Indirect Rule
Published by
Hayes, Peter.
How Was It Possible? A Holocaust Reader.
University of Nebraska Press, 2015.
Project MUSE.
https://muse.jhu.edu/book/38981.
For additional information about this book
https://muse.jhu.edu/book/38981
[132.205.204.75] Project MUSE (2025-02-05 01:38 GMT) Concordia University Library
Indirect Rule
Isaiah Trunk
From Judenrat
[132.205.204.75] Project MUSE (2025-02-05 01:38 GMT) Concordia University Library
The Organizational Structure
of the Jewish Councils
The Councils were conceived by the Nazis not as
an instrument for organizing life in the ghettos
or for strengthening the structure of the ghetto,
but the opposite; as an instrument which, in their
hands, would help them to realize their plans concerning the Jewish population in the occupied
territories and, in particular, their extermination
plan. The Councils were permitted, at most, to
take care of distributing the meager supplies and
maintaining a certain standard (only too low) of
sanitation (for the continuous epidemics would
also threaten the Nazis themselves); they were
permitted to preserve “peace and order” as understood by the authorities.
The ramified Jewish organization was originally created to carry out, precisely and efficiently, all the regulations and directives of the
occupation authorities. This was the definition
of its role in the very first document about the
Council of Elders (the “urgent letter” of Heydrich
of September 21, 1939), in the regulation concerning the establishment of the Jewish Councils of
November 28 of the same year, issued by Hans
Frank, and in official Nazi declarations dealing
with Jewish self-rule in the occupied territories.
The Councils had to serve only one purpose—to
execute Nazi orders regarding the Jewish population.
336
Other activities undertaken by the Councils,
with the consent of the authorities, in the sphere
of internal ghetto life (social welfare, economic
and cultural work) were performed, in fact, outside their prescribed tasks. Such other activities,
which dealt with the internal requirements of the
Jewish population, were sometimes accorded a
certain degree of tolerance, and even of encouragement; they served the Nazi-propagated illusion that the continued existence of the ghettos
was guaranteed and concealed the Final Solution
(Endziel) from the Jews for as long as necessary.
The tasks of the Councils can be divided into
three classes:
1. Tasks imposed by the authorities, such as
conduct of the census of the Jewish population,
the supply of forced labor, registration of candidates for the work camps, for deportation, etc.
2. Routine tasks in social welfare, medical
care, and in the economic and cultural fields—
tasks which were, in the main, a continuation of
prewar communal activities.
3. New tasks made essential by the complete
elimination of the Jewish population in the
ghetto from governmental and municipal services, such as food supplies, the management
of the ghetto dwellings, industry, health, police
and judicial services, etc.
These varied duties of the Councils necessitated the growth of a ramified, administrative
apparatus. The organizational structure of this
apparatus expanded as the isolation of the Jewish population from the general, governmental,
and municipal framework was completed. . . . The
Nazi-created Jewish ghetto necessarily became
a Jewish city sui generis, linked to the main city
only by slender links that had to be maintained
for purely technical reasons, e.g., lighting, watersupply, sewage, and limited telephone connection
(up to a certain period). Generally the ghettos
were cut off from the normal postal services and,
in some ghettos, special post offices were opened.
Suitable administrative machinery had, therefore,
to be created in the ghettos to serve the needs of
the Jewish population in those matters normally
dealt with by the government and the municipality. It was also necessary to set up special departments to carry out the orders and directives of
the authorities with regard to forced labor, collection of taxes, delivery of various materials and
merchandise, of forced-labor workers, transfers,
evacuations, and the like.
From the start of the occupation, the Germans
excluded Jews from the benefits of social services
such as pensions for war invalids, sick benefits,
etc.1 Jewish bank accounts were withheld and Jewish property confiscated;2 forced labor duty for
the Jews was ordered.3 In many places the Jews
were also excluded from the general system of
food supply. As a result of all these measures, even
before the ghettos had been established, Jews were
faced with most urgent tasks: to provide in short
order some social and medical services, if only
on a minimal scale; to take care of food supply
and distribution; and to search for new sources
of income for countless people eliminated from
the national economies and from state and community frameworks.
A particularly urgent field of activities demanding immediate attention was the necessity to provide shelter for the overflow of homeless people
who had lost all their possessions as a result of the
war operations. Masses of desolated, penniless
refugees surged from their ruined dwelling places
into the larger communities, where some sort of
lodgings had to be found for them. The ranks of
these unfortunates were soon augmented by the
thousands of Jews the Germans threw out of their
homes. The Germans complemented this deluge
of aimlessly wandering people without any tangible means of existence by systematic spoliation of
Jewish property and by relentless, random arrests
for forced labor. By such measures these people’s
economic existence was entirely broken down.
New departments had to be established, and
old ones revitalized or reorganized by the Councils, to cope with this ever increasing responsibility and with the overriding necessity to deal with
the hostile authorities on a daily basis. The departments of welfare and medical care, food supply,
and forced-labor duty were the earliest ones established. Later came the crucial moment when the
Jews were enclosed in the ghettos, where, according to the plans of the Nazis, the “ghetto autonomy” was to be complete and self-sustaining in
all sectors of community life. It then became particularly important to extend the existing administrative apparatus . . . to include policing of the
ghetto area, management of real estate to organize
the food distribution, etc. . . .
The departments of registration and vital statistics came into being quite early, in accordance
with Heydrich’s circular letter of September 21,
1939, which ordered the Councils to carry out a
census of the Jewish population according to age.
At the end of October 1939 a statistical bureau was
established in Warsaw following the order to take
a census of Jews residing in the Polish capital. The
census took place on October 28.4 In Lublin the
registration department was established on February 22, 1940, and its first duty was to carry out
the census there.5 In Lodz a department for this
purpose was established on May 9, 1940, soon after
Indirect Rule
337
[132.205.204.75] Project MUSE (2025-02-05 01:38 GMT) Concordia University Library
the Jews were closed up in the ghetto.6 Prior orders
during October 1939 had directed the forced labor
department to carry out the registration of males
eighteen to sixty years old and females twenty-two
to fifty-five years old.
To take care of the deliveries of merchandise
ordered by various authorities, there were established in some of the ghettos special offices, such
as the acquisition office (Beschaffungsamt) at
Lwów, the material deliveries office (Sachleitungskomission) at Zólkiew, etc.7
The “resettlement” of the Jews into the overcrowded ghettos—for the most part located in
desolate, squalid, slum-ridden sections of the
towns—suddenly forced upon the community
leaders extremely heavy responsibilities: to move
the worldly goods of thousands of dislodged families; to find the living space necessary to shelter
them, to try to distribute this insufficient room
among the people rendered homeless on short
notice, to move dislodged institutions of public service into some new quarters, to speed up
repairs of ruined buildings to create additional
living space. These agonizing tasks all demanded
simultaneous solution. Among the new departments that mushroomed in the ghettos, those
that dealt with providing homes were necessarily among the first and most important to come
into being. Initially called resettlement departments or commissions, they were renamed tenants’ departments as time passed.
It was also necessary to serve in other fields.
Isolated in the ghettos, robbed of personal property, forced to give up their businesses and
positions of employment, and, as a rule, even
compelled to surrender their homes, native Jews
and refugees alike, businessmen and salaried
workers, had been deprived of their livelihood
and customary means of sustenance. All required
immediate attention and assistance in their search
338 Je ws in the Na zi Grip
for some means of support for themselves and
their families. People had to start all over from
scratch. Trade had to be organized, new sources
of income created. Simultaneously, it was necessary to plan and bring to life a network for distribution of allotted food rations, to open schools,
to make arrangements for distribution of mail (as
a rule the Jews were excluded from general postal
service), to establish management of real estate,
and, in places like Lodz, to take over servicing
gas and electricity for the ghetto on behalf of the
municipality. Last, but not least, when Passover
approached, some of the ghettos created ad hoc
commissions to take care of seasonal necessities,
such as providing matzoth.
The administrative structure of the Councils
grew in stages, accretions depending on the realities of life in the ghetto, the necessity to take care
of ever growing tasks for the ghetto inmates, and
the heavy duties imposed by the occupation
authorities. The structure of the Councils also
depended on the type of the ghetto: whether life
was totally regimented by a forceful bureaucratic
apparatus or some opportunities for free enterprise were left to the inmates. Added to everything else, the enormous paper work demanded
by the supervisory authorities necessitated the
establishment of new offices, if only to diminish
the heavy workload of existing departments. . . .
A Council seldom remained unaltered from
beginning to end of its existence. Usually the
opposite took place. Council members escaped,
took cover, resigned, were arrested, were killed
on the spot, or were deported; and others were
nominated to take their places.
The reasons for this fluctuation among the
Council members were twofold: an internal reason stemming from the Jews themselves, and an
external one stemming from the Germans. In the
majority of known cases, Jewish communal or
civic leaders were unwilling to join the Councils.
Elected or nominated members were moved to
accept and, once accepting, to continue in their
difficult positions only out of a fear of reprisals by the Gestapo or a sense of responsibility
toward defenseless coreligionists, under the illusion that as Council members they might be in
a position to ease the lot of the Jews. However,
Council members perceived or imagined what
they could expect. Naturally there were exceptions. Some ambitious individuals tried to get
nominated as Council members for egoistic reasons, believing in the power ostensibly vested in
them by the Germans. These included some who
tried to play the role of intermediaries between
the Germans and the Jews even before the Councils had been established.
The terror inflicted on the Jews and the Councils by the Germans from the very start of the
occupation strongly influenced many Council members to relinquish the dangerous office,
apprehensive of tasks the Germans might have
in store for them.
There were various perilous means of avoiding
membership in the Councils. Escape with or without one’s family, was one of them, particularly at
the early stages of occupation before the ghettos
came into being. For example, we read concerning
the first members of the Tarnow Judenrat that they
have quickly gotten the right idea about the
Germans’ intentions. Dr. Josef Apner, the pride
of the judicial profession in Galicia, whom the
Germans forced to take over the leadership of
the Council, soon relinquished his position,
for he understood what the Germans would
be asking of him. His substitute Lenkowicz,
and the Council member Waksman, escaped
to Lwów right after all the prayer houses and
synagogues went up in flames one day.8
In Szczebrzeszyn “the members of the first
Council quickly relinquished their office and, for
the most part, escaped to the Russian-occupied
area. Another Council was then elected.”9 An eyewitness account of events in Kalisz relates that “the
Jewish Council disintegrated before the expulsion in the fall of 1939. The majority of the Council members escaped.”10 The first chairmen of the
original Councils in Kolo, Plock, Przemysl, Boryslaw, Kutno, and many other places, also ran away.11
In Warsaw six Council members were allowed to
leave Poland in the winter of 1939–1940. A seventh
member escaped abroad.12 Later, when free travel
for Jews was strictly curtailed, it became very difficult to escape.
Another form of expressing unwillingness
to serve on the Jewish Councils was to resign.
This, however, was highly dangerous. It required
a lot of courage and determination to take such
a step. In the Gazeta Zydowska (No. 16, February
25, 1941) an answer was printed to two inquiries
addressed to the “Legal Corner.” The inquirers
were advised that changes of Council chairmen
or changes in the composition of the Councils
could take place only by a decision of the Stadtor Distrikthauptmann or by voluntary resignation.
The editor cautioned, however, that this was his
own personal opinion based on an interpretation
of the order establishing the Jewish Councils; he
did not know whether the pertinent authorities
would accept this view, since the order did not
specifically mention the length of tenure of members or the procedure for changing the composition of the Councils. In the prevailing atmosphere
of constant terror “voluntary resignations” were
as unrealistic an idea as were the accounts themselves in the Gazeta Zydowska.
There were other cases of repression directed at
Council members trying to resign. In Nowy Saçz
a member resigned at the end of 1941 “because
Indirect Rule
339
[132.205.204.75] Project MUSE (2025-02-05 01:38 GMT) Concordia University Library
he was of the opinion that the Council ought
to refuse to deliver Jews for the labor camps
and let the Gestapo itself take whomever they
wanted.” Apparently at the demand of the German
authorities, the ghetto police delivered him to the
Gestapo. He was not seen any more.13 A member
of the Jewish Council at Kozienice (Radom district) resigned during the first weeks of the occupation and found refuge on the “Aryan” side. There
were subsequent rumors that the Pole who had
given him shelter killed him and buried him in a
cellar. When his body was exhumed after the war,
it was found that his head had been severed from
his body.14 “At first, respectable civic leaders in
Krzemieniec participated in the Council. . . . After
a short while, however, when they had realized its
true character and tasks, they resigned.”15 A member of the Plock Jewish Council hid himself to
avoid serving.16 The first chairman of the Council
at Bursztyn resigned. He had been appointed by
the Ukrainian mayor, “but chose rather to work at
hard labor together with all other Jews.”17 Another
member gave the same mayor a suit as a gift to be
released from serving on the Council.18 In Ozierany, Council members tried to be released from
membership on the local Council (although others paid large amounts for the privilege of becoming Council members”).19 The first chairmen of
the Councils at Czyzów, Nowy Dwór, Staszow,
and others also resigned.20
As a rule, however, nominated Council members, fearing Gestapo reprisals, did not resign or
ask to be released from service. Those who gathered enough courage to try to get permission to
resign were given “friendly advice” not to do so.
Adam Czerniakow notes in his Diary under the
date January 26, 1940: “In view of these events
[cash extortions from the Council], I have asked
the ss to relieve me of the chairmanship, because
I am in no position to lead the community in such
340 Je ws in the Na zi Grip
abnormal times. I was advised not to do so [for
his own good].”
The makeup of Councils or the hierarchy of
their membership was liable to changes because
of internal controversies. The attitude prevailing
in a given Council was also a very important factor. Changes in Council memberships, dismissal
of old members, and nomination of new ones
were, to a certain degree, the result of struggles
and divergent opinions about tactics that should
be used vis-à-vis the German authorities. Sometimes the struggles degenerated into wrangles
about authority, in which the Germans became
involved. Thus the first chairman of the Chmielnik
Jewish Council had to resign under the pressure
of opposition against him within the Council and
the relief committee.21 The sources do not always
supply information as to the reasons for changes
in the composition of the Councils, limiting their
information to the mere fact that change took
place. What actually happened in many cases can
only be surmised by drawing analogies to known
causes of change in other places.
Changes in the personnel of the Councils in
Upper Eastern Silesia were made by Moshe Merin,
chief of the Union of Jewish Communities in that
part of the occupied territory. He made changes in
order to pack the Councils with his own people.
In Czestochowa the presidium dismissed 10
Council members for “sabotaging the Council’s
activities” in 1940.22 A former member of the
Bursztyn Jewish Council relates that three members, including the chairman, were removed. They
were replaced by three others who had previously
been sent to the Kreisamt in Rohatyn to deliver
a cash contribution ordered by the authorities.
Whether this change was initiated by the Germans or by the Jews themselves is not indicated
in the pertinent account. It is possible that the
success of their mission to Rohatyn (under the
protection of the Ukrainian police commandant)
won the approval of the Kreischef, who may have
forced upon the Bursztyn Council the decision
to co-opt them to the Council in place of three
members who had been fired.23
For the most part the German authorities
instigated changes in the personnel of the Councils. The Germans bullied the Councils in every
respect; they fired, arrested, and killed chairmen
and members who happened to fall into the bad
graces of the authorities, refusing to become
obedient tools in the execution of German atrocities or violating the arbitrary rules in other ways.
No legal norms were applied in the treatment of
the Councils by the Germans. The principle of
“local leadership” reigned supreme and without
mercy. Whenever they considered it suitable to
their own interests, the Germans would reduce
or augment the number of Council members,
disregarding their own orders concerning the
number of the Council members (such as, for
instance, Frank’s order of November 28, 1939). In
place of persons removed from the Councils, the
Germans brought in people in whom they apparently had more confidence. Numerous chairmen
and Council members were removed because
they displeased the Germans by their independent attitudes or because their German masters simply did not like them. It often happened
that the memberships of entire Councils were
replaced by hand-picked people chosen from a
list of names prepared in advance. Some of the
Germans’ protégés were placed in top positions.
In cases where they could not find people suitable for their aims within the functioning Councils, they nominated new members from outside
the Councils. . . .
Changes in the composition of the Councils
or in the hierarchy of their members occurred
especially often before or during “resettlement
actions,” when the authorities needed the full
cooperation of the Councils and the ghetto police.
As a rule, when Council members and policemen were themselves caught up in the deportations, they were replaced by new, though greatly
reduced, Councils and police forces.
Sources illustrating the fluctuation caused by
German interference, including arrests and murders of dismissed members, are so abundant that
we must limit ourselves to only a small number
of illustrations pertaining to the various occupied
areas. The first Vilna Jewish Council of Ghetto
No. 1 (the short-lived Ghetto No. 2 existed till the
end of October 1941 and had its own Council)
was established on July 4, 1941, with a membership of 10 (one resigned). On July 24 the Council received an order to increase the number of its
members to 24, but at the beginning of August
(the exact date is unknown), the Gebietskommissar ordered the Council to reduce its membership to the previous number.24 On September 2,
Schweinenberg, a Gestapo officer, came to the
Jewish Council, arrested 5 Council members and
11 other persons (mainly Council functionaries
who happened to be present on the premises
at the time), and sent them all to the Lukishki
jail for not delivering 10 carts on time as ordered
(the order had been received the previous day, but
because all carts belonging to Jews had long since
been confiscated, the Council had hired five carts
from gentiles and sent them to the headquarters
of the Ypatinga [Lithuanian special police], which,
however, had sent them back). None of these 16
persons returned from jail. Only six persons, of
whom one was a Council member, were allowed
to remain in the Council building after their documents had been checked. The Council actually
stopped its activities.25 When the ghetto was
established, the Gestapo nominated one of the
remaining Council members as head of the third
Indirect Rule
341
[132.205.204.75] Project MUSE (2025-02-05 01:38 GMT) Concordia University Library
Council. The new chairman co-opted three members of the second Council and one more member from outside the Council. Thus this Council
was limited to only five members.26
In Lódz, 20 or so of the 31 members of the first
Beirat (the advisory council established during
the first 10 days of October 1939), were summoned
to the Gestapo office on November 7, 1939. All
were arrested and deported to a penal camp not
far from Lódz. . . . Some of the Beirat. members
were shot to death or tortured, others were sent
to concentration camps in Germany and perished
there, and five members were sent to Cracow during the partial expulsion of Lodz Jews to certain
parts of the Government General.27 In the beginning of February, Rumkowski asked the police
authorities to issue passes to members of his second Council.28
The first chairman of the Jewish Council at
Lwów was Dr. Josef Parnas, a man in his seventies. He was a strong-willed person with a great
deal of pride, descended from a noble, prosperous family, who had served as an officer in the
Imperial Austrian Army. Dr. Parnas was arrested
in October or November 1941, allegedly because
he had refused to deliver Jewish forced laborers,
and was shot in jail. The second chairman, Dr.
Adolf Rotfeld, a prewar member of the executive
of the Zionist organization in Eastern Galicia, died
of “natural causes” in February 1942, according to
pertinent sources—after only a few months in
office. The third chairman, Dr. Henryk Landsberg,
a well-known lawyer and prewar civic leader, was
publicly hanged together with 11 Jewish policemen on the balconies of the Council building in
September 1942. This was in reprisal for a Jewish
butcher’s resisting arrest by an ss-man, who happened to drop dead during the squabble. On the
same day, 175 Council functionaries were shot.
Dr. Eberson was then nominated Council chair342
Je ws in the Na zi Grip
man, saying, according to a witness, “I have gladly
accepted the nomination. Maybe they will shoot
me soon.” His gloomy prediction came true. During the “action” that took place from January 5 to 7,
1943, Dr. Eberson was shot, together with a number of other Council members, after reporting for
“selection” as ordered. Other Council members
hid themselves. However, according to the witness
who heard him say why he accepted the nomination to head the Council, Dr. Eberson committed
suicide. Some of the Council members were sent
to the camp at Janowska Street.29
In Horodenka (Distrikt Galizien) a Jewish
Council of three members was established on
orders from Kreishauptmann Winkler. After a
while a “deceitful and money-greedy ss-man”
was appointed Kreishauptmann. He dismissed
the Council and appointed a larger one. Only the
chairman of the former Council was included in
the new Council.30
The story of the Council of Elders in Belchatów
(Wartheland) is characteristic for the unceremonial, despotic manner in which the Germans governed the Councils. At first, the Council there
consisted of 12 members, but in March 1940,
apparently on orders from the Kommandant of
the local gendarmes, the Council was reduced to
three members. It seems that after the intervention by the local German mayor on April 2, 1940,
the Council was enlarged to five members. But
the new Council was not of long duration. It was
dismissed on October 18, 1940, and a new one was
appointed. The new chairman lasted for only a few
days. He was arrested on October 23 and another
chairman was nominated. He functioned until July
2, 1941. The composition of the entire Council was
changed on that day and a new chairman, two
members of the so-called Beirat, and new chiefs of
welfare, food, forced labor, and other departments
were appointed. This Council, the sixth one, func-
tioned only until September 24, 1941, when the
German mayor again ordered a change in its composition. The chairman of the fourth, formerly
dismissed, Council was appointed to head the
new one. Only two Beirat members remained. The
chiefs of the departments were also changed. It is
not known how long this, the seventh, Council
was allowed to function.31 Some reasons for these
repeated changes in the composition of the Belchatow Jewish Council can be derived from the
mayor’s letter of October 20, 1940 (i.e., two days
after the dismissal of the third Council), apparently addressed to the Council chairman, in which
he and other dismissed members were accused
of grumbling and agitating against the authorities. They all were warned of severe punishment
if they tried to interfere with the authority of the
new Council.32 The extreme fluctuation of the
Belchatów Jewish Council may have come also as
a result of personal intrigues by some of its members who were trying to win the mayor’s support
for their personal aspirations.
In Konskie (Radom district) at the beginning of
1940 the Jews were ordered to elect a new Council
in place of the first one.33 The same happened in
Mir, Mlawa, Kielce, and in many other places.34
In Jaworów (Distrikt Galizien), the chairman was
changed four times,35 in Krzemieniec three times.
The first chairman in Krzemieniec, Dr. Ben-Zion
Katz, was condemned to death for not delivering
a second list of Jews ostensibly for labor duty (he
told the Germans that he would submit a second
list after the men on his first list returned). A second chairman, the lawyer Jonas Grynberg, suffered a nervous breakdown, and only the third
one lived till the tragic end of the ghetto.36
Some of the members of the Lancut Council (Distrikt Galizien) were arrested at the end
of March 1942 during a conference called by the
Gestapo at Jaroslaw. The majority of the Council
members, expecting nothing good from the “conference,” simply did not show up. According to
another version, the German mayor warned one
Council member, Dr. Pohorile, not to go. Eight
members were therefore saved. Those who went
to the “conference” were ordered to deliver 10 hostages. They refused and were arrested. Together
with six other Jews seized randomly in the street,
they were sent to Jaroslaw. All were shot in midJuly 1942. The authorities nominated a new Council, with the lawyer Rubin Nadel as its chairman.37
We have already indicated that before or during “resettlement actions” the authorities changed
or reduced the Councils. In the Lublin Ghetto,
during an extraordinary meeting on March 31,
1942 (an “action” had started there on the 17th),
four ss-men came to the Council and told them,
among other things, that the 24-man Council
then in operation was to be reduced to 12 members. Six of the old Council, in addition to the vice
chairman, one of the office functionaries, and five
outsiders, were to be included in the new Council. The remaining 18 Council members were to
be “resettled” in the next transport. The Council
members destined for “resettlement” and who
had their residence outside the ghetto (this was
a rare privilege) were given a chance to go home,
guarded by the Security Police, to fetch any personal belongings they might need. After that, their
apartments would be sealed. The ss-men gave cynical assurances that the chairman and one member of the old Council would take over leading
positions on the Council and in the jss [ Jewish
Social Welfare] in their new domicile because they
had the necessary experience. The ss-men then
nominated the vice chairman to be chairman of
the new Council and nominated and assigned the
duties of a three-member Council presidium.38
After the “action” in Horodenka, the Kreishauptmann called in Jewish representatives and, expressIndirect Rule
343
[132.205.204.75] Project MUSE (2025-02-05 01:38 GMT) Concordia University Library
ing his condolences for what had happened,
accused the Ukrainians of requesting that the
Germans decrease the number of Jews in town.
He ordered the establishment of a new Council
headed by Moryc Filfel, one of the “useful” Jews
who had been released from among some Jews
assembled in a prayer house for “resettlement.”39
In August 1942 the authorities nominated a new
chairman of the Krasnobród Council (Lublin district), one month before the “resettlement action.”
He functioned until the ghetto was liquidated in
February 1943.40
In Stanislawów (Distrikt Galizien) the authorities nominated new Councils after almost every
“action.” The first Council was nominated on
July 26, 1941, immediately after the Germans had
occupied the town. It was dismissed after the first
slaughter, on October 12, 1941. The tenure of the
second Council lasted till July 1942. All its members were then arrested and were not seen any
more. Neither did the third Council last for long.
In August 1942 all its members were arrested and
publicly hanged. The fourth Council lasted until
the liquidation of the ghetto in February 1943. Its
members were shot on the 23rd of that month.41
Of the 24 members of the Jewish Council in
Radom only 3 remained after the first “resettlement action” in mid-August 1942. The survivors were Dr. L. Fastman (who became Council
chairman), Dr. N. Szenderowicz, and Dr. Zabner.
Dr. Zabner and his wife committed suicide after
they were arrested in the building of the criminal police. They had been accused of sending
their two children over to the “Aryan” side in the
course of the “resettlement.” A certain Leon Yames
replaced Dr. Zabner. Dr. Fastman was arrested
on January 10, 1943, and sent to Auschwitz for
not reporting that Dr. Dimant had come back to
the ghetto from Szydlowiec (a nearby town). Ten
days later, on January 20, Dr. Szenderowicz was
344
Je ws in the Na zi Grip
nominated Council chairman. On May 1, 1943, the
Gestapo summoned all members and functionaries of the Council, carried them away to Wolanów
(near Radom), where most of them were shot.
The chairman and the members who survived
were sent to Auschwitz.
The Attitude of the Councils
toward Physical Resistance
Before analyzing Council attitudes toward physical resistance against the Germans, three aspects
of the problem should be taken into account: (a)
the objective chances for resistance, (b) resistance
in relation to other prospects for rescue, and (c)
the ethical positions of diverse segments of the
Jewish population on the very idea of physical
resistance. These matters are complicated, and
we shall limit ourselves here to discussing only
a few of them:
1. The situation of the Jews in the tightly
sealed ghettos was such that the objective conditions for physically resisting the Nazi extermination machine with some hope of success
simply did not exist.
2. The number of able-bodied males capable
of fighting was continually reduced as a result
of demographic changes among the ghetto
inmates.
3. Because of complete isolation, it was next
to impossible to get arms from the outside
world, even if they had been offered.
4. There was a complete lack of arms (for
instance, the Organization of Jewish Fighters in
the Warsaw Ghetto was able to accumulate no
more than 10 old pistols up to January 18, 1943,
the day of the first attempt at armed resistance).
5. Gentile neighbors were hostile to the Jews
except for certain democratic and socialist circles, parts of the liberal intelligentsia, and some
of the clergy.
6. An endless mass of often conflicting German orders frustrated any plans for counteraction. The Jews in the ghettos were rendered
physically and mentally weak by constant hunger, disease, and relentless terror. These conditions brought about widespread apathy and a
fatalistic attitude, rendering long-range planning impossible, as is demonstrated by events in
Vilna, Bialystok, and Czestochowa.42 In addition, the perfidy of the Germans, sudden raids,
roundups, and the graduated scale of extermination actions all contributed to the emergence
of the illusion that the Jews who remained after
each action would survive.
7. The Jewish underground movement
could not rely on direct aid from any institution abroad, while the non-Jewish resistance
groups systematically received arms, manpower, training, and money from their respective governments-in-exile in London. Without
this support they could not exist, grow, or effectively perform.
Of the two basic forms of physical resistance, in
the ghettos and in partisan units, the latter offered
better prospects for rescue. Considering the chronology of the Holocaust, however, even these
prospects were not too bright. It is important to
bear in mind that the partisan movement in Eastern Europe, which perhaps provided a chance of
rescue for small groups of escapees from the ghettos (because of the generally hostile attitude of the
non-Jewish environment, purely Jewish resistance
groups had very little chance of holding out),
became a serious factor as late as the second half
of 1942, at a time when the vast majority of Jews
in the Ostland and the Ukraine had already been
murdered, and when extermination in the areas
of the Government General and the incorporated
territories was already in full swing. Incidentally
the partisan movement could have meaning only
for those ghettos in Eastern Europe situated close
to Soviet partisan units, the only ones that were
not openly hostile to escapees from the ghettos.
The other ethnic partisan groups in that area—
Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian (except
the very small Communist groups)—not only
did not admit Jews, but fiercely combatted ghetto
refugees who tried to find shelter in the woods.
These and other tragic circumstances thwarted
efforts to create meaningful Jewish resistance in
the ghettos. To bring the problem into historical perspective it is sufficient to compare the
objective fighting possibilities of Jews enclosed
in ghettos to those of the resistance movements
of non-Jewish segments of the populations in the
occupied territories. It is clear that the prospects
for armed Jewish resistance leading to rescue
were quite minimal. Only young people in good
health had a chance to free themselves from the
condemned ghettos and reach the partisans, after
hazardous peregrinations. The large majority of
ghetto inmates—mothers with children, old, sick,
emaciated people—were not able to go the long,
dangerous way. Not many of those who joined
the so-called family camps—groups connected
with purely Jewish partisan groups (of the Belsky
brothers, for instance)—survived.
There also were unfavorable subjective circumstances for physical struggle. Even during these
most difficult times the Jews were confident that
the world was not lawless. It was unthinkable that
a government in the very heart of civilized Europe,
even a Nazi one, should openly hold as its main
political goal the physical elimination of an entire
people, and it was unthinkable that the world
would let it happen. This was one of the reasons
why people did not believe in the terrible truth
until the very end, when it was too late to plan
or undertake anything. When the hideous truth
revealed itself in its full horror on the thresholds of
Indirect Rule
345
[132.205.204.75] Project MUSE (2025-02-05 01:38 GMT) Concordia University Library
gas chambers or on the brinks of mass graves, the
victims may have pondered whether it was worthwhile to fight for life after all in a world of limitless
bestiality and passive silence.43 It should also be
borne in mind that the Orthodox population of
non-Soviet Eastern Europe (constituting perhaps
half the inmates of the ghettos) grew up amid the
age-old Jewish tradition of spiritual heroism and
martyrdom in times of oppression and was therefore historically and mentally unprepared and
mostly opposed to the concept of physical resistance. These people were armed with quite different weapons: prayers and faith that the Almighty
would have mercy on His oppressed people—that
a miracle would happen in the end.
Another factor crippling the will to armed resistance was the nightmare of collective responsibility mercilessly imposed on the occupied areas by
the Nazis—the fear that innocent people would
suffer because of the resistance of small groups,
that for each endeavor to resist or escape from the
ghetto into the woods the Nazis would inflict collective reprisals on particular families and even
on the entire ghetto. This anxiety sometimes rendered helpless even the most courageous young
people in the underground organizations. As long
as they remained in the ghettos with their parents and siblings, their feeling of responsibility
for their families was a restraining factor against
joining the resistance. Only on the eve or during
the course of the last liquidation actions, when
the end was obviously inescapable, did groups of
young people or entire families escape from ghettos in Eastern Poland and Ostland, where there
was a better chance to join partisans in the adjacent woods. They often paid a high price for their
courageous endeavors.
One more factor hampering organized resistance by the Jews was the deep-seated conviction
prevalent among some of the ghetto inmates—
346
Je ws in the Na zi Grip
particularly the workers, artisans, and experts
working for the benefit of the German war
machine—that they had a good chance to survive because of their work but that this chance
would be destroyed by attempts at resistance. This
was the fundamental tenet of the entire rescue
conception of the Jewish Councils, a tenet that
adversely influenced the ghetto inmates by weakening their will to resist.
The majority of ghetto inmates maintained that
resistance was not a real alternative to their desperate situation. They feared that it might even
speed the liquidation process by giving the Germans an excuse to implement bloody repressions.44 . . .
Believers in the idea of resistance could be
found only among the politically conscious
inmates—mostly party-affiliated young people. But even these men quarreled among themselves because of fear for the fate of helpless ghetto
inmates and of their loved ones, and also because
of their inability to agree on where the armed
struggle with the enemy should be undertaken.
Some believed that the Jewish resistance movement bore a historical responsibility to protect the
lives and honor of the oppressed Jewish masses
within the ghetto walls; others maintained that,
in view of extremely adverse conditions for fighting within the ghetto, the best thing to do was to
leave and join the partisans. Heated and prolonged
discussions went on in the Vilna, Bialystok, and
Warsaw Ghettos.45
Councils also grappled with this problem and
sources testify to their dramatic, passionate discussions. One report describes the soul-searching
debate of the Siauliai Jewish Council: on February 5, 1943, the Council of Elders called a meeting of the coworkers of the ghetto administration,
the ghetto court, and members of the Hechalutz
[Zionist pioneer] organization to discuss the
burning problem: whether to start immediately to
resist or to wait a little longer; whether to escape to
the woods or join the Lithuanian resistance movement with which some contact had been established prior to the meeting. An evasive answer had
been received from the Lithuanian underground:
there were not enough arms, it would be hard for
escapees to hide, etc. It became clear in the course
of the discussion that only well-organized and
armed young people had any chance of escaping
from the ghetto into the marshlands of northeastern Lithuania, where Soviet partisans operated.
Women, elderly or weak people, and children had
no chance. As most of those attending the meeting
were in these categories, the proposal to escape
from the ghetto was rejected. The chairman, Mendel Leibowicz, suggested that the inmates be given
arms to prepare for resistance within the ghetto
and that the ghetto be set in flames on all sides at
the critical moment, so that inmates would have
a chance to escape. E. Yerushalmi, to whom we
are indebted for this report, notes that apart from
arms and a detailed plan, a strong will and readiness to sacrifice women and children were also
needed. Those present at the meeting lacked both.
This was the main reason why no underground
organization was created in Siauliai.46 . . .
We may therefore conclude that, as with other
problems, there was no uniform opinion among
the Jewish Councils on the problem of resistance.
There were Councils with an extremely negative
attitude both to resistance within the ghetto and
to escape from the ghetto to join the partisans in
the woods. On the other hand, there were Councils that sympathized with the resistance groups
and supported them morally and materially. Still
others were ambivalent, wavering in their attitude. There were also Councils that actively participated in resistance during the last period of
the ghettos’ existence.
Notes
1. vbigg, No. 13 (December 21, 1939), Par. 5; vbigg
1, no. 18 (March 13, 1940), Par. 8.
2. vbigg, Part 2 (1940): 23.
3. vbigg, No. 1, 6–7; No. 13 (December 21, 1939);
No. 14 (December 23, 1939).
4. Bericht Warschau, 7.
5. Sprawozdanie, 56.
6. zc, Doc. 110.
7. Zaderecki, 445; testimony by Rabbi David Kahane, 15–16 (yia); Gerszon Tafet, Zalada Zydów
zoliewskich (Lódz, 1946), 25–26.
8. Turne. Kiyum un khurbn fun a yidisher shtot (Tel
Aviv, 1954), 810, 811.
9. Yilon leinformatsye veyediyot, No. 4 (1952), 113.
10. Testimony No. G-28/328, 11–12 (YaVA).
11. Questionnaire No. 179; Questionnaires Nos.
281, 285, 286, 288, 289; in the first months of the
occupation five members left for Warsaw; Questionnaire No. 355; Questionnaire No. 849.; ra, 2,
No. 1155.
12. Questionnaires Nos. 49, 50, 52, 54, 65, 68.
13. Questionnaire No. 191.
14. Questionnaire No. 213.
15. Pinkos Kremenets, 252.
16. Questionnaire No. 284.
17. Questionnaire No. 244.
18. Testimony by Abraham Kalisher (yia).
19. Sefer Ozheran vehasviva, Encyclopaedia (1959), col.
487.
20. Yizkor-bukh Chizheve, 926–27; testimonies Nos.
g-53/679, b-48/681, in YaVA; Sefer Stashev, 418.
21. Pinkos Khmielnik, 731.
22. Brener, op. cit., 15: from a source emanating from
the Council (Rocznik 2, 11), which listed two
different slates of Council members, it is evident that 10 persons left the Council and were
replaced by others.
23. Sefer Burshtyn, Encyclopaedia (i960); testimony
by Abraham Kalisher, 10.
24. Kruk, op. cit., 25–28.
25. Ibid., 46–48.
26. Ibid., 69, 71; Dvorzhetsky, op. cit., 44.
Indirect Rule
347
27. Lodzher geto, 30.
28. Eisenbach, Getto Lódzkie, 21–22.
29. Friedman, Encyclopaedia, 674–75; Diary of Zvi
Radletsky (File E/37–2–2 in YaVA); testimony
by Rabbi David Kahane.
30. Sefer Horodenko, 287.
31. ajhi, “Mss. about Cities,” File No. 151, 29, 31, 105,
127.
32. Ibid., 30, 36. A denunciation against the Council
chairman was placed before the Gestapo by the
mayor on November 16, 1941, in which the chairman was accused of having contacts with smugglers (on whose behalf he interceded before the
authorities) and with persons arrested by the
Gestapo for political reasons. One can easily
imagine the fate in store for a person so accused.
33. G.Z., No. 11 (August 28, 1940).
34. Testimony by Haim Wierzba in the yia; Pinkos
Mlave, 405–6; Sefer Kelts, 13; Dr. Peltz was allegedly deported to Auschwitz for refusing to perform lethal injections on sick people in the
Jewish hospital.
35. Druk, op. cit., 12–16.
36. Pinkos Kremenets, 268.
37. Sefer Lantsut, 363–64; English section of the
book, xxxvi–xxxvii.
38. Minutes of the Council, No. 16/140, of the same
date.
39. Sefer Horodenko, 290.
40. Krasnobród, sefer zikaron (Tel Aviv, 1956), 345,
352.
41. Ami Weitz, Al Khorvotekha Stanislavuv (Tel Aviv,
1947), 28, 44, 76–78, 95.
42. Dapim min hadleyka, 93–94; Brener, op. cit., 64–
65.
43. I. Trunk, “Yidisher vidershtand in der nazitkufe,” Shtudies in yidisher geshikhte in poyln (Buenos Aires, 1963), 302–3.
44. Reports on the “Witenberg day” in the Vilna
Ghetto by Nusia Dlugi, Breine As, Shimon
Palewski, Zhenie Berkman, and Mark Dvorzhetsky, YlVO-Bleter 30, no. 2: 188–213.
45. R. Korczak, op. cit., 167–68; Dapim min hadleyka,
97–107 (minutes of the meeting of the members
348 Je ws in the Na zi Grip
of the kibbutz Dror, in Bialystok February 27,
1943); address by Yitzhak Cukierman (Antek)
at a meeting held in kibbutz Yagur, published in
Nasze Slowo (Warsaw, April 1948); Sefer hapartizanim hayehudim, vol. 1 (Merkhavia, 1958), 570.
46. Yerushalmi, op. cit., 315.