Volume: 5 Issue: 2 Year: 2008
Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based
Federalism in Ethiopia
By:
Dr. Wondwosen Teshome B.,
Department of Anthropology,
University of Vienna,
Althanstrasse 14, 1090 Wien
E-mail: wonteslm007@gmail.com
&
(2) Dr. Jan Záhořík,
Department of Anthropology,
University of West Bohemia in Pilsen,
Tylova 15, 30125 Plzeň
E-mail: nvgogol@seznam.cz
2
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Abstract
Ethiopia adopted ethnic federalism and restructured the regions along ethnic lines as soon as
the EPRDF took political power by overthrowing the Marxist military government in 1991.
The aim of this paper is to examine the merits and the demerits of federalism. The paper
particularly assesses federalism in Africa by taking the case of Ethiopia as an example. The
paper argues that in order to ensure the success of federalism, it should not be imposed from
above. Since its introduction in 1991 and officially sanctioned in the country’s 1994
Constitution, ethnic federalism and Article 39 of the Constitution that awarded the self-rule
states (regions) the right to secede has become the major source of intense debate. For some,
ethnic federalism and the right to secede discourage ethnic tensions in the country and
encourage the various ethnic groups to live together peacefully. However, for others, this
“experiment” can go out of hand and may lead the country into never-ending ethnic wars and
eventually to disintegration. This paper, by taking into account of Ethiopia’s and other
countries’ experiences, will examine both sides of the arguments.
Key Words: Africa, Ethiopia, federalism, ethnic-federalism, secession, ethnicity.
1. Introduction
According to Elazar (1987b) and Ostrom (1989), the term “Federalism” originated from the
Latin term “Foedus”, meaning “Covenant”. For Börzel (n.d) federalism “refers to a spatial
or territorial division of power between two or more levels of government in a given political
system”. Riker (1964: 11), quoted by Fillippov et al (2004: 5), defines federalism as a state in
which “two levels of government rule the same land and people; each level has at least one
area of action in which it is autonomous; there is some [Constitutional] guarantee.....of the
autonomy of each government in its own sphere.” For William H. Riker (cited in Lijphart
1999: 186) therefore, federalism is “a political organization in which the activities of
government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a
way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions.”
The longest federal political systems in the world are found in the USA (1789), Switzerland
(1848), Canada (1867), and Australia (1901) (Watts 1998: 132). Despite the success of
3
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
federalism in these countries, there are many cases where federalism miserably failed. These
include countries in East Europe, and other Third World countries (Watts 1998: 132). As
noted by Agbu (2004: 31) the earliest advocates of federalism like Wheare (1964) and
Duchacek (1977) equated federalism with democracy. Duchacek (1977) claimed that
“democracy and federalism are always found together [and that] federalism is a
territorial dimension of democracy.” Federal systems 1 are composed of a federal
(national) government, and constituent unit governments that are known by a variety of
names in various countries: In USA, Mexico (Cameron and Falleti 2004), Nigeria (Agbu
2004), India (Chandhoke 2006; Maiti 2002), and Ethiopia (Aalen 2006; Abate 2004;
Wondwosen 2008) they are called “states” or “regions” 2 ; in Switzerland “cantons” (Rüsch
and Kihm 2003); in Canada (Studlar 2006) and South Africa (Asmal 1990) “provinces,” in
Germany (Broschek 2007) and Austria (Erk 2004) “Länder”; in Belgium “regions” (Gerard
2001); in Spain “autonomous communities” (Almendral 2002); in Russia “republics”
(Fedosov 2002), or “oblasts” (Fedosov 2002, Khakimov 2002). There is a confusion
regarding the concept of “federalism” and “federation” and many researchers use these terms
interchangeably. It was King (1982) who, for the first time, noted the distinction between
federalism and federation. For Elazar (1987, 1993, 1994) federalism is a genus of political
organization containing “a variety of species including federations, confederacies,
associated statehoods, unions, leagues, condominiums, constitutional regionalization , and
constitutional ‘home rules’ ” (cited by Watts 1998: 120). In this case, therefore, federation is
one species with in the wider genus of federalism. As Assefa (2007) points out many
theories failed to make a distinction between federalism and federations. While federalism is
an organizing principle that “advocates a ‘multi-tiered government combining elements of
1 There is a difference between a federal system and regional autonomy. In a regional autonomy, the autonomous
region is more subjected to the central veto than regions in a federal system (Watts 1998: 120).
2 In Ethiopia they are also called “Kilil.”
4
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
shared-rule through common institutions for some purposes and regional self-rule’ for
constituent units for some other purposes” (Assefa 2007: 102), federations “refer to tangible
institutional facts” (Assefa 2007: 103). Federations thus constitute the institutional and
structural techniques for achieving one of the goals of federalism, and they are used to
describe actual systems of governments.
Theoretically, according to Stephan (2001: 320-323), federalism can be achieved in two
ways: “Coming-together federations”, and “Holding-together federations.” The first one, i.e.
“coming together federation” appears when sovereign states decide to form a federation
voluntarily due to various reasons such as security purposes, governmental efficiency and so
on. The second one, “holding together,” mostly emerge after consensual parliamentary
decisions to maintain a unitary state by establishing a multi-ethnic federal system largely to
avoid or settle ethnic, regional and other type of group conflict (Ibid: 324). According to
Keller (2002: 24), there are many forms of federalism3 , but the bottom line is that
fundamentally all involve self-rule and shared-rule. For Gurr and Harff (1994), Hameso
(1997), Kimenyi (1997), Kymlicka (2006) Lijphart (1977, 2002), O’Leary (2002), and
Osaghae (2006), ethnic federalism reduces ethnic groups’ disparity and secession of regions,
gives self-rule to ethnic groups and thus brings ethnic harmony. On the other hand, for Ake
(1996), Egwe (2003), Fleiner (2000), Mamdani (2005), Nordlinger (1972), and Nyong’o
(2002) ethnic federalism accentuates ethnic conflicts, increases secession, suppresses
individual citizen’s rights and eventually leads to the disintegration of countries. In a similar
manner Watt (1998: 133), drew the following three conclusions on federalism:
The most important ones include: Quasi-federalism, Centralized federalism, Decentralized Federalism,
Symmetrical Federalism, Asymmetrical Federalism, Cooperative Federalism, Executive Federalism, Personal
Federalism, Territorial Federalism, Ethnic Federalism (Seibert 2003: 3, 6).
3
5
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
“First, in the context of the contemporary global scene, federal political
systems combining shared rule and self-rule do provide a practical way
of combining the benefits of unity and diversity through representative
institutions, but they are no panacea for humanity’s political ills.
Second, the effectiveness of a federal political system depends on the
degree of public acceptance of the need to respect constitutional norms
and structures, and on a spirit of compromise and tolerance.
Third, within the broad genus of federal systems and even within the
narrower species of federations there are many variations in the
application of the federal idea.”
The paper poses the following research questions:
(1) What are the advantages and the disadvantages of ethnic federalism?
(2) Did ethnic federalism in Ethiopia really help in solving or at least minimizing ethnic and
tribal conflicts in the country?
(3) What are the merits and the demerits of Article 39 (the right to secede) of the 1994
Ethiopian Constitution?
2. Federalism in Africa
In Africa, federalism is associated with the colonial experience of divide and rule (Assefa
2007: 101). This means that in different contexts federalism can mean different things
depending on the cultural and historical connotations. During Colonialism colonial rulers in
Africa followed a unitary system of government in governing African colonies. The British
had tried to introduce federalism in some of their colonies in Africa. However, African
nationalists and anti-colonial leaders strongly resisted the British attempt, perceiving it as the
continuation of “divide and rule” in another form. It was on this ground nationalist leaders
6
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana campaigned against federalism. After independence, the
new African rulers opted for the unitary system of government (Agbu 2004: 30). The African
leaders preferred the formation of a unitary governments rather than federalism (Jinadu Sep.
2002: 14-15). In contemporary Africa, most of the countries are unitary states with political
power vested in the central government (Kimenyi 1998: 43). Many political leaders in Africa
at present are not willing to entertain federalism fearing that federalism reinforces tribalism
(Kimenyi 1998: 61). As Elaigwu (1994: 76) opined the new rulers of post-colonialism Africa
considered federalism as a crisis escalator rather than a crisis damper (cited by Agbu 2004:
30). For Will Kymlicka, as cited by Turton (2005: 90-91), federalism in Africa and
federalism in Europe have two major differences. In Europe, since European countries have
no more neighboring enemies, their ruling elites would not be afraid that national minorities
who live federated with other majority population groups will collaborate with outsiders and
endanger their mother nation. But in Africa one of the fears of the African ruling elites is the
possibility of minorities collaborating with the neighboring hostile countries. 4 Second, in
Europe, there is no fear that the minorities would expel members of other population groups
from their territories by exercising their right to govern themselves since liberal democratic
values in the West have developed enough to cut-across ethnic division. However in Africa,
one of the most difficult problems in federal states is the persecution and expulsion of
members of various ethnic groups who do not belong to that specific region. 5
4 It is good to remember that in the recent war between Ethiopia and the Islamic groups of Somalia (ICU) (20062008) the international media and the Western-based analysts had been predicting that the ethnic minority Somalis
of Ethiopia in Ethiopian Somalis Regional State which is also known as “Region 5” would collaborate with the
neighboring Somali Islamists (see ICG 26 Jan. 2007, 2-4).
5 In Ethiopia, after the adoption of ethnic federalism in 1991, there were many massive massacres and persecutions.
The massacres of innocent Amharas at Arbagugu (Addis Digest July 1995; September-October 1995; Berhanu 1998
EC: 122; Merera 2003: 124), Bedeno (Addis Digest July 1995; September-October 1995; Andargachew 1997 EC:
149; Berhanu 1998 EC: 122; Merera 2003: 124) and the expulsion of Amhara, Gurage and Kembata people from
Negele Arsi and the surrounding rural areas and the expulsion of millions of ethnic minorities in various regions of
the country who had been relocated by the Derg government (1974-1991) in its infamous re-settlement program can
be cited as examples (For further detail on ethnic conflicts in the country see AP 28 February 2001; Addis Tribune 2
March 2001; BBC 31 January2001; PANA 28 February 2001; ARB September 1999).
7
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Until recently, the only federal state in Africa was Nigeria (Brosio 2000: 2). But, as Osaghae
(2004: 171) notes, at present, some more countries in Africa like Ethiopia, Nigeria, South
Africa and Tanzania follow federalism (Bednar 2006: 320-321). In general, countries like
Cameroon, Comoros, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania
and Uganda either follow federalism or have constitutions with strong federal flavor. There
is still an intense debate in Nigeria on federalism.6 For Awolowo-Dosunmu (1994) and
Wonotanzokan (1994) Nigeria is unsuitable for federalism while Adele-Jinadu (1994) and
Momoh (1999) argue that federalism is necessary for Nigeria to manage the country’s ethnic
diversity. Awolowo-Dosunmu (1994) lamented that federalism is applied to Nigeria more as
an instrument of divide and rule than solving ethnic problems in the country. Agbu (2004:28)
claimed that, “it is generally accepted that so far federalism as a conflict management
system has failed to remove the bogey of ethnicity, sectionalism and religion form Nigeria’s
body politic.”
Osaghae (2004: 174) argues that federalism is necessary for Africa to manage the problems
emanating from diversity such as inequitable social and political relations, and unequal
development of groups. For Kimenyi (1998: 45), “Since ethnic groups associate with
particular territories, African States are naturally suited for the establishment of federal
systems of government.” For Horowitz (1997), Coakley (2000), Hechter (2000) and Ghai
(2000), federalism is very important means to accommodate difference in multicultural
states. Unfortunately, as Agbu (2004:28) pointed out, despite the need for federalism in
Africa, “federalism has had a poor run in countries where it has been applied”
6 Nigeria adopted federalism in 1954
8
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
3. Federalism in Ethiopia: Ethnic-based Federalism
Before any analysis is done, the Ethiopian federalism needs to be understood in a historical
perspective. Merera (2006) and Assefa (2007) presented their view on Ethiopian modern
history in three perspectives: colonial, nation building (Assefa substitutes it by “Greater
Ethiopia”), and national oppression. These versions followed Levine’s (1974) theory of
Ethiopian history as composed of “Amhara thesis”, “Oromo anti-thesis”, and “Ethiopian
synthesis”.
After taking political power by militarily overthrowing the Marxist military government of
Ethiopia in May 1991, the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Party)
adopted a federal structure which is based on ethnic lines. Article 1 of the 1994 Ethiopian
Constitution says, “This constitution establishes a federal and democratic state structure.”
According to the 1994 Ethiopian constitution, the duties and responsibilities of the federal
government include: foreign relations, national defense, Inter-state commerce, currency,
immigration, communication, inter-state water resources. The duties and responsibilities of
the regional states include: draft their own constitutions, administer land and other natural
resources, levy taxes and duties on revenue sources reserved for the states, enact civil service
laws, and establish state police.
The Right to Secession
The most controversial article in the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution is Article 39 that deals with
the right to secession. 7 Article 39 of the Constitution says that every Nation, Nationality and
7 As many Vaughan (2003: 6) indicated the authors of ethnic federalism (the elites of TPLF) in Ethiopia are heavily
influenced by the Marxist theory of the “National Question.” Before coming to power in 1991, the TPLF elites
were ardent followers of the “Albanian Socialism.”
9
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to
secession. The conditions for cessation are:
(a) When a demand for secession has been approved by a two-thirds majority of the
members of the Regional parliament.
(b) The federal government arranges a referendum with in 3 years after receiving the demand
for cessation.
(c) When the demand for secession is supported by majority vote in the referendum.
Since its introduction, ethnic federalism and its impact on the country have become a point
of discussion and a source of highly intense debate (see Abate 2004; Alem 2003; Aalen
2002, 2006; Gebrehiwet 2006; Keller 2002; Kimenyi 1998; Pätz n.d.; Serra-Horguelin 1999;
Turton 2005; Tsegaye 2004; Tronvoll 2000; Vaughan 2003). As the EPRDF leaders have
claimed and other scholars such as Hechter (2000: 142-145) argued, federalism decreases the
demand for secession in Ethiopia by increasing self-government. The EPRDF officials argue
“that ethnic federalism was the only way of democratically restructuring the country,
enhancing the political participation of the Ethiopian population and giving ethno-regional
rights to the previously oppressed peoples or nationalities” (Aalen 2006). For some political
thinkers like Chabal and Daloz (1999: 58) ethnic federalism in Ethiopia might be a good
experiment. Ethnic federalism of the EPRDF is also positively viewed and considered as a
useful tool in reorganizing Ethiopia by Cohen (1995), Henz (1998) and Kidane (1997).
On the other hand, there have been many scholars and researchers, who criticized the system
of establishing regions along ethnic lines. Mazrui (1994: 60) argues that ethnic-based
federalism of Ethiopia is the “re-tribalization” of the country. For Ottaway (1994, 1997)
ethnic-based federalism increases ethnic conflicts rather than defusing or minimizing ethnic
10
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
strives. The other scholar who offered a harshest critic on this issue is Huntington (1993b:
15) who said,
“.... attempt to classify people by ethnic background is reminiscent of
practices which used to exist in the former Soviet Union and in South
Africa. It seems totally contrary to a political process one of whose
purposes is to promote a common Ethiopian national identity. It also
seems in appropriate in a country in which substantial portions of the
population are of mixed ethnic background or unsure of which ethnic
group they belong to or wish to identify with.....”
Kymlicka (1998) and de Silva (1986: 374; 1989) also argue that federalism does not prevent
secession, but serves as a stepping stone for those groups whose aim is independence.
Similarly, Keller (1998: 122) remarked, “Breaking Ethiopia up into a few large ethnically
based regions, does not solve the nationality problem, but exacerbates it.” As indicated by
Brietzke (1995) and Merera (2003) there are many people in Ethiopia who opposed ethnic
federalism, fearing that the end result of this process could be the disappearance of Ethiopia
from the political map of the world. This fear and anxiety is mostly common among the
Amhara ethnic group, and other population groups (Keller 2002: 33). As Ottaway (1994)
argues, cited by Engedayehu (1993), ethnic federalism might lead to the disintegration of a
nation. It is also criticized for its possibility of creating more ethnic conflicts. Abbink (1993:
682) says,
“....In the interstices of State transformation where traditional power
relations fall apart and new structures of a representative democracy are
not yet established, traditional enmities and conflicts of interest are
being completely politicized and played out on an ethnic basis. The
11
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
policy-makers have not yet come to grips with these realities, either
intellectually or administratively, not at least because they know not how
to handle the rising tide of movements for both ‘democracy’ and ‘ethnic
self-determination.”
Keller (2002:33) expressed his worry on ethnic federalism of Ethiopia, in a rather frank
manner. He said,
“Whether one agrees or disagrees with Ethiopia’s strategy of ethnic
federalism, the process of constructing it will not be easy. In spite of the
fact that international donors tend to accentuate the positives in this
approach, there are no prior examples of success in establishing a
purely ethnically based system of federalism.”
According to Aalen (2002: 91), Abbink (1997), Mohammed (1999), Ottaway (1994, 1995),
Vestal (1999) and Walle (1997), ethnic federalism is the “divide and rule” policy of the
TPLF designed to strengthen its own position and it might lead the country in to
disintegration. Moreover, according to Abbink (1997), Brietzke (1995), Cohen (1995),
Mattei (1995) and Paul (2000), the most common criticism against the federal model of
Ethiopia is the inclusion of the right to secession in the 1994 Constitution. The elites of the
two dominant ethnic groups in the country (Amhara and Oromo), challenged the federalism
process from their own particular parallel perspectives. As the report of NDIA and AAI
(1992) allege:
“Some Amhara political leaders, for example, asserted that the TGE’s 8
experiment implied the sacrifice of an Ethiopian National identity and
8 TGE (Transitional Government of Ethiopia) which temporarily ruled Ethiopia in the transition period (1991-
1994). Then it was replaced by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1994-Present).
12
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
effective central government. Alternatively, certain quarters within the
OLF 9 believed that the proposed ethnic federalism would merely co-opt
the OLF into yet another Northern-dominated system, and that Oromos
would thereby forfeit an historical opportunity to achieve true sovereign
independence for Oromia.”
Similarly, Aalen (2002: 9) argues that the Tigry People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) (the core
organization of EPRDF), representing only 10% of the total population of Ethiopia, devised
this policy to divide the other people of Ethiopia along ethnic line so that it could maintain its
political position at the expense of other political groups. Huntington (1993b: 14-16) heavily
criticized the division of Ethiopia’s administration structure along ethnic lines. He said,
“.......ethnicity is likely to be central to Ethiopian political parties,
elections, and politics generally. Attempts to suppress ethnic
identifications or to prevent ethnic political appeals are not likely to be
successful......parties and other political groups will undoubtedly be
organized primarily on ethnic lines, however, supplements what is
unavoidable with what is undesirable.... the combination of ethnic
territorial units and ethnic parties cumulative cleavages and can have a
disastrous effect on national unity and political stability.”
4. Discussion
One of the most controversial issues in conflict studies is the role of federalism. For Roeder
(1991) and Snyder (1999) federalism in the two Socialist countries (the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia) was the cause of their disintegration that later on led to the emergence of new
9 OLF (Oromo Liberation Front)
13
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
independent states. Federalism prepared ideal conditions for conflicts that later on led to the
collapse and the disintegration of these countries: It promoted a common language; assisted
in the creation of a sub-nationalist intelligentsia; established and financed sub-national
political elite, and moreover, it supplied resources which these sub-national political elites
could use for legitimacy. As Bunce (1999:49) noted, federalism in these two communist
countries “put into place virtually all of the building blocks that are necessary for the rise of
nationalist movements and for the formation of states.”
On the other hand, according to Saideman et al (2002: 118, 122) and Brancati (2006),
federalism and political decentralization contribute for the reduction of ethnic conflicts in
many countries. 10 The best example in this respect is Quebec of Canada. For Hechter (2000:
142-143) and Lustick et al (2004: 209), federalism helps in solving secessionist movements.
There are two pre-conditions to stop or prevent ethnic conflicts in a federal state. These are,
as Aalen (2006) argues, the presence of a democratic government, and the respect for
individual and group rights. According to Aalen (2006), federalism is criticized for
encouraging or not stopping the self-determination of ethnic groups, which can lead to
secessions unless at the same time or simultaneously the idea of common citizenship is
propagated and encouraged in the federal country. 11 A common citizenship could be
10 However, this does not mean that federalism stops all violent communal conflict. For instance, though both
Nigeria and India are Federal countries, they still suffer form violent communal conflicts.
11 This is one of the failures of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. Many Ethiopians are angry on the ruling EPRDF party
officials’ failure to propagate and encourage the idea of common citizenship in the federal country. In the post 1991
Ethiopia, people who profess “Ethiopianness” instead of their ethnic origin were persecuted as Amhara radicals, or
“Neftegnas” (lit. “gun-carriers”). Ironically, it was the “Neftegnas” as warriors of Menelik II’s government who
preserved Ethiopia’s independence and territorial integrity by fighting against foreign invaders. In fact, in many ways
the Ethiopian “Neftegnas” were very similar with the Japanese “Samurai.”
On the other hand, the TPLF members were accused of demonizing the Ethiopian history (Andargachew 1997 EC:
8) and desecrating the Ethiopian flag, particularly in the first half of the 1990s. The leader of the EPRDF and the
Prime Minister of the country, Meles Zenawi, was accused of publicly degrading the Ethiopian flag (Negussay 2006).
It was reported that while addressing the issue of the Ethiopian national flag, he said that it was just a “garment” or
“rag” (Negussay 30 June 2007).
14
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
propagated and cultivated if the federal government is neutral so that it can intervene to
pacify in case of ethnic conflicts. However, if the federal government is perceived as a
representative of a certain ethnic group in the country, its role in propagating and
maintaining the idea of common citizenship would be in question. Though many scholars
advocate for federalism by emphasizing its advantages, at present there are only few
countries in the world that follow federalism. What are the reasons for this?
For Mueller (n.d), the probable reasons are two: First, perhaps, the disadvantages out weigh
the advantages. Second, federalism is somehow inherently unstable. According to Muller
(n.d) when federalism is chosen it fails to survive, “not because of any fundamental difficulty
in the out comes it produces, but because of the existence of forces in democracy, which
undermine it.”
Federalism involves decentralization. Decentralization involves two processes: “Political
decentralization” and, “administrative decentralization.” For Cohen and Peterson (1999: 2324), “While administrative decentralization is not the same as political decentralization, it
can, under enlightened central leadership, lead to democratization and greater political
participation.” In order to measure the effectiveness of federal systems we have to asses the
political decentralization and the administrative decentralization. Political decentralization
can be measured by assessing the public’s support at the sub-regional level for governmental
institutions at national, regional and local levels (Keller 2002: 26). The administrative
decentralization can also be measured by examining the three most common forms of
administrative decentralizations: “decentralization”, “delegation”, and “devolution.”
“Decentralization” is a form of administrative decentralization where decision making
15
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
process regarding financial and managerial matters is transferred to federal institutions at the
local or state levels. “Delegation”, another form of administrative decentralization, is a
situation where administrative or decision making authority is transferred to lower level in a
certain well defined cases. “Devolution” is a situation that involves the transfer of
constitutionally specified authorities from the central government to local governments and
autonomous States (Keller 2002 26-27; Cohen and Peterson 1999: 20-30).
Though federalism in Africa is usually considered as imported model from the Western
World, there are researchers who argue that in Ethiopia federalism is part of the country’s
political tradition. As reported by Serra-Horguelin (1999), Dr. Alemayehu Aredo, the expresident of the civil service college argues that during the Era of Princes (1770-1855)
Ethiopia had “feudal federalism”. Similarly, Abbink (1997) asserted that in its most of
history Ethiopia has a tradition of federation because “the power of the monarch was often
superficial and remote, and regional autonomy substantial.” However, Serra-Horguelin
(1999) rejected this argument and for him both the arguments of Aredo and Abbink are not
sufficient to claim that Ethiopia was a federation. For Serra-Horguelin (1999) therefore
“Ethiopia was closer to an empire than a federation.”
The Ethiopian Constitution that has become the basis for the country’s principle of ethnic
federalism, as Turton (2005:89) insisted, is clearly influenced by the Leninist model of
federalism. Though, at present, federalism is considered as one of the possible ways to
curtain ethnic conflicts, in its initial form (as evidenced and substantiated by examining the
American and Swiss models) it was not intended or designed to solve or contain ethnic
conflicts (Aalen 2002: 14).
16
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
According to Keller (2002: 24), “Ethiopia began as what appeared to be holding together
federation in 1991,” but with in a year ended up as a “putting together federation.” As
Keller (2002: 27) said, the Ethiopian government followed a strategy of administrative
decentralization that mixed de-concentration and devolution. For Keller (2002: 31),
“Although, the Constitution states that States may prepare their own
constitutions, decide their own official language, develop their own
administrative systems, establish separate police forces, and collect
certain taxes,......again, the initiative for these arrangements came from
the center than from the constituent States.”
This “imposition from the top” or from the Center scheme is also shared by Kidane (1999:
19) and Hassen (1999: 234). According to Keller (2002: 22), power sharing formulae usually
include decentralization, regional autonomy and federalism, and they are principally
considered as ideal strategies for avoiding or solving ethnic strives and for attaining
democracy. In order to achieve these, Ethiopia’s strategy includes the “use of administrative
institutions and institutional reform as instruments of change” (Ibid: 23). For Turton (2005:
88) the EPRDF’s principle of self-determination for federal regional units “has gone further
than any other African State, and probably further than any state worldwide, in using
ethnicity as its fundamental organizing principle.” In other parts of the World, federalism
was exercised to meet administrative and bureaucratic needs (except Canada and
Switzerland) than to accommodate ethno-territorial pluralism in a single state (Turton 2005:
89).
17
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
The most controversial article in the Ethiopian Constitution is article 39 that deals with the
right to secession. Ethiopia perhaps is the only country in Africa that included such article in
its constitution at present time. But, in the past few communist countries and political parties
in the world had similar clauses in their constitutions. For instance, in the 1924 Soviet
Constitution, as noted by Kreptul (2003: 70), the right to secession was guaranteed. It says
“this Union is a voluntary association of peoples with equal right, that each republic is
assured of the right of free secession from the Union.” For Buchheit (1978: 121),
”It was primarily Lenin’s thesis that some expansive talk about
secessionist rights was necessary to insure the acceptance of the early
revolutionary movement by the many nationalities contained within
tsarist Russia. By offering a protection of national rights, up to and
including the right to secede, Lenin hoped to assuage the fears of the
disparate populations within the Russian empire and woo them to the
revolutionary cause.”
According to Saxer (1992:613), the 1924 Russian constitution stated that “the right of
secession, could not be amended, limited, or repealed without the prior consent of all of the
republics.” The Soviet Constitution was revised in 1936 and in 1977. However, the right of
secession was retained in both successive constitutions12 (Kreptul 2003: 70). It is good to
remember that although the right to secession was retained in all three Russian Constitutions,
it had no practical effect and it was never intended to be exercisable.
12 The 1936 Constitution (Article 17); 1977 Constitution (Article 72)
18
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
In a similar manner, the communist party of China also included the right to secede in its
constitution in 1931 in order “to lure in the ethnic nationalities of the Chinese mainland”.
However, “once the Chinese communists consolidated control over the main land and
surrounding territories, the right of secession was dropped” (Kreptul 2003: 70). The 1975
revised Chinese Constitution did not include the right of secession. A constitutional right of
secession was also included in the 1947 Burmese Constitution 13 . The Constitution declared
that there had to be three conditions for the right of secession to be implemented in Burma:
(1) A waiting period of ten years (2) The secession proposal had to get two-thirds vote of the
state council wishing to secede and (3) A nation wide plebiscite vote. In 1974 the right of
secession was totally repealed from the Constitution (Kreptul 2003: 71). To sum up, in all
aforesaid cases it can be said that,
“secession rights have often been used as a tactic to attract smaller
sovereign ethnic and national groups into a Larger Political Union for
purpose of enjoying perceived Economic and Social benefits. However,
once the political Union has attained, the right of secession was often
delegitimized, either through practical politics or legal repeal” (Kreptul
2003: 71).
Monahan and Bryant (1996), as cited by Kreptul (2003: 79), have claimed that out of 89
constitutions in the world only seven constitutions have provisions of the right of secession:
Austria, Ethiopia. France, Singapore, St.Christoper and Nevis, the Former Soviet Union and
the former Czechoslovakia. In the 1960s, secession constitutionally or through established
fundamental law has happened in Asia. In 1965, due to various reasons including the racial
and economic incompatibility between the minority Chinese-Singaporeans and the majority
13 Chapter X of the 1947 Constitution
19
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Malayan population, the federation of Malaya allowed Singapore to secede (rather,
expelled). Surprisingly, the secession of Singapore was completed when the Malayan
parliament decided to amend its constitution in only three hours discussion (Kreptul
2003:68). Although secession usually occurs in unitary states, federal states also had suffered
from secessionist movements. The best example prior to the 1990s was Bangladesh (1971).
In the worst cases, as Berhnau (2008: 1) mentioned there were federal countries that
disintegrated due to secessionist movement: the USSR (1991), Yugoslavia (1991) and
Czechoslovakia (1993), although each with different results.
Acording to Aalen (2006), the Ethiopian constitution under the EPRDF defined ethnicity and
ethnic groups only in primordialist way. According to Article 39(5) of the Ethiopian
constitution
“A ‘Nation, Nationality or People’ for the purpose of this Constitution ,
is a group of people who have or share large measure of a common
culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a
common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and
who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.”
The primordialist approach which the EPRDF based its ethnic classification of the country
deserves more emphasis and explanation. There are two major theoretical “Schools” on
nationalism and violence: primordialism and instrumentalism. According to primordialism,
humans are subdivided into naturally demarcated communities (Gurr 1994). In
instrumentalism theory, on the other hand, individuals choose their identity rationally.
Therefore, as described by Anderson (1983), Ellingsen (2000: 203) and Gurr (1994: 348), in
instrumentalist perspective, communities are seen as either imagined or chosen and
members’ loyalties to the communities are determined by shared prospects, not shared
20
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
qualities. Primordialism theory was dominant in the 19th century where it served as a
rationale for the nationalist movements and the principle: for every nation-one state. In the
20th century, the applicability of “for every nation-one state” theory was challenged in two
ways: First of all, many areas of the world are inhabited by mixed people. Second, different
people define their nationality in different ways: for some language is the fundamental
criterion, others consider race as the primary distinction between peoples, while religion and
culture are perceived fundamental by others (Helland-Hansen 2007). As stated above,
according to primordialist view, ethnicity is regarded as something naturally inborn, fixed
and stable. This view can be best explained by assessing how colonialists particularly
indirect rule proponents regarded Africans during colonialism. The European colonist and
the early structural functionalist anthropologists viewed African society as a collection of
tribes that are characterized by distinct cultural markers (Evans-Pritchard 1951). However,
contrary to the colonialist claim, recent Anthropological studies disclosed that it was the
policy of colonialist themselves that “created” or rigidified the previous very loose ethnic
identities making them fixed instead of flexible (Bayart 1993; Ranger 1983). At present,
social scientists conventionally view ethnicity as a constructed phenomenon. This approach
is called “modernist”, or “instrumentalist.” In the struggle for resources and political power,
politicians mobilize people by dividing people along constructed ethnic lines (based on
selection of cultural markers) (Yeros 1999). In this case, ethnicity is not fixed and stable.
Expanding his argument Aalen (2006) stressed that according to Article 39(10) of the 1994
Constitution, “the whole population of the federation is seen as composed of nations,
nationalities and peoples....it means that every citizen must belong to an ethnic group and
define themselves along ethnic lines.” In this case, for Aalen (2006), the constitution will end
up in creating fixed and inborn ethnic identities in the same manner as indirect rule of
colonialism created fixed inborn ethnic identities in Africa. Aalen (2006) claims that, “Some
21
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
commentators are concerned that the ‘ethnicisation’ of the Ethiopian state structures has
opened a Pandora’s Box of ethnic rivalries and hostility that will be difficult to close again.”
5. Conclusion
According to Turton (2005: 90), ethnic federalism is unpopular in Africa though it is
successful and popular in those very few European countries that undertook a form of ethnic
federalism. As we tried to explain in the above paragraphs, Ethiopia has been following
federalism for the last two decades. Therefore, it is proper to ask, did ethnic federalism
succeed in Ethiopia? According to Turton (2005: 92-93),
“When one considers the level of internal conflict, military violence and repression
by agencies of the state that characterised the period of the Derg, the restructuring
of Ethiopia as an ethnic-based federation has been an undeniable success. It has
provided peace and security for the great majority of the population following a
violent civil war and laid down, for the first time in the history of Ethiopia, ‘the legal
foundation for a fully fledged democracy.’ But if one considers the success of
federalism in Ethiopia not against the record of the previous regime, but against the
essential requirements of a genuinely federal division of powers, one cannot but
entertain fears for its long-term future.”
After considering the various facts which we have exhaustively discussed, the following
conclusions are drawn:
(1) Ethnic federalism has failed to solve ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia.
In the post 1991 Ethiopia, major and minor ethnic conflicts have been raging in many parts
of the country including the capital, Addis Ababa, due to political, economic and border
problems. Conflicts have become very common between the Oromo and the Somali ethnic
groups; Oromo and Harari, Somali and Afar; Oromo and Southern nations, Oromo and
22
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Amhara etc. These conflicts have led to the death of many innocent people, the destruction
of property, and the dislocation of many people. 14 According to the official report of the
Ethiopian Federal Police in the 2000 EC 15 (2007/8GC) alone, there were 28 ethnic conflicts
in the country (Reporter 09 April 2008a). Universities and schools have also become the
center for ethnic conflicts and are frequently closed due to ethnic clashes (Ethiopia Zare 10
April 2008; Sudan Tribune 9 September 2006). Moreover, due to ethnic conflicts ethnic
minorities are being expelled from various regions.
(2) The inclusion of Article 39 in the Constitution has encouraged the ethnic-based
organizations in the country that have secessionist programs such as the ONLF and the OLF
(Wondwosen 2008) to fight for a separate state. For the last two decades the secessionist
movements of the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) 16 and the ONLF (Ogaden National
Liberation Front 17 ) have reached a very high level and the political parties are able to get
international attention by conducting armed resistance. For instance, in the 1992 regional
election the ONLF won and formed a regional government that lasted just only a year. In the
following election the WSLF (Western Somali Liberation Front) in collaboration with the
ONLF won and formed a government. In February 1994, the Ogaden clan dominated
regional assembly opted for secession from Ethiopia by exercising the right to selfdetermination as stipulated in the Constitution. This action prompted a swift action by the
federal government that aborted the secession attempt (Hagmann and Khalif 2006: 25-49).
14 In order to assess the magnitude of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia in the post-1991 Ethiopia see Merera (2003: 143),
and the reports of the BBC (16 December 2003, 4 February 2004); Daily Monitor (19 July 2005); IRIN (01
November 2005, 5 July 2002, 13 December 2007, 22 December 2003, 6 February 2004, 14 June 2006, 12 March
2003, 19 July 2006); Ethiopia Zare (09 June 2008); Reporter (09 April 2008a, 09 April 2008b, 28 May 2008); Reuters
(9 April 2008); Sudan Tribune (9 September 2006, 12 April 2008, 15 February 2004, 6 March 2004, 15 May 2008, 24
May 2008); Wondwosen and Jerusalem (2007).
15 EC (Ethiopian Calendar), GC (Gregorian calendar)
16 See BBC (15 September 2006, 5 July 2002, 19 August 1999, 3 December 1997); Reuters (4 November 2006);
Sudan Tribune (15 November 2006, 13 September 2005, 11 December 2006, 8 June 2005, 5 April 2007).
17 See BBC (25 April 2007, 26 April 2007, 23 July 1999, 5 July 2000); The New York Times (13 June 2008); Sudan
Tribune (2 April 2008, 13 June 2008, 14 August 2006, 17 March 2006, 30 August 2007).
23
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
(3) Federalism in principle is good. But other models of federalism should be explored. For
example, territorial federalism i.e., splitting national territory in geographical zones and
regions (like Germany, USA, Spain, UK) can be an alternative.
(4) Ethiopian federalism is not a democratic federalism. Regional (State) leaders are either
members of the ruling EPRDF party or the puppets of the ruling party in the name of “allied
parties”. According to opposition parties, there are many TPLF members who occupied top
administrative positions in many regions in the country. In Amhara, Oromia, the SNNP and
other regions TPLF members are placed in key positions to check the loyalty of those
regions to the ruling party (Andargachew 1997: 253-254, 256; Merera 2003:124, 161).
Moreover, the TPLF created the infamous Peoples’ Democratic Organizations (PDOs) in
various regions (controlled by its political cadres) to suppress other genuine political
organizations of the people. According to Merera (2003: 123), the PDOs are “not locally and
independently initiated political groups, but TPLF-created ...for the control of non-Tirrayan
ethnic groups of the country.”
The major problems of the Ethiopian ethnic federalism have been outlined by Turton (2006:
5) who says that “it was decided that each major subnational group should be dominant in
one, and only one, regional state.” Levine (2008) states that Ethiopia has to create a
“national public” to overcome conflicts caused by recent constitution and historical claims of
various groups, while Abbink (2006) suggested to re-arrange the ethno-linguistic borders
delineated by the constitution, which should be the first step towards depoliticizing ethnicity.
The reason why the ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia seems to fail lies not only in the
character of the Ethiopian constitution, outlined along the ethno-linguistic borders, but also
in the historical claims and oppositions that the constitution managed to stress. Already after
24
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
the fall of the Derg regime in 1991, the new government wanted to distinguish itself from the
previous regimes and ethnic federalism seemed to be the proper solution. Unfortunately, with
the lack of good governance, democratic process and elections, and by accenting ethnicity
and diversity of Ethiopia, ethnic federalism has little to offer for the populations on the
“periphery”. Federalism means a “division of power” and a “decentralized government” and
this is not what we may expect from the contemporary ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia.
25
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
References Cited
Aalen, Lovise (2002): Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian
Experience 1991-2000.
Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. Development Studies and Human Rights, Bergen.
Aalen,Lovise (2006): “Ethnic Federalism and self Determination for Nationalities in s SemiAuthoritarian State: the Case of Ethiopia.” International Journal on Minority and
Group Rights, 13 (2-3), pp. 243-261.
Abate Nikodimos Alemayehu (Fall 2004): Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Challenges and
Opportunities, Faculty of Law, University of Lund (Master thesis).
Abbink, Jon (1997): “Ethnicity and Constitutionalism in Contemporary Ethiopia.” Journal of
African Law, 41: 159-174.
Abbink, Jon (1993): “Ethnic Conflict in the ‘Tribal Zone:’ The Dizi and Suri in Southern
Ethiopia,” Journal of Modern African Studies, XXXI, 4 P. 675
Abbink, J. (1997): “Ethnicity and constitutionalism in contemporary Ethiopia”, Journal of
African Law, 4th Quarter.
Abbink, J. (2006): Ethnicity and Conflict Generation in Ethiopia: Some Problems and
Prospects of Ethno-Regional Federalism. Journal of Contemporary African Studies
24 (3): 389-406.
Adele-Jinadu, L., (1994): ‘Federalism and the Structure of Nigerian Federation: Some
Recurrent Issues’, The Nigerian Journal of Federalism, Vol.1, No.2, December.
Addis Digest (July 1995): “Focus of the Month: The Ethnic Problem in Ethiopia,” No. 4,
GRAPECA, Bonn.
Addis Digest (September-October 1995): “Focus: Ethnic Federation: Reality, Rhetoric and
26
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Risks”, No.6/7, GRAPECA, Bonn.
Addis Tribune (2 March 2001): “Over 100 killed in East Wollega” EHRCO says Ethnic
Religious Conflict Reach Serious Stage.”
Agbu, Osita (2004): “Re-Inventing Federalism in Post- Transition Nigeria: Problems and
prospects”, Africa Development, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, pp. 26-52.
Ake, Clude (1996): Democracy and Development in Africa, Washington DC: Brooking
Institute.
Alem Habtu (2003): Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Background, Present Conditions and
Future Prospects. Paper Submitted to the Second EAF International Symposium on
Contemporary Development Issues in Ethiopia, July 11-12, 2003, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia.
Almendral, Violeta Ruiz (2002):”Fiscal Federalism in Spain: the Assignment of Taxation
Powers to the Autonomous Communities,” Presented at the Comparative Fiscal
Federalism Conferenceorganized by the University of Birmingham, with the support
of the Canadian High Commission (London), the Forum of Federations (Ottawa) and
the Research in Brussels program of Brussels-City Region. January 18th 2002.
Andargachew Tsige (1997 EC): “Netsanet yemayawk netsa awchi” (“Freedom Fighter with
out Freedom”)
Anderson, Benedict (1983): Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. London: Verso
AP (Associated Press) (28 February 2001): Human right group: 100 killed, 10900 displaced
by the fighting in Western Ethiopia”
ARB (Africa Research Bulletin): Political, Social and Cultural Series (September 1999),
“Ethiopia: OLF Defeated? Vol. 36, No.8.
Asmal, Kader (1990): Constitutional Issues for A Free South Africa: Decentralization of a
27
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Unitary State, Transformation 13, pp.81-95.
Assefa Fiseha (2007): Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia. A
Comparative Study. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers.
Awolowo-Dosunmu (1994): ‘Observations on Nigerian Federalism’, The Nigerian Journal
of Federalism, Vol.1, No.1, June.
Bayart, J.-F. (1993): The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, (Longman, New York).
BBC (16 December 2003): “Violent Land Clashes in Ethiopia”
BBC (4 February 2004): “Western Ethiopia tense after clashes”
BBC (25 April 2007): Q & A: Ethiopia’s ONLF rebels
BBC (26 April 2007): “Ethiopia rescue attempt warning”
BBC (23 July 1999): “The Somali connection”
BBC (31 January 2001): “Ethiopia: Amhara Nationals Being evacuated form Western
District”
BBC (5 July 2000): “Ogaden Opposition radio on air”
BBC (15 September 2006): Ethiopian officers join rebels’
BBC (5 July 2002): Oromo rebels deny Ethiopian ‘victory’”
BBC (19 August 1999): “Ethiopia says Oromo rebels crushed)
BBC (3 December 1997): “Ethiopia charges 31 over suspected rebel attacks”
Bednar, Jenna (7 September 2006): The Robust Federation. University of Michigan; Dept. of
Political science
Berhanu Gutema Balcha (2008): “Ethnicity and restructuring of the state in Ethiopia,”
DIIPER Research Series, Working Paper No. 6.
Berhanu Nega 1998 EC: Yenetsanet Goh Siked. Likelebes Yetemokerew Ye Ethiopia
Democracy (in Amharic) (“The Dawn of Freedom”)
28
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Börzel, Tanja A. (n.d): University of Heidenberg. “Federalism is dead-Long live
Federalism”.
EPS forum: Debating Federalism and Constitutionalism in European Union.
Brancati, Dawn (2006): Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of
Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism,” International Organization, 60(3), 651-685.
Brietzke, Paul (1995): “Ethiopia’s Leap into the Dark”: Federalism and Self-determination in
the New Constitution.” Journal of African Law, Vol. 40.
Brosio, Giorgio (October 2000): Decentralization in Africa.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/fiscal/brosio.pdf
Broschek, Jörg (2007): “Federalism and Political Change: Germany and Canada in
Historical-Institutionalist Perspective” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
Canadian Political Science Association, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, May 30 –
June 1, 2007.
Bunce, Valerie (1999): Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism
and the State. Cambridge University Press.
Buchheit, Lee (1978): Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination. New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press.
Cameron, Maxwell A. And Tulia G. Falleti (2004): “Federalism and the Separation of
Powers at The Subnational Level, “Prepared for Delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting
of The American Political Science Association, September 2 - September 5, 2004.
Chabal, Patric and J.P. Daloz (1999): Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument.
Oxford: James Currey.
Chandhoke, Neera (September 2006): ‘A State of One’s Own’: Secessionism and Federalism
29
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
in India, Working Paper no. 80, Crisis States Research Centre, Crisis State
Programme, Working paper Series, No. 1.
Coakley, John (2000): The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict. London: Frank Cass
Cohen, John M. and Stephan B. Peterson (1999): Administrative Decentralization: Strategies
for Developing Countries. West Hartford, CN: Kumarian press.
Cohen, J.M. (1995): “Ethnic federalism” in Ethiopia. Northeast African studies, 2, pp.157188. "Constitution of the [Chinese] Soviet Republic" November 7, 1931, in Brandt,
Conrad, Benjamin Schwartz, and John Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese
Communism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1952), p. 220.
Daily Monitor (19 July 2005): “Gabra, Guji Conflict Displaces over 43,000.”
De Silva, Kingsley M. (1986): Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies,
Lanham: University of America.
Duchacek, Ivo (1977): ‘Antagonistic Cooperation: Territorial and Ethnic Communities’,
Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 7(4), Fall, 8-9.
Egwu, Samuel (2003): ‘Ethnicity and Citizenship Rights in the Nigerian Federal State’, in
Gana and Egwu (eds) Federalism in Africa, vol. 2, NJ: Africa World Press Inc.
Elaigwu, J. I., (1994): ‘Ethnicity and the Federal Option in Africa’, The Nigerian Journal of
Federalism, 1(1), June.
Elazar, Daniel (1987a): “Foreword.” In: The Political Theory of the Compound Republic:
Designing the American Experiment, Vincent Ostrom, (Ed) 2nd ed. rev.
Elazar DJ. (1987b): Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa: Univ. Alabama Press.
Elazar DJ. (1993): International and comparative federalism. PS: Polit. Sci. Polit. 26(2): 190195.
Elazar DJ, (Ed). (1994): Federal Systems of the World. Harlow, UK: Longman Group. xxi,
2nd Ed.
30
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Ellingsen, Tanja (2000): Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew? Multiethnicity and
Domestic Conflict During and after the Cold War. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution:
Journal of the Peace Science Society (International). Sage Publications Ltd., Vol.
44(2), pp. 228-249.
Engedayehu, Walle (1993): “Ethiopia: Democracy and the Politics of Ethnicity.” Africa
Today, 2nd Quarter, pp. 29-30.
Erk, Jan (Winter 2004): Austria: “A Federation without Federalism,” Publius: The Journal
of Federalism 34(1), 1-20.
Ethiopia Zare (10 April 2008): Be Bale University Haya temariwoch tegedelu (“20 students
killed in Bale university”)
Ethiopia Zare (09 June 2008): “Bewelegaw Gicht Yemotut Ke 250 yibeltalu” (“More than
250 killed in Wollega conflict”)
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1951): Kinship and Marriage among the Nuer. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Fedosov, Pyotr (2002): “Theoretical Aspects of Federation in Russia,” in: Federation in
Russia, Rafael Khakimov (Ed.), Donald J. and Natalia Dolgova Jacobsen (Trans.).
Kazan, pp. 12-19.
Fillippov, Mikhail, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga Shvetsova (2004): Designing Federalism: A
Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions. Cambridge University Press.
Fleiner, Lidija R. Basta (2000): ‘Can Ethnic Federalism Work?’- Paper for the Conference
on “Facing Ethnic Conflicts”, Bonn, Germany 14-16, December 2000 - Centre for
Development Research (ZEF Bonn).
Ghai, Yash (2000): Autonomy and Ethnicity Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic
States. New York: Cambridge. University press.
Gebrehiwet Tesfai Barki (August, 2006): “Ethiopia: Is Multy – Ethnicity Federalism
31
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Feasible? Challenges and Prospects.” Institute of Federalism, Friburg University.
Gérard, Marcel (2001): “Fiscal Federalism in Belgium,” Conference on Fiscal Imbalance,
Québec City, September 13-14, 2001.
Gurr, Ted Robert (1994): “Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing
World System,” in: International Studies Quarterly. Blackwell Publishers, No. 38.
Gurr, T. Robert and Barbara Harff (1994): Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Oxford.
Hagmann, Tobias and Mohamad H. Khalif (2006) Bildhaan: An International Journal of
Somali studies, Vol.6, pp.25-49.
Hameso Y. Seyoum (1997) Ethnicity in Africa: Towards a Positive Approach, London: TSC
publications.
Hassen, Mohamed (1999): “Ethiopia: Missed Opportunities for peaceful Democratic
Process.” In: State-building and Democratization in Africa. Kidane Mengistiab and
Cyril Daddeh (Eds.). Westport, CN: Praeger. Hechter, Michael. 2000. Containing
Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hechter, Michael (2000): Containing Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Helland-Hansen, Kristian (27 February 2007): “Peace be Upon You: The Relevance of
Religion to violent Conflict”. Dept. of Political Science, University of Oslo
Henz, Paul B. (1998): “Is Ethiopia Democratic? A political Success story.” Journal of
Democracy 9: 40-54.
Horowitz, Donald (1997): “Ethnic conflict Management for policy Makers.” In:
Conflict and peacemaking in multi ethnic states. Joseph V. Montville (Ed.). New
York: Lexington Books.
Huntington, Samuel (1993a): The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Country. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1993b): “Political Development in Ethiopia: A Peasant-based
32
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Dominant-Party Democracy.” Report to USAID/Ethiopia on consultation with the
Constitutional Commission, March 28 to April 1, 1993, pp., 14-16.
ICG (26 Jan. 2007): Somalia: The Tough Part is Ahead, in: Africa Briefing, No. 45,
Nairobi/Brussels.
IRIN (1 November 2005): “Police attacked in troubled Western region”.
IRIN (13 December 2007):”Healing the Scars of conflict”
IRIN (22 December 2003): “56 Arrested after ethnic killings”
IRIN (6 February 2004): “Ethnic violence leaves 18 dead in the east.”
IRIN (14 June 2006):” Ethnic Conflict claims 100 lives in the South”
IRIN (12 March 2003): “Government blamed for ethnic conflict”
IRIN (19 June 2006): “Thousands displaced in clashes over land in the South”
IRIN (5 July 2002): “Ethnic Conflict Worsening Afar food crisis”
Jinadu, L. Adele (September 2002): “Ethnic Conflict of Federalism in Nigeria”. ZEFDiscussion papers on Development Policy, Bonn, Nov. 49.
Khakimov, Rafael (2002): “Forword” in: Federation in Russia, Rafael Khakimov (Ed.),
Donald J. and Natalia Dolgova Jacobsen (Trans.). Kazan, pp. 7-9.
Keller, Edmond J. (June 2002): “Ethnic Federalism, Fiscal Reform, Development and
Democracy in Ethiopia,” African Journal of political science (formerly African
Journal of Political Economic), Vol. 7, No.1, pp. 21-50.
Keller, Edmond (1998): “Transitional Ethnic Conflicts in Africa.” In: The International
spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation.
Kidane Mengisteab (1997): “New Approaches to State Building in Afirca: The case of
Ethiopia’s ethnic based federalism.” African Studies Review 40, pp.111-132.
Kidane Mengisteab (1999): “Ethiopia’s Ethnic-based federalism: State-Building or Empire
Reviving? “Unpublished paper.
33
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Kimenyi, Mwangi (1998): “Harmonizing Ethnic Claims in Africa; A proposal for EthnicBased Federalism,” Cato Journal, 18(1), 43-63.
Kimenyi, M. S. (1997): Ethnic Diversity, Liberty and the State: The African Dilemma,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
King P. (1982): Federalism and Federation. London: Croom Helm.
Kreptul, Andrie (2003): “The Constitutional Right of Secession in political Theory and
History,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, 17(4), 39-100
Kymlicka, Will (1998): “Is federalism a viable alternative to secession? In: Theories of
Secession. Percy M. Lehning (Ed.). London: Routledge.
Kymlicka, Will (2006): “Emerging Western Models of Multination Federalism: Are they
Relevant for Africa? In: David Turton (Ed), Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian
Experience in Comparative Perspective, Addis Ababa University Press and James
Currey Publishers, 2006, pp. 32-64.
Levine, Donald (1974): The Evolution of the Multi-Ethnic Society. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Levine, Donald (2008): Public action and Democracy. The Reporter, Sat, Jan 19, 2008, p.
11.
Lijphart, Arend (1977): Democracy in Plural Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lijphart, Arend (1999): Patterns of Democracy. USA: Yale University Press
Lijphart, Arend (2002): ‘The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy’, in: Andrew Reynolds
(Ed.) The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management,
and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lustick, Ian S., Dan Miodownik, and Roy J. Eidelson (2004): Secessionism in
Multicultural States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It? American
Political Science Review, 98(2), (May).
34
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Mamdani, Mahmood (2005): ‘Political identity, citizenship and ethnicity in postcolonial
Africa’. A keynote address in Arusha conference, “New frontiers of social policy” –
December 12-15, 2005.
Maiti, Prasenjit (2002): Major changes for India’s constitution? Federations, 2(4), June/July.
Mattei, Ugo (1995): “The New Ethiopian Constitution: First thoughts on ethnical federalism
and the reception of Western Institutions.” In: Grande, Elisabetta (Ed.). Transplants
Innovation and Legal Tradition in the Horn of Africa. Torino: L’harmattan Italia.
Mazrui, Ali (April 1994): The Bondage of Boundaries. IBRU Boundary and Security
Bulletin, Pp. 61-63.
Merera Gudina (2003): Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for
Democracy, 1960-2000. Addis Ababa: Chamber Printing Press.
Merera Gudina (2006): Contradictory Interpretations of Ethiopian History: the Need for a
New Consensus. In: Turton, D. (ed.): Ethnic Federalism. The Ethiopian Experience
in Comparative Perspective, Oxford: James Currey, pp. 119-130.
Mohammed Hassan (1999): “Ethiopia: missed opportunities for PeacefulDemocratic
process.” State Building and Democratization in Africa: Kidane Mengisetab and Cyril
Daddieh (Eds.). Westport: Praeger.
Momoh, Abubakar (1999): ‘Problemitizing the Issues and Politics in Civil Society’s notion
of Federalism in Nigeria’, AFRIGOV Conference on New Directions in Federalism in
Africa, March 14-18, Abuja.
Monahan, Patrick J., and Michael J. Bryant (June 1996): “Coming to Terms with Plan B:
Ten Principles Governing Secession.” With Nancy C. Cote. C.D. Howe Institute
Commentary 83.
Mueller, Dennis C. (n.d): “Federalism: A Constitutional Perspective.” Charles B. and
35
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Dennis C. Mueller (Eds.)
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDIA) and the African American
Institute (AAI). (1992): An Evaluation of the June 21, 1992 Elections in Ethiopia.
Negussay Ayele (2006): “Meles Zenawi and Etrhiitorpeia”
<http://ethiomedia.com/articles/meles_zenawi_and_eritrea.html>
Negussay Ayele (30 June 2007): “On the Identity of PM Meles Zenawi and His TPLF
Regime in Ethiopia”
<http://www.ethiopians.com/Views/On_the_Identity_of_PM_Meles_Zenawi_by_Ne
gussayAyele_June07.pdf>
Nordlinger, Eric (1972): Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, Cambridge: Centre for
International Affairs, Harvard University.
Nyong’o, P. Anyang’ (2002): “The Study of African Politics. A Critical Appreciation of a
Heritage”. Heinrich Böll Foundation. Regional Office for East and Horn of Africa.
Nairobi. p. 101.
O’Leary, Brendan (2002): ‘Federations and the Management of nations: Agreement and
arguments with Walker Connor and Ernest Gellner’, in Daniele Conversi (ed.)
24 Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the study of
nationalism, London and New York: Routledge, pp 153-183.
Osaghae, Eghosa E. (2006): ‘Ethnicity and the State in Africa’, Afro Asian centre for Peace
and Development Studies. Ryukoku University.
Osaghae, Eghosa E. (2004): “Federalism and the Management of Diversity in Africa.”
Identity, Culture and Politics, 5(1&2), 162-178.
Ostrom, Vincent (1989): “Courts and Collectivities.” Paper prepared for a Conference on
Public Choice and the Judiciary, Utah State University,
Ottaway, Marina (1995): “The Ethiopian Transition: Democratization or New
36
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Authoritarianism”. Northeast African Studies 2: 64-84.
Ottaway, Marina (1994): Democratization and ethnic nationalism: African and Eastern
European Experiences. Washington DC: Overseas Development Council.
PANA (Pan African News Agency) (28 February 2001): “Ethnic Clashes Claim 100 Lives”
Paul, James C.N (2000): “Ethnicity and the New Constitutional Orders in Ethiopia and
Eritrea In: Ghai, Yash (Ed,) Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in
Multi-ethnic States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
PANA (Pan African News Agency) (28 February 2001): “Ethnic Clashes Claim 100 Lives”
Pätz, Tom (n.d): Ethiopia: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Forum of Federations.
Pausewang, Siegfried, Kjetil Tronvoll, Lovis Aalen (Eds.) (2002): Ethiopia Since the Derg:
A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance. London: ZED Books.
Ranger, T. (1983): 'The Invention of Tradition in Africa,' in E. J. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger
(eds.), The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Reporter (28 May 2008):” Bewelga gichit yetekesetew sebawi gudat Enditrara leparlama
tiyake kerebe” (“A Request to Enquire about the human causality in Wollega
Conflict”)
Reporter (09 April 2008a): “Bekililoch Bezendrow amet 28 Gichitoch tekestewal” (“In the
current year there were 28 conflicts in the regions”)
Reporter (09 April 2008b): “Bewendo Genet betekosekse Gichet Kehaya belay sewoch
tegadelu” (“In the Wondo Genet conflict more than 20 killed”
Reuters (9 April 2008): “Land clashes kill 18 in Ethiopia”
Reuters (4 November 2006): “Ethiopia’s OLF rebels call for Kenyan mediation.”
Riker, William H. (1955): “The Senate and American Federalism.” American Political
Science Review, 49(2):452–69.
37
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
Riker, William H. (1964): Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little,
Brown and Company.
Riker, William and Peter Ordeshook (1968): “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting.”
AmericanPolitical Science Review 62(1):25–42.
Roeder, Phillip G. (1991): Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization. World Politics, 43(2),
196-232.
Rüsch, P. and U. Kihm (2003): “The Federal System of Veterinary Services in Switzerland,”
Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz., 22 (2), 423-432.
Saideman, Stephen M., David J. Lanoue, Michael Campenni, and Samuel Stanton (2002):
Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series
Analysis, 1985-1998. Comparative Political Studies 35:1 (February).
Saxer, Urs W. (July 1992): “The Transformation of the Soviet Union: From a Socialist
Federation to a Commonwealth of Independent States.” Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Journal
Serra-Horguelin, Arnault (1999): “The Federal Experiment in Ethiopia: A Socio-political
Analysis”. Centre D’etude D’Afriquie Noire. No. 64.
Siebert, Stella (February 2003): “Federalism and multi-Ethnic Societies: Opportunities and
Limitations.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES). Colombo.
Stephan, Alfred (2001): Arguing Comparative Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Studlar, Donley T., and Kyle Christensen (October 2006): “Is Canada a Westminster or
Consensus Democracy? A Brief Analysis,” Journal: PS: Political Science and
Politics, 37(4), pp. 837-841.
Snyder, Jack (1999): When Voting Leads to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist
Conflict. New York: Norton.
Sudan Tribune (12 April 2008): “Ethiopia’s ruling party accused of instigating clashes
38
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
between Oromo and Sidama”
Sudan Tribune (15 February 2004): “Ethnic tension threatens Ethiopia’s Stability”
Sudan Tribune (6 March 2004): “Ethiopian government apologizes for failing to avert ethnic
clashes”
Sudan Tribune (9 September 2006): “Ethiopian Security Crackdown on Oromo Students
escaliating”
Sudan Tribune (15 May 2008): “36 killed in tribal clashes in Southern Ethiopia”
Sudan Tribune (24 May 2008): “Hundred killed during clashes between Gumuz and Oromos
in Ethiopia”
Sudan Tribune (2 April 2008): “Ethiopia’s ONLF denies arrest of 8 rebels”
Sudan Tribune (13 June 2008): “Rights Watchdog accuses Ethiopia of human rights violence
in Ogaden”
Sudan Tribune (14 August 2006): “Ogaden ONLF denies capture of leading officials”
Sudan Tribune (17 March 2006): “Ethiopian rebels delegation meets Danish officials”
Sudan Tribune (30 August 2007): UN to examine needs, violence in Ethiopia’s Ogaden
Sudan Tribune (13 September 2005): “Ethiopian PM willing to open talks with rebel OLF
Sudan Tribune (11 December 2006): OLF urges Ireland to press for democratic change in
Ethiopia
Sudan Tribune ( 8 June 2005): “Oromo rebels say will not accept Ethiopian government
victory”
Sudan Tribune ( 5 April 2007): “Oromo rebels kill 11 soldiers in northwest Ethiopia”.
The New York Times (13 June 2008): “Rebel with a cause”
Tronvoll, Kjetil (2000): Ethiopia: A New Start? Minority Rights Group International, UK
Tsegaye Regassa (2004): State Constitutions in Federal Ethiopia: A Preliminary
Observation,
39
Teshome B., W., Záhořík, J., (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia.
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 5:2. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com
A Summary for the Bellagio Conference, March 22-27, 2004.
Turton, D. (2005): “Four Questions about Ethiopia’s Federalism,” STAIR 1, No. 2, pp.88101.
Turton, D. (2006): Introduction. In: Turton, D. (ed.): Ethnic Federalism. The Ethiopian
Experience in Comparative Perspective, pp. 1-31. Oxford: James Currey.
Yeros, P. (1999): Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa: Constructivist Reflections and
Contemporary Politics. Palgrave: Basingstoke Macmillan
Vaughan, Sarah (2003): Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia, the University of Edinburgh.
Vestal, T. (1999): Ethiopia: a post cold war state. Westport: Praeger.
Walle Egegahyehu (1997): “Ethiopia: the pit falls of Ethnic Federalism”. In: Issues and
Trends in Contemporary African Politics. Agbango G. (Ed.). New York: Peter Lang.
Watts, Ronald L. (1998): “Federalism, federal political systems, and federations” Annual
Review of Political Science, 1: 117-37.
Wheare, K. C. (1964): Federal Government, London, Oxford University Press.
Wonotanzokan, Tagowa, N. (1994): ‘The Structural Transformation of Nigeria’s Federal
Compact and Nation-Building’, The Nigerian Journal of Federalism, Vol.1, No.2,
December.
Wondwosen Teshome B. (2008): “Ethnic Federalism and Minority Rights in Ethiopia: The
Case of Ethiopian Somali National Regional State. Paper presented at the
conference,” “Tage der Kultur- und Sozialanthopologie 2008”, Department of Social
and Cultural Anthropology, University of Vienna, Austria, 10-11 April 2008.
Wondwosen Teshome B., and Jerusalem Negash Wossene (2007): “The Culture of
Accommodation and Tolerance: Islam and Christianity in Ethiopia,” Paper Presented at
KCTOS: Knowledge, Creativity and Transformations of Societies, held at Vienna,
Austria, December 6-9, 2007.