Chapter 3
Henry the Peaceable: Henry III,
Alexander III and Royal Lordship in the
British Isles, 1249-1272
Michael Brown
Never did any of the English or British kings, in any past time, keep his pledges more
faithfully or more steadfastly than this Henry; for, nearly the whole time of his reign, he
was looked upon by the kings of Scotland, father and son, as their most faithful neighbour
and adviser ... I
The thirteenth-century source used by John de Fordun for his Chronica Gentis
Scotorum preserved a view of Henry III which contrasted with its hostility to his
father and son. This verdict has generally been followed by later Scottish historians
who have presented the reign as a period of peace and stability in the relationship
between the two internationally-recognised kingdoms of the British Isles. By
comparison with events after 1290 this is undeniable. Peaceful relations with Henry
have been used as the external backdrop to the Scottish kings' furthest extension of
their lordship and the definition of Scotland as a separate unit of ecclesiastical and
secular authority. However, there remain limits to our understanding of the
relationship between Henry III and the Scots. The contacts, tensions and rivalries
between the two royal lordships were complex and shifting, especially between the
accession of Alexander III and the death of Henry III. The years from 1249 to 1272
witnessed changes of major significance across the British Isles. They were not
external to Scotland. Relationships between kings, princes and communities in
these islands and on the continent provided the wider framework for Scottish
politics. This chapter examines the experience of Scotland's monarchy and
community against the interplay of these relationships, the most important of
which were the policies and ambitions of Henry III.2
Henry's attitude to Scotland assumed an exceptional importance from 1249.
The death of King Alexander II of Scotland altered the character and balance of
politics in the northern British Isles. An ambitious and able adult was replaced by
a child of eight years. The new king, Alexander III, could not be expected to
exercise personal royal lordship for a decade and the absence of royal direction
put exceptional strains on the political elites of the Scottish realm. In the
circumstances of a minority, many members of this elite regarded Henry III as a
source of legitimacy and guidance. Their attitude and Henry's involvement in
Scotland after 1249 were shaped by the existing relationship between the two
realms.
44
England and Europe in the Reign of Henry III
This relationship was not between two entirely separate political units. Its character
was shaped by the numerous contacts and overlaps which linked the Scottish king
and his realm with the Plantagenet dominions. Most concrete of these were ties of
landholding. A significant group of magnates held lands in both kingdoms and the
kings of Scots were also English barons. They were lords of Tynedale and of the
earldom of Huntingdon and possessed claims to Northumberland, Westmoreland
and Cumberland. These claims had a major impact on the relations between Henry
III and Alexander II. Between 1215 and 1217, Alexander had pursued his claim to
these lands by war and, though he never resorted to arms again, he continued to see
possession of these English lordships as a key element of his relations with England.
He sought them by diplomacy during the 1220s but once again threatened war on
the issue in 1234-1235. The danger Alexander posed was not as an invader. In 1215
he acted as a lord denied his just rights and was accepted as the leader of the
northern English rebels. The overlapping interests of the two realms in the north
could encourage peace, but also served as a cause of tension. The settlement of the
Scottish king's claims at York in 1237 was a recognition of the importance of the
issue.3
There were more advantages than simply the avoidance of war in the north to be
had from the Scottish king's friendship. During the 1220s, Alexander II worked
closely with Henry III's government. Friendship between the kings rested on personal
bonds. In July 1221 Alexander married Henry's sister, Joan and, as late as 1231,
there were plans for a marriage between Henry himself and Alexander's youngest
sister, Margaret. However, the crucial marriage was between Alexander's elder
sister (another Margaret) and Hubert de Burgh, justiciar of England and leading
figure in the young Henry's government. This marriage, which occurred at the
same time as Alexander's own, secured the Scottish king's support, political, military
and financial, for the minority regime in England. Between 1223 and 1225, de
Burgh's government faced a powerful coalition of enemies throughout the British
Isles. In Ireland, Hugh de Lacy with considerable Gaelic support was seeking to
recover the earldom of Ulster and forged alliances with Llywelyn ap Iorwerth,
prince of Gwynedd and the latter's neighbour, Ranulf, earl of Chester. In this crisis
Alexander II aided his brother-in-law, de Burgh. In 1223 he promised Hubert that
he would allow no help to reach de Lacy from Scotland and, later in the year, was at
Worcester for the opening of the royal campaign in Wales which brought Llywelyn's
submission. Alexander's presence signified symbolic, not military support, but he
probably sanctioned the intended expedition of his constable, Alan of Galloway, to
Ulster the next year. Though this was forestalled by a settlement with de Lacy, the
Scottish king had given steady aid to the royal government in its greatest crisis of
the 1220s. Alexander's assistance also came in the form of money. In 1225 he gave
£1000 to help finance the expedition being sent to defend Gascony against Louis
VIII of France and in 1230 he raised an aid of 2000 marks to support Henry's
campaign to recover Plantagenet lands and influence in Brittany and Poitou. This
latter grant was specifically recorded as a gesture of goodwill not a precedent, but
the two subsidies were probably recalled by Henry as further benefits of Scottish
support. 4
However, such advantages proceeded from friendship not dominion and, when
de Burgh fell from power in 1231-1232, the friendship ended. Alexander saw his
Royal Lordship in the British Isles, 1249-1272
45
sister rejected as Henry's bride and sheltered de Burgh and his associates. The rest
of Alexander II's reign would not witness a return to the close relations between the
two royal governments of the 1220s. The possibility of a royal marriage for his
sister, which would have involved a final amicable settlement of Alexander's
territorial claims in northern England and brought the Scottish king prestige and
influence in England, was over. Alexander renewed his claim for a full coronation
at the papal curia, which he had not pressed between 1221 and 1233, and, during
the next five years, adopted a belligerent stance towards Henry IIJ.S Between 1232
and 1237, instead of supporting the English king's authority against his opponents,
Alexander exploited such opposition to put pressure on his royal brother-in-law. He
entered an alliance with Richard Marshal, earl of Pembroke and lord of Leinster, in
1234 during the earl's revolt against Henry. Llywelyn ap lorwerth was also allied to
Marshal, and the English king was faced with a potential coalition of the leading
prince of native Wales, the greatest lord in the Welsh Marches and English Ireland
and the king of Scots. The connection survived Marshal's death in battle in 1234.
The next year Richard's brother and successor, Gilbert, married Margaret,
Alexander's jilted sister, receiving extensive Scottish lands. Though the match had
Henry III's consent, in 1236 Alexander used it to threaten the English king, proposing
to wage war against him with the help of Gilbert Marshal and Llywelyn of Gwynedd. 6
Instead of war, these tensions led to the treaty of York in 1237 and the settlement
of Alexander's claims in the far north of England. It is a mistake to see this
agreement as the resolution of Anglo-Scottish tensions. In the early 1240s a new
dispute brought the kings to the brink of war. While the north of England was the
setting for the main confrontation, the clash concerned a range of issues and the
general relations between the two kings. Henry had given Alexander authority over
the far north and custody of Newcastle when he departed for France in 1242. He
was treating the Scottish king as a friend, and the latter's activities in the region
were not a direct cause of the crisis in their relationship. This occurred inside
Scotland where the murder of a Scottish noble, Patrick of Atholl, by his enemies,
the Bisset family, in 1242 provoked an aristocratic coalition led by Walter and
Alexander Comyn, the earls of Menteith and Buchan, Patrick, earl of Dunbar and
William, earl of Mar. Although he intervened in favour of Walter Bisset and his kin,
King Alexander was forced to bow to the pressure of these magnates and exile the
accused. 7 This was a conflict between Alexander's vassals within his realm and did
not impinge directly on the dominions of Henry III. Henry's intervention in the
dispute demonstrated that the English king did not view his rights as Alexander's
lord as being confined to the latter's role as a baron in England. Walter Bisset
approached Henry in Gascony. He asked for the king's help, not as Alexander's
neighbour but as his lord. Bisset claimed that, as Henry's vassal, Alexander had no
right to disinherit men without his lord's permission. He levelled other charges
against the Scottish king. Alexander was said to be harbouring Henry's rebel,
Geoffrey Marsh. Marsh was a former partisan of Richard Marshal, Alexander's
former ally, and his link to the Scottish king recalled this earlier confrontation. The
Scottish king was further accused of fortifying the Scottish border and planning to
ally with Henry's French enemies after his marriage, in 1239, to the daughter of
Enguerrand de Couci, a major vassal of Louis IX of France. According to Matthew
Paris, the final spark came when Alexander responded to Henry's accusations by
46
England and Europe in the Reign of Henry Ill
stating that 'not even a particle of the kingdom of Scotland did he hold of the king
of England' .s
From April 1244, Henry prepared a military expedition against Alexander on a
considerable scale. His preparations were not motivated by a desire to establish
direct lordship over the Scottish realm, by immediate fear of a military alliance
between Louis IX and Alexander II, or even by anxiety about the Scottish king's
ambitions in the north. Instead Henry's aim was to make a forceful but general
point about the status of the king of Scots. Henry had given Alexander authority in
the far north of England as his vassal and agent, but Alexander had encouraged
castle-building in the marches of his own realm, received Henry's enemies into his
own protection and formed links with the English king's continental rivals. In
return, Henry was appealed to for redress by lords exiled from Scotland. In all these
issues Henry believed he possessed rights as Alexander's lord. Although this lordship
related formally only to the latter's lands in England, to Henry it also implied
general obligations of friendship and support from the vassal to his superior,
obligations which did not stop at the Anglo-Scottish border. These were nebulous
but significant for the English king and he probably regarded Alexander's actions
as violating them. Henry's campaign of 1244 had the aim of forcing Alexander to
acknowledge his position, while the Scottish king regarded himself as defending
his rights as ruler of a realm which lay firmly outside Henry's authority. The speedy
settlement arrived at between the two armies outside Newcastle in early August
represented a compromise. Alexander promised to 'preserve good faith . . . and
love' to his 'liege lord' Henry and neither ally with the king's enemies or 'stir up or
make war' which would harm the English king or his dominions. In return Alexander
gained Henry's recognition of his own right to make marriages, though it was also
agreed to a match between his new-born son, the future Alexander III, and Henry's
daughter, Margaret. Henry had obtained an agreement which placed limits on
Alexander's future behaviour. Though Alexander gave away nothing from his rights
as king of Scots, after the events of the preceding decade it was a not insignificant
statement of his political position.9 Given his preparations, Henry may have wished
to press the issue further. His readiness to negotiate was probably not the product of
his 'gentle heart' but of wider problems. Many northern English magnates had an
interest in preventing open warfare between the kings and it was probably whilst
Henry was in the north that he received news that almost the whole of native Wales
was in arms against him. His efforts to raise fresh resources to deal with this more
direct challenge would play a part in sparking a political crisis in England during
the autumn. Not for the first or last time, the Scots benefited from being only one of
the manifold concerns and problems of the Plantagenets. 10
The confrontation of 1244 was linked directly to such wider concerns, not just
for Henry but also for Alexander. Despite the Welsh war of 1244-1245, events in
the British Isles during the preceding decade appeared to favour Henry. The deaths
of Llywelyn ap lorwerth of Gwynedd in 1240 and of Gilbert Marshal in 1241
deprived Alexander of his allies of the previous decade and may have encouraged
Henry's bellicose attitude. However, the influence and authority of both kings away
from their royal heartlands had been increasing during the years before the crisis.
Henry's position in Wales was greatly strengthened by a series of deaths in the
house of Gwynedd and the division of their principality between the sons and
Royal Lordship in the British Isles, 1249-1272
47
grandsons ofLlywelyn ap Iorwerth, while the king's authority in the Welsh Marches
and the lordship of Ireland was increased by a series of deaths amongst his magnates
which Jed to the final extinction of the Marshal family in 1245 and the de Lacys in
1241-1242. The reach, resources and relative power of royal government in Wales
and Ireland rose to levels not attained since King John's activities in the west
between 1209 and 1212. However, the 1230s also saw the further and steady
extension of Scottish royal lordship into the west and north of the mainland. In
terms of the relations between Henry III and Alexander II, the crucial events were
the deaths of Alan, lord of Galloway, in 1234 and of Hugh de Lacy, earl of Ulster,
in 1242. These magnates acted as the agents of the two royal governments and as
great lords, rivals and allies in the lands and seas on each side of the North
Channel. Following their deaths without recognised male heirs, the kings ensured
their own authority was established in the earldom of Ulster and the lordship of
Galloway. As a result, for the first time, royal officials, Henry's bailies in Ulster and
Alexander's justiciar of Galloway and sheriff of Wigtown, faced each other across
the narrow seas. In the 1240s the channel became a clear frontier between the two
royal lordships of the British Isles for the first time. II
The interests of the two crowns in this region often coincided. In particular, there
were mutual anxieties about the activities of the Hebridean magnates. These lords
held lands in western Scotland as well as the Isles, and their interests as allies and
mercenaries extended to Gaelic Ireland. They were, therefore, a threat to both
kings' interests. However, in 1244 this new borderland of royal lordships added to
the tensions. Scottish attacks on Ireland were one of the charges levelled against
Alexander in that year and Henry sought to raise an expedition from English and
Gaelic vassals in his lordship to threaten south-west Scotland. In the settlement at
Newcastle, Alexander and his men specifically promised not to stir up trouble in
Ireland, but disturbances in Ulster and around the Clyde continued. These clashes
were not the direct product of royal competition. Instead they had much to do with
the continuing feuds over the Galloway inheritance which spanned the North
Channel. It was the murder of the last male member of the house of Galloway,
Alan's nephew, Patrick of Atholl, which had sparked the whole crisis. Local warfare
between Patrick's killers, the Bissets, and the dead man 's half-brother, Alan, son of
the Earl, began in 1243 and lasted until 1248. Patrick raided his enemies' lands in
Ulster and Walter and John Bisset seized and fortified the castle of Dunaverty in
Kintyre, which Alan then took by siege. Henry III had deliberately employed the
Bissets in Ulster and in 1248 allowed John to buy corn from the earldom to
provision Dunaverty. Alexander II's relations with Alan are less clear but the latter
clearly had powerful friends amongst the Bissets' aristocratic enemies.12
More directly, Alexander went straight from the settlement at Newcastle into a
sustained attempt to extend his rule to the west of his kingdom. The Isles, from
Man to Lewis, were under the lordship of the king of Norway, Hakon IV, the third
sovereign royal lord in the British Isles. Though distant from this western province,
Hakon's influence in the Isles was far from negligible and had been maintained by
recent expeditions. When Alexander II tried to buy King Hakon's rights in the
region, he was rebuffed. In response, Alexander launched a military expedition to
Argyll and the Isles. The principal aim of this was to force the magnates of the
Hebrides, and, in particular, Ewen MacDougall of Lorn, to recognise Alexander's
48
England and Europe in the Reign of Henry Ill
authority beyond the shores of his kingdom. The campaign was a direct assault on
Hakon's rights and a forceful attempt to shift the boundaries between the different
kingdoms in the British Isles. It was criticised by contemporaries and must have
been unwelcome to Henry III too. The English crown enjoyed friendly relations
with the kings of Norway and Henry had no reason to wish Hakon's lordship
replaced by that of the Scottish king. His particular concern was the status of Man
and its kings. Henry had maintained long-standing bonds with the rulers of the
island. During the 1230s and 1240s, Henry had guaranteed the security of Man and
rewarded its king, Harald, for his role in safeguarding the seas between England
and Ireland. The English king's role as patron and ally was signified by Henry's
knighting of Harald in 1246. The death of King Harald, drowned as he returned
from Norway as Hakon's designated deputy in the whole of the Isles, left Man
without a ruler and weakened the Norwegian king's ability to oppose Alexander in
the west. In connection with events in Ulster, Henry III must have worried about his
own interests in the region in the face of the Scottish king's ambitions. 13
Alongside such territorial tensions were other issues. During the later 1240s,
Alexander II once again sought the right to receive full coronation from the curia.' 4
Henry's agents blocked the request by claiming that the Scottish king was his
vassal. It was an argument which lay at the heart of Henry's attitude to Scotland.
The English king intervened in Scottish affairs rarely. For the most part, he recognised
Alexander's rights to rule over his realm. However, Henry was sensitive to perceived
challenges to his own status and to his interests in the British Isles. The king of
Scots was one of many great lords on the fringes of his rule from Foix and Beam in
the Pyrenees northwards, with whom he had to maintain a working relationship. In
dealing with Alexander II, Henry could not ignore these wider concerns. Time and
again relations with the Scottish king had become involved with Plantagenet interests
in the rest of the British Isles and on the continent. By securing recognition of his
rights as Alexander's lord, Henry sought to prevent Scottish support for disaffected
Welsh or English magnates, to guarantee the interests of his friends and vassals in
the northern British Isles and even gain access to the resources of the Scottish
realm as during the 1220s. Alexander's actions suggest a very different perspective.
Though aware of his duties as an English baron, he regarded himself as Henry's
equal more than his vassal and the settlement of 1244 had not limited Alexander's
quest for greater rights, either ideological or territorial. The tension between these
two positions had emerged repeatedly during the three decades before 1249 and,
unlike the territorial dispute over northern England, had not been resolved.
In its context, news of Alexander II's death in the Isles cannot have been
unwelcome to Henry III. The absence of an adult king of Scots meant that he
possessed new advantages in his dealings with Scotland during the decade from
1249. However, it is striking that his aims and objectives did not alter fundamentally
from the earlier years of his reign. On two occasions after 1249 Henry came north
to exert personal influence on Scotland. Both interventions, in 1251 and 1255, saw
Henry act as an arbitrator with considerable, declared Scottish support. Henry was
not hungry to exploit the weakness of the Scottish realm under a child king. Two
years passed from the death of Alexander II before Henry became directly involved
in Scottish politics. The end of Alexander's ambitions had reduced Henry's need to
consider his relations with Scotland. When formal contacts occurred they centred,
Royal Lordship in the British Isles, 1249-1272
49
not on earlier tensions, but on the renewal of ties between the two royal houses
through the marriage of the young Alexander III to Henry's daughter, Margaret.
This was not simply an external alliance. The wedding of the couple at York over
Christmas 1251 was used as a display of Henry's personal lordship over his son-inlaw. On Christmas Day the young king was knighted by Henry. The next morning
(St Stephen's Day) the young couple was married. During the next week Alexander
remained in York, performing homage for his English lands. He was also reportedly
asked to pay homage to Henry for Scotland. This request was rejected and Henry
did not press the issue. Instead he stressed that nothing at York prejudiced Alexander's
rights in his realm. Though he registered a claim to lordship over Scotland, Henry's
chief concern was to establish a less defined superiority over Alexander. Thus, the
knighting of the king of Scots was not demanded as a right but marked Alexander's
'reverence and honour to so great a prince'. Whilst at York, Henry oversaw the
removal of Alexander's chief advisers, including the justiciar, Alan Durward. His
statement that this did not form a precedent did not remove its significance. By
issuing pardons to outlaws at the request of his daughter and son-in-law, by
entertaining his guests in lavish style and by being asked for, and giving judgement
in the rivalries between Alexander's councillors, Henry was acting as the young
king's protector, demonstrating a personal relationship between them in which he
was the patron. IS
Though Scottish suspicions remained, as Alexander's father by marriage and in
chivalry, Henry had formed new justifications for exerting influence on Scotland.
His concerns for the health and safety of the royal couple were a significant factor
and valuable justification for Henry's second intervention in Scottish politics in
1255. Though accompanied by an armed escort, Henry chose to keep the majority
of his English supporters outside Scotland. He relied on diplomacy, surprise and
the actions of his Scottish adherents. Once again Henry was taking a limited
approach as the protector of Alexander, his 'chief adviser' not his superior lord.
Although the expedition witnessed Henry's one entry into Scotland, on 20 September
1255, when he rode to meet Alexander and Margaret at Roxburgh, he stated on that
day that, once again, the rights of the king had not been reduced by his intervention.
The visit of the Scottish king and queen to Henry's court during July 1256 reaffirmed
the bonds of kinship which were central to the English king's claims to a greater
role in Scotland.l6
Though personal obligations were an important factor in Henry's dealings with
Scotland, the king's attitudes were also driven by material objectives. In particular,
Henry sought Scottish support for his interests across the British Isles and Western
Europe. The Scottish marriage was the least spectacular of a series of dynastic
plans designed to extend Henry's network of kin and allies. These plans would
mark a shift in the king's goals and was signalled by Henry's decision to take the
cross in March 1250. This would be superseded by the efforts to secure the imperial
title for Henry's brother, Richard, and the Sicilian throne for his son, Edmund.
These objectives required huge funds. Henry's search for resources has long been
recognised as a cause in the political crisis which erupted in England in 1258. It
also formed a major element in Henry's relationship with Scotland during the years
when that realm lacked a king. Even before the marriage of Alexander and Margaret,
Henry had approached the pope seeking an extension of the ecclesiastical tax he
50
England and Europe in the Reign of Henry lli
had been given to include Scotland. In April 1251 Innocent IV rejected this request
as 'unheard of in another's kingdom'. However, after the marriage Henry anticipated
that Scottish support would materialise for his schemes as in 1225 and 1230 as a
result of his influence with the new councillors. Between July 1253 and December
1254, Henry was on the continent. His principal aim was to secure his hold on
Gascony. Faced by local opposition led by Gaston de Beam who had support from
the king of Castile, Henry sought military support from his vassals and allies. In
late 1253 he wrote to the king of Scots asking him to summon the prelates and
magnates of his kingdom in late February to meet Henry's envoys from Gascony.
Henry hoped that the Scots would give him 'council and aid' in his 'arduous and
urgent affairs'. He asked for this help 'by reason of the bond and alliance concluded
between us which requires that we make known to you and your liegemen all
arduous and urgent matters touching our estate, and you to us in return'. The
English king was making a request as a friend and kinsman not a demand as lord,
but must have expected support. His success is hard to gauge but was probably less
than he had hoped. Several knights associated with Alexander's councillors served
Henry in Gascony in 1254, but the greatest impression was made by their enemy,
Alan Durward. Durward used his presence to make a point about the limited aid the
council had sent to their royal sponsor,l7
Limited aid from the council for Henry was a factor in his growing hostility to
the men around the Scottish king during 1255. At the same time, Henry's need for
Scottish financial aid had suddenly increased. During 1254 he had negotiated an
agreement with the pope by which his son would be invested with the Sicilian
throne. In return Henry would pay over £90,000 to the papacy and finance a
Mediterranean war. He received papal assistance in efforts to raise the money.
Innocent ordered the Scottish clergy to raise money for the English king. In May
1254 a twentieth of Scottish ecclesiastical incomes was assigned to Henry for the
next three years and in 1255 the levy was extended for three more years. After
Gascony, Henry may have had doubts about the willingness of the Scots to raise
funds for his needs. The intervention of September 1255 was designed in part to
form a council which was more responsive to these needs. By early 1256, serious
efforts were being made to raise clerical taxation in Scotland. Once again Henry
declared that this did not prejudice the Scottish king's rights and the pope instructed
his agent to persuade the Scottish prelates to contribute either through taxation or
by informal contributions. However the chaplain was also told to keep silent
concerning the privileges and independence of the Scottish church, suggesting
papal awareness that these rights were being trespassed upon. IS
The ambitious marriage diplomacy which accompanied Henry's European schemes
also affected Scotland. The marriage of Henry's elder son, Edward to Eleanor,
sister of the king of Castile, was designed to secure Gascony and attract a crusading
ally. By 1255 Henry may have hoped to win Castilian support for the conquest of
Sicily and these plans involved him in dealing with a ruler much closer to Scotland.
Around 1255-1256 negotiations were opened for a marriage between Henry's
daughter, Beatrice, and Magnus, eldest son of Hakon IV, king of Norway. A second
match between Hakon's daughter and the brother of the king of Castile was also
sponsored by Henry. Henry hoped that Hakon, who had also taken the cross, would
divert his fleet from the Holy Land to Sicily. This planned alliance between the
Royal Lordship in the British Isles, 1249-1272
51
kings of England and Norway had an obvious significance for the Scottish realm,
especially in the isles and coastlands of the west where all three kingdoms met. 19
The extension of the Scottish crown's influence into the Hebrides had come to a
sudden halt with Alexander II's death. The early 1250s saw Henry and Hakon take
a much more influential role in the region, combining to remove local threats. The
most obvious of these was the attempt by Magnus, brother of the drowned King
Harald of Man, to seize the island from rival claimants. In 1250 Magnus allied with
Ewen MacDougall, the leading Hebridean magnate and in 1251 he sought Irish aid
but he failed to impose his rule by force. Henry III ordered action against what he
saw as the invasion of 'the lands of the king of Norway' . It was only by recognising
the lordship of the two kings that Magnus obtained his lands. In 1253 he departed
for Norway having placed himself under Henry's protection. With the English
king's sponsorship, Magnus was 'honourably received' by Hakon and in 1254
returned to be accepted as king by the Manxmen. He was not the only westerner at
Hakon's court. Ewen MacDougall and his cousin, Dugald MacRuairi of Garmoran,
were also present, indicating the Norwegian king's influence. 20
Henry's intervention in Scotland in September 1255 was marked by his increased
interference in the west, as in other areas. His desire to further his own and Hakon's
interests was clearly in his mind. On 21 September, the day after the new Scottish
council had been appointed, Henry placed Ewen MacDougall under his protection.
The king promised to ensure that Ewen was not permanently deprived of his
Scottish lordship in Lorn in northern Argyll, taken from him in 1249. Henry was
protecting an Islesman who had received Hakon's favour, mirroring the relations
between Magnus of Man and the two kings. The following Easter this relationship
was further enhanced when Magnus attended Henry's court and was knighted by
the English king. The new authority of the Norwegian king in the west was reflected
by a reference to him being made king 'over all the isles which his predecessors
had held' in a northern English chronicle.2I
By cooperating with Hakon in the Isles, Henry probably hoped to win that king's
aid in his wider ambitions. However, the influence and friendship he established
with the Scottish and Norwegian kings allowed Henry to hold the balance in this
sensitive maritime zone. His aims were the prevention of conflicts which would
threaten the stability and balance of the region and he sought to achieve them by
regulating the status of island magnates, supporting those who recognised his
influence. Those who did not accept Henry's personal lordship faced the hostility
of all three kings in the region. In February 1256 Henry ordered that Angus
MacDonald of Islay, who had sought protection from neither Henry nor Hakon,
should not be received in the lordship of Ireland. The Scottish king's officials
assisted in the action against him by providing the English with the names of
Angus's adherents. Henry's main concern was the security of Ireland and his lands
in eastern Ulster in particular. Angus 's family had previously supported Gaelic Irish
leaders in Ulster and Henry feared that he would support the leading Gaelic lord in
the province, Brian O'Neill. O'Neill had successfully resisted efforts to force his
submission and had 'devastated the plain land of Ulster' in 1253. By extending
influence with the Scots and Norwegians, with the Manx king and some Hebrideans,
Henry III sought to keep the peace in a way which would bolster his position in
northern Ireland.22
52
England and Europe in the Reign of Henry Ill
Influence and indirect involvement also characterised Henry's participation in
the politics of the Scottish realm. In the early 1250s the realm's political elites
looked to the English king as a source of guidance, leadership and support. For
these magnates, Henry possessed the means to remove their rivals from office
whilst claiming to respect their king's rights. In early 1252 one group of lords, led
by the earls of Menteith and Mar persuaded Henry to act against Alan Durward and
his allies. Menteith's family, the Comyns, and their allies secured control of the
king's council and offices with Henry's backing during the festivities surrounding
Alexander III's wedding at York. Three years later, it was Durward who sought the
English king's intervention and encouraged Henry's dissatisfaction with Alexander's
councillors. However, Scottish magnates seized the king, with only limited direct
support from Henry, and carried Alexander to Roxburgh. Henry's role was to
provide physical backing from this distance and to legitimise the transfer of power.
He confirmed letters issued by Alexander which appointed a formal council of
fifteen to govern Scotland until 1262. These letters also excluded a group of
prelates and lords, including the Comyns and Mar, from office and access to the
king. Henry's consent would be required to end the authority of this council or
restore those excluded from power. Though he promised that these letters would be
returned at the end ofthe minority and that no prejudice would be done to the king
of Scots by his role, Henry had secured formal rights to determine the personnel
and, by implication, the practice of Scottish government.23
Such powers were not the long-cherished aim of the English king. Unlike other
elements of his relations with Scotland and its king in the 1250s, they did not
develop from Henry's goals before 1249. His interventions in Scottish political
society stemmed from appeals made to him by Scots. The value of this role to
Henry was as the means to a number of ends. He must have hoped that a grateful
minority regime would not cause him the difficulties which Alexander II had,
would show him respect and add to his prestige and would provide him with active
support. Henry also had reason to be anxious about the consequences of nonintervention. Open conflict between Scottish magnates was a threat not an
opportunity. It would, and did, impinge on Henry's lands and interests.
Henry's approach to Scottish politics remained fluid. The English king displayed
no set attitude to Scottish magnates. The men favoured by Henry in 1251 were
those blamed by him for the disturbances in 1244. One of them, Alan, son of the
earl, was pardoned by Henry at York for his attack on Ireland. The English king
sought to use lords with lands in both realms to influence Scottish government.
Henry possessed stronger formal and informal bonds with cross-border magnates
like John Balliol and Robert Ros and hoped this would make them direct the
council in his interest. Their failure incurred Henry's serious hostility but shows the
fragility of the king's influence. The truth was that Henry's actions at York were no
guarantee of the support or goodwill of great Scottish magnates like Walter Comyn,
earl of Menteith or William, earl of Mar. The greater formal rights which Henry
secured in 1255 reflected his awareness of this. He wanted the ability to manage the
young king's government without personal intervention or the open intrusion of
English servants. His promise to protect Ewen MacDougall of Lorn in 1255 indicated
Henry's belief that, as Alexander III's 'principal adviser', he could direct the
actions of the latter's council. It showed a confidence in his ability to exert
Royal Lordship in the British Isles, 1249-1272
53
unprecedented influence over what was a separate political society with minimal
effort, which would prove to be misplaced.24
Henry's limited involvement in Scotland was a product of his overall outlook.
The maintenance of his influence in the kingdom was never much more than a
marginal concern. The English king was concerned with Scottish affairs only where
they concerned his personal prestige. Only at Christmas 1251 and in September
1255 did Scotland merit Henry's personal involvement. Even on these occasions
Henry swiftly became involved in other issues. Alexander's marriage at York was
overshadowed by a public clash between the king and Simon de Montfort, while
Henry hastened away from Scotland in 1255 to attend his son's investiture as king
of Sicily. As a monarch with European ambitions, Henry's need was for a swift but
secure resolution of Scottish political disputes.25
The king of England probably returned from Scotland in late September 1255,
believing he had achieved this goal. It formed another element in the extension of
his influence in the northern and western British Isles which had gained pace since
the late 1240s. Henry had imposed the Treaty of Woodstock on the rulers of
Gwynedd, Owain and Llywelyn ap Gruffydd, placing unprecedented territorial and
political limits on their lordship in north Wales. The king also granted extensive
lands to his friends and family in the Welsh Marches and in western Ireland. He
marked a further change by giving Ireland and lands in Wales to his heir, Edward,
in 1254. These acts were not a masterplan for the consolidation of Plantagenet
lordship in the north and west, but Henry was aware of the interconnection of these
areas. In early 1256 the king sent out warnings about Manx rebels to the Scottish
king and nobility, to English officials in Wales and Ireland and, probably, to princes
of Gwynedd. Henry's government was seeking to police a fragmented but
strategically vital maritime region which lay between the realms of the British
Isles. 26
However, as striking as the advance of Henry's lordship was the way in which
his gains unravelled. His extension of royal lordship provoked a backlash. Though
this became caught up in the English political crisis of 1258, the reactions of native
polities was not dependent on events in England. This was most obvious in Wales.
Llywelyn ap Gruffydd had seized sole power in Gwynedd in 1255 and late the next
year he swept into Edward's lands in north-east Wales, extending his campaign into
Powys and Deheubarth in 1257. Llywelyn claimed to be liberating the Welsh from
'bondage' and scored a string of military successes against English forces. 27 During
1256 and 1257, there were also hesitant but clear signs of growing resistance to
Henry's settlement of Scotland. This settlement had excluded a group of magnates
from power. These lords had strong reasons for opposing it and refused to seal the
document which excluded them. They were not a negligible group. The earls of
Menteith, Buchan and Mar were the leaders of the faction to which Alexander II
had been forced to bow in 1242. With William, earl of Ross as their ally, they had a
secure position in the north. When the new council threatened further action against
them, the earls responded defiantly. In the summer of 1256 Henry was preparing to
send English troops to the aid of the council but by February 1257 he was responding
instead to negotiations between the Scottish parties. These parties looked to Henry
to help resolve their disputes. In late July he sent an embassy to hold a council with
the Scots 'to terminate and settle disputes stirred up' between them. Embarrassingly,
54
England and Europe in the Reign of Henry III
however, when the council met at Stirling in August it was used by a group of
prelates with Comyn associations to pronounce papal sentences of excommunication
against the king's councillors. These sentences were in response to the council's
seizure of the temporalities of St Andrews which followed the consecration of a
kinsman of the Comyns, master Gamelin, as bishop in late 1255. For the pope's
protege, Henry III, this was an added problem. For the Comyns and their allies, it
justified an alteration in political tactics. These magnates now claimed to be acting
as the defenders of the liberties of the Scottish Church. They allied this to an attack
on Henry's settlement which was declared an 'abominable document . . . which
might result in the dishonour of the king and kingdom' by the sympathetic Melrose
chronicler. Posing as defenders of the royal and ecclesiastical liberties of Scotland,
Menteith, Buchan, Mar and their allies claimed the leadership of the realm, perhaps
the origin of Matthew Paris's garbled account of them as 'natives', expelling the
foreign adherents of king and queen.28
While native blood was no stronger in this group than amongst their enemies, the
northern earls lacked close ties with Henry and major English lands.29 As a result
they found it easier to abandon the basis of minority politics and openly reject
Henry's will. In late October 1257 Menteith, Mar and Buchan seized King Alexander
at Kinross and carried him to Stirling. This was not a desperate act by a faction on
the ropes. Since late 1255, the Comyns and their allies had successfully defended
their interests in Scotland and at the curia, forcing their enemies to negotiate. The
decision to seize Alexander was a display of confidence, presented in Scotland as a
move to rescue the king from the hands of his discredited, excommunicated
councillors and save the realm from interdict. The events of the winter and spring
confirm the impression of their ascendancy, though not their unchallenged authority.
The king's new keepers distributed offices and extended their influence, particularly
in the south-west where John Comyn, Menteith's nephew, was made justiciar of
Galloway. By comparison, their enemies waited for Henry's support and Alan
Durward went to England before the end of December. In January, Henry ordered
his northern barons to be ready to join an expedition to deliver the Scottish king
from his 'rebels'. However the crisis was delayed until late March. Though the new
Scottish regime sent envoys to Henry asking him to provide representatives to
attend a 'parliament' in mid-April, this willingness to talk did not signal a readiness
to capitulate to the English king.30 Henry certainly mistrusted them. He ordered his
northern sheriffs to raise an army should his 'friends' be attacked and, if peace was
kept, then they were to assemble their men at Roxburgh, the base for the coup
which Henry had instigated in 1255. The English king was right to be suspicious.
The 'adverse party' quickly followed diplomacy with force. In late March the king
was at the head of an army which marched on Roxburgh against the 'traitors'. The
army, which included a fearsome contingent from Galloway, was clearly raised and
led by the Comyns. Their enemies initially offered to negotiate and then fled to
England. Henry responded to the 'war and disturbance' by offering bases and
troops to Durward and his allies, but their flight suggests that, unlike 1255, there
was no wide coalition of magnates waiting for English leadership.3 1
The bellicose approach of the Comyn party from October 1257 did not occur in
isolation. Just before the army took the field, on 18 March, the earls of Menteith,
Mar, Buchan and Ross and a group of other lords put their names to an alliance
Royal Lordship in the British Isles, 1249-1272
55
with Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, named as prince of Wales. The two parties promised
mutual aid and agreed to make no peace with Henry or his supporters which did not
include the other. Unlike Llywelyn, the Scots were only a party within their realm
and were permitted to obey their king's 'strict order'. This was a reasonable
precaution with an eye to future shifts of power and it is significant that the Scots
did not seek to associate Alexander with the alliance. However, when the agreement
was made, these men were still able to use the king against his 'traitors' and their
long-term worries did not remove the immediate value of the alliance. Llywelyn
and his new allies recognised that they were both objects of Henry III's hostility in
early 1258. An agreement to resist the English king in tandem helped both. This
sense of shared interest was not without precedents. Alexander II and Llywelyn ap
Iorwerth had threatened to ally against Henry in the 1230s and the Scots and Welsh
may well have been more closely aware of events in the other realm than is
assumed. The seizure of Alexander III occurred after news that Henry had retreated
ignominiously from Wales in September 1257 had reached Scotland. If the alliance
of March 1258 is a unique survival it is not entirely surprising. In the next two
months it proved useful to both parties and especially the Scots. The alliance
ensured that Henry's military efforts would be divided between two expeditions. Of
these it was the Welsh campaign which drew his personal attention and plans to
support the king's 'friends' in the north stalled during April. By mid-May, Henry
was seeking a negotiated settlement with the Comyns and their allies. In response
to envoys from these lords, Henry asked only for the protection of his friends
against new attacks, his daughter's well-being and for discussions between parties
to be postponed until September. Until then the king was effectively calling a truce
which left his enemies in power. Though he still talked about a campaign in Wales
in his letter of 13 May to the Scots, within a week he was in discussions with
Llywelyn, concluding a truce with the prince in June.32
The alliance had served both Llywelyn and the Scots lords well, but the ease
with which they defied Henry was due to the collapse of the king's authority in
England from early April. The formation of the baronial confederation on 7 April,
Henry's promise to reform his realm in early May, and the barons' takeover of
government at the Oxford parliament in early June corresponded with the gradual
abandonment of planned campaigns in Wales and Scotland.33 During the next
decade, Henry's political difficulties were a major factor in the distribution of
power outside England. In 1258 the English king's wider interests suddenly passed
out of his reach. In Scotland the influence he had held since 1255 was already
faltering. It now evaporated. Between May and August there was no formal contact
with the Scots. Events in the north were not clear but the only formal act of King
Alexander, issued in October, was witnessed by Menteith, Mar and their ally, Hugh
Barclay, indicating the Comyn party's continued dominance of the king.3 4 During
the summer they had probably cemented this dominance by reaching agreement
with magnates like Alexander Steward and the earl of Strathearn who had opposed
them in 1255 but had not fled to Henry III in 1258. This recognition of the king's
new officers and the widening of the regime's support may have been the news
which reached England in late August and 'amazed' Henry. The Scots lords around
the king were ready to demonstrate that further English involvement was
unacceptable. In early September the Scottish king and his council met an English
56
England and Europe in the Reign of Henry Ill
embassy at Melrose. They claimed that these envoys planned to repeat the coup of
1255 and seize Alexander. In response, they raised an army and led it to the border
at Jedburgh to threaten the 'traitors'. The move was designed to quash any possible
challenge to the council's authority and encourage Durward and his allies, who
were still in England, to recognise that they would only recover their Scottish lands
by reaching a settlement with their enemies. 35
This settlement followed swiftly. It resulted in a new royal council with powers
to last until Alexander reached his majority. In November, Henry issued letters
recognising this council but in very different circumstances to his similar action in
1255. Now Henry and the English government were outsiders. The Scots had
established the council without English involvement and merely sought Henry's
acceptance of their actions. The form of this recognition makes clear that this was
still a minority government. Though Alexander was seventeen, the need for formal
regulation of his councillors makes no sense in terms of political factions, dealings
with England or the king's own interests unless he had stifl to claim his full rights
as an adult. It is not necessary to see the young king as being behind the end of
political conflict and if Alexander had forced all parties to a settlement his action
would have surely been referred to in dealings with England which still showed
Henry to be concerned with his daughter's treatment, a theme of earlier complaints.
Instead the council emerged from agreement amongst the Scottish political elite.
The new council of ten included Durward, the Steward and the queen-mother
alongside Menteith, Buchan, Mar and Bishop Gamelin. However compromise was
limited. The three justiciarships and the offices of chancellor and chamberlain
remained in the hands of the Comyns and their allies. The death of Walter Comyn,
earl of Menteith, in mid-November removed the most active and abrasive member
of this group. It improved prospects of smoother relations on the council but did not
weaken his friends seriously.36
The dominant group on the council remained men who had been excluded from
power in 1255. Their seizure of power, armed demonstrations on the border and
alliance with Llywelyn were all directed against the English king. The support they
enjoyed owed something to their success in winning wider support for claims that
Henry's actions had infringed the liberties of the kingdom. Henry had sparked
similarly hostile reactions in England, Wales and Ireland by the late 1250s. His
Scottish enemies were one more group in open opposition to Henry's ambitious
policies. However, during the two years from late 1258 it was clear that this
opposition did not mean a fundamental alteration in the relationship between the
two realms. Such a shift would threaten the overlapping interests which existed
between them. Instead of a dispute over the running of Scotland as a separate
political society, debates between the two realms from 1259 concerned issues
similar to those of the 1240s. The Scots lords asked for the payment of Queen
Margaret's dowry, the surrender of the document which had excluded many of
them from government, for Henry's consent to Alexander's coronation and for his
promise not to aid the king of Man. In response the English government prevaricated.
A similar approach to Llywelyn provoked the prince into war in 1260, but by
contrast relations between English and Scottish realms improved.3 7
This improvement centred on the personal relations between the two kings who
both began 1260 excluded from full power. During the summer, plans were laid for
Royal Lordship in the British Isles, 1249-1272
57
a visit to the English court by Alexander and Margaret. This visit would prove to
have major implications. Alexander probably insisted on it against the will of his
councillors. It was these councillors who insisted on the series of conditions
preventing the English from making demands on the king about the Scottish realm,
changing his councillors or altering his status, perhaps declaring him to be of full
age. Scots lords who had witnessed Henry's actions in 1251 and 1255 were reluctant
to allow him a third chance to use his son-in-law. According to Matthew Paris, the
Scots were also angered by the news that their queen was pregnant. In return for
allowing Margaret to remain in England to give birth after he had returned north,
Alexander received a promise from Henry that, should he die, his newborn heir
would be handed to three or more lords from a list of thirteen bishops, earls and
barons. It was the concerns of these magnates rather than Alexander which needed
to be satisfied. This would prove to be the last occasion when the authority of a
group of Scottish magnates was formally acknowledged by Alexander. Although
the arrangement marked the Scots' preparation for a future minority, it was also the
last act of the existing one. The chief importance of Alexander's visit to England
was as the symbolic establishment of his authority. Henry used the occasion for a
lavish display of his family connections designed to impress English and Scots
alike. By contrast with Alexander's visits to England in 1251 and 1256, in 1260 the
practical results of the meeting between the kings concerned the partial satisfaction
of Alexander's demands and not an expression of Henry's informal superiority.
Alexander returned to Scotland strengthened in money and prestige. He used this
strength to exert his authority over his council. The king's intervention in a threecornered dispute over the earldom of Menteith was the first, indisputable evidence
of the king enforcing his will over a powerful group of his magnates, including
Buchan, Mar, Durward and two other earls. Interestingly, Henry too recovered
authority in the aftermath of the Scottish king's visit. This was due to the collapse
of the baronial council in late 1260, but the contrast between the failure of the
council to deal with Llywelyn's fresh attacks and Henry's establishment of friendly
relations with the Scots was obvious.38
Henry's anxiety to maintain this friendship was of major value to Alexander
during the next six years. The latter's intervention in Menteith was accepted by
most of his magnates, but the disappointed claimants looked for means to reverse
his judgement. Walter Comyn's widow, Countess Isabella of Menteith, and her
husband, the English knight, John Russell, sought Henry's aid. In September 1261
Henry confirmed documents stating Isabella's right to the earldom and allowed a
papal nuncio to begin hearing the case in England after 1263. However, in contrast
to his support of the Bissets, Henry gave no active support to the couple. Henry had
no wish to precipitate a crisis with Scotland to add to his other troubles. His
priorities are shown by his treatment of another rejected claimant. John Comyn was
a much more powerful magnate than the countess. Instead of encouraging his
Scottish grievances, Henry retained him as a source of valuable support in the
English political crisis.39
These preoccupations also affected English activity in the sensitive maritime
region around the north Irish Sea. English concerns with this area increased in the
late 1250s. The crisis of 1258 in Britain coincided with an increasingly effective
challenge to the dominance of English officials and magnates in the north of
58
England and Europe in the Reign of Henry Ill
Ireland. In 1255 Brian O'Neill formed an alliance with Fedlimid and Aed O'Connor,
the leading Gaelic lords in Connacht who were waging a largely successful war
against the government and Walter de Burgh, lord of Connacht. In 1258 Aed
O'Connor and other Irish lords recognised O'Neill as high-king. This alliance of
Irish magnates coincided with the collapse of Henry's influence in the Isles and
Scotland. The implications of this were demonstrated by the plundering attack of
the Hebridean magnate, Dugald MacRuairi, on the English of Connacht. The
marriage of Dugald's daughter to Aed O'Connor in 1259 represented an alliance
with dangers for both English and Scottish governments. Most directly, the prospect
of Irish lords being supported by heavily armed Hebrideans represented a direct
threat to the colony in Connacht and Ulster.40
In these circumstances, the distant influence of Hakon of Norway was of limited
value to the English government. The collapse of Henry III's Mediterranean plans
reduced the wider value of the Norwegian alliance and in 1259, whilst protesting
continued friendship, Henry informed Hakon that the proposed marriage alliance
between their children would not occur. Instead the English recognised that concerns
about the rapid political developments in the region were shared by the Scottish
council. The Comyns, Alexander, earl of Buchan and John Comyn of Badenoch,
Alexander Stewart and his brother Walter Bailloch, and the earls of Ross and
Strathearn were all lords with interests and estates in the lands bordering the Isles
and in a position to direct the council. They may well have resented the support of
Henry III for lords in the Isles like Magnus of Man and Ewen of Lorn during the
mid-1250s. By 1259 these Scottish 'marchers' may already have been exerting
pressure on the Isles. It may have been under this pressure that Ewen submitted,
recovering his Scottish lordships for a high rent, designed to ensure his allegiance.
In May 1259 the Scots wrote to Henry III asking him not to assist Magnus, king of
Man. While their aims probably did not include Man itself at this point, Magnus
also held Lewis and Skye and the earl of Ross was looking covetously at these
islands. The approach by the Scots must have warned Henry that their ambitions in
the Isles did not coincide with his own. However, in 1259-1260 the English could
not afford to be choosy. The earldom of Ulster was the target of a major attack by
Brian O'Neill and the O'Connors. In late April 1260 English officials in Ireland
were ordered to prevent Scots coming to Ir~land and forming alliances to the harm
of the Scottish king. This was almost certainly directed against the Islesmen,
recognised as a common danger by both English and Scottish governments. The
success of their efforts was possibly indicated by the absence of Hebrideans amongst
the list of leaders killed with O'Neill in his defeat by the English of Ulster at Down
in June 1260. The victory, recorded by an Irish bard as won by the heavily armoured
foreigners over the silk-clad Gaels, would have been much harder if O'Neill had
been aided by his own foreigners from the Isles.4I
The English government may have encouraged Scottish ambitions in the Isles at
a decisive point. Attacks initiated by Scottish magnates from 1261 were to receive
the enthusiastic endorsement of their young king as he assumed power. For
Alexander, war in the Isles provided a bridge with the last goals of his father and
with the interests of a powerful group amongst his earls and lords. While warfare in
the Hebrides was left to these magnates, Alexander copied his father by seeking to
buy out Hakon's claims in the Isles in 1261 and in 1263 coordinated the defence of
Royal Lordship in the British Isles, 1249-1272
59
his realm against the Norwegians in which the great lords of north and west, once
again, took the chief active role. Significantly, when Alexander took the field in
person it was in a different direction. In 1264 the king raised an army and fleet to
sail to Man and force the submission of King Magnus to him. Alexander III's plans
for Man had not been foreshadowed by previous royal ambitions on the island and
Magnus's surrender at Dumfries had a greater significance in the British Isles than
the submission of the Hebrideans in the same year. 4 2
Alexander's campaign had exploited the political weakness of England in 1264.
The war between the Scottish and Norwegian kings was watched with impotent
anxiety by Henry Ill. His efforts between 1262 and 1264 to negotiate between the
parties were politely ignored. Compared with 1255 when Henry had possessed
considerable influence with both kings, this failure graphically illustrated the decline
of his reach in the northern British Isles. This decline was clearest with regard to
Man. Alexander had imposed his lordship on an island which had been under
Henry's protection since the 1230s. In other areas too the war in the Isles touched
Henry's interests. The king and his son could only respond indirectly. Edward's
creation of Walter de Burgh as earl of Ulster at the height of the war in July 1263
may have been, in part, an effort to build support in English politics. However, its
timing and regional significance owed more to the need for a secure focus for
lordship in the north of the colony, against the Irish, but also at a time of major
instability in the neighbouring Isles, against possible attacks of Scots, Norwegians
or fugitive Hebrideans. The creation was an admission that the English crown could
not defend its regional interests. 43
This was underlined in 1265 when Magnus of Man died. Alexander took the
island under his direct rule, an action which seems to show the Scottish king's
lordship moving in the opposite direction to that of Henry in the region. Care is
needed in drawing such a conclusion. The treaty of Perth in 1266 transferred the
rights of the Norwegian crown in the Hebrides and Man to the kings of Scots in
return for annual payments, and subjected the Islesmen to Scottish laws and customs.
However, although the Manx dynasty was extinguished, Alexander largely accepted
the rule of the other Hebridean dynasties. His dealings with these dynasties worked
principally through western magnates like the Comyns, the Stewarts and the earls
of Ross and Strathearn. The success of royal authority rested on the stability of
aristocratic alliances and power structures in the region and was not much removed
from English lordship in much of Connacht and Ulster. Just as English rule in
north-west Ireland was vulnerable to shifts of political power and the failure of
Marcher dynasties, so would Scottish authority in the Isles prove to be fragile after
1286. Direct rule was equally problematic. The Manxmen rebelled against Alexander
in 1269 and 1275 and after 1286 would express a hostile view of Scottish rule.
Alexander III's advances in the west proved no more secure than had Henry III's
during the 1240s and 1250s. 44
Scottish activities in the Isles during the 1260s exploited English political crises
without causing a direct clash. While Llywelyn ap Gruffudd renewed war against
the English from late 1262, Alexander III's aims could be achieved whilst maintaining
friendship with Henry. Unlike Llywelyn and his own father he did not have territorial
ambitions which could only be won through military intervention in alliance with
the enemies of the English crown. However, grievances did remain, over Queen
60
England and Europe in the Reign of Henry Ill
Margaret's dowry and Henry's failure to return the 1255 document, which might
have induced a king of Alexander II's temperament to exert diplomatic or military
pressure on the rival parties. Alexander III made no such move. Throughout the
period of sporadic civil war in England between 1263 and 1267, Alexander was
identified by all parties as a natural ally of King Henry. It was only the capture of
Henry and Edward by Simon de Montfort at Lewes in May 1264 that forced a
direct role on Alexander. During the autumn and winter, he sent envoys to the
English government seeking access to the captives reportedly arousing de Montfort's
suspicions. By the spring of 1265, de Montfort was seeking to win over Alexander.
In early March two letters were sent to him in Henry's name. The first commanded
him to recognise the peace in England as Henry's vassal. The second was a
personal appeal based on 'ties of blood and affinity', which it was hoped the queen
would support in the interests of her family. These approaches may have had some
success. By late May the king of Scots's envoys were en route to Henry and de
Montfort at Worcester. They included Guy Balliol of Cavers, who was to die as de
Montfort's standard-bearer at Evesham in August. His presence may indicate that
Alexander was using his contacts with de Montfort and was ready to recognise the
new regime. If so, his readiness ceased when Edward escaped from captivity and
renewed the war in late May. According to a Scottish chronicle, Alexander had
raised an army to aid Edward when the news arrived of de Montfort's defeat and
death at Evesham on 4 August 1265. 45
The Scottish king was also involved in the final sparks of opposition to Henry
and Edward. In January 1267 Edward came north to besiege the rebel, John de
Vesci, in Alnwick Castle. De Vesci was Alexander's cousin and vassal, and Scottish
landowners fought in both camps. Although lord of Tynedale, Alexander was not
involved himself, but he did show his continued support for Edward when the latter
visited him at either Roxburgh or Haddington after the capture of Alnwick. One of
Edward's supporters, Gilbert de Umfraville, was enfeoffed with the earldom of
Angus and Edward was allowed to raise a force of Scots and lead them against a
new uprising in the Midlands. Though this force was probably composed of the
cross-border lords who swore an oath to Edward at York, they went with the open
consent of the Scottish king.46 The events of 1267 marked the last phase of the
English political crisis. They also cemented the close family ties between Alexander
and his English kin. This family mood prevailed the following year when Edward
and his brother, Edmund, visited the Scottish king and queen and the royal couple
travelled south with them to meet Henry at York 'for the sake of solace and
recreation'. The meeting was clearly friendly and informal, but during it, a series of
transactions involving Anglo-Scottish magnates were carried through. The family
reunion was not divorced from the business of the two kings or their vassals.
Alexander's friendship for his English kin did not remove areas of dispute. On the
lingering issues of ecclesiastical taxation and on Queen Margaret's dowry, and in a
fresh dispute about Alexander's rights in the lordship of Penrith, the Scottish king
was no more ready to concede than his father would have been. However, larger
issues seem to have been allowed to drop. Henry does not seem to have pressed
obligations on Alexander like those he sought in 1244 or the 1250s. In tum, after he
gained full authority in 1260-1261, Alexander did not renew the quest for his
coronation. 47
Royal Lordship in the British Isles, 1249-1272
61
Peace and stability had been established during the 1260s against a background
of family ties, personal visits and expressions of affection. This apparently genuine
affection, stretching back to 1251, was perhaps the most important achievement of
Henry III during Alexander's minority. However, the good relations between kings
and kingdoms after 1260 were also due to English weakness. Despite long-term
factors encouraging cooperation, amity was not automatic. In the 1230s and 1240s,
a range of issues had caused tensions and, despite his reputation for goodwill,
Henry did seek to demonstrate a material and symbolic superiority over the Scottish
kings. The Scots' responses to these expressions of limited lordship were not uniformly
hostile. Even Alexander II had recognised his obligations to Henry in 1244. while
the settlement of 1255, giving the English king control over the duration of Alexander
III's minority and composition of his council was accepted by a large group of
Scots lords. For this group, Henry's promise that his role was temporary was
sufficient protection in return for his political support and it was their favourable
attitude to Henry which Fordun recorded. However, those excluded from the council
claimed that Henry's intervention threatened Scottish liberties. The resistance of an
aristocratic group, motivated by both private interests and more general hostility to
external interference, was a combination which would re-emerge in opposition to
efforts to establish direct English royal lordship in Scotland from the 1290s.
Though the struggles of the 1250s never reached the scale of the wars after 1296,
1258 was a crucial year for Scotland. The prospect of an English army waging war
with Scottish allies against the group of lords with custody of Alexander was very
real. Though, as the summer showed, a political settlement was always possible,
major conflict seemed likely in March and may have occurred but for the crisis in
England. The interest and involvement of Scotland in the unfolding of this crisis
from April 1258 emphasises the impossibility of separating the northern kingdom
from the other political societies of the British Isles. This involvement went beyond
the aid given by Alexander and some of his magnates to Henry. From a wider
perspective, the terms of the Treaty of Perth in 1266 were a consequence of the
English crisis like the Treaty of Montgomery the following year, by which Henry
recognised Llywelyn as Prince ofWales and direct lord of the native Welsh princes. 48
Both treaties represented the contraction of Henry's lordship on the fringes of his
varied and complex dominions in the British Isles. The Treaty of Montgomery was
a much more direct loss of influence and, as Llywelyn remained Henry's vassal,
concerned the internal character of royal lordship in Wales. However, the Treaty of
Perth, and in particular the extension of Alexander's direct lordship over Man
concerned the English king. At the earliest opportunity, in the late 1280s, Edward I
would secure the island. His chosen agent, Richard, earl of Ulster, was the son of
the magnate whose authority in north-east Ulster had been established during the
crisis of the early 1260s in the region. It is possible that Edward regarded the
Scottish lordship of Man and Llywelyn's principality as both being unpalatable
results of the temporary collapse of his family's power in the 1260s.
The treaties also emphasised differences in the positions of Alexander and
Llywelyn which were central to Scotland's place in the British Isles. Unlike
Llywelyn, Alexander was the heir to an established royal lordship with defined
status and territory. During the early 1260s, the Scottish king had not needed to
wage war against Henry or seek alliances with his enemies, and his gains from the
England and Europe in the Reign of Henry lil
62
crisis represented a much more limited shift in power. The relative position of the
Scottish king and the Welsh prince by 1270 was shown by Henry III's promise to
pay 2000 marks of Margaret's long-overdue dowry from the money owed by
Llywelyn for his treaty. While Alexander emerged from the 1260s as the secure
ruler of his realm and Henry's friend and kinsman, Llywelyn's more spectacular
achievements had left a legacy of debt and mistrust which would cause fresh
conflict within a decade.49
It is important not to see the relations between English and Scottish monarchies
in isolation. They were part of the interplay between numerous communities and
lords in the British Isles. The ability of the kings to direct events away from their
heartlands varied greatly during these years and affected their dealings with each
other. Neither were these dealings set in stable and fixed patterns between 1217 and
1290. Even a king with limited ambitions, like Henry III, could still be seen as a
threat by some Scots and the dependence on personal factors was illustrated by the
events which followed Alexander's death in 1286. While Edward I's approach to a
new Scottish minority between 1286 and 1290 had similarities to the actions of his
father in the 1250s, his demands for sovereign lordship over Scotland from 1291
went far beyond any earlier search for limited short-term influence. The reaction
from Scottish elites to Edward's demands showed that, while the stability of Scottish
kingship might depend on personal factors, the survival of the rights of crown and
realm rested on a wider base of support.
Notes
2
3
4
5
6
Johannes de Fordun, Chronica Gentis Scotorum, ed. W.F. Skene (Edinburgh, 18711872), i, 295-6.
Recent works have begun to examine the place of the thirteenth century Scottish realm
in the British Isles. See in particular K. Stringer, 'Scottish foundations: Thirteenthcentury perspectives' in eds A. Grant and K.J. Stringer, Uniting the Kingdom? The
Making of British History (London and New York, 1995), 85-96.
For the extent and importance of cross-border landholding see K.J. Stringer, Earl
David of Huntingdon (Edinburgh, 1985), 177-211; ibid., 'Identities in thirteenth-century
England: frontier society in the far north', in eds C. Bjorn, A. Grant and K.J. Stringer,
Social and Political Identities in Western History (Copenhagen, 1994), 28-66; ibid.,
'Periphery and core in thirteenth century Scotland: Alan son of Roland, lord of Galloway
and constable of Scotland', in eds A. Grant and K.J. Stringer, Medieval Scotland,
Crown, Lordship and Community (Edinburgh, 1993), 82-113.
CDS, i, nos 761, 799, 808, 852, 856, 862, 890, 909, 1086; ed. A.O. Anderson, Scottish
Annals from English Chroniclers (London, 1908), 335; Stringer, 'Periphery and core',
93-4; D.A. Carpenter, The Minority of Henry Ill (Berkeley, 1990), 245, 260, 343-58;
R. Frame, Ireland and Britain, 1170-1450 (London, 1998), 158-60. As Alexander's
heir-presumptive, his cousin, John the Scot, was Chester's ward and was married by
the earl to a daughter of Llywelyn, Alexander may have had direct concerns about the
dispute (A.O. Anderson, Early Sources of Scottish History, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1922),
ii, 452, 462).
CDS, i, nos 1113, 1181; CPL, i, 83; N. Vincent, Peter des Roches, an alien in English
politics, 1205-1238 (Cambridge, 1996), 268-80, 301-2.
CDS, i, nos 1181, 1335; Anderson, English Chroniclers, 343-5; Anderson, Early
Royal Lordship in the British Isles, 1249-1272
63
Sources, ii, 498-9; Vincent, Peter des Roches, 371, 417-18, 438-40. Between 1234
and 1237 Alexander was repeatedly pressed by the pope to obey his lord, Henry III
(CPL, i, 142; ed. E.L.G. Stones, Anglo-Scottish Relations 1174-1328 (Oxford, 1965),
34-7; CDS, i, no. 1277).
7 Walter Bower, Scotichronicon, ed. D.E.R. Watt, 9 vols (Edinburgh, 1987-98), v, 17987; Anderson, English Chroniclers, 349-50; Anderson, Early Sources, ii, 536-9; A.
Young, Robert the Bruce's Rivals: The Comyns, 1212-1314 (East Linton, 1997), 41-3;
A. Young, 'The north and Anglo-Scottish relations in the thirteenth century', in eds
J.C. Appleby and P. Dalton, Government, Religion and Society in Northern England
1000-1700 (Stroud, 1997), 77-89, 84-5.
8 Anderson, English Chroniclers, 350-1; Anderson, Early Sources, 536-9; CDS. i, nos.
1621, 1624, 1631.
9 Anderson, English Chroniclers, 351-8; CDS, i, nos. 1631, 1634, 1637, 1642, 1643,
1647-50, 1654; Foedera, i, 257; Scotichronicon, v, 184-5. Although Alexander reportedly
received aid from his French in-laws, Henry had concluded a truce with Louis IX in
1243 and was not fighting on two fronts.
10 Anderson, Early Sources, 538. Dafydd ap Llywelyn, son of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth of
Gwynedd renounced the peace with Henry in July 1244 and the English king led a
major campaign in Wales the following summer. At least one Scottish source ascribed
Henry's retreat to this cause (Johannes de Fordun, i, 291-2; BT, RBH, 238-9; F.M.
Powicke, Henry Ill and the Lord Edward (Oxford, 1947), 632-4; J.B. Smith, Llywelyn
ap Gruffudd, Prince ofWales (Cardiff, 1998), 48-9).
11 For Galloway see A.A.M. Duncan, Scotland: The Making of the Kingdom (Edinburgh,
1975), 531-2; R. Frame, 'Henry III and Ireland: The shaping of a peripheral lordship'
in Frame, Ireland and Britain, 31-58, especially 46-7; ibid., 'Ireland and the Barons
Wars' in Frame, Ireland and Britain, 62; T. McNeill, Anglo-Norman Ulster (Edinburgh,
1980), 29; J.B. Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, 62-8; H.W. Ridgeway, 'Foreign favourites
and Henry III's problems of patronage, 1247-58', EHR 104 (1989), 590-610.
12 CDS, i, nos. 1640-1, 1865, 2671-2; CD!, i, nos 2732, 2752, 2754, 2755, 2925;
Anderson, English Chroniclers, 355; Scotichronicon, v, 186-7. Alexander II reputedly
disowned Alan to Henry III but he was pardoned by the latter when the Comyns and
other Scottish enemies of the Bissets were established in power in 1251-1252.
13 Anderson, Early Sources, ii, 542, 546, 548-50, 553-9; CD!, i, nos 2269, 2327, 2381;
K. Helle, 'Anglo-Scandinavian Relations in the reign of Hakon Hakonsson ( 12171263)' in Medieval Scandinavia 1 (1968), 101-14; A.O. Johnsen, 'The payments from
the Hebrides and the Isle of Man to the crown of Norway', Scottish Historical Review
58 (1969), 18-34; A.A.M. Duncan and A.L. Brown, 'Argyll and the Western Isles in
the Early Middle Ages', Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland 90
(1956-7), 192-220, 207-10; R.A. McDonald, The Kingdom of the Isles: Scotland's
Western Seaboard c.JJ00-1336 (East Linton, 1997), 98-102.
14 It was probably Alexander II who renewed the request for coronation which concerned
Henry III in 1250-1251. He certainly encouraged the pope's canonisation of Queen
Margaret which occurred in 1250 (CDS, i, no. 1798).
15 CDS, i, nos. 1812, 1816, 1818, 1847-8, 1852, 1857, 1865; Foedera, i, 179; Anderson,
English Chroniclers, 363-8; Johannes de Fordun, i, 295-6; D.E.R. Watt, 'The Minority
of Alexander III of Scotland', TRHS, 5th series, 21 (1971), 1-23, 9-10; K. Staniland,
'The nuptials of Alexander III of Scotland and Margaret Plantagenet', Nottingham
Medieval Studies 30 (1986), 20-45. The value of such ill-defined displays of English
royal prestige has recently been discussed with regard to Alexander III's attendance on
Edward I in 1278 (R.R. Davies, The First English Empire: Power and Identities in the
British Isles 1093-1343 (Oxford, 2000), 22-5.
64
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
England and Europe in the Reign of Henry III
Anderson, Early Sources, ii, 580-5; Anderson, English Chroniclers, 370-3; Stones,
Anglo-Scottish Relations, no. 10; CDS, i, nos. 1986-7, 1995, 2002-3, 2013, 2015,
2053; Foedera, i, 327; CR. 1254-56, 218; Duncan, Scotland, 565-7; Watt, 'Minority',
14-15.
Foedera, i, 277, CR, I253-54, 70, 108; CDS, i, nos. 1984-85; J.R. Maddicott, Simon
de Montfort (Cambridge, 1994), 106-24; Powicke, Henry Ill, 230-6; S. Lloyd, 'Henry
III, the Crusade and the Mediterranean', eds, M. Jones and M. Vale, England and her
Neighbours Essays in Honour of Pierre Chaplais (London, 1989), 97-119. From
Bordeaux, Henry III sent his Gascon lieutenant and brother-in-law, Simon de Montfort,
to Scotland in August 1254 with secret information about the king's anxiety. This may
have been a further request for support or financial aid (Foedera. i, 306).
B. Weiler, 'England and the Empire, 1216-1272: Anglo-German Relations during the
reign of Henry III', unpublished PhD thesis, University of St Andrews (1999), 128-38;
Maddicot, Simon de Montfort, 128-9; Foedera, i, 322, 336, 348-9; CDS, i, nos. 2040,
2065.
B. Gelsinger, 'A thirteenth-century Castillian-Norwegiarr alliance', Medievalia et
Humanistica, New Series 10 (1981), 55-80; CR, 1256-59, 276-7; Weiler, 'England
and the Empire', 118.
Anderson, Early Sources, ii, 567-9, 573, 576-8, 587; CD!, i, no. 3206; S. Duffy, 'The
Bruce brothers and the Irish Sea world, 1306-29', Cambridge Medieval Celtic Studies
21 (1991), 55-86, 63. The Chronicle of Man describes the defeat of Magnus and Ewen
by the Manxmen in 1250, but says that in 1252 Magnus was 'received ... with joy' on
Man. This does not suggest a successful conquest of the island but an arrangement
which Magnus was quick to have confirmed by Henry and Hakon.
CDS, i, nos. 2014, 2046; Foedera, i, 338; Chronicon de Lanercost, Bannatyne Club
(Edinburgh, 1839), 60-1.
Foedera, i, 336; Annala Connacht, The Annals ofConnacht, ed. A.M. Freeman (Dublin,
1996), 102-3, 108-9; J. Lydon, 'A land of war', ed. A. Cosgrove, A New History of
Ireland, II, Medieval Ireland (Oxford, 1987), 240-74, 244.
Johannes de Fordun, i, 295-7; Anderson, Early Sources, ii, 571, 580-4; Anderson,
English Chroniclers, 372-4; Stones, Anglo-Scottish Relations, no. 10.
CDS, i, nos. 1865, 2014; Anderson, English Chroniclers, 370, 372-4. John Balliol was
only forgiven for his treatment of Queen Margaret and restored to Henry's favour in
1257 (CDS, i, no 2091).
Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 114; Weiler, 'England and the Empire', 134.
CDS, i, no. 2046; Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, 58-60, 64n; Frame, 'Henry III and
Ireland', 49-54; Ridgeway, 'Foreign favourites'; M. Prestwich, Edward I (London,
1988), 10-15; C.W. Lewis, 'The Treaty of Woodstock: Its background and significance',
Welsh History Review 2 (1964-5), 37-65.
BT, RBH, 247-51; Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, 84-101. For contemporary Gascon
resistance to Henry's government see J.B. Smith, 'Adversaries of Edward 1: Gaston de
Bearn and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd', eds C. Richmond and I. Harvey, Recognitions:
Essays in Honour of Edmund Fryde (Aberystwyth, 1996), 55-88.
Littere Wallie, ed. J.G. Edwards (Cardiff, 1940), no. 317; CDS, i, no. 2058; Foedera, i,
353, 362; Anderson, Early Sources, ii, 585-6, 588-9; Anderson, English Chroniclers,
376; Johannes de Fordun, i, 297-8. Gamelin was consecrated bishop of St Andrews
against the will of the council in December 1255. He was then driven into exile and
took his complaints to Pope Alexander who, in tum wrote to Henry III asking for
redress (CDS, i, no. 2037; M. Ash, 'The Church in the Reign of Alexander III', ed. N.
Reid, Scotland in the Reign of Alexander Ill (Edinburgh, 1990), 31-52, 38-9).
It is, however, striking that John Balliol and Robert Ros, the two magnates with major
Royal Lordship in the British Isles, 1249-1272
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
65
lands in both realms who had incurred Hemy's hostility in 1255 did not join their
former allies in challenging the English king and the Scottish council in 1256-57.
Balliol was formally forgiven by Henry in August 1257 (CDS, i, no. 2092).
Johannes de Fordun, i, 297-8; Scotichronicon, v, 318-21; Anderson, Early Sources, ii,
589-90; Littere Wallie, no. 317; CR, 1256-59, 290--1, 300--1. The dispatch of the
Scottish embassy in March 1258 was not a result of a loss of power by Alexander's
captors. One of the envoys was the abbot of Jedburgh who had pronounced
excommunication against Durward and his allies in 1257 and the 'parliament' they
asked Henry to send representatives to was to meet at Stirling, the burgh to which the
Comyn party had taken Alexander in 1257. For alternative views of 1257-59 in Scotland
see Watt, 'Minority', 17-19; Duncan, Scotland, 571-6; Young, The Comyns, 57-61.
CR, 1256-59, 299-301, 302; CDS, i, nos. 2116-8; Anderson, Early Sources, ii, 591.
Scottish chroniclers recorded Henry's retreat from Wales in 1257 as a defeat (Anderson,
Early Sources, ii, 588).
Littere Wallie, nos. 33, 37, 317; Foedera, i, 370, 371; CR, 1256-59, 294-5, 299, 31011; Smith, Uywelyn ap Gruffudd, 104-16.
For this timetable and events in England see D.A. Carpenter, 'What happened in
1258?', eds J. Gillingham and J.C. Holt, War and Government in the Middle Ages:
Essays in Honour of J.O. Prestwich (Woodbridge, 1984), 106-19.
Liber Ecclesie de Scon, Bannatyne Club (Edinburgh, 1843), no. 108. The evidence
from' May 1258 does not prove that Alexander was in control of his government. The
envoys sent to England were Adam Malcarston, the provost of St Marys on the Rock at
St Andrews, and Thomas Normanville, justiciar of Lothian before 1255 and amongst
the group excluded from power by Henry, men whose sympathies were strongly with
the Comyn party. For Malcarston see D.E.R. Watt, A Biographical Dictionary of
Scottish Graduates to 1410 (Oxford, 1977), 371-3. Henry's attempts to ensure his
daughter's good treatment also make more sense if she was still under the control of
the group which had been accused of mistreating her in 1255.
CR, 1256-59, 329; Anderson, Early Sources, ii, 592-3. The earl of Stratheam was at St
Andrews in April, giving a vague response to a request from Henry III that the earl
should protect Queen Margaret. The earl may have been more concerned with making
peace with the queen's custodians (Foedera, i, 376).
Stones, Anglo-Scottish Relations, no. 11; Foedera, i, 378; Anderson, Early Sources, ii,
593; Anderson, English Chroniclers, 376. For the continued dominance of the offices
of Scottish government by the group which seized power in 1257 see Duncan, Scotland,
573-4; Young, The Comyns, 68-70.
CR, 1256-59, 477; Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, 120--31.
CDS, i, nos. 2198, 2204, 2205; Foedera, i, 402; Anderson, English Chroniclers, 378-9;
Vetera Monumenta Hibemorum et Scotorum Historiam lllustrantia, ed. A. Theiner
(Rome, 1864), no. 237; Scotichronicon, v, 322-3. After reasserting his authority, Hemy
also sought to improve relations with Llywelyn, though no final agreement was reached.
Llywelyn's envoy to Henry was a Scot, Alan Irvine, who had negotiated the 1258
alliance. His employment may point to continuing contacts between the prince and the
chief councillors of the Scottish king (Smith, Uywelyn ap Gruffudd, 134-5).
W. Fraser (ed.), The Red Book of Menteith, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1880), ii, nos. 7, 8;
Scotichronicon, v, 322-3; CDS, i, nos. 2284, 2285, 2287, 2291.
Ann. Connacht, 112-13, 126-9; Duffy, 'The Bruce Brothers', 69; Frame, 'Henry III
and Ireland', 51-2.
CR, 1256-59, 476-7; The Acts of Parliament of Scotland, 12 vols (Edinburgh, 181475), i, 115 (henceforth cited as APS); CD/, ii, no. 661; Ann. Connacht, 130--3; Lydon,
'Land of War', 244-5. Henry's response to the Scottish request concerning the king of
66
England and Europe in the Reign of Henry Ill
Man and his letter to Hakon were written on consecutive days in May 1259 suggesting
a conscious shift in English policy. Though the document by which Ewen held his
lands has been dated to 1255-56, the presence of Mar amongst his guarantors would
have been unlikely shortly after the earl had been excluded from government by Henry
III. The earl of Ross attacked Skye in 1262 and was lord of the island after 1266.
42 Anderson, Early Sources, ii, 602-42, 648-9; Scotichronicon, v, 346-7; McDonald,
Kingdom of the Isles, 106-23; E.J. Cowan, 'Norwegian Sunset - Scottish Dawn:
Hakon IV and Alexander III' in Reid, Alexander Ill, 103-31.
43 Foedera, i, 417; CR, 1261-64, 388; CDS, i, no. 2320. For the timing and possible
motivation for Edward's grant to de Burgh see R. Frame, 'Ireland and the Barons'
Wars', Frame, Britain and Ireland, 59-10,65-6.
44 Anderson, Early Sources, ii, 653, 672-3; Scotichronicon, v, 369; APS, i, 420; R.
Lustig, 'The Treaty of Perth: a re-examination', Scottish Historical Review 58 (1979),
35-57; Foedera, i, 739.
45 CDS, i, nos. 2377-9, 2381; Anderson, Early Sources, ii, 649-52; Scotichronicon, v,
352-3. Alexander presumably gave his support to Robert Bruce, John Balliol and John
Comyn who raised men from their Scottish estates to support Henry in 1264.
46 Lanercost Chron., 81; Scotichronicon, v, 354-5; CDS, i, nos. 2429, 2432, 2452; K.J.
Stringer, 'Nobility and Identity in medieval Britain and Ireland: The De Vesey Family,
c.ll24-l314', ed. B. Smith, Britain and Ireland 900-1300: Insular Responses to
Medieval European Change (Cambridge, 1999), 199-239; Prestwich, Edward I, 57-8.
47 Scotichronicon, v, 370-1; CDS, i, nos. 2482-3, 2486, 2489-96, 2578-80; Foedera, i,
477; M. Ash, 'The Church', 44; P.C. Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives in
Scotland: Legates, Nuncios and Judges-Delegate, 1125-1286 (Edinburgh, 1997), 10811. Other contacts between the royal families occurred at Christmas 1267 when Edmund,
Henry's younger son, visited Margaret and Alexander at Berwick, while the Scottish
king and queen came south to visit Henry at Christmas 1270 (CDS, i, no. 2542;
Scotichronicon, v, 367).
48 For the Treaty of Montgomery and its background see Littere Wallie, no. 1; Smith,
Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, 139-86; R.R. Davies, The Age of Conquest: Wales 1063-1415
(Oxford, 1991), 312-16; A.D. Carr, Llywelyn ap Gruffydd (Cardiff, 1982).
49 CDS, i, no. 2580. Though, like Llywelyn, Alexander III had secured his new lands by
promising an annual payment to the Norwegian king.