Standardisation with
Chinese Characteristics?
The Missing Pillar in Rebooting
Europe’s Industrial Policy
Alexandre Ferreira Gomes
Maaike Okano-Heijmans
Miriam Sainato
Niels ten Oever
Susann Lüdtke
CKN & Clingendael Report
Standardisation with
Chinese Characteristics?
The Missing Pillar in Rebooting
Europe’s Industrial Policy
Alexandre Ferreira Gomes
Maaike Okano-Heijmans
Miriam Sainato
Niels ten Oever
Susann Lüdtke
CKN & Clingendael Report
July 2025
The authors wish to thank the expert interviewees, as well as the
policymakers and academics who contributed to an expert session
on the topic on 8 April 2025 in The Hague.
Disclaimer: This report will be published under the framework agreement for the China
Knowledge Network (CKN), funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for knowledge
exchange with all Dutch ministries regarding policy challenges and opportunities related
to China. Responsibility for the content and opinions expressed lies solely with the authors.
The network is managed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands Institute of
International Relations ‘Clingendael’ and the Leiden Asia Centre.
July 2025
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About the authors
Alexandre Gomes is a Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute for International
Relations ‘Clingendael’ in The Hague, where he is part of the EU and Global
Affairs Unit and of the ‘Geopolitics of Technology and Digitalisation’ programme.
His research focuses on the role of technology in geopolitics.
Maaike Okano-Heijmans is a Senior Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute for
International Relations ‘Clingendael’ in The Hague, where she leads the ‘Geopolitics
of Technology and Digitalisation’ programme. She is also a Visiting Lecturer in the
Master of Science in International Relations and Diplomacy (MIRD) programme of
the University of Leiden.
Miriam Sainato is a former Research Assistant at Clingendael’s EU and Global Affairs
Unit, where she contributed to the Geopolitics of Tech and Digitalisation programme.
Niels ten Oever is an Assistant Professor in the European Studies department and
Co-Principal Investigator of the Critical Infrastructure Lab at the University of
Amsterdam. He is also Coordinator of the ‘Tech, Power, and Policy’ theme group
at the Amsterdam Centre for European Studies and Visiting Professor at the Centro
de Tecnologia e Sociedade at Fundação Getúlio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro.
Susann Lüdtke has a doctoral degree in economics. She was a research fellow at the
University of Trier and the University of Würzburg. Dr. Lüdtke worked for Bosch and
Siemens Household Appliances (BSH) in China and as a consultant for the automotive
industry and for patent data analytics and IP management. In 2025, she launched
Lüdtke Intelligence Analytics – L.I.A., consultancy services in high-tech standards and
emerging disruptive technologies.
Contents
Executive Summary
1
Introduction
1
4
2
The Strategic Reach of Technical Standards 2.1 The International Landscape 2.2 From Economics to the Geopolitics of Standardisation
8
13
16
3
China’s Rise as a Standards Power: The Basis of Long-term Dominance
3.1 From Domestic Control to Regional Dominance 3.2 From Regional Dominance to Global Influence 22
26
27
4
Standardisation in Practice: Industry Snapshots
4.1 Telecommunications and the Internet 4.2 Electric Vehicle Chips Lessons and Implications for Other Sectors 32
32
36
40
5
Blueprint for Action 5.1 Programming: Strategising Standardisation 5.2 Promoting: Aligning Industrial Priorities and Global Standards’
Leadership Ambitions 5.3 Protecting: Defending Strategic Technologies, Detecting Power Shifts
5.4 Partnering: Mobilising Local Action and European Alignment to
Achieve Global Impact 5.5 Process: Scanning Opportunities, Selecting Priorities and Scaling
What Works 6
Maintaining Europe’s Edge
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
List of Figures
42
42
43
45
47
48
53
55
57
Executive Summary
Standardisation is emerging as a strategic battleground in global technological
competition. Once confined to the realm of technical experts and engineers,
standard-setting now plays a central role in shaping industrial ecosystems, global
trade, interoperability, innovation flows and dependencies embedded in digital
infrastructures and applications, ranging from 5G to AI chips and from steel
quality to digital public passports. As the geopolitical dimension of technology
becomes more pronounced, the ability to influence standards is a key driver to
competitiveness and sovereignty.
Europe has historically occupied a central position in international standardisation,
starting from the founding of the Geneva-based International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) way back in 1865. While the European Standardisation Strategy of
2022 signalled newfound political attention on the topic, the current posture of the
EU and its Member States remains out of step with the pace and coordination of
other global actors – mainly China. Through an integrated strategy that connects
domestic industrial policy and foreign affairs through long-term planning, China
has transformed from a reactive standards-taker into a proactive standards-maker
since 2018. Initiatives such as ‘China Standards 2035’, in tandem with the Belt and
Road Initiative, have enabled China to align industrial champions, state institutions
and global diplomacy behind a shared objective: embedding Chinese standards in
the global economy of tomorrow.
The European Union and its Member States remain largely reactive. Despite a
strong base in research, industry and international engagement, the EU’s 2022
standardisation strategy still lacks key implementation steps. Its approach is
fragmented, under-resourced and slow to align technical influence with broader
economic and political goals. As a result, Europe risks ceding control over
future rule-making processes in areas ranging from digital communications to
automotive chips.
This report argues that Europe must see standardisation not as a niche technical
field, but as a key site of geopolitical contestation and opportunity. Its focus
is on the key challenger and the key domains: China and rapidly developing
technologies that shape digital societies and economies. Building on an analysis
of the main standard-setting organisations, the focus turns to the strategic
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
design and consequences of China’s state-led approach to standardisation.
A key characteristic of the Chinese government’s approach lies in the push and
empowerment of companies and experts as key players in standard-setting
organisations and in the roll-out of technologies through its Digital Silk Road.
Zooming in on the domains of telecommunications and the internet, and electric
vehicle chips, two industry snapshots present more detailed insights into the
newly emerging power balance in the relevant standardisation bodies and
processes. Taken together, these call attention to China’s incorporation of
standardisation into its strategic priorities with the aim of asserting economic
and normative leadership in global markets.
To reassert European strength in this field, the report then offers a five-pronged
approach that builds on the three pillars of Europe’s Economic Security Strategy
of 2023. This Blueprint for Action on standardisation centres on programming,
promoting, protecting, partnering and process as parallel paths to help reorient
Europe’s stance on standardisation, including the EU and its Member States.
Success depends on several shifts, key among which are:
• Standardisation must be embedded more deeply in industrial strategy and
policy planning;
• Early engagement is essential, with Europe positioning itself at the
pre-standardisation and agenda-setting stages, rather than merely reacting
to technical drafts;
• Stronger coordination across EU Member States is needed to consolidate
influence in international standard-setting organisations;
• Resources – financial, human and digital – must be scaled up, especially in
the formative stages of technical committee work, where critical scope and
terminology decisions are made;
• Europe must also build alliances with like-minded partners to amplify its
values and avoid isolation in multilateral forums.
The stakes are particularly high for the Netherlands, a European leader in
key (emerging) technologies such as chip equipment and manufacturing,
and quantum technologies. With major assets in the semiconductor sector,
digital infrastructure and multistakeholder governance, the Netherlands is
well positioned to contribute to a stronger European role in international
standardisation. Its current position can be upheld and deepened with the
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
necessary institutional support, policy alignment and a long-term vision on
standardisation and industrial policy.
Standardisation defines the rules of engagement for future technologies. If the
EU and its Member States fail to act strategically, the European continent risks
becoming a bystander in a system increasingly shaped by others. Swift action
that puts policy to practice, reinvests in capabilities and empowers business
players can ensure that Europe continues to define the standards of the next
digital and industrial era on its own terms.
3
1 Introduction
Behind the political limelight, hidden behind a wall of acronyms and still
largely off the public’s radar, standardisation plays a critical role in defining
how technologies evolve across industries in the long run. While technologies
have long been an engine of industrial development, their role as a key factor
in geopolitical power and influence has intensified over the past decade.
This goes for established as well as emerging technologies, ranging from mobile
and electricity networks to social media, advanced semiconductors, artificial
intelligence (AI) and quantum technologies.
Standardisation is instrumental in defining the rules of the technological
and economic systems, offering a significant advantage for first movers and
determining access to and interoperability of markets. From manufacturing
to information technology, standard-setting creates the foundation for
interoperability between networks and devices, as well as safety, quality
assurance and innovation. Without well-defined standards, industries face
fragmentation, inefficiencies and barriers to trade that hinder economic growth
and technological progress. Moreover, consumers would face higher prices,
more vendor lock-in and less choice. As technological rivalry grows with the
diversity of propositions, standardisation is becoming a geopolitical contention
point too.
Western Dominance Challenged
Since the establishment of the International Telegraph Union (ITU) in 1865,1
countries have sought to coordinate and cooperate on standardisation in
multilateral settings. From the outset, these international standardisation bodies
were largely dominated by Western powers. The development of the internet,
for example, was led by the United States (US), while Europe dominated mobile
communication networks, up until their fourth generation (4G). 2
1
The International Telegraph Union is one of the oldest international organisations still in place.
It evolved into the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the oldest United Nations agency.
See: ITU, Overview of ITU’s History (1); ITU, About International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
2
Peter (Maxigas) Dunajcsik and Niels ten Oever, Geopolitics in the Infrastructural Ideology of 5G,
2023.
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
A country’s position in standardisation is largely defined by its technological
capabilities. China’s emergence in recent decades as a technological powerhouse
was thus set to redefine the balance of power in standardisation. Beyond this
natural shift, China’s shaking of the system is strengthened by its unique approach
of state-directed strategic planning and company-level engagement, anchored
in its comprehensive ‘China Standards 2035’ strategy, announced in 2018 – and
adopted three years later with the National Standardisation Outline.3 The Chinese
government’s strategic push is further reinforced by its ‘Made in China 2025’
industrial policy and promoted internationally through the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) – and in particular, its Digital Silk Road (DSR).
China, once only a follower in technology development, played a decisive role
in contributing to 5G standards in the 2010s. With Huawei as a leader in the
sector, China actively participated in the main international collaboration
body for mobile network standardisation: the 3GPP.4 Huawei’s global market
share in 4G and 5G networks has grown significantly, supported by the Chinese
government’s foreign push through the BRI. Huawei’s substantial contributions to
3GPP standards have enhanced its influence in the telecommunications sector
and reinforced its capacity to reinvest in research and development for future
technologies, such as 6G.
The cooperative nature of telecommunications has historically required
alignment among global competitors. Nonetheless, China’s efforts to weigh
in more strongly are notable, and the increased presence of Chinese officials
and companies has deepened competitive and normative differences between
participants. The standardisation bodies that were mostly regarded as technical
in nature have thereby gradually become seen more and more as political
organisations too.
The Structure of this Report
This report examines the growing significance of standardisation and the
shifts in standardisation governance that have occurred over the past decade.
It starts with a brief history of standardisation, to explain how the issue has been
increasingly politicised and why the European Union (EU) and the Netherlands
3
Keiti (Huiting) Wei, China’s National Standardisation Development Outline: Policy Implications and
Future Directions, 2022.
4
3GPP stands for Third Generation Partnership Project, a consortium of seven major national or
regional standardisation bodies such as ETSI (Europe), ATIS (USA), CCSA (China) or TSDSI (India).
5
Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
need to act to protect and promote their interests. This is especially urgent
given that the EU’s 2022 Standardisation Strategy, while commendable for
elevating the political relevance of standards, still lacks robust mechanisms for
enforcement and coordination. Its success largely depends on the actions of
EU Member States, many of which have yet to develop comprehensive national
approaches to technical standardisation.
The report starts from a discussion of the role of international standard-setting
organisations, governments and industry stakeholders in developing standards;
the balance between regulatory frameworks and market-driven approaches;
and how the great powers have influenced standard-setting. It then turns to
two industry snapshots of the domains of telecommunications and the internet,
and electric vehicle (EV) chips. These testify to China’s emergence in the global
arena of standards-setting, given the strategic value and geopolitical, economic
and technological implications of these domains. After all, telecommunications
and the internet form the backbone of critical infrastructure, underpinning
today’s digital economy and even our modern way of living. EV chips underscore
the role of supply chains, green industrial policy and technological ecosystems.
Developments in EV chips are of particular relevance to the Netherlands, given
the country’s strong industrial base: with the global leader of semiconductor
machinery equipment (ASML) and several EV chip manufacturers (notably
NXP). Drawing on these insights and lessons from the industry snapshots, this
report offers a targeted roadmap for Dutch and European policymakers and
standardisation bodies. It provides concrete policy recommendations aimed at
strengthening Europe’s strategic approach to standardisation – linking it more
directly to recent industrial policy goals and economic security priorities.
The State of Play in Europe
The European Commission’s 2022 Standardisation Strategy marked a shift in
the EU’s view of standardisation. The strategy responds to a growing awareness
that Europe is falling behind in shaping international standards, particularly in
comparison to assertive moves by China. The strategy lays out five core priorities:
anticipating standard needs in key tech sectors like chips, data interoperability
and hydrogen; improving the governance and inclusiveness of the European
standardisation system; reinforcing international leadership in key technologies,
while promoting EU core values; better linking research and innovation to
standard-setting; and cultivating the next generation of experts. While its
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
ambition is clear, the strategy’s success largely depends on effective action by
EU Member States – an area where progress so far has been limited.5
Important changes have followed since 2022, including the launch of a High-Level
Forum to steer EU priorities, updates to Regulation (EU) 1025/2012 to enhance
public control over harmonised standards, leading to the changes in the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) governance mentioned above,
a ‘standardisation booster’ initiative to link EU-funded research to European
Standards Organisations (ESOs) technical committees, and a code of practice to
raise awareness about and engagement with standardisation.6
While the strategy has aligned standardisation efforts with the EU’s broader
policy goals, Europe’s ability to act strategically remains hindered by fragmented
participation in international standardisation organisations and limited
representation in global technical leadership roles. Unlike China’s statecoordinated mirror committee system, which allows for fast alignment on
international positions, the EU’s bottom–up, consensus-based approach, while
democratically robust, can lack agility and coherence.
The role of EU Member States is particularly pivotal but underdeveloped. Although
the European Commission has urged national governments to adopt dedicated
standardisation strategies and better support the participation of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), academia and civil society, most countries
have yet to respond with substantive plans or investments. This leaves insufficient
implementation and risks deepening the disconnect between EU policy ambitions
and on-the-ground influence in standard-setting forums. Without addressing
these coordination and capacity gaps, the EU’s geopolitical aspirations in
standardisation will remain unrealised.
In the recently released Competitiveness Compass, the European Commission
only briefly mentions the importance of accelerating and improving access to the
standard-setting process. The Compass offers no concrete policy initiative or
investment plan to address the rapidly evolving global standardisation landscape.
Once a leader in global standard-setting, the EU must revive its position in global
standardisation.
5
European Commission, An EU Strategy on Standardisation: Setting Global Standards in Support of
a Resilient, Green and Digital EU Single Market, 1 February 2022.
6
European Commission, Code of Practice on Standardisation in the European Research Area,
1 March 2023.
7
2 The Strategic Reach of
Technical Standards
Standards are documented and reproducible technical specifications that
are typically adopted voluntarily, produced in a described procedural manner
and accessible under defined conditions. They enable the organisation of
production and the exchange of goods and services.7 Technical standards ensure
interoperability between networks and devices, allow for their quality control
and safety when using them. In telecommunications, for instance, they define
the processes that enable different technologies to connect with each other,
facilitating communication and data exchange.
In some countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, the term ‘normalisation’
(in Dutch: normalisatie) is used to refer to the standardisation process when this is
conducted and facilitated at the national level by a national standardisation body
(NSB), such as NEN in the Netherlands or DIN in Germany. The outcome of such
processes is referred to as a norm. For consistency with common English usage,
this report uses the term ‘standardisation’ rather than ‘normalisation’.
Multilateral Collaboration
International coordination and collaboration by states and companies on
standardisation take place in dedicated bodies, best known as standards
development organisations (SDOs). At the international level, they are traditionally
led by states in so-called formal SDOs, like the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU), International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Formal SDOs produce or adopt
technical standards that have formal recognition by the states that endorse those
bodies. The voting rights in the ITU follow the principle of ‘one country, one vote’,
which means that each member state has equal voting power, regardless of its
size or technological capacity. In the case of the ISO and IEC, voting rights are
exercised by NSBs that represent the states (one NSB per state), rather than by
states per se. These organisations follow a more complex voting model: votes
7
Jean-Christophe Graz, The Power of Standards: Hybrid Authority and the Globalisation of Services,
2019.
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
on standards are typically cast by NSBs designated as ‘participating members’
(P-members) or ‘observing members’ (O-members), with P-members having
formal influence over the development of standards.
Since the 1980s, given the increasingly private nature of key tech sectors
– including telecommunications and the internet – and the rise of an increasingly
dynamic and powerful private sector, a parallel class of SDOs has emerged –
known as quasi-formal SDOs. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
for instance, is a well-known quasi-formal organisation, recognised for its
contribution to the development of the internet. Standards produced by quasiformal SDOs are not officially endorsed by states, and individuals and companies
can participate and vote directly. Nonetheless, the importance of quasi-formal
SDOs is comparable to that of formal SDOs in terms of developing wellestablished technical standards that are recognised and followed by the private
sector for reasons discussed below. Formal SDOs can – and often do – adopt
standards developed by quasi-formal SDOs as their own.
When standards are incorporated into legislation at the national or regional
level (such as the EU), they become de jure standards. The adoption of USB
Type-C as a common charging port, as described in Box 1 below, illustrates how a
widely used technical specification, developed by the private sector, can become
legally required once incorporated into EU law.8 There are also proprietary,
de facto standards, which emerge when industry players widely adopt them.9
Figure 1 clarifies these concepts and their interrelationship.
8
European Union, Directive (EU) 2022/2380 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 November 2022 amending Directive 2014/53/EU on the Harmonisation of the Laws of the
Member States relating to the Making Available on the Market of Radio Equipment (Text with EEA
relevance), 23 November 2022. See also: Compliance & Risks, USB-C in the EU: A New Standard for
Universal Charging, 25 February 2025.
9
Electronic Design, What’s the Difference between De Jure and De Facto Standards?, 14 November
2012.
9
Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
Figure 1
Formal vs quasi-formal SDOs and de jure vs de facto standards
Formal SDOs
Formal standards
- States are represented and formally recognise these standards. E.g.: ITU or IEC
globally; CEN or CENELEC in Europe.
- Standards’ development is still led by the private sector, either at the national
level (via their work through National Standardisation Bodies), or by adopting
standards developed by quasi-formal SDOs.
- De jure standards are a subset of formal standards, which emerge when their use
is mandated by law. Harmonised European Standards (hENs) are an example of a
de jure standard.
Quasi-formal SDOs
can be
adopted
byformal
SDOs as
Quasi-formal standards
- Led by the private sector, quasi-formal SDOs develop technical standards that
hold (industry) value similar to formal standards, but lack formal recognition by
states. E.g. IEEE, IETF, W3C.
- Some refer to consortium or forum standards when these are initiated by the
private sector through collaborative industry groups rather than international
standards bodies. Example: USB Implementers Forum.
Proprietary standard
De facto standards
- Market-driven, operating outside of standardisation organisations. Developed by
a single party. E.g. Microsoft Windows or Apple iOS.
- The term industry standard can be used to define de facto standards, but it is
often used as a synonym for quasi-formal standards too.
Source: authors’ compilation.
In times of rapid technological development, de facto standards gain traction.
They emerge as specific companies build (global) market share and set
standards before regulatory frameworks are established. Microsoft’s operating
system and Google’s search algorithms are examples of de facto standards.
In practice, over the past four decades, the relative influence of (Western) states
in standard-setting has declined as private sector actors have increasingly
shaped quasi-formal and de facto standards.
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
Box 1
Standardisation in practice: the adoption of USB Type-C as a
de jure standard for charging ports
1. USB Type-C was initially developed by the USB Implementers Forum
(a quasi-formal industry consortium) and later adopted by the IEC,
under the designation IEC 62680-1-3.
2. The European Commission issued a standardisation request to one of
the three European Standardisation bodies: the European Committee
for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC). CENELEC was
responsible for aligning EU legal requirements with the objective of
reducing e-waste and improving consumer convenience.
3. This led to the creation of a harmonised European standard (hEN),
which becomes so when cited in the Official Journal of the EU.
hENs provide a presumption of conformity with EU law.
4. The specification was then explicitly incorporated into the (amended)
Radio Equipment Directive via EU Directive 2022/2380, making USB-C
a legal requirement – that is, a de jure standard – for specific categories
of devices, such as smartphones and tablets, as of 2024, and 2026 for
laptops.
The Rise of Private Actors
Amid the growing role and influence of private companies in standardisation,
current standardisation mechanisms – both in formal and quasi-formal SDOs –
may be said to lack democratic legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy in this context
refers to the inclusion of public-interest perspectives, transparent decisionmaking and accountability to citizens and consumers, who are ultimately affected
by the standards in everyday technologies. Yet many standardisation processes
are dominated by corporate actors, with limited involvement from civil society or
governments. This argument is amplified by the rise of quasi-formal SDOs over the
past four decades. But even NSBs, which represent states in international SDOs,
are mostly funded by private-sector memberships.10 As a result, both formal and
quasi-formal organisations are essentially led by the private sector, rather than
public mandates.
10 To give an example, part of the revenue of standards bodies comes from the sale of standardisation
documents to companies, business and trade associations, and other stakeholders.
11
Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
Industry and businesses generally prefer to work via quasi-formal bodies
because they are quicker and more agile, while formal SDOs provide the political
setting and procedural legitimacy that states seek. Formal and quasi-formal
SDOs coexist and, at times, compete in developing standards.
The shift from traditional intergovernmental organisations to more flexible
governance schemes, embodied by quasi-formal SDOs, reflects a broader
trend towards new modes of governance. One such mode is orchestration,11
where public actors coordinate intermediaries to achieve governance outcomes
without direct control. This framework helps to describe China’s approach to
standardisation, in which tech companies and industrial consortia play an active
role in advancing policy objectives and carry out decision-making on behalf of
the Chinese state.
Great powers, notably China, and the biggest private-sector companies
have come to see standards as a strategic asset to introduce and enforce
their worldview and economic power and preferences via technical means.
China’s ‘New Internet Protocol’ (or New IP) proposal, discussed in Section 4.1 of
this report on Telecommunications and the Internet, is a case in point.
As the so-called Global South increasingly demands a stronger voice in global
decision-making, and new groupings such as BRICS and the G77 promote
alternative models of global governance, it becomes essential to understand the
role of standardisation – politically and technologically. Standardisation depends
on international cooperation – between states, companies and institutions.
From this point of view, China’s active participation in international SDOs can be
seen as a constructive contribution. However, ongoing geopolitical shifts – with
an increasingly affirmative China on the one hand and the US under President
Trump II that looks more inwards on the other – make standardisation, often
an overlooked theme, an important geopolitical arena. Amid such geopolitical
change, standardisation adds an additional layer of complexity in power
dynamics and in how those affect the Netherlands and Europe.
11
Abbott et al., International Organisations as Orchestrators, 2015.
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
2.1
The International Landscape
This section offers a concise overview of the landscape of SDOs at the global,
EU and national levels. Figure 2, below, presents a schematic overview, with a
focus on the US and China, next to the EU and the Netherlands.
Global Standardisation Organisations
The three key formal SDOs with global membership are the ITU (for technical
standardisation, incorporated into the UN in 1947 as its first specialised
agency), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC, for electrical
engineering and electronic technology) and the International Organisation
for Standardisation (ISO, for industrial products and processes, excluding
telecommunications and electrical/electronic fields, which are covered by
the other two organisations).
When it comes to quasi-formal SDOs on telecommunications and internetrelated matters, the key bodies include the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C), and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN). While IEEE covers a broad range of technologies, the
latter three are particularly focused on the development and governance of
internet protocols, architecture and naming systems. These organisations
closely resemble formal SDOs, having gained comparable status and influence
in standards-setting. Indeed, they are increasingly preferred for their faster,
more streamlined adoption processes, direct industry involvement and better
responsiveness to innovation and market trends. However, voting procedures in
quasi-formal SDOs differ significantly from those of formal ones. In these bodies,
voting rights are generally based on individual or organisational participation
rather than state representation. For instance, in the IETF, decisions are made
by ‘rough consensus’ rather than formal votes.12 At the W3C, votes are usually
conducted within working groups where each member organisation typically has
one vote, and consensus is encouraged.13 The IEEE employs a more structured
voting process, where individuals participate as members in working groups and
12
IETF, On Consensus and Humming in the IETF, June 2014.
13
W3C, W3C Process Document, 3 November 2023.
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
vote during various stages of the development of standards.14 In all cases, active
participation and technical contribution are essential for influencing outcomes.
EU and National Standardisation Bodies
Besides international SDOs, standardisation organisations exist at the regional
and national levels too. At the European level, European Standardisation
Organisations (ESOs) are formal bodies guiding standardisation efforts.
One example is the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI),
which contributed to the development of some of the first digital mobile
telecommunications standards. The other two ESOs are the European Committee
for Standardisation (CEN), which develops standards in a broad range of
sectors excluding electrotechnical fields, and the European Committee for
Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC), which focuses specifically on
electrical and electronic engineering.
Since its creation in 1988, ETSI has provided a platform for direct industry
participation in the standards’ development process. Over recent years,
criticism and concerns have been raised about the influence of Chinese and
American companies on ETSI’s decision-making. In response, and following
recommendations outlined in the 2022 European Standardisation Strategy,
governance reforms were introduced to strengthen European oversight via
NSBs and reduce the sway of non-European actors within the organisation.15
CEN and CENELEC allow industry participation exclusively through national
standardisation bodies.
Roughly 20 per cent of the standards developed by ESOs result from formal
requests by the European Commission to support regulations in the public
interest, such as hENs. Once cited in the Official Journal of the European Union,
hENs grant a ‘presumption of conformity’ with the corresponding essential legal
requirements set out in EU legislation. In practice, this allows manufacturers
using hENs to demonstrate compliance more easily and benefit from access to
the internal market without undergoing additional conformity assessments.16
14
IEEE, IEEE SA Standards Board Bylaws, September 2024.
15
ETSI, ETSI Welcomes the Strengthened Role for NSOs in the Decision-making Process of European
16
CEN–CENELEC, European Standardisation.
Standards, 19 October 2022.
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Voting procedures vary across the ESOs. In CEN and CENELEC, voting rights are
held by the NSBs of EU and European Free-Trade Association (EFTA) countries,
following a weighted voting system based on population size and pre-determined
approval thresholds.17 In contrast, ETSI operates on a direct membership model,
where companies, research institutions and public authorities participate
directly. In ETSI, voting is generally conducted on a ‘one member, one vote’ basis
within Technical Committees, although some decisions use weighted voting
depending on membership category.18
At the national level, NSBs are in charge and represent countries’ positions in
international bodies. NEN is the Dutch national standardisation body.19 NSBs
identify market needs for standards and typically address these in three ways:
by developing new national standards using a technical committee representing
relevant stakeholders; by adopting existing international standards; or by
participating in international technical committees with national experts to
jointly develop standards. NSBs contribute to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI to
coordinate their efforts and support harmonised European standards. 20
This multitude of organisations not only reflects the complex nature of
standardisation but also its growing geopolitical importance. Standardsetting has evolved into a competitive arena where standards-makers seek to
consolidate their technological primacy.
Figure 2 shows a non-exhaustive graphical representation of the global SDO
landscape, with a focus on Europe, the US and China.
17
European Committee for Standardisation, Common Rules for Standardisation Work: Internal
Regulations, Part 2, January 2025.
18 ETSI, TM Approval Procedure.
19
NEN, Who is NEN and What Do We Do?. NEN stands for Nederlands Normalisatie Instituut, or Royal
Dutch Standardisation Institute (in English).
20 European Commission, Key Players in European Standardisation.
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Figure 2
The SDO landscape: key governmental and private organisations at the global,
EU and national level
Quasi-formal SDOs or
standards consortia
IEEE, IETF, W3C
3GPP, OASIS,
OneM2M
European Union
(regional)
China (national)
The Netherlands (national)
Global
United States of America
(national)
Source: authors’ compilation. Please note that there is a geographical and hierarchical
nature to these organisations, moving up from the national level, to the regional level,
to the global level.
2.2
From Economics to the Geopolitics of Standardisation
Geopolitical competition plays out in the different governance models used
to develop standards. Broadly speaking, the US follows a predominantly
market-driven model, where firms shape standards through their global market
leadership. The EU is best characterised as a mixed model, combining privatesector input with oversight by public institutions. However, the EU and its
Member States have so far struggled to mobilise effectively and significantly
private-sector actors to engage strategically in global standardisation efforts.
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In contrast, through a state-led approach, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
plays a directive role in setting and promoting standards. 21 While the US and
EU have historically relied on innovation-driven influence, China is the first
to implement a comprehensive national strategy to shape global technical
standardisation. This assertive model is increasingly viewed as a geopolitical
challenge by European and American actors.
The differences between governance models to develop standards matter.
Standards-setting has ramifications across a wide range of domains, as
standards structure the economy and technical characteristics of each and every
domain they cover. Over recent decades, largely unnoticed, technical standards
have been a driving force behind globalisation. As well as ensuring the safety
and interoperability of products and services, standards facilitate international
trade by reducing transaction costs and providing unified frameworks to prevent
market fragmentation. Originally designed to maintain quality in particular
sectors, standards have evolved to regulate safety and become regulatory tools
that establish the ‘rules of the game’ for economic actors. 22
The harmonising nature and regulatory influence of standards were reinforced
by the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, signed in 1994 by over
130 nations under a World Trade Organisation (WTO) Treaty. The TBT Agreement
advanced the internationalisation of standards by encouraging WTO members
to base technical regulations on them. While the Agreement does not make
standards themselves legally binding, it promotes their use in domestic
regulation. 23 Furthermore, the agreement established a framework enabling
WTO members to challenge another member’s technical regulations, if perceived
as unnecessary obstacles to trade, through the WTO’s dispute settlement
mechanism. While the WTO does not create technical standards itself, it
promotes the use of internationally agreed standards to reduce trade barriers
and ensure fair regulatory practices. 24
21
Alexi Drew, The Critical Geopolitics of Standards Setting, 7 May 2021.
22 JoAnne Yates and Craig N. Murphy, Engineering Rules: Global Standard Setting since 1880,
2020; and Sabrina Weithmann and Susann Luedtke, Evaluating the Impact of Deviating Technical
Standards on Business Processes, Trade and Innovation, 1 January 2023.
23 Martin Kellermann, Ensuring Quality to Gain Access to Global Markets: A Reform Toolkit, 2019.
24 World Trade Organisation, Technical Barriers to Trade.
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Although the benefits of standards and international harmonisation for trade
are well recognised, critics often highlight their potential negative impact on
innovation. Standardisation may limit alternative approaches, potentially stifling
the emergence of new and improved solutions. It may also create barriers to
market access and foster lock-in effects. 25 The QWERTY keyboard layout is often
cited as an example of status quo bias, where a non-optimal de facto standard
persists because of high conversion costs and user familiarity, despite the
potential availability of more ergonomic designs. 26
However, this represents only one side of the story, as standardisation can
also provide a significant foundation for innovation and progress. A notable
distinction exists between national and international standards. Studies suggest
that, in a globalised economy, national standards tend to restrict innovation,
whereas international standards foster it. 27 While both types of standards incur
compliance costs, international standards help to reduce the costs associated
with commercialising an innovative product across multiple markets, because
they reduce or eliminate the need to adapt products to differing national
specifications and certification procedures. This streamlining allows firms to
scale faster, access global supply chains more efficiently and avoid duplicative
compliance burdens.
In fact, the relationship between technology standards and innovation is best
understood in how they mutually impact each other in the short and long term:
developing standards prepares the markets, while missing standards can close
them. In the short term, standards help to set expectations, compatibility and
guidelines that enable new technologies to enter and grow in the global market.
Without these standards, innovations might struggle to gain acceptance, slowing
or even preventing their adoption. In the long term, established standards
shape the direction of innovation, guiding development along certain paths and
sometimes restricting it in others.
25 Frances Farrugia, The Paradox of Standardisation and Innovation, 17 January 2022.
26 The view that QWERTY is non-optimal has faced criticism, with research questioning the
methodological rigour and neutrality of studies comparing it to alternatives like the Dvorak layout.
27 Knut Blind and Florian Münch, The Interplay between Innovation, Standards and Regulation in a
Globalising Economy, February 2024.
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Five Power Dimensions of Standardisation
A country’s technological leadership significantly shapes its influence in
international standardisation. This is illustrated by the shifting balance of power
from traditionally dominant actors like the EU, US and Japan to emerging
players like China. 28 Moreover, the creation or revision of standards results in
‘winners and losers’. 29 Standards are a source of power that stretches in various
dimensions, as Figure 3 shows.
Figure 3
Five dimensions of standardisation as a source of power
Ideational
Dimension
Legal
Dimension
Political
Dimension
Economic
Dimension
Technological
Dimension
Source: S. Lüdtke’s compilation, based on Tim Rühlig, The Shape of Things to Come:
The Race to Control Technical Standardisation, 2021.
First, there is an ideational dimension. Standards influence global reputation and
soft power, shaping perceptions of technological leadership and values. This is
exemplified by debates around China’s ‘New Internet Protocol’ proposal in 2019,
which sparked international concerns over surveillance and digital governance.
Standards also raise ethical implications, especially in areas like data privacy
and state control.
Second, standardisation has a legal dimension. Standards serve as benchmarks
for non-tariff trade barriers, affecting over 80 per cent of global trade.30 They are
28 The ‘Three-Phase Standardisation Development Concept’ (SDC) is an established indicator to
clarify the state of technology development and therefore the likelihood that deviating technology
standards emerge as a result of technology leadership. See: Sabrina Weithmann, The Evolvement
of Standards in China: Insights from the Electric Vehicle Sector, 2018; and Susann Lüdtke,
Standardisation in China’s Building Energy Efficiency Industry: The Development of a National
Standard for Passive Houses in China, 2024.
29 Sabrina Weithmann and Susann Lüdtke, Evaluating the Impact of Deviating Technical Standards
on Business Processes, Trade and Innovation, 1 January 2023.
30 Tim Rühlig, China, Europe and the New Power Competition over Technical Standards, 2021.
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frequently referenced in national regulations, providing legal certainty and
ensuring compliance across jurisdictions.
Third, there is a political dimension. Technical standards create long-term
dependencies and lock-in effects, which may have serious geopolitical
consequences. Set against this context, China’s Digital Silk Road initiative
has raised national security and strategic concerns. With its government
push, Huawei positioned itself at the forefront of 5G infrastructure rollouts in
countries like South Africa, Indonesia and Cambodia.31 Cybersecurity standards
are another critical area, with emerging technologies like quantum-secure
communication posing both risks and opportunities.32
Fourth, there is an economic dimension. Standards influence trade by
harmonising regulations and reducing technical barriers, as divergent product
standards remain a major obstacle to international commerce. They also affect
costs, including patent licensing fees and compliance expenses. Companies
that fail to establish their technology as a global standard face adaptation costs
to comply with dominant alternatives. The German standardisation body DIN
notes that standards foster efficiency and innovation, contributing to broader
economic growth.33
Fifth, there is a technological dimension. High-tech standards drive innovation
by enabling collaboration among experts and aligning with cutting-edge
research. They improve the market success of new technologies and are closely
tied to Standard Essential Patents (SEPs), which influence licensing models
and industrial policy.34 Companies that lead in standards-setting can not only
avoid adaptation costs but also earn royalties from SEPs – enhancing both
competitiveness and their economic advantage.35
31
David Sacks, China’s Huawei is Winning the 5G Race: Here’s What the United States Should Do to
Respond, 29 March 2021.
32 ILNAS and ANEC, Quantum Communication and Technical Standardisation, November 2024.
33 Sabrina Weithmann and Susann Lüdtke, Evaluating the Impact of Deviating Technical Standards
on Business Processes, Trade and Innovation, 1 January 2023; DIN, Standardisation and the TTIP
with the USA: Opportunities and Risks, September 2014.
34 Group of Experts on Licensing and Valuation of Standard Essential Patent, Contribution to the
Debate on SEPs, January 2021.
35 Sabrina Weithmann and Susann Lüdtke, Evaluating the Impact of Deviating Technical Standards
on Business Processes, Trade and Innovation, 1 January 2023; and T. Pohlmann, K. Blind and
P. Hess, Studie zur Untersuchung und Analyse der Patentsituation bei der Standardisierung von 5G
(in German), January 2020.
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Ownership of core technologies also confers strategic power in standardisation,
particularly from a security perspective. Developers of a technology have detailed
knowledge of its workings – including potential vulnerabilities. Once a technology
becomes an international standard, it is widely adopted across borders, giving
the original developers potential insight into flaws that could be exploited to
undermine the security of others, raising serious national security concerns.
Although not directly related to standards, this concern underpins the bans or
restrictions imposed by the US and several European countries on equipment and
digital infrastructure from Chinese companies such as Huawei, ZTE and Alibaba.
The following section explores China’s rise in the past decade as a standardisation
power along these five dimensions. Its expanding technological prowess, together
with its state-led model, have helped to reshape the rules of the standardisation
game.
21
3 China’s Rise as a Standards
Power: The Basis of Longterm Dominance
Over the past decade, the global standardisation landscape has undergone a
significant transformation, with China evolving from merely adopting global
standards to actively shaping them. As a key player in developing cutting-edge
technology and dominating areas like solar energy and EV chips, China’s growing
technological leadership has elevated its role in global standardisation efforts.
Recognising the strategic value of standardisation in enhancing competitiveness,
China has made standardisation one of its comprehensive industrial policy’s
central elements. China has now established a distinctive standardisation
system, characterised by strong government involvement, while also increasingly
engaging the private sector to drive innovation and disseminating it abroad.
‘Third tier companies make products; second tier companies make technology;
first tier companies make standards’. This mantra effectively encapsulates China’s
standardisation approach,36 which has been strategically promoted and planned
since the 18th National Congress of the CCP in 2012. The internationalisation of
standards gained momentum with the launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative
in 2013. The promulgation of the ‘Made in China 2025’ technological upgrading
strategy in 2015 further accelerated this process, laying the groundwork for
the ‘China Standards 2035’ (CS2035) initiative, which was introduced in 2018.
Alongside the development of the CS2035 strategy, China actively began
executing plans to shape global standards for emerging technologies such as 5G,
the Internet of Things and artificial intelligence (AI).37 These diverse strategies
and policies highlight China’s coordinated use of standards to stimulate industrial
growth and align with broader economic goals. National and international
standards are to be developed closely together, bringing about a shift from
a nationally oriented approach to a so-called ‘national–international mutual
transformation’. By 2035, the Chinese standardisation system should become
36 John Seaman, China and the New Geopolitics of Technical Standardisation, January 2020.
37 EAC International Consulting, China Standards 2035: Shaping the World of Tomorrow?
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
internationally compatible, fitting a ‘standardisation management system with
Chinese characteristics’.38
The active role of the government in China’s standardisation approach is evident
in the multitude of state bodies involved in the process. The Standardisation
Administration of China (SAC), operating under the State Administration for
Market Regulation (SAMR) and the State Council, primarily sets overall strategies
and oversees China’s standardisation efforts. SAC is responsible for strategic
coordination, project approval and represents China in the ISO and IEC. In the
ITU, China is represented by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
(MIIT). National and sector standards are developed by Technical Committees
(TCs), composed of experts from both the public and private sectors. TCs report
to their corresponding ministries, on a sector basis.
Figure 4
China’s government-led standardisation approach: key actors
State Council
Oversees
Ministry of Industry
and Information
Technology
(sector-specific for
19 industries like
communications,
electronics)
Oversees
State Administration
for Market Regulation
(SAMR)
Belongs to
Oversees
Standardisation
Administration of China
(SAC)
Support
Support
Oversees
Other ministries and
sector-specific
administrative
departments
Management
level
Support
Standardisation community: affiliated industry associations,
research and standardisation institutes in charge of most
standardisation initiatives (TCs, SCs, WGs)
Implementation
level
Participate in
Industry
Source: Susann Lüdtke’s compilation, adapted from Seconded European Standardization
Expert in China (SESEC), 2024.
Note: TCs stands for Technical Committees; SCs stands for Sub-Committees; and WGs
stands for Working Groups.
38 CPC Central Committee and the State Council, National Standardisation Development Outline,
10 October 2021.
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This structure marks a significant contrast to the United States and the European
Union, where industry-driven and non-governmental organisations typically
guide the development of standards. Additionally, it highlights the political
priority that standardisation holds in China, positioning it as a key national
priority rather than simply a technical or business concern. SAC is also the
Chinese representative in the international formal SDOs.
The SAC is responsible for coordinating national strategies and policies related
to standardisation, while specific technical standards are developed by research
institutes affiliated with various Chinese government ministries. For example,
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) plays a pivotal role,
with specialised institutes such as the China Electronics Standardisation Institute
(CESI), which focuses on AI standards, and the National Technical Committee
of Automotive Standardisation (NTCAS), which handles, among others,
EV standards. This high level of state involvement not only ensures a cohesive
and coordinated strategy for the development of standards, but also allows for
the strategic allocation of state subsidies to standardisation bodies and rewards
companies for working on patents and standards.39
China is also intensifying its efforts to encourage greater industry involvement
in standards-setting. With the 2018 amendment to China’s Standardisation
Law and the introduction of the National Standardisation Development (NSD)
Outline in 2021, the Chinese government granted legal status to ‘association
standards’ developed by industry associations. While national and sector
standards are developed within technical committees, much of the work is
now reportedly driven by experts from the private sector, with state institutions
retaining formal overall leadership.40 The new law has also abolished mandatory
industry and local standards, which were previously overseen by ministries
and local authorities, leaving only mandatory national standards under SAC’s
control.41 The new system reflects a clearer governance model of orchestration,
combining state-led initiatives with market-driven participation, where
the government acts as a facilitator and coordinator rather than the sole
39 John Seaman, China and the New Geopolitics of Technical Standardisation (p. 12), January 2020.
40 Sorina Teleanu, The Geopolitics of Digital Standards: China’s Role in Standard-Setting
Organisations, 14 December 2021.
41
John Lee, Eric Zhang and Rogier Creemers, China’s Standardisation System: Trends, Implications
and Case Studies in Emerging Technologies (p. 8), 2022.
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decision-maker. Figure 5 illustrates the changes brought about by the 2018
standardisation law amendment.
Figure 5
Changes in China’s standardisation governance after the 2018 standardisation
law amendment
Local standards
Sector standards
National standards
(issued by NSB)
National standards
(issued by NSB)
Sector standards
(issued by Ministry)
Local standards
(issued by local gov.)
Association standards
(issued by Association)
Local standards
Enterprise standards
(issued by enterprises)
Enterprise standards
Governmentissued standards
Mandatory
Sector standards
China’s standardisation
system after 2018
Voluntary
Mandatory
National standards
National standards
Voluntary
Government-issued
standards
China’s standardisation
system until 2017
Adopted
ISO/IEC/ITU
standards
Market-issued
standards
Source: Adapted from John Seaman, China and the New Geopolitics of Technical
Standardisation, January 2020; and authors’ compilation.
This shift towards more private-sector involvement was deemed necessary
to improve the quality and competitiveness of Chinese standards, as it is the
industry that brings the technical expertise needed for the development and
standardisation of modern technologies. Therefore, the governance shift that
occurred in 2018 should not be viewed as a move away from state control, but
rather as a strategy to strengthen the capabilities of the state-centred standards
system.42 The Chinese government will continue to oversee national mandatory
standards in critical areas related to national security, the technologies of the
42 Matt Sheehan, Marjory S. Blumenthal and Michael R. Nelson, Three Takeaways from China’s New
Standards Strategy, 2021.
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future like AI and quantum, environmental protection and economic and social
governance – thus ensuring that standardisation serves broader competitiveness
and geopolitical objectives.
3.1
From Domestic Control to Regional Dominance
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) marked China’s ambition to expand its global
presence, and with that its global role and influence.43 This ambition was also
extended to standardisation. In 2015 and 2018, China’s State Council and SAC
released two action plans promoting China’s standardisation cooperation with
BRI countries. These plans enabled China to promote bilateral recognition
of standards in manufacturing industries and the adoption of Chinese
telecommunications standards by BRI partner countries.44 As part of the
initiative, China started translating its domestic technical standards into foreign
languages to support their adoption in other countries. By September 2019,
China had entered into 90 bilateral agreements on technical standardisation
cooperation with 52 nations and regions.45
These agreements show that China promotes its standards through a
bilateral, sector-specific approach rather than attempting to build a unified
regional standards regime. This suggests that China is not aiming to replace
existing international standardisation frameworks, but rather to reshape them
incrementally from within. Bilateral agreements with partner countries create
long-term interoperability and dependencies, particularly in developing countries
that lack the capacity to develop their own standards. As these countries adopt
Chinese technical norms, it increases the likelihood that such standards will be
proposed – and accepted – in international SDOs. In this way, China leverages
bilateral engagement under the BRI to strengthen its collective voting power and
influence in global standardisation forums.
43 Brigitte Dekker and Maaike Okano-Heijmans, Unpacking China’s Digital Silk Road, 27 July 2020.
44 John Lee et al., China’s Standardisation System: Trends, Implications and Case Studies in
Emerging Technologies, April 2022.
45 Tim Rühlig, China, Europe and the New Power Competition over Technical Standards (p. 8),
January 2021.
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3.2
From Regional Dominance to Global Influence
Over the past fifteen years, China has made significant strides in its engagement
with formal SDOs, making this a central element of its standardisation strategy.
This effort has yielded significant results, of which the rise of Chinese official
Houlin Zhao to become ITU Secretary-General from 2015 to 2022 is a prime
example.46 Key strategies to achieve this include: submitting more proposals for
international standards; increasing the volume and quality of technical input
from Chinese stakeholders; and expanding the presence of Chinese experts in
technical committees – particularly by securing leadership and secretariat roles
within those bodies.47
From 2020, SAC prioritised increasing its active participation in the three formal
international SDOs: the ITU, ISO and IEC. A key way to do so was to enhance
China’s presence in formal SDOs’ Technical Committees (TCs), which play a
critical role in shaping the content and direction of international standards.
These committees are where technical specifications are drafted, reviewed and
negotiated, which makes them the backbone of the standardisation process.48
Taking the example of the ISO, China is currently involved in 778 ISO TCs,
ranking as the country with the largest number of TCs in which it participates
(see Table 1).
46 Chinese official Houlin Zhao was elected ITU Secretary-General in late 2014, following a decadeslong career at the ITU. Notably, Zhao has a background in developing telecom standards for
the Chinese government and during his tenure at ITU he has been a vocal supporter of Chinese
telecom giant Huawei, especially in the context of 5G technology. See: CSIS, The International
Telecommunication Union: The Most Important UN Agency You Have Never Heard Of, 14 December
2020; and Philip Lott, How China Became the Standard Maker, 11 October 2022.
47 The allocation of secretariat positions within the Technical Committees (TCs) is a key factor in
the ISO and IEC, as these committees are responsible for drafting technical standards. See: Björn
Fägersten and Tim Rühlig, China’s Standard Power and its Geopolitical Implications for Europe,
February 2019.
48 Sorina Teleanu, The Geopolitics of Digital Standards: China’s Role in Standard-Setting
Organisations, 14 December 2021.
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
Table 1
Countries’ participation in ISO Technical Committees (TCs) and Secretariat
positions, as of March 2025
Country
TC Participation
TC Secretariat
China (SAC)
778
90
France (AFNOR)
651
82
Germany (DIN)
721
134
Japan (JISC)
665
84
Netherlands (NEN)
454
10
United Kingdom (BSI)
702
76
United States (ANSI)
562
92
Source: authors’ compilation based on ISO Technical Committee data.
See: ISO, ISO Technical Committees Metadata, May 2025.
However, mere participation in committees does not guarantee influence
over standards-setting outcomes. Securing a secretariat position is a key
factor in determining a country’s influence, as it often reflects a member’s
dedication to deeper involvement and the commitment of additional resources
to standardisation efforts, as well as to setting the agenda. In this regard, China
holds the second largest number of secretariat positions (90), following Germany
(134). While Table 1 shows that EU Member States are still far more represented
than China in the ISO, Figure 6 illustrates the trend in ISO leadership positions
among selected countries between 2013 and 2023.49
49 A more detailed analysis of the specific TCs is required to provide insight into how strategic the
positions held by China are.
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
ISO leadership positions change, 2013–2023
200
100
0
-100
Ko Ch
re in
a, a
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Re
n,
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Is Ja .
la
m pan
ic
Re
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r
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ss ou an
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de ica
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te do
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Change in ISO secretariat and convenor positions
Figure 6
Source: United States Studies Centre, Standards Development Organisations in an Era of
Strategic Competition, 16 December 2024.
In 2019, Chinese companies submitted 830 technical specifications for wired
communications in the context of the ITU. This is more than the combined total of
the three next-largest contributors: Japan, the US and South Korea.50 Since 2020,
China has consistently boosted its ISO and IEC proposals by 20 per cent each
year.51 While the ITU does not play a leading technical role in developing mobile
telecommunications standards – where the 3rd Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) is the primary arena – it remains influential in legitimising technologies
through official adoption processes. In September 2024, the ITU approved three
Chinese proposals related to 6G mobile technologies as candidate frameworks
for further study, underscoring China’s ambition to shape benchmarks. This trend
50 Brett Schaefer and Danielle Pletka, Countering China’s Growing Influence at the International
Telecommunication Union, 7 March 2022.
51
Kommission Arbeitsschutz und Normung, China: A Developing Global Power in Standardisation,
2021.
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is expected to continue across several sectors, as the Chinese government’s goal
is to lead over 100 international standardisation projects by 2030.52
China’s increased involvement in international SDOs is strongly supported
from Beijing. Both China’s central and regional governments are reported to
allocate annual financial incentives to companies leading the development of
standards, through an incentive and reward mechanism to compensate their
efforts.53 However, this incentive scheme is not without drawbacks. Practitioners
have noted that an emphasis on the quantity of contributions does not always
translate into technical quality, and that the large volume of submissions from
Chinese stakeholders can at times slow down the work of international SDOs
or overwhelm committee processes. Another approach involves replicating ISO
and IEC TCs at the national level, a strategy also adopted by the US and the
EU. This practice is known as mirroring, or twinning. Mirror committees review
drafts issued by international TCs, gather input from domestic experts, and align
stakeholders on national voting positions and contributions. This process ensures
that a country’s voice is coherent, technically sound and strategically positioned
in global standardisation efforts. China has approximately 870 mirror committees
for ISO/IEC TCs and their subcommittees (SCs) that closely follow international
standardisation developments.54 In contrast, the European mirror committee
system reflects the diversity of national standardisation bodies and stakeholder
processes across EU Member States. This leads not only to slower consensus
building but also often to a heterogenous vote, while China is sometimes able to
use a ‘bandwagon’ strategy to convince others to vote with them.55
Overall, China’s approach demonstrates strategic planning, with standardisation
seen as a key component of its industrial and innovation policy. Driven by strong
government involvement and capabilities, China is increasingly positioning
52 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) of China, SESEC IV Translation: Key Points of
Automotive Standardisation in 2021, 2021.
53 Sorina Teleanu, The Geopolitics of Digital Standards: China’s Role in Standard-Setting
Organisations, 14 December 2021; and CCATS, Guiding Opinions of the Standardisation
Administration of the People’s Republic of China on Carrying out Pilot Projects for National
Standardisation Innovation and Development and Taking the Lead in Realising the ‘Four
Transformations’, 31 August 2022.
54 Sorina Teleanu, The Geopolitics of Digital Standards: China’s Role in Standard-setting
Organisations, 2021.
55 Although aligning votes is officially not allowed, European and other practitioners have reported
that this is the case.
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
itself as a leading player in shaping international standards. In contrast,
standardisation in Europe still appears to lack priority, putting the European
Union at risk of falling behind in establishing the standards that will drive the
next wave of technological innovation.
31
4 Standardisation in Practice:
Industry Snapshots
As global competition in emerging technologies intensifies, standardisation
becomes a powerful tool of strategic influence. To illustrate the nature of
standardisation bodies and the shift that has occurred in the power balance
over recent decades, two domains are analysed: (1) telecommunications and
the internet; and (2) electric vehicle (EV) chips. Telecommunications underpin
global connectivity but also national security, while EV chips are critical to
the next generation of mobility and smart infrastructure. By examining these
two domains, this section highlights how standardisation not only buttresses
technological progress, but also reflects China’s incorporation of standardisation
into its strategic priorities, with the aim to assert its leadership in global markets.
4.1
Telecommunications and the Internet
Telecommunications and the internet are foundational to the functioning of
modern economies, public services and national security systems. As illustrated
in Figure 7, most of the standardisation work on telecommunications and the
internet occurs at the quasi-formal level, in the context of organisations like the
IEEE or IETF; or standards consortia such as 3GPP.56 The internet is, in fact, a
prime example of how standardisation is increasingly left to private actors. As
the internet developed, standardisation increasingly shifted towards private-led
bodies, while the ITU remained more central to traditional telecommunications’
infrastructure and coordination. Initially, the internet operated under a loose
governance model that emerged in the 1980s, primarily driven by American
entities.57 Notably, the establishment of a private multistakeholder internet
56 The 3GPP’s organisational format is exceptional. It is not a formal SDO per se, but rather an
umbrella organisation of predominantly formal national and regional SDOs, which automatically
take over 3GPP outputs. The secretariat of 3GPP is held by ETSI.
57 Laura Denardis, The Global War for Internet Governance, 2014; and Janet Abbate, Inventing the
Internet, 2000.
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governance regime resulted in the industry-led Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) in 1986, which spearheaded the technical standardisation of the internet.58
Figure 7
List of SDOs involved in standards-setting on telecommunications and
the internet (non-exhaustive)
Telecommunications
Internet
ITU-T
3GPP
IEEE
OneM2M
IETF
W3C
Source: authors’ compilation.
Note 1: The ITU is the only international formal body responsible for technical
standardisation in the fields of telecommunications and the internet.
Note 2: While ICANN is not a standardisation body, it plays a crucial coordination role
in internet governance by managing the global Domain Name System (DNS), IP address
allocation and protocol parameter assignments, all of which rely on standards developed
by other organisations like the IETF.
The history of mobile networks’ development, from 2G to 5G, also showcases the
complexity of the interaction between formal and quasi-formal SDOs. In practice,
the ITU’s role has been to define the requirements and approve standards that
meet these requirements, rather than developing the standards themselves.
Europe has historically played a significant role in these forums, particularly
through bodies like the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI), which contributed to key mobile technology standards like the Global
System for Mobile Communications (GSM). However, part of the momentum has
shifted. Today, influence over standards in telecommunications and the internet
58 IETF, Introduction to the IETF.
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
increasingly reflects wider geopolitical trends – with China’s rising prominence
and the United States’ continued dominance pressing Europe to rethink its
strategic positioning.
Since the late 1990s, China’s role in telecommunications has changed
rapidly from follower to innovator. China entered the telecommunications
standardisation game by developing the domestic 3G standard TD-SCDMA, with
the intention to foster internal industry growth and protect its domestic market
from foreign competition.59 The initiative was partly successful: in spite of not
having gained global traction, TD-SCDMA ‘was approved by ITU as one of the
candidate standards for 3G mobile communications in May 2000 and accepted
by 3GPP in March 2001’.60 This initiative allowed China to develop knowledge
about the processes around standardisation, both at home and abroad.
In parallel, the Chinese government stimulated the sector by giving subsidies to
national champions like Huawei, ZTE and China Unicom, showcasing its ability to
integrate and embed different strategies working towards the same goal.61
A high-profile example of these dynamics is the (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt
by China to promote a ‘New Internet Protocol’ (New IP) at the ITU in 2019, led
by Huawei. Although presented as a next-generation internet architecture,
the proposal raised red flags over risks to openness, decentralisation and net
neutrality. Ultimately, the lack of technical details and political resistance
stalled the proposal. Interviews with internet routing specialists indicate that
no technical disruptions or routing anomalies have been observed in relation
to internet traffic to and from China.62 While this might suggest a successful
defence of the open internet model by Western and multistakeholder actors, this
case also highlights China’s growing coordination across telecommunications
firms (like Huawei and ZTE), state-linked institutes, and research entities and
experts within SDOs like the ITU and 3GPP. This should be regarded as a wake-up
call for others, as China continues to shape how future standards are drafted, for
instance in areas like 6G or smart cities.
59 Tomoo Marukawa, Diminishing Returns to High-Tech Standards Wars: China’s Strategies in Mobile
Communications Technology, August 2014.
60 H. Chen, C. Fan and W. Lu, China’s Perspectives on 3G Mobile Communications and Beyond:
TD-SCDMA Technology, April 2002.
61
E. Harwit, China's Telecommunications Revolution, 2008.
62 P. Brand, N. ten Oever, R. van der Berg, J. Verweij. Internetinfrastructuur: Standaardisatie,
Techniek En Geopolitiek (in Dutch), 2022.
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From Europe’s and the Netherlands’ perspective, China’s growing influence
poses both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge lies in the risk of losing
normative influence over global internet and telecom standards. But there is also
an opportunity: by leveraging its strong digital infrastructure, technical expertise
and multistakeholder governance tradition, the Netherlands could play a much
more active role in shaping the future of standardisation.
As noted above, one of the key governance features in telecom and internet
standardisation is that while the ITU plays a convening and high-level
coordination role, the actual technical drafting of standards often takes place in
quasi-formal bodies such as 3GPP and the IETF. These working groups are largely
dominated by industry actors, with limited formal mechanisms for public-interest
oversight. This structure can undermine Europe’s normative priorities – including
transparency, human rights protections and digital sovereignty – as these values
may not always be embedded in technically driven, industry-led processes.
For the private sector, this should also serve as a wake-up call. If European
companies remain underrepresented or disengaged from these technical bodies,
they risk losing influence over the standards that will define their markets, shape
global compliance environments and determine long-term competitiveness.
Summing up, China’s approach to telecom standardisation strategy today
has distinctive elements: it involves the proactive allocation of Chinese state
resources to companies participating in SDOs; there is clear alignment between
industrial policy and standards’ diplomacy, reflected in broader initiatives such
as ‘Made in China 2025’ and ‘China Standards 2035’; and by building leadership
in technical committees, hosting key meetings and conferences, and developing
full technical proposals ahead of the curve, China maximises its influence while
remaining formally compliant with multilateral procedures.
Actionable Steps for Europe and the Netherlands:
1. Prioritise early engagement: Europe must shape the agenda at the earliest
possible phase – from pre-standardisation research to early drafting of
technical requirements. This includes coordinating positions well before
standards reach the voting stage.
2. Invest in multistakeholder presence: The Netherlands, leveraging its digital
infrastructure strengths and technical expertise, can increase its presence in
both formal and informal telecom standardisation processes. This includes
seconding technical experts to SDOs and offering travel and coordination
support to Dutch stakeholders.
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
3. Link standards to industrial strategy: Technical standards are not
neutral – they underpin future markets. Aligning Dutch and EU R&D efforts
in telecommunications networking technologies, such as 6G or quantum
communication, with proactive standardisation efforts can strengthen
Europe’s competitive position. Strategic foresight and data-driven decisionmaking can play pivotal roles in guiding and amplifying these efforts.
4. Build coalitions with like-minded partners: Aligning with countries such as
Japan, South Korea and India within the ITU and 3GPP can amplify Europe’s
influence and counterbalance coordinated Chinese proposals.
5. Safeguard democratic values: As decisions migrate to industry-led SDOs,
it becomes crucial to embed safeguards for openness, privacy and human
rights in technical specifications. European actors must continue to champion
these values and push for transparency reforms in bodies like the 3GPP and
ITU.
4.2
Electric Vehicle Chips
The importance of the automobile sector to Europe’s economy makes the
standardisation of electric vehicle (EV) chips a matter of long-term strategic
significance. The automotive industries of Germany and France, in particular,
have been major drivers of economic growth, exports and employment – not
only within their own borders, but also across their extended value chains
throughout the EU. This includes the Netherlands, which is home to several key
semiconductor firms that supply the increasingly digitalised automotive sector.
As mobility systems become more software-defined and chip-reliant, aligning
industrial capabilities with standardisation priorities becomes a critical task for
Europe’s competitiveness and resilience.
Against this backdrop, various types of chips are increasingly important to
automotive systems, a trend that is expected to continue as the market for
EVs, new energy vehicles (NEVs), intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) and
autonomous driving vehicles grows. As EVs become increasingly embedded
in global mobility and infrastructure systems, EV chips – the semiconductors
powering these vehicles – are emerging as critical chokepoints. The case of
EV chips is particularly interesting, as EVs use legacy chips (also known as
mature nodes) alongside advanced chips to support basic functions and ensure
compatibility with existing systems. They are essential not only for propulsion,
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
but also for safety, communication, power electronics, battery management and
autonomous functionality.
The international EV chip standardisation ecosystem is notably fragmented.
Formal SDOs such as the ISO (with its ISO 26262 standard on functional
safety) and the IEC (notably TC 22 for power electronics) play central roles.
In parallel, quasi-formal and industry-led bodies – like the IEEE, Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE International), Joint Electro Device Engineering
Council (JEDEC), Automotive Open System Architecture (AUTOSAR) and the
International Automotive Task Force (IATF) – contribute standards on reliability,
communications, safety and software architecture. Regulatory frameworks from
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), such as WP.29
(the world forum concerning motor vehicles and their equipment), complement
this architecture.
Chinese stakeholders not only seek to influence international EV chip standards,
particularly in areas such as battery safety, chip reliability (such as with the EU’s
Trusted Chips Initiative) and data protection, but are also very active in national
EV chip standardisation. China’s EV chip standardisation system is characterised
by strong central government leadership, primarily through China’s Ministry
of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), which coordinates the
development and implementation of both national and industry standards
covering reliability, safety, cybersecurity and testing protocols. Recent years
have seen the introduction of a formal automotive-grade chip63 certification
system and accelerated timelines for mandatory standards, reflecting China’s
strategic ambition to enhance domestic chip quality and reduce reliance on
foreign chip technology.64 As with other areas, EV chip standardisation involves
collaboration among government agencies, industry associations, large
Chinese firms and research institutes. Besides, it increasingly aligns with – or
seeks to influence – international standards. The standardisation of EV chips
in China is roughly split between automotive standards and integrated circuits
(chips) standards. For instance, automotive standards are orchestrated by
63 Automotive-grade chips refer to semiconductor chips that meet automotive industry standards
and are used in automotive electronic systems. The distinction is made between computing chips,
power chips and sensor chips.
64 Simultaneously, state-led efforts from China’s MIIT, like the Guidelines for Developing National
Automotive Chip Standard System (2024), aim to deliver 70 national standards by 2030, with a
strong focus on reliability, cybersecurity and compatibility.
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
China’s National Technical Committee of Automotive Standardisation (NTCAS)
and via its TC 144 ‘Road Vehicles’. Moreover, integrated circuits (i.e. chips)
standards are developed by China’s National Integrated Circuit Standardization
Technical Committee (NICSTC) and via its TC 78 ‘Semiconductor Devices’ and
the new TC 599 ‘Integrated Circuits’. The latter was established as a response
to international restrictions and export controls. Both committees are part of
China’s comprehensive strategy for technological independence and leadership
in the global automotive chips’ standards landscape. While regulatory
responsibility is divided among different departments within MIIT, the related
standardization work for automotive and EV chips standards is organized
and implemented by specific research institutes like the China Automotive
Technology and Research Cente (CATARC) and associations like the China
Electronics Standardisation Institute (CESI), among others. Figure 8 presents
a visual representation of the main actors involved in China’s EV and automotive
chips standardisation landscape.
Figure 8
High-level organisation of China’s automotive standardisation landscape
Oversees
Oversees
State Administration
for Market Regulation
(SAMR)
Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology
Belongs to
Affiliated to
Oversees
Standardisation
Administration of China
(SAC)
- Automotive standards.
E.g. China Automotive
Technology and
Research Cente
(CATARC)
Support
- Semiconductors and
integrated circuits
(chips) standards. E.g.
China Electronics
Standardisation
Institute (CESI
Develop
- National Technical Committee for Standardization of Semiconductor Devices (SAC/TC78);
- National Road Vehicles Standardization Technical Committee (SAC/TC114);
- National Integrated Circuit Standardization Technical Committee (SAC/TC599); and
corresponding subcommittees and working groups
Participate in
Industry
38
Implementation
level
Management
level
State Council
Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
In theory, foreign enterprises and Chinese companies can participate in equal
terms in the various EV chip-related working groups and TCs. Since 2024, this
pattern has seemed to diminish as China’s MIIT established the China Automotive
Chip Alliance (CACA), composed of Chinese original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs, such as BYD and SAIC), automotive electronics and software vendors
(like CATL), chipmakers (such as SMIC and Black Sesame) and state-affiliated
research bodies. CACA’s main intent is to reduce China’s high import dependency
on foreign chips and bring China towards autonomy in automotive chips through
the entire automotive chip value chain – but this purely Chinese consortium also
likely enables strategic coordination on EV chip standardisation, serving as a
model for how technical coordination can be leveraged for geopolitical influence.
In this context, Europe – including the Netherlands – faces twin challenges.
First, despite the EU Chips Act, strategic focus remains skewed towards
advanced chips for data centres or AI, while legacy and application-specific
chips, which are essential to the EV ecosystem, receive limited attention.
Second, the EU’s engagement on standards remains reactive and fragmented,
resulting in diminished leverage in settings where China coordinates large voting
blocs and places state-supported experts in leadership roles across committees.
The Netherlands, although relatively underrepresented in EV chip
standardisation, holds a strong position in the broader semiconductor value
chain. Global leaders like NXP – headquartered in Eindhoven and with deep
automotive integration – are central to both design and production. In addition,
Dutch academic institutions and innovation hubs such as Brainport Eindhoven
form a key node in Europe’s chip research and development infrastructure.
These assets offer a strategic opportunity to deepen Dutch influence on
standardisation – both directly and via EU coordination.
Actionable Steps for Europe and the Netherlands:
1. Recognise the strategic role of legacy chips: These chips are not ‘outdated’ –
they are indispensable in EVs, medical devices and defence systems.
Europe should allocate research and industrial resources to areas where it
has latent strengths and align these with standardisation agendas.
2. Refocus the EU Chips Act: Current apparent emphasis on high-end
manufacturing risks missing the broader industrial and societal implications
of EV chips. As discussions on a Chips Act 2.0 advance, European funding
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
and policy should explicitly support standardisation efforts that are tied to
mobility, energy transition and supply chain resilience – not just advanced
node manufacturing.65
3. Create a central coordination mechanism: The establishment of the China
Automotive Chip Alliance (CACA) in 2024 illustrates how China is strategically
aligning its standardisation activities across industry, government and
research. Europe should consider sector-specific coalitions that integrate
governments, industry leaders and NSBs to define shared positions in SDOs
and pre-standardisation processes.
4. Leverage Dutch industrial strengths: The Netherlands would do well to
elevate companies like NXP, linking them to standardisation leadership roles.
This includes supporting participation in ISO/IEC technical committees and
working on placing Dutch experts in rapporteur and chairing positions.
5. Strengthen coordination on standardisation with partners: EU Member
States should move from fragmented, individual participation in international
SDOs towards more coordinated, collective engagement. In addition, informal
strategic standardisation dialogues can be enhanced with partners that
share interests and concerns, such as Japan and South Korea, for example on
automotive technology.
Lessons and Implications for Other Sectors
Our analysis of telecommunications and the internet, and EV chips, illustrates
how China leverages technical standardisation as a tool of industrial strategy
and geopolitical influence. For Europe, this dual use of standardisation poses
both a strategic challenge and a window of opportunity. This goes in particular
for innovation-driven countries like the Netherlands.
While the two industry snapshots on telecommunications and the internet,
and EV chips, focus on high-profile technologies, it is important to recognise
that much of the standardisation work – especially within NSBs – takes place
in far more specific domains. This includes areas such as steel quality, fire
safety protocols and food safety procedures. Although often overlooked,
such standards can shape industrial processes, regulatory compliance and
cross-border market access just as much as frontline technologies.
65 Tobi Sterling, EU Chips Act 2.0 Should Include Legacy Chips, Says Industry Group Chief, Reuters.
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The current development of a Digital Product Passport (DPP) is such an
example. The DPP is being designed as a digital record containing standardised
information about a product’s characteristics, lifecycle and environmental
performance, in line with the implementation of the Ecodesign for Sustainable
Products Regulation (ESPR). Within the EU, a joint technical committee under
CEN and CENELEC is tasked with creating a standard for DPPs. In parallel, the
IEEE also launched a similar initiative in September 2024, also aimed at shaping
a global framework. While CEN frequently integrates IEEE standards, the output
of this dual-track approach will be a test of influence – as to whether CEN as
a European SDO, or the IEEE as a quasi-formal organisation, ultimately sets
the benchmark.
Building on the preceding analysis, section 5 sets out a series of recommen­
dations and action pointers designed to address both high-profile technology
areas – like those covered in the industry snapshots above – and the less visible,
more operational dimensions of standardisation that shape day-to-day technical
and regulatory outcomes.
41
5 Blueprint for Action
The findings of our industry snapshots point to a pressing need for the EU and
its individual Member States, including the Netherlands, to invest far more time
and (political) capital in standardisation. Standardisation must be integrated
in industrial, economic security and foreign policies – from engagement with
multilateral institutions to projects in the context of Global Gateway.66 Building
on the three core pillars of action of the 2023 EU Economic Security Strategy,67
this section provides a comprehensive overview of policy recommendations
along five lines of action: (1) Programming; (2) Promoting; (3) Protecting;
(4) Partnering; and (5) Process.
5.1
Programming: Strategising Standardisation
On programming, the Netherlands and Europe can learn two lessons from
China’s strategy on standardisation. First, standardisation should be considered
part of an overarching industrial and technology policy, regarded as one
of its strategic spearheads and part of its overarching technology vision.
Second, orchestrating the private sector is a powerful way to leverage
standardisation as a mechanism for asserting technological dominance, thereby
establishing a strong position to shape the development and direction of
standards across multiple arenas.
To the first point, China’s acknowledgement of standardisation’s importance
contrasts with the still-evolving role of standardisation in the EU’s agenda.
While institutional attention for standardisation in Europe has increased
significantly since the adoption of the 2022 European Standardisation Strategy
– most notably through the creation of the High-Level Forum on European
Standardisation, chaired by successive European Commissioners – the
66 Global Gateway is the EU’s programme to assist partner countries with their green and digital twin
transitions by mobilising up to EUR 300 billion in infrastructure development projects between
2021 and 2027. See: Alexandre Gomes and Maaike Okano-Heijmans, Dutch Niches for Global
Gateway in the Digital Domain: An Initial Inquiry, October 2023.
67 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council
and the Council on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’, 2023.
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integration of standardisation into Europe’s broader industrial and technological
strategy and its implementation remains incomplete. The forum, which brings
together 55 members including EU and European Economic Area (EEA) countries,
European SDOs such as CEN and CENELEC, industry, academia and civil society,
has produced several deliverables through its sectoral workstreams. However,
despite its mandate to convene twice annually, no meeting took place in 2024,
raising concerns about continuity and political follow-through.
Relying on a fragmented approach to technical standardisation is increasingly
untenable, but in the context of escalating geopolitical fragmentation, there is
a real risk that standardisation falls behind other, short-term priorities. Rather,
standardisation should be embedded in a broader industrial strategy that
nurtures native innovation ecosystems and reduces long-term vulnerabilities.
Without this, Europe risks falling behind in defining the rules for technologies of
the future.
Second, regarding orchestration, standardisation efforts involve a wide range of
stakeholders, particularly from the private sector. States can support and guide
these efforts by deploying policy tools such as public procurement, targeted
funding, and education and training initiatives. To this end, the Netherlands
and the EU must take a more proactive and leading role in standardisation.
Recognising the long-term effects of standardisation is the first step in doing so.
The second step is to define objectives and translate them into goals that can be
achieved through a coordinated approach with societal actors – learning from
China’s orchestration strategy. Greater coordination among the private sector
and industry, and the academic and research communities – both within the
Netherlands and in Europe – is a necessary condition for a successful industrial
policy that places standardisation as one of its core elements.
5.2
Promoting: Aligning Industrial Priorities and Global Standards’
Leadership Ambitions
Policies aimed at strengthening Dutch and European influence in technical
standardisation bodies should be closely linked to the EU’s broader knowledge
strategy. This includes leveraging Research, Development and Innovation
(R&D&I) ecosystems, which form the foundation of the EU bloc’s long-term
competitiveness. This means developing an agenda that focuses on policies
to foster research and innovation, intellectual property (IP) and patents
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development. Crucially, these efforts must have commercialisation and the
development of customer-facing applications as their ultimate goals, so that
the EU can reap the social and economic benefits of the research done within
its borders. Inability to bridge the gap from research to commercialisation and
entrepreneurship remains a major challenge in the EU.
However, the Netherlands and the EU cannot realistically aim to compete on
all fronts, as that would not be economically viable and would be unlikely to
yield positive results. Industrial policy comes at a cost, meaning that difficult
policy decisions have to be made: deciding where to focus current and future
investments is one such decision. For example, investing in sectors where
China already holds a significant lead, such as solar panels, is unlikely to
prove worthwhile. The European Commission and EU Member States like the
Netherlands would benefit from mapping the areas where they hold a futureready position and designing appropriate standardisation mechanisms and
targeted resource allocation strategies that best optimise efforts in those areas.
The goal ought not to be picking winners, but rather avoiding overinvesting in
sectors or industries where Europe is already behind and/or which are not of
strategic importance. Trying to compete with the US and China in technologies
where these countries are already dominant is unlikely to be a winning strategy.
Moreover, in line with recent initiatives such as the European Semiconductor
Coalition,68 building coalitions of the willing and explicitly incorporating
standardisation as one of the pillars of EU-wide initiatives related to, for
example, emerging technologies may prove beneficial. This would help in
making standardisation a political theme in forums where the theme is most
often omitted. To raise the profile and importance of standardisation further, EU
Member States could consider establishing dedicated national representatives
or envoys (ambassador-like roles) tasked with leading and coordinating
negotiations on standards, mobilising national multistakeholder communities
and strategising their participation in international technical standardssetting. A complementary approach would be to reinforce and institutionalise
strategic standardisation dialogue within the EU. While the High-Level Forum
on European Standardisation provides a valuable platform, this dialogue could
be strengthened by formalising annual meetings among all – or a coalition of
68 Government of the Netherlands, European Countries Agree to Strengthen Position in
Semiconductor Industry, 12 March 2025.
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
willing – EU Member States and the European Commission to assess jointly
key priorities, set shared objectives and align public-sector perspectives on
international technical standardisation.
Finally, tying Promoting to Programming, Europe must realise that the lead-time
for professionals to build experience on standardisation, as well as on R&D and
SEPs, and to bear (commercial) fruit is long. Impactful engagement requires
sustained, long-term investment aligned with broader industrial and strategic
goals. This means making adequate resources and dedicated funding streams
available at both national and EU levels to support expertise development,
participation in standardisation bodies and the commercialisation of strategic
technologies.
5.3
Protecting: Defending Strategic Technologies, Detecting Power
Shifts
Protecting the Dutch and EU’s position in international standardisation requires
action on several fronts. The first is to prevent technology transfers according to
two criteria: where there is dual-use potential; and in critical areas where Europe
wants to keep its technology superiority. This element connects well with the
outbound investment screening plans that the European Commission is currently
developing.69
Moreover, Europe would benefit from working on data analytics-driven
intelligence and digital tools to understand and assess the distribution of
power on standardisation. Information regarding participation in international
standardisation forums is scattered across multiple sources and difficult to
assemble. A communications system or monitoring platform for trends and
developments in standardisation that are made by China – and others – on key
technologies would help European stakeholders interested in standardisation
to organise themselves better and align their engagement strategies. Proper
understanding of how the Chinese orchestration model for standardisation
works in practice is lacking, and funded research on this area could bring about
insights and better information on China’s standardisation system. The Australian
69 European Parliament – Legislative Train Schedule, Outbound Investment Screening: In ‘A New Plan
for Europe’s Sustainable Prosperity and Competitiveness’, 20 February 2025.
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Strategic Policy Institute’s Critical Technology Tracker, which monitors countries’
research performance and potential technology capabilities, could serve as
inspiration for a framework to monitor developments and technology trends on
standardisation.70
Furthermore, an in-depth discussion on sanctions, bans or export controls
could also be carried out. The fine balance between protecting our industries
and knowledge spill-over effects and making sure that Europe is not actually
stimulating Chinese efforts to further and more quickly develop native
capabilities – and thereby catch-up – is worth a thorough analysis. Conducting
such an analysis could help Europe to define measures to avoid making our
ecosystems dispensable for China – be they EV chips or lithography equipment.
The progress made by China in AI and semiconductors over the past two years,
despite export controls by the US, the Netherlands and Japan, provides a case
study to assess and learn about this matter. Other, older chips, although less
advanced in design, are strategically indispensable across critical sectors – from
automotive and healthcare to aerospace and defence. The challenge that Europe
faces not only stems from global overcapacity, as often portrayed, but also from
a lack of competitive European production. This has concrete implications for
policy. Rather than focusing primarily on protectionist tools such as sanctions or
export controls – which may have a limited effect or unintended consequences –
the EU should prioritise ‘promote’ and ‘partner’ strategies, as described in the
previous and the following sections. The EU should nonetheless adopt proactive
strategies to maintain and strengthen its technological edge where it still holds
competitive advantages.
These technological advancements are closely linked to standardisation
efforts, as Chinese companies like SMIC and BYD increasingly participate
in international technical committees related to automotive as well as
semiconductor standards. Monitoring their progress also means monitoring how
they contribute to and influence global standards.
This challenge is compounded by the asymmetry in how standardisation
access is structured. While Chinese companies can participate in EU Member
States’ NSBs and European SDOs – often without significant barriers – foreign
companies face more restricted access to China’s standards-setting system.
70 See: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker.
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Participation in China’s domestic standardisation processes requires local
registration and formal partnerships with government-affiliated entities,
limiting meaningful foreign input – or, as in the case of CACA, it is simply
not allowed. Assessing this imbalance is crucial for shaping EU policy on
whether and how principles of reciprocity should be integrated into European
standardisation governance.
5.4
Partnering: Mobilising Local Action and European Alignment to
Achieve Global Impact
The theme of partnering is of particular interest for the EU and ties well with
promoting and protecting, as discussed above. Only when EU Member States
partner among themselves and cooperate with others such as Japan, South
Korea, the UK or India can Europe ensure leadership in the global standardisation
arena. Such collaboration helps to bridge knowledge gaps, align technical
priorities and consolidate voting power in international standards bodies, which
often operate on consensus or weighted participation systems.
It remains essential for European stakeholders to align informally around shared
priorities in voting rounds, which are often unpredictable and labour-intensive.
Developing a mutual agenda – grounded in transparent coordination, timely
information exchange and early engagement – can help to ensure that European
interests are effectively represented, without breaching the principles of
openness and neutrality that underpin international standardisation.
Electric vehicles offer a particularly illustrative example of the opportunities and
challenges involved in international technology partnerships. In fact, European
automotive chip suppliers continue to pursue technology partnerships with
Chinese companies. However, also from a self-protection point of view, there is
a growing need to reassess cooperation with Chinese companies like Huawei
and BYD, since they are also producing EV chips, which may lead to increased
competitive pressure on European suppliers, potential IP leakage and longterm dependency risks in a strategically critical technology domain. In parallel,
the EU can work on exerting its influence by strengthening interactions with
relevant Chinese standardisation organisations, ensuring that it partakes in the
development of standards and thereby minimises future technical differences.
This implies encouraging China’s entanglement by working on the development
of EV chip standards with CATARC to avoid diverging standards. Autonomy and
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
strategic entanglement must be properly balanced, and this balance will differ
per technology area and depend on the level of European ambition in each area.
5.5
Process: Scanning Opportunities, Selecting Priorities and
Scaling What Works
There is ample opportunity to improve the processes of standardisation bodies.
Standardisation is a complex process that requires adhering to several formal
procedures, while also relying on informal coordination and negotiations – both
during and outside of meetings.
Process and outcome documents related to standardisation present two main
challenges. On the one hand, the sheer volume and complexity of documentation
– especially within Technical Committees – make it difficult for practitioners to
navigate the process and keep track of developments. On the other hand, there is
a significant transparency gap: access to many documents remains restricted to
participating members (P-members), with limited visibility for the broader public
and even for some stakeholder groups.
For instance, in ISO/TC 197 on Hydrogen Technologies, only P-members such
as the Netherlands have access to the committee’s materials, while the public
remains excluded. Although national committees are expected to consult their
constituencies, in practice this input channel is often limited. Conversely, when
a country is not a P-member – as in the case of the Netherlands and ISO/TC
351 on Contact Centres – it lacks access to the documents altogether, thus
complicating inclusive participation. Ensuring more transparency regarding
participation in standardisation meetings, as well as easier access to public
archives on the topic, are needed to allow for greater accountability and
openness. All documentation on standards should be made more accessible
and – every time it is feasible and acceptable – publicly available in machinereadable format by default, to ensure that it can be analysed by external experts.
Additionally, the names of participants and institutions involved in standardsetting processes should be made public, in order to enhance transparency
and democratic legitimacy. These are matters that EU Member States can
promote within formal SDOs.
Early documentation of procedures and methods in technical standards can
provide companies or governments with a first-mover advantage by shaping
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
the direction of the standard before others have the chance to contribute.
This dynamic can place latecomers – often from countries or organisations with
less-developed standardisation infrastructures – at a disadvantage, as their
ability to influence or adapt to the standard is diminished. In the ISO, for example,
once standards on a certain area are documented and put up for discussion and
voting, changing their content is very difficult. ISO processes are cumbersome
and time-consuming, often making them voluntary, rather than mandatory – such
as ISO 27001, despite it being the golden standard on information security.71
However, as this report has alluded to, the outcome of standardisation does not
always represent the best solutions for the industry or the consumers. This is
partly because influencing standards is an expensive, complicated and lengthy
process and the theoretically best technical solutions do not always win. In
addition to allocating fewer resources on standardisation than China, European
governments and companies do not always allocate their existing resources
effectively.72 Developing an ISO standard, for instance, can take up to three
years, while undergoing regular revisions.73 In order to influence the process
more directly, European countries that prioritise a particular topic can benefit
from taking on the secretariat of the technical committee(s) addressing that
topic. The advantages include chairing the TC, setting the agenda and indirectly
influencing the work programme.
Another reason why standardisation is more effectively driven in China than
in the Netherlands relates to insufficient cooperation between the public and
private sectors. In the Netherlands, processes are largely dominated by the
private sector, also for formal SDOs. While the Dutch government co-funds
topics that it considers important, such as national building codes (which refer
to mandatory construction and safety regulations, that often incorporate formal
technical standards), the guidance it provides on other, less obvious areas
– but perhaps more strategic – is minimal. This contrasts sharply with China’s
state-centric approach, where projects and experts receive financial support
that is aligned with broader industrial strategy goals, leading to more leadership
roles and shorter lead times overall.
71
ISO, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, 2022.
72 European Commission, An EU Strategy on Standardisation: Setting Global Standards in Support of
a Resilient, Green and Digital EU Single Market (p. 6), 2 February 2025.
73 ISO, Stages and Resources for Standards Development.
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In the Netherlands, the communication between NEN, the government and
industries regarding developments on specific industries remains a challenge.
For instance, there seems to be insufficient signalling – in both directions –
regarding important standardisation and technical developments in areas of
common interest. To address this flaw, the establishment of a national Dutch
standardisation platform, or dialogue, would benefit all of the stakeholders
involved or with an interest in standardisation. This would include stakeholders
from the government, industry and academia. Another element is that of tracking
Chinese developments: an important function that is currently unavailable is
monitoring, for example, newsletters from SDOs, the work of TCs (proposals
and change requests, etc.) and the data points embedded in standardisation
documents. These data points can reveal divergences in technical standards
and potential risks, and are essential for evaluating Chinese initiatives and
coordinating responses with relevant stakeholders in the corresponding field
of expertise.
Another challenge regarding the allocation of resources is time, which partly
reflects the perception that standardisation costs yield little benefit. Dutch
stakeholders do not allocate sufficient time to delve deeply into the technical
matters at stake in SDOs, as standardisation is often treated as an ‘add-on’
rather than having dedicated employees working on the topic. Simply put,
functions that are taken as full-time jobs in China are considered side projects
in the Netherlands. Consequently, members of the Technical Committees often
only have time to attend meetings and vote, leaving little room for drafting or
reviewing text proposals – which is where the real impact can be made. One
illustration of the lack of sense of urgency relates to some Technical Committees,
where months or years can pass until the relevance of a topic is assessed in
the EU Member States, while fundamental documents were already being
developed internationally. In practice, this means that the risks and impact of the
standards being developed are not assessed during these early but key phases.
The consequence is that when an EU Member State becomes a permanent
member of those TCs, the subject matter often only receives broader attention
when the voting rounds begin – when it is too late to have actual influence over
the outcomes.
Adopting a long-term vision for standardisation in the Netherlands would be a
stepping stone to improve the current approach and avoid the pitfall of engaging
with a topic only once an ISO/TC is already established and operational.
In relation to this, the role of the Netherlands in existing Technical Committees
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
can be assessed from a more strategic point of view, namely by identifying
opportunities to influence the outcome. For instance, if the development of a
certain standard is advanced and is not of key importance to the Netherlands,
participation may have limited impact and resources may be better used
elsewhere. An initial step in this direction would be to evaluate a few – up to
five – key ITU/ISO/IEC Technical Committees. A thorough analysis of those
bodies’ workings and operational challenges, engaging stakeholders from NSBs,
academia and industries working on them, could provide valuable insights into
how standardisation works in different sectors, what the actual costs and effort
involved are and thus inform better policymaking.
The organisational model of most NSBs is another key aspect affecting how
resources are allocated. Companies pay an annual subscription fee to their
national standardisation institute and send experts to SDO meetings, whose
costs (including labour, travel and accommodation) they are responsible for
covering. An ISO meeting, for instance, can take up to three or four days.
In Europe, it is often underestimated how costs can increase significantly
once an ISO/TC project is approved (i.e. when a standard is authorised for
development), leading to insufficient follow-up. This is even more of a challenge
for small and medium-sized enterprises, which lack the economic power and
influence to participate in these forums, regardless of their intellectual merits
and despite some EU-level instruments at their disposal for participation.
In order to move from a reactive approach to standardisation, the Netherlands
– and the European Union – should assign more resources and establish
teams that can enable a greater role for countries in preparatory activities.
Such teams would work on developing or adjusting fundamental documents such
as roadmaps, scopes, definitions and baseline standards. These preparatory
steps set boundaries and scope for the proposals that come later. Establishing
teams that support these activities and also participate (or that support
industry experts participating) in projects defined as relevant, focusing on the
pre-standardisation phase where foundational principles, such as the scope, are
defined, is key to having effective impact. Such a structure across EU Member
States would enhance cooperation across the bloc.
Finally, the societal aspects of standardisation are, overall, insufficiently
assessed. Impact assessments of human rights should become an inherent
part of standardisation processes in all SDOs – at least the formal ones. When
it comes to the internet, for instance, this could be a step towards realising the
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
vision of the United Nations General Assembly that human rights online should be
protected as human rights offline, a goal also outlined in the Dutch International
Cyber Strategy 2023–2028.74
Figure 9
Five lines of action
1
Programming
Make standardisation a core pillar
of industrial strategy.
2
Promoting
Align R&D, IP, and tech investments
with standard-setting leadership.
3
Protecting
Monitor strategic shifts; guard
against asymmetrical access.
4
Partnering
Build EU coalitions + alliances with
partners like Japan, Korea, India, UK.
5
Process
Improve transparency, early engagement,
and stakeholder inclusion.
74 United Nations Digital Library, The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on
the Internet: Resolution / Adopted by the Human Rights Council on 5 July 2018, 5 July 2018; and
Government of the Netherlands, International Cyber Strategy 2023–2028, 12 September 2023.
See also: United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights and Technical Standard-setting
Processes for New and Emerging Digital Technologies, 18 September 2023.
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6 Maintaining Europe’s Edge
Long regarded as a technical afterthought, standardisation has evolved into a
central lever of geopolitical influence and element of industrial strategy. As is
often remarked in standardisation circles, ‘whoever owns the standard, owns the
market’.75 China’s deliberate integration of standardisation into its technology,
industrial and foreign policies is elevating the country from a standards-taker
to a standards-maker. This transition is facilitated by the orchestration of public
and private actors, strategically coordinated interventions in international
standard-setting bodies and concentrated investments in sectors such as
telecommunications and EV chips.
By contrast, Europe all too often treats standardisation as a predominantly
technical matter. Despite a strong industrial base, deep experience in
international standardisation and renewed political attention by way of the
2022 European Standardisation Strategy, the EU and its Member States lack
a coordinated, strategic and long-term approach. The result is a fragmented
landscape marked by reactive behaviour and underinvestment – both in terms
of material resources and institutional capacity. This undermines Europe’s
ability to shape the global rules of tomorrow’s industrial and digital economies.
If standards define the playing field, then failing to shape them means competing
on terms set by others.
The answer does not lie in isolationism. The right balance between asserting the
interests of European countries and companies and ensuring interoperability
and interdependence with other countries and regions differs between sectors.
Strengthening Europe’s influence means deepening alliances with countries that
share normative interests and concerns – such as Japan, South Korea and the
UK – while simultaneously investing in domestic capabilities, aligning EU Member
State efforts, and stepping up engagement in global standard-setting bodies.
For the Netherlands and the EU alike, reclaiming leadership in standardisation
demands a shift in mindset. Standardisation must be seen not as an isolated
technical task but as a core element of technological, industrial and foreign
75 Foreign Policy, China Wants to Run Your Internet, 25 August 2023.
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
policy. This requires long-term planning, robust public–private coordination, and
the political will to focus on areas where Europe has the capacity to lead and
define the standards of the future.
Five interconnected levers for action can be drawn from the insights from this
analysis of the evolving dynamics of standardisation – particularly China’s
strategic approach – and two industry snapshots on telecommunications and the
internet and on EV chips. These levers offer a framework to rebalance European
influence by: setting clear priorities (programming); advocating European
positions globally (promoting); defending against adverse norms (protecting);
forming strategic alliances (partnering); and improving internal mechanisms
(process).
The proposed Blueprint for Action on Standardisation calls for:
1. Programming: Embedding standardisation more explicitly in strategic
planning and industrial policy;
2. Promoting: Prioritising sectors with a high potential for European leadership
through targeted investment, commercialisation support and cross-border
coordination to maximise the impact of European standardisation efforts;
3. Protecting: Controlling critical tech transfers, improving standardisation
monitoring and addressing access asymmetries to national or regional SDOs
with China;
4. Partnering: Building strategic coalitions with like-minded countries and
engaging selectively with China to align standards and manage long-term
dependencies;
5. Process: Improving transparency, coordination and early engagement in
standardisation processes by investing in capacity, digital and data-driven
monitoring tools and strategic participation.
Time is of the essence. By making standardisation a foundational pillar of its
geopolitical and industrial agendas, Europe still has the agency to influence
the global technological order – rather than to be shaped by it.
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
AI
AUTOSAR
BRI
BRICS
CACA
CATARC
CCP
CEN
CENELEC
CESI
CS2035
DNS
DPP
DSR
EEA
EFTA
ESO
ESPR
ETSI
EU
EV
GSM
G77
hEN
IATF
ICANN
ICV
IEC
IEEE
IETF
IP
ISO
ITU
JEDEC
Artificial intelligence
Automotive Open System Architecture
Belt and Road Initiative
Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and other leading
emerging economies
China Automotive Chip Alliance
China Automotive Technology and Research Centre
Chinese Communist Party
European Committee for Standardisation
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation
China Electronics Standardisation Institute
‘China Standards 2035’ initiative
Domain Name System
Digital Product Passport
(China’s) Digital Silk Road
European Economic Area
European Free-Trade Association
European Standards Organisation
Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation
European Telecommunications Standards Institute
European Union
Electric vehicle
Global System for Mobile Communications
Group of 77 developing nations
Harmonised European standard
International Automotive Task Force
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
Intelligent connected vehicle
International Electrotechnical Commission
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Internet Engineering Task Force
Intellectual property
International Organisation for Standardisation
International Telecommunications Union
Joint Electron Device Engineering Council
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Standardisation with Chinese Characteristics? | CKN & Clingendael Report, July 2025
MIIT
NEV
NSB
NSD
NTCAS
OASIS
OEM
OneM2M
R&D&I
SAC
SAMR
SC
SDC
SDO
SEP
SME
TBT
TC
UNECE
US
W3C
WG
WTO
3GPP
4G / 5G / 6G
(China’s) Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
New energy vehicle
National standardisation body
(China’s) National Standardisation Development (outline)
(China’s) National Technical Committee of Automotive
Standardisation
Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information
Standards
Original Equipment Manufacturer (company that produces
components used in another company’s finished product)
Global standardisation initiative to develop a common service
layer for Machine-to-Machine (M2M) and Internet of Things
(IoT) technologies
Research, development and innovation
Standardisation Administration of China
State Administration for Market Regulation
Subcommittee (of Technical Committee)
Standardisation Development Concept
Standards Development Organisation
Standard Essential Patent
Small and medium-sized enterprise
Technical Barriers to Trade
Technical Committee
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
United States
World Wide Web Consortium
Working Group
World Trade Organisation
Third Generation Partnership Project
Fourth generation / Fifth Generation / Sixth Generation
(wireless mobile telecommunications technology)
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List of Figures
Figure 1 Formal vs quasi-formal SDOs and de jure vs de facto standards
10
Figure 2 The SDO landscape: key governmental and private
organisations at the global, EU and national level
16
Figure 3 Five dimensions of standardisation as a source of power
19
Figure 4 China’s government-led standardisation approach: key actors
23
Figure 5 Changes in China’s standardisation governance after the 2018
standardisation law amendment
25
Figure 6 ISO leadership positions change, 2013–2023
29
Figure 7 List of SDOs involved in standards-setting on
telecommunications and the internet (non-exhaustive)
33
Figure 8 High-level organisation of China’s automotive standardisation
landscape38
Figure 9 Five lines of action
52
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