cannot
theirallocationacross
(or households)
changed.
ofthemodelarediscussedin moredetailthere.Note
10. Certainaspectsofthestructure
fiscal
thathere,unlikeinthepreviousanalysis,we consider
onlythecaseofa Ricardian
thatplaya
conditions
whichallowsus toavoiddiscussionofcertain
equilibrium
policy,
keyrolein theearlierpaper.
v as a reduced-form
in Section4, we can interpret
11. As is discussedfurther
representaandlabormarkets.
Underthisinterpretacostsina modelwithfirms
tionofproduction
returns
to laborand becausethe
tion,v is convexbothbecausethereare diminishing
oflaboris increasing
in labor.
marginal
disutility
Framework
Econometric
309
Optimization-Based
.
ever,we seekto use themodeltoexplainthedynamicsofrealGDP,and
not just of consumptionspending.Thus we actuallyinterpret
Ci as
of
as
investment
well
to
the
household's
as
purchases
goods
referring
an
the
of
obvious
and
assume
(at price
oversimplifigoods,
consumption
cation)thatall such purchasesare made to obtainimmediateutility,
a reduced-form
orindirect
funcwhichcan be expressed(through
utility
a
at
of
total
an
concave
function
as
tion)
purchases
given
increasing,
ofinvestment
date. We ignoretheeffects
spendingupon theevolution
in thehopethattheseeffects
areinanyeventnot
ofproductive
capacity,
at thefrequencies
withwhichwe are mostconcernedin
too significant
In makingthissimplifying
evaluatingalternative
monetarypolicies.12
a
we
tradition
ofmacroeconometric
of
follow
long
assumption, course,
more
or
versions
ISbased
less
elaborate
ofthetextbook
upon
modeling
LM model.13
elementofourpreference
Perhapsthemostsurprising
specification,
are
in
that
we
interested
from
issues,is thatwe abstract
monetary
given
theliquidity
servicesprovidedbymoney.Thisis no morethana simplifias a thelimitofa modelwherereal
cation.Ourmodelcanbe understood
but
balances
money
provideutility where,in thelimit,theseliquidity
small.Alternatively,
themodelcanbe understood
servicesarearbitrarily
as one whereutility
is additively
separablein realmoneybalances,conand
as
sumption,
goods supply, in Woodford(1996).In thiscase, the
modelimpliesan additionalfirst-order
condition
realbalancesto
relating
and
the
In
interest
rate.
the
an
of
interest-rate
consumption
presence
which
after
all
is
the
of
this
focus
our
additional
rule,
analysis,
equilibriumconditionsimplydetermines
thenominallevelofmoneybalances.
Sincethisequilibrium
conditionplaysno rolein determining
inflation,
or
interest
itcan safelybe ignoredforourpurposes.
rates,
output,
Whenallocating
a givenamountofnominalspendingat t,S, acrossall
thedifferent
differentiated
(3.2)subject
goods,thehouseholdmaximizes
to the constraint
thatspendingon all goods mustnot exceedSR.This
leads to thefamiliar
demandrelationsforrelativequantiDixit-Stiglitz
tiespurchasedas a function
ofrelative
prices.As usual,thetotalexpenditurerequiredto obtaina givenquantityof theconsumption
aggregate
(3.2) is givenby S' = PtC, wherePt is the Dixit-Stiglitz
priceindex
definedby
1=((I (Z)
odz
.
Pt
=
(
(1-dz).
(3.3
(3.3)
12. Thiswillbe a subjectofquantitative
in laterwork.
investigation
13. Similarsimplifications
are advocated,forexample,in McCallumand Nelson(1997).
& WOODFORD
310 ROTEMBERG
"
The intertemporal
allocationofspending,in turn,amountsto choosing
thepathoftheaggregate{CJ}definedin (3.2) tomaximize(3.1) subjectto
a budgetconstraint
thatis written
in termsof aggregateconsumption
expenditure.
We suppose thatthereare completefinancial
markets4and no obstacles to borrowing
future
so
that
each householdfacesa
income,
against
constraint.
forward
fromdatet,the
budget
singleintertemporal
Looking
of
i
constraint
household
is
of
the
form
budget
intertemporal
t>I
EtT=t 8t,TST8Et,T[pt(i)y
T=t
o0o00
- T + Ai,
t]
(3.4)
whereAidenotesthenominalvalueofthehousehold'sfinancial
assetsat
the beginningof periodt, Ttdenotesits net nominal(lumpsum) tax
discountfactorthatdefines
obligationat date t,and 8t,Tis thestochastic
thenominalpresentvalue at t ofnominalincomein any givenstateat
dateT > t. Becauseoftheexistenceofcompletefinancial
these
markets,
stochasticdiscountfactorsare uniquelydefined;a financialclaimto a
randomnominalquantity
In
Xtat datethas a nominalvalueofEt(8t,TXt).
the
nominal
interest
on
a
if
denotes
rate
riskless
(gross)
particular, Rt
ratemustsatisfy15
one-periodbond purchasedin periodt, thisinterest
Rt
=
(Ett,t+})-1.
(3.5)
WeassumethathouseholdsmustchoosetheirindexofpurchasesC at
thisto meanthatactionsalreadytakenpriorto
datet - 2.16Weinterpret
14. Itis important
tonotethatbythiswe meansimplythata householdis abletotransfer
betweendatesand statesoftheworld,through
theexchangeof
power
freely
purchasing
financialclaims.We do not suppose thatthe state-contingent
exstate-contingent
atsomeinitial
changesofrealgoodsand servicesthatoccurinourmodelarecontracted
model.Nordo we supposethathouseholdsareableto
date,as in theArrow-Debreu
thatwouldallowthem,in effect,
to get
sortsof contracts
arrangemorecomplicated
thatwe assumeto existin thespotmarkets
aroundtheconstraints
uponprice-setting
claimsthatwe imagine,howfinancial
forgoods and services.The state-contingent
incomerisk
ofinsuring
oneselfagainsttheidiosyncratic
ever,do includethepossibility
dates.
becausetheychangetheirpricesatdifferent
thathouseholdssuffer
for
be priced,butthisis theonlyone thatmatters
claimscan similarly
15. Otherfinancial
bankconductsmonetary
ourpurposes,as we assumethatthecentral
policybytrading
nominalclaimsofthiskind.
forshort-term
in themarket
ofperiodt- 1,before
as ofthebeginning
16. Infact,we simply
requirethatC be determined
butata timeatwhichallperiod-t
themonetary
policyshockinperiodt- 1isrevealed,
this
In termsofournotational
1 goodstransactions
havebeendetermined.
convention,
set.Notealsothatwhilewe require
meansthatC belongstothedate-t- 2 information
atdatet - 2, thepurchasesofindividual
thattheindexCtbe determined
goodsthatare
of
madeinordertoachievethisaredetermined
onlyatdatet - 1-or bythebeginning
pricesoftheindividual
goods.
periodt-as thesedependupontheperiod-t
*311
Econometric
Framework
Optimization-Based
the realizationof date-t- 1 monetarypolicymakeit imperative
that
certainpurchasesbe made duringperiodt. Certainkindsof interestof thiskind;in
sensitivepurchasesdo involveadvance commitment
manykindsofinvestment
particular,
projectstakemorethanone quarterto complete,and abandonment
oftheprojectafterinitiation
maybe
toocostlytobe contemplated
interim
expectin thecase ofquiteextreme
changesin marketconditions.17
The household'soptimalprogramofpurchasesthenmustsatisfy
Eu'(Ct+2,t+2)=
E,(Ai+2t+2)
(3.6)
at each date, whereA' representsthe household'smarginalutilityof
nominalincomeat date t.18The marginalutilities
ofincomeat different
datesand in different
statesin turnmustsatisfy
=
A,8t,T
T-ti
(3.7)
forany T 3>t. Conditions(3.6) and (3.7),and therequirement
that(3.4)
hold withequality,completely
determine
thehousehold'soptimalconsumptionplan,givenitsinitialwealth,initialpredetermined
consumptionlevel,and after-tax
incomeexpectations.
We furthermore
assumethatfinancial
markets
existthatallowhouseholds to insureone anotheragainstidiosyncratic
incomerisk(which
hereresultssolelyfromdifferences
in the timeat whichtheychange
theirprices).Assumingthatall householdshaveidenticalinitialwealth,
tocompletely
theywillchoosein equilibrium
pooltheirincomerisk,and
we assume an equilibrium
of thiskind.As a result,in equilibrium
the
side of (3.4) has the same value foreach householdat any
right-hand
date,and householdschooseidentical
consumption
plansandhaveidenticalmarginalutilities
ofincome.Wecan therefore
dropthesuperscripts
i in equations(3.6) and (3.7). Notealso thatitfollowsfrom(3.5)and (3.7)
thatthecommonmarginalutility
ofincomesatisfies
=
At PEt(RtAt+,).
(3.8)
17. Ourassumption
thusamountstoa limiting
case ofa time-to-build
model,inwhichthe
bulkoftheexpenditure
witha projectinitiated
connected
atthebeginning
ofperiodt 1 occursduringperiodt. Notethatwe couldgivean information-lag
to
interpretation
thisrestriction
upon householdpurchases:householdschoosetheiroveralllevelof
but
conditions,
purchasesin periodt withknowledgeofperiod-t- 1 goods-market
beforelearningaboutperiod-t- 1 money-market
oraboutperiod-t
condiconditions,
tionsin eithergoodsmarkets
ormoneymarkets.
18.Thisquantity
associatedwithconstraint
appearsas theLagrangemultiplier
(3.4). Itis
measuredin unitsofperiod-t
flowperdollar.
utility
312 ROTEMBERG
& WOODFORD
"
In our computation
oftheequilibrium
responsesto shocksin subsea
we
make
of
use
to theequisections,
quent
log-linear
approximation
libriumconditionsof our model, expandingin termsof percentage
deviationsof variousstationary
statevariablesfromtheirsteady-state
values (theirconstantvalues in the absence of all stochasticdisturbances).In thislog-linear
(3.8)becomes
approximation,
A,= E,(R-
it+l
+
At1),
and denotepercentage
variwhere
deviationsin thestationary
jt,
iit
At,
ables APt,
and
makes
last
definition
sense
(This
P/Pt+1
respectively.
Rt,
all ofourequationsarounda steady-state
becausewe log-linearize
equilibriumin whichtheconstantrateofinflation
is zero.) We can furtherto obtain
moresolvethisforward
A
=
,Al
ERTAt= rt
T=t
(0
fT+)
(3.9)
realrateofreturn.
whereP definespercentagedeviationsin a long-run
(In all of the equilibriathatwe analyzebelow,bothinterestratesand
ARMA processes,as a resultof whichthe
inflationfollowstationary
infinite
sumin (3.9) converges.)
to (3.6)is givenby
The corresponding
approximation
log-linear
-&Et(?t+2-
Ct+2) = Etrt+2,
(3.10)
& equals -u"C/u'(evaluatedat thesteady-state
level
wheretheelasticity
of consumption), indicatesthe percentagedeviationof fromits
Ct
Ct
value, and C, is an exogenousdisturbance
(a certainfuncsteady-state
thelevelofconsumption
reshocket)indicating
tionof thepreference
in
time
to
maintain
a
constant
certain
at
each
marginal
point
quired
utilityof consumption.Equation(3.10), togetherwiththe stipulation
at date t, indicateshow interest-sensitive
thatit+2 be determined
purat date t.
chasesin periodt + 2 dependupon interest-rate
expectations
Totalaggregatedemandis assumedtobe givenby
Yt= C, + Gt,
(3.11)
where Gt representsexogenousvariationin autonomousspending.
of Gt is thatit represents
Whileone naturalinterpretation
exogenous
variationin government
purchases,thereare otherpossibleinterpreta-
Econometric
313
Optimization-Based
Framework.
tionsas well.Forinstance,Gtcouldrepresent
consumption
purchasesby
all
their
income
who
consumers,
(as inCampliquidity-constrained
sperd
bell and Mankiw,1989,exceptthatwe supposethattherealincomeof
theseconsumersis an exogenousrandomprocess,ratherthanbeinga
constantfraction
oftotalincome).Becauseofthesevariouspossibleinterdo
notseektoidentify
we
purchases
pretations,
Gtwiththegovernment
variablein thenationalaccounts,anymorethanwe wishto identify
Ct
of
we focusonlyon theimplications
withconsumerexpenditure.
Rather,
ourmodelfortheevolutionofYt.Notethatwe assumethatGtis deterofperiodt (i.e., thatitbelongsto thedate-t- 1
minedbythebeginning
madeinouridentiwiththeassumptions
information
set),forconsistency
in
VAR
from
our
Section2.
shocks
fication
ofthemonetary
policy
of
Log-linearization (3.11)yields
Y = +S
tt+
deviationsof fromitssteady-state
whereYtdenotespercentage
value,
Yt
valueexpressedas a
denotesthedeviationofG,fromitssteady-state
Gt
value
valueofY, and scis thesteady-state
ofthesteady-state
percentage
this
into
share C/Y.Substituting
of the interest-sensitive
(3.10) then
yieldsthemodel'sIS equation
=
(3.12)
+Et,
-0-Et-2t
+
is a compositeexogenous diswherear= Scr, and
t = Gt scEt-2Ct
demand
blockof our modelthenconsistsof the
turbance.The aggregate
equation(3.9),and theIS equapolicyrule,theterm-structure
monetary
tion (3.12).19
modelofpricesettingand aggregate
We now turnto our optimizing
of
The
decision
dependsuponthedemand
supply.
problem pricesetters
thattheyfacefortheirproduct.We supposethatautonomousexpendian aggregateofpurchasesofindividualgoods,
tureGt also represents
and we letthisaggregatehave thesameformas (3.2),so that
=( lgt(z)1'-x18dz
Gt
(_
1
)0/(0-1)
we supposethattheseindividualpurchases,gt(z),arechosen
Moreover,
to maximizethis aggregateforany givenlevel of expenditure.
As a
19. Notethatthisis thesamebasicstructure
as is used in thesmallmodelofFuhrerand
Moore(1995b).However,becauseourIS equationis derivedfrom
intertemporal
optimiforexample,itis thepastexpectation
ofthecurrent
zation,thereare somedifferences;
realratethataffects
current
rather
demand,in ourspecification,
long-term
aggregate
thanthepastvalueofthelong-term
realrateitself.
& WOODFORD
314- ROTEMBERG
as thoseof
result,thesepurchasesare made in the same proportions
consumers,so thattheoveralldemandfacedby an individualsupplier
satisfies
Y
PtW
(3.13)
"= t
As is standardin modelsofmonopolistic
we assumethat
competition,
an individualsupplierregardsitselfas unableto affect
theevolutionof
thevariablesYtand Pt,and so choosesitsownprice,takingtheevolution
ofthosevariablesas given.
of monetary
The sourceof the realeffects
policyin our modelis an
in
of
decision
lags pricesetting.FollowingCalvo (1983),we
assumption
assumethatpricesare changedat exogenousrandomintervals.
Specifi1 - a ofsellersgettochoosea newpriceat thebeginning
cally,a fraction
any given period,whereasthe othersmustcontinueusing theirold
y startchargprices.Of thosewho getto choosea new price,a fraction
1that
whereas
the
the
fraction
new
remaining
priceduring period,
ing
y must wait untilthe nextperiod to chargethe new price,because
ofthemarketsforthesegoods) they
organization
(owingto a different
mustpost theirpricesa quarterin advance.These assumeddelaysexdisturbance
plainwhyno pricesrespondin thequarterofthemonetary
of the policyshocks),and why the
(as assumed in our identification
to a monetary
shocktakesplace onlytwo
largestresponseof inflation
the
after
shock.20
quarters
Now letp,denotethepricechosenby a supplierthatchargesa new
pricebeginningin periodt, ifthe new priceis chosenon thebasis of
(fori = 1,2). (Thepricechosenbyall suppliers
period-t- i information
setwillbe thesame.)It
thatchooseon thebasisofthesameinformation
thenfollowsfrom(3.3) thatthepriceindexPtwillevolveaccordingto
P =
[aPt--
+ (1 - a)y(pi)'- + (1 - a)(1 -
/)(2)1-0-0)
we obtain
DividingbothsidesbyPtand log-linearizing,
=
7rt
yA
where 9!
+ (1 -
y)k$t,
(3.14)
[(1-a)/a] log (p/Pt)for i = 1,2. Thus the overall rate of
inflation
dependsupon therelativepricesofthetwotypesofsuppliers
withnew pricesin a givenperiod.
information
20. Onceagain,ourdecisionlagscouldrepresent
lags.
Econometric
315
Optimization-Based
Framework.
The optimalvalue of p', in turn,willbe the pricep thatmaximizes
where
Et_~P,(p),
I
j=
t+j
p
and r is a constanttaxratethatwe assumethegovernment
leviesupon
salesofoutput.Thefirst-order
forthisoptimization
condition
problemis
givenby
= 0.
t-i@'(P)
(3.15)
Whentheserelationsare log-linearized
fori = 1,2,one findsthatthey
implythat(up toa log-linear
approximation)
logptis equal totheconditionalexpectation
at t - 2 oflogp'. It followsthat
1-a
2 = Et-2
(tI - Et-2t
a
Equation(3.14)thenimpliesthat
rrt
1
+
1+q
A
41
(3.16)
Xt +11+A Et 2rtV,
- y)/Iya,
where4
and wherewe now simplywrite forkt.Thusit
kt ofXA.
-(1we discussthedetermination
suffices
that
ofpl,and hence
(3.15)fori = 1 arounda zero-inflation
Log-linearizing
steadystate,we
obtain
Et-1 (a/-y (1
+
6)
-
((0
+
-
1 a
j=0
s=1
=
--)(
t+j-
Yt+J)
r+S
,(3.17)
t-1,
wherewequals v"Y/v'(evaluatedat thesteady-state
levelofoutput),
, - Et[Rt,- it+2
Yst (+0
=
- Yt+
Et-l
&j+-
t+2
,t,
t+2 -
Yt+1+ (t+)11
& WOODFORD
316 ROTEMBERG
"
ofthepreference
and YT,is an exogenousdisturbance
(a certainfunction
shock?) thatindicatesthelevelofsupplyateachpointintimerequiredto
ofsupply.Equation(3.17)
maintaina certainconstantmarginal
disutility
the
a
real
interest
ratesat t,theprice
for
term
that,
involving
says
except
firm
that
an
to
a
has
opportunity changeits priceat t is
chargedby
a
value ofmarginalcosts.Marginal
to
discounted
proportional present
thatdependson thelevelof
costequals thepricelevelplus a correction
must
forexogenoussupplydisturand
also
be
corrected
activity,
aggregate
bances,representedby ;.21 A highlevel of the real interestrateat t
rateofconsumption
fromttot + 1 reduces
totheexpectedgrowth
relative
the pricechargedat t. Such a highrealrateimpliesthattherevenues
generatedfromreductionsin pricesare actuallymorevaluablethanis
levelofoutput.Thereasonforthisis thattheneed
impliedbythecurrent
is not
inadvanceimpliesthatthecurrent
tosetconsumption
consumption
ofincome.Rather,a highreal
a perfect
indicatorofthemarginalutility
fromt to t + 1
raterelativeto therateofgrowthofconsumption
interest
is
of
income
that
the
relatively
highat t,because
marginalutility
implies
ofconsumpthe
current
if
raise
could,
utility
marginal
peoplewould, they
tionbypostponingsomeoftheircurrent
consumption.
inWoodford
(3.17),alongthelinesofthederivation
Quasidifferencing
to
leads
(1996),
X, =
s) -
+
K(Yt,3E,-lXt+1
K
o+o
t-1,(3.18)
where
K-
(1 - a)(1 - ap)(w + a)
a(1 + wO)
The aggregate
supplyblockofourmodelthenconsistsofequations(3.16)
and (3.18).
ofboth(3.16)and (3.18)
Note thatifwe takeconditional
expectations
at date t - 2, we obtain simply
=
-
KEt_2(Y,
Y)
+
PEt-2t+1.
Et_-21t
costat tthat
21. Wehavedefinedr in termsofthesupplydisturbances
affecting
marginal
becauseonlythesedisturon thebasis of period-t- 1 information,
can be forecast
bancesaffectpricingdecisions,giventhatall period-tpricesare set on thebasis of
informationat t - 1 or earlier.
Econometric
317
Framework
Optimization-Based
.
to the formof aggregate
This is identical,in conditionalexpectation,
supply equationobtainedfrommodels such as those of Rotemberg
(1982)and Calvo (1983),calledby Roberts(1995)"theNew Keynesian
PhillipsCurve."In thisexpectations-augmented
Phillipscurve,theexY playstheroleofa "natural"rateof outputfor
ogenousdisturbance
herehavethesameimplications
periodt. Ouraggregatesupplyrelations
as regardsthe relationthatmustexistbetweeninflation
and output
fluctuations
thatcan be forecastsufficiently
farin advance;but they
allowfora moreflexibleshort-run
due to theexistenceof
relationship,
additionaldecisionlags beyondthosepresentin thesimplestdiscretetimeversionoftheCalvo model.
4. Estimation
ofModelParameters
We now have a completemodelof thedetermination
ofoutput,inflation,and interestrates,whichconsistsof equations(2.1), (3.9), (3.12),
ofthemonetary
(3.16)and (3.18).Apartfromthecoefficients
policyrule
ofwhichwe havediscussedin theprevioussection,
(2.1),theestimation
and theparameters
thestochastic
specifying
processesfortherealdisturbances,whichwe considerin thefollowing
section,themodelinvolves
sixparameters,
thestructural
a,
parameters /3,y,or,0, and co.Herewe
considertheestimation
oftheseparameters
so as to makethemodel's
the
effects
a
of
predictions
regarding
monetary
policyshockfitthose
estimatedbytheunrestricted
VAR(and shownin Figure1) as closelyas
possible.
Beforeproceedingfurther,
it is perhaps worthwhileto comment
our
on
estimation
We wish to estimatethe modelpabriefly
strategy.
rametersso as to matchtheoretical
withmeasuredsecondmomentsof
ourthreetimeseries.Thesecondmoments
ofthedatacanbe completely
summarizedby (1) thevariancesof thethreeorthogonal
VARinnovaof thethreevariablesto
tions,and (2) theimpulseresponsefunctions
each ofthethreeorthogonal
we canmatchthe
innovations.22
Obviously,
observedvariancesof the threeinnovationsby choosingappropriate
variancesfortheexogenousdisturbances
in ourmodel.We showin the
nextsectionthatwe can also completely
matchtheestimatedimpulse
of
all
three
variables
to
the
two
innovations
thatare orthogoresponses
nal to theidentified
shock
monetary
policy
byappropriately
specifying
the stochasticprocessesof the "real" disturbances.
This possibility
is
furthermore
of
the
values
we
have
completely
independent
may
assigned
22. Note that the possibilityof describingthe data in this way does not depend upon
of the orthogonalVAR innovations.
having a structuralinterpretation
318 ROTEMBERG
& WOODFORD
"
to thestructural
parameters,
thoughitdependsupon ouruse ofOLS to
ofthemonetary
estimatetheparameters
policyrule.We do indeedobtain the monetaryrule in thisway; we use the estimatesin the first
columnofTable1 withthecoefficients
on outputdividedby4 so thatthe
estimatesare identicalto thosewe would have obtainedifwe had not
rateand inflation
annualizedourinterest
series.Giventhiswayofestiofthedata thatpromatingthemonetary
policyrule,theonlyfeatures
about the structural
vide any information
are theimpulse
parameters
responsesto themonetary
policyshock,shownin Figure1.23 It follows
so as to fittheestithatit is appropriateto estimatetheseparameters
matedimpulseresponsefunctions.
We now discusstheextentto whichthestructural
can be
parameters
identified
fromtheimpulseresponses.In fact,theyarenotall identified.
Note firstthat0 appears onlyin (3.18),whereit mattersonlyforthe
of K. We maythusproposeto estimateK ratherthan0.
determination
Withthischangeofvariables,neithera nory appearsexceptin (3.16),
wheretheymatteronlythroughtheireffect
upon theratio4= (1 - y)/
areat mostthefiveparameters
ya. Thus theidentified
parameters
/, K,
cr,a, and qf.
of the structural
In fact,one can show thatonlyfourcombinations
fromtheimpulseresponsesto a monetary
can be identified
parameters
feedbackruleforthemonetary
policy.
policyshock,givena particular
areeachidentified,
butonlya singlefunction
Theparameters
/, K, and c-r
of w and 0 is, ratherthan eitherof thesebeing identified
indepenWhiletheimpulseresponsesdo notfullyidentify
q, theycanbe
dently.24
in
used to puta lowerboundon it(giventhepossiblerangeofvariation
ofa subsetofproducerswho mustdetermine
w). Thusourintroduction
to y < 1, so thatq1
pricechangestwoquartersin advance(corresponding
is strictly
positive)does allow us to betterfitthe estimatedimpulse
y cannotbe identified.
responses,eveniftheparameter
The reason that,fora given K, 4 and w cannotbe identifiedseparately
fromthe impulseresponsefunctionis the following.The effectof a
monetaryshockat t on the expectedevolutionof prices,output,and
theseare displayedonceagainusingannualizedinflation
ofpresentation,
23. Forclarity
interest
and interest
rates,even thoughtheequationsofthemodelinvolvequarterly
rates.
and inflation
fortheimpulseresponsesdethatmatters
ofparameters
24. The particular
combination
forthe
ofthemonetary
policyrule.Thusbothwand q/matter
pendson thecoefficients
ofalternative
theconsequences
model'spredictions
monetary
policyrulesregarding
theeffects
of monetary
policy
regarding
theyeven matterforthemodel'spredictions
underalternative
shocks
regimes.However,ifwe onlyobservetheimpulseresponses
without
thetwoparameters
undera singlepolicyregime,we areunabletodisentangle
information.
further
Econometric
319
Optimization-Based
Framework.
ofq/and w.
inflation
fromtheirpositionat t + 1 is independent
starting
The reasonis thatfork > 1 theexpectation
at t of t+k is zero (so thatw
does notaffectthedynamicequationsforperiodsbeyondt + 1), while
theexpectationat tof ^Tt+k+1is equal to theexpectationat tofEt+k-l1t+k+1 (so
that41does not affectthe dynamicequationsbeyondt + 1). So the
theresponseofinflation
41and wmatter
parameters
onlyfordetermining
at t + 1 (sinceoutputat t + 1 is predetermined).
Buttheresponseofjust
one variableat t + 1 cannotseparately
two
identify parameters.
The completeset of parameterscan thusbe determined
onlyifwe
We proposeto calibratetwoofthe
introduceadditionalconsiderations.
unidentified
on thebasisofindependent
evidence,allowing
parameters
us to estimatethe remaining
from
the
parameters
impulseresponses.
One parameterwe calibrateis a, whichdetermines
how frequently
on
a
his
her
or
Given
our
assumed
conaverage producerchanges
price.
ourmodelimpliesthatthemeantimethata
straints
upon pricesetting,
is 1/(1- a) quarters.We can thuschoosea
givenpriceremainsin effect
value
for
based upon microeconomic
this
evidence
plausible
parameter
the
of
in
time
individual
remain
effect.
regarding averagelength
prices
different
studies
of
individual
Unfortunately,
priceadjustment
report
different
estimatesforthisaveragelength.At one extreme,Cecchetti
(1986)reportsthatthenewsstandpricesofmagazinesstayconstantfor
between1.8 and 14 years.At theother,Dutta,Bergen,and Levy(1995)
reportthatthepriceoforangejuice at supermarkets
staysconstantfor
between2 and 10 weeks.The findings
ofCarlton(1986),Blinder(1994),
and Kashyap(1995)fallsomewherein between.Carlton(1986)shows
forbetween4 and 13
that,dependingon theproduct,pricesareconstant
months.Blinder(1994)reportsthathisinterviewees
keptpricesconstant
foran averageof9 months.25
Finally,Kashyap(1995)showsthatproductsfromtheL. L. Beancataloguekeeptheirpricesconstant
forbetween
11 and 30 months.This diversity
of findingsleads us to use Blinder's
conservative
and becauseit
(1994)estimatebothbecauseit is relatively
coversa broadrangeofindustries.
The resultis that1/(1- a) equals 3
quarters,so thata equals 0.66.
won thebasisofdataregarding
Wecan also calibrate
laborcosts.Note
thatthisparameter
the
of
the
ofprogives
elasticity
marginaldisutility
with
an
to
in
increase
It
is
thus
ducingoutput
respect
output.
closely
relatedto theelasticity
ofmarginalcostwithrespectto output.To relate
thisparameterto measuresoflaborcosts,we mayfurther
specifythat
25. In hisTable4.1, he reportsthefraction
ofhisrespondents
forwhomthefrequency
of
fallsbetweenvariousthreshold
levels.We had to makesomewhat
priceadjustment
to convert
thesefrequency
intomeanlengthsofconarbitrary
assumptions
categories
stantprices.
320* ROTEMBERG& WOODFORD
Y = f(H),whereH reprefunction
outputis producedvia a production
sents hours worked,and that the representative
household has a
of
so
that
is
v(Y)
disutility workinggivenbyg(H),
equal tog(f-'(Y)).The
if
with
our
earlier
formulation
is
direct
thehouseholduses
equivalence
its own hoursin orderto produce,as in the standardyeoman-farmer
model.However,thesameequilibrium
foroutputand prices
conditions
are obtainedifwe assumethatoutputis actuallysoldby firmsthathire
laborin a competitive
In thiscase, themodelalso deterlabormarket.26
in
minestheequilibrium
each
labormarket.
segmented
wages
=
that
v'
as
Thisspecification
a
result
ofwhich
implies
g'/f',
v"Y
W = v' = (
f
f'f' 'H
g"H f"H
g'
g(4.1)
behaviorbyhouseholdsimpliesthatthewageinlabormarWage-taking
keti mustsatisfyw' = g'(HI)/u'(C).Log-linearizing
aroundthe steadystatevaluesofthestatevariables,and aggregating
acrosslabormarkets,
thisyields
g"H f
g' f'H
oftheFrischelasticity
oflaborsupplywith
whereg"H/g'is thereciprocal
oftheaveragerealwage
respectto therealwage,and ey is theelasticity
in outputthatare
withrespectto variationin Y, in thecase ofvariations
or technology.
Variousinstrunotassociatedwithshiftsin preferences
are possible.Christiano,
mentsforsuch changesin economicactivity
VARto identify
Eichenbaum,and Evans (1996)show,usinga structural
monetary
policyshocks,thatan increasein thefederalfundsratethat
leads to a 0.4% reductionin outputreducesrealwages by about0.1%,
suggestingan elasticityof 0.25. Rotembergand Woodford(1996) use a
ofoil priceincreases,and findthatan oil shock
VARto studytheeffects
thatlowersoutputby about0.25%lowersrealwagesby0.1%,suggestwe set = 0.3.27
of0.4. Giventhisrangeofestimates,
ingan elasticity
Ewy
to assumethatthefirmsthatsellgoodsthe
underthisinterpretation,
26. It is necessary,
datesalso hirefromdistinct
so
labormarkets,
pricesofwhichare chosenat different
ineachofthesegmented
thattheirwagesneednotmovetogether
despitecompetition
ofcompetition,
sincethere
withtheassumption
Thisis notinconsistent
labormarkets.
mightbe severalfirmsat each "location"thatsharea locallabormarketand thatall
changetheirpricesat thesametime.
in aggregate
27. Notethatthiselasticity
oftherealwagewithrespecttovariations
output
andParker(1994),whodo notinstrument
agreeswiththatmeasuredbySolon,Barsky,
orpreference
shocks.
fortechnology
321
Econometric
FrameworkOptimization-Based
function,
Finally,assumingan isoelastic(Cobb-Douglas)production
withan elasticity
ofoutputwithrespecttohoursworkedgivenby'q,one
=
behavioron thepartoffirms
findsthat-f"f/(f')2
(1 - )/. Price-taking
in
labor
marketi mustsatisfyw. =
the
that
furthermore
wage
implies
share
of
that
the
It
follows
from
this
wagesin thevalueofoutput
f'(H1).
in thatsectorshouldequal q/I',where/' is thegrossmarkupofprice
and Woodford,
overmarginal
costin sectori (Rotemberg
1997a).Ifmarkthe
in
then
value
of
shouldnotbe
on
modest
are
q
size,
ups
average
set71= 0.75,
muchlargerthantheaveragelaborshare.We accordingly
= 0.33.
find
w = 0.63 we
that
that
this,
Substituting
implying -f"f/(f')2
the
in
estimation
of
values
of
our
thesetwo
This
is
restriction
imposed
cr.
parameters.
The parameter
pis calibratedas well,notbecauseitis notidentifiable
moredirectly
fromtheimpulseresponses,butbecauseitis identifiable
and
cannot
be
thus
from
moments
of
our
data,
plausibly treatedas a
first
to fitthesecondmoments.Our modelimfreeparameter
when trying
pliesthatp-' shouldequal thegrossrealrateofreturn.Sincethisequals
1.01on average,we set13equal to0.99.
approximately
We thenchoosevaluesforourremaining
threestructural
parameters,
K, Or,and 0, to ensure thatthe theoreticalimpulse responses are as close
as possibleto theempiricalones. We focuson theresponsesin thefirst
fourquartersafterthe shock,on the groundthatwe have the most
confidence
in theestimated
impulseresponsesforthefirst
year,and that
itis onlyfortheseinitialresponsesthatwe canrejectthehypothesis
that
irrelevant
shocks
are
for
our
three
variables.
We
thus
monetary
policy
choose the theoretical
parametersthatminimizethe sum of squared
and empirical
differences
betweenthetheoretical
impulseresponsesof
4 following
and
interest
rates
for
0
a
inflation,
output,
quarters through
In
shock.
this
we
to
the
monetary
optimization, giveequal weight
policy
threediscrepancies
thatare depictedin Figure1.
The parameters
thatminimizethiscriterion
function
are K = 0.024,a
= 0.16, and 0 = 0.88, which in turnimply y = 0.63, to = 0.47, and 0 =
7.88. Withthe possibleexceptionofw.,theseparametervalues are all
The estimateof 1/ris substantially
fairlyplausible.28
greaterthanthe
of
substitution
in theliterature
found
intertemporal
elasticity
typically
thatanalyzesnondurableconsumption
our estiHowever,
purchases.
mateof1/rindicatestheelasticity
ofexpectedoutput
with
growth
respect
to the expectedreal return.Thus, we shouldexpecta lowera in our
28. The plausibilityof these parametersruns counterto the suggestionof Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan(1996) that models of this type are unable to reproduce the empirical
persistenceof output responses to monetaryshocks withoutimplausibleparameters.
322 ROTEMBERG
& WOODFORD
.
modelsincethe purchasesofbothconsumerdurablesand investment
goods are likelyto be moreinterest-sensitive.
withourestimateof o toobtainan estimate
We can use (4.1) together
oftheFrischelasticity
oflaborsupply.Giventhatourassumptions
imply
that-f"f/(f')2
is equal to0.33,theresulting
Frischelasticity
is 9.5. Thisis
studcertainly
higherthantheestimatesobtainedfrommicroeconomic
ies suchas Pencavel(1986)and Card(1994).Itis important
tostressthat
thishighlaborsupplyelasticity
is notnecessaryto matchtheempirical
of
the
three
series
we
have
focusedon. Wecouldalternatively
responses
have imposeda Frischelasticity
ofonly1.0,and stillhave obtainedthe
thesameo and
sametheoretical
responsesforourseries,bymaintaining
K. The parameter
would
then
have
to
while
yand 0 would
equal 1.66,
wo
be 0.71,and 7.61respectively.
reason
for
the
Our
preferring higherlabor
is
it
the
weak
that
rationalizes
observedresponseofreal
supplyelasticity
At
a
the
same
to
disturbance.
time,we recognizethe
monetary
wages
need formoreresearchto reconcilethemacroeconomic
responseofreal
labor
evidence
household
with
the
microeconomic
concerning
wages
supply.
Finally,the estimatedelasticity0 of the demandcurvefacedby a
typicalsupplieris quiteplausible.It impliesa degreeofmarketpower
coston
thatresultsinpricesbeingsetata level15%higherthanmarginal
of
demand
is
low
as to
thus
neither
so
estimated
The
elasticity
average.
it
to
nor
so
as
make
high
implausible
largemarkups,
implyimplausibly
forfirmsto staggertheirpriceadjustments.
In additionto displayingtheempirical
impulseresponsesto a monewith
their
confidence
shock
bands, Figure1 also
together
tarypolicy
to
our
estimated
the
theoretical
parameresponsescorresponding
gives
is
the
solidline,while
tervalues.(In eachpanel,thetheoretical
response
theestimatedresponseis themiddledashed line.)As thisfigureindiratesmatchthe
cates,the theoretical
responsesof outputand interest
it
In
is
worth
estimated
notingthatour
responsesveryclosely. particular,
of
and thedegreeofpersistence
modelaccountsforboththemagnitude
theeffects
on outputofsucha shock.
Our abilityto matchtheoutputresponsemayseemsurprising
given
to itssteady-state
returned
ratehas essentially
thatthenominalinterest
value by the timeoutputfinallyfalls.However,the positiveshockto
rate
rateslowersinflation
interest
and,as a result,raisestherealinterest
withtheIS equation
forsometime.Thismakestheoutputfallconsistent
ratesis smallrelativeto the
(3.12). Becausetheincreasein realinterest
is
movements
theserelative
fallin output,thevalueoforthatrationalizes
also small.
is matchedwell forthe firstfewquarters.
The responseof inflation
Econometric
Framework
323
Optimization-Based
.
inflation
revertsmorequicklyto itsmeanin thetheoretiSubsequently,
is muchmore
cal response,whereastheestimatedresponseofinflation
Theproblem
is reminisifone canbelievethepointestimates.
protracted,
cent of the criticism
of the Taylor(1980)model of overlappingwage
contractsby Fuhrerand Moore (1995a)as unable to explaininflation
persistence.However,the confidenceintervalsindicatethatthe reis verypoorlyestimatedin our sample,so thatit is
sponse ofinflation
of our
difficult
to say thatthedata rejectthisaspectofthepredictions
model.
thatthepredictions
ofourmodelon this
Itis also worthremembering
In particular,
uncertain.
score(as on others)arethemselves
theydepend
on the estimatedcoefficients
of the monetarypolicyrule,whichcan
hardlybe estimatedwithgreatprecision.Our method,whichhas estito theimplicamatedthe monetarypolicyrulewithoutany reference
of this rule forthe natureof the theoretical
tionsof the coefficients
toa monetary
shock,makesit
impulseresponsesofoutputand inflation
impulseresponseswillmatch
particularly
unlikelythatthe theoretical
VARestimates.
A jointestimation
theunrestricted
(inwhichthe
strategy
are jointly
coefficients
of the policyruleand the structural
parameters
withestimatedimpulseresponses)
chosen so as to matchtheoretical
mightwellimprovethefitoftheimpulseresponseofinflation.
5. Identification
Processes
ofShock
In thissection,we construct
timeseriesforthethreestochastic
disturbancesEt, t,and 4. Wefurther
showhow theVARcanbe used toinfer
the stochasticprocessthatgeneratesthesevariables.Finally,we show
how to construct
theresponseofourthreeendogenousvariablesto the
shockprocessesforany givenmonetary
policyrule.Thisallowsus to
construct
counterfactual
historiesthat,accordingto our model,would
havetakenplaceifthemonetary
had followeda different
rule.
authority
that(2.3) can be premultiplied
Notefirst
byT-1to yield
Zt = BZt_1+ U-t,
(5.1)
wherethe matrixU consistsof zeros exceptthatits upperleft3-by-3
blockconsistsof a lowertriangular
matrixwithones on thediagonal.
Letting denotethevectorwhosenthelementis a one and whoseother
inare zero, the historicaltimeseriesforthe monetarypolicy
elements
shockEtcan be derivedfromtherelation
E,
=
(i,)'(Zt
-
BZt_1).
(5.2)
324 ROTEMBERG
& WOODFORD
"
WedenotebyZ, thevectorwhoseelementsarethemodel'stheoretical
theelementsof thevectorofhistorical
time
predictions
concerning
Zt,becomeclearwhenwe introseries.(Theneed forseparatenotationwill
duce our simulationmethod;we willthendistinguish
betweenthehislaw ofmotionof
toricallaw of motionof and the theoretical
The
Zt
2t.)
structural
of
the
equations
previoussection,(3.9), (3.12), (3.16), and
in
can
be
written
terms
oftheZ's as
(3.18),
M'2
t
- N
j=1
,
Et_12,+=
(5.3)
t+l,
=
+
+
P'E,1_Zt R'EtZ+l, Yi+1 tr + (0 Et(Gt+2
t+l).
(5.4)
Here(5.3) is obtainedfrom(3.12)bysubstituting
(3.9) toeliminate
Ptand
and
in
to
the
are
the
that,
model,
+1
according
period-t
recalling
^t+1
information
set. Similarly,
(5.4) is obtainedby substituting
(3.16) into
is
(3.18) to eliminatethe X^variables.Note also thatthe timesubscript
sidesofboth
increasedby one in bothequations,so thattheright-hand
exogenousshocksin periodt.
equationsrepresent
VARcorrectly
that
the
processfolcapturesthestochastic
Assuming
thetimeseriesfor
lowedbythevariablesin onecanthusreconstruct
6t
Zt,
coincidewiththeVARforeand byassumingthatagents'expectations
Forinstance,thisimpliesthat,underthepolicyregimethatgenercasts.29
Itthen
areequal to
atesthehistorical
data,agents'forecasts
Et1Zt
and Ytusing
timeseriesfor BZ_-1.
historical
followsthatwe can reconstruct
Ct
A
st
[t+,
t+,]'
=
-
+
CZt_1 D(5.5)
-
M'
N'B(I- - B)-1
[ p' + R'fB
[N'1B M'(I B)0](d
D=
[
--
] B,
M']
[M'(I- B) + N'B2(I- B)-1] U.
+-'
Theseseriesare exogenousaccordingto ourmodel,so theirrealizations
underalternaofcounterfactual
can be held fixedin simulations
history
tivepolicyregimes.
[R'B
29. In inferringour shock series fromthe residuals of our structuralequations, we extend
the methodologyof Parkin(1988).
Econometric
Framework
325
Optimization-Based
.
Because our modelinvolvesforward-looking
behavior,such simulathestochastic
beliefs
tionsalso requirethatwe specify
regarding
agents'
Given
our
the
shock
series.
proposedidentification
processesgenerating
of
oftheshockseries,thereis an obviousmodel-consistent
specification
suchbeliefs:agentsregardthevectorofshockss, fromsomeperiodt =
withthelaw ofmotion
1 onward,as beinggeneratedby (5.5),together
a
of the initial
for
the
stochastic
Z1,
(5.1)
given specification
process
conditionZ0 and the distribution
fromwhichthe white-noise
innovationsFtare drawneachperiod.
A completesimulationmodel would therefore
consistof a specificationof a monetarypolicyrule of the form(2.1), togetherwitha
forthe monetary
specifieddistribution
policyshocksEt;the structural
and
law
forthe real disturbances
the
of
motion
equations(5.3)-(5.4);
and
with
the
distribution
oftheshocksTe.
(5.5), together
givenby (5.1)
Such a modelwould determinethe evolutionof
giveninitial
{Zt,Zt,st}
conditions {Z0,E0o1,Zl0} and the white-noise shocks {Et,,t}. The model
ifwe supplythehistoricouldbe used tosimulatecounterfactual
history
cal shock series (computed above) for{jEt,Tt}. In such a simulation,it is
= BZ0, where Z0
natural to specifyinitialconditionsZ0 = Z0 and
EOZ0
representsthe historicaldata forthe periodimmediately
priorto the
the
can
of
The
model
also
be used to
simulation
simulation.30
beginning
about
moments
of
the
second
elements
of Z, in
generatepredictions
the stationary
an
with
associated
equilibrium
arbitrary
policyregime,
overthe distribution
of possiblerealizations
of
by takingexpectations
theshocks.
This methodof simulationwould have the property
that,ifthe assumed monetarypolicyrule is the estimatedhistoricalone, and one
feedsin theconstructed
historical
shockseries,thepredictedseries
{7t}
coincidesexactlywiththehistorical
dataseries
Thusthismethodof
{Zt}. reconstruction
of the shockswould allow a complete
identification
of
thehistorical
data as theunfolding
ofa stationary
rationalexpectations
The intuition
forthisresultis straightforward.
Use ofthe
equilibrium.
rule
VAR
the
ensures
that
we
can
monetary
policy
impliedby
perfectly
reconstruct
thebehaviorofinterest
ratesas longas we are also able to
matchthe behaviorof outputand inflation.
Moreover,the proposed
methodforconstructing
and
Y7
ensures
whencurrent
and past
that,
6t
30. This specification
of initialconditions
makessense ifwe assumethatthestationary
thatresultsinthelaw ofmotionindicated
equilibrium
bytheVARhasbeenineffect
up
ofZ0to
through
periodzero,and hasbeenin effect
longenoughforalloftheelements
havebeendetermined
underthatregime.
326 ROTEMBERG
& WOODFORD
"
valuesofoutputand inflation
areequal totheiractualvalues,themodel
is consistent
withtheVAR'spredictions
futuremovements
concerning
in thesevariables.Thus,as longas we startfroman initialconditionin
whichthe model and the data agree,we are able to rationalizethe
evolutionofall threeseries.
It is important
to stressthatthisabilityto reconstruct
thehistorical
seriesdoes not implythatour structural
modelis correct.Indeed,we
wouldbe able toreconstruct
thehistorical
seriesofoutput,inflation,
and
ratesin thewaydescribedevenforarbitrary
interest
valuesofthestructuralparameters.The modeldoes, however,have testablepredictions
severalofthestructural
(whichis whatallowsus toidentify
parameters
frommomentsofthedata). Specifically,
theidentified
policy
monetary
to therealdisturbances
shockprocesse,shouldbe orthogonal
6, and YS
at all leads and lags. Thisrestriction
is notimposedin theabovemethod
of identification
of thehistorical
shockseries.(In fact,theconstructed
historicalshocks have the propertythat = Etin everyperiod.31)One
el,
can avoidthisproblemin thecase ofthestochastic
simulation
model,by
assumingthatelt and Et are independentrandomvariables,though
Buttheresulting
drawnfromidenticaldistributions.
modelofthedatastill
to
an
internal
in thatif
is
subject
inconsistency,
process
generating
thefourindepenthemodelis true,itshouldnotbe possibleto identify
VARofthekindthat
dentshocksEt,t, e2t,and e3tfroma three-variable
we use.
theabove proceThis inconsistency
can be eliminatedby modifying
of the shocks.Specifically,
we assume thatthe
dure foridentification
realdisturbances
stare generatedby thelaws ofmotion(5.1) and (5.5),
but we assume thatin theseequations = 0 at all times,whereas
e2t
Fl
randomterms,indepenand e-3t
are again assumed to be white-noise
dentofeach otherand ofthemonetary
shocks,and drawneach period
VARresiduidenticalto thoseof thecorresponding
fromdistributions
modelhas onlythreeindepensimulation
als. Thisalternative
stochastic
each period(two "real" shocksand the
dent exogenousdisturbances
the assumptionthatsuch a model is
Under
monetarypolicyshock).
VAR
of
the
correct,analysis
accordingto our methodshould(at least
recover
exactlythetruestochastic
processesgenerating
asymptotically)
thevariousshocks.
historicalsimulafor purposes of counterfactual
Correspondingly,
unless
realandmonetary
shockseriesarenotorthogonal,
31. Thisimpliesthatconstructed
in(5.1)and (5.5)happentoimplythattheshocksIl, haveno effect
thematrices
uponst.
This is in factnot the case forour estimatedmodel,forotherwisethe theoretical
matchthoseestimated
shockwouldperfectly
using
impulseresponsesto a monetary
theVAR.
*327
Econometric
Framework
Optimization-Based
thehistorical
shockseriesbysubstituting
the
tions,we do notconstruct
historical
data
and VARresiduals into(5.5). Instead,we use the
et
Zt_1
=
in all
historicalVAR residuals '2t and e3t, but set elt
0
periods, and
thensimulate(5.1), startingfroman initialZ0 givenby the historical
data, to generatea modifiedsequence{ZJ}.Thesemodified and 7t
the historicalsequence
Zt_1 of
are then substituted
into (5.5) to construct
realdisturbances.
The methodthusamountsto usingnottheresiduals
of the structural
equations(5.3)-(5.4), but ratherthe componentof
those residualsthatis orthogonalto the identifiedmonetarypolicy
the simulatedpaths
shockand to all its lags. Withthismodification,
estimated
rule
the
no
monetary
policy
longerneed to equal the
using
actualpaths. The extentto whichthe simulateddata trackthe actual
data thenbecomesa testof the accuracyof our structural
model.As
we show in the next section,our estimatedmodel (withhistorical
shockseriesconstructed
in the way just described)does quitea good
for
the
variationsin real GDP, inflation,
and the
of
job
accounting
Federal fundsrate since 1980, despitethe specification
errorthatis
matchthe estimatedimpulsereindicatedby its failureto perfectly
in
1.
sponses Figure
Anotherway ofassessingthedegreeofcorrespondence
betweenour
model and the U.S. data is to comparetheempiricalauto-and crosscorrelation
functions
forourthreeserieswiththecorresponding
predictionsof the stochasticsimulation
model,withthestochastic
processes
fortheshocksspecifiedas above.Thiscomparison
is shownin Figure2,
wherein each oftheninepanels,thesolidlineindicatesthetheoretical
and thedashedlinethecross-correlation
cross-correlation
funcfunction,
tionimpliedbytheunrestricted
VARcharacterization
oftheU.S. data.It
is clearthatour modelaccountsforthesecondmomentsofthedata to
thesamedegreeas does theunrestricted
VAR.Amongother
essentially
is
our
model
able
to
the
things,
perfectly
reproduce degreeofpersistence
of inflationdespitethe criticism
of a Taylor-style
model of staggered
on
this
and
score
Fuhrer
Moore
(1995a).Itis also able to
pricesetting
by
matchthe negativecorrelation
of outputwithlaggednominalinterest
ratesthatKingand Watson(1996)findcannotbe explainedby an optimizingmodel withCalvo-stylestaggeredpricesettingsimilarto our
own. Fuhrer(1997b)also drawsattention
tothiscorrelation
and suggests
thata "backwardslooking"IS curveis neededto explainit.We suspect
thatsomeofthedifficulties
facedbythesepreviousauthorsin reconcilmodels
of
and ofstaggered
consumers
ing
optimizing
pricesettingwith
thesefeaturesofthedata mayrelateto theimposition
ofa priori
restrictionsupontheexogenousshockprocesses,forwhichthereis no theoretical justification.
328 ROTEMBERG & WOODFORD
"
Figure2 EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL AUTO- AND CROSSCORRELATIONS
pi, pi(-k)
0.025
12
0.02
pi, y(-k)
0.03
100.025
/
0!
,.0.02
1
0.02
0.015
x 10-3
0.018
0.02
0.015
0.005
0.01
60.01
0.005
0.005
4
0
-0.005
0
5
10
2
0
20
x 10-3 y, pi(-k)
20-0.005 0
10
20
R, pi(-k)
0
0
0.01
O.l/
-0.01
0
-0.01
10
20
R, y(-k)
0.018
0.03
/
-0.02
0
10
20
R, R(-k)
0.08
0.016
0.06
0.025
0.014
0.02
00.012
0.015
0.04
- -
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.008
0.005
0
0
20
0.01
0.02
/
-10
10
y, R(-k)
0.02
0.03
,
0.035
10
0.04
-5
0
0
0
y, y(-k)
0.05
0
-15
pi, R(-k)
10
20
0.006
0
10
20
0
0
10
20
Econometric
Framework
329
Optimization-Based
.
Rules
6. Simulation
Policy
Monetary
ofAlternative
modelbuiltup in
how thesimulation
In thissectionwe briefly
illustrate
the previoustwo sectionscan be used to predictthe consequencesof
alternative
possiblemonetarypolicyrules of the form(2.1). We first
displayin Figure3 theconsequencesofa feedbackrulewiththecoefficientsoftheestimatedhistorical
policyrule.In eachpanelofthisfigure,
thedashedlinerepresents
theactualdatafortheseriesin question,the
ofourmodelassumingthehistorical
solidlinerepresents
thesimulation
seriesforthe
sequenceofmonetary
policyshocksas wellas thehistorical
a
simulation
in
whichthe
realshocks,and thedash-dotlinerepresents
butwiththemonehistorical
feedbackruleforthefundsrateis followed,
tarypolicyshocksetsetequal to zero.
One observes,first,thatthe firsttwo plotstrackone anotherquite
for
closelyin each panel. Thus ourmodeldoes quitewellat accounting
and thefundsrate,despitethe
thehistorical
pathsofoutput,inflation,
factthatthetheoretical
and estimatedimpulseresponsesto a monetary
shockdo notperfectly
coincide.The onlyverynoticeablefailureofour
thelevelofinflation
simulation
from1993onward.
modelis in tracking
somewhatmorefromthesolidline;thisindiThe dash-dotlinediffers
catestheconsequences,accordingto ourmodel,oftherandomdisturbancesto monetary
policy.Monetarypolicyshocksclearlyhave played
somerole;in particular,
oursimulations
indicatethatunexpectedly
tight
monetarypolicyin early1982deepenedthe 1982recession,and that
in the period1992loose policystimulatedreal activity
unexpectedly
1993.
On the otherhand, the simulations
littleof the
implythatrelatively
in outputor inflation
in thisperiodcan be attributed
to the
variability
monetary
policyshocks.Table2 showsthisin a different
waybyreportvariancesofinterest
rates,output,and inflaingthepredictedstationary
tionundera varietyofalternative
tworowsofthe
policyrules.The first
tablegivethesestatistics
fortworegimescorresponding
totheestimated
feedbackrulewithand withoutthestochastic
term.Comparisonofthe
numbersin thesetworowsshowsthat,inthesimulation
ofthehistorical
overthelong
policyregime,themonetary
policyshocksareresponsible,
run, foronly 5.0% of the varianceof deviationsof real outputfrom
foronly1.3% ofthevarianceof
trend,and (perhapsmoresurprisingly)
inflation.
But theseresultsdo notimplythatmonetary
policyis unimportant.
Nordo theynecessarily
absolvetheFed fromanyblamefortheinstabilWhattheymeanis thatitis thesystematic
ityofoutputor inflation.
part
of recentmonetarypolicythathas been of significance
forrecenteco-
330 ROTEMBERG
& WOODFORD
3
Figure3 ACTUALAND SIMULATEDPATHS
Output
0.04
I
I
I
1
0.02
0
-0.02
-
-0.04 -0.06-0.08,
1980
1982
1984
1986
1990
1992
1994
Inflation
0 12
0.1
1988
-
1996
1
'
i
0.08 -
0.06
0.04 -
/
/,
0.02 0
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
InterestRate
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05-
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1986
1984
1982
1980
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1992
1994
996
Econometric
331
Framework
Optimization-Based
.
Table2 VARIANCESOF OUTPUT,INFLATION,AND INTERESTRATES
UNDER DIFFERENTMONETARYRULES
Policy
VarR
VarY Varwr
withshocks 7.64 4.79
Historical:
6.73 4.55
withoutshocks
17.14 3.87
0, = 1.5, = 0.5
=5
22.95 0.51
0, = 1, OO.
= 10, = 0
30.11 12.61
OY
0,
Minimum-L
732.89 18.77
Constrained-optimal 1.93 11.30
2.28
2.25
7.34
6.45
0.30
0
0.39
Var
(,-Eir)
0.66
0.65
0.81
0.91
0.25
0
0.20
Lossfrom
Var
variability
E(Y - Y')
(L)
12.14
11.89
13.86
17.84
4.58
0
7.57
3.43
3.39
8.72
8.10
0.74
0
0.93
Note:Forthesecomputations,
theinterest
rateand inflation
are measuredin annualizedpercentage
fromtrend.
deviation
points,and outputis measuredas a percentage
nomic performance,not the stochasticvariationin Fed policy (which,
accordingto our estimates,has been minimal).
One can gain some understandingof the effectof alternativesystematic monetarypolicies by comparingthe predictedconsequences of simple feedbackrules of the kind discussed by Taylor(1993b),
r,= Ofrrtt+ 0y,
under alternativevalues forthe coefficients
0, and 0Y.Rows 3-5 ofTable
2 report predicted moments of the data for three possible choices of
these coefficients.In row 3, we considera "Taylorrule" with0, = 1.5,
0Y
-= 0.5- values which are close to those used by Taylorto characterize
currentpolicy(his exactcoefficients
are in footnote2).32 Accordingto our
since both inflamodel, adherence to thisrule would make a difference,
tion and interestrateswould be significantly
morevariable.
Even sharpercontrastsbetween policyrulesare possible ifwe varythe
coefficientsof the "Taylorrule." Row 4 considers a policy in which instead 0, = 1 and = 5. The increased response to deviationsof output
0Y
fromtrendis predictedto reduce the variance of output fluctuationsto
about a tenthofitsvalue underthehistoricalpolicyregime.This stabilization of output, however, is accompanied by increased volatilityof inflation and short-termnominal interestrates. (A counterfactualhistorical
simulationassuming thispolicyrule is shown in Figure4.) For purposes
of contrast,row 5 of the table considersa "Taylorrule" in which 0, = 10
32. The rule thatwe simulatehere is not exactlyTaylor's,since he assumes thatthe funds
rate responds to the rate of inflationin the currentand previous threequarters,while
our rule assumes that it responds to the rate of inflationin the currentquarteronly.
332* ROTEMBERG& WOODFORD
Figure4 SIMULATED"TAYLORRULE"(0,,= 1, Oy= 5)
Output
0.04
0.02.
0
-
-0.02
-
-0.04
-0.06
\
-0.08,
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1990
1992
1994
1996
1990
1992
1994
1996
Inflation
0.2
0.15-
0.1
-
-
0.05
0
1980
1982
1984
I
1986
1988
InterestRate
0.3
0.25-
0.15
0.2
0.1 -
0.050-0.05
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
- 333
Econometric
Framework
Optimization-Based
in inflation
is preand = 0. The increasedresponseto fluctuations
0Y
to aboutan eighthofitsvalue
dictedto reducethevarianceofinflation
underthehistorical
stabilization,
however,is accompapolicy.Inflation
niedbyincreasedvolatility
ofbothoutputand interest
rates.
These comparisonsshowthataccordingto ourmodel,monetary
policymattersa greatdeal forthebehaviorofbothoutputand inflation,
sinceeitherinflation
oroutputcanbe stabilizedtoa muchgreater
extent
thanit has been historically.
Thisraisestheobviousquestionofwhich
offluctuations.
We takethis
policyruleresultsin moredesirable
patterns
in
the
next
section.
up
7. TheWelfare
Lossfrom
Price-Level
Instability
We wish to considerthe consequencesof alternative
monetary
policy
rulesforthe value achievedin equilibrium
by thelifetime
utility(3.1)
of the representative
household.The precisecomparisonthatwe proto
make
is
the
rationalpose
following.Associatedwithany stationary
of
the
kind
discussed
above
froma
expectations
equilibrium
(resulting
time-invariant
feedbackrule formonetarypolicy)is an unconditional
expectedvalue of (3.1), averagingover all the possible historiesof
shocksthatmayhave occurredpriorto datezero. We proposeto compare stationary
equilibriain termsof the value of thisunconditional
In thisway,we takea "long-run"
in evaluexpectedutility.
perspective
alternative
we
consider
do
not
the
rules;
ating
policy
advantagesthata
rule
have
that
from
the
result
nature
of the particular
particular may
initialconditionsthatmayexistat thetimethatone contemfortuitous
to sucha rule.
platescommitment
This objectiveis easilyseen to be equivalentto maximization
of the
function
simplerobjective
W= E
(u(Ct)
-f v(yt(z))dz ,
(7.1)
whereE refersto theunconditional
Thisobjectiveaverages
expectation.
thedisutility
ofworkingacrosshouseholdsat a pointin time,because,
fromour"long-run"
perspective,
anygivenhouseholdis equallylikelyto
be in thesituationofanyone ofthehouseholds(whichdiffer,
afterall,
in
the
of
times
at
which
have
been
to
able
only
sequence
they
changethe
of
the
that
the
over
sell).
prices
goods
they
Byincluding integral z in(7.1),
we do notneed tointerpret
theexpectation
toan
operatorE as referring
ofopportunities
foran individualsellerto
averageoverpossiblehistories
oftheaggrechangeitsprices,butonlyan averageoverpossiblehistories
to preferences
and technology).
gateshocks(i.e.,thedisturbances
& WOODFORD
334*ROTEMBERG
We furthermore
ouranalysisbytakinga second-order
simplify
Taylor
seriesapproximation
toourobjective(7.1). (Moredetailsofthesecalculaand Woodford,
tionscan be foundin Rotemberg
1997b.)This has the
lossfunction
thatcan
advantageofallowingus toderivean approximate
be evaluatedusingonlythe log-linearapproximate
characterization
of
theequilibrium,
obtainedby solvingtheequationsderivedin Section3.
Anotheradvantageis thatwe obtaina loss function
thatcan be written
fromthevariancesofvariousendogeas a weightedsumofcontributions
ofourconclusions
withthe
nous series,whichallowsdirectcomparison
ad hocloss functions
assumedin theliterature.
typically
ofmonetary
At thecostofnotbeingable to evaluatetheeffect
policy
on thelong-runlevelofoutput,we supposethatchangesin monetary
rateT so
policyare accompaniedby changesin theconstantincome-tax
thatthistaxis optimalineachcase. Thisensuresthat,roughly
speaking,
levelofoutputis optimaland independent
ofmonetary
theaverage
policy.Our idea hereis to separatetheissueofthewelfarelossesassociated
in outputfromthosedue toa suboptimal
levelof
withfluctuations
average
the
to
of
or
due
(for
competition
example)
presence monopolistic
output,
to
make
for
the
and
taxes,
responsible
monetary
policy
solely
distorting
of the formerlosses, assumingthatotherpolicyinstruminimization
mentswillbe used to ensurethe desiredaveragelevelofoutput.This
makessenseif,as a practical
oftasksto policyinstruments
assignment
thelong-run
levelofoutputbutcannotbe
thetaxcode can affect
matter,
an optimalresponseto
be
to
used
to
ensure
adjustedrapidlyenough
disturbances.
stochastic
In Rotemberg
and Woodford(1997b),we show thata second-order
to
approximation W takestheform
W= -
1
1
uCY (cr+ w) var [Et-2(Yt- Y)] + (0-1 + 0o)Evar,log yt(z) (7.2)
L
2
plus termsthatare of thirdor higherorderin the amplitudeof the
shocks,and termsthatare unaffected
policy.(Such terms
by monetary
in
the
that
aresimilarly
expressions follow.)Thusourmeasure
neglected
of aggregateoutput
of deadweightloss depends upon the variability
aroundthe"naturalrate,"butalso upon thedispersionofoutputlevels
acrossproducersofdifferent
goods. The secondterm,in turn,depends
of
the
degree pricedispersion,since the demand curve
solelyupon
that
(3.13)implies
var,log yt(z)= 0' varzlog pt(z).
(7.3)
Econometric
335
Optimization-Based
Framework.
settingequationsimplythat
our-price
Finally,
E [varzlog pt(z)]=
a
+ (1 + 41) 1
[ var
(Et2,i^)
var
+ (E^I)2(7
(Et-2rt
a)2L var(*r Et-2,t)
- a
(1 -
Thusthedegreeofpricedispersionthatexistson averageincreaseswith
forecasted
oftherateofinflation
withthevariability
averageinflation,
of unexpectedinflatwo quartersin advance,and withthe variability
tion.Substituting
(7.3) and (7.4) into(7.2),one obtains
1
[ (1--a) K
W= -- 2 ucYO(1 + Ow)a(1 a)2 (1-a)Kvar
Et-2(t_(1- a13)0
.
+var (E-2) + (1 + ) VaT(t - E2t) +(E)2
)
(7.5)
in termsofwhichwe shallcomparealternaThisis thewelfarecriterion
tivepolicies.Note thatonlytwo structural
parameters,
namely41and
of
alternative
matter
for
the
relative
ranking
policies
(1-a)K/[(1-aP)0],
of the absolutesize of the deadweight
(as opposed to a computation
loss).
One can furthermore
show thatthefactorin squarebracketsin (7.5)
equals L + Ir.2, where ,r*is the average inflationrateand
L=
+
(1 - a)
a)
K(1 - af)O
1
1+4,
var
var Et-2(kt- Ikt+1) + var Et2t
-X
(Xt
- Et-2kt).
(7.6)
L is thewelfareloss fromoutputand inflation
denominated
variability,
in theunitsofthevarianceofinflation.
Thisloss obviouslyreachesan
absoluteminimumwhenX, is a constant,so thatinflation
is constant.
On theotherhand,theremaining
loss termin (7.5) is minimized
when
inflation
Thus
the
W
is
zero.
welfare
measure
achieves
its
theoaverage
reticalmaximumvalue ofzero when inflation
is constantand equal to
zero,whichis to say,whenpricesareconstantovertime.33
33. Our finding
thatpricestability
is optimalin ourmodelis closelyrelatedto Kingand
Wolman's(1996)argumentthat,in theircloselyrelatedmodel,pricestability
leads
Notethatthisconclusion
outputtobehaveas itwouldifpriceswereflexible.
depends
ofthemodeldevelopedhere,inparticular,
upona numberofspecialfeatures
uponthe
is theonlydistortion
that
assumptionthatthe existenceof nominalpricerigidities
fromnecessarily
prevents
equilibria
beingoptimal.
336-ROTEMBERG
& WOODFORD
We momentarily
rate,and
ignorethechoiceof theaverageinflation
show thatthereis a policythatensuresthatX, is constantso thatL is
are to inzero.3 The onlyeffectsof a nonzeroe* on our equilibrium
creasethe interestratein each periodby Tr*whileX is increasedby a
forboth and intothestrucconstants
constantas well.Substituting
7^rt
Xt
with
turalequations(3.9), (3.12),and (3.18),we see thatan equilibrium
inflation
involves
steady
t = Et-2Y +Gt-
(7.7)
Et-2
and
- Et2( <w[((t- ~s)
Y++l)],
+
2) (,+1
+oEt-l[(tEt,
=
)]
(7.8)
thatall
wherewe have neglectedtheconstants.It is theneasilyverified
and
and
are
if
two
are
satisfied
these
ofthestructural
are,
equations
Xt
iTt
in principle,
ofcompleteinflaconstant.Thisestablishesthepossibility,
tionstabilization.
Thisis theonlyrestriction
Notethat(7.8) onlydetermines
upon
Et-,Rt.
To
ratesimpliedbypricestability.
nominalinterest
thepathofshort-term
bankshould
noisetointerest
avoidaddingunnecessary
rates,thecentral
also ensurethattheactualvalueofRt(as opposedtoonlyitsexpectation
side of(7.8). Thishas theadditional
at t - 1) is givenby theright-hand
of the
on
the
information
it
that
economizes
requirements
advantage
ratesat tdependonlyon theperiodcentralbank,sinceitmakesinterest
t - 1 informationset.
Usingour estimatedprocessesfortherealshocks,we now consider
in outputand interestratesthatwould obtainunder
the fluctuations
wouldhaverequiredoutput
sucha first-best
policy.Suchan equilibrium
to varymuchmorethanit did underhistorical
policy;Table2 indicates
a varianceof output
to
would
have
led
thatthis minimum-L
policy
the
variance
as
times
as
four
policy.
impliedbythehistorical
large
nearly
ofourinferred
series
Thisis mainlydue to thehighlyvolatilecharacter
Ys. Accordingto our model,the reason
forthe "supply"disturbances
havebeenso muchsmallerundertheactualpolicyis
outputmovements
rulethatachieves
feedback
34. Wedo notanalyzeinthispapertheformoftheinterest-rate
It is unlikelythatonlyone feedbackrulesupportsthis
thisstationary
equilibrium.
in
butdiffer
rulesmaysupportthesamestationary
equilibrium
optimum;alternative
the behaviorspecifiedforthe centralbankofftheequilibrium
path.However,it is
thananymemberof
worthnotingthatin generaltherulemustbe morecomplicated
issue is takenup in thecontextofa simplified
thefamily(2.1). The implementation
and Woodford
versionofourmodelin Bernanke
(1997).
Econometric
Framework
337
Optimization-Based
.
"leansagainstthewind,"so thatthe
thattheactualpolicyconsistently
rateis increasedwheneveroutputrises.As hasbeenpointedout
interest
(1983),Ireland(1997),and
by numerousauthors[see, e.g., Rotemberg
such
and
Braun
(1996)],
countercyclical
policyis notappropriAiyagari
ate in responseto supplyshocksof the sortrepresented
by Y. With
tendsto
reduces
which
in
an
increase
costs,
marginal
stickyprices
Yt,
ratesare raised
lowerpricesand thusraiseoutput.However,ifinterest
in responseto theoutputincrease,pricesfallbyless thanmarginal
cost,
foroutputtoincreasebytheamount
so thisfallin pricesis notsufficient
thatY"increases.A policyof pricestability
requiresthatthemonetary
in
the
increase
accommodate
outputrequiredby theincrease
authority
in 2. As a result,outputbecomesmorevariableifYtis variable.
ratesthatwouldhaveachievedcompleteinflation
The pathofinterest
ratesand is remarkinvolvesverylargeswingsin interest
stabilization
variance
2
the
ofthefunds
as
Table
In
indicates,
ablychoppy. particular,
ratealongthispathis 733(a standarddeviationof27percentage
points),
whilethevarianceofthefundsrateunderthehistorical
policyis only7.6
(a standarddeviationonlya tenththatlarge).One consequenceofthisis
witha low averageinterest
rate(and
thatsucha policyis notconsistent
can
be
nominal
interest
rate
the
inflation
unless
rate)
negative.Thus,as
floorposes
the
zero
nominal-interest-rate
Summers
(1991),
suggestedby
a
ofinflawith
low
level
an impediment
to stabilization
average
policy
of
would
stabilization
inflation
tion.35
Givenour parameters,
complete
to
the
federal
inflation
rate
near
50%
an
peryear keep
require average
fundsratepositiveinallquartersoveroursampleperiod.Butthatwould
implyothersortsofwelfarelosses,boththoseindicatedby(EI^t)2in (7.5)
thatresultfromthe increaseddispersionof pricesacrosssuppliers,as
well as the more conventional"shoe-leather
costs" (fromwhichour
modelabstracts).
Thus our analysisleads to theconclusionthatcompletely
stableinflationis inconsistent
witha low average
inflation
rate.Thisoccursin our
in Yt.Insulatmodelbecausewe findtheretobe fairly
largefluctuations
of
from
the
these
shocks
effects
ing prices
supply
requiresverylarge
rateif,as seemsplausibleand as is impliedbyour
swingsin theinterest
in interest
ratesare needed to
parameters,
largemovements
relatively
firms
the
that
choose
to
set.
of
thecostsofhaving
Because
change prices
35. The discussionof themodelin Section3 has ignoredthisfloor,becausethatmodel
abstracts
fromthefactthatmoneybalancesareheld.If,however,
we introaltogether
duceliquidity
servicesfromnon-interest-earning
moneyinto(3.1),we obtainan additionalequilibrium
the demandformoney.This equilibrium
conditionrepresenting
willbe inconsistent
withan equilibrium
condition
nominalinterest
ratethatis negative
in anyperiod.Notethattheintroduction
ofa demandformoneyneedhaveno effect
otherthanimposingR, 1 forall t uponthesystemofequationsderivedin Section3.
& WOODFORD
338-ROTEMBERG
to maintaina highaveragerateofinflation,
itis likelytobe desirableto
of
inflation
for
some
accept
variability thesake ofreducingthe
degree
size oftheswingsin nominalinterest
ratesrequiredin orderto stabilize
It is thusofinterest
to considerthecosts,in termsofa higher
inflation.
ofthe
valueofL, thatmustbe acceptedin ordertoreducethevariability
that
Federalfundsrate.We thusconsiderthenatureoftheequilibrium
of
achievestheminimumpossiblevalue of (7.6) subjectto a constraint
theform
var : vR.
At
(7.9)
betweentheconstraint
parameter
Figure5 showsthetrade-off
vRand
variabilattainable
levelofthewelfarelossL frominflation
theminimum
ity,which,as notedabove,is expressedin unitsofthevarianceofinflawhichhas thevarianceofthefederalfundsrateon the
tion.Thisfigure,
horizontalaxis, shows thatthe minimumattainableloss L is a convex
variation
thedeadweightlossfrominflation
ofvR. In particular,
function
AND
INTEREST-RATE
VOLATILITY
BETWEEN
5 THETRADEOFF
Figure
WELFARE
LOSSL
x'
3.5
I
I
HistoricalPolicy
3I2.5 -
2-
1.5
1.
ConstrainedOptimalPolicy
0.5
Minimum-LPolicy
00
100
100
200
200
300
300
400
400
500
500
600
600
700
700
800
800
Econometric
Framework
339
Optimization-Based
.
ratesis reducedfromits
hardlyrisesas thevarianceofnominalinterest
thatsize(correspondto
a
value
than
one-seventh
value
of
733
less
optimal
10
a
the
of
standard
deviation
on
order
to
percentage
points).Further
ing
on welfare,
rateshavelargereffects
in thevolatility
ofinterest
reductions
nearits
but even reducingthevarianceof thefundsrateto something
ofthedeadrecentlevelrequiresan increasein L thatis onlya fraction
weightloss associatedwithcurrentpolicy,accordingto our estimates.
The questionthenbecomeswhichpointin Figure5 is optimalonce
one recognizesthat pointswith more volatileinterestrates require
rates.Herewe pursuea crudeapproachto this
higheraverageinflation
thattheaveragefederalfundsrate
the
problemby imposing constraint
mustbe no smallerthanktimesthestandarddeviationofthefundsrate,
forsomek > 0.3 Sincetheaverage(or steady-state)
fundsrateis given
=
+
r*
rate
where
is
real
of
return
the
*,
p
p
(determined
by
steady-state
in theform
can
be
written
the
rate
of
time
this
constraint
by
preference),
p + 7* > ku(R).
(7.10)
Thisconstraint
indicateshow a higherdegreeofvariability
ofthefunds
raterequiresa highertargetrateofinflation Wecan thenask which,
r*.
earlierthat
equilibriacharacterized
among the log-linearapproximate
in
other
addition
to
the
achieves
conditions,
equilibrium
satisfy(7.10)
thehighestvalue of(7.5).
Underourlog-linear
ofequilibrium,
characterization
the
approximate
value ofL achievedin anystationary
is
of
the
equilibrium independent
rate r*aroundwhichinflation
fluctuates.
(Our approxitargetinflation
mate equilibriumconditionsare derivedby log-linearizing
around a
state
with
but
zero
continue
to
a
valid
inflation,
steady
represent
approximationas longas f* is smallenough.)Thuswe can consider,
on theone
witha givenvalueofo(A), given
hand,thelowestvalue ofL consistent
thestructural
used
to
derive
equations
Figure5, and on theotherhand,
thelowestvalue of
consistent
withthevalue of R(A),
given(7.10).
r.2
The sum of thesetwo terms,expressedas functions
of o(?), is minimizedby theuniquevalueofu(R) forwhich
=
{-2Au(/)} + {2k[ko(A) p]} 0,
36. In the eventthatthe exogenousshockshave boundedsupports,thisis a sufficient
condition
fornonnegativity
ofthefundsrateat all times,and necessary
withintheclass
of equilibriain whichthe statevariablesall are linearfunctions
of theshocks.This
makesa naturalcase toconsider,
methodsheretocharacgivenouruse oflinearization
terizeequilibria.
In general,however,
theoptimalequilibrium
subjecttotheconstraint
thatthefundsratemustalwaysbe nonnegative
is unlikely
to belongto theclass of
linearsolutions.
& WOODFORD
340 ROTEMBERG
.
thederivawherethetwotermsin curlybracesrepresent,
respectively,
tivesofL and e2 withrespectto cr(R),and where-A (withA >0) is the
as
slope of the locus graphedin Figure5. We assume p = 3%/year,
historical
from
indicatedby thelong-runvaluesr*and ff*
resulting
policy(accordingto ourVAR)and k = 2.26,whichis thelargestvalue such
thatthe historicalequilibrium(accordingto our VAR) would satisfy
at thepointin Figure5 whereA =
(7.10).Thenthisconditionis satisfied
rateofat leastfr*
0.22and varR"= 1.93,whichrequiresa targetinflation
= 0.14%/year.
as conjectured
Thisis a positiverateofinflation,
bySumthiscalculationneglects
smallone. Furthermore,
mers,but a trivially
such as the costs of economizingon money
othercosts of inflation,
balancesthatare emphasizedin muchoftheliterature.
Takingaccount
rateeven
of such costswould onlymaketheoptimalaverageinflation
k.
for
a
value
of
lower
would
the
choice
as
lower,
ofL
Hence,becausethereexistonlysmallgainsin termsofreduction
of interestratesbeyondwhatis consistent
fromraisingthe variability
thetrade-off
indicatedin Figure5 is favorwithzero averageinflation,
low.Ifthereare additional,independent
able towardskeepinginflation
reasonsfortheFed to prefernotto havea highlyvariablefundsrate(as
discussed,forexample,by Goodfriend,
1991),thenthesewouldjustify
totheleftinFigure5, and henceofan even
choiceofa pointevenfurther
lowertargetrateofinflation.
interestto comparetheconstrained-optimal
It is of particular
policy
rateat 0.14%with
thatminimizesL whilekeepingtheaverageinflation
the actual policyof the Fed. This constrained-optimal
policyhas the
and itsvariance
immediateadvantagesthatitsaveragelevelofinflation
smallerthanunderthehistorical
ratesareconsiderably
ofinterest
policy.
2 indicate,theloss fromvariability
the
and
Table
as
Moreover,
(L)
figure
as largeas undertheestimated
underthispolicyis onlyabouta fourth
historical
policy.The varianceofoutputdoublesrelativeto thehistorical
but
policy, accordingto themodelthisis desirableas well,sinceoutput
is keptcloserto the"naturalrate."
fromachow theconstrained-optimal
To illustrate
policywoulddiffer
and
tualpolicy,Figure6 plotstheimpulseresponsesofoutput,inflation,
ratestothetworealshocks,undertheconstrained-optimal
interest
policy
and underourestimateofhistorical
policy.The twoshocksareorthogoin thesecond
shock(theone considered
nalizedas follows.One period-t
+
1
autonomous
in
innovation
the
as
is
defined
period-t
column)
thebasisof
on
be
forecast
not
that
could
of
the
part Gt+l
spending-i.e.,
other
t.
The
rates
interest
and
period-t
through
period
output,inflation,
shock(theone consideredin thefirst
column)is definedas thatcompointhe"naturalrate"ofoutput thatis orthogonal
nentoftheinnovation
t
Econometric
Framework
341
Optimization-Based
.
Figure6 IMPULSERESPONSESUNDERACTUALAND CONSTRAINEDOPTIMALPOLICY
Output
0.5
0
-1.5
-0.5
1
-1
0.5
-1.5
0
-2
0
5
10
15
20
-0.5
0
5
Inflation
1
0.5
Output
2
10
15
20
15
20
15
20
15
20
Inflation
0.4
\
I-0.2
i
0
0
-0.5
0
0
5
-0.2
10
15
20
-0.4
0
5
Price Level
6
6
4
4
2
2
0
0
-2
0
5
15
20
0
5
i
10
Interest Rate
1.5
/
1
0.4
0.5
0.2
0
-0.2
-2
Interest Rate
0.8
0.6
10
10
Price Level
0
5
10
15
20
0
0
5
10
& WOODFORD
342*ROTEMBERG
to the innovationin autonomousspending.The specificshockrepresentedin the firstcolumnis a supplyshockthatincreasesequilibrium
inflation (underthehistorical
policyrule)by1%morethanonewould
IT?1 giventhelevelofautonomousspending;theshockreprehaveexpected
sentedin thesecondcolumnis an autonomous
shockthatraises
spending
realspending by 1%.
t9,
In each panel
of the figure,the dashed line indicatesthe impulse
the
underthe historical
to
shock
response
policy,whilethe solid line
indicatestheresponsethatwould occurundertheconstrained-optimal
policy.Under historicalpolicy,both typesof shocksare inflationary,
thatpersistformanyquarters,
and so to
leadingto increasesin inflation
a large eventualcumulativeincreasein the price level. Under the
on impact.Butwhat
constrained-optimal
policy,pricesalso riseslightly
abouttheconstrained-optimal
is
that
is striking
itultimately
leads
policy
fall
in
to
these
to
shocks.
Thus
response
prices
inflationary
inflationary
in subsequentquarters.
shocksare accompaniedby expecteddeflation
The resultis thattheconstrained-optimal
policynotonlystabilizesinflationto a greaterextentthanundercurrentpolicy,it also stabilizesthe
extent.
pricelevelto a considerable
difference
betweenhistorical
andconstrained-optimal
Anotherstriking
with
of
do
shocks
on realactivity.
Under
has
to
the
effect
supply
policy
from
of
real
is
insulated
the
effects
historical
policy, output largely
supply
ininflation.
fluctuations
Under
shocks,whichinsteadresultinpersistent
an
results
adverse
shock
theconstrained-optimal
instead,
policy,
supply
ratesand a sharptransitory
contracinrelatively
largeincreaseininterest
It is forthisreasonthat(as Table2 indicates)the
tionof real activity.
than
outputvariability
constrained-optimal
policyinvolvesmuchgreater
has occurredunderthehistorical
policy.
inresponsetotheautonomousspendoutputmovements
Bycontrast,
under
and constrained-optimal
similar
historical
are
shock
quite
poling
has
allowed
to
Historical
output respondtotheseshocks,but
policy
icy.
accordingto our model it is desirableforthisto occur.The nominal
interest
raterisesless undertheconstrained-optimal
policy,and returns
ratesarenotsignificantly
morequicklytonormal.However,realinterest
backto thesteadystate,becausethispolicy
lowerduringthetransition
as discussedabove.
inducesdeflation
betweenthisconstrained-optimal
Table2 also providesa nicecontrast
are 0,,= 10 and = 0.
whose
coefficients
rule"
the
and
"Taylor
policy
0Y
and outThesetwopoliciesinduceaboutthesamevarianceofinflation
L. However,the
put while also havingsimilarlosses fromvariability
ratesreactaggressimple"Taylorrule"achievesthisbyhavinginterest
and thisleads interest
ratesto be veryvolatile.Our
sivelyto inflation,
Econometric
Framework
343
Optimization-Based
.
rule,by contrast,allows interestratesto be less
constrained-optimal
variablebytailoring
thedynamicresponsetoshocksmoreappropriately.
8. Conclusions
This paper has provideda methodforcomputingoptimalmonetary
modelthatfitstheU.S. datanearly
policyin thecontextofan optimizing
The twobasicingredias wellas an unrestricted
vectorautoregression.
ofthevariablesofinterest
entsofthismethodarea vectorautoregression
and an optimizing
modelthatpredictstheevolutionofthesevariables.
As longas themodelcan matchtheestimated
impulseresponsesofthe
variablestoa monetary
shock,themethodcanbe appliedeasily,because
itis straightforward
tofittheresponseofthemodeltotheothershocks.
muchrichervectorautoregressions
Thus,themethodcan accommodate
thantheone we have considered,as wellas moreelaboratemodels.In
thispaperwe haveworkedwitha minimal
model,bothtoshowhowthis
methodcan be appliedand to show thateven verysimpleoptimizing
well.Evenso, itwouldbe desirabletohave
modelscanfitthedatarather
a modelthatdeals explicitly
withinvestment
and theresulting
capital
variables.
accumulation
as wellas withlabor-market
a methodofanalysis,we havealso beenable
In additionto providing
to reachinteresting
conclusionsregarding
optimalmonetary
policy.In
stabilization
of
inflation
to
the
particular, complete
appears requirefairly
floor,
large swingsin interestrates,which,givena zero interest-rate
a
and
a
interest
rate
thus
inflation
rate.
Thus,
require highaverage
high
the existenceof thisfloorlimitsthe degreeto whichit is desirableto
stabilizeinflation.
On theotherhand,itappearstobe possible,atleastin
both
to
lowertheaverageinflation
rateand to stabilizeinflaprinciple,
tionmorethanhas beendonehistorically
in theU.S. Whilethisrequires
thatinflationary
shocksstillbe allowedto increaseinflation
transitorily,
suchshocksmustbe followedbydeflation
thereafter.
Theresult
shortly
is that neithersurges in autonomousspendingnor adverse supply
shockslead to long-run
increasesin prices.
Our specificconclusionsas tothedesirableresponsesofoutput,inflaratesto stochastic
disturbances
tion,and interest
maywellbe sensitive
to theparticular
we
model
have
considered
and, specifically,
optimizing
to the absenceof othertypesof stochastic
such as timedisturbances,
labor-market
and
distortions
over
time
in
firms'
desired
varying
changes
of
over
cost.
These
are
issues
that
markups price
marginal
onlyfurther
of
more
elaborate
models
can
settle.Our
other,
investigation
optimizing
mainhope withthispaperis preciselyto shiftthedebateoveroptimal
models,all of
monetary
policyso thatitwillinvolvedifferent
optimizing
344 ROTEMBERG& WOODFORD
which fitthe data reasonablywell, instead ofinvolvingequations thatfit
well by constructionbut thathave only a tenuous connectionto explicit
behavioral hypothesesat the microeconomiclevel.
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Reserve
1. Introduction
This paper espouses several admirable goals. First,it aims to build a
macroeconometricmodel froman optimizsimple rational-expectations
At
two
least
framework.
advantages attachto thisapproach. The first
ing
is thatto the extentthatthe model is builtupon stablemicroparameters,
it has some hope of addressing the Lucas critique(1976). Of course, the
model is not certain to be invulnerableto the critiqueby virtueof its
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