1
Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy in the Context of Globalization
Amid a world that is rapidly progressing socially, morally, and technologically, the
contemporary philosopher finds himself facing a multitude of emerging ethical dilemmas. Some
of the most perplexing issues unveiled by modern technological advancement are the ethical
questions centered around the effects of social globalization. Advancements in communication,
travel, and economics have vastly lessened the geographical boundaries of and increased the
interaction between the various global cultures. The increased interactions of societies of
differing values force the contemporary philosopher to question both the existence and
composition of a system of ethics capable of governing globalized interactions. To do so requires
exploration of the totality of human nature, a task to which the Scottish Enlightenment
philosophers devoted much of their study. The application of Scottish Enlightenment moral
philosophy, and specifically Adam Smith’s concept of sympathy, implies the necessary existence
of a shared, global understanding of ethics and suggests a potential method for discovering
which values compose it.
Globalization and Multiculturalism
To explore the broad effects of globalization, it is first necessary to obtain a working
definition. Although there is some variation in the detailed descriptions of globalization held by
modern philosophers, they are largely in agreement on its general nature. Two main schools of
thought govern globalization. Some philosophers, such as Karl-Otto Apel, focus on the economic
implications of globalization. Apel (2000) defines globalization as the expansion of economy
through the systematic intertwining of financial capitalism and communications technology. The
other school examines the larger social implications. Waters describes globalization as a “social
process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in
2
which people become increasingly aware that they are receding,” (1995, p. 3). Regardless, both
schools agree that the receding of geographical borders produces drastic cultural effects
worldwide.
The virtual destruction of geographic barriers between countries has dramatically shifted
the makeup of their cultures. Cultures that once consisted almost exclusively of the immediate
geographical residents and neighbors of a society are now perforated with growing pockets of
foreign cultural influence. According to Mason (2007), as cultures are exposed more to each
other, they are presented with opportunities to clash, merge, or hybridize in greater quantities
than ever before. Increased exposure results in varying amounts of both fragmentation and
homogeneity, which thus far have proved to operate largely outside of the influence of the
nation-state or social policy (2008). It is important, here, to recognize the urgent present tense
with which this problem is understood. Globalization is a current and rapidly accelerating issue;
by nature, its progression moves forward permanently into unexplored territory. As Apel
observes, once globalization has destroyed an individualistic understanding of social values, they
cannot be returned to their previous state (2000). Although globalization has led to advancements
in areas such as diversity and cultural respect, it has led to equal amounts of clashing and social
problems. Globalization, therefore, concerns a potentially negative global civil society that must
have some manner of ethical management (Giddens, 1998). The urgency of globalization forces
policymakers to examine the role of cultural ethics and values in such a civil society.
An ethical study of globalization leads to the discovery of a difficult global ethical
dilemma. No one who observes the effects of globalization questions the need for a system of
ethics in a global civil society (Apel, 2000). The dilemma comes when one tries to determine
which universal values, if any, can fulfill this requirement. The moral basis for the ethics of
3
globalization is multiculturalism, or rather the concept that all cultures should be equally
respected due to an inability to impartially decide a superior culture (Neubauer, 2007). Its core is
the love of diversity, and multiculturalism largely denies the possibility of universal ethics
(Mason, 2008). Such denial hinges on the dilemma of the lack of a viable foundation upon which
to build a system of ethics. The dilemma pits science and ethics against each other. Science and
rationality, which have been used to understand and outline the dilemma of globalization, cannot
be the basis for universal morals, as by nature they are value-neutral. Neither can ethics
themselves serve as any more fitting of a foundation, as they are biased by their roots in
individual cultures. Therefore, it is impossible to settle upon a rational foundation in the face of a
multicultural, value-neutral 21st century (Apel, 2000). To any with a multiculturalist view, the
dilemma tightly excludes the possibility of a universal system of ethics.
The dilemma presents two issues to which the contemporary moral philosopher must
respond. First, he must examine the existence of any form of shared human experience which
may be used to build the necessary ethical understanding. Having done so, he must display the
nature of the specific values that might be used. If globalization results in a form of global civil
society, then it follows that there must be at least some concept of values that are a universal part
of the shared human experience. The guiding principle of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers
was the development of a concept of human nature that could explain the entirety of human
history. With such a broad approach, their philosophy aids in the examination of a global culture.
An application of Adam Smith’s ideas of sympathy and the impartial spectator succinctly
outlines both evidence for the existence of shared human experience and a potential method to
discover precisely which values may be a part of global culture.
4
Adam Smith: Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator
Adam Smith’s view of moral philosophy attempts to explain the holistic process of the
development of morality. Smith’s theory centered around the technical concept of sympathy, or
rather, man’s inherent capacity for emotional empathy. Sympathy describes man’s tendency to
place himself, through imagination, in the situation of others to render moral judgment (Broadie,
2006). Smith argues that sympathy, as a part of human nature, is the basis by which man can
develop and concept of morality. Humans understand right and wrong because we can place
ourselves into the situations of others to understand how we would react. By seeking to
understand the emotions of our fellow man, we to some degree become him in our imaginations
by trying to understand what it would be like to be him. The practice of sympathy leads to the
development of what Smith terms the impartial spectator. Through our capacity for sympathy,
we create in our imagination a spectator imbued with our understanding of morality. As this
spectator is impartial to the situation at hand, its reaction serves as the judgment of both the
propriety and merit of all actions we encounter.
Sympathy serves as the foundation upon which Smith builds his moral philosophy. It is a
universal human experience that occurs without man’s direct influence. “How selfish soever man
may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the
fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it
except the pleasure of seeing it,” (Smith, 1759, I.i.I.1) The man’s pleasure is in some way linked
to the fortune of others, and their fortune or misfortune can directly impact his emotions. This is
because the emphasis of sympathy is not upon considering what you might do when placed in
another man’s situation, but rather what it would be like to be that man himself (Broadie, 2016).
Sympathy, therefore, is not hindered by barriers of rationality. Our capacity to feel the emotions
5
of another is not prevented by their inability to feel those emotions themselves. For example, a
man may be so without mental faculties that he cannot comprehend his own situation, yet we
might still feel the emotions that we imagine he should be feeling (Broadie, 2019). It is through
this universal aspect of sympathy that Smtih’s theory of moral philosophy aids in responding to
the two issues of the globalization dilemma.
Cross-Cultural Sympathy
Smith’s study of moral philosophy by necessity focuses on the impartial spectators inside
one individual set of cultures, as well as the interactions between separate cultures. However, a
broad application of his concepts provides a crucial perspective on the nature of a global culture.
Sympathy functions on the separate impartial spectators within the psyche of individuals. As
society reflects the individuals who compose it, it follows that there must be a sort of cultural
impartial spectator governing the interactions between individual cultures. The impartial
spectator would be generated by the sympathies between cultures.
The existence of cross-cultural sympathy proves the existence of some form of shared
human experience. Multiculturalism demands recognition. In other words, as tolerance and
diversity are the core demands of multiculturalism, the outside observer is required to display
some form of acknowledgment of the validity of external cultures (Ishimatsu, 2018). To
recognize an external culture’s validity requires an understanding of its right to hold its values
that can only be gained through cross-cultural sympathy. To make the moral claim that all
cultures have the right to their values implies an understanding of the emotional turmoil that they
would experience were they denied the right to practice. As multiculturalism makes this claim
globally, it implies the existence of a global impartial spectator that exists as a reflection of some
sort of universal standard. The fact that we can share emotions with those of different cultures
6
through mutual sympathy indicates the existence of some common principle of shared human
experience. If sympathy requires inheriting the emotions of others, becoming them in a fashion,
then that we can achieve sympathy with those of another culture proves the existence of
something connecting us all that supersedes developed cultural customs. Cross-cultural
sympathy, therefore, adequately addresses the first issue of the globalization dilemma. By
utilizing a multicultural understanding of sympathy, Smith’s moral philosophy can similarly
address the second issue.
The process of comparing the impartial spectators to locate commonalities could provide
insight into the nature of this shared human experience. If all cultures have a general impartial
spectator, then the concept of sympathy can be utilized to divine the nature of any shared values.
By seeking to place himself in the cultural shoes of others and comparing the experience to his
own and others, the moral philosopher can develop a comprehensive understanding of shared
experiences that reflect shared values. This is not a process that can happen in solitude. “In
practice, sympathetic relations through mutual understandings are possible by acquiring
knowledge of the object and by practice of communications,” (Ishimatsu, 2018, p. 232). The
endeavor to gain a shared understanding of the human experience relevant to the issues of
globalization must be undertaken cross-culturally by as many cross-cultural individuals as
possible, as this is the only way to mitigate potential biases.
Limitations of Cross-Cultural Sympathy
Cross-cultural sympathy aids in understanding the issues presented by the globalization
dilemma. While it provides valuable perspective and understanding of human nature, applying
Adam Smith’s moral philosophy leaves itself open to three major limitations. The first is the
claim that an understanding of sympathy is of itself an ethical principle that was culturally
7
developed, and therefore cannot serve as the basis of moral foundation. Therefore, a sympathetic
perspective must be careful to address the potential biases within the culture in which it was
developed. Second, utilizing the methods of sympathetic relations presents issues with general
feasibility. The difficulties involved with coordinating and managing enough people to achieve
adequate levels of control are most likely too extensive for any practical undertaking. And
finally, any claims made by such an undertaking would expose themselves to the possibility of
being too general for practical use. It is difficult to generate binding generalities when operating
on a global scale.
Conclusion
Adam Smith’s concepts of sympathy and the impartial spectator help to gain crucial
insight into the complicated dilemma presented by globalization, however their practical use in
the matter serves to be refined in the future. As globalization is a matter of ongoing urgency, its
study calls for greater attention shortly. The permanent nature of its effects urges the moral
philosopher to inquire urgently into methods of establishing a system of ethics to manage the
mounting levels of cross-cultural interaction. Adam Smith’s moral philosophy may eventually
prove vital to achieving stability in a globalizing world.
8
References
Apel, K-O. (2000). Globalization and the Need for Universal Ethics. European Journal of Social
Theory, 3(2), 137-155. https://doi.org/10.1177/13684310022224732
Broadie, A. “Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator.” The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith.
Cambridge university Press, 2006. p.158-188.
Broadie, A. (2008). The scottish enlightenment: An anthology. Canongate.
Giddens, A. (1998): The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Haakonssen K. ed. The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith. Cambridge University Press;
2006.
Ishimatsu, H. (2018). Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy and contemporary culturally diverse
society. Artes Liberales, (103), 209–241.
Mason, M. (2007). Multiculturalism, Shared Values, and an Ethical Response to Globalization.
In: Mason, M., Hershock, P.D., Hawkins, J.N. (eds) Changing Education. CERC Studies
in Comparative Education, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-14020-6583-5_4
Neubauer, D. (2007). Globalization and Education: Characteristics, Dynamics, Implications. In:
Mason, M., Hershock, P.D., Hawkins, J.N. (eds) Changing Education. CERC Studies in
Comparative Education, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-40206583-5_2
9
Rendall, J. (1978). Moral Philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment: The Study of Human
Nature. In: The Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment. History in Depth. Palgrave
Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04140-4_5
Smith, A., & West, E. G. (1969). The theory of moral sentiment. Arlington House.
Waters, Malcolm (1995): Globalization. Cambridge: Polity Press.