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To Marion, Emma, Katie, Jeannie, and Maggie/Edith
Brief contents
Preface .............................................................................................................................................................................................. xv
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................................................... xvi
New to this edition ..................................................................................................................................................................... xvi
Guide to using this book ........................................................................................................................................................xviii
List of case studies ........................................................................................................................................................................ xx
About the contributors ............................................................................................................................................................. xxii
World map ................................................................................................................................................................................... xxiv
Part One International relations in a global era
1Introduction: from international politics to world politics ............................. 5
patricia owens · john baylis · steve smith
2
Globalization and global politics ...........................................................................19
anthony mcgrew
Part Two The historical context
3
4
5
6
The rise of modern international order ..............................................................39
george lawson
International history of the twentieth century .................................................54
len scott
From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order? ..............................70
michael cox
Rising powers and the emerging global order ..................................................85
andrew hurrell
Part Three Theories of world politics
7
8
9
Liberal internationalism ........................................................................................ 103
tim dunne
Marxist theories of international relations ..................................................... 116
stephen hobden · richard wyn jones
Realism ........................................................................................................................ 132
or rosenboim
10 Feminism .................................................................................................................... 147
helen m. kinsella
11 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches ......................................................... 162
meera sabaratnam
12 Poststructuralism ..................................................................................................... 179
lene hansen
13 Social constructivism .............................................................................................. 194
michael barnett
viii
Brief contents
Part Four Structures and processes
14 War and world politics ........................................................................................... 213
tarak barkawi
15 International and global security ....................................................................... 228
john baylis
16 Global political economy ...................................................................................... 244
nicola phillips
17 Gender ........................................................................................................................ 260
paul kirby
18 Race in world politics ............................................................................................. 276
robbie shilliam
19 International law ..................................................................................................... 293
christian reus-smit
20 International organizations in world politics ................................................. 308
susan park
21 The United Nations ................................................................................................. 323
devon e. a. curtis · paul taylor
22 NGOs in world politics ........................................................................................... 339
jutta joachim
23 Regionalism in international affairs .................................................................. 355
edward best · thomas christiansen
Part Five International issues
24 Environmental issues ............................................................................................. 377
john vogler
25 Global health ............................................................................................................. 394
sophie harman
26 Refugees and forced migration ........................................................................... 409
ariadna estévez
27 Poverty, hunger, and development ................................................................... 425
tony evans
28 Global trade and global finance ......................................................................... 441
matthew watson
29 Terrorism and globalization ................................................................................. 456
james d. kiras
30 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ............................................... 473
sheena chestnut greitens
31 Nationalism, national self-determination, and international relations .488
john breuilly
32 Human rights ............................................................................................................ 505
ratna kapur
33 Humanitarian intervention in world politics ................................................. 521
alex j. bellamy · nicholas j. wheeler
Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................................................537
References ....................................................................................................................................................................................559
Index ..............................................................................................................................................................................................597
Detailed contents
Preface .............................................................................................................................................................................................. xv
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................................................... xvi
New to this edition ..................................................................................................................................................................... xvi
Guide to using this book ........................................................................................................................................................xviii
List of case studies ........................................................................................................................................................................ xx
About the contributors ............................................................................................................................................................. xxii
World map ................................................................................................................................................................................... xxiv
Part One International relations in a global era
1
Introduction: from international politics to world politics ................................................. 5
1.1 From international politics to world politics
6
1.2 The study of International Relations
7
1.3 Theories of world politics
8
1.4 Theories and globalization
14
1.5 Globalization: myth or reality?
15
2
Globalization and global politics ...............................................................................................19
2.1 Introduction
20
2.2 Making sense of globalization
20
2.3 The crisis of globalization and the liberal world order
27
2.4 Globalization and the transformation of world politics
30
2.5 Conclusion
33
Part Two The historical context
3
The rise of modern international order ..................................................................................39
3.1 Introduction
40
3.2 Historical international orders
40
3.3 How did modern international order emerge?
43
3.4 The consequences of the global transformation
47
3.5 Conclusion
52
4
International history of the twentieth century .....................................................................54
4.1 Introduction
55
4.2 Modern total war
55
4.3 End of empire
57
4.4 Cold war
59
4.5 Conclusion
67
5
From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order? ..................................................70
5.1 Introduction: the cold war and after
71
5.2 The United States: exploiting the unipolar ‘moment’
71
5.3 After the USSR: Yeltsin to Putin
72
x
Detailed contents
5.4 Europe: rise and decline?
5.5 China in a new Asian century?
5.6 A new Global South
5.7 The Middle East in turmoil: 9/11, the Arab Spring, and after
5.8 From Obama to Trump to Biden
5.9 Conclusion: beyond the liberal world order?
6
74
76
77
79
80
82
Rising powers and the emerging global order ......................................................................85
6.1 Introduction
86
6.2 The post-cold war order
86
6.3 The US order under challenge
87
6.4 Three questions about the power of rising powers
90
6.5 Debating the impact of rising powers on international relations
93
6.6 Beyond the BRICS: emerging powers in the twenty-first century
95
6.7 Conclusion
98
Part Three Theories of world politics
7
Liberal internationalism ............................................................................................................ 103
7.1 Introduction and context
104
7.2 Founding ideas of nineteenth-century liberal internationalism
105
7.3 Internationalism and institutionalism: peace through law
107
7.4 The challenges confronting liberal internationalism
109
7.5 Conclusion: incomplete, but indispensable, internationalism
112
8
Marxist theories of international relations .......................................................................... 116
8.1 Introduction
117
8.2 The essential elements of Marxist theories of world politics
119
8.3 Marx internationalized: from imperialism to world-systems theory
121
8.4 Gramscianism
123
8.5 Critical theory
125
8.6 New Marxism
127
8.7 Conclusion
129
9
Realism ............................................................................................................................................ 132
9.1 Introduction
133
9.2 Fundamental ideas
133
9.3 Realism in historical perspective
136
9.4 Geopolitics
139
9.5 Multiple realisms?
140
9.6 Conclusion
145
10 Feminism ........................................................................................................................................ 147
10.1 Introduction
148
10.2 What is feminism?
148
10.3 What is feminist International Relations theory?
152
10.4 Gender and power
154
Detailed contents
10.5 Four feminist International Relations theories
10.6 Conclusion
155
160
11 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches ............................................................................. 162
11.1 Introduction
163
11.2 What are postcolonial and decolonial approaches?
163
11.3 Where did postcolonial and decolonial ideas come from?
166
11.4 What are the main ideas underpinning postcolonial and
decolonial thought?
169
11.5 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches to studying world politics
172
11.6 Decolonization: the struggle continues?
175
11.7 Conclusion
176
12 Poststructuralism ......................................................................................................................... 179
12.1 Introduction
180
12.2 Studying the social world
180
12.3 Poststructuralism as a political philosophy
181
12.4 Deconstructing state sovereignty
186
12.5 Identity and foreign policy
189
12.6 Conclusion
192
13 Social constructivism .................................................................................................................. 194
13.1 Introduction
195
13.2 The rise of constructivism
195
13.3 Constructivism
197
13.4 Constructivism and global change
203
13.5 Conclusion
207
Part Four Structures and processes
14 War and world politics ............................................................................................................... 213
14.1 Introduction
214
14.2 Defining war
215
14.3 War: international and global
216
14.4 Clausewitz’s philosophy of war
219
14.5 War, state, and society in the West
221
14.6 War, state, and society in the Global South
224
14.7 Conclusion
226
15 International and global security ........................................................................................... 228
15.1 Introduction
229
15.2 What is security?
229
15.3 The traditional approach to national security
231
15.4 Alternative approaches
232
15.5 Globalization and the ‘return of geopolitics’
235
15.6 Globalization and the future of world order
239
15.7 Conclusion
241
xi
xii
Detailed contents
16 Global political economy .......................................................................................................... 244
16.1 Introduction
245
16.2 Approaches to IPE
246
16.3 What drives globalization?
248
16.4 Who wins and who loses from globalization?
253
16.5 The future of globalization
257
16.6 Conclusion
258
17 Gender ............................................................................................................................................. 260
17.1 Introduction
261
17.2 Sex and gender in international perspective
261
17.3 Global gender relations
263
17.4 Gendering global politics
265
17.5 Gendering global security
268
17.6 Gendering the global economy
271
17.7 Conclusion
274
18 Race in world politics ................................................................................................................. 276
18.1 Introduction
277
18.2 Histories of race in world politics
277
18.3 Thinking through race
283
18.4 Contemporary manifestations of race in world politics
286
18.5 Conclusion
290
19 International law .......................................................................................................................... 293
19.1 Introduction
294
19.2 Order and institutions
294
19.3 The modern institution of international law
295
19.4 From international to supranational law?
300
19.5 The laws of war
302
19.6 Theoretical approaches to international law
303
19.7 Conclusion
305
20 International organizations in world politics ..................................................................... 308
20.1 Introduction
309
20.2 What are international organizations?
309
20.3 Why are international organizations important?
313
20.4 Why do states create IOs?
314
20.5 How can we analyse IO behaviour?
319
20.6 Conclusion
320
21 The United Nations ..................................................................................................................... 323
21.1 Introduction
324
21.2 A brief history of the United Nations and its principal organs
325
21.3 The United Nations and the maintenance of international peace
and security
329
21.4 The United Nations and economic and social questions
334
21.5 Conclusion
336
Detailed contents
22 NGOs in world politics ............................................................................................................... 339
22.1 Introduction
340
22.2 What are NGOs?
341
22.3 The growing importance of TNGOs
348
22.4 Conclusion
353
23 Regionalism in international affairs ....................................................................................... 355
23.1 Introduction
356
23.2 Regional cooperation and regional integration
357
23.3 Regional cooperation in a global context
361
23.4 The process of European integration
367
23.5 Conclusion
371
Part Five International issues
24 Environmental issues .................................................................................................................. 377
24.1 Introduction
378
24.2 Environmental issues on the international agenda: a brief history
379
24.3 The functions of international environmental cooperation
382
24.4 Climate change
386
24.5 The environment and International Relations theory
390
24.6 Conclusion
392
25 Global health ................................................................................................................................. 394
25.1 Introduction: why did health become a global issue?
395
25.2 Global health governance
396
25.3 Health financing and vertical and horizontal approaches to global health
400
25.4 Global health security
401
25.5 Medicalization of security
404
25.6 Conclusion
406
26 Refugees and forced migration ............................................................................................... 409
26.1 Introduction
410
26.2 Concept production and the politics of international protection
411
26.3 Types of forced migration
414
26.4 The international refugee regime and institutionalized racism
421
26.5 Conclusion
423
27 Poverty, hunger, and development ........................................................................................ 425
27.1 Introduction
426
27.2 Poverty
426
27.3 Hunger
429
27.4 Development
431
27.5 Conclusion
438
28 Global trade and global finance .............................................................................................. 441
28.1 Introduction
442
28.2 The globalization of trade and finance
443
xiii
xiv
Detailed contents
28.3 The regulation of global trade
28.4 The regulation of global finance
28.5 Conclusion
446
450
453
29 Terrorism and globalization ..................................................................................................... 456
29.1 Introduction
457
29.2 Definitions
457
29.3 Terrorism: from transnational to global phenomenon (1968–2001)
459
29.4 Terrorism: the impact of globalization
460
29.5 Globalization, technology, and terrorism
463
29.6 Combating terrorism
468
29.7 Conclusion
470
30 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction .................................................................... 473
30.1 Introduction
474
30.2 WMD technology and its spread
474
30.3 Theoretical debates about nuclear proliferation
480
30.4 Evolution of non-proliferation efforts
483
30.5 Conclusion
486
31 Nationalism, national self-determination, and international relations ..................... 488
31.1 Introduction
489
31.2 Nationalism, nation-states, and global politics
489
31.3 The changing meanings of NSD since 1918
495
31.4 Conclusion
501
32 Human rights ................................................................................................................................. 505
32.1 Introduction
506
32.2 The global human rights structure
506
32.3 The core assumptions on which human rights are based
510
32.4 Doing human rights advocacy
515
32.5 Conclusion
518
33 Humanitarian intervention in world politics ...................................................................... 521
33.1 Introduction
522
33.2 The case for humanitarian intervention
522
33.3 The case against humanitarian intervention
524
33.4 The 1990s: a golden era of humanitarian activism?
526
33.5 The responsibility to protect (R2P)
528
33.6 Conclusion
534
Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................................................537
References ....................................................................................................................................................................................559
Index ..............................................................................................................................................................................................597
Preface
In this new edition of The Globalization of World Politics we have followed a similar format and structure to previous editions, but we have added one new chapter and one chapter has been completely
rewritten by a new author. We believe these additions make this already popular and successful book
even better. A new chapter on global health by Sophie Harman has been included because of the contemporary importance of the Covid-19 pandemic and its effects on international relations. The chapter on realism by Or Rosenboim provides a new perspective on this important theoretical approach
to the subject. All the other chapters have been updated to reflect the feedback we have received from
students around the world, comments from teachers and scholars of International Relations, and the
extremely detailed reviews of the eighth edition commissioned by Oxford University Press. Together,
all these comments have helped us to identify additional areas that should be covered. We have also
updated the learning features, including dozens of brand new case studies and many new suggestions
for further reading.
Praise for The Globalization of World Politics
‘The new chapter 25 on Health is a timely, comprehensive introduction to a complex issue of highest
importance, well-written and with impressive empirical evidence’
(Associate Professor Jens Ladefoged Mortenson, University of Copenhagen, Denmark)
‘After several decades, this textbook is still the most relevant and essential undergraduate textbook there
is in International Relations globally. I consider it to be an organic and constantly evolving source of
knowledge and reflection about and within globalization simultaneously. It is simply the pillar stone of
the IR undergraduate classroom globally today’
(Senior Lecturer Erika Svedberg, Malmo University)
‘A comprehensive, well-written, up-to-date introduction to IR and the historical and theoretical
approaches that shape our world’
(Teacher Anna-Karin Eriksson, Linnaeus University, Sweden)
‘The Bible of International Relations’
(Lecturer Maria Panayiotou, London Metropolitan University, UK)
‘The best book for teaching IR to undergraduate students, whether they are total newcomers to the subject
or have a good level of prior knowledge’
(Programme Director Ian Finlayson, European School of Economics, UK)
‘An excellent introductory and foundational text for understanding IR in a global era. It is
well-structured, comprehensive, and written in an accessible manner’
(Visiting Lecturer Annapurna Menon, University of Westminster, UK)
Acknowledgements
Producing an edited book is always a collective enterprise. But it is not only the editors and authors
who make it happen. We make substantial revisions to every new edition of this book based on the
numerous reviews we receive on the previous one. We are extremely grateful to all those who sent to
us or Oxford University Press their comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the eighth edition
and our plans for this ninth edition of the book. Very many of the changes are the result of reviewers’ recommendations. Once again, we would also like to thank our excellent contributors for being
so willing to respond to our detailed requests for revisions, and sometimes major rewrites, to their
chapters. Many of these authors have been involved with this book since the very first edition, and
we are extremely grateful for their continued commitment and dedication to International Relations
pedagogy.
Here we would also like to make a special acknowledgement and extend our greatest thanks to
our editorial assistant on this edition, Dr Danielle Cohen. With efficiency, deep conscientiousness,
patience, and humour, as in the past, she has done an excellent job working with the contributors and
the editors to ensure deadlines were met and all tasks completed on time. The book is much better
because of her hard work.
The editors would also like to thank the editorial and production team at Oxford University Press,
especially Katie Staal and Sarah Iles, who have provided us with encouragement and enormous patience in guiding us through the production process. They have been a pleasure to work with.
John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens
The publishers would be pleased to clear permission with any copyright holders that we have inadvertently failed, or been unable, to contact.
New to this edition
The ninth edition has been rigorously updated following extensive reviewer feedback. Key changes
include:
• New Chapter 9 on realism by Or Rosenboim
• New Chapter 25 on global health by Sophie Harman
• Expanded coverage of non-Western approaches, particularly perspectives from the Global South,
is woven throughout the chapters to ensure you appreciate the importance of viewing international relations from representative and varied perspectives
• Updated International Relations theory chapters reflect a more contextualized and historical perspective, allowing you to gain a thorough, nuanced understanding of the historical and political
context in which these approaches emerged
Guide to using this book
The ninth edition of The Globalization of World Politics provides a rich multimedia experience in which the text’s unrivalled coverage is supplemented by features and resources that
help you to navigate the text and contextualize your understanding, supporting development of the essential knowledge and skills you need to underpin your International Relations (IR) studies.
Outlined here are the key features and resources in the book and its online resources to
help you understand international relations.
www.oup.com/he/baylis-globalization9e
Consolidate your understanding
Self-test questions, mapped to each section of the book, provide extensive opportunities to
check your understanding. Each chapter’s flashcard glossary and concluding review questions offer further ways to test your knowledge. Lists of Key Points throughout the text
sum up the most important arguments, acting as a useful revision tool, and provide an
at-a-glance overview of the issues raised in each chapter. Watch the online author videos to
see top scholars analysing current issues and exploring IR theories and concepts in more
depth.
Develop critical thinking skills
Each chapter opens with provocative framing questions to stimulate thought and debate on the subject area. In each chapter you will find an opposing opinions feature
with accompanying questions, which will help you evaluate theory and facilitate critical
and reflective debate on contemporary policy challenges, from campaigns to decolonize
the curriculum to debates over whether global health security aims to protect powerful
states or people. Access the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle the
questions. An online interactive timeline accompanies the IR theory chapters to help
you fully understand how the discipline has developed.
Connect IR theory and practice
Two engaging and relevant case studies in every chapter illustrate how ideas, concepts, and
issues are manifested in the real world. Each case study is followed by questions to encourage you to apply theory to current and evolving global events. In addition, you will also find,
in the online resources, extended IR case studies, which encourage you to apply theories to
current and evolving global events.
Finally, develop your negotiation and problem-solving skills, and apply IR theory to
practice, by exploring the online international relations simulations.
• IR Simulation: Keeping the Peace
• IR Simulation: Negotiating the Lisbon Protocol
• IR Simulation: Negotiating with China
• IR Simulation: Stopping an Epidemic
Guide to using this book
Read more widely
Annotated recommendations for further reading at the end of each chapter help you familiarize yourself with the key academic literature and suggest how you can explore your
interest in a particular aspect of IR. Web links are provided to deepen your understanding
of key topics and allow you to explore different voices and opinions.
Resources for lecturers
www.oup.com/he/baylis-globalization9e
Adopting lecturers can access the following online resources:
• Additional case studies to use in class discussions to contextualize and deepen theoretical understanding
• Customizable PowerPoint® slides, arranged by chapter, for use in lectures or as handouts
to support efficient, effective teaching preparation
• A fully customizable test bank containing ready-made assessments with which to test
your students’ understanding of key concepts
• Question bank of short-answer and essay questions encourages critical reflection on
core issues and themes in each chapter
• All author videos for you to share with your students
• All figures and tables from the book available to download
xix
List of case studies
Case Study 2.1
Case Study 2.2
Global food security: ceding sovereignty������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22
Multicentric globalization����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28
Case Study 3.1
Case Study 3.2
The dual character of international law���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 50
Imperialism in China�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 51
Case Study 4.1
Case Study 4.2
Fidel Castro������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 62
The city of Berlin 1945–89���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 63
Case Study 5.1
Case Study 5.2
Russia and the West: a ‘new cold war’?����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 74
Populism, globalization, and the end of the liberal order?����������������������������������������������������������������� 81
Case Study 6.1
Case Study 6.2
The BRICS���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 88
Brazil�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 89
Case Study 7.1
Case Study 7.2
The rise and fall of the ‘indispensable nation’���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������108
Sovereignty as responsibility: an African concept��������������������������������������������������������������������������������113
Case Study 8.1
Case Study 8.2
The capitalist development of Communist China�������������������������������������������������������������������������������117
The global Covid-19 pandemic�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������118
Case Study 9.1
Case Study 9.2
Kautilya’s realist thought������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������137
Russia’s annexation of Crimea��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������144
Case Study 10.1 Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom���������������������������������������������������������������������� 151
Case Study 10.2 The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan���������������������������������������������������������158
Case Study 11.1 Imperial wars after decolonization? Rethinking Vietnam������������������������������������������������������������������165
Case Study 11.2 Indigenous peoples between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’����������������������������������������������173
Case Study 12.1 Discourses, images, and the victory of the Taliban regime���������������������������������������������������������������182
Case Study 12.2 Covid-19, state sovereignty, and vaccines����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������188
Case Study 13.1 Social construction of refugees and the contemporary migration crisis���������������������������������������201
Case Study 13.2 ‘Victims’������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������205
Case Study 14.1 What’s global about the global war on terror?�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������217
Case Study 14.2 War and society: Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United States����������������������������������������������������������������218
Case Study 15.1 Insecurity in the post-cold war world: the Nagorno-Karabakh War����������������������������������������������236
Case Study 15.2 Growing tensions in the South and East China Seas���������������������������������������������������������������������������237
Case Study 16.1 Global value chains (GVCs) and global development�������������������������������������������������������������������������251
Case Study 16.2 Globalization and child labour������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256
Case Study 17.1 The Kurdish Yekîneyên Parastine Jin (Women’s Protection Units)��������������������������������������������������� 268
Case Study 17.2 Neo-slavery and care labour in Asia��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������273
List of case studies
Case Study 18.1 Race, caste, and Dalits����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������282
Case Study 18.2 Ecofascism�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������285
Case Study 19.1 Is international law an expression of Western dominance?�������������������������������������������������������������� 297
Case Study 19.2 Non-Western agency in the development of international human rights law����������������������������298
Case Study 20.1 Africa’s premier financial institution: the African Development Bank�������������������������������������������� 311
Case Study 20.2 ‘Non-liberal’ IOs: the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation���������������������������������������������������������������321
Case Study 21.1 The UN and conflict in Syria�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������324
Case Study 21.2 UN peacekeeping in the Congo����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������330
Case Study 22.1 Friends of the Earth vs. Royal Dutch Shell: NGOs and climate change litigation������������������������ 341
Case Study 22.2 #BlackLivesMatter: the rise of a global movement������������������������������������������������������������������������������346
Case Study 23.1 Mercosur: great potential, unfulfilled ambition�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������362
Case Study 23.2 Regionalism in Southeast Asia: beyond intergovernmentalism?�����������������������������������������������������365
Case Study 24.1 The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������388
Case Study 24.2 The geopolitics of Arctic climate change������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������391
Case Study 25.1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1308�������������������������������������������������������������������������������398
Case Study 25.2 Covid-19 vaccines and intellectual property rights�����������������������������������������������������������������������������405
Case Study 26.1 Covid-19 and asylum processing: the demise of the deterrence model?������������������������������������� 412
Case Study 26.2 Forced migration, criminal/state violence, and corporations: Venezuela������������������������������������� 419
Case Study 27.1 The state of the world’s children���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������431
Case Study 27.2 The Ugandan family��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������436
Case Study 28.1 The Covid-19 vaccination programme and global economic recovery����������������������������������������445
Case Study 28.2 Biden’s proposed global minimum corporate tax rate�����������������������������������������������������������������������453
Case Study 29.1 Activities of the so-called Islamic State in the Philippines and Mozambique, 2017–present�������462
Case Study 29.2 The 6 January ‘Insurrection’������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������466
Case Study 30.1 North Korea’s nuclear programme�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477
Case Study 30.2 Iran’s nuclear programme���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478
Case Study 31.1 Germany����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������493
Case Study 31.2 Yugoslavia��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������496
Case Study 31.3 India������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������498
Case Study 31.4 Nationalisms in South Africa, not South African nationalism����������������������������������������������������������499
Case Study 32.1 The Islamic headscarf ban��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������513
Case Study 32.2 Same-sex or queer relationships, LGBTQ rights, and colonial laws�������������������������������������������������514
Case Study 33.1 Myanmar: barriers to intervention�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������525
Case Study 33.2 The role of Middle Eastern governments in Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011)����������531
xxi
About the contributors
Tarak Barkawi is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and
Political Science.
Michael Barnett is University Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at the George
Washington University.
John Baylis is Emeritus Professor of Politics and International Relations and a former Pro-Vice-
Chancellor at Swansea University.
Alex J. Bellamy is Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies and Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for
the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland.
Edward Best is Senior Expert at the European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, and
Senior Fellow of Maastricht University.
John Breuilly is Emeritus Professor of Nationalism and Ethnicity, London School of Economics and
Political Science.
Thomas Christiansen is Professor of Political Science and European Integration at Luiss University
in Rome, Italy.
Michael Cox is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the London School of Economics
and Political Science and Founding Director of LSE IDEAS.
Devon E. A. Curtis is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at
the University of Cambridge.
Tim Dunne is Provost and Senior Vice-President at the University of Surrey, and Honorary Professor
of International Relations at the University of Queensland.
Ariadna Estévez is a Professor at the Centre for Research on North America, the National
Autonomous University of Mexico.
Tony Evans was Professor of Global Politics at the University of Southampton.
Sheena Chestnut Greitens is Associate Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs,
University of Texas at Austin and Director of UT’s Asia Policy Program.
Lene Hansen is Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen.
Sophie Harman is Professor of International Politics at Queen Mary University of London.
Stephen Hobden is Reader in International Relations in the Department of Social Sciences,
University of East London.
Andrew Hurrell is Montague Burton Emeritus Professor of International Relations at Oxford
University and an Einstein Visiting Fellow in Berlin.
Jutta Joachim is Associate Professor of Global Security Governance at Radboud University,
Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
Ratna Kapur is Professor of International Law, School of Law, Queen Mary University of London
and Senior Faculty, Institute of Global Law and Policy, Harvard Law School.
Helen M. Kinsella is Associate Professor of Political Science and Law and Affiliate Faculty in
Department of Gender, Women and Sexuality Studies, the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public
About the contributors
Affairs, the Human Rights Center, and the Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change
at the University of Minnesota-Minneapolis.
James D. Kiras is Professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama.
Paul Kirby is Associate Professorial Research Fellow at the Centre for Women, Peace and Security at
the London School of Economics and Political Science.
George Lawson is Professor of International Relations in the Coral Bell School at the Australian
National University.
Anthony McGrew is Distinguished Professor in Global Public Policy at Shanghai University,
Shanghai.
Patricia Owens is Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford.
Susan Park is Professor of Global Governance at the University of Sydney.
Nicola Phillips is a Professor of Political Economy and the Provost of the University of Melbourne.
Christian Reus-Smit is Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia and Professor of
International Relations at the University of Queensland.
Or Rosenboim is Senior Lecturer and Director of the Centre for Modern History at the Department
of International Politics at City, University of London.
Meera Sabaratnam is Reader in International Relations at SOAS University of London.
Len Scott is Emeritus Professor of International History and Intelligence Studies at Aberystwyth
University.
Robbie Shilliam is Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University.
Sir Steve Smith is former Vice-Chancellor and Professor of International Politics at the University
of Exeter.
Paul Taylor is Emeritus Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and
Political Science.
John Vogler is Professorial Research Fellow in International Relations at the University of Keele,
UK.
Matthew Watson is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Warwick and was a UK
Economic and Social Research Council Professorial Fellow from 2013 to 2019.
Nicholas J. Wheeler is Professor of International Relations at the University of Birmingham and
Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the British-American Security Information Council (BASIC).
Richard Wyn Jones is Professor and Director of Cardiff University’s Wales Governance and Dean
of Public Affairs.
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Part One
International relations
in a global era
In this part of the book, we introduce you to how
this book makes sense of international relations in a
global era. We have two main goals in this part.
First, we want to provide you with a context in
which to read the different chapters that follow. We
do this by explaining why the main title of this book
refers to ‘world politics’ rather than ‘international politics’; giving you a short history of the study and discipline of International Relations; and providing a very
brief introduction to the main theoretical approaches
to the study of International Relations, including how
each conceives of globalization.
dennisvdw/Getty Images
Second, we go into much more detail on the
dynamics, complexities, and contradictions of contemporary globalization. What is globalization, and
what are its main engines and drivers? How should
we understand the contemporary crisis of globalization and its implications for the current world order?
Are we entering a world of ‘deglobalization’ or ‘reglobalization’? Making sense of these questions is essential to understanding world politics in the twenty-first
century. We hope that these two chapters provide a
powerful entry point into what follows in the rest of
the book.
Chapter 1
Introduction: from
international politics to
world politics
patricia owens · john baylis · steve smith
Reader’s Guide
This book provides a comprehensive overview of
world politics in a global era. The term most often
used to explain world politics in the contemporary
period—‘globalization’—is controversial. There is considerable dispute over what it means to talk of ‘globalization’, whether this implies that the main features
of contemporary world politics are different from
those of the past, and whether much of the world is
experiencing a backlash against ‘neoliberal globalization’. The concept can be most simply used to refer to
the process of increasing interconnectedness among
societies such that events in one part of the world
increasingly have effects on peoples and societies
far away. On this view, a globalized world is one in
which political, economic, cultural, and social events
become more and more interconnected, and also
one in which they have more impact. For others, ‘globalization’ is the ideology associated with the current
phase of the world economy—neoliberal capitalism—
which has most shaped world politics since the late
1970s. In this introduction we explain how we propose to deal with the concept of globalization in this
book, and we offer some arguments both for and
against seeing it as an important new development
in world politics.
We will begin by discussing the various terms
used to describe world politics and the academic
discipline—International Relations (IR)—that has led
the way in thinking about world politics. We then
look at the main ways in which global politics has
been explained. Our aim is not to put forward one
view of how to think about world politics somehow
agreed by the editors, let alone by all the contributors
to this book. There is no such agreement. Rather, we
want to provide a context in which to read the chapters that follow. This means offering a variety of views.
For example, the main theoretical accounts of world
politics all see globalization differently. Some treat it
as a temporary phase in human history; others see
it as the latest manifestation of the growth of global
capitalism; yet others see it as representing a fundamental transformation of world politics that requires
new ways of understanding. The different editors and
contributors to this book hold no single agreed view;
they represent all the views just mentioned. Thus, they
would each have a different take, for example, on why
powerful states cannot agree on how to tackle global
climate change, why wealthy states hoarded vaccines during the Covid-19 pandemic, why a majority
of British people voted to leave the European Union,
the significance of the 2007–8 global financial crisis,
whether the Western-led world order is in terminal
6
patricia owens · john baylis · steve smith
decline, why Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, or the
causes and significance of economic, gendered, and
racialized inequality in world politics.
There are three main aims of this book:
• to offer an overview of world politics in a global era;
• to summarize the main approaches to understanding contemporary world politics; and
to provide the material necessary to develop a con• crete
understanding of the main structures and
issues defining world politics today.
In Part Two we will examine the very important historical background to the contemporary world, including: the rise of the modern international order; the
major crises of international relations that defined
the twentieth century; more recent developments
that define the twenty-first century; and the significance of the rise of non-Western powers in contemporary world politics after a period of Western
dominance. Part Three gives a detailed account of
each of the main theories of world politics—liberal
internationalism, realism, Marxism, constructivism, poststructuralism, postcolonial and decolonial approaches, and feminism. In Part Four we look
at the main structures and processes that do most to
shape the central contours of contemporary world
politics, such as global political economy, international security, war, gender, and racial hierarchy.
Then in Part Five of the book we deal with some of
the main policy issues in the globalized world, such
as global health, poverty, human rights, refugees,
and the environmental crisis.
1.1 From international politics to world politics
Why does the main title of this book refer to ‘world
politics’ rather than ‘international politics’ or ‘international relations’? These are the traditional terms
used to describe the kinds of structures and processes covered in this book, such as the causes of war
and peace or the global economy and its inequalities. Indeed, the discipline that studies these issues is
nearly always called International Relations. We will
say more about this discipline shortly. The point here
is that we believe the phrase ‘world politics’ is more
inclusive than either of the alternative terms ‘international relations’ or ‘international politics’. It is meant
to signal that in this book we are interested in a very
wide set of actors and political relations in the world,
and not only those among nation-states (as implied
by ‘international relations’ or ‘international politics’).
It is not that relations between states are unimportant; far from it. They are fundamental to contemporary world politics. But we are also interested in
relations among institutions and organizations that
may or may not be states. For example, this book will
introduce you to the significance of multinational
corporations , transnational terrorist groups, social
classes, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) such as human rights groups. We also think
that relations among multinational corporations,
governments , or international organizations can
be as important as what states and other political
actors do. Hence, we prefer to use the more expansive
term ‘world politics’, with the important proviso that
we do not want you to defi ne ‘politics’ too narrowly.
Many contributors to this volume also understand
politics very broadly.
Consider, for example, the distinction between
‘politics’ and ‘economics’. Clearly, a great deal of power
accrues to the group that can persuade others that the
existing distribution of wealth and resources is ‘simply’
an economic or ‘private’ question rather than a political
or ‘public’ issue. Indeed, the very distinction between
‘politics’ and ‘economics’ has a history and is open to
dispute. According to Oxfam, 82 per cent of the world’s
global wealth is held by 1 per cent of its population; the
world’s richest 27 people possess the same wealth as its
poorest 50 per cent—3.8 billion people. And the global
wealth gap increases every year. The world’s ten richest
men doubled their wealth during the pandemic. The
point here is that we want you to think about politics
very broadly because many of the chapters in this book
will describe as ‘political’ features of the contemporary
world that you may not have previously thought of in
that way. Our focus is on the political and power relations, broadly defined, that characterize the contemporary world. Many will be between states, but many—and
perhaps most—will not.
Chapter 1 Introduction: from international politics to world politics
1.2 The study of International Relations
As you will discover in reading this book, International
Relations (IR) is an incredibly exciting and diverse field
of study. It is exciting because it addresses the most
pressing problems shaping the lives of everyone on the
planet: the global environmental catastrophe, pandemics, matters of war and peace, the organization of the
global economy, the causes and consequences of global
inequality, to name just a few of the most obvious. The
key concepts that organize debate in the field are also
some of the most contentious: power, violence, sovereignty, states, empire, genocide, intervention, inequality, justice, and democracy.
The field is highly diverse, organized into various
subfields and specialisms, including international history, international security, international political economy, international law, and international organizations.
Scholars of International Relations also often work with
regional specialisms, focusing on Latin America, East
Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa, or North America.
International Relations is also highly interdisciplinary, drawing on theoretical and methodological traditions from fields as diverse as History, Law, Political
Science, Geography, Sociology, Anthropology, Gender
Studies, and Postcolonial and Decolonial Studies. In
Britain, historians were most influential in the earliest
decades of the organized study of international relations (Hall 2012). In more recent years, especially after
the end of the Second World War, and especially in the
United States, Political Science has tended to have the
greatest influence on the discipline of International
Relations. This tended to narrow the range of acceptable approaches to the study of IR, and also led to an
excessive focus on US foreign policy, to the detriment
of non-Western history and theories of world politics.
However, both inside and outside the United States,
scholars have started to pay much more attention to
how and why IR has neglected non-Western histories
and experiences, and have begun to rectify this (Tickner
and Wæver 2009). In doing so, they have increasingly
moved the field away from Eurocentric approaches to
world politics, and begun to take seriously the project
of developing a Global IR (Acharya 2014b).
Watch the video on the online resources to see the
author explain the move away from a Eurocentric
approach to world politics.
People have tried to make sense of world politics for
centuries. However, the formation of the academic
discipline of International Relations is relatively
recent. This history also partly accounts for some of
the issues just described. Consider how the history of
the discipline of IR is itself contested. One of the most
influential accounts of its history is that the academic
discipline was formed in 1919 when the Department of
International Politics was established at the University
of Wales, Aberystwyth (now Aberystwyth University).
The emphasis in this version of the story is that the
Department of International Politics was founded after
the horrors of the First World War to help prevent a
future war. If scholars could find the causes of war, then
they could put forward solutions to help politicians prevent wars from breaking out. According to this view,
the discipline of IR was—or should be—marked by
such a commitment to changing the world; the task of
academic study should be one of making the world a
better place.
Others have challenged this story as a foundation
myth for a field with a much darker history, situating
the emergence of IR somewhat earlier in the history of
colonial administration and the study of imperialism
(Long and Schmidt 2005; Vitalis 2015). For example, the
first journal in the field was called the Journal of Race
Development, first published in 1910, and which is now
the influential US-based publication known as Foreign
Affairs. The beginning of the twentieth century was
not only a period of world war, but also one of empire,
theft of land, and belief in racial supremacy—that is,
maintaining and justifying white supremacy in world
politics. In the United States, African-American scholars interested in studying race and world politics were
systematically marginalized from the emerging discipline of IR (Vitalis 2015). However, situating the history
of the field in this context gives a very different gloss
to the role of academic International Relations today,
which exists in a context of international hierarchy
and the continuing significance of race and racism in
world politics, as discussed later in this book. Indeed,
even more recently scholars have started to decentre
the origin story of International Relations, pointing to
its multiple origins around the world (Davis, Thakur,
and Vale 2020; Thakur and Smith 2021).
The point to note here is that there are important
debates about how academic knowledge is produced,
the global political contexts in which academic disciplines are formed, and some of the enduring legacies of this history. Another important example is how
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histories of international thought and the discipline of
International Relations almost entirely exclude women
thinkers and founders of the discipline (for an exception,
see Ashworth 2014). Women in the past thought and
wrote a great deal about international politics (Sluga and
James 2016), but this work has yet to be fully recovered
and analysed (but see Owens and Rietzler 2021; Owens
et al. 2022). Knowledge about world politics—and the
academic subjects that you study at university—also has
a history and a politics. This history is relevant for the
identity of the academic field of International Relations
and for how we should think about world politics today.
Indeed, you should keep in mind that the main theories
of world politics did not arise from nowhere. They were
developed by intellectuals and practitioners in specific
circumstances for very concrete and political reasons.
International theories have histories too (Knutsen 1997;
Keene 2005; Ashworth 2014).
Watch the video on the online resources to see the
author discuss why women have been excluded
from the discipline of IR.
1.3 Theories of world politics
The basic problem facing anyone who tries to understand contemporary world politics is that there is so
much material to look at that it is difficult to know
which things matter and which do not. Where on
earth would you start if you wanted to explain the
most important political processes? How, for example, would you explain the failures of climate change
negotiations, the struggles over poor countries’ access
to vaccines, ‘Brexit’ from the EU, or the 9/11 attacks?
Why are thousands of migrants from North Africa
seeking to make the extremely dangerous voyage across
the Mediterranean Sea to the European Union? Why
does the United States support Israel in its conflict with
Palestinians in the occupied territories? As you will
learn, there are very different responses to these questions, and there seems no easy way of arriving at definitive answers to them.
Whether you are aware of it or not, whenever you are
faced with questions like these you have to turn not only
to the study of history, though that is absolutely essential, but also to theories. Theory is a kind of simplifying device that allows you to decide which historical or
contemporary facts and events matter more than others
when trying to develop an understanding of the world.
A good analogy is using sunglasses with differentcoloured lenses: put on the red pair and the world looks
red; put on the yellow pair and it looks yellow. The world
is not any different; it just looks different. So it is with
theories. Shortly, we will summarize the main theoretical views that have dominated the study of world politics so that you will get an idea of which ‘colours’ they
paint world politics. But before we do, please note that
we do not think theory is an option: you cannot say that
you do not want to bother with theory, all you want to
do is to look at the ‘facts’. This is impossible, since the
only way you can decide which of the millions of possible facts matter is by adhering to some simplifying
device. Theory is such a device. Note also that you may
not be aware of your theory. It may just be the view of or
even ideology about the world that you inherited from
your family, social class, peer groups, or the media. It
may just seem common sense to you and not at all complicated. But in such a case your theoretical assumptions are just implicit rather than explicit. We prefer
to try to be as explicit as possible when thinking about
world politics.
Of course, many proponents of particular theories also claim to see the world the way it ‘really is’.
Consider the International Relations theory known
as ‘realism’. The ‘real’ world as seen by realists is not
a very pleasant place. According to their view, human
beings are at best selfish and domineering, and probably much worse. Liberal notions about the perfectibility
of human beings and the possibility of a fundamental
transformation of world politics away from conflict and
towards peace are far-fetched from a realist perspective. Indeed, realists have often had the upper hand in
debates about the nature of world politics because their
views seem to accord more with common sense. We will
say more about realism in a moment. The point here is
to question whether such a realist view is as neutral as
it seems commonsensical. After all, if we teach world
politics to generations of students and tell them that
people are selfish, then does this not become common
sense? And when they go to work in the media, universities, for governments, international organizations, or
the military, do they not simply repeat what they have
been taught and act accordingly? Might realism simply
be the ideology of powerful states, interested in protecting the status quo? What is the history of realism and
Chapter 1 Introduction: from international politics to world politics
what does this history tell us about its claims about how
the world ‘really is’? For now, we would like to keep the
issue open and simply point out that we are not convinced that realism is as objective, timeless, or nonnormative as it is often portrayed.
What is certainly true is that realism has been one of
the dominant ways in the West of explaining world politics over the last 150 years. But it is not the only theory
of international relations, nor the one most closely associated with the earliest academic study of international
relations. We will now summarize the principal assumptions underlying the main rivals as theories of world
politics: liberal internationalism, realism, Marxism,
constructivism, poststructuralism, ­postcolonial and
decolonial approaches, and feminism. These theories
will be discussed in much more detail in Part Three
of this book; although we do not go into much depth
about them here, we want to give you a flavour of their
main themes as we also want to say something about
how each thinks about globalization.
Watch the video on the online resources to see
the author explain how and why IR theory is
valuable.
1.3.1 Liberal internationalism
Liberal internationalism developed after the First
World War, in a period defined by competing but unstable empires, class conflict, women’s suffrage, and experiments in international organization (Sluga and Clavin
2017). As you will later learn, there are many kinds of
‘liberalism’. But the main themes that run through liberal thought are that human beings and societies can be
improved, that capitalism is the best way of organizing
the economy, that representative democracy is necessary for liberal improvement, and that ideas—not just
material power—matter. Behind all this lies a belief in
progress, modelled on the achievements of liberal capitalist societies in the West. Hence, liberals reject the
realist notion that war is the natural condition of world
politics. They also question the idea that the state is the
main actor on the world political stage, although they
do not deny that it is important. They see individuals,
multinational corporations, transnational actors, and
international organizations as central actors in some
issue-areas of world politics. Liberals tend to think of
the state not as a unitary or united actor, but as made up
of individuals and their collective societal preferences
and interests. They also think of the state as comprised
of a set of bureaucracies, each with its own interests.
Therefore, there can be no such thing as one ‘national
interest ’ since it merely represents the result of whatever societal preferences or bureaucratic organizations
dominate the domestic decision-making process. In
relations among states, liberals stress the possibilities
for cooperation; the key issue becomes devising international institutions in which economic and political
cooperation can be best achieved.
The picture of world politics that arises from the liberal view is of a complex system of bargaining among
many different types of actors. Military force is still
important, but the liberal agenda is not as restricted
as the realist one of relations between great powers.
Liberals see national interests in more than just military terms, and stress the importance of economic,
environmental, and technological issues. Order in
world politics emerges from the interactions among
many layers of governing arrangements, comprising
laws, agreed norms, international regimes, and institutional rules to manage the global capitalist economy.
Fundamentally, liberals do not think that sovereignty is
as important in practice as realists believe. States may
be legally sovereign, but in practice they have to negotiate with all sorts of other public and private actors, with
the result that their freedom to act as they might wish is
seriously curtailed. Interdependence between states is
a critically important feature of world politics.
1.3.2 Realism
Realists have a different view of world politics and, like
liberals, claim a long tradition. However, it is highly
contested whether realists can actually claim a lineage
all the way back to ancient Greece, or whether realism is an invented intellectual tradition for cold war
American foreign policy needs. Either way, there are
many variants of something called ‘realism’. But in
general, for realists, the main actors on the world stage
are the most powerful states, which are legally sovereign actors. Sovereignty means that there is no actor
above the state that can compel it to act in specific ways.
According to this view, other actors such as multinational corporations or international organizations have
to work within the framework of inter-state relations
set by the most powerful states. As for what propels
states to act as they do, many realists see human nature
as centrally important, and they view human nature
as rather selfish. As a result, world politics (or, more
accurately for realists, international politics) represents
a struggle for power among states, with each trying to
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maximize its national interest. Such order as exists in
world politics is the result of the workings of a mechanism known as the balance of power, whereby states
act so as to prevent any one state from dominating.
Thus, world politics is all about bargaining and alliances, with diplomacy a key mechanism for balancing
various national interests. But finally, the most important tool available for implementing states’ foreign
policies is military force. Ultimately, since there is no
sovereign body above the states that make up the international political system, world politics is a self-help
system in which states must rely on their own military
resources to achieve their ends. Often these ends can
be achieved through cooperation, but the potential for
conflict is ever-present.
Since the 1980s, an important variant of realism
has developed, known as neorealism. This approach
stresses the importance of the structure of the international system in affecting the behaviour of all states.
Thus, during the cold war two main powers dominated
the international system, and this gave rise to certain
rules of behaviour; now that the cold war has ended, the
structure of world politics is said to be moving towards
multipolarity (after a phase of unipolarity), which for
neorealists will involve very different rules of the game.
1.3.3 Social constructivism
Social constructivism is a relatively new approach
in International Relations, one that developed in the
United States in the late 1980s and has been becoming increasingly influential since the mid-1990s. The
approach arose out of a set of events in world politics,
notably the disintegration of the Soviet empire, as symbolized most dramatically by the fall of the Berlin Wall
in 1989. These events indicated that human agency had
a much greater potential role in world politics than
implied by realism or liberalism. But the theoretical underpinnings of social constructivism are much
older; they relate to a series of social-scientific and philosophical works that dispute the notion that the ‘social
world’ is external to the people who live in it, and is not
easily changed. To different degrees, realism and liberalism stress the regularities and ‘certainties’ of political
life (although liberalism is somewhat less adamant).
By contrast, constructivism argues that we make and
remake the social world so there is much more of a role
for human agency than realism and liberalism allow.
These approaches underestimate the possibilities for
human progress and for the betterment of people’s lives.
To this degree, social constructivism strongly overlaps
with liberalism and can even be seen as providing the
social theory underpinnings of liberal political theories
of world politics. In the words of one of the most influential constructivist theorists, Alexander Wendt, even
the self-help international system portrayed by realists is something that we make and remake: ‘anarchy
is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992). Therefore, the
world that realists portray as ‘natural’ or ‘given’ is in
fact far more open to change, and constructivists think
that self-help is only one possible response to the anarchical structure of world politics. Indeed, not only is
the structure of world politics amenable to change, but
so also are the identities and interests that neorealism
or neoliberalism take as given. The seemingly ‘natural’
structures, processes, identities, and interests of world
politics could in fact be different from what they currently are. Note, however, that social constructivism is
not a theory of world politics in itself. It is an approach
to the philosophy of social science with implications for
the kinds of arguments that can be made about world
politics. Constructivists need to marry their approach
to another political theory of world politics, such as
realism, feminism, but usually liberalism, to actually
make substantive claims.
Realism, liberalism, and social constructivism are
the dominant approaches in the most influential location for IR scholarship, which is currently the United
States. But by no means should realism, liberalism, and
social constructivism be considered the only compelling theories or the only approaches with large numbers of adherents. On the contrary, outside the United
States these theories are often considered to be far
too narrow and thus unconvincing. We now turn to
some other approaches that are highly critical of these
three approaches and move beyond them in quite farreaching ways.
1.3.4 Marxist theories
The fourth main theoretical position we want to mention
is Marxism, also known as historical materialism, which
immediately gives you a clue as to its main assumptions.
But first we want to point out a paradox about Marxism.
On the one hand, Marxist theory has been incredibly influential historically, inspiring socialist revolutions around the world, including during the process of
decolonization, and also in the recent global uprisings in
response to the 2007 global financial crisis. On the other
hand, it has been less influential in the discipline of IR
Chapter 1 Introduction: from international politics to world politics
than either realism or liberalism, and has less in common with either realism or liberalism than they do with
each other. Indeed, from a Marxist perspective, both
realism and liberalism serve the class and imperial interests of the most powerful actors in world politics to the
detriment of most of the rest of the world.
For Marxist theory, the most important feature of
world politics is that it takes place in a highly unequal
capitalist world economy. In this world economy the
most important actors are not states but classes, and
the behaviour of all other actors is ultimately explicable
by class forces. Thus states, multinational corporations,
and even international organizations represent the
dominant class interest in the world economic system.
Marxist theorists differ over how much leeway actors
such as states have, but all Marxists agree that the
world economy severely constrains states’ freedom of
manoeuvre, especially that of poorer and weaker states.
Rather than an arena of conflict among national interests or with many different issue-areas, Marxist theorists conceive of world politics as the setting in which
class conflicts are played out. In the branch of Marxism
known as world systems theory, the key feature of the
international economy is the division of the world into
a wealthy capitalist core, a semi-periphery, and an
exploited periphery integrated into the economy in its
provision of natural resources and labour made cheap.
Of course, in the semi-periphery and even the periphery there exist wealthy pockets that are tied into the
capitalist world economy, while even in the core area
there are exploited economic areas. But what matters is
the dominance of the power not of states but of global
capitalism, and it is capitalist forces, including capitalist crises, that ultimately determine the main political
patterns in world politics. Sovereignty is not nearly as
important for Marxist theorists as for realists since it
refers to political and legal matters, whereas the most
important feature of world politics for Marxist theorists is the degree of economic autonomy, and here they
see all states as having to play by the rules of the international capitalist economy.
1.3.5 Poststructuralism
Poststructuralism has been a particularly influential
theoretical development throughout the humanities and
social sciences in the last 30 years. It reached international theory in the mid-1980s, but it can only be said
to have really arrived in the last few years of the twentieth century. Indeed, for a time poststructuralism
was probably as popular a theoretical approach as any
discussed in this book, and it overlaps with several of
them. Part of the difficulty, however, is precisely defining poststructuralism, which is also sometimes referred
to as postmodernism. This is in addition to the fact, of
course, that there are substantial theoretical differences
within its various strands. One useful definition is by
Jean-François Lyotard (1984: xxiv): ‘Simplifying to the
extreme, I define post-modern as incredulity towards
metanarratives’. ‘Incredulity’ simply means scepticism;
‘metanarrative’ means any theory that asserts it has clear
foundations for making knowledge claims and involves
a foundational epistemology. You do not need to
worry too much about what this means right now. It is
explained in more detail in the chapter on poststructuralism (see Ch. 12), and we say a little more about these
meta-theory questions in Section 1.3.8. Put simply, to
have a foundational epistemology is to think that all
truth claims about the world can be judged true or false
(epistemology is how we can claim to know something).
Poststructuralism is essentially concerned with distrusting and exposing any account of human life that
claims to have direct access to ‘the truth’. Thus realism,
liberalism, social constructivism, and Marxism are all
suspect from a poststructuralist perspective because
they claim to have uncovered some fundamental truth
about the world. Michel Foucault, an important influence on poststructuralists, was opposed to the notion
that knowledge is immune from the workings of power.
Instead, and in common with Marxism, he argued that
power produces knowledge. All power requires knowledge and all knowledge relies on and reinforces existing
power relations. Thus there is no such thing as ‘truth’
existing outside of power. Truth is not something
external to social settings, but is instead part of them.
Poststructuralist international theorists have used
this insight to examine the ‘truths’ of International
Relations theory, to see how the concepts that dominate
the discipline are in fact highly contingent on specific
power relations. Poststructuralism takes apart the very
concepts and methods of our thinking, examining the
conditions under which we are able to theorize about
world politics in the first place.
1.3.6 Postcolonial and decolonial
approaches
Postcolonialism has been an important approach in
cultural studies, literary theory, and anthropology for
some time, and has a long and distinguished pedigree.
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In recent years, more and more scholars studying international politics are drawing on ideas from other disciplines, including postcolonialism, especially those that
expose the Eurocentric character of IR. It is noteworthy
that all the major theories we have discussed so far—
realism, liberalism, Marxism, social constructivism,
and poststructuralism—emerged in Europe in response
to specific European problems, including imperialism.
They are all ‘Eurocentric’. Postcolonial scholars question whether Eurocentric theories can really purport to
explain world politics, its historical relation to empire
and colonialism, or world politics as it relates to the
lives of most people on the planet. It is more likely that
these Eurocentric approaches help to continue and justify the military and economic subordination of the
Global South by powerful Western interests. This process is known as ‘neocolonialism’.
Postcolonialism has also become more popular in
IR since the 9/11 attacks, which encouraged people to
try to understand how the histories of the West and
the Global South have always been intertwined. For
example, the identities of the colonized and colonizers are constantly in flux and mutually constituted.
Postcolonial scholars argue that the dominant theories, especially realism and liberalism, are not neutral
in terms of race, gender, and class, but have helped
secure the domination of the Western world over the
Global South. At the same time, traditional Marxism
did not pay sufficient attention to the way that racial
and gendered identities and power relations were central to upholding class power. Decolonial scholarship,
which comes out of and is closely linked to postcolonialism, then proceeds to think about how to ‘decolonize’ the dominant theories and ways of knowing.
Thus, an important claim of postcolonial and decolonial approaches is that global hierarchies of subordination and control, past and present, are made possible
through the historical construction and combination
of racial, gendered, class, and national differences and
hierarchies. As other chapters in this volume suggest,
IR has been slightly more comfortable with issues
of class and gender. But the issue of race was almost
entirely ignored from the end of the Second World War
until quite recently. This occurred even though at the
turn of the twentieth century international relations
explicitly meant ‘race relations’ since a large proportion of international relations research focused on the
administration of colonies (Vitalis 2015). As shown
in Chapter 18, race and racism continue to shape the
contemporary theory and practice of world politics in
far-reaching ways. In 1903, W. E. B. DuBois famously
argued that the problem of the twentieth century would
be the problem of the ‘colour-line’. How will transnational racism continue to shape global politics in the
twenty-first century?
1.3.7 Feminism
Feminists were among the earliest and most influential
writers on international politics in the period during
which the academic discipline of International Relations
emerged (Ashworth 2011; Owens et al. 2022). But, as
noted earlier, this tradition of international theory
was marginalized from the discipline of International
Relations after the Second World War until the 1980s.
The first and most important thing to note about feminism itself is that there is no one feminist theory: there
are many kinds of feminisms. However, the different
approaches are united by their focus on the construction of differences between ‘women’ and ‘men’ in the
context of hierarchy and power and the highly contingent understandings of masculinity and femininity that
these power relations produce. Indeed, the very categories of ‘women’ and ‘men’, and the concepts of masculinity and femininity, are highly contested in much
feminist research. Some feminist theories assume natural and biological (i.e. sex) differences between men and
women. Some do not. However, all the most interesting work in this field analyses how gender both affects
world politics and is an effect of world politics; in other
words, how different concepts (such as the state, war, or
sovereignty) are gendered and, in turn, how this gendering of concepts can have differential consequences
for ‘men’ and ‘women’.
Some feminists look at the ways in which women
are excluded from power and prevented from playing a
full part in political activity. They examine how women
have been restricted to roles critically important for
the functioning of things (such as reproductive economies) but that are not usually deemed to be important
for theories of world politics. Other feminists argue
that the cause of women’s inequality is in the capitalist system – that overthrowing capitalism is the necessary route for the achievement of the equal treatment of
women. ‘Standpoint feminists’ identify how women, as
a particular class by virtue of their sex rather than economic standing (although the two are related), possess
a unique perspective—or standpoint—on world politics as a result of their subordination. For example, in
an important essay, J. Ann Tickner (1988) reformulated
Chapter 1 Introduction: from international politics to world politics
the famous ‘six principles of political realism’ developed by the ‘godfather’ of realism, Hans J. Morgenthau.
Tickner showed how the seemingly ‘objective’ rules of
realism reflect hegemonic ‘masculine’ values and definitions of reality. As a riposte, she reformulated these
same rules taking women’s experiences as the starting
point.
Postcolonial and decolonial feminists work at the
intersection of class, race, and gender on a global scale,
and especially analyse the gendered effects of transnational culture and the unequal division of labour in
the global political economy. From this perspective, it
is not good enough to simply demand (as some liberal
feminists do) that men and women should have equal
rights in a Western-style democracy. Such a move
ignores the way in which poor women of colour in the
Global South remain subordinated by the global economic system—a system that liberal feminists were too
slow to challenge in a systematic way.
1.3.8 Some meta-theoretical questions
For most of the twentieth century, realism, liberalism,
and Marxism tended to be the main theories used to
understand world politics, with constructivism, feminism, and poststructuralism becoming increasingly
influential from the mid-1990s and postcolonialism
gaining some influence since the 2000s.
While it is clear that each of these theories focuses
on different aspects of world politics, each is saying
more than this. Each view is claiming that it is picking
out the most important features of world politics and
that it offers a better account than rival theories. Thus,
the different approaches are really in competition with
one another. While you can certainly choose among
them and combine some aspects of some of the theories
(see, for example, Marxism, feminism, and postcolonialism), it is not always so easy to add bits from one to
the others. For example, if you are a Marxist then you
think that state behaviour is ultimately determined by
class forces. But realists and liberals do not think that
class affects state behaviour in any significant way. In
other words, these theories are really competing versions of what world politics is like rather than partial
pictures of it. They do not agree on what the ‘it’ is.
One way to think about this is in relation to metatheoretical questions (questions above any particular theory). Such terms can be a little unsettling, but
they are merely convenient words for discussing fairly
straightforward ideas. First consider the distinction
between explanatory and constitutive theories. An
explanatory theory is one that sees the world as something external to our theories of it. In contrast, a constitutive theory is one that thinks our theories actually
help construct the world. In a very obvious way our
theories about the world shape how we act, and thereby
make those theories self-confirming. For example, if we
think individuals are naturally aggressive then we are
likely to adopt a different posture towards them than
if we think they are naturally peaceful. However, you
should not regard this claim as self-evidently true, since
it assumes that our ability to think and reason makes
us able to determine our choices (i.e. that we have free
will rather than having our ‘choices’ predetermined).
What if our human nature is such that we desire certain
things ‘naturally’, and that our language and seemingly
‘free choices’ are simply rationalizations for our needs?
The point is that there is a genuine debate between those
who think of the social world as like the natural world,
and those theories that see our language and concepts
as helping to create that reality. Theories claiming the
natural and social worlds are the same are known as
naturalist (Hollis and Smith 1990).
In IR, realist and liberal theories tend to be explanatory, with the task of theory being to report on a world
that is external to our theories. Their concern is to
uncover regularities in human behaviour and thereby
explain the social world in much the same way as a natural scientist might explain the physical world. By contrast, nearly all the approaches developed in the last 30
years or so tend to be constitutive theories. Here theory
is not external to the things it is trying to explain, and
instead may construct how we think about the world.
Or, to put it another way, our theories define what we
see as the external world. Thus, the very concepts we
use to think about the world help to make that world
what it is.
The foundational/anti-foundational distinction
refers to the simple-sounding issue of whether our
beliefs about the world can be tested or evaluated
against any neutral or objective procedures. This is a
distinction central to the branch of the philosophy of
social science known as epistemology (the study of how
we can claim to know something). A foundationalist
position is one that thinks that all truth claims (about
some feature of the world) can be judged true or false.
An anti-foundationalist thinks that truth claims cannot be judged in this way, since there are never neutral
grounds for doing so. Instead each theory will define
what counts as the facts, and so there will be no neutral
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patricia owens · john baylis · steve smith
position available to adjudicate between rival claims.
Think, for example, of a Marxist and a liberal arguing
about the ‘true’ state of the economy. Foundationalists
look for ‘meta-theoretical’ (above any particular theory)
grounds for choosing between truth claims. In contrast, anti-foundationalists think that there are no such
positions available; the belief itself is simply a reflection
of an adherence to a particular view of epistemology.
Most of the contemporary approaches to international theory are much less wedded to foundationalism
than were the traditional theories. Thus, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and some feminist theory would
tend towards anti-foundationalism, whereas neorealism and neoliberalism would tend towards foundationalism. Interestingly, social constructivism wishes to
portray itself as occupying the middle ground. On the
whole, and as a rough guide, explanatory theories tend
to be foundational while constitutive theories tend to be
anti-foundational. The point at this stage is not to construct some checklist, nor to get you thinking yet about
the epistemological differences among these theories.
Rather we want to draw your attention to the important
impact of these assumptions about the nature of knowledge on the theories you will be learning about. The
last 30 years have seen these underlying assumptions
brought more into the open. The most important effect
of this has been to undermine realism’s and liberalism’s
claims to be delivering the truth.
We have offered a very rough representation of how
various International Relations theories can be categorized. This is misleading in some respects since there are
quite different versions of the main theories and some
of these are less foundationalist than others. So the classifications are broadly illustrative of the theoretical landscape and are best considered a useful starting point for
thinking about the differences among theories.
1.4 Theories and globalization
No International Relations theory has all the answers
when it comes to explaining world politics in a global
era. In fact, each sees ‘globalization’ differently. We do
not want to tell you which theory seems best, since the
purpose of this book is to give you a variety of lenses
through which to look at world politics. All we will do is
say a few words about how each theory responds to the
debate about ‘globalization’. We will then say something
about the possible rise of globalization and offer some
ideas on its strengths and weaknesses as a description of
contemporary world politics.
• For liberals, globalization is the end product of a long-
running, progressive transformation of world politics.
Liberals are particularly interested in the revolution
in economy, technology, and communications represented by globalization. This increased interconnectedness among societies, which is economically and
technologically led, results in a very different pattern of
world political relations from that which came before.
States are no longer such central actors. In their place
are numerous actors of differing importance depending on the issue concerned. The world looks more like
a cobweb of relations than like the state model of realism or the class model of Marxist theory. For example,
from this perspective, the British vote to exit from the
EU was a foolish and very expensive decision to reject
political and economic integration.
• For realists, the picture looks very different. For them,
globalization—however its advocates define it—does
not alter the most significant feature of world politics, namely the territorial division of the world into
nation-states. While the increased interconnectedness among economies and societies might make
them more dependent on one another, the same cannot be said about the state system. Here, powerful
states retain sovereignty, and globalization does not
render obsolete the struggle for political power among
those states. Nor does it undermine the importance of
the threat of the use of force or the importance of the
balance of power. Globalization may affect our social,
economic, and cultural lives, but it does not transcend
the international political system of states. For example, we might think of the decision of the British people to leave the European Union, or the way wealthy
states hoarded Covid-19 vaccines, as a demonstration
of the enduring significance of national sovereignty.
• For constructivist theorists, globalization tends to be
presented as an external force acting on states, which
leaders often argue is a reality that they cannot challenge. For constructivists, this is a very political act, since
it underestimates the ability of changing social norms
and the identity of actors to challenge and shape globalization, and instead allows leaders to duck responsibility
by blaming ‘the way the world is’. Instead, constructivists think that we can mould globalization in a variety
Chapter 1 Introduction: from international politics to world politics
of ways, notably because it offers us very real chances,
for example, to create cross-national human rights and
social movements aided by modern technological
forms of communication such as the internet.
• For Marxists, globalization is a sham, and the recent
backlash against ‘globalization’ is evidence of this.
From a historical perspective, it is nothing particularly
new, and is really only the latest stage in the development of international capitalism: neoliberalism. It does
not mark a qualitative shift in world politics, nor does
it render all our existing theories and concepts redundant. Above all, globalization is a Western-led capitalist
phenomenon that simply furthers the development of
global capitalism, in a neoliberal vein. Neoliberalism is
less a variant of liberal internationalism, though there
are links, than the effort to deregulate global capitalism
for the benefit of the rich. Rather than make the world
more alike, neoliberal globalization further deepens the
existing divides between the core, the semi-periphery,
and the periphery.
• For poststructuralists, ‘globalization’ does not
exist out there in the world. It is a discourse.
Poststructuralists are sceptical of the grand claims
made by realists, liberals, and Marxists about the
nature of globalization, and they argue that any
claims about the meaning of so-called ‘globalization’ make sense only in the context of a specific discourse that itself is a product of power. These various
regimes of truth about globalization reflect the ways
in which both power and truth develop together in
a mutually sustaining relationship throughout history. The way to uncover the workings of power
behind the discourse of ‘globalization’ is to undertake a detailed historical analysis of how the practices and statements about globalization are ‘true’
only within specific discourses.
• Postcolonial and decolonial scholarship on globalization is similar to much Marxist thought in that
it highlights the important degree of continuity and
persistence of colonial forms of power in the globalized world. For example, the level of economic and
military control of Western interests in the Global
South is in many ways greater now than it was under
direct colonial control—a form of ‘neo’-colonialism
that is compatible with neoliberal capitalism. So,
although the era of formal colonial imposition by
force of arms is largely over, an important starting
point for postcolonial scholarship is the issue of vast
inequality on a global scale, the forms of globalizing
power that make this systematic inequality possible,
and the continued domination of subaltern peoples,
those classes dominated under hegemony such as
poor rural women in the Global South.
• Each of the different branches of feminist scholarship responds differently to the question of globalization, but they all address and debate the effects it
has on gendered forms of power. Liberal feminists,
as is to be expected, are most positive and hopeful
about globalization, viewing it as a way to incorporate more women into the liberal capitalist political and economic system that has benefited many
women in the West. Others are much more sceptical, pointing to the negative effects of neoliberalism
and economic globalization on the global wealth
gap, which has a disproportionately negative effect
on women of colour. From a feminist perspective, to
really assess the significance, causes, and effects of
globalization requires concrete analysis of the lived
experiences of men and women, showing how seemingly gender-neutral issues are highly gendered,
reinforcing relations of power and other forms of
gender injustice.
By the end of the book, we hope you will work out
which of these approaches (if any) best explain not only
‘globalization’, but world politics in general. The central
point here is that the main theories see globalization
differently because they have a prior view of what is
most important in world politics.
1.5 Globalization: myth or reality?
This book offers an overview of world politics in a
global era. But what does it mean to speak of a ‘global
era’? Societies today are affected both more extensively and more deeply by events in other societies.
The world seems to be ‘shrinking’, and people are
increasingly aware of this. The internet is one very
graphic example since it allows us to sit at home and
have instant communication with people around
the world, including during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Email and social media such as TikTok, Facebook,
and Twitter have also transformed communications
and hence how we come to know about world politics.
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patricia owens · john baylis · steve smith
But these are only the most obvious examples. Others
would include: pandemics such as Covid-19, pollution and climate change, global supply chains and
global newspapers, international social movements
such as Black Lives Matter, Amnesty International,
or Greenpeace, global franchises such as McDonald’s,
Coca-Cola, and Apple. Have these developments
really changed the nature of world politics? The
debate about globalization is not just the claim that
the world has changed, but whether the changes are
qualitative and not merely quantitative. Has a ‘new’
world political system really emerged as a result of
these processes?
Our final task in this introduction is to offer you a
summary of the main arguments for and against globalization as a distinct new phase in world politics.
We do not expect you to decide where you stand on
the issue at this stage, but we think we should give you
some of the main arguments to keep in mind as you
read the rest of this book. Because the arguments for
globalization as a new phase of world politics are most
effectively summarized in Chapter 2, we will spend
more time on the criticisms. The main arguments in
favour are:
• The pace of economic transformation is so great
that it has created a new world politics. States are
less and less like closed units and they cannot control their own economies under global capitalism.
The world economy is more interdependent than
ever, with cross-border trade and financial flows
ever expanding.
• Communications have fundamentally revolutionized the way we deal with the rest of the world. We
now live in a world where events in one location can
be immediately observed on the other side of the
world. Electronic communications alter our notions
of the social groups we live in.
• A risk culture is emerging, with people realizing
both that the main risks they face are global (pollution and climate change, Covid-19, HIV/AIDS) and
that individual states are unable to deal with these
problems. Time and space seem to be collapsing.
Our old ideas of geographical space and of chronological time are undermined by the speed of modern communications and media, as well as by new
infectious diseases.
• There is now, more than ever before, a global
culture, so that most urban areas resemble
one another. Much of the urban world shares a
common culture, a good deal of it emanating
from Hollywood.
• A global polity is emerging, with transnational
social and political movements and the beginnings
of a transfer of allegiance from the state to sub-state,
transnational, and international bodies.
• A cosmopolitan culture is developing, especially
around the issue of climate change. People are
beginning to ‘think globally and act locally’.
However, just as there are powerful reasons for seeing globalization as a new stage in world politics, often
allied to the view that globalization is progressive—that
it improves people’s lives—there are also arguments
that suggest the opposite. Some of the main ones are:
• Globalization is merely a buzzword to denote the
latest phase of global capitalism: neoliberalism. In a
very powerful critique of globalization theory, Paul
Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1996) argue that one
effect of the globalization thesis is that it makes it
appear as if national governments are powerless in
the face of global economic trends. This paralyses
government attempts to subject global economic
forces to control and regulation. Arguing that most
globalization theory lacks historical depth, Hirst
and Thompson suggest that it paints the current
juncture as more unusual, and also as more firmly
entrenched, than it is. Current trends may well be
reversible and the more extreme versions of globalization are ‘a myth’. Hirst and Thompson support
this claim with five main conclusions from their
study of the contemporary world economy (Hirst
and Thompson 1996: 2–3). First, the present internationalized economy is not unique in history. In some
respects, it is less open than the international economy between 1870 and 1914. Second, ‘genuinely’
transnational companies are relatively rare; most
are national companies trading internationally.
Third, there is no shift of finance and capital from
the richest to the poorest countries. Overseas direct
investment continues to be highly concentrated in
the richest states. Fourth, the world economy is not
global; rather trade, investment, and financial flows
are concentrated in and among different blocs—
Europe, North America, China, and Japan. Finally,
if they coordinated policies, this group of blocs
could regulate global economic markets and forces.
Hirst and Thompson offer a very powerful critique
of one of the main planks of the globalization thesis:
that the global economy is something beyond our
Chapter 1 Introduction: from international politics to world politics
control. This view both misleads us and prevents us
from developing policies to control national economies. All too often we are told that our economy
must obey ‘the global market’, with enormous consequences for social spending and social justice. Is
this a myth?
• Another obvious objection is that globalization is
very uneven in its effects. At times it sounds very
much like a Western theory applicable only to
a small part of humankind. If 40 per cent of the
world’s population is not connected to the internet, then we are in danger of overestimating both
the extent and the depth of globalization. Some
have argued that we are now in a period of socalled ‘deglobalization’, of diminishing support for
greater interdependence, as witnessed with Brexit,
the US election of Donald Trump, Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine, and rising populist parties in Europe
and the United States.
Watch the video on the online resources to see
the author discuss if we are now in a period of
‘deglobalization’.
raises crucial questions of censorship and preventing access to certain kinds of material, including
those trading in the sexual exploitation of children.
• Turning to so-called global governance, the main
worry here is about responsibility. To whom are
the transnational social movements responsible
and democratically accountable? If IBM or Shell
becomes more and more powerful in the world, then
this raises the issues of accountability and democratic control. One of the arguments for ‘Brexit’ was
that EU decision-making is undemocratic and unaccountable. Most of the emerging powerful actors in a
globalized world are not accountable to democratic
publics. This argument also applies to seemingly
‘good’ global actors such as Amnesty International
and Greenpeace.
We hope that these arguments for and against the
dominant way of representing globalization will cause
you to think deeply about the utility of the concept of
globalization. The chapters that follow do not take a
common stance for or against. We end by posing some
questions that we would like you to keep in mind as you
read the remaining chapters:
• A related objection is that globalization may well • Is globalization a new phenomenon in world politics?
be simply the latest stage of Western imperialism. • Which International Relations theory best explains
It is the old modernization theory in a new guise.
The forces that are being globalized are conveniently
those found in the Western world. What about nonWestern experiences and values? Where do they fit
into this emerging global world? The worry is that
they do not fit in at all, and what is being celebrated
in globalization is the triumph of a Western worldview, at the expense of others.
• There are very many losers as the world becomes
more ‘globalized’. Globalization only represents the
supposed ‘success’ of neoliberal capitalism in an
economically divided world. Perhaps one outcome
is that neoliberal globalization allows the more efficient exploitation of poorer nations, and segments
of richer ones, all in the name of economic ‘openness’. The technologies accompanying globalization
are technologies that benefit the richest economies
in the world, and allow their interests to override
those of local communities. Not only is globalization imperialist, it is also exploitative.
• Not all globalized forces are necessarily ‘good’.
Globalization makes it easier for drug cartels and
terrorists to operate, and the internet’s anarchy
globalization?
• Is globalization a positive or a negative development?
• Is neoliberal globalization merely the latest stage of
capitalist development?
• Does globalization make the state obsolete?
• Does globalization make the world more or less
democratic?
• Is globalization merely Western imperialism in a
new guise?
• Does globalization make war more or less likely?
• In what ways is war a globalizing force in itself?
• Do you think that the vote for Brexit or the spread
of Covid-19 represent a major new challenge to
globalization?
We hope that this introduction and the chapters
that follow help you to answer these questions, and
that this book provides you with a good overview of
the politics of the contemporary world. Whether or
not you conclude that globalization is a new phase
in world politics, whether you think it is a positive
or a negative development, or that it does not really
exist at all, we leave to you to decide. But we think
it is important to conclude this chapter by stressing
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patricia owens · john baylis · steve smith
that how we think about politics in the global era
will reflect not merely the theories we accept, but
also our own positions in the world. In this sense,
how we respond to world events may itself be ultimately dependent on the social, cultural, gendered,
racialized, economic, and political spaces we occupy.
World politics suddenly becomes very personal: how
does your economic position, your ethnicity, race,
gender, culture, or religion determine what globalization means to you?
Further Reading
On the history of the academic field of International Relations, see L. M. Ashworth (2014), A History
of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations
(London: Routledge); R. Vitalis (2015), White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American
International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); A. Acharya and B. Buzan (2019), The
Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press); A. E. Davis, V. Thakur, and P. C. J. Vale (2020), The Imperial Discipline:
Race and the Founding of International Relations (London: Pluto Press).
On the history of international political thought and international theories more generally, see
E. Keene (2005), International Political Thought: An Historical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity);
D. Armitage (2013), Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press); and P. Owens and K. Rietzler (2021), Women’s International Thought: A New
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
There are several good introductory guides to the globalization debate. On the intellectual
origins of ‘globalism’, see O. Rosenboim (2017), The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World
Order in Britain and the United States, 1939–1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Comprehensive discussions are found in A. McGrew and D. Held (2007), Globalization Theory:
Approaches and Controversies (Cambridge: Polity Press) and F. J. Lechner and J. Boli (eds) (2014),
The Globalization Reader (Oxford: Blackwell). Also see C. el-Ojeili and P. Hayden (2006), Critical
Theories of Globalization (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
C. Enloe (2016), Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link, 2nd edn (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield) is a good analysis from a leading feminist of the connections between
globalization and various forms of violence.
We also point you to other books in the Rowman & Littlefield series on globalization edited by
M. B. Steger and T. Carver, in particular J. Agnew (2017), Globalization and Sovereignty: Beyond the
Territorial Trap, 2nd edn; V. M. Moghadam (2020), Globalization and Social Movements, 3rd edn;
and M. E. Hawkesworth (2018), Globalization and Feminist Activism, 2nd edn.
Excellent critiques of the globalization thesis are J. Rosenberg (2002), The Follies of Globalization
Theory (London: Verso); D. Held and A. McGrew (2007), Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond
the Great Divide, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press); B. K. Gills (ed.) (2002), Globalization and the
Politics of Resistance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); B. K. Gills and W. R. Thompson (eds)
(2006), Globalization and Global History (London: Routledge); J. E. Stiglitz (2017), Globalization and
its Discontents Revisited: The Era of Trump (London: Penguin); L. Weiss (1998), The Myth of the
Powerless State (Cambridge: Polity Press); and P. Hirst and G. Thompson (1999), Globalization in
Question, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity Press).
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
Chapter 2
Globalization and
global politics
anthony mcgrew
Framing Questions
●
What is globalization?
●
Does globalization still matter?
●
What does globalization add to our understanding of contemporary world politics?
Reader’s Guide
Globalization is a concept which refers to the
widening, deepening, and acceleration of worldwide connectivity or interconnectedness. Popular
metaphors portray it in vivid terms as a ‘shrinking
world’, a ‘networked world’, or a ‘global village’.
Indeed, both the Covid-19 pandemic and climate
change are indicative of just how deeply enmeshed
the fate of communities and societies across the
world has become, not to mention how globalization simultaneously unifies and divides the world.
Globalization is a complex and contradictory process, so not surprisingly has always been the subject of great controversy. One of the most debated
issues of our times is whether globalization is in
retreat (‘deglobalization’) or undergoing a renaissance (‘reglobalization’). Either way, globalization
will continue to matter profoundly to the study and
practice of twenty-first century world politics. This
chapter explores the complexities and contradictions of contemporary globalization and considers
why it is essential to comprehending and explaining
world politics.
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anthony mcgrew
2.1 Introduction
Globalization, as with war, has been central to the formation of the modern world system and world politics (Bayly 2004, 2018; Osterhammel 2014). Although
a recent concept, it represents neither a novel nor a
solely Western phenomenon: global connectivity has
a long history and diverse origins, from the Great Silk
Road and ‘ancient globalization’ to ‘oriental globalization’ (globalization from the East) (Bayly 2018; Hobson
2021) (see Box 2.1).
This chapter is organized into three parts. Section
2.2 is concerned with making sense of globalization by addressing several primary questions: What
is globalization? What are its dominant features?
How is it best conceptualized and defined? Section
2.3 examines the current predicament of globalization (often referred to as the ‘crisis of globalization’) and its implications for world order and world
politics. Section 2.4 considers the contributions of
globalization scholarship to advancing a critical
Box 2.1 Histories of globalization
Many histories of globalization reflect a Western-centric
perspective eliding globalization with the rise of the West to
global domination. The history of globalization is thus often
described in terms of successive waves of Western expansion:
beginning with the so-called ‘age of discovery’ (1450–1850),
continuing to the late nineteenth century Belle Epoque (1850–
1914) or Pax Britannica, then to Pax Americana (1945–89), and
finally reaching the most recent phase of post-cold war neoliberal globalization (1990–2008).
However, new global histories seek to correct this partiality by drawing upon a global analysis (see Chs 3 and 11).
They draw attention to the ‘multicultural origins’ of globalization, explaining how it has always been a multicentric rather
than a Western-centric process, thus critiquing the ‘rise of the
West’ narrative (Conrad 2016; Hobson 2021; Pieterse 2012;
Sharman 2019).
understanding of twenty-first-century global affairs.
Section 2.5 concludes with brief reflections on the
three core framing questions.
2.2 Making sense of globalization
In the first two decades of the twenty-first century the
world experienced major global crises, namely the 2008
global financial crisis (GFC), the Covid-19 pandemic,
and, latterly, the war in Ukraine. These have had consequences worldwide revealing the unprecedented scale
and depth of global integration since the end of the cold
war. Indeed, globalization is integral to the functioning
of modern economies, societies, and their institutions.
Universities, for instance, are literally global institutions, from the recruitment of students to the dissemination of academic research.
2.2.1 Mapping globalization
In today’s global economy, the fate and fortunes of
entire nations, communities, and households across
the world are bound together through complex webs of
global trade, finance, digital, and production networks.
Such is the integration of the world economy that no
national economy can insulate itself from the workings of global markets, as the GFC demonstrated to
such disastrous effect (see Ch. 16). A global crash was
only averted through coordinated action by the world’s
major economies at the 2009 G20 summit prompting
(at the time) the ironic headline: ‘(Communist) China
comes to the “rescue of global capitalism”’.
Before the eruption of the GFC, economic globalization (measured by global flows of capital, trade,
and production) reached historic levels. At its peak
in 2007, global flows of capital, goods, and services
were estimated at a staggering 53 per cent of world
economic activity (GDP) (McKinsey Global Institute
2016). Global economic integration had intensified and
expanded to embrace most of the world’s population as
the emerging economies of China, Brazil, India, and
others were incorporated into a 24-hour global capitalist economy. Following the GFC, the pace of economic
globalization slowed dramatically, prompting much
commentary about the end of globalization or ‘ deglobalization’. Although global economic flows partially
recovered, the period since the GFC has been one of
economic ‘slowbalization’: well below peak 2007 levels (as a share of world GDP), though for the most part
at levels similar to or above those at the beginning of
this century (Altman and Bastian 2021; WTO 2021b;
Lund et al. 2019). Subsequently, the Covid-19 pandemic had a hugely disruptive economic impact, with
global trade only beginning from late 2021 to recover
Chapter 2 Globalization and global politics
to pre-Covid-19 levels, while global financial flows
remain subdued (WTO 2021a; UNCTAD 2021c)—a
partial recovery, however, which appeared to lose much
momentum following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
(Ruta 2022).
Every single working day, turnover on the world’s
money markets averages a startling $6.5 trillion,
slightly more than the combined annual (2021) GDP of
the UK and France. Few governments today have the
resources to resist global market speculation against
their national currency without significant domestic economic consequences (see Ch. 28). Moreover,
many transnational corporations have turnovers which
exceed the GDP of many countries. Collectively they
account for over 33 per cent of world output, control
global production networks which account for 30 per
cent of world trade, and are primary sources of international investment in manufacturing and services
(UNCTAD 2018). They have enormous influence over
the location and distribution of productive, economic,
and technological power, not to mention where they
declare their profits and pay their tax. Indeed, they
confound the traditional distinction between the
international and the domestic economy: the German
automotive company BMW is the top exporter of automobiles from the US. BMW’s largest manufacturing
plant is in Spartanburg, South Carolina, and, together
with other German-owned car plants located in the US,
accounts for the majority of American car exports to
China.
Contemporary globalization is intimately associated
with the revolutions in modern transport and communication technologies, from jet transport and containerization to mobile phones and the internet (see Box
2.2). Digitalization is revolutionizing worldwide communications through relatively cheap, instantaneous,
round-the-clock global communication and information flows. Moreover, it is transforming all aspects of
globalization and has accelerated because of the Covid19 pandemic (see Box 2.3) (UNCTAD 2021a). Global
data flows are increasing exponentially, while the digital population has expanded from over 1 billion users
to 4.66 billion (59.5 per cent of the world’s population),
with the majority in Asia (Statista 2021a).
Although simultaneously widening the global
digital divide (UNCTAD 2021a), global communication infrastructures have made it possible to manage not only just-in-time production networks across
continents, but also to organize and mobilize likeminded people across the globe in virtual real time
Box 2.2 The engines of globalization
Explanations of globalization tend to focus on three interrelated factors: technics (technological change and social organization); economics (markets and capitalism); and politics
(power, interests, and institutions).
to any account of globalization, since an
• Technics—central
integrated global system depends upon an advanced
communications and transport infrastructure.
as technology is, so too is
• Economics—crucial
globalization’s specifically economic logic. Capitalism’s
insatiable demand for new markets and profits leads
inevitably to the globalization of economic activity.
for ideologies, interests, and power,
• Politics—shorthand
politics constitutes the third logic of globalization. If
technology provides the physical infrastructure of
globalization, politics provides its normative and
regulatory infrastructure.
Box 2.3 Digital globalization
Digital technologies are transforming globalization, with
profound consequences in all domains from the cultural to
the military. But it is in the economy that its impact is so
visible. The fusing of robotics, artificial intelligence, supercomputing, and advanced communications technologies
(the fourth Industrial Revolution) is disrupting the services
sector which is now the dominant sector in many economies. Work, rather than production, is being globalized. Just
as in the 1990s, when production was outsourced across
the globe, in the 2020s, services work, from marketing to
engineering design to telemedicine and accountancy, can
be globalized as it can be done from anywhere by workers
with the relevant skills. This teleworking or ‘virtual offshoring’ is now big business and growing rapidly with major
implications for employment. This ‘globotics upheaval’, as
Richard Baldwin labels it, is driving a new phase of economic globalization with major implications for developing
economies.
Digital technologies are also transforming global trade.
Consider the case of SpeedOutfitters in Elkhart, Indiana.
Run by motorcycle enthusiast Travis Baird, it started as a
traditional retail store named Baird Motorcycles, before
expanding to include online sales. Some 41 per cent of
SpeedOutfitters’ total sales are now outside the United
States in 131 different countries. This business is not unique;
97 per cent of eBay sellers export. Global e-commerce is
growing rapidly and is worth well over $1 trillion. This is
more decentred—more the preserve of small companies,
rather than huge corporations. In 2020, partly because of
the Covid-19 pandemic, small UK companies on Amazon
Marketplace exported a record £3.5 billion of merchandise,
a 20 per cent increase compared to 2019.
Sources: Baldwin 2019; McKinsey Global Institute 2019;
UNCTAD 2021a; van der Marel 2021
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anthony mcgrew
(see Case Study 2.1). The Black Lives Matter movement became a spontaneous global phenomenon
in 2020, mobilizing people across borders to advocate for racial justice. Paradoxically, even the current wave of nationalist populism has acquired
a global reach through transnational networking
across Europe, the US, and Latin America between
like-minded political parties and ideological factions (Wajner 2022; Moffitt 2017). People organize
across borders—both virtually and physically—on a
remarkable scale, such that in 2019, 38,000 international non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
Case Study 2.1 Global food security: ceding sovereignty
UN Food Systems Summit September 2021 NYC
© Luiz Rampelotto/EuropaNewswire / Shutterstock
On 23 September 2021, the UN convened the world’s first global
Food Systems Summit (FSS) to ‘awaken the world to the fact that
we all must work together to transform the way the world produces, consumes and thinks about food’ (UN Secretary-General
2021). The current system routinely fails to deliver effective
food security—access to essential food to meet people’s dietary
requirements—for a staggering 2.37 billion people (see Ch. 27).
The FSS took place in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic
which resulted in a ‘hunger pandemic’ with 270 million people
thrust into starvation. The purpose of the FSS was to agree on
reforms to this ‘broken global food system’ to deliver on UN
Sustainable Development Goal 2: abolishing hunger by 2030.
Among the most critical issues at the FSS was the most
essential element of food production: the ‘humble seed’. For,
whoever controls seed production effectively has significant control over the entire global food production system
(Kloppenburg 2010). Over recent decades, seed ownership
and new seed technologies have increasingly become a battleground in the global politics of food security. At issue is
the emergence of a ‘new global seed order’ which promotes
the liberalization and global harmonization of seed laws that
commodify and commercialize seeds to expand globally the
industrial model of agricultural production as a solution to
global food insecurity. This is generally supported by global
agribusiness, such as Bayer-Monsanto and Corteva; multilateral agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank; as well as global philanthropic agencies which advocate agricultural modernization, such as the
Gates Foundation. Contesting what they conceive as a ‘corporate takeover’ are fluid global coalitions of governments
from the Global South, indigenous peoples, and small farmers
organizations from every continent, such as Via Campesina
and Farm Workers of Florida; hundreds of local and international civil society organizations, from the International Indian
Treaty Council to the African Alliance for Food Sovereignty;
alongside many global justice, expert, and environmental
organizations. What unites them is a desire to protect and
promote local ‘seed sovereignty ’ and thus control over local
food production, which they argue is both more environmentally sustainable and the sole livelihood for rural communities
across the globe. In short, they seek to resist and reform this
‘new global seed order’ which is perceived as eroding ‘seed
sovereignty ’. Indeed, an alternative virtual Global People’s
Summit on Food Systems was organized in parallel with the
official FSS following a boycott by key civil society groups such
as La Via Campesina.
The global politics of seeds is indicative of how globalization
both creates winners and losers and reflects stark inequalities of
power. Global agribusiness has enormous structural power since
four major transnational corporations control almost 67 per cent
of the global seed market. Moreover, the multilateral development agencies and global philanthropic organizations (such as the
Rockefeller Foundation and Gates Foundation) have significant
institutional power to influence government policy in ways which
align with their priorities. Governments are also constrained by
global intellectual property rights law, which includes seed patents, ownership, and usage, alongside their commitments (under
the World Trade Organization Agreement on Agriculture) to liberalize agricultural trade. Not surprisingly, many governments in the
Global South have harmonized their national seed laws with this
‘new global seed regime’ or, as critics perceive it, by ceding their
sovereignty to it. However, since the FSS failed to resolve the seed
sovereignty question, for the foreseeable future seeds will remain
a controversial issue in the global politics of food security. Thus,
quite literally the food on our plates is a manifestation of globalization and highly contentious global food politics.
Sources: Clapp 2022; Kloppenburg 2010; O’Grady-Walshe 2019;
UN Secretary-General 2021.
Question 1: What does this case illustrate about globalization and
global politics?
Question 2: What are the ethical and normative issues raised by
this case?
Chapter 2 Globalization and global politics
from Amnesty International to Women Working
Worldwide, operated across 167 countries (see
Ch. 22). Alongside these global civil society NGOs,
digital and mobility infrastructures facilitate the
illicit activities of transnational organized criminal and terrorist networks, from the Yakuza to Al
Shabab, human trafficking to money laundering.
This illicit globalization has expanded considerably
over the last two decades, contributing to a more disorderly, violent, and insecure world. Globalization is
therefore a source of unprecedented risks, societal
vulnerabilities, and conflict.
As Goldin and Mariathasan (2014) observe, the scale
and intensity of global connectivity today has created a
complex world of systemic interdependencies not just
between countries, but also between global systems,
from finance to the environment (see Chs 15, 24, 25,
28, 29 and 30). This complexity generates potentially
catastrophic global systemic risks such that a highly
infectious pathogen first detected in Wuhan, China
was a source of the Covid-19 pandemic which led to the
shutdown of the global economy and millions of fatalities (Tooze 2021). From pandemics to the proliferation
of technologies of mass destruction, cyberattacks on
critical societal infrastructures to the climate emergency, globalization is associated with a world risk society in which national borders provide little protection
from distant dangers or the consequences of systemic
failures—e.g. war in Ukraine precipitated food shortages
from Africa to Asia. Preventing and managing these systemic risks has contributed to the expanding jurisdiction of global and regional institutions (see Chs 19, 20,
21, and 23).
Over the last four decades, there has been a dramatic
growth in transnational and global forms of governance,
rule-making, and regulation, from formal G20 summits
to the 2021 Glasgow Conference of the Parties to the
Climate Change Treaty, alongside many private global
regulatory bodies (such as the International Accounting
Standards Board). Today there are over 292 permanent
intergovernmental organizations constituting a system of global governance, with the United Nations
at its institutional core (see Chs 20 and 21). While in
no sense a world government, this system of multilateral governance has been critical to both the promotion
and regulation of globalization, from the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO) policies to liberalize world trade
to the International Labour Organization’s role in promoting workers’ rights. For much of the world’s population, more significant are the humanitarian functions of
this system, which are vital to the human security of the
most vulnerable, such as the World Health Organization
(WHO) COVAX programme to expand access to Covid19 vaccines in the Global South.
With the expanding jurisdiction of global governance has come its deepening reach into the domestic affairs of states, as global standards, norms, and
legal rules are incorporated into domestic law or public policy and political discourse. National and local
government bureaucracies are increasingly regionally
and globally networked as are the world’s major cities. These transgovernmental networks enable government officials to share information and collaborate
with colleagues abroad on matters from agricultural
policy to human trafficking, from the Financial Action
Task Force (which brings together government experts
on money laundering from major OECD countries) to
the BRICS National Security Advisors network (which
connects senior national security officials from the
BRICS governments). Just as national economies have
been globalized, so, to varying degrees, have politics
and governance.
While capital freely circulates the globe, the same is
not the case for people: borders and national controls
continue to matter as in the almost complete shutdown
of global travel during much of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Nevertheless, people—along with their cultures—have
been on the move for centuries. Though most migration is still within countries, patterns of global migration
have significantly altered in recent years: from the world’s
South to North and from East to West (IOM 2021). The
scale of migration is contributing to public perceptions,
especially in the West, of a migrant crisis, despite evidence
to the contrary (see Chs 14 and 26). During the Covid-19
pandemic, the global migrant population (those resident
outside the country of their birth) increased to 280 million (3.6 per cent of the world population), but border
closures significantly disrupted migration flows (which
are unlikely to return to pre-2019 levels), although war in
the Ukraine precipitated a humanitarian crisis as 6.3 million people fled the conflict seeking refuge across Europe
(IOM 2021; UNCHR 2022). In contrast, before the pandemic the world’s expanding middle classes toured the
globe with a record 1.5 billion tourist visits (2019), spending some $1.47 trillion in an industry employing 10.6 per
cent of the global workforce (Statista 2021b; WTTC 2021).
Tourism temporarily collapsed during the pandemic, but
has rebounded. Significantly, the trajectories of migration and tourism illustrate how globalization reproduces
existing global inequalities.
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anthony mcgrew
Migration has become a contentious global issue
since it highlights cultural difference, which for some
may be perceived as a threat to traditional ethnic and
national ­
identities—what Kwame Anthony Appiah
(2018) refers to as the ‘lies that bind’. It is an especially
conspicuous illustration of how globalization both
unites and divides neighbourhoods, communities,
nations, and the world. Indeed, in this digitally hyperconnected world there is little evidence of significant cultural convergence, irrespective, for instance, of Netflix’s
137 million subscribers across 190 countries streaming
the same programmes, or the 4.3 billion global viewings
of K-pop video ‘Gangnam Style’. Rather than bridging
cultural divisions, some argue the world wide web reinforces heightened awareness of irreconcilable cultural or
religious differences (see Chs 17, 18, and 31). However,
this overlooks the growing significance of the mixing or
hybridization of cultures expressed in everything from
cuisine to hyphenated identities (Japanese-Brazilian,
Greek-Australian). If anything, cultural globalization is
associated with a world of increasing cultural complexity in which, for instance, the youth of northeast India
revere ‘Hallyu’ (a global wave of Korean popular culture)
while Ibeyi (a French-Cuban twins’ musical duo) performs in Yoruba, English, French, and Spanish.
2.2.2 Analysing globalization
Globalization is a process characterized by:
• the stretching of social, political, cultural, and eco-
nomic activities across national frontiers such that
events, decisions, and actions in one part of the world
have the potential to impact directly and indirectly
on individuals, communities, and countries in distant
regions of the globe, e.g. climate change;
• the intensification, or the growing magnitude, of
interconnectedness in almost every sphere of modern life, from the economic to the ecological;
• the accelerating pace of global flows and processes
as the velocity with which ideas, news, goods, information, capital, and technology circulate the world
increases, e.g. the pandemic-induced global stock
market crash of 20 February 2020;
• the deepening enmeshment of the local and global, e.g.
war in the Ukraine produces grain shortages which
contribute to famine in villages across Southern Sudan;
• a developing (subjective) awareness among people and
organizations of being embedded in a global system or
community (i.e., global imaginaries (Steger 2008)), e.g.
global climate justice or world religions (see Box 2.4).
Box 2.4 Approaches to conceptualizing
globalization as a:
The most common approach conceives of
• Process:
globalization as a material and virtual process of increasing
worldwide connectivity which is open to empirical and
historical methods of enquiry.
Globalization is conceived in ideational or
• Narrative:
subjective terms. The ‘reality’ of globalization is subject to
interpretation (i.e., socially constructed) such that there are
many competing narratives or discourses of globalization
which influence both how people and organizations
comprehend it and their responses to it, e.g., globalization
as Westernization (Roberts and Lamp 2021) (see Chs 11,
12, and 13).
Globalization is conceived as a political,
• Project:
economic, and ideological project advanced by the most
powerful (states and elites) to fashion a world order
according to their interests, e.g., the neoliberal
globalization of the Washington Consensus (see Ch. 16).
This chapter draws on all these approaches.
Globalization is indicative of an unfolding structural change in the scale of human social and economic
organization. Human affairs are no longer organized
solely on a local or national territorial scale, but increasingly organized on transnational, regional, and global
scales. Examples include Samsung’s global production
networks and the year-long (2011–12) worldwide protests of the Occupy movement in 951 cities across 82
countries in the wake of the GFC. This significant shift
is manifest in every sphere from the economy to security, connecting and transcending all continents—what
Jan Aart Scholte (2005: ch. 2) refers to as ‘transworld’
or ‘supraterritorial’ (as opposed to international) relations. In this respect, globalization is associated with a
process of relative deterritorialization: as social, political, or economic activities are organized at the global or
transnational levels, they are effectively detached from
their place or locale. For instance, the very notion of a
national economy as coterminous with national territory is a simplification since corporate ownership and
production transcends borders. Many of the UK’s largest
companies have their headquarters in India, Japan, and
Germany, while many small enterprises outsource their
production to East Asian countries.
However, this structural shift is not experienced
uniformly across the world for globalization is marked
by highly differential patterns of inclusion, giving it
what Manuel Castells (2000) calls a ‘variable geometry’.
Western countries are much more comprehensively globalized than are the poorest sub-Saharan African states
Chapter 2 Globalization and global politics
(see Chs 16 and 27). Even within countries, globalization is differentially experienced, varying significantly
between cities and rural areas, sectors of the economy,
and even between households in the same neighbourhood. Thus, in both Western and sub-Saharan African
states, elites are enmeshed in global networks, while the
poorest find themselves largely excluded. Globalization
has significant distributional consequences, creating
winners and losers not just among countries but also
within them. Indeed, it is associated with a growing
global polarization of wealth, income, and life chances
(Milanovic 2018; World Inequality Lab 2021). For the
most affluent, it may very well translate into ‘one world’,
but for much of humanity it is associated with a world
marked by inequality and exclusion.
How globalization is experienced also gives rise
to very different interpretations or narratives of what
it means and how to respond to it. In the Global
South, globalization is frequently understood as
Westernization or Americanization, or a new form of
imperialism, provoking resistance and contestation.
Thus, globalization, contrary to the liberal narrative (see Ch. 7), does not produce a more harmonious world society but rather is a significant source of
conflict.
Although geography and distance very much do still
matter, the concept of globalization is associated with
a process of time–space compression. New technologies of mobility and communication effectively ‘shrink’
geographical space and time. From live global coverage of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics to the global
supply chains which daily put fresh fruit harvested
thousands of miles away on supermarket shelves, the
world appears to be literally shrinking, at least for some
but not all. In this ‘shrinking world’, sites of power
and the subjects of power quite literally are often continents apart. During the GFC, the principal decisionmakers, whether in Washington, Beijing, New York,
or London, were oceans apart from local communities
directly impacted by their decisions. In this respect, the
concept of globalization highlights the ways in which
power is organized and exercised (or increasingly has
the potential to be) at a distance. This, combined with
the complexity of a networked world, makes the exercise of power enormously opaque, such that identifying
responsible and accountable agencies may be almost
impossible, a situation dramatically illustrated by the
GFC (Tooze 2018). Such complexity and opacity have
very significant implications for all states since it creates a public perception that they are subject to external forces over which they can exert little control: a
significant factor in the widespread appeal of narratives of anti-globalism in the wake of the GFC (Moffitt
2017).
To summarize: the concept of globalization can be
differentiated from that of internationalization or
international interdependence. Internationalization
refers to growing connections between sovereign independent nation-states; international interdependence
refers to mutual dependence between sovereign states
such that each is sensitive or vulnerable to the actions
of the other. By contrast, the concept of globalization
refers to an uneven process of the widening, deepening,
intensification and acceleration of trans-world connectivity which transcends states and societies. It dissolves
the distinction between domestic and international
affairs and is differentially experienced, giving rise to
competing globalization narratives or global imaginaries. Globalization can be defined as:
a historical process involving a fundamental shift or
transformation in the spatial scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the
reach of power relations across regions and continents.
2.2.3 Debating globalization
Globalization is a contentious issue in the study of world
politics. Disagreement concerns its descriptive and
explanatory value: whether it is a ‘conceptual folly’ or
alternatively a new paradigm for understanding world
politics. Although the controversy is far more nuanced,
two broad clusters of arguments can be identified in this
great globalization debate: the sceptical and the globalist.
The sceptical argument contends that globalization
is highly exaggerated and a superficial phenomenon—
a myth or ‘conceptual folly’ that distracts attention from
the ‘real’ forces which determine world politics: state
power, geopolitics, nationalism, capitalism, and imperialism (Hirst and Thompson 1999; Rosenberg 2000; Gilpin
2002). Those of a realist persuasion argue that geopolitics and the anarchical structure of the state system are
the principal determinants of world politics (Gilpin 2001;
Mearsheimer 2018) (see Ch. 9). Globalization, or more
accurately internationalization, is a product of hegemonic power. It is dependent entirely on the most powerful state(s) creating and policing a world order (the Pax
Americana of the post-war era) aligned with their core
interests. Globalization is therefore contingent, its fortunes entirely tied to those of its hegemonic sponsor(s).
As such, globalization, or rather internationalization, is
both a product and instrument of hegemonic power(s)
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anthony mcgrew
graphically illustrated by the US imposition of comprehensive economic and financial sanctions on Russia
following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While realist
sceptics acknowledge growing international connectivity,
they argue it is neither historically novel nor altering the
centrality of states and state power in world politics.
Marxist sceptics are equally unconvinced by the
idea of globalization, though on substantively different (historical materialist) grounds than realists (see
Ch. 8). They argue that globalization has its origins in
the inevitable expansionary logic of capitalism, sharing
much in common with the imperialisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Harvey 2003, 2010).
Globalization is nothing more than a new label for an
old phenomenon so has little explanatory value. It is a
myth or ‘conceptual folly’ which conceals the principal forces shaping world politics, namely imperialism
or uneven capitalist development (Rosenberg 2000;
Rosenberg 2021). Sceptics therefore conclude that globalization is epiphenomenal: a derivative of more primary forces, either geopolitics or capitalism, or both.
In contrast, globalists reject these arguments affirming
both the actuality of globalization and its significance as
a fundamental source of disruptive change in world politics. Castells (2009), for instance, links globalization to a
transformation in the form of modern capitalism, which
he argues is best conceived as a new epoch of ‘global informational capitalism’. Other neo-Marxist accounts explore
how this new epoch of global capitalism is reshaping world
politics, despite the GFC and the Covid-19 pandemic
(W. Robinson 2014, 2020a). Liberal accounts, by comparison, emphasize how globalization is creating a ‘flat
world’ or an ‘emerging global network civilization’ overlaying the inter-state system (T. Friedman 2011; Khanna
2017: xvii). Finally, critical globalization scholarship
explores how globalization from below is associated with
new forms of transnational politics: expressions of alterglobalizations advocating for global justice (see Chs 10,
11, 12, and 22).
For some globalists—referred to in the literature
as transformationalists—this disruptive change is
associated with significant transformations in world
politics, creating a profoundly more complex and
unpredictable world. This is evident not just in historic power shifts—from West to East and from state
to non-state actors—but also in the reconfiguration
of sovereign statehood, capitalism, societies, identities, and even warfare (Arquilla 2021; McNamara and
Newman 2020; Steger and James 2020). They therefore
conclude that globalization requires a corresponding
radical conceptual shift in the study of international
relations. Although transformationalists emphasize
that globalization is neither inevitable nor irreversible, they argue it is deeply embedded in the everyday
functioning of societies. For transformationalists, the
epoch of contemporary globalization is not only historically distinct but is also associated with a fundamental reconfiguration of how power is organized,
distributed, exercised, and reproduced (Held et al.
1999; Keohane and Nye 2003; Castells 2009; Khanna
2017). But they also recognize that it has taken quite
different historical forms from empire to post-cold war
neoliberal globalization.
However, deepening geopolitical rivalry, rising nationalism, the disruptive consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, and Russia’s war on Ukraine have coalesced into
a ‘perfect storm’ which threatens to reverse globalization.
This ‘crisis of globalization’ is the focus of Section 2.3.
Key Points
refers to the widening, deepening,
• Globalization
intensification, and acceleration of worldwide
interconnectedness.
•
is associated with a dramatic growth in
• Globalization
transnational and global forms of governance, rule-making,
is associated with a process of time–space
• Globalization
compression and linked to the relative deterritorialization of
power.
Globalization is experienced and interpreted in radically different
ways through competing narratives or global imaginaries.
accounts consider globalization to be a conceptual
• Sceptical
folly and argue that hegemony or imperialism remain
and policy coordination through which it is simultaneously
promoted and regulated.
essential to explaining world politics. By contrast, globalist
accounts conceive of globalization as a process associated
with significant disruptive change in world politics. Some
globalists—the transformationalists—argue that globalization
is transforming world politics and requires a corresponding
conceptual shift.
globalization is a highly uneven process
• Contemporary
unifying and dividing communities with major distributional
consequences in terms of winners and losers.
Chapter 2 Globalization and global politics
2.3 The crisis of globalization and the liberal world order
If the GFC was ‘the first crisis of globalization’, the
second undoubtedly is the Covid-19 pandemic (G.
Brown 2011). Both have had catastrophic consequences
for communities and societies across the globe and,
in both cases, globalization reversed with alarming speed and ferocity. Moreover, if the GFC and the
great recession which followed it gave momentum
to an already resurgent ‘globalization backlash’, the
Covid-19 pandemic reinforced it (Mansfield, Milner,
and Rudra 2021; Tooze 2018, 2021). This backlash
took many forms, but nationalist populism, buoyed
on initially by Brexit and Trump’s successful ‘Make
America Great Again’ (MAGA) presidential campaign,
has become its dominant expression. This powerful
backlash not only contests globalization but also the
liberal world order—‘globalism’—which nurtures and
sustains it. Compounded by Russia’s war on Ukraine
many consider today’s ‘grave new world’ heralds, if not
deglobalization, certainly an unprecedented ‘crisis of
globalization’ (King 2017).
This crisis of globalization arguably reflects an
unravelling of the tacit international consensus which
promoted and sustained globalization, or more accurately the neoliberal model of globalization, since
the end of the cold war. Three developments have
coalesced which many argue are disrupting not only
globalization but also the post-war Western liberal
world order itself (Acharya 2014a; Kagan 2017; Haass
2018; Layne 2018). These three interlocking developments comprise: the global populist revolt; the return
of great power rivalry; and the growing securitization
of global connectivity.
The dominant form of populism today is that
of nationalist populism or radical right populism
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017; Eatwell and Goodwin
2018). It has assimilated into mainstream politics
across Europe, the Americas, and beyond: from
Hungary and the Philippines to Brazil and Australia.
Although the GFC accelerated its rise in the West, it
is by no means simply a movement of the ‘left behind’
or ‘the forgotten people’ (Mansfield, Milner, and
Rudra 2021). It has built on festering public distrust
with mainstream politics that predates the GFC,
reinforced by growing public aversion to multiculturalism, the social impact of widening inequality, and
divisive national culture wars (Eatwell and Goodwin
2018). Nationalist populism contributes not only to
the erosion of the Western international political
consensus which sustains globalization, but also
to declining domestic support for the liberal world
order (Stokes 2018; Paul 2021). This was expressed
in dramatic shifts in US policy under the Trump
administration’s ‘America First’ agenda, captured in
the aphorism, ‘Americanism not globalism will be
our credo’. Despite the Biden administration’s liberal rhetoric, the US has not completely abandoned
unilateralism (evident from its unilateral withdrawal
from Afghanistan in 2021), while it rejects the neoliberal globalization project of the ‘Washington
Consensus’ era. In these respects, the most significant
threats to globalization and the liberal world order
now emanate from within the West, as Brexit illustrates (Kagan 2018).
The resurgence of great power rivalry is the second significant factor (see Ch. 5). Since the turn of
the twenty-first century the world has experienced a
historic redistribution of power with the rise of new
powers, such as China, Brazil, and India. This power
transition represents a profound shift from a unipolar
world (the US as sole superpower) to a system of many
great powers—a multipolar world (see Ch. 6). Already
by 2010, China had become the second largest economy
in the world, displacing Japan, and on some measures
has become the world’s largest economy, with India the
third largest, after the US (IMF 2017; 2021). This power
shift has resulted in intensifying strategic competition
between the US, China, India, and Russia threatening
to undermine global stability, and with it the tacit consensus which, for many decades, sustained the liberal
world order and thus globalization (Ikenberry 2018a).
Russia’s war in Ukraine represents a dramatic escalation of this rivalry, with potentially profound consequences for globalization and the liberal world order,
e.g. the Russia–China ‘strategic partnership’. Moreover,
it has compounded deepening Sino–US rivalry, reinforcing a tendency towards a bipolar world of parallel
(although overlapping) systems of globalization and
world order (Owen 2021) (see Case Study 2.2): what
Yan Xuetong refers to as a system of ‘uneasy peace’
(Yan 2020a).
Finally, global connectivity is becoming increasingly securitized. Three factors in particular have
contributed to this: geo-economic competition, the
Covid-19 pandemic, and the fallout from unprecedented Western economic sanctions imposed on Russia
following its invasion of Ukraine. As geo-­economic
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anthony mcgrew
Case Study 2.2 Multicentric globalization
The signing of the memorandum of understanding on
China’s Belt and Road Initiative
© Bloomberg / Getty Images
On 1 January 2018, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn
officially declared open the Addis Abba to Djibouti railway.
Following years of construction, the successful completion of the
720 km project marked a significant milestone for China’s Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) in Africa. Initiated in 2013 by President
Xi Jinping, BRI is an ambitious global infrastructure investment
programme covering 144 countries on all continents, 32 international organizations, 206 international cooperation agreements,
1,590 projects, and a $1 trillion budget. BRI ‘aims to promote the
connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their
adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the
countries along the Belt and Road . . . and realize diversified,
independent, balanced and sustainable development in these
countries’ (PRC State Council 2015).
In effect, BRI is a global version of the ancient Silk Road, on
land, across oceans, and, increasingly, in cyberspace: a form of
infrastructural globalization on a historic scale in every sector
from transport to health. It involves the financing and construction of projects in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Central Asia,
from hospitals in Iran to the Pan-Asia railway to digital connectivity projects in Laos and Central Asia. In Pakistan alone, there
are infrastructure projects to the value of $60 billion. Supporting
BRI are China-initiated international development institutions,
competition has intensified, the world’s major economic powers, including the EU, have sought to protect their industrial and technological bases both by
strategic decoupling from global networks and by
restricting foreign ownership and investment in strategic sectors, particularly that from China. The classic
case of this is the US campaign to persuade its allies
and many other governments to block Huawei, the
Chinese telecommunications giant, from participation
in the rollout of their 5G mobile networks on security
grounds. Underlying this case is a major policy shift
in treating globalization increasingly as a national
such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS
Development Bank, which provide project finance. Oliver
Stuenkel (2016) conceives of these institutions as a manifestation
of an emerging parallel system of global governance. Not surprisingly, BRI has attracted considerable global interest but also
much criticism as a ‘high speed empire’. BRI is frequently referred
to as ‘globalization with Chinese characteristics’, with historical
parallels with an earlier epoch of ‘oriental globalization’.
BRI is central to China’s strategy of ‘inclusive globalization’ or
‘growbalization’, which emphasizes development through deepening connectivity across the Global South. Moreover, despite
the Covid-19 pandemic, China’s advocacy of globalization has
strengthened: as President Xi Jinping remarked at the 2022 World
Economic Forum, ‘economic globalization has never and will
never veer off course’ (World Economic Forum 2022). BRI exemplifies an emergent multicentric globalization.
However, multicentric globalization also raises some fundamental questions. While it may be more inclusive, it may simultaneously be a source of greater global friction and competition.
Indeed, in the context of intensifying strategic rivalry between
China and the US it harbours the potential for a ‘clash of globalizations’ (see Ch. 18) and a more bipolar world. Evidence for
this exists already: US and EU projects to ‘build back better’ after
the pandemic are in direct competition with BRI, while the world
wide web is arguably becoming increasingly fragmented, creating a ‘splinternet’ (e.g., China’s Great Firewall and the US Clean
Network global initiative). Furthermore, a deepening ‘strategic
partnership’ between Russia and China (formalized at a bilateral summit during the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games)—­
especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—have arguably
reinforced tendencies towards a more bipolar world and a ‘clash
of globalizations’.
Sources: Arase 2020; PRC State Council 2015; Owen 2021; Pieterse
2017; World Economic Forum 2022; Yan 2020a; Zhang, Alon, and
Lattemann 2018.
Question 1: How is BRI evidence of multicentric globalization?
Question 2: What do you understand by the ‘clash of
globalizations’?
security issue. The Covid-19 pandemic reinforced this
securitization logic by dramatically exposing the vulnerabilities of economies to global supply chain disruption. Moreover, unprecedented Western financial
and economic sanctions on Russia (following its invasion of Ukraine) and European dependence on Russian
energy supplies have highlighted how global connectivity can also be weaponized by states. Increasingly
authorities, from the EU to India, Germany to China,
are implementing strategies of ‘strategic autonomy’ or
‘atmanirbhar bharat’, ‘strategische autonomie’, or ‘zili
gengsheng’, to reduce their potential vulnerabilities.
Chapter 2 Globalization and global politics
This securitization of globalization is arguably creating
the conditions for a ‘new age of autarky’ or deglobalization (Malcomson 2021).
Combined, these three developments constitute
a significant ‘conjuncture’ or turning point in world
politics. Whether it necessarily portends deglobalization and the demise of the liberal world order, as
some conclude, is a matter of substantial disagreement
(Abdal and Ferreira 2021; Cha 2020).
Sceptical interpretations emphasize that this conjuncture is symptomatic of the underlying (relative)
decline of US power. As US hegemony is eroded, so
too are the foundations of the post-war liberal order
and the neoliberal globalization it fostered (see Ch.
16). Such crises are inevitable since they reflect the
historical cycle of the rise and decline of great powers and the differential (uneven) economic development between countries associated with capitalism.
However, although some realists fear the consequences of the demise of the liberal world order,
for others it will not be mourned (Kagan 2018;
Mearsheimer 2018). Marxist sceptics consider that
the liberal world order and neoliberal globalization
simply conceal the harsh reality of US hegemony and
imperialism. Accordingly, among sceptics, the crises
of the liberal world order and of globalization are
principally associated with the decline of Western
liberal hegemony and the implosion of the neoliberal
globalization project in the aftermath of the GFC.
Historically significant as this dangerous conjuncture
is, it does not automatically threaten a new world disorder, nor a grave new world, but rather exemplifies
the competition for power and wealth which defines
world politics (Mearsheimer 2018).
Globalist interpretations of this conjuncture divide
into two broad kinds: liberal accounts and transformationalist accounts. Liberal accounts emphasize that
it prefigures a return to a dystopian world absent a
rules-based order, in which might is right. Advocates
of the liberal world order and globalization therefore
argue that the only effective response is to strengthen
and defend the existing order through more assertive
US and Western leadership: a coalition of democracies
(World Economic Forum 2016; Paul 2021).
By contrast, transformationalist accounts are not
persuaded by either such nostalgic prescriptions, nor
the deep pessimism concerning the liberal world order
and future of globalization. They argue that the crisis
of globalization and the liberal world order have been
exaggerated (Ikenberry 2018b; Deudney and Ikenberry
2018) in two senses: first, the liberal world order has
never been entirely liberal, nor universal, nor orderly,
and has always been contested; and second, global
trends are more indicative of reglobalization than
deglobalization (Bishop and Payne 2021; James 2021;
Bordo 2017; Lund et al. 2019).
Transformationalist accounts assert the current
conjuncture discloses a historic transition involving
not only a global power shift, but also the emergence
of a post-Western global order associated with a more
multicentric form of globalization (Acharya 2018a,
2018b, 2021; Pieterse 2017). Amitav Acharya argues
that this emerging post-Western global order is not
simply a more inclusive liberal order (see Box 2.5).
Rather, it is a far more diverse and pluralistic order
defined by the coexistence and overlap between elements of the old liberal order alongside the parallel
orders of emerging powers. It is therefore a posthegemonic order confirming, as Robert Keohane
concluded in his classic study of the liberal world
order, that hegemony is not a necessary condition for
international orders to function effectively (Keohane
1984). Contrary to those who fear the passing of the
liberal world order, this post-Western global order is
Box 2.5 The multiplex order
Amitav Acharya describes the emerging global order as a
‘­multiplex order’. This is a global order which is:
1. decentred: there is no global hegemon or Western
hegemony, but instead multiple powers (i.e. a multipolar
order);
2. diverse: it is more global in scope and inclusive than the
liberal world order, thus less US- and Western-centric;
3. complex: there are multiple and overlapping levels of
governance, from local to global, while the world is highly
interconnected and interdependent;
4. pluralistic: there are many actors or agents, not just states,
while power, ideas, and influence are widely diffused.
Acharya’s metaphor for this order is the multiplex cinema: multiple theatres with different films all showing simultaneously
but all ‘under one complex . . . sharing a common architecture’. It is an order ‘in which actors, state and non-state, established and new powers from the North and the South, interact
in an interdependent manner to produce an order based on a
plurality of ideas and approaches’ (Acharya 2018a: 10–11). This
form of order historically has many parallels with the international order of medieval Europe or the Indian Ocean from the
sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries (Bull 1977; Phillips and
Sharman 2015; Acharya 2018a, 2018b).
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anthony mcgrew
not an anti-Western order, but rather a non-Western
order: an inclusive order of neither confrontation nor
chaos (Stuenkel 2016).
Globalization too has proved much more resilient than its critics have assumed. Despite the global
shutdown during the Covid-19 pandemic and the
Russia-Ukraine war, globalization is experiencing a
reset or reboot. A new form of globalization is emerging (Steger and James 2020). This reglobalization is
being shaped by three developments. First, digital
technologies and digital capitalism are powering this
new phase of globalization across every sector from
the economic, cultural, defence, and political to the
environmental (Altman and Bastian 2021; Robinson
2020b; Steger and James 2020; Lund and Tyson 2018).
Second, since the GFC, China increasingly has become
a principal force for globalization, as the world’s largest exporter, the dominant source of global economic
growth, a major financial power, the largest provider
of bilateral development assistance in the Global
South, and, by 2025, home to 230 of the world’s 500
largest multinational corporations (McKinsey Global
Institute 2017). Moreover, as neoliberal globalization has faltered, China has continued to expand
and intensify its Belt and Road Initiative as a parallel model of ‘inclusive globalization’ (Zhang, Alon,
and Lattemann 2018) (see Case Study 2.2). Third, as
Acharya concludes, the Covid-19 pandemic ‘will not
be the end of globalization’ because the mobilization
of state power to combat it and the political imperatives to repair and rebuild economies and societies
have created the conditions for ‘a new dynamic of
globalization’ (Acharya 2021)—a new dynamic which
historically has generally followed from previous episodes of ‘slowbalization’, and one which has acquired
a greater imperative in the wake of the war in Ukraine
and intensifying geo-­economic rivalry (James 2021,
2022). This reglobalization reflects a significant ‘move
away from the simple market dogmas’ of neoliberal
globalization so discredited by the GFC while also,
as Achayra notes, being far less Western-centric: in
short ‘the end of globalization as we have known it’
(Abdal and Ferreira 2021; Acharya 2021; Rugitsky
2020; UNCTAD 2021b).
In conclusion, both the liberal world order and globalization are adapting to the changing circumstances
of global power and capitalism in the twenty-first century. Globalization therefore continues to matter.
Key Points
prevalent discourse in the West concerns the crisis of
• Aglobalization
and the liberal world order.
developments are central to this discourse: the rise
• Three
of nationalist populism, the revival of great power rivalry,
and the securitization of global connectivity.
accounts consider the crisis to be symptomatic of
• Sceptical
declining Western hegemony and the restructuring of
Western capitalism in the wake of the GFC.
accounts are of two kinds: liberal and
• Globalist
transformationalist.
accounts stress the existential threats to the liberal
• Liberal
world order and globalization, and the profound
consequences for global security and prosperity of their
inevitable breakdown.
accounts contend that the intersecting
• Transformationalist
crises of the liberal world order and globalization are
associated with the emergence of a post-Western global
order alongside a reconfiguration of globalization or
‘reglobalization’.
2.4 Globalization and the transformation of world politics
Globalization matters academically in that it presents
several related challenges to traditional approaches
to the study of world politics. First, in focusing attention on global connectivity it invites a conceptual shift
from a state-centric imaginary to a decidedly geocentric or global imaginary (Steger 2008). This demands
a holistic global systems (economic, political, social)
perspective, rather than one principally focused on the
state system (Albert 2016). Second, the focus on the
global reveals the deeply Western-centric assumptions
of the discipline of International Relations (IR), challenging it to be more reflective and inclusive in respect
of how IR is studied and practiced (Behera 2021;
Mahbubani 2018; Reus-Smit 2021). Third, much globalization scholarship focuses on issues of transformational change in world politics, compared with those
traditional approaches which emphasize its essential continuities. Drawing on this transformationalist scholarship, this final section will discuss briefly
several significant transformations associated with
Chapter 2 Globalization and global politics
globalization which are essential to understanding
contemporary world politics.
2.4.1 From international politics
to planetary politics
Just as nineteenth-century Europe witnessed the
nationalization of politics, a noticeable trend has been
towards the globalization of politics. ‘Global politics’
is a term which acknowledges that the scale of political life has been transformed: politics is not confined
within territorial boundaries. Decisions and actions
taken in one locale affect the security and prosperity
of communities in distant parts of the globe, and vice
versa, such that local politics is globalized, and world
politics becomes ‘localized’. The substantive issues of
political life consistently escape the artificial foreign/
domestic divide. Accordingly, the study of global politics involves more than geopolitics or inter-state politics, vital as these remain. Even twenty-first century
geopolitics is being transformed by thickening webs of
global connectivity (Bew 2016; Grevi 2009).
2.4.2 From the liberal world order to a
post-Western global order
Globalization is associated with a historic power shift
in world politics propelling China, India, and Brazil
to the rank of major twenty-first-century powers (see
Chs 5 and 6). This power transition is eroding several
centuries of Western dominance of the global order
and transforming the political and normative foundations of the liberal world order. These new powers,
alongside Russia as an established power, are increasingly assertive about refashioning the rules and institutions of world order to reflect their transformed
status and power (see Ch. 6) (Stuenkel 2016). Whether
this transition towards a post-Western world order
is essentially peaceful or conflictual is among the
most critical questions in contemporary world politics, especially in the context of the return of war in
Europe.
2.4.3 From intergovernmentalism
to global governance
Since the UN’s creation in 1945, a vast nexus of global
and regional institutions has evolved, in tandem with
globalization, into what Michael Zürn (2018) refers to
as a global governance system. Although by no means
historically unique, its scale, jurisdictional scope, and
authority undoubtedly is (Zürn 2018). This transformation from primarily intergovernmentalism—cooperation between sovereign states—to global governance is
associated with globalization.
While world government remains a fanciful idea,
this shift has significant implications for the state (see
Opposing Opinions 2.1). Far from globalization leading
to ‘the end of the state’, it engenders, as during the Covid19 pandemic, a more activist state. In a radically interconnected world, states engage in extensive multilateral
collaboration and cooperation simply to achieve their
domestic objectives. States confront a political dilemma:
in return for more effective domestic policy and delivering on their citizens’ demands, their capacity for selfgovernance—state autonomy—is often compromised.
All governments confront a trade-off between effective
governance and self-governance which has significant
implications for sovereign statehood (see Chs 3 and 19).
The effective sovereign power and authority of states—
the practice of sovereignty—is being reconfigured or
transformed, although sovereignty remains the principal juridical attribute of statehood. This is a condition
best described as ‘organized hypocrisy’ (Krasner 1999).
2.4.4 From national security to a world
risk society
Contemporary world politics is marked by a proliferation of enormously diverse ‘transboundary issues’, from
climate change to pandemics to the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, which are directly or indirectly a product of globalization (see Chs 24, 25, 27, 29,
and 30). Ulrich Beck refers to this as the emergence of a
‘world risk society’ in which the prevention and management of such risks, such as the climate emergency, is a
structural feature of world politics (Beck 2006).
2.4.5 From hegemonic power to diffused
power
Globalization is associated with the reconfiguration
of power in world politics in at least three senses: the
redistribution of power in the state’s system; the diffusion of power; and new forms and instruments of
power (see Ch. 5). Globalization has been a major
contributory factor in the ongoing historic power
shift from West to East. Moreover, power in the global
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anthony mcgrew
Opposing Opinions 2.1 Globalization erodes the power of the state
For
Against
States are impotent in the face of global capitalism. This
is particularly true for financial markets, as illustrated by
Western financial sanctions imposed on Russia at the outset of
the Ukraine war which precipitated the collapse of the rouble.
Moreover, national economic policies are severely constrained
by global market disciplines, as evidenced by the austerity
policies ‘forced on’ many indebted countries in the wake of
the GFC.
State power in general is not being eroded, as the responses
to the Covid-19 pandemic signally demonstrate. Indeed,
many states used extensive powers to combat the pandemic,
including national lockdowns and directing the production of
vaccines. But, as the example of seed sovereignty illustrates (see
Case Study 2.1), weak states experience greater constraints on
their choices than more powerful states.
States are ceding power in many key areas to unelected
global and regional institutions, from the EU to the WTO.
States are bound by global rules, such as cutting CO2 emissions.
This erodes both their sovereignty and their autonomy to manage their own affairs.
States are increasingly vulnerable to external disruption or
events abroad. As both the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in
Ukraine demonstrate, global connectivity potentially brings with
it major societal risks to human and national security.
Democratic states are experiencing an erosion of their
democratic credentials. Growing inequalities resulting from
economic globalization undermine trust in democratic institutions while unelected international bureaucracies determine
the global rules. Both reinforce the belief that global capital and
international institutions trump the democratic will of the people. Such concerns have been crystallized in the recent revival of
nationalist populism.
Border control is central to the practice of sovereign
statehood and domestic security, but globalized systems increasingly evade it. The very same infrastructures
which facilitate globalization enable a global illicit economy,
from people smuggling to money laundering. The expanding
scope and scale of illicit global flows increasingly has major
consequences for the domestic security and social stability
of states.
States are not ceding power or sovereignty to unelected
international bureaucracies. On the contrary, by acting multilaterally they increase their power to act effectively in world
politics. Although global agencies may require states to trade
some of their national autonomy for a greater chance of realizing
their national interests, it does not diminish national sovereignty,
understood as their absolute legal right to rule within their own
territory.
Globalization is part of the solution to states’ growing vulnerabilities. Although states are increasingly vulnerable to
distant threats, multilateral cooperation offers increased global
surveillance capacity and cooperation, as with WHO during the
pandemic, to address national vulnerabilities, so enhancing,
rather than undermining, national security.
Democratic states are indeed experiencing challenges
to democracy; however, these are primarily a result of
domestic factors, not globalization. The tensions or contradiction between capitalism and democracy is not new:
it is structural. Globalization simply makes it more visible.
Moreover, it is a fallacy to argue that globalization prevents
governments from addressing domestic challenges such as
inequality, as evidenced by strong redistributive welfare states,
as in Scandinavia.
State control of borders (or, at the least, the capacity to
control) has never been greater, as the Covid-19 pandemic
shows. Digital surveillance technologies and systems of monitoring and control of (embodied and virtual) cross-border flows
are more extensive and intensive than even a few decades ago.
Moreover, international intelligence and policing cooperation
to stem illicit flows has expanded in scope and scale, as has
states’ capacity to deter and intercept them. Domestic security
may be compromised by illicit flows, but is not fundamentally
undermined.
1. Why do you think the issue of state power and sovereignty is so politically controversial?
2. Are you more persuaded by the ‘for’ or ‘against’ position? If so, why? If neither, what other arguments or evidence might be relevant?
3. What political values and normative beliefs underlie your judgement in respect of this proposition?
Visit the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle these questions.
Chapter 2 Globalization and global politics
political system is no longer the monopoly of states,
but is also diffused, with important consequences for
who gets what, how, when, and where. This is manifest in the growing power of non-state actors from
transnational organized crime to global corporations
and NGOs. Finally, globalization enables state and
non-state actors to leverage new forms and instruments of power: from soft power to the weaponization
of global connectivity, in effect, coercion and ‘warfare’ by new means, e.g. comprehensive Western economic sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion
of Ukraine; cyberattacks and cyberwarfare (Farrell
and Newman 2019). In this respect, globalization is
associated with new instrumentalities of power in the
form of (non-military) ‘weapons of mass disruption’
or coercion blurring the distinctions between peace
and war, diplomacy and coercion, conflict and competition (Leonard 2021) (see Ch. 14).
2.4.6 From liberal peace to structural
conflict
Although liberal theory tends to associate globalization with the conditions for peace and prosperity, it
is also simultaneously a significant source of conflict in world politics since it reproduces structural
inequalities of power and wealth, exclusion and
inclusion. This gives rise to a deeply contentious
global politics: a politics of domination, competition, and resistance among and between powerful
states and transnational non-state forces. Conflict is
thus endemic to globalization, from the neighbourhood to the global level. It is not necessarily violent,
though, as George Modelski (1972) reminds us, the
history of globalization is defined by extraordinary
‘arrogance and violence’ (Robinson 2020b).
Key Points
scholarship presents significant challenges to
• Globalization
traditional approaches to the study of world politics.
is associated with structural transformations in
• Globalization
world politics, from governance to power and world order.
requires a conceptual shift in thinking about
• Globalization
world politics, from a principally state-centric and
Western-centric perspective to the perspective of global
politics—the politics of planetary relations.
is a significant source of conflict, as well as
• Globalization
cooperation, systemic risks, and power shifts.
is not leading to the demise of the sovereign
• Globalization
state, but is transforming the practice of sovereign statehood.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to clarify the concept of globalization and to explain why, despite recent history, it matters to the study of contemporary world politics. It began
by examining critically the concept of globalization and
exploring differing theoretical interpretations, notably
the sceptical and globalist accounts (see Section 2.2).
Globalization is a contentious subject in the study of
international relations because there is still fundamental
theoretical disagreement with respect to its descriptive
and explanatory power. Similarly, it is a highly contentious and divisive issue in political life since it begets
winners and losers, conflict and cooperation.
The chapter also analysed three major sources of the
current crisis of globalization and why it is implicated
in a wider crisis of the liberal world order (see Section
2.3). Rather than deglobalization, it concluded that a
process of reglobalization is under way. Globalization
therefore continues to matter to both the study and
practice of world politics. Moreover, the alleged demise
of the liberal world order is confused with the emergence of a post-Western global order.
Section 2.4 addressed the question of what globalization contributes to the study of world politics. It
identified and briefly examined significant transformations in world politics associated with globalization
which are essential to comprehending and explaining
twenty-first-century global politics.
Profound normative and political disagreement
exists as to whether globalization is a benign or malign
force in world politics (see Ch. 6). Indeed, among the
most contentious and unresolved questions in world
politics today is how globalization might best be governed for the benefit of both humanity and the planet:
a struggle, played out across the globe every day, from
the village square to the citadels of global power (see
Chs 5 and 22).
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anthony mcgrew
Questions
1. Distinguish the concept of globalization from those of internationalization and international
interdependence.
2. Critically review the major transformations in world politics associated with globalization.
3. Why is globalization associated with conflict in world politics?
4. Compare globalist and sceptical accounts of globalization.
5. What are the sources of the current crisis of globalization? Is the world entering a period of
deglobalization?
6. What is meant by the term ‘liberal world order’?
7. What is meant by the term ‘global governance system’?
8. Distinguish the concept of global politics from those of geopolitics and international (interstate) politics.
9. Critically assess some of the key arguments of the transformationalists.
10. Why do some argue the world is witnessing the emergence of a post-Western global order?
Visit the online resources to test your understanding by trying the self-test questions.
Further Reading
Freeman, D. (2020), Can Globalization Succeed? (London: Thames and Hudson). A very accessible
introduction to current academic and political debates about globalization.
Goldin, I., and Mariathasan, M. (2014), The Butterfly Defect: How Globalization Creates Systemic
Risks, and What to Do About It (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). An accessible and
comprehensive examination of the worldwide systemic risks associated with globalization, with
particular emphasis on the economic, financial, and technological.
Khanna, P. (2017), Connectography: Mapping the Global Network Revolution (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson). An accessible introduction to the new phase of globalization.
Mahbubani, K. (2013), The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World (New
York: PublicAffairs). Argues that globalization is creating the conditions for a global
convergence in which the rising powers of Asia will shape the future of globalization and global
politics.
Pieterse, J. N. (2017), Multipolar Globalization: Emerging Economies and Development (London:
Routledge). An examination of the economic dimension of multicentric globalization.
Roberts, A., and Lamp, N. (2021), Six Faces of Globalization: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why
it Matters (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Compares and contrasts the
dominant narratives (or global imaginaries) which shape the politics of economic
globalization.
Singer, P. (2016), One World Now: The Ethics of Globalization, 3rd edn (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press). A superb examination of the normative and ethical issues posed by
globalization.
Steger, M. (2020), Globalization: A Very Short Introduction, 5th edn (Oxford: Oxford University
Press). This is a brief but very informative account of globalization and the controversies to
which it gives rise.
Chapter 2 Globalization and global politics
Steger, M., and James, P. (2019), Globalization Matters: Engaging the Global in Unsettled Times
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). A comprehensive analysis of why globalization is still
central to the study of the social sciences and how it is changing.
Stuenkel, O. (2016), Post-Western World (Cambridge: Polity Press). A comprehensive examination
from a non-Western perspective of the transformations under way in the global political
economy.
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
35
Part Two
The historical context
In this part of the book, we provide a historical context within which to make sense of international relations. We have two main aims.
Our first aim is to introduce you to some of the most
important aspects of international history, and we shall
do this by giving you a chronologically concentrated
set of chapters. We start with an overview of the rise of
the modern international order itself. We think that you
need to have some basic understanding of the main
developments in the history of world politics, as well
as some kind of context for thinking about the contemporary period of world history. This is followed by
a chapter that looks at the main themes of twentiethcentury history up to the end of the cold war. The third
chapter looks at developments in international history
since 1990. The final chapter of this part of the book
Agencja Fotograficzna Caro/Alamy Stock Photo
examines the historical significance of the emergence
of new powers, such as China, India, and Brazil, that are
challenging the existing Western-centric world order.
These chapters give you a great deal of historical information that will be of interest in its own right.
Our second aim is to draw to your attention the
main themes of international history so that you can
develop a deeper understanding of the structures
and issues—both theoretical and empirical—that are
addressed in the remaining three parts of this book.
We hope that an overview of international history
will give you a context within which to begin thinking about globalization: is it a new phenomenon that
fundamentally changes the main patterns of international history, or are there precedents for it that make
it seem less revolutionary?
Chapter 3
The rise of modern
international order
george l awson
Framing Questions
●
When did modern international order emerge?
●
To what extent was the emergence of modern international order shaped by the
experience of the West?
●
Is history important to understanding contemporary world politics?
Reader’s Guide
This chapter explores the rise of modern international
order. It begins by surveying international orders
before the modern period, examining how trade and
infrastructure helped to tie together diverse parts of
the world. The chapter then examines debates about
the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which is often said to
mark the origins of modern international order. Next
it turns to nineteenth-century developments, ranging
from industrialization to imperialism, which played a
major role in the formation of modern international
order. Particular attention is paid to the main ideas
that underpinned modern international order, the
‘shrinking of the planet’ that arose from the advent
of new technologies, and the emergence of a radically unequal international order. The chapter closes
by assessing the significance of nineteenth-century
developments for twentieth- and twenty-first-century
international relations.
40
george lawson
3.1 Introduction
All international orders are made up of multiple
political units. Whether these units are empires, citystates, or nation-states, the key feature that distinguishes international from domestic politics is that, in
the international sphere, political units are forced to
coexist in the absence of an overarching authority. This
means that the discipline of International Relations is
fundamentally concerned with the issue of ‘political
multiplicity’ (Rosenberg and Kurki 2021). Its guiding
question is how order can be generated in an environment that is fragmented rather than unified.
Political multiplicity, though, is only part of the
story. Although international relations is a fragmented
space, this does not stop political units from interacting with each other. These interactions are what
make up international orders: regularized practices
of exchange between political units. These patterns of
exchange vary greatly: they can be sparse (limited to
diplomatic protocols) or intensive (involving high levels
of trade, shared legal codes, common security arrangements, extensive cultural exchanges, and more); hierarchical (as in empires) or purportedly ‘equal’ (as in the
contemporary states system); formal (as in the constitutional structure of the European Union) or informal (as
in the notion of a ‘sphere of influence’). International
orders have existed ever since political units began to
interact with each other on a regular basis, whether
through trade, diplomacy, or the exchange of ideas. In
this sense, world history has seen a great many regional
international orders. However, it is only over the past
two centuries or so that we can speak of a distinctly
modern international order in the sense of the construction of a global economy, a global system of states,
and the global circulation of ideas. This chapter explores
both historical international orders and the emergence
of the modern, global international order to show how
world politics has become marked by increasingly deep
exchanges between peoples and political units.
One of the most noteworthy aspects of the contemporary international order is the dominance of
‘Western’ ideas and institutions. ‘The West’ is usually
taken to mean Europe (with particular emphasis on
the northern and western parts of the continent) and
the Americas (with particular emphasis on the United
States). The West looms large in the functioning of the
global political economy—just think of the importance
of London and New York as financial centres. The West
is also central to global governance—the main home of
the United Nations (UN) is in New York, while both
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) are headquartered in Washington, DC. Western
ideas (such as human rights) and Western culture (particularly music) are well known around the world. But
why is this the case? Some people argue that Western
power has arisen because of its innate strengths: liberal
ideas, democratic practices, and free markets (Landes
1998). These people tend to see Western power as both
natural and enduring. Others see Western domination
as rooted in specific historical circumstances, many of
them the product of practices of colonial exploitation
and subjugation (W. E. B. Du Bois (1994) [1903]; see
also Hobson 2021). For these people, Western power
in the contemporary world is unusual and likely to
be temporary. This debate is discussed in Opposing
Opinions 3.1.
For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to
note two preliminary points. First, the ‘rise of the West’
has occurred only relatively recently: over the past two
or three centuries. Second, many aspects of its rise can
be traced to international processes, such as imperialism and the global expansion of capitalism. These international dynamics allowed a small number of mostly
Western states to project their power around the world.
As they did so, they generated a range of new actors that
subsequently became leading participants in international affairs: nation-states, transnational corporations,
and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs). They also helped to bind the
globe together through new forms of transport (such as
the steamship) and technologies (such as the telegraph).
This chapter explores these dynamics and explains how
they helped to shape contemporary world politics.
3.2 Historical international orders
When should we start thinking about the emergence
of ‘international orders’? Although the term ‘international order’ is a relatively recent innovation, some
accounts trace the historical origins of international
orders to the period when nomadic groups first settled
and became sedentary communities (Buzan and Little
Chapter 3 The rise of modern international order
Opposing Opinions 3.1 The rise of the West was the result of its own strengths
For
Against
The West alone had inclusive political institutions. Representative
institutions promoted negotiation among elites and heightened
links between elites and publics.
Very few, if any, of the materials that were fundamental to
the rise of the West originated from within Western societies. Most notably, cotton is not indigenous to England. Similarly,
Europe’s pre-industrial trade with Asia was largely underpinned
by gold and silver mined in Africa and the Americas.
The Enlightenment promoted new forms of scientific
thinking. These ideas fostered an independence of thought and
an experimental tradition that, in turn, led to advances in engineering and the sciences.
The West pioneered a range of new economic practices.
Double entry bookkeeping and comparable innovations allowed
for a clear evaluation of profit, thereby enabling companies to
provide credit in depersonalized form—the hallmark of commercial capitalism.
The West enjoyed unusually beneficial geographical circumstances. For example, British industrialization was aided
greatly by the unusual co-location of coal and iron.
For many centuries, Asian powers were held in respect, even
awe, in many parts of Europe. The West interacted with Asian
powers sometimes as political equals, and at other times as supplicants. Between 1600 and 1800, India and China were so dominant in manufacturing and many areas of technology that the rise
of the West is sometimes linked to its relative ‘backwardness’ in
comparison to major Asian empires.
European success was based on imperialism. Between 1815
and 1865, Britain alone conquered new territories at an average
rate of 100,000 square miles per year. Many of the resources that
enabled the rise of the West originated from imperialism: Indian
textiles, Chinese porcelain, African slaves, and colonial labour.
European power was premised on multiple forms of inequality. Particularly crucial was the restructuring of economies
into a primary producing ‘periphery’ and a secondary producing ‘core’. Western powers established a global economy in
which they eroded local economic practices and imposed their
own price and production systems. This allowed Western states
to turn an age-old, and more or less balanced, system of trade
in elite goods into a global market sustained by mass trade and
marked by inequality.
1. Did the ‘rise of the West’ stem from its own distinct institutions and ideas?
2. To what extent was Western power forged through its encounters with non-Western states?
3. What are the implications of the history of the ‘rise of the West’ for the West’s contemporary relations with the rest of the world?
Visit the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle these questions.
2000). The earliest recorded examples of this process
took place around 5,000–6,000 years ago in Sumer—
modern day Iraq. Sedentary communities in Sumer
accumulated agricultural surpluses that allowed for
year-round subsistence. These surpluses generated two
dynamics: first, they fostered trade between groups; and
second, they put groups at risk of attack. The response
of sedentary communities was to increase their capabilities: they got bigger, they developed specializations
(such as dividing people into distinct ranks of soldiers
and cultivators), and they developed political hierarchies, establishing order through the command of a
leader or group of leaders (Buzan and Little 2000). These
leaders increasingly interacted with their counterparts
in other groups, establishing rituals that we now know
as diplomacy. In the process, these communities generated regularized practices of exchange between political
units—the definition of international orders.
Beyond ancient Sumer can be found a great many
historical international orders. Indeed, if we take
world history as our canvas, every region in the world
has been home to regular, widely shared practices of
commerce, war, diplomacy, and law. Many of these
historical international orders developed through
encounters with other parts of the world: the extensive interactions between the Byzantine and Ottoman
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george lawson
empires is one example; a second is the early modern
international order centred on the Indian Ocean that
incorporated actors from Asia, Africa, and Europe; a
third is the Eurasian international order between the
thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, spanning from
Europe to China, which sustained deep interactions
between diverse political orders and, in the process,
helped to forge notions of sovereignty and world order
(Zarakol 2022).
Most accounts of international order, however,
begin not in thirteenth century Eurasia or early modern South Asia, but in seventeenth century Europe. The
majority of accounts date the birth of ‘modern’ international order to a specific date—the 1648 Peace of
Westphalia , which marked the end of the wars of religion in Europe (e.g. Philpott 2001). Westphalia is seen
as important because it instituted the principle of cuius
regio, eius religio (‘whose realm, their religion’). This
principle, it is argued, acted as a brake on the reasons by
which states could go to war. After Westphalia, so the
story goes, European states could no longer intervene
in other states on the basis of religious belief. In other
words, states assumed sovereignty over their own
­territories—first in terms of their right of confession,
and later over other spheres of activity, such as the ways
in which they organized their governance and economies. In this sense, Westphalia is seen as important
because it established the principle of ‘sovereign territoriality’ (a claim to political authority over a particular
geographical space).
A number of criticisms of the Westphalian narrative have emerged in recent years. Three of these are
worth particular consideration. First, Westphalia was
not a European-wide agreement, but a local affair—its
main concerns were to safeguard the internal affairs of
the Holy Roman Empire and to reward the victors of
the Wars of Religion (France and Sweden). The impact
of Westphalia on European international relations, let
alone global affairs, was not as great as is often imagined (Teschke 2003). Second, even within this limited
space, the gains of Westphalia were relatively slight.
Although German principalities assumed more control over their own affairs after 1648, this was within
a dual constitutional structure that stressed loyalty to
the Empire and that was sustained by a court system in
which imperial courts adjudicated over both inter-state
disputes and internal affairs (a bit like the modern-day
European Union). Third, Westphalia actually set limits
to the principle of sovereignty established at the 1555
Peace of Augsburg, for example by retracting the rights
of polities to choose their own religion. Westphalia
decreed that each territory would retain the religion it
held on 1 January 1624. For the most part, after 1648,
European international order remained a patchwork of
marriage, inheritance, and hereditary claims. Imperial
rivalries, hereditary succession, and religious conflicts
remained at the heart of European wars for several centuries after Westphalia.
Although Westphalia is usually considered to be
the basis for ‘modern’ international order, it is not the
only starting point for thinking about these issues.
In part, the choice of when to date the emergence of
modern international order depends on what people
consider to be the most important components of
international order. In Section 3.1, international orders
were described as: ‘regularized practices of exchange
between political units’. But what form do these ‘regularized practices of exchange’ take?
One type of pattern emerges through economic
interactions. Here we might stress the importance of
long-distance trade routes in silks, cotton, sugar, tea,
linen, porcelain, and spices that connected places as
diversely situated as Malacca, Samarkand, Hangzhou,
Genoa, Acapulco, Manila, and the Malabar Coast for
many centuries before Westphalia (Goldstone 2002).
Another example is systems of infrastructure, transport, and communication. Here, we could highlight
the European ‘voyages of discovery’ during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which opened up sea
lanes around Africa and across the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans. As discussed earlier, when Europeans moved
into the Indian Ocean, they found a well-developed
international order in place. India’s huge coastline,
skilled artisans, and plentiful traders had long made
it a central node in the trans-Eurasian exchange of
goods, ideas, and institutions. Further east could be
found an equally well-developed regional international
order, mainly thanks to Chinese advances in oceangoing shipbuilding and navigation techniques, which
were in many respects more advanced than those of the
Europeans (Hobson 2021).
It is also possible to combine economic and infrastructural interactions, highlighting dynamics such as
the trafficking of African slaves, which constructed a ‘triangular trade’ in which the demand for sugar in London
fostered the plantation system in the Caribbean, which
was supplied by African slaves and North American
provisions (Blackburn 1997). This vile feature of international order was linked both to increasing trade and
to advances in transport technologies; it helped to forge
Chapter 3 The rise of modern international order
the Atlantic into a regional international order. Also
important to this process was the increasing number of
ecological transfers between the Americas and Europe:
maize, potatoes, tomatoes, beans, and tobacco were
imported from the ‘New World’, while horses, cattle,
pigs, chickens, sheep, mules, oxen, vines, wheat, rice,
and coffee travelled in the opposite direction. Even
more important was the transatlantic transfer of diseases: smallpox, measles, influenza, and yellow fever
killed two-thirds of the population of the Americas
by the middle of the sixteenth century (Crosby 2004).
These examples help to illustrate the ways in which,
over time, regularized exchanges between political
units can generate forms of interdependence in which
events in one place have a major effect on others. One
of the consequences of the increasingly dense interactions that have characterized international orders over
recent centuries has been heightened levels of interdependence, from productive circuits to pandemics.
Despite the plentiful examples of regional international orders in world history, before the last two centuries or so, the ties of interdependence that bound
international orders were relatively limited in scope.
For example, until the nineteenth century the vast
majority of economic activities did not take place over
large distances, but in ‘microeconomies’ with a 20-mile
circumference (Schwartz 2000: 14). Those activities that
went beyond the micro-scale, such as the long-distance
trading corridors noted earlier in this section, were
usually lightly connected. A journey halfway around
the world would have taken a year or more in the sixteenth century, five months in 1812, and one month in
1912. In the contemporary world, it takes less than a
day. In general, the pace of change during the period
before the nineteenth century was much slower than
the rapid, incessant change that has become a feature
of the past two centuries. In this sense, although we can
speak of many regional international orders before the
nineteenth century, we should locate the emergence of
a distinctly modern international order only in the last
two centuries.
What makes the last two centuries such a strong
candidate for thinking about the emergence of modern international order? As noted in the previous
paragraph, during this period, multiple regional international orders were linked in a global order in which all
parts of the world were closely connected. This period
is sometimes known as the ‘global transformation’: a
term used to denote the shift from a world of multiple
regional international systems to one characterized by
a global international order (Buzan and Lawson 2015).
The global transformation brought to an end a long
period in which human history was mainly local and
contact among peoples fairly light. It replaced this with
an era in which human history was increasingly global
and contact among far-flung peoples intense. For better or worse, and often both together, the nineteenth
century saw the transformation of the daily condition
of peoples nearly everywhere on the planet (Hobsbawm
1962; Bayly 2004; Osterhammel 2014).
Key Points
orders are regularized practices of exchange
• International
between political units. They may be sparse or intensive,
hierarchical or egalitarian, formal or informal.
is possible to speak of multiple international orders in
• Itworld
history, perhaps even as far back as ancient Sumer.
In
International
the 1648 Peace of Westphalia is
• often consideredRelations,
to be the foundational date from which
‘modern’ international order emerged.
recently, scholars have viewed the emergence of
• More
modern international order as the product of the last two
centuries, as this is when various regional orders were
forged into a deeply interdependent, global international
order.
3.3 How did modern international order emerge?
Up until around 1800, there were few major differences
in living standards among the most developed parts of
world: in the late eighteenth century, gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita levels in the Yangtze River
Delta of China were around 10 per cent lower than the
wealthiest parts of Europe, less than the differences
today between most of the European Union (EU) and
the US. Major sites of production and consumption
such as Hokkaido, Malacca, Hangzhou, and Samarkand
enjoyed relative parity with their European counterparts across a range of economic indicators, and were
technologically equal or superior in many areas of production (Pomeranz 2000).
A century later, the most advanced areas of Europe
and the United States had levels of GDP per capita
between tenfold and twelvefold greater than their Asian
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george lawson
equivalents. In 1820, Asian powers produced 60.7 per
cent of the world’s GDP, and ‘the West’ (defined as
Europe and the United States) only 34.2 per cent; by
1913, the West produced 68.3 per cent of global GDP
and Asia only 24.5 per cent. Between 1800 and 1900,
China’s share of global production dropped from 33
per cent to 6 per cent and India’s from 20 per cent to 2
per cent (Maddison 2001). The rapid turnaround during the nineteenth century represents a major shift in
global power (see Box 3.1).
What generated this shift in global power? There are
a number of explanations for what is sometimes called
the ‘great divergence’ between East and West (Pomeranz
2000). Some accounts concentrate on innovations such
as the capacity of liberal constitutions in the West to
restrict levels of domestic conflict. Others, in contrast,
focus on the frequency of European inter-state wars:
European powers were involved in inter-state wars in
nearly 75 per cent of the years between 1494 and 1975
(Mann 2012: 24). The frequency of European interstate wars, it is argued, led to technological and tactical advances, the development of standing armies, and
the expansion of permanent bureaucracies. In this way,
nineteenth-century European states combined their
need for taxation (in order to fight increasingly costly
wars) with support for financial institutions that could,
in turn, deliver the funds required for investment in
armaments. A third set of explanations highlights the
role of ideas in producing the great divergence, most
notably the scientific advances associated with the
European Enlightenment. A fourth set of approaches
concentrate on the geographical and demographic
advantages enjoyed by the West: a temperate climate
that was inhospitable to parasites, and later marriage
habits, which led to lower fertility rates and, in turn,
lower population densities. Finally, some accounts stress
the role of capitalism in generating Western ‘take-off’,
Box 3.1 The importance of the nineteenth
century
The nineteenth century saw the birth of international relations
as we know it today.
(Osterhammel 2014: 393)
During the nineteenth century, ‘social relations were assembled, dismantled and reassembled’.
(Wolf 1997: 391)
Nothing, it seemed, could stand in the way of a few western
gunboats or regiments bringing with them trade and bibles.
(Hobsbawm 1962: 365)
whether this is seen as emerging from favourable access
to credit and bills of exchange, or through the ways in
which private property regimes enabled capital to be
released for investment in manufacturing and finance
(Buzan and Lawson 2015).
Relatively few of these accounts stress the international dimensions of the global transformation. Yet
these were significant (see Box 3.2). First, European
success was predicated on imperialism (Sharman 2019).
Between 1878 and 1913, Western states claimed 8.6 million square miles of overseas territory, amounting to
one-sixth of the Earth’s land surface (Abernathy 2000:
81). By the outbreak of the First World War, 80 per cent
of the world’s land surface, not including uninhabited
Antarctica, was under the control of Western powers,
and one state—Britain—claimed nearly a quarter of
the world’s territory. Germany’s colonies in East Africa
were forced into producing cotton for export, just as
Dutch Indonesia became a vehicle for the production
Box 3.2 Key dates in the emergence of
modern international order
The French and Haitian revolutions begin a
• 1789/1791:
long ‘wave’ of ‘Atlantic Revolutions’ that lasts until the
1820s. These revolutions introduced new ideas such as
republicanism and popular sovereignty, and challenged
the central place of slavery in the Atlantic international
order.
in the First Opium War the British defeat China,
• 1842:
perhaps the greatest classical Asian power.
the Indian Revolt prompts Britain to assume formal
• 1857:
control of the Indian subcontinent, while serving as a
forerunner to later anti-colonial movements.
the British Companies Act marks a shift to limited
• 1862:
liability firms, opening the way to the formation of
transnational corporations as significant international
actors.
the International Telecommunications Union
• 1865:
becomes the first standing intergovernmental organization,
symbolizing the rise of permanent institutions of global
governance.
the opening of the first transatlantic telegraph cable
• 1866:
begins the wiring together of the planet with instantaneous
communication.
the Prime Meridian Conference establishes world
• 1884:
standard time, easing the integration of trade, diplomacy,
and communication.
Japan defeats Russia in the Russo-Japanese War,
• 1905:
establishing itself as the first non-Western, non-white
Great Power.
Chapter 3 The rise of modern international order
of sugar, tobacco, and later rubber. In a similar vein,
after the British East India Company was ceded the
right to administer and raise taxes in Bengal, they
made the cultivation of opium obligatory, subsequently
exporting it to China in a trading system propped up
by force of arms. Through imperialism, European powers exchanged raw materials for manufactured goods
and used violence to ensure low production prices.
Although the gains from these circuits are difficult to
measure precisely, many of them were highly profitable. The Atlantic slave trade, for example, returned
profits to British investors at an average rate of 9.5 per
cent at the turn of the nineteenth century (Blackburn
1997: 510).
Second, European powers assumed control, often
coercively, over the trade of commodities as diverse
as sandalwood, tea, otter skins, and sea cucumbers, as
well as silver, cotton, and opium. Europeans used silver
from the Americas and opium from India to buy entry
into regional trading systems. This led to radically
unequal patterns of trade: while Britain provided 50
per cent of Argentina’s imports and exports, and virtually all of its capital investment in 1900, Argentina provided just 10 per cent of Britain’s imports and exports
(Mann 2012: 39). European control of trade also led to
radically unequal patterns of growth: whereas India’s
GDP grew at an average of 0.2 per cent per year in the
century before independence, Britain’s grew at ten
times this rate (Silver and Arrighi 2003: 338). India
provided a colonial tribute to Britain that saw its budget surpluses expatriated to London so that they could
be used to reduce British trade deficits. The inequality
that marks modern international order is discussed in
Section 3.4.
Third, Western advances arose from the emulation
and fusion of non-Western ideas and technologies.
Technologies used in the cotton industry, for example,
drew heavily on earlier Asian advances (Hobson 2021).
These ideas and technologies were carried, in part, via
migration. Up to 37 million labourers left India, China,
Malaya, and Java during the nineteenth century and the
early twentieth, many of them to work as bonded labour
in imperial territories. Over 50 million Europeans also
emigrated between 1800 and 1914, most of them to the
United States. By 1914, half of the population of the US
was foreign-born. Six million Europeans emigrated to
Argentina between 1857 and 1930; at the onset of the
First World War, one-third of Argentinians, and half
the population of Buenos Aires, had been born outside
the country (Crosby 2004: 301).
The great divergence was therefore fuelled by a
global intensification in the circulation of people, ideas,
and resources—what was described in Section 3.2 as
interdependence. More precisely, it can be linked to
three main dynamics: industrialization, the emergence
of ‘rational’ states, and imperialism.
3.3.1 Industrialization
Industrialization took place in two main waves. The
first (mainly British) wave occurred in the early part
of the nineteenth century and was centred on cotton,
coal, and iron. Here the crucial advance was the capture of inanimate sources of energy, particularly the
advent of steam power, an innovation that enabled the
biggest increase in the availability of power sources for
several thousand years. Also crucial was the application of engineering to blockages in production, such
as the development of machinery to pump water efficiently out of mineshafts. Engineering and technology
combined to generate substantial gains in productivity:
whereas a British spinner at the end of the eighteenth
century took 300 hours to produce 100 pounds of cotton, by 1830 the same task took only 135 hours; by 1850,
18 million Britons used as much fuel energy as 300 million inhabitants of Qing China (Goldstone 2002: 364).
The second (mainly German and American) wave of
industrialization took place in the last quarter of the
century and was centred on advances in chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, and electronics. Once again, new
sources of energy were crucial, with oil and electricity emerging alongside coal, and internal combustion
engines replacing steam piston engines. The oil industry took off in Russia, Canada, and the US from the
middle of the nineteenth century, initially to provide
kerosene for lighting. Before the century’s end, pipelines and tankers were bringing oil to a global market,
and further advances in distillation and mechanical
engineering were opening up its use as a fuel. During
the 1880s, electricity began to be generated and distributed from hydroelectric and steam-powered stations.
Advances in light metals and electrics, allied to the
use of oil products for fuel, provided an impetus to the
development of cars, planes, and ships.
These two waves of industrialization helped to produce a dramatic expansion of the world market. After
several centuries in which the volume of world trade
had increased by an annual average of less than 1 per
cent, trade rose by over 4 per cent annually in the half
century after 1820 (Osterhammel 2014: 726). By the
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george lawson
early years of the twentieth century, world trade was
increasing at a rate of 10 per cent per year, increasing
levels of interdependence and heightening practices of
exchange. The expansion of the market brought new
opportunities for accumulating power, particularly
because of the close relationship between industrialization in the West and deindustrialization elsewhere.
For example, Indian textiles were either banned from
Britain or levied with high tariffs—the British government tripled duties on Indian goods during the 1790s
and raised them by a factor of nine in the first two
decades of the nineteenth century. In contrast, British
manufacturing products were forcibly imported into
India without duty. Between 1814 and 1828, British
cloth exports to India rose from 800,000 yards to over
40 million yards; during the same period, Indian cloth
exports to Britain halved. For many centuries before
‘the global transformation’, India’s merchant class
had produced the garments that ‘clothed the world’
(Parthasarathi 2011: 22). By 1850, the English county
of Lancashire was the new centre of a global textiles
industry.
3.3.2 Rational states
The extension of the market was accompanied by
important changes in how states were organized.
During the nineteenth century, states began to assume
greater control over the use of force within their territory. This was not as straightforward as it might seem
when viewed from the vantage point of the contemporary world and its nearly 200 nation-states (see Ch.
31). In the eighteenth century, institutions such as the
Dutch East India Company held a constitutional warrant to ‘make war, conclude treaties, acquire territory
and build fortresses’ (Phillips and Sharman 2020).
These companies remained influential throughout the
nineteenth century: the British parliament provided a
concession of several million acres of land to the British
North Borneo Company as late as 1881, while the
Imperial British East Africa Company and the British
South Africa Company also held state-like powers of
governance.
In general, though, during the course of the nineteenth century, armies and navies became more distinctly national, increasingly coming under the direct
control of the state. Although nation-states coexisted with other political units—and most Western
polities were imperial nation-states in that they were
both empires and nations simultaneously—there was
a general ‘caging’ of authority within states (Mann
2012). Most notably, states became staffed by permanent bureaucracies, selected by merit and formalized
through new legal codes. State personnel in the last
quarter of the century grew from 67,000 to 535,000 in
Britain and from 55,000 to over a million in Prussia/
Germany. During the same period, state military personnel tripled in Britain and quadrupled in Prussia/
Germany. The term ‘rational state’ refers to the ways in
which states become organized less through interpersonal relations and family ties, and more by abstract
bureaucracies such as a civil service and a nationally
organized military.
Once again, there was a distinctly international
dimension to this process: many aspects of the modern,
professional civil service were formed in India before
being exported to Britain; cartographic techniques
used to map colonial spaces were reimported into
Europe to serve as the basis for territorial claims; and
imperial armies acted as the frontline troops in conflicts around the world. Britain deployed Indian police
officers, bureaucrats, and orderlies in China, Africa,
and the Middle East, and Indian troops fought in 15
British colonial wars. Other Western states also made
extensive use of colonial forces: 70 per cent of the Dutch
army deployed in the Dutch East Indies were colonial
forces, while 80 per cent of the French expeditionary
forces that fought in North and East Africa were colonial conscripts (MacDonald 2014: 39–40). These imperial wars increased the coercive capacities of European
states, while requiring states to raise extra revenues,
which they often achieved through taxation. This, in
turn, fuelled further state development.
3.3.3 Imperialism
Until the nineteenth century, nearly three-quarters of
the world’s population lived in large, fragmented, ethnically mixed agrarian empires. During the nineteenth
century, these empires were swamped by mono-racial
Western powers. The bulk of European imperialism
took place during the ‘scramble for Africa’, which saw
European powers assume direct control of large parts
of the continent. But experiences of imperialism went
much further than this. Between 1810 and 1870, the
US carried out 71 territorial annexations and military interventions (Go 2011: 39). The US first became
a continental empire, seizing territory from Native
Americans, the Spanish, and Mexicans. It then built
an overseas empire, extending its authority over Cuba,
Chapter 3 The rise of modern international order
Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Hawaii,
Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, Samoa, and the
Virgin Islands. Other settler states also became colonial powers in their own right, including Australia and
New Zealand in the Pacific.
Imperialism took many forms. In the case of the
British, their imperial web included direct-rule colonies
(e.g. India after 1857), settler colonies (e.g. Australia),
protectorates (e.g. Brunei), bases (e.g. Gibraltar),
treaty ports (e.g. Shanghai), and spheres of influence (e.g. Argentina). The image of a late nineteenthcentury map of the world in which imperial territories are represented by a single colour is, therefore,
highly misleading. British India included several hundred ‘Princely States’ that retained a degree of ‘quasisovereignty’, as did nearly 300 ‘native states’ in Dutch
East Asia. Where imperialism was successful, it relied
on establishing partnerships with local power brokers:
the Straits Chinese, the Krio of West Africa, the ‘teakwallahs’ of Burma, and others (Darwin 2012: 178). Two
hundred Dutch officials and a much larger number of
Indonesian intermediaries ran a cultivation system that
incorporated 2 million agricultural workers. A little
over 75,000 French administrators were responsible for
60 million colonial subjects (Mann 2012: 47).
Imperialism was deeply destructive. At times, this
destruction took the form of ecocide. Manchuria was
deforested by the Japanese in the interests of its mining and lumber companies, while ‘wild lands’ in India
were cleared by the British so that nomadic pastoralists could be turned into tax-paying cultivators. At
other times, destruction took the form of genocide.
Belgian imperialists were responsible for the deaths of
up to 10 million Congolese during the late nineteenth
century and the early twentieth. In the opening years
of the twentieth century, Germany carried out a systematic genocide against the Nama and Herero peoples
in its South West African territories, reducing their
population by 80 per cent and 50 per cent respectively.
Similar stories could be told about the conduct of the
Americans in the Philippines, the Spanish in Cuba, the
Japanese in China, the British in Kenya, the French in
Algeria, and the Australians in Tasmania. Overall, the
casualty list of imperialism numbered tens of millions
(Osterhammel 2014: 124–7).
Key Points
1800, there was a ‘great divergence’ between some
• After
Western imperial nation-states and much of the rest of the
world.
were three main sources of the ‘great divergence’:
• There
industrialization, the ‘rational’ state, and imperialism.
three dynamics served as the mutually reinforcing
• These
foundations of modern international order.
dynamics were deeply intertwined with
• These
international processes, most notably industrialization with
deindustrialization, and rational states with imperialism.
3.4 The consequences of the global transformation
Section 3.3 examined the main dynamics that underpinned the global transformation. This section explores
three of its main consequences: the ‘shrinking’ of the
planet (see Section 3.4.1), the emergence of international organizations and non-governmental organizations (see Section 3.4.2), and the development of an
unequal international order (see Section 3.4.3).
3.4.1 Shrinking the planet
A thin global trading system existed for many centuries
before ‘the global transformation’. Lightweight luxury
goods such as silk, porcelain, spices, precious metals,
and gems moved across Eurasia and other transnational
trading circuits for millennia, although generally at a
slow pace. During the eighteenth century, it took three
years for a caravan to make the round trip from Moscow
to Peking. This meant that, until the nineteenth century,
international orders tended to be somewhat limited in
scale. Two thousand years ago, imperial Rome and Han
China knew of each other, and had a significant trade in
luxury goods. But their armies never met, they had no
diplomatic relations, and the trade between them was
indirect rather than direct, taking the form of a relay
through a range of intermediaries.
The infrastructural gains prompted by the global
transformation generated major efficiency savings: communication times between Britain and India dropped
from a standard of around six months in the 1830s (via
sailing ship), to just over one month in the 1850s (via rail
and steamship), to the same day in the 1870s (via telegraph) (Curtin 1984: 251–2). There were three main
sources that lay behind these efficiency savings: steamships, railways, and the telegraph.
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george lawson
During the nineteenth century, as steam engines
became smaller, more powerful, and more fuel-efficient,
they began to be installed in ships, initially driving
paddle wheels, and later the more efficient screw propeller. As a result of these improvements, ocean freight
rates dropped by 80 per cent during the century as a
whole, with a corresponding expansion in the volume
of trade. One million tons of goods were shipped worldwide in 1800; by 1840, ships carried 20 million tons of
tradable goods; by 1870, they carried 80 million tons
(Belich 2009: 107). By 1913, steam tonnage accounted
for 97.7 per cent of global shipping. Steam engines both
freed ships from dependence on wind (although at the
cost of dependence on coal or oil) and tripled their average speed. Because steamships were not dependent on
weather or season, they provided predictable, regular
services to replace sporadic and irregular links by sail.
Equally important was the arrival of railways.
Widespread railway building began in Britain during
the 1820s, spreading to the United States, France, and
Germany during the 1830s. By 1840 there were 4,500
miles of track worldwide, expanding to 23,500 miles by
1850 and 130,000 miles by 1870; by the end of the century, there were half a million miles of track worldwide
(Hobsbawm 1962: 61). As with steamships, the expansion of the railway had a major effect on trade. By the
1880s the cost of transportation by rail in Britain was
less than half of that by canals, and a sixth of transport
by road. The figures for the US were even more dramatic, with late nineteenth-century railways between
30 and 70 times cheaper than trade via road in 1800.
Investment in railways served to internationalize capital: France invested heavily in Russian railways, while
British investors provided the capital for railways in
continental Europe, the Americas, and Asia. By 1913,
A steam ship in the nineteenth century
© Canada. Patent and Copyright Office, Library and Archives Canada
41 per cent of Britain’s direct overseas investments were
in railways (Topik and Wells 2012: 644).
Railways had two further effects on international
order. First, they prompted the emergence of timetables
and, in turn, pressed states to regularize time. World
standard time was pioneered at the Prime Meridian
Conference in Washington in 1884, and the universal day of 24 time zones was consolidated at the 1912
Paris International Conference on Time (Ogle 2015).
Second, as railways spread, they became pipelines from
continental interiors to coastal ports, linking with
steamships to provide a global transportation system.
Railways linked Argentinian food products to the port
of Buenos Aires, Australian wool to the port of Sydney,
and South African diamonds and gold to the port of
Cape Town. This allowed Western states to import
products in a way that had not been possible before, and
they could establish mass industries that depended on
raw materials grown in other parts of the world. The
combination of railways and steamships underpinned
the division of labour between an industrial ‘core’ and a
commodity-producing ‘periphery’ that first emerged as
a defining feature of the global political economy during the nineteenth century.
The final breakthrough technology was the telegraph. During the 1840s, telegraph networks spread
throughout Europe and North America, increasing
from 2,000 miles in 1849 to 111,000 miles by 1869.
By 1870, a submarine telegraph system linked the UK
and India. By 1887, over 200,000 km of underwater
cable connected (mainly imperial) nodes in the world
economy. And by 1903, there was a global network
in place consisting of over 400,000 km of submarine
cabling (Osterhammel 2014: 719). Use of the telegraph
was widespread, if uneven. At the end of the nineteenth
century, two-thirds of the world’s telegraph lines were
British owned. In 1913, Europeans sent 329 million
telegraphs, while Americans sent 150 million, Asians
60 million, and Africans 17 million (Topik and Wells
2012: 663).
The impact of the telegraph on the speed of communications was dramatic: a letter sent from Paris to St
Petersburg took 20 days in 1800, 30 hours in 1900, and
30 minutes in 1914. This, in turn, had a major impact
on key features of international relations, from war and
diplomacy to trade and consumption. Governments
could learn about political and military developments
almost as they happened, while financiers and traders
had faster access to information about supply, prices,
and market movements. One consequence of this was
Chapter 3 The rise of modern international order
the formation of command structures over long distances. With instant communication, ambassadors,
admirals, and generals were not granted as much independence of action, and firms kept tighter control over
their distant subsidiaries.
Steamships, railways, and the telegraph provided the
core infrastructure of modern international order, adding greatly to levels of interdependence and prompting
far deeper patterns of exchange. In combination, they
helped to construct a global economy and a single space
of political–military interactions. They also ratcheted
up cultural encounters, enabling (and often requiring)
people to interact on a previously unprecedented scale.
Increasingly, the human population knew itself as a
single entity for the first time.
3.4.2 Intergovernmental organizations
and international non-governmental
organizations
Technological changes created demands for international coordination and standardization. This resulted
in the emergence of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as permanent features of international
order. The link between these dynamics is made clear
by the functions of most early IGOs: the International
Telecommunications Union (1865), the Universal
Postal Union (UPU) (1874), the International Bureau
of Weights and Measures (1875), and the International
Conference for Promoting Technical Unification on the
Railways (1882). The UPU, for example, responded to
the need for inter-operability among diverse postal systems that was created by new forms of transportation.
As they developed, IGOs and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) covered a wide
range of issue-areas, from religion and politics to sport
and the environment. By the 1830s, transnational associations were taking part in vigorous public debates on
issues as varied as trade policy and population growth.
Several prominent INGOs, including the International
Red Cross, were formed in the 1850s and 1860s, as were
issue-based groups such as those seeking to improve
animal welfare, promote the arts, and formalize academic subjects ranging from botany to anthropology.
The latter half of the nineteenth century saw a further
growth in INGO activity with the emergence of a number of groups formed in response to the inequities of
industrialization and, in the last part of the century,
the first industrial-era depression. An organized labour
movement emerged in the second half of the nineteenth
century. A further tranche of INGOs put pressure on
states to enact faster, deeper processes of democratization. A transnational movement for women’s suffrage
emerged in the last quarter of the nineteenth century;
by the early years of the twentieth century, the membership of the International Council of Women counted up
to 5 million women around the world (Osterhammel
2014: 507).
3.4.3 Inequality
As Section 3.3 explored, the global transformation
generated a deeply unequal international order. This
inequality did not go unchallenged, whether through
attempts at reform or revolution. Case Study 3.1 illustrates this push-and-pull between inequality and challenge through the example of international law (Pitts
2018). The rest of this section explores global inequality
through two further issue-areas: racism (see Section
3.4.3.1) and economic exploitation (see Section
3.4.3.2).
3.4.3.1 Racism
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a
new form of racism emerged. ‘Scientific’ racism was
based on a radically unequal view of world politics (see
Ch. 18). Its proponents argued that it was ­possible—
and desirable—to establish a political hierarchy based
on biological markers, either visible (as in skin colour)
or according to bloodline (as in who counts as Jewish,
Black, or Chinese). Broadly speaking, for ‘scientific’ racists, lighter-skinned peoples inhabited the highest rung
on the evolutionary ladder and darker-skinned peoples were situated at the bottom. These ideas allowed
Europeans to racially demarcate zones within imperial territories, as well as to homogenize diverse indigenous peoples, such as Native Americans, into a single
category of ‘Indians’. The result was the formation of
an international order premised in large measure on
a ‘global colour line’ (Du Bois 1994 [1903]]; Lake and
Reynolds 2008).
The global colour line was strengthened by mass
emigration from Britain to Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand. These emigrations created ‘settler states’ ruled
by white elites who saw themselves as inherently superior to the indigenous peoples. The scale of this enterprise is striking: white settlers in Australia increased
from 12,000 in 1810 to 1.25 million in 1860; one million
white British emigrated to Canada between 1815 and
1865, multiplying the country’s population by a factor
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Case Study 3.1: The dual character of international law
During the nineteenth century, international law assumed a dual
character: first, as an enabler of inequality; and second, as a possible route to equality. Two key legal concepts, ‘occupation’ and
‘universality’, illustrate how this worked.
On the one hand, ‘occupation’, the notion that something
belonging to nobody becomes the property of the first person
to take it, was central to European imperialism in the Americas,
Asia, the Pacific, and Africa. As it developed, the law of occupation was tied to notions of progress, and frequently put to work
in agreements, alliances, treaties, contracts, and land purchases.
The key innovation was to associate occupation with economic
development, first in terms of the supposed superiority of
European agricultural society and second in terms of the right to
trade, which was seen as the hallmark of ‘advanced’ commercial
societies. In this way, ‘occupation’ sustained a range of legal practices: unequal treaties for those left nominally independent (like
the Ottoman Empire, Japan, and China); partial takeovers, such
as protectorates, in which most local government was allowed
to continue, but finance, defence, and foreign policy were handled by a Western power (as in the case of Sudan); formal colonization, resulting in elimination as an independent entity (as in
India after the 1857 uprising); and indigenous displacement (as
in many parts of the Americas, Australia, and southwest Africa).
On the other hand, opponents of European imperialism used
the notion of ‘universality’ to claim that their territories were
already occupied. For many colonized peoples, ‘universality’ was
a means of contesting Western claims to unequal legal rights.
Some Latin American lawyers, for example, argued that the
imperial histories of the region, best represented by the Aztecs
and Incas, provided them with a history and status that merited
their equal inclusion in international society. Increasingly, though,
jurists in what is today called the Global South made their case
not on the basis of their own civilizational capabilities, but on the
basis that imperialism was the mark of uncivilized powers, and
that the universal right to self-determination was a legal shelter
against this incivility.
These debates remain live in the contemporary world. Even
after overcoming imperialism, post-colonial states often combined de jure political independence with de facto economic
dependence. Britain, for example, repackaged many of its former colonies as ‘overseas territories’, acknowledging the right to
political self-determination as long as the overarching relationship remained one of economic dependence and exploitation.
At the same time, arguments about the rights of ‘occupation’
can be found in contemporary debates about the status of the
two poles, the indigenous peoples of the Torres Straits and West
Papua, the proposed annexation of the West Bank, and more.
As in many other spheres of international relations, nineteenthcentury debates about international law are crucial to unravelling
key issues in contemporary world politics.
of seven. In 1831, the white population of New Zealand
was little more than 1,000; 50 years later, it was 500,000
(Belich 2009: 83). The cumulative effect of these repopulations was significant. Whereas at the beginning of
the nineteenth century, the white English-speaking
‘Anglosphere’ was made up of 12 million (mostly poor)
people, by 1930 it constituted 200 million (mostly
rich) people. When added to the growing power of the
United States, the ‘Anglosphere’ became an increasingly prominent actor in world affairs, a status that—to
some extent—it retains today (Bell 2020).
The racism fostered by white emigration forged
what W. E. B. Du Bois (1994 [1903]: 61) called ‘the new
religion of whiteness’. Settler colonists became a racial
caste united by fear of rebellion by the indigenous population and by a sense of their own cultural and racial
superiority. As white Westerners became a ‘global people’, settlers helped to racialize international politics,
making the colour bar a globally recognized tool of
discrimination.
3.4.3.2 Economic exploitation
Industrialization and associated processes, such as
the commercialization of agriculture, were global in
form. As profits from these processes could only be
achieved through higher productivity, lower wages, or
the establishment of new markets, capitalist expansion
was constant, leading to the development of both new
areas of production (such as southeastern Russia and
central parts of the United States) and new products
(such as potatoes). In 1900, Malaya had around 5,000
acres of rubber production; by 1913, it contained 1.25
million acres (Wolf 1997: 325). Deindustrialization was
equally rapid. As discussed in Section 3.3.1, after 1800,
the British government ensured that British products
undercut Indian goods and charged prohibitive tariffs
on Indian textiles. Within a generation or two, the deindustrialization of India meant that centuries-old skills
in industries such as cloth dyeing, shipbuilding, metallurgy, and gun making had been lost (Parthasarathi
2011; Hobson 2021).
Question 1: How was international law used in the nineteenth
century to both sustain and challenge imperialism?
Question 2: What is the relevance of ‘occupation’ and ‘universality’
to contemporary world politics?
Chapter 3 The rise of modern international order
The profits from capitalist expansion helped to forge
an unequal global economy. In the cultivation system
operated by the Netherlands in Indonesia, Dutch settlers enjoyed 50 times the level of per capita income as
indigenous Indonesians. Around half of the revenue
collected by the Indonesian government under the
cultivation system was remitted to the Netherlands,
constituting 20 per cent of the state’s net revenue
(Osterhammel 2014: 443). This is just one example of
the ways in which imperial powers adapted global production to their needs, setting up the modern hierarchy
between providers of primary and secondary products.
While colonized countries could be the main producers of primary products, as India was with tea, Burma
with jute, Malaya with rubber, Nigeria with palm oil,
Bolivia with tin, and Brazil with coffee, imperial powers maintained an advantage in high-value exports and
finance. This division of labour, with its accompanying
upheavals, was first established in the nineteenth century; it came to dominate the global political economy
in the twentieth century. Case Study 3.2 illustrates how
these dynamics worked.
Key Points
major consequence of the global transformation was the
• A‘shrinking
of the planet’ via steamships, railways, and the
telegraph.
technologies deepened the ‘regularized exchanges’
• These
that serve as the foundations of international order.
exchanges were increasingly managed by IGOs and
• These
INGOs.
modern international order that emerged during the
• The
nineteenth century was profoundly unequal. The sources
of this inequality included racism and economic
exploitation.
Case Study 3.2 Imperialism in China
American cartoon, c.1900
© Granger Historical Picture Archive / Alamy Stock Photo
At the heart of imperialism was a claim about the material, cultural, and moral superiority of the West. As Case Study 3.1 illustrated, Western powers exacted vastly unequal terms of exchange
with those they dominated, even if these polities had once been
great empires, as was the case with China. Indeed, the decline of
China helps to illustrate the ways in which imperialism served to
transform international order in the nineteenth century.
During the nineteenth century, Western powers pressed
China to open up to higher levels of trade. This was particularly
important for the British, for whom the (illegal) opium trade was
extremely lucrative: by the 1830s, the British were exporting
30,000 chests of opium from India to China each year, each of
which carried 150 pounds of opium extract. It was little surprise
when, in 1840, Britain used the pretext of a minor incident involving the seizure of opium stocks by Chinese officials to instigate
conflict with China (the ‘First Opium War’), which it won easily.
The Treaty of Nanjing that followed the war required China to
cede Hong Kong to the British, pay an indemnity for starting the
conflict, and open up five new treaty ports. The treaty also legalized the opium trade. After defeat in the Second Opium War of
1856–60, which included the sacking of the Summer Palace in
Beijing by British and French forces, China signed a further series
of unequal treaties, including some that guaranteed low tariffs on
European imports.
If these treaties weakened China, so too did domestic unrest.
During the 1850s, a rebellion originating among the Hakka
minority in Guangxi spread to the Yangtze region and the imperial capital of Nanjing. The rebellion was oriented around a strain
of apocalyptic Christianity, blended with elements of Manchu
and Confucian thought. Over the next decade, the ‘Taiping
Rebellion’ mobilized over a million combatants and spread to
an area the size of France and Germany combined. The conflict
severely diminished imperial control. It also destroyed both land
and livelihoods, and between 1850 and 1873, over 20 million
people were killed. War and related dynamics, including starvation, saw China’s population as a whole drop from 410 million to
350 million during this period.
The Taiping Rebellion was not the only uprising experienced
by China during this period. In 1898, a series of ‘modernizing’
reforms by the 17 year-old Guangxu Emperor prompted a coup
by the Empress Dowager Cixi. Cixi fanned a wave of assertive
nationalism, including a movement—the Boxer Rebellion—that
sought to overturn the unequal rights held by Westerners. The
defeat of the Boxers by a coalition of Western forces led to the
stationing of foreign troops in China, as well as a range of new
concessions. Key aspects of public finances were handed over to
outsiders, most notably the Maritime Customs Services, which
was used to collect taxes, regulate tariffs, and finance the substantial indemnity demanded by Western powers.
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george lawson
All in all, China’s experience of Western imperialism was
deeply destructive. During this period, Chinese per capita income
dropped from 90 per cent to 20 per cent of the world average,
while the country’s share of global GDP fell from around a third to
just 5 per cent. China lost wars with Japan, Britain, and France. It
saw large parts of its territory handed over to foreign powers and
suffered the ignominy of being forced to sign a number of unequal treaties. China went through two major rebellions, including
one (the Taiping Rebellion) that produced more casualties than
any other conflict during the nineteenth century. No wonder that
this period is known in China as the ‘Century of Humiliation’.
Question 1: What were the main features of China’s ‘Century of
Humiliation’?
Question 2: How has China’s experience of imperialism in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries impacted its contemporary
foreign policy?
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter defined international order as ‘regularized
practices of exchange between political units’. There have
been many international orders in world history, and
these have taken many forms: sparse and intensive, hierarchical and more purportedly egalitarian, formal and
informal. However, it is only over the past two centuries
that an international order has emerged that is global in
scale and deeply interdependent politically, economically, and culturally. Not everything has changed over the
past two centuries. But the world has undergone a major
transformation enabled by imperialism, the emergence
of industrialization, and rational states. These dynamics
have prompted far-reaching changes to how international
order has been organized and understood. And they have
deepened degrees of both interdependence and inequality
to levels that are unprecedented in world history.
The legacies of this period are profound: a global economy, a global system of states, global communication
and transportation systems, a huge number of IGOs
and INGOs, and more. Even the basic terminology
used to describe much of the contemporary world
has nineteenth-century origins, from the idea of
‘the West’ to framings such as ‘the Middle East’ and
‘Latin America’ (Osterhammel 2014: 73–86). Equally
important are the legacies of imperialism, racism,
and economic exploitation that continue to generate resentment in many parts of the world. The West
ignores these sentiments at its peril. Although the
world continues to be based largely on Western terms,
this is changing (see Ch. 6). The ‘modernizing mission’ first undertaken by nineteenth-century Japan
(see Box 3.3) has now been undertaken in various
forms by many of the world’s states. Understanding
how we got here is crucial to assessing both the shape
of contemporary international order and the challenges it faces.
Box 3.3 Japan’s ‘modernizing mission’
The most spectacular example of a nineteenth-century ‘modernizing mission’ outside the West was that of Japan. Following the
shock caused by the appearance of American gunboats in Tokyo
Bay in 1853 and the subsequent signing of unequal treaties, Japan
sent over a hundred representatives on a mission to 11 European
countries and the United States in order to negotiate revisions
to these treaties and learn from Western practices. The Iwakura
Mission subsequently borrowed extensively from the practices of
Western states.
The result was a restructuring of domestic society through
rapid ‘modernization’ and a reorientation of foreign policy
towards imperialism: Japan invaded Taiwan in 1874 (annexing it
formally in 1895), fought wars for overseas territory with both
China (1894–5) and Russia (1904–5), and annexed Korea (1910).
Becoming a ‘civilized’ member of international society meant
not just abiding by European law and diplomacy; it also meant
becoming an imperial power. At home, the result was a radical
programme known as the Meiji Restoration. The Charter Oath of
the Meiji Restoration made frequent references to Confucianism.
However, it did so in the context of the need to revive Japanese
thought and practices within a new, ‘modern’ context. Under the
slogan fukoku kyo–hei (rich country, strong military), the Meiji oligarchy sought to erode feudal forms of governance, abolish the
Shogunate, and replace the Samurai (who numbered over 5 per
cent of the population) with a conscript army.
The Meiji pioneered the idea of the developmental state. They
imported industrial technologies (often through ‘international
experts’), increased military spending (which climbed from 15 per
cent of government spending in the 1880s to around 30 per cent
in the 1890s, and nearly 50 per cent in the 1900s), and mobilized
the population through an ideology of (sometimes chauvinistic)
nationalism. A private property regime was introduced alongside
new systems of taxation, banking, and insurance. The Meiji state
built cotton mills, cement works, glass factories, and mines, and
maintained a leading interest in arms: between 1873 and 1913,
Japan constructed one of the largest navies in the world.
During the Meiji period as a whole, the state was responsible for 40 per cent of the capital investment in the country. This
was state-led development with a vengeance. And it served as a
model for later such projects around the world.
Chapter 3 The rise of modern international order
Questions
1. What are the main components of ‘international order’?
2. How important was the Peace of Westphalia to the formation of modern international order?
3. What were the international dynamics that helped Western powers become so powerful
during the nineteenth century?
4. What was the significance of industrialization to Western ascendancy?
5. What ideas sustained the ‘global transformation’?
6. How significant was the ‘standard of civilization’ to the formation of global inequality?
7. What have been the consequences of the ‘shrinking of the planet’?
8. Why did IGOs and INGOs emerge in the nineteenth century?
9. In what ways did imperialism impact the construction of modern international order?
10. What have been the main consequences of the global transformation?
Visit the online resources to test your understanding by trying the self-test questions.
Further Reading
Bayly, C. A. (2004), The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914 (Oxford: Blackwell). This is the best
place to start for those interested in the global origins of modern international order.
Benton, L., and Ford, L. (2016), Rage for Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Makes
the case that the origins of modern international law can be found in nineteenth-century
imperial practices.
Burbank, J., and Cooper, F. (2010), Empires in World History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press). The best available global history of empires and their role in the formation of modern
international order.
Buzan, B., and Lawson, G. (2015), The Global Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press). Blends International Relations and global history in order to show how nineteenthcentury dynamics have impacted contemporary world politics.
Getachew, A. (2019), Worldmaking After Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Explores the ways in which anti-colonial thinkers imagined, and attempted to enact, various
forms of international order.
Goswami, M. (2004), Producing India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). An account that
stresses the global features of the transformation from colonialism to the nation-state in India,
with particular emphasis on issues of political economy.
Hobson, J. (2020), Multicultural Origins of the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press). Argues that the emergence of capitalism can be found in global encounters rather than
dynamics internal to the West.
Osterhammel, J. (2014), The Transformation of the World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press). The definitive global history of the nineteenth century. A long book, but written in
bite-sized chapters that allow readers to pick and choose which topics they are interested in.
Pomeranz, K. (2000), The Great Divergence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). A
breakthrough book making the case that Western powers became more powerful than their
Asian counterparts only after 1800.
Zarakol, A. (2022), Before the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Charts the ways in
which Eurasian ideas of world order between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries served
as the basis for a range of modern practices, most notably sovereignty.
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
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Chapter 4
International history of the
twentieth century
len scot t
Framing Questions
●
Why do you think decolonization in the twentieth century took so long?
●
Do you agree that ‘we all lost the cold war’?
●
How do you believe nuclear weapons shaped the twentieth century?
Reader’s Guide
This chapter examines some of the principal developments in world politics from 1900 to 1999: the advent
of total war, the demise of European imperialism, the
development of nuclear weapons, and the onset of
cold war. Confrontation between the United States
(US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
became the key dynamic in world affairs, replacing
the dominance of—and conflict among—European
states in the first half of the twentieth century. The
cold war encompassed the ideological, political, and
military interests of the two states (and their allies)
and extended around the globe. To what extent, and
in what ways, the cold war promoted or prevented
confrontation are central questions. Similarly, how
decolonization became entangled with East–West
conflicts is crucial to understanding many struggles
in the ‘Third World’. Finally, how dangerous was the
nuclear confrontation between East and West? This
chapter explores the role of nuclear weapons in specific phases of the cold war, notably détente during
the 1960s and 1970s, and then during the deterioration of Soviet–American relations in the 1980s.
Chapter 4 International history of the twentieth century
4.1 Introduction
The First World War (also known as the Great War)
began among European states on European battlefields,
and then extended across the globe. It was the first
modern, industrialized total war, as the belligerents
mobilized their populations and economies as well as
their armies, and as they endured immense casualties.
The Second World War was yet more total in nature
and global in scope, and fundamentally changed world
politics. Before 1939, Europe was the arbiter of world
affairs, when both the USSR and the US remained, for
different reasons, primarily preoccupied with internal development. The Second World War brought the
Soviets and Americans militarily and politically deep
into Europe and transformed their relationship from
allies to antagonists. This transformation was reflected
in their relations outside Europe, where various confrontations developed. Like the First and Second World
Wars, the cold war had its origins in Europe, but quickly
spread, with enormous global consequences.
The First World War led to the collapse of four
European empires: Russian, German, AustroHungarian, and Ottoman (in Turkey). After 1945,
European power was in decline. The economic plight
of the wartime belligerents, including victors, was
increasingly apparent, as was growing realization of
the military and economic potential of the US and
the USSR. Both emerged as ‘superpowers’, combining global political ambition with military capabilities
that included weapons of mass destruction. European
political, economic, and military weakness contrasted
with the appearance of Soviet strength and growing
Western perception of malign Soviet intent. The cold
war in Europe marked the collapse of the wartime
alliance between the UK, the USSR, and the US. The
most ominous legacy of the Second World War was the
atomic bomb, built at enormous cost, and driven by fear
that Nazi Germany might win this first nuclear arms
race. After 1945, nuclear weapons posed unprecedented
challenges to world politics and to leaders responsible
for conducting post-war diplomacy. The cold war provided both context and pretext for the growth of nuclear
arsenals that threatened the very existence of humankind, and which have continued to spread well after the
end of the East–West confrontation (see Ch. 30).
Since 1900, world politics has been transformed in
multiple ways, reflecting political, technological, and
ideological developments, of which three are examined
in this chapter: (1) the transition from crises in European
power politics to total war; (2) the end of empire and
withdrawal of European states from their imperial
acquisitions; and (3) the cold war: the political, military, and nuclear confrontation between East and West.
There have, of course, been other important changes,
and indeed equally important continuities, which other
chapters in this volume address. Nevertheless, these
three principal developments provide a framework for
exploring events and trends that have shaped world
politics during the twentieth century.
4.2 Modern total war
The origins of the First World War have long been
debated. For the victorious allies, the issue of how war
began became a question of how far Germany and its
allies should be held responsible. At Versailles, the victors imposed a statement of German war guilt in the
final settlement, primarily to justify the reparations
they demanded. Debates among historians about the
war’s origins focus on political, military, and systemic
factors. Some suggest that responsibility for the war was
diffuse, as its origins lay in the complex dynamics and
imperatives of the respective alliances. In 1967, however, the West German historian Fritz Fischer argued in
his influential book, Germany’s Aims in the First World
War, that German aggression, motivated by the internal
political needs of an autocratic elite, was responsible for
the war. Whatever the causes, the pattern of events is
clear. A Serbian nationalist’s assassination of the heir
to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, triggered Austro-Hungary’s declaration of
war against Serbia. Russia’s alliance with Serbia, and
Germany’s alliance with Austro-Hungary, then became
catalysts for European-wide conflict. Germany feared
war on two fronts against France and Russia, and
attacked France in search of a speedy victory. This not
only failed, but British treaty obligations to Belgium
brought the UK into the war.
However complex or contested the origins of the
Great War, the motivations of those who fought were
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more explicable. The peoples of the belligerent nations
shared nationalist beliefs and patriotic values. As they
marched off to fight, most thought war would be short,
victorious, and, in many cases, glorious. The reality of the European battlefield quickly proved otherwise. Defensive military technologies, symbolized by
the machine gun and trench warfare, triumphed over
the tactics and strategy of attrition. It was not until
November 1918 that the allied offensive finally achieved
rapid advances that helped end the fighting. War was
total in that whole societies and economies were mobilized: men were conscripted into armies and women
into factories. Germany’s western and eastern fronts
remained the crucibles of combat, although conflict
spread to other parts of the globe, as when Japan went to
war in 1914 as an ally of Britain. Most importantly, the
United States entered the war in 1917 under President
Woodrow Wilson, whose vision of international society, articulated in his Fourteen Points, later drove
the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The
overthrow of the Tsar and seizure of power by Lenin’s
Bolsheviks in November 1917 quickly led Russia (soon
to become the USSR) to seek peace. Germany no longer
fought on two fronts but faced a new threat as America
mobilized. With the failure of its last great western
offensive in 1918, and an increasingly effective British
naval blockade, Berlin agreed to an armistice.
The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 promised a new
framework for European security and a new international order. Neither was achieved. There were crucial
differences among the victorious powers over policies towards Germany and over principles governing
international order. Moreover, the treaty failed to
tackle, what was for some, the central problem of
European security after 1870—a united and frustrated
Germany. Moreover, it further encouraged German
revanchism by creating new states and contested borders. Economic factors were also crucial. The effects of
the Great Depression, triggered in part by the Wall
Street Crash of 1929, weakened liberal democracy in
many countries and strengthened the appeal of communist, fascist, and Nazi parties. The economic impact
on German society was particularly damaging. While
all European states suffered mass unemployment,
Germany experienced hyperinflation. The value of
the German currency plummeted as more and more
money was printed and the cost of living rose dramatically. Economic and political instability provided
the ground in which support for the Nazis took root.
In 1933, Adolf Hitler gained power, and transformation of the German state began. Debate remains about
the extent to which Hitler’s ambitions were carefully
thought through and to what extent expansion was
opportunistic. A. J. P. Taylor provided a controversial
analysis in his 1961 book, The Origins of the Second
World War, in which he argued that Hitler was no
different from other German political leaders. What
was different was the philosophy of Nazism and the
combination of racial supremacy with territorial
aggression. British and French attempts to negotiate
with Hitler culminated in the Munich Agreement of
1938. Hitler’s territorial claims on the Sudetenland in
Czechoslovakia were accepted as the price for peace,
but within months Germany had seized the rest of
Czechoslovakia and was preparing for war on Poland.
Recent debates about appeasement have focused on
whether, given the lack of allied military preparedness,
there were realistic alternatives to negotiation.
In 1939, the defensive military technologies of the
First World War were overwhelmed by armoured warfare and air power, as the German blitzkrieg brought
speedy victories against Poland and in Western
Europe. Hitler was also drawn into the Balkans and
North Africa in support of his Italian ally, Benito
Mussolini. With the invasion of the USSR in June 1941,
the scale of fighting and the scope of Hitler’s aims were
apparent. Massive early victories gave way to winter
stalemate and the mobilization of the Soviet people
and military. German treatment of civilian populations and Soviet prisoners of war reflected Nazi ideas
of racial supremacy and caused the deaths of millions.
Nazi anti-Semitism and the development of concentration camps gained new momentum after a decision
on the ‘Final Solution of the Jewish Question’ in 1942.
The term Holocaust entered the political lexicon of the
twentieth century as the Nazis attempted the genocide
of the Jewish people and other minorities, such as the
Roma.
4.2.1 The rise and fall of Japan
After 1919, attempts to provide collective security
were pursued through the League of Nations. The
US Senate prevented American participation in the
League, however, and Japanese aggression against
Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia
Chapter 4 International history of the twentieth century
in 1935, and German involvement in the Spanish Civil
War of 1936–9 were met with ineffectual international
responses. In 1868, Japan emerged from centuries of
isolationism to pursue industrial and military modernization and then imperial expansion. In 1937, it invaded
China, already embroiled in civil war between communists and nationalists. The brutality of the Japanese
troops is best remembered for ‘The Rape of Nanjing’
in 1937–8, when 40,000–300,000 civilians were massacred and over 20,000 women raped. Tokyo’s strategic ambitions, however, could only be realized at the
expense of European empires and American interests.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt increasingly sought to
engage America in the European war, against strong
isolationist forces; by 1941, German submarines and
American warships were fighting an undeclared war.
The American imposition of economic sanctions on
Tokyo precipitated the Japanese surprise attack on the
US fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. When
Germany and Italy declared war on America in support of their Japanese ally, Roosevelt committed the
United States to the liberation of Europe. The British
and Americans engaged in strategic bombing, including against German cities. And after invasions of North
Africa in 1942 and Italy in 1943, the allies launched a
‘second front’ in France in 1944, for which Stalin had
been pressing.
Defeat of Germany in May 1945 came before the
atomic bomb was ready. The subsequent destruction of
the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains
controversial. (see Table 4.1). Aside from moral objections to attacking civilian populations, fierce debate
emerged, particularly among American historians,
over why the bomb was dropped. Gar Alperovitz, in his
1965 book Atomic Diplomacy, argued that, as President
Truman already knew Japan was defeated, his real
motive was to coerce Moscow in pursuit of post-war
American interests in Europe and Asia. Such claims
generated angry and dismissive responses from other
Table 4.1 Second World War estimated casualties
Hiroshima (6 August 1945): 70,000–80,000 ‘prompt’; 140,000
by end 1945; 200,000 by 1950
Nagasaki (9 August 1945): 30,000–40,000 ‘prompt’; 70,000 by
end 1945; 140,000 by 1950
Tokyo (9 March 1945): 80,000–120,000
Dresden (13–15 February 1945): 24,000–35,000+
Coventry (14 November 1940): 568
Leningrad (siege 1941–44): 800,000–1,000,000+
historians. Ensuing scholarship has benefited from
greater availability of historical evidence, though debate
persists over whether Truman dropped the bomb simply to end the war, or how far other factors, including
coercion of the Soviets, informed his calculations.
Key Points
about the origins of the First World War focus on
• Debates
whether responsibility should rest with the German
government or whether it resulted from more complex
factors.
Treaty of Versailles in 1919 failed to address central
• The
problems of European security. Restructuring the European
state system created new sources of grievance and
instability. Principles of self-determination, espoused in
particular by Woodrow Wilson, did not extend to the
colonial empires of the European powers.
rise of Hitler presented threats that European political
• The
leaders lacked the ability and will to meet, culminating in
the outbreak of the Second World War.
German attack on the Soviet Union extended the war
• The
from short and limited campaigns to extended, large-scale,
and barbaric confrontation, fought for total victory.
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought America into
• The
the war in Europe, and eventually forced Germany into
war on two fronts (again).
persists about whether the atomic bomb should
• Debate
have been used in 1945.
4.3 End of empire
The demise of imperialism in the twentieth century
marked a fundamental change in world politics. It
reflected, and contributed to, the decreasing importance of Europe as the arbiter of world affairs. The belief
that national self-determination should be a guiding
principle in international politics represented a transformation of attitudes and values. During the age of
imperialism, political status accrued to imperial powers. After 1945, imperialism became a term of opprobrium. Colonialism and the United Nations Charter
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were increasingly recognized as incompatible, although
achievement of independence was often slow and sometimes marked by prolonged and armed struggle. The
cold war frequently complicated and hindered the transition to independence. Different factors influenced
decolonization: the attitude of the colonial power; the
ideology and strategy of anti-imperialist forces; and the
role of external powers. Political, economic, and military factors played various roles in shaping the transfer
of power. Different imperial powers and newly emerging independent states had different experiences of the
end of empire (see Table 4.2).
4.3.1 Britain
In 1945, the British Empire extended across the globe.
Between 1947 and 1980, 49 territories were granted
independence. In 1947, the independence of India, the
imperial ‘Jewel in the Crown’, created the world’s largest
Table 4.2 Principal acts of European decolonization,
1945–80
Country
Colonial
state
Year of
independence
India
Pakistan
Burma
Sri Lanka
Indonesia
French Indo-China
Ghana
Malaya
French African colonies*
Zaïre
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Tanganyika
Uganda
Algeria
Rwanda
Kenya
Guinea-Bissau
Mozambique
Cape Verde
São Tomé
Angola
Zimbabwe
Britain
Britain
Britain
Britain
Netherlands
France
Britain
Britain
France
Britain
Britain
Britain
Britain
Britain
France
Belgium
Britain
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal
Britain
1947
1947
1948
1948
1949
1954
1957
1957
1960
1960
1960
1961
1961
1962
1962
1962
1963
1974
1975
1975
1975
1975
1980**
* Including Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon,
Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and
Upper Volta.
** In 1965, the white minority government in (what was then)
Rhodesia declared independence from Britain. Civil war ensued,
eventually followed by the creation of Zimbabwe in 1980.
democracy, although division into India and Pakistan
led to inter-communal ethnic cleansing and hundreds of
thousands of deaths. Indian independence was largely an
exception in the early post-war years, however, as successive British governments were reluctant to rush decolonization. The end of empire in Africa came towards the
end of the 1950s and early 1960s, symbolized by Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan’s speech in South Africa in
February 1960, when he warned his hosts of the ‘wind of
change’ blowing through the continent.
British withdrawal from empire was comparatively
peaceful, except for India and conflicts in Kenya (1952–6)
and Malaya (1948–60). In Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, the
transition to ‘one person one vote’ and Black majority rule was opposed by a white minority willing to
disregard the British government and world opinion.
The South African government aided and abetted this
minority. Under apartheid, after 1948, South Africans
engaged in what many saw as the internal equivalent
of imperialism, while South Africa also conducted
traditional imperialist practices in its occupation of
Namibia. In addition, South Africa exercised important influence in postcolonial/cold war struggles in
Angola and Mozambique after the last European
empire in Africa—that of Portugal—collapsed with the
overthrow of the military dictatorship in Lisbon.
4.3.2 France
The French experience of decolonization stood in contrast to that of the British. France had been occupied during the Second World War, and successive governments
sought to preserve French international prestige by maintaining its imperial status. In Indochina after 1945, Paris
withdrew only after prolonged guerrilla war and military
defeat at the hands of the Viet Minh, the Vietnamese
revolutionary forces led by Ho Chi Minh. In Africa,
the picture was different. Under President Charles de
Gaulle, France withdrew from empire while attempting
to preserve its influence. In Algeria, however, the French
refused to leave. Many French people regarded Algeria as
part of France itself. The resulting war, from 1954 to 1962,
caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, and France itself
was brought to the brink of civil war.
4.3.3 Legacies and consequences:
nationalism or communism?
From the perspective of former colonies, the principles
of self-determination that underpinned the new global
Chapter 4 International history of the twentieth century
order were often slow to be realized, and required
political, ideological, and in some cases military mobilization. The pattern of decolonization in Africa was
diverse, reflecting the attitudes of colonial powers, the
nature of local nationalist or revolutionary movements,
and in some cases the involvement of external states,
including cold war protagonists. Tribal factors were
also important in many cases. The most horrifying
example of the political exploitation of tribal divisions
came in the former Belgian colony, Rwanda, when in
1994 some 800,000–1,000,000 Tutsis were massacred
by the Hutu majority (of whom an estimated 100,000
were also killed). Tutsi women were also subjected to
mass rape, including for the purpose of spreading HIV/
AIDS. To what extent the imperial powers created or
exacerbated tribal divisions is an important question in
examining the political stability of newly independent
states. Equally important is the effectiveness of political
leaders in these societies in tackling formidable political challenges and economic problems of poverty and
underdevelopment.
In Asia, the relationship between nationalism and
revolutionary Marxism was a potent force. In Malaya,
the British defeated an insurgent communist movement (1948–60). In Indochina (1946–54) the French
failed to do likewise. For the Vietnamese, centuries of
foreign oppression—Chinese, Japanese, and French—
soon focused on a new adversary: the United States.
For Washington, early reluctance to support European
imperialism gave way to incremental and covert involvement, and, from 1965, growing military commitment
to the newly created state of South Vietnam. American
leaders embraced a domino theory: if one state fell to
communism, others would follow. Chinese and Soviet
support for North Vietnam highlighted the cold war
context. However, Washington failed to coordinate
limited war objectives with an effective political strategy; once victory was no longer possible, it sought to
disengage through ‘peace with honor’. The 1968 Tet
(Vietnamese New Year) offensive by the ‘Viet Cong’
guerrillas marked a decisive moment, convincing many
Americans that the war would not be won, though it
was not until 1973 that American forces finally withdrew, two years before South Vietnam collapsed.
The global trend towards decolonization was a key
development in world politics in the twentieth century,
one frequently shaped by both local circumstances and
the international dynamics of the cold war. Yet, while
imperialism withered, other forms of domination or
control took shape. The term ‘hegemony’ emerged to
critique the behaviour of the superpowers, notably
Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and US hegemony
in Central America.
Key Points
was founded on the principle of self• Decolonization
determination and marked the eclipse of European power.
European powers had differing attitudes to
• Different
decolonization after 1945: some sought to preserve their
empires, in part (the French) or whole (the Portuguese).
process of decolonization was relatively peaceful in
• The
many cases; in others, it led to revolutionary wars (Algeria,
Malaya, and Angola) whose scale and ferocity reflected the
attitudes of the colonial powers and nationalist
movements.
and national liberation became embroiled
• Independence
in cold war conflicts when the superpowers and/or their
allies became involved, for example in Vietnam. Whether
decolonization was judged successful depends, in part, on
whose perspective you adopt—that of the European
power, the independence movement, or the people
themselves.
4.4 Cold war
The rise of the United States as a world power after 1945
was of paramount importance in international politics. Its relationship with the USSR provided a crucial
dynamic in world affairs, one that affected—directly
or indirectly—every part of the globe. In the West, historians have debated with vigour and acrimony who
was responsible for the collapse of the wartime alliance between Moscow and Washington. The rise of the
Soviet Union as a global power after 1945 was equally
crucial. Moscow’s relations with its Eastern European
‘allies’, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and revolutionary forces in the Third World were vital issues
in world politics and key factors in Soviet–American
affairs.
Some historians date the origins of the cold war to
the Russian Revolution of 1917, while most focus on
events between 1945 and 1950. Whether the cold war
was inevitable, whether it was the consequence of mistakes and misperceptions, or whether it reflected the
response of courageous Western leaders to malign and
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aggressive Soviet intent, are central questions in debates
about its origins and dynamics. For many years, these
debates were supported by evidence from Western
archives and sources and reflected Western assumptions and perceptions. With the end of the cold war,
greater historical evidence has emerged of the motivations and perceptions of other states, notably those of
the Soviet Union.
4.4.1 1945–53: onset of the cold war
The development of the cold war in Europe reflected
failure to implement the principles agreed at the wartime conferences of Yalta and Potsdam. The future
of Germany and that of various Central and Eastern
European countries, notably Poland, produced growing
tension between the former wartime allies. Reconciling
principles of national self-determination with national
security proved a formidable task. In the West, feeling
grew that Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe was
guided not by historic concern with security but by ideological expansion. In March 1947, the Truman administration justified limited aid to Turkey and Greece with
rhetoric designed to arouse awareness of Soviet ambitions, and declared that America would support those
threatened by Soviet subversion or expansion. The
Truman doctrine and the associated policy of containment expressed the self-image of the US as inherently defensive. It was underpinned by the Marshall
Plan for European economic recovery, proclaimed in
June 1947, which was essential to the economic rebuilding of Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, democratic
socialist and other anti-communist forces were undermined and eliminated as Marxist–Leninist regimes,
loyal to Moscow, were installed. The exception was
Yugoslavia, where the Marxist leader, Marshal Josip
Broz Tito, consolidated his authority while maintaining independence from Moscow. Tito’s Yugoslavia subsequently played an important role in the Third World’s
Non-Aligned Movement.
The first major confrontation of the cold war took
place over Berlin in 1948. The former German capital
was left deep in the heart of the Soviet zone of occupation, and in June 1948 Stalin sought to resolve its
status by cutting communications with the West. A
massive airlift kept West Berlin’s population and its
political autonomy alive. Stalin ended the blockade
in May 1949. The crisis saw deployment of American
long-range bombers in Britain, officially described as
‘atomic-capable’, although none were actually armed
with nuclear weapons. US military deployment was
followed by political commitment enshrined in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created
in April 1949. The key article of the treaty—an attack
on one member would be treated as an attack on all—
accorded with the principle of collective self-defence
established in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In practice, the cornerstone of the alliance was the American
commitment to defend Western Europe. This soon
meant Washington’s willingness to use nuclear weapons against Soviet ‘aggression’. For Moscow, ‘political
encirclement’ encompassed a growing military, and
specifically nuclear, threat.
While the cold war originated in Europe, conflicts in Asia and elsewhere were also crucial. In 1949,
the 30-year-long Chinese civil war ended in victory
for the communists under Mao Zedong. This had a
major impact on Asian affairs and perceptions in both
Moscow and Washington. In June 1950, the North
Korean attack on South Korea was interpreted as
part of a general communist strategy and a test case
for the United States and the United Nations to resist
aggression. The resulting American and UN military
commitment, followed in October 1950 by Chinese
involvement, led to a war lasting three years in which
over 3 million people died before pre-war borders were
restored in an armistice. North and South Korea themselves remained locked in hostility, even after the end
of the cold war.
Assessing the impact of the cold war on the Middle
East is more difficult. The founding of the state of Israel
in 1948 reflected the legacy of the Nazi genocide and
the failure of British colonial policy. The complexities
of Middle Eastern politics, diplomacy, and armed conflict in the years immediately after 1945 cannot be readily understood through the prism of Soviet–American
ideological or geo-strategic conflict. Both Moscow and
Washington supported the creation of Israel in previously Arab lands, although by the 1950s the Soviets
supported Arab nationalism. The pan-Arabism of the
charismatic Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser,
embraced a form of socialism, but one far removed
from Marxism–Leninism. The state of Israel was created by force and owed its survival to a continuing
capability to defend itself against adversaries who did
not recognize the legitimacy of its existence. Israel
developed relations with the British and the French,
culminating in their secret agreement to attack Egypt
in 1956. Over time, Israel built a more crucial relationship with Washington, with whom a de facto strategic
Chapter 4 International history of the twentieth century
alliance emerged. Yet, Britain, France, and the United
States also developed a complex web of relationships
with Arab states, reflecting historical, strategic, and
economic interests.
4.4.2 1953–69: conflict, confrontation,
and compromise
One consequence of the Korean War was the build-up
of American forces in Western Europe, as communist aggression in Asia heightened perceptions of the
Soviet threat to Europe. The idea that communism was
a monolithic political entity controlled from Moscow
became an enduring American fixation, not shared in
London or elsewhere. Western Europeans nevertheless depended on Washington for military security,
and this dependence grew as cold war confrontation
in Europe deepened. The rearmament of the Federal
Republic of Germany in 1954 precipitated the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. Military build-up
by Washington and Moscow continued apace, creating unprecedented concentrations of conventional
and, moreover, nuclear forces. As the Soviets developed
the capacity to strike the United States with nuclear
weapons, the credibility of ‘extended deterrence’ was
questioned as American willingness to risk ‘Chicago
for Hamburg’ was called into doubt. The problem was
exacerbated as NATO strategy continued to depend on
American willingness not just to fight, but to initiate,
nuclear war on Europe’s behalf. By the 1960s, there
were some 7,000 nuclear weapons in Western Europe
alone. NATO deployed nuclear weapons to offset Soviet
conventional superiority, while Soviet ‘theatre nuclear’
forces in Europe compensated for overall American
nuclear superiority.
The death of Stalin in 1953 portended significant
changes for the USSR at home and abroad. Stalin’s
eventual successor, Nikita Khrushchev, strove to modernize Soviet society, but helped unleash reformist
forces in Eastern Europe. Moscow backed away from
confrontation with Poland. However, the situation in
Hungary threatened Soviet hegemony and, in 1956,
intervention of the Red Army brought bloodshed to the
streets of Budapest and international condemnation.
Soviet intervention in Hungary coincided with the
attack on Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel, precipitated by Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal. The British
government’s actions provoked fierce domestic and
international criticism, and the most serious rift in the
‘special relationship’ between London and Washington.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower strongly opposed his
allies’ action, and in the face of punitive American economic action, the British abandoned the operation (and
their support for the French and Israelis). International
opprobrium at Soviet action in Budapest was lessened
and deflected by what many saw as the final spasm of
European imperialism.
Khrushchev’s policy towards the West combined a
search for political coexistence with continued ideological confrontation. Support for national liberation
movements aroused Western fears of a global communist challenge. American commitment to liberal
democracy and national self-determination was often
subordinated to cold war considerations, as well as
to US economic and political interests. The cold war
saw the growth of powerful intelligence organizations
in both the US and USSR, whose roles ranged from
estimating intentions and capabilities of adversaries to secret intervention in the affairs of other states.
American hostility to Fidel Castro’s revolution in
Cuba after 1959 and Cuba’s growing relationship with
Moscow (see Case Study 4.1) helped lay the foundations
for the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Crises over Berlin
in 1961 (see Case Study 4.2) and Cuba in 1962 marked
the most dangerous moments of the cold war. In both,
there was risk of direct military confrontation and, certainly in October 1962, the possibility of nuclear war.
How close the world came to Armageddon, and exactly
why peace was preserved, remain matters of debate
among historians.
A more stable period of cold war coexistence and
competition developed after 1962. Nevertheless, nuclear
arsenals continued to grow. Whether this situation is
best characterized as an arms race, or whether internal
political and bureaucratic pressures drove the increases
in nuclear stockpiles, is open to interpretation. For
Washington, commitments to NATO allies also created pressures and opportunities to develop and deploy
shorter-range (‘tactical’ and ‘theatre’) nuclear weapons. The nuclear dimension of world politics increased
as other states joined ‘the nuclear club’: Britain (1952),
France (1960), China (1964), India (1974), and Pakistan
(1998). Israel and South Africa also developed nuclear
weapons, though the South Africans dismantled theirs
as apartheid ended. Growing concern at the spread of
nuclear weapons led to negotiation of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, whereby states with
nuclear weapons committed themselves to halting the
arms race, while those without promised to forego their
development.
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Case Study 4.1 Fidel Castro
Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) Premier of the Soviet
Union, with Fidel Castro
© World History Archive / Alamy Stock Photo
Fidel Castro remains an iconic figure of the twentieth century.
A charismatic and impassioned orator, El Barbudo (The Bearded
One) became a symbol of resistance to Yanqui (Yankee) imperialism and an inspiration to revolutionary socialists. Seizing power
from a corrupt and brutal dictatorship in 1959, Castro led Cuba
as prime minister, then president, for nearly fifty years. With his
brother, Raúl, and the similarly iconic Che Guevara, he sought
to promote revolution at home and abroad. And in the 1980s,
Cuban combat troops fought in the Angolan civil war in support
of Marxist protagonists against those backed by America (and
apartheid South Africa).
Castro had no links with Moscow when he came to power, nor
was he a member of the Cuban Communist Party. He embraced
Marxism-Leninism (and physically embraced Nikita Khrushchev)
as relations with the US collapsed and relations with Moscow
flourished. Debate remains over whether a modus vivendi could
4.4.3 1969–79: the rise and fall of détente
As American military involvement in Vietnam deepened, Soviet–Chinese relations were deteriorating.
Indeed by 1969, a territorial dispute led to significant military clashes between the PRC and the USSR.
have developed between Castro and Washington. Yet, radical agrarian reform and public ownership of Cuban industries
threatened the interests of powerful American corporations.
Americans also looked to the potential threat of revolutionary
contagion across Latin America.
Meanwhile, rooting out dictator Fulgencio Batista’s officials
entailed large numbers of executions, and augured increasingly
repressive measures against ‘counter-revolutionaries’, as control
of the Cuban communist party was extended, and political freedoms undermined, precipitating an exodus of Cubans to the US.
At the same time, Castro’s pursuit of social justice meant significant and enduring advances in health care and literacy, especially
for Cuba’s peasants.
Critics argue that Havana was driven into the hands of Moscow
by Washington. From March 1960, the CIA pursued regime
change in Havana—including plots to assassinate Fidel Castro,
even engaging the American mafia to murder him. In April
1961, a force of CIA-trained Cuban emigres landed at the Bay
of Pigs hoping to provoke a popular uprising. They were heavily
defeated. Secret American attempts to overthrow Castro nevertheless continued, and the US sought to isolate Cuba diplomatically and economically.
In 1962, fear of an American invasion made the Cuban leadership receptive to Khrushchev’s proposal to deploy Soviet nuclear
missiles in Cuba. Castro agreed, though was keen to emphasize
Cuba’s role in the anti-imperialist struggle. When the US discovered the missiles in October 1962, the world moved to the brink
of nuclear catastrophe. Castro embraced the cause of ‘Homeland
or Death’ and was willing to fight a nuclear war in the cause
of anti-imperialism. Khrushchev, however, was desperate to
avoid nuclear war and failed to consult Castro on the deal with
Kennedy to withdraw the missiles. Intensive Soviet efforts were
needed to assuage Fidel’s anger and restore relations, reflecting
Castro’s view that Cuba was an ally not a client of the USSR. Later,
Cuba emerged as a prominent member of the 120-strong NonAligned Movement.
The collapse of the USSR in 1991 did not persuade Fidel Castro
to abandon the Cuban revolution. El Barbudo continued to forge
new political and economic relations with fellow-minded revolutionaries in Latin America, notably in Nicaragua and Venezuela.
Rapprochement with Washington during the twentieth century
remained unforthcoming.
Question 1: Was confrontation between Castro’s revolution and
the United States inevitable?
Question 2: How will history remember Fidel Castro?
Such tensions assisted the foundations of détente
between Moscow and Washington, and helped facilitate rapprochement between Beijing and Washington.
Détente in Europe originated from the Ostpolitik of
the German Socialist Chancellor, Willy Brandt, and
resulted in agreements that recognized the peculiar
Chapter 4 International history of the twentieth century
Case Study 4.2 The city of Berlin 1945–89
Checkpoint Charlie (Checkpoint C) crossing point between
East and West Berlin during the Berlin Crisis of 1961
© Universal Art Archive / Alamy Stock Photo
Berlin began and ended the twentieth century as the capital of
a united Germany. After 1945, the city became a crucible of the
cold war. In 1948 and 1961, it provided the focus for confrontations that risked war between East and West.
During the war, the allies agreed to divide Germany into zones
of occupation, pending an eventual political settlement. Berlin
was governed between the Soviet, American, British, and French.
The city, however, was 120 miles deep in the Soviet zone. After
Stalin objected to the merger of the three western sectors, he
attempted to end joint administration by a blockade of communications with West Berlin.
Between June 1948 and May 1949 (when the blockade was
called off) West Berlin was supplied by American and British
aircraft with food, fuel, and medicine. The population of West
Berlin (and its peculiar political status) survived. In 1958, Nikita
Khrushchev resolved to settle its anomalous status by threatening a peace treaty with East Germany and making Berlin ‘a free
city’. In June 1961, he repeated the threat to President Kennedy
at their summit in Vienna. In NATO eyes, the security of West
status of Berlin and the sovereignty of East Germany.
Soviet–American détente had its roots in mutual recognition of the need to avoid nuclear crises, and in the
economic and military incentives to avoid an unconstrained arms race.
In the West, détente was associated with the political
leadership of President Richard Nixon and his adviser
Henry Kissinger (both of whom were also instrumental in Sino-American rapprochement). During this
phase in Soviet–American relations, each side pursued
political goals, some of which were increasingly incompatible with the aspirations of the other superpower.
Both supported friendly regimes and movements, and
both subverted adversaries. Détente came as political
Berlin (and West Germany) rested on America’s willingness to use
nuclear weapons against the USSR in the event of Soviet aggression. As West Berlin could not be defended by conventional
forces, Kennedy would have to choose between nuclear war and
surrendering the city: ‘holocaust or humiliation’.
Meanwhile, the exodus of refugees from East to West Berlin
accelerated. Faced with economic catastrophe, Khrushchev
accepted East German demands to close the border (which
occurred on the night of 13 August 1961). The Berlin Wall
staunched the haemorrhage of skilled workers at political cost
to Moscow’s credibility (and at a humanitarian cost of those
killed attempting to flee west). The problem of Berlin was not,
however, resolved. In October 1961, a concatenation of local
events precipitated confrontation between American and
Soviet tanks at Checkpoint Charlie. Some US and Soviet officials thought these events more dangerous than the Cuban
crisis in 1962. Back-channel diplomacy and superpower choreography enabled Kennedy and Khrushchev to draw back
without losing face, in a confrontation neither had planned or
anticipated.
After the Cuban missile crisis, relations between Washington
and Moscow improved and Berlin was no longer the locus of confrontation. Political leaders, notably the erstwhile mayor of Berlin,
Willy Brandt, pursued détente, which led to the Quadripartite
Agreement in 1971 that facilitated recognition of East Germany
and effective acceptance of existing borders.
Subsequently, the seismic changes wrought by the collapse
of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe brought the prospect of
German reunification. In November 1989, the people of Berlin
began to dismantle the Wall, symbolizing the end of the cold war.
Within a year, Germany was reunified, and soon Berlin regained
its status as its capital.
Question 1: Why was West Berlin so important in the cold war?
Question 2: Examine and evaluate Western policy towards Berlin
from 1945 to 1989.
upheavals were taking place in the Third World (see
Table 4.3). The question of to what extent the superpowers could control their friends, and to what extent
they were entangled by their commitments, was underlined in 1973 when the Arab–Israeli war embroiled
Washington and Moscow in a potentially dangerous
confrontation. Getting the superpowers involved in
the war—whether by design or by serendipity—nevertheless helped to create the political conditions for
Egyptian–Israeli rapprochement. Diplomatic and strategic relations were transformed as Egypt switched
allegiance from Moscow to Washington. In the short
term, Egypt was isolated in the Arab world. For Israel,
fear of a war of annihilation fought on two fronts was
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Table 4.3 Revolutionary upheavals in the Third World,
1974–80
Ethiopia
Overthrow of Haile Selassie
Sept. 1974
Cambodia
Khmer Rouge takes Phnom
Penh
April 1975
Vietnam
North Vietnam/‘Viet Cong’
take Saigon
April 1975
Laos
Pathet Lao takes over state
May 1975
Guinea-Bissau Independence from Portugal
Sept. 1974
Mozambique
Independence from Portugal
June 1975
Cape Verde
Independence from Portugal
June 1975
São Tomé
Independence from Portugal
June 1975
Angola
Independence from Portugal
Nov. 1975
Afghanistan
Military coup
April 1978
Iran
Ayatollah Khomeini installed in
power
Feb. 1979
Grenada
New Jewel Movement takes
power
March 1979
Nicaragua
Sandinistas take Managua
July 1979
Zimbabwe
Independence from Britain
April 1980
Source: Halliday (1986): 92.
lifted. Yet continuing political violence and terrorism,
and enduring enmity between Israel and other Arab
states, proved insurmountable obstacles to a regional
settlement.
Soviet support for revolutionary movements in
the Third World reflected Moscow’s self-confidence
as a superpower and its analysis that the Third World
was turning towards Marxism-Leninism. Ideological
competition with the West and with China ensued. In
America, this was viewed as evidence of Soviet duplicity. Some claimed that Moscow’s support for revolutionary forces in Ethiopia in 1975 killed détente. Others
cited the Soviet role in Angola in 1978, where Moscow
supplied arms and helped transport Cuban troops to
support the Marxists. The perception that Moscow
was using arms control to gain military advantage was
linked to Soviet behaviour in the Third World. Growing
Soviet military superiority was reflected in increasing
Soviet influence, it was argued. Critics claimed that the
SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) process failed
to prevent the Soviets from deploying multiple independently targetable warheads on large intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), threatening key American
forces. The United States faced a ‘window of vulnerability’, they claimed. The view from Moscow was different, reflecting divergent assumptions about the scope
and purpose of détente and the nature of nuclear deterrence. Other events weakened American influence. The
overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 resulted in the
loss of an important Western regional ally, although
the subsequent revolutionary Islamic government was
hostile to both superpowers.
December 1979 marked a point of transition in East–
West affairs. NATO agreed to deploy land-based Cruise
and Pershing II missiles in Europe if negotiations with
Moscow did not reduce what NATO saw as serious military imbalances. Later that month, Soviet armed forces
intervened in Afghanistan to support the USSR’s revolutionary allies. Moscow was bitterly condemned in the
West and in the Third World, and became embroiled
in a protracted and bloody struggle that many compared to America’s war in Vietnam. In Washington,
President Jimmy Carter’s view of Moscow changed
dramatically. He withdrew the SALT II Treaty from
Senate ratification, sought an international boycott of
the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, and announced
the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force for use in
an area stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Horn
of Africa. Nevertheless, Republicans increasingly used
foreign and defence policy to attack the Carter presidency. Perceptions of American weakness permeated
US domestic politics, and in 1980 Ronald Reagan was
elected president, committed to a more confrontational
approach with Moscow on arms control, conflicts in
the Third World, and East–West relations in general.
4.4.4 1979–86: ‘the second cold war’
In the West, critics of détente and arms control argued
that the Soviets were acquiring nuclear superiority.
Some suggested that the United States should pursue
strategies based on the idea that victory in nuclear war
was possible. Reagan’s election in 1980 was a watershed
in Soviet–American relations. He inherited the issue
of nuclear missiles in Europe, which loomed large in
the breakdown of relations between East and West.
Changes in the strategic and European nuclear ‘balances’ had generated new anxieties in the West about
the credibility of extended deterrence (see Table 4.4).
NATO’s resulting decision to deploy land-based missiles capable of striking Soviet territory precipitated
great tension in relations between NATO and the
USSR, and political friction within NATO. Reagan’s
own incautious public remarks reinforced perceptions
that he was ill-informed and dangerous in nuclear matters, although key arms policies were largely consistent
Chapter 4 International history of the twentieth century
Table 4.4 Principal nuclear weapons states: number of intact nuclear warheads, 1945–90
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
USA
6
369
3,057
20,434
31,982
26,662
27,826
24,304
24,327
21,004
USSR
–
5
200
1,605
6,129
11,643
19,055
30,062
39,197
37,000
UK
–
–
10
30
310
280
350
350
300
300
France
–
–
–
–
32
36
188
250
360
505
PRC
–
–
–
–
5
75
185
280
425
430
Total
6
374
3,267
22,069
38,458
38,696
47,604
55,246
64,609
59,239
Source: Norris and Kristensen (2006): 66.
with those of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter. However,
Reagan was uninterested in agreements that would
freeze the status quo for the sake of reaching accord,
and Soviet and American negotiators proved unable to
make progress in talks on long-range and intermediaterange weapons. One particular idea had significant
consequences for arms control and for Washington’s
relations with both allies and adversaries. The Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI), quickly dubbed ‘Star Wars’,
was a research programme designed to explore the feasibility of space-based defences against ballistic missiles. The Soviets appeared to take SDI very seriously;
they claimed that Reagan’s real purpose was to regain
the American nuclear monopoly of the 1940s. Reagan
himself retained an idiosyncratic attachment to SDI,
which he believed could make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. However, the technological advances
claimed by SDI proponents did not materialize and the
programme was eventually reduced and marginalized.
The ensuing period of superpower confrontation
between 1979 and 1986 has been described as the second cold war and compared to the early period of
confrontation between 1946 and 1953. In both Western
Europe and the USSR there was fear of nuclear war,
much of which reflected a reaction to the rhetoric and
policies of the Reagan administration. American statements on nuclear weapons, and military interventions
in Grenada (1983) and against Libya (1986), were seen as
evidence of a new belligerence. Reagan’s policy towards
Central America, and support for the rebel Contras
in Nicaragua, generated controversy in America and
internationally. In 1986, the International Court of
Justice found the United States guilty of violating
international law for the Central Intelligence Agency’s
(CIA’s) covert attacks on Nicaraguan harbours.
The Reagan administration’s use of military power
was nonetheless limited: rhetoric and perceptions
were at variance with political action. Some overseas
operations ended in humiliating failure, notably in
Lebanon in 1983. Nevertheless, there is evidence that
some in the Soviet leadership took seriously the Reagan
administration’s words (and deeds) and became anxious that Washington might be planning a nuclear
first strike. In 1983, Soviet air defences shot down a
South Korean civilian airliner in Soviet airspace. The
American reaction, and imminent deployment of
American nuclear missiles in Europe, created a climate
of great tension in East–West relations. Some historians believe that in November 1983 Soviet intelligence
may have misinterpreted a NATO training exercise
(codenamed ‘Able Archer’) leading to fear in Moscow
that NATO was preparing an attack. How close the
world came to a serious nuclear confrontation in 1983
remains a subject of debate (see Table 4.5).
Throughout the early 1980s, the Soviets were handicapped by a succession of aging political leaders (Leonid
Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko),
whose ill-health further inhibited Soviet foreign policy.
This changed dramatically after Mikhail Gorbachev
became premier in 1985. Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ in
foreign policy, together with domestic reforms, created
a revolution in Moscow’s foreign relations and within
Soviet society. At home, glasnost (or openness) and
perestroika (or restructuring) unleashed nationalist
forces that, to Gorbachev’s dismay, helped bring about
the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Table 4.5 Cold war crises
1948–9
1954–5
1961
1962
1973
Berlin
Taiwan straits
Berlin
Cuba
Arab–Israeli war
1983
Exercise ‘Able Archer’
USSR/US/UK/France
US/PRC
USSR/US/NATO
USSR/US/Cuba
Egypt/Israel/Syria/Jordan/
US/USSR
USSR/US/NATO
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Gorbachev’s aim in foreign policy was to transform international relations, most importantly with
the United States. His domestic agenda also catalysed
change in Eastern Europe, though, unlike Khrushchev,
he was not prepared to use force or coercion. When
confronted with revolt in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev’s
foreign ministry invoked Frank Sinatra’s song ‘I Did
it My Way’ to revoke the Brezhnev doctrine that
had earlier limited Eastern European sovereignty and
political development. The Sinatra doctrine meant
Eastern Europeans were now allowed to ‘do it their
way’. Moscow-aligned regimes gave way to democracies, in what was, for the most part, a peaceful as well
as speedy transition (see Ch. 5). Most dramatically,
Germany was united and the East German state (the
German Democratic Republic) disappeared.
Gorbachev pursued arms agreements that helped
ease tensions that had characterized the early 1980s. In
1987, he travelled to Washington to sign the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, banning intermediaterange nuclear missiles, including Cruise and Pershing
II. While this agreement was heralded as a triumph for
the Soviet premier, NATO leaders, including Margaret
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, argued that it vindicated
the policies pursued by NATO since 1979. The INF Treaty
was concluded more quickly than a new agreement
on cutting strategic nuclear weapons, in part because
of continuing Soviet opposition to SDI. Instead, it was
Reagan’s successor, George H. W. Bush, who concluded
a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement
reducing long-range nuclear weapons (though only back
to the level they had been in the early 1980s). Gorbachev
used agreements on nuclear weapons to build trust and
to demonstrate the serious and radical nature of his
purpose. However, despite agreements on conventional
forces in Europe (culminating in the Paris Agreement
of 1990), the end of the cold war marked success in
nuclear arms control rather than nuclear disarmament
(see Table 4.6). The histories of the cold war and nuclear
weapons are connected very closely, but while the cold
war is over, nuclear weapons are still very much with us
(see Opposing Opinions 4.1).
Table 4.6 Principal arms control and disarmament agreements
Treaty
Purpose of agreement
Signed
Parties
Geneva protocol
Partial Test Ban Treaty
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Biological Weapons Convention
SALT I Treaty
ABM Treaty
SALT II Treaty
INF Treaty
START 1 Treaty
START 2 Treaty
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Banned use of chemical weapons
Banned atmospheric, underwater, outer-space nuclear tests
Limited spread of nuclear weapons
Banned production/use
Limited strategic arms*
Limited anti-ballistic missiles
Limited strategic arms*
Banned two categories of land-based missiles
Reduced strategic arms*
Banned multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs)
Banned all nuclear tests in all environments
1925
1963
1968
1972
1972
1972
1979
1987
1990
1993
1996
140
125+
190+
180+
US/USSR
US/USSR
US/USSR
US/USSR
US/USSR
US/USSR
180+
* Strategic arms are long-range weapons.
Source: adapted from Harvard Nuclear Study Group (1985): 96.
Key Points
remain about when and why the cold war
• Disagreements
began, and who was responsible. Distinct phases can be
discerned in East–West relations, during which tension and
the risk of direct confrontation grew and receded.
civil and regional wars were intensified and prolonged
• Some
by superpower involvement; others may have been
prevented or shortened.
weapons were an important factor in the cold war.
• Nuclear
To what extent their development had a momentum of its
own is a matter of debate. Agreements on limiting and
controlling the growth of nuclear arsenals played an
important role in Soviet–American (and East–West)
relations.
end of the cold war did not result in the abolition of
• The
nuclear weapons.
international crises occurred in which there was risk
• Various
of nuclear war. How close we came to catastrophe at these
times remains open to debate.
Chapter 4 International history of the twentieth century
Opposing Opinions 4.1 During the cold war, the benefits of nuclear weapons outweighed their
costs and risks
For
Against
Nuclear deterrence kept the peace. European conflicts in the
twentieth century resulted in devastating wars that killed many
millions. Nuclear weapons helped prevent war in Europe (and
elsewhere).
The bomb increased East–West political tensions and heightened the threat of war. Nuclear weapons helped breed mutual
fear and hostility. They contributed to the cold war antagonism
that helped create global conflict. Yet, at the same time, the
Korean and Vietnam wars were neither prevented nor ended by
nuclear weapons. States without nuclear weapons were often not
deterred from attacking those with nuclear weapons.
Mutually assured destruction (MAD) provided a form of
­stability. Both sides knew they could not win a nuclear war, but
to ensure this, each needed to threaten retaliation on a devastating scale.
The bomb was cheap. Conventional defences were far more
expensive than nuclear armaments. In the West, nuclear weapons proved less costly than traditional armed forces, in both
money and personnel. They therefore contributed to economic
growth and social stability.
Cold war arms agreements reduced the risks and costs of the
arms race. Negotiated agreements helped provide strategic stability by establishing greater equality in numbers and reducing
fears of nuclear first strikes. Soviet–American arms control eased
political tensions in various phases of the cold war, most importantly during détente in the 1960s and 1970s. Specific agreements stopped nuclear testing in the atmosphere (1963 Partial
Test Ban Treaty) and eliminated specific categories of nuclear
weapons (1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty).
Arms control did not lead to disarmament. Cold war nuclear
arsenals grew in size and sophistication. Arms control legitimized
the possession of nuclear weapons and encouraged proliferation.
During the 1980s, nuclear weapons technologies became a key
focus of Soviet–American anxiety. The end of the cold war did not
lead to nuclear disarmament.
Twentieth–century nuclear crises demonstrated that misinformation, misjudgement, and miscalculation by political leaders risked ‘inadvertent’ nuclear war. Those risks were
increased by the delegation of nuclear authority to subordinate
military commanders. Potential failures of command control
remained a persistent concern throughout the cold war (and
beyond).
Nuclear weapons carry dire environmental implications.
Global nuclear war would have led to global environmental
catastrophe and the prospect of a ‘nuclear winter’ that could have
virtually extinguished all human life.
1. Do you believe it was morally acceptable to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against cities during the cold war?
2. Was it the good judgement of political leaders or good luck that best explains how we avoided nuclear war during the cold war?
3. What do you think were the main achievements of Soviet–American arms control agreements during the cold war?
Visit the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle these questions.
4.5 Conclusion
The changes that took place in twentieth-century world
politics were enormous. Assessing their significance
raises many complex issues about the nature of international history and international relations. How did war
come about in 1914? What accounts for the rise of Hitler?
What were the origins, dynamics, and costs of the cold
war? These questions have generated robust debate and
fierce controversy. This conclusion emphasizes several
points about the relationship between total war, end of
empire, and cold war. However war broke out in 1914,
the transformation of warfare into industrialized total
war reflected a combination of technological, political,
and social forces. Subsequently, political leaders proved
incapable of restoring peace and stability; attempts
to reconstruct the European state system after 1919
failed to address enduring problems while creating new
obstacles to a stable order. The rise of Nazi Germany
brought global conflagration and new methods of fighting and killing. The scale of carnage and suffering was
unprecedented. Nazi ideas of racial supremacy resulted
in brutality and mass murder across Europe and culminated in genocide against the Jews. One consequence
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was the creation of Israel, which set in motion conflicts
that continue to have global repercussions today. In
the 1930s, the rise of an expansionist military regime
in Tokyo likewise portended protracted and brutal war
across the Pacific.
The period since 1945 witnessed the end of European
empires constructed before, and in the early part of,
the twentieth century, and saw the rise and fall of the
cold war. The relationship between the end of empire
and cold war conflict in the Third World was a close,
though complex, one. In some cases, involvement of the
superpowers helped bring change. In others, it resulted
in escalation and prolongation of conflict. Marxist ideology in various forms provided inspiration to liberation movements in the Third World, and provocation
to the United States (and others). The Vietnam war
was the most obvious example of this. Precisely how
the cold war affected decolonization is best assessed
on a case-by-case basis, but one key issue is the extent
to which the objectives of revolutionary leaders and
movements were nationalist rather than Marxist. It
is claimed that both Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and
Fidel Castro in Cuba were primarily nationalists, who
turned to Moscow and to communism only in response
to Western hostility. Divisions between Moscow and
Beijing also demonstrated diverging trends in the practice of Marxism. In several instances, conflict between
communists became as bitter as that between communists and capitalists. In other areas, notably the Middle
East, Marxism faced the challenge of pan-Arabism and
revolutionary Islam, which held greater attraction for
the peoples involved. Superpower involvement was
more complex and diffuse, though in moments of crisis
nevertheless significant.
Similarly, the relationship between the cold war
and nuclear history is close, though often complex.
Some historians contend that the use of atomic weapons played a decisive part in the origins of the cold war.
Others see the prospect of annihilation as central to
understanding Soviet defence and foreign policy, and
the unprecedented threat of devastation as crucial to
understanding the mutual hostility and fear of leaders
in the nuclear age. Yet it is also argued that without
nuclear weapons, direct Soviet–American conflict
would have been much more likely, and had nuclear
weapons not acted as a deterrent, war in Europe could
have happened. Still others contend that nuclear weapons played a limited role in East–West relations, and
that their importance is exaggerated.
Nuclear weapons have, nevertheless, constituted
a focus for political agreement, and during détente,
arms agreements acted as the currency of international
politics. Yet how close we came to nuclear war in 1961
(Berlin), or 1962 (Cuba), or 1973 (Arab–Israeli war), or
1983 (Exercise ‘Able Archer’), and what lessons might
be learned from these events, are crucial questions
for historians and policy-makers alike. One central
issue concerns the extent to which cold war perspectives and involvement of nuclear-armed superpowers
imposed stability in regions where previous instability had led to conflict and war. The cold war may have
produced unprecedented concentrations of military
and nuclear forces in Europe, but it was also a period
characterized by stability and great economic prosperity, certainly in the West.
Both the cold war and the age of empire are over,
though across the globe their legacies—good and bad,
seen and unseen—persist. The age of ‘the bomb’, and
of other weapons of mass destruction (chemical and
biological), continues. To what extent the clash of
communist and liberal/capitalist ideologies helped
facilitate or retard globalization is a matter for reflection. Despite the limitations of the human imagination, the global consequences of nuclear war remain
all too real. The accident at the Soviet nuclear reactor
at Chernobyl in 1986 demonstrated that radioactivity
knows no national boundaries. In the 1980s, scientists
suggested that the explosion of even a fraction of the
world’s nuclear weapons over a fraction of the world’s
cities could end life itself in the northern hemisphere.
While the threat of strategic nuclear war has receded,
the global problem of nuclear weapons remains a common and urgent concern for humanity in the twentyfirst century.
Chapter 4 International history of the twentieth century
Questions
1. How far do you believe Germany was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914?
2. Who do you think was responsible for the failure of the Versailles Treaty to solve the
problems of European political instability from 1919 to 1939?
3. Do you believe there were missed opportunities to stop Hitler’s aggression in Europe?
4. Do you think that the principal reason why the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan was to
end the war?
5. Do you believe that the American defeat in Vietnam was inevitable?
6. How would you explain the breakdown of détente in the 1980s?
7. Which European power do you consider to be the most successful at decolonization?
8. Why do you think some struggles for national liberation were more violent than others?
9. Do you believe that nuclear weapons kept the peace after 1945?
10. What role do you think nuclear crises played in the cold war?
Visit the online resources to test your understanding by trying the self-test questions.
Further Reading
Best, A., Hanhimäki, J. M., Maiolo, J. A., and Schulze, K. E. (2014), International History of the
Twentieth Century and Beyond (London: Routledge). A comprehensive and authoritative
account of twentieth-century history.
Brown, C. (2019), Understanding International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). A
valuable introduction to how theories of international relations provide interpretation and
understanding.
Ferguson, N. (2006), The War of the World: History’s Age of Hatred (London: Allen Lane). A
panoramic view of war and conflict in the twentieth century.
Getachew, A. (2019), Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press). A distinctive exploration of the role of anti-colonial thinking in
shaping decolonization and world politics.
Keylor, W. R. (2012), The Twentieth-Century World and Beyond: An International History since 1900
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). A comprehensive and balanced assessment of twentiethcentury international history.
Reynolds, D. (2005), One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945 (London: Penguin). A highly
authoritative, comprehensive, and nuanced analysis of world politics since 1945.
Thomas, M. (2014), Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and Their Roads from Empire (Oxford: Oxford
University Press). An accessible and systematic assessment of the strategies and practices of
decolonization of the two largest colonial states.
Young, J., and Kent, J. (2020), International Relations Since 1945, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford
University Press). A comprehensive survey of the impact of the cold war on world politics since
1945, providing analysis of war in the Middle East, the development of European integration,
and the demise of the European empires in Africa and Asia.
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
69
Chapter 5
From the end of the cold war
to a new world dis-order?
michael cox
Framing Questions
●
Has the international system become more or less orderly since the end of the cold war?
●
Does the rise of other powers, most notably China and Russia, signal a major shift of
power?
●
Why is globalization now being challenged in the West?
Reader’s Guide
This chapter provides a broad overview of the international system between the end of the cold war and
the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) through to
the early 2020s, when it looked as if a once confident
West was under siege, the United States in decline,
and the liberal economic order in deep crisis. How did
all this come about? Why were the high hopes entertained in the West in the 1990s not fully realized? And
how critical has the situation become for the West?
To answer these big questions, the chapter takes the
long view and looks in turn at the Bill Clinton years (a
moment of high liberal optimism), the two terms of
George W. Bush (a period dominated by the so-called
‘war’ on terror), and the onset of the financial crash
of 2008 and the impact this had on the world. The
chapter then examines the changing face of Europe,
the challenges confronting the ‘Global South’, the
ongoing problems facing the Middle East, and the
reasons for the successful rise of China within an
economically dynamic Asia. The chapter concludes
by exploring three big questions. First, is power now
shifting away from the West and is the world still unipolar? Second, how serious is the threat to globalization and the liberal order? And finally, how has the
Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine impacted
the international system?
Chapter 5 From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order?
5.1 Introduction: the cold war and after
The modern world system is in many ways the result
of two great twentieth-century wars, the first of these
leading to the Russian Revolution and the break-up of
empires that had hitherto dominated Europe, and the
second and more devastating conflict to a major restructuring of the international order. This left Germany and
Japan under Allied control, most of Europe and Asia in
tatters, former colonies in a state of political turmoil,
and two opposing states—the US and the USSR—in
positions of enormous strength. Many then hoped that
the world would enjoy a long period of ‘great power’
cooperation. But after a brief moment of optimism,
the world was soon confronted by yet another conflict
which very quickly came to be known as a ‘cold war’.
The causes of the cold war have been much debated.
But several factors in the end caused it, including a deep
incompatibility between the social and economic systems of East and West, mutual fears on the part of the
USSR and the US concerning the other’s intentions, and
insecurities generated by an ongoing nuclear arms race.
Beginning in Europe, the cold war soon spread to what
became known then as the ‘Third World’ (but after the
end of the cold war as the ‘Global South’). Here, the
conflict assumed a far more deadly form, with over 25
million people killed as a result of real wars—civil as
well as wars of intervention—fought out from Korea to
Vietnam, South Asia to southern Africa.
Inevitably, the discipline of International Relations
(IR) was influenced by the cold war. Indeed, having
also become a largely American discipline after the
Second World War, IR was very much shaped by the
theoretical preferences of key US scholars such as Hans
J. Morgenthau, whose 1948 textbook Politics Among
Nations went into seven editions, and a little bit later
by Kenneth Waltz, whose 1959 Man, The State, and
War soon became a classic. Though different in their
approaches to world politics, both Morgenthau and
Waltz championed the theoretical case for what became
the dominant IR paradigm during the cold war: realism
(see Ch. 9). Waltz did something else as well: he provided what many believed was a rationalization for the
cold war, in a much-quoted article published in 1964.
In this article, he even went so far as to suggest that by
reducing the number of major international actors to
only two (‘bipolarity’) the cold war had created its own
form of stability (K. Waltz 1964).
This way of thinking about the East–West stand-off
may in large part explain the failure of IR academics
to seriously contemplate the possibility of it ever coming to an end. Nor was there much reason to think that
it could, given the then-standard Western (and indeed
traditional Soviet) view that the USSR was a ‘superpower’ in its own right which would never voluntarily
give up control of Central and Eastern Europe or contemplate the possibility of Germany uniting. The conflict therefore would go on. But as we now know, it did
not. East European discontent with Soviet rule, a slowdown in the Soviet economy made worse by attempts
to reform the system after 1985, the cost of an extended
global competition with an economically more
advanced West, and the fact that the USSR contained
within it many nationalities (including, most importantly, Ukraine), finally spelled doom for the Soviet
system. Whether what finally happened was inevitable
remains a question which historians continue to debate
(Zubok 2021).
5.2 The United States: exploiting the unipolar ‘moment’
The collapse of Soviet power in Eastern and Central
Europe, followed two years later by the end of the USSR
itself, did not just change the way in which millions of
people around the world regarded their own political
futures. It also led to profound changes in the structure
of the international order. Indeed, with the passing of
the USSR, scholars of International Relations began to
talk of a rapid transition from a world in which there
had been two balancing powers—a bipolar system—
to another in which there was no balance at all—a
unipolar system in which the United States would now
shape international politics almost completely.
This new global conjuncture raised a series of important questions. How stable would the new international
order be? How long could US primacy last? What kind
of foreign policy would the United States pursue now
that it no longer had a single enemy to fight?
In the end, these particular questions were not
answered on the pages of foreign policy journals so
much as by the election of President William (Bill)
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Jefferson Clinton in 1992. Helped into office by an electorate that was now more focused on domestic matters than international affairs—and sensing that the
American people were seeking a new foreign policy
approach—he concentrated mainly on economic issues,
linking prosperity at home with the US’ ability to compete abroad. This did not preclude the US having to
address other more traditional threats, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism. But having
won the cold war, not only were the American people
deeply reluctant to intervene abroad, there seemed to
be no pressing reason for the US to get sucked into conflicts overseas either.
Yet, as Clinton conceded, the US could neither
escape from the world nor retreat from it. There may
have been little appetite for military intervention, especially following the 1993 debacle in Somalia, but the
US was hardly inactive. It did after all impose its own
military ‘solution’ on the Serbs in the unfolding war in
former Yugoslavia. Clinton then pushed hard for the
enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) (a policy that later came back to haunt the
West’s relationship with Russia). And he was anything
but hesitant when it came to trying to resolve some
fairly intractable regional conflicts, including the one
in Northern Ireland.
This of course did not convince his many critics
on the right. They believed the United States under
Clinton had no ‘grand strategy’; indeed, one critic
claimed Clinton was taking the nation on a liberal
‘holiday from history’ (Will 2001). But this was perhaps less than fair or accurate. The US may have had
no single state enemy to fight and Clinton was certainly not looking for one. On the other hand, his
administration did recognize more quickly than most
the very real threat posed by a non-state actor—Al
Qaeda. Moreover, if Clinton displayed caution when
it came to employing American military power overseas, this seemed to correspond to the wishes of most
Americans during the 1990s.
Clinton’s approach also allowed the US to focus on
the one thing it seemed to do best: unleashing the power
of the market at home while advancing the case for globalization around the world. Indeed, Clinton himself
became one of globalization’s greatest advocates, at one
stage even arguing that it was the ‘economic equivalent of a force of nature, like wind or water’ (Clinton
2000–1). It certainly felt like one, as economic barriers
around the world began to come down under US urging, leading to a massive increase in trade, a huge jump
in foreign direct investment (FDI), and growth in the
world’s total wealth from around $22 trillion in 1990
to $33 trillion in 2000. Perhaps more significant, in this
new age of globalization, big emerging economies like
India and China became richer, more dynamic, and
inevitably began to become important economic players on the world’s stage.
Even so, doubts remained about Clinton’s policies
and how successful he was in laying the basis of a stable
world order. As progressives on the left pointed out, his
wholehearted adoption of free market policies at home
and abroad were not only leading to growing inequality, but also to a loss of American manufacturing jobs
to other countries (China most obviously). These costs
could be borne in the short term while the US economy
continued to grow, as it did throughout the 1990s and
the early 2000s. But if or when a politician emerged to
question globalization and the benefits it had brought to
ordinary Americans, then the nation might be in political trouble. As Dani Rodrik noted, during Clinton’s second administration, the kind of runaway globalization
being promoted by Clinton was exposing social fissures
between those with the education, skills, and mobility
to flourish in an unfettered world market—the apparent ‘winners’—and those without. The seeds of future
division were already being sown (Rodrik 1997).
Key Points
end of the cold war increased the US’ weight in the
• The
international system.
President Clinton there was a greater focus on
• Under
economic issues as a central part of US foreign policy.
on the right attacked Clinton for having no grand
• Critics
strategy.
to the left of Clinton asked whether
• Opponents
globalization had gone too far.
5.3 After the USSR: Yeltsin to Putin
Scholars of International Relations have long been
deeply interested in the interplay between the great
powers and the reasons why even the most powerful
have in the end disappeared from the stage of history—
something that happened to the Ottoman and AustroHungarian empires after the First World War, then to
Chapter 5 From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order?
the European colonial empires after the Second World
War, and finally to the Soviet empire itself between
1989 and 1991. But history also demonstrates that when
empires fall this is not always followed by stability and
prosperity. So it was in the past; so it turned out to be
following the collapse of Soviet communism. Many
challenges faced the new Russia.
First there was the issue of what to do with the
USSR’s nuclear arsenal, and how to either prevent
weapons leaving the former USSR or ensure that control of them remained in Russian hands. Second, there
was an equally serious problem posed by the break-up
of the USSR. Not only did 25 million Russians now
find themselves living outside of Russia proper, but the
other nations of the former USSR also had to work out
some kind of relationship with a Russia which found it
almost impossible to think of its relationship with such
states as Ukraine and Georgia in anything other than
imperial terms (perhaps unsurprisingly, Russia under
Vladimir Putin later came to wage war against both).
Finally, there was the even more basic problem of making the transition from a centralized, planned economy,
designed to guarantee full employment, to a competitive market economy where many of the old industries
that had been the bedrock of the USSR (including its
huge military-industrial complex) were evidently no
longer fit for purpose. Clearly some very tough times
lay ahead, made tougher still by the extraordinarily
painful market reforms that Russia adopted from 1992
onwards. Indeed, as a result of its speedy adoption of
Western-style privatization, Russia in the 1990s experienced something close to a 1930s-style depression, with
industrial production plummeting, living standards
falling, and whole regions once devoted to cold war
military production going into free fall. Nor did the
economic situation show much sign of improvement as
time went on. Indeed, in 1998 Russia experienced its
own financial crisis, one that wiped out the savings of
ordinary people and made the new post-communist
regime under Boris Yeltsin even less popular than it
had been a few years earlier. Not surprisingly, a year
later he decided to resign.
It was not at first clear that Yeltsin’s successor would
behave any differently. Indeed, it was no less a person
than Yeltsin himself who chose Vladimir Putin as
his anointed successor in 1999. A product of the KGB
(the Soviet security agency) and a central figure in the
creation of its successor organization, the FSB, Putin
seemed at first to have few, if any, original ideas of his
own. However, he did understand power in the purest
sense. Ruthless even by Russian standards, he brooked
no opposition. But his wider task, as he saw it, was not
just to impose his will on others but to restore Russian
prestige after what he saw as its precipitous decline during the 1990s. Putin never hid his ambitions. The disintegration of the USSR in 1991, he repeated, had been
a ‘tragedy’, and even though it would not be possible
to put the old empire back together again, there would
be no further concessions. This might not take Russia
back to anything like the Soviet era, though some wondered whether that was his ultimate aim. But Russia,
he insisted, had to assert itself more forcefully—most
obviously against those in the West who thought they
could ignore Russia’s security concerns by pushing
NATO right up to Russia’s historic borders.
Putin’s nationalist rhetoric may have shocked some
in the West. For a while, however, policy-makers there
waited to see what might unfold. Indeed, most adopted
the realist view that it was important to work closely
with Russia: partly for economic reasons—Russia was a
major supplier of oil and gas to Europe; partly because
Putin was as opposed to terrorism as policy-makers in
the West; and partly because Russia was a permanent
member of the UN Security Council and remained a
nuclear weapons state. However, the cumulative impact
of Putin’s policies could not but complicate Russia’s
relations with the West. Some even began talking—
very loosely—of a ‘new’ cold war between Russia and
the West (see Case Study 5.1). There was no single
event which led writers to take that view. However, one
clearly important event was the Russian intervention
in Georgia in 2008. Another was Russia’s support for
the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad. Then came the crisis in Ukraine in 2014 and Russia’s illegal annexation
of Crimea, accompanied by its proxy war in eastern
Ukraine against the central government in Kyiv.
Even then, few could have predicted how bad relations would become, leading in February 2022 to a
Russian military intervention into Ukraine itself. The
‘new cold war’, as some called it, now looked as if it
had become decidedly ‘hot’. No doubt emboldened by
the diplomatic support he was receiving from China,
Putin’s strategic ambitions seemed to know no bounds,
and a Russia which seemed to be in terminal decline
only twenty years earlier—in 2022 its economy was
still only one-tenth the size of China’s and around
fifteen times smaller than that of the United States—
now seemed to be moving forward boldly on all fronts.
Whether this would enhance the power of Russia, or
lead it into a permanent conflict with the West it could
not, in the long term, hope to win alone, remained to
be seen.
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Case Study 5.1 Russia and the West: a ‘new cold war’?
A vigil to protest the Russian invasion of Ukraine in front
of the White House in Washington, 2022
© Andrew Harnik / AP / Shutterstock
It has become increasingly fashionable among commentators to
define the Russian relationship with the West as being like a ‘new
cold war’. Perhaps the first to use the term was Edward Lucas in
his 2008 bestseller, The New Cold War. Russian military intervention in Georgia, he believes, signalled the beginning of a new
and dangerous period in the relationship. Subsequent developments have only seemed to confirm this early assessment. The
murders of investigative journalists in Russia itself, targeted assassination outside Russia, its meddling in the internal affairs of the
Baltic republics, Russia’s use of cyberwar, its various disinformation campaigns designed to undermine the West, and finally its
interventions in Ukraine after 2013 culminating in its invasion of
Ukraine in February 2022, all point to a profound crisis in relations—a new cold war in effect. Lucas also blames the West, not
so much for having caused the conflict—Russia, he insists, is the
guilty party—but rather for having failed to recognize the threat
and confront it in its early stages. Preoccupied as the West once
was with building a partnership with Russia, it did not see the
writing on the wall until it was too late.
Critics of the term ‘new cold war’ do not so much dispute the
facts—though some would blame the West as much as Russia
for having precipitated the crisis. Rather they question the use
of the term itself. They make four specific arguments. First, the
cold war coincided with the existence of the old communist
superpower, the USSR, and as the USSR no longer exists the term
‘cold war’ is not a suitable term to define the subsequent crisis in
Russia’s relations with the West. Second, the cold war was basically an ideological clash between opposing socio-economic
systems—one communist and the other capitalist—whereas the
current clash has little or nothing to do with ideology. It is just
a pure power struggle. Third, the cold war kept the two sides
apart. The new contest, on the other hand, seems to recognize
no such boundaries, and as such might be much more dangerous. Finally, critics of the idea of a new cold war argue that one
must beware of using terms drawn from history like ‘cold war’
which do more to obscure contemporary reality than illuminate
it (M. Cox 2011).
Question 1: Is the term ‘new cold war’ useful or misleading?
Question 2: Is the West or Russia most to blame for tensions
between Russia, the West, and Russia’s near neighbours?
Key Points
break-up of the USSR inevitably unleashed problems
• The
which proved difficult to solve.
reforms in the 1990s created a new class of
• Economic
super-rich Russians but exacerbated Russia’s overall
economic decline.
•
under Putin aims to be a ‘world power’, but remains
• Russia
highly dependent on energy and is far less significant in
Vladimir Putin has attempted to reverse what he saw as
Russia’s decline in the 1990s.
global economic terms than either its main partner, China, or
its principal rival, the United States.
relationship between the West and Russia began to
• The
deteriorate with Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 and
continued to deteriorate by the end of 2021 with its
stationing of 190,000 troops close to the Ukrainian border,
followed by an invasion of Ukraine itself in February 2022.
5.4 Europe: rise and decline?
Though Americans may have claimed that it was the
US that ‘won’ the cold war, it was in fact Europe and
in particular Germany that were the most immediate
beneficiaries. First, a continent and a country that had
once been divided were now united. Second, the states
of Eastern Europe achieved one of the most important
of international rights: the right of self-determination.
Finally, the threat of serious war with potentially devastating consequences for Europe as a whole was eliminated. Naturally, the move from one order to another
Chapter 5 From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order?
did not happen without conflict, as events in former
Yugoslavia (1990–9) revealed only too tragically. Even
so, the new united Europe, with its open borders and
democratic institutions, clearly had much to look forward to.
But what kind of Europe would it be? Here there
was much room for debate, with some countries—
most notably France—believing that Europe should
now develop its own specifically European security
arrangements (a view again articulated in 2022 by
French President Emmanuel Macron). Others, meanwhile, believed Europe should remain closely tied to the
US—a view forcefully expressed by both the new elites
of Central Europe and by other, more established members of the NATO alliance. Europeans could not agree
either about what kind of Europe they preferred. There
were those, of course, who sought an ever-deeper union
that would fulfil their dream of building a United States
of Europe, one that would be able to play a major role
alongside China and the US in the international system. Other countries (the UK most significantly) feared
such a development. Europe, they asserted, should be
a Europe composed of its very different nation-states,
a Europe that recognized national difference and did
not try to undermine the principle of sovereignty. In
the end, it was such ideas that fuelled the argument that
finally led to Brexit .
While many in ‘old’ Europe debated Europe’s
future, policy-makers themselves were confronted with
the more concrete issue of how to bring the ‘East’ back
into the ‘West’, a process that went under the general
heading of ‘enlargement’. In terms of policy outcomes,
the strategy scored some notable successes. Indeed, by
2007 the European Union (EU) had grown to 27 members (and NATO to 26). In the process, the two bodies
also changed their club-like character, much to the consternation of some older members, who found the new
entrants to be as much trouble as asset. In fact, according to critics, enlargement had proceeded so rapidly
that the essential core meaning of both organizations
had been lost. The EU in particular, some now argued,
had been so keen to enlarge that it had lost the will to
integrate. Still, it was difficult not to be impressed by
the capacity of institutions that had helped shape part
of Europe during the cold war being employed now in
quite new roles to help manage the relatively successful (though never easy) transition from one kind of
European order to another. For those realists who had
earlier disparaged the part that institutions might play
in preventing anarchy in Europe, the important roles
played by the EU and NATO seemed to prove that institutions were essential.
But even if the EU proved to be more resilient than
some of its critics argued at the time, its role outside
the European area remained unclear. Europeans may
have wished for a stronger Europe; however, there was
marked reluctance to hand over serious security powers to Brussels. Nor did Europeans seem especially keen
(until the war in Ukraine made it seem essential) on
boosting their collective strength by investing more in
hard power. Indeed, only the UK and France maintained
anything like a serious military capability, meaning that
when ‘Europe’ did feel compelled to act militarily—as it
did in Libya in 2011 and then a year later in Mali—it was
not ‘Europe’ as a collective actor that intervened, but one
or both of these two countries, with US support.
Nonetheless, Europe still retained what American
political scientist Joseph Nye has defined as significant
‘soft power’ assets. By the turn of the century, it had
also become a formidable economic actor, with a market capacity larger even than that of the United States.
Not only that: it continued to be the US’ most favoured
economic partner. Still, not all the news was positive, and as one century gave way to another, Europe
slipped from being the ‘poster child’ of international
politics (some writers even talked of the EU becoming
a model for the twenty-first century) to looking like
a house divided against itself which could not unite
around a common purpose other than the most basic
one of making sure it remained in being. Indeed, with
the onset of the so-called ‘euro crisis’, followed by economic turmoil in Greece and a growing refugee crisis,
the whole project looked to be under serious stress.
What European leaders could not have anticipated
however is what happened in 2016, when in June the UK
voted to leave the European Union, followed in November
by the election of a US president (Donald Trump) who
during his campaign had talked of NATO as being obsolete, the EU as a trade threat, and Germany as ‘free riding’ on the US. One event alone was shocking enough:
the two coming close together caused something bordering on an existential crisis across European capitals. Yet,
having got over the trauma, the European Union did in
time appear to recover its political nerve. As one of the
most influential writers on EU affairs noted, by reminding European of the need to be remain together, Trump
ironically may have turned into something of a ‘boon’,
while the chaos in the UK caused by Brexit made the
best argument possible for all other European countries
remaining within the EU (Tocci 2017).
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Key Points
the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, both Europe
• Despite
and Germany benefited from the collapse of a post-war
order which had previously divided the continent.
and the election of Trump in 2016 posed a serious
• Brexit
challenge to the integrity and future of the EU.
believe that the challenges facing the EU are
• Pessimists
life-threatening.
EU’s many defenders argue it retains the economic
• The
capacity and political will to meet these challenges
successfully.
5.5 China in a new Asian century?
Perhaps nowhere in the modern world does history
exercise such a great influence as in Asia. First subjected to European power during the nineteenth century, and then to the even worse depredations of Japan
before 1945, it was hardly surprising that the region as
a whole became one of the most unsettled parts of the
world during the cold war. Indeed, while Europe as a
whole was acquiring some degree of organized stability after 1945 under the watchful eyes of the two new
superpowers, Asia during the cold war experienced
at least two devastating wars (one in Korea, the other
in Vietnam), a war of partition in India, a genocide
in Cambodia, a short and bloody conflict between
Vietnam and Cambodia, and a Chinese invasion of
Vietnam a year later. If the cold war remained ‘cold’ in
Europe, this could hardly be said of Asia before 1989.
The contrast between postcolonial Asia and postSecond World War Europe could not have been
more pronounced. Indeed, scholars of International
Relations have been much taken with the comparison, pointing out that whereas Western Europe at least
managed to form a new liberal security community in
which nationalism and ‘ancient hatreds’ came to play
much less of a role over time, Asia remained a complex
tapestry of often warring and suspicious states, whose
enmities ran deep and where nationalism played a central part in defining identity. Nor did the end of the
cold war lead to the same results in Asia as in Europe.
In Europe, 1989 concluded with free elections, the
resolution of territorial issues, the unification of one
country (Germany), and the disintegration of another
(Yugoslavia). In Asia, 1989 concluded with powerful
communist parties remaining in power in at least three
countries (North Korea, Vietnam, and China), several territorial disputes remaining unresolved, Korea
remaining divided, and memories from the past—in
particular Japanese aggression before 1945—still souring relations in the region.
This is not to say that Asia was not impacted by the
end of the cold war and the collapse of communism
in Europe and the USSR. China in particular drew its
own particular lesson. Indeed, having witnessed what
was unfolding in the former USSR under the reformist leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Chinese communist leadership decided to do the opposite, namely
abandon political reform and impose even tighter control from the centre. North Korea, too, drew its own
lessons. Indeed, after having seen what had happened
to another communist state which had once looked so
stable—East Germany—it now did everything it could
to ensure that it did not suffer the same fate, including
using ‘nuclear blackmail’ against its various neighbours
as a crude but effective way of ensuring the regime’s
survival.
Because of the very different ways the end of the
cold war played itself out in Asia, many writers (including one very influential American scholar, Aaron
Friedberg) argued that far from being primed for a
liberal peace, Asia in general, and East Asia in particular, was ripe for new rivalries. Indeed, according to
Friedberg (1993–4), Europe’s very bloody past between
1914 and 1945 could easily turn into Asia’s future. This,
however, was not a prediction borne out by events.
The first and most important reason why was because
of the great economic advances which occurred in the
region from the late 1990s onwards. Though uneven
(and interrupted by a crisis in 1998), within thirty years
of the end of the cold war Asia as a whole—representing close to 60 per cent of the world’s population—had
moved centre stage in the world economy. Indeed, some
writers began to talk of a new Asian century in the
making around which the once dominant West would
now have to fit (Khanna 2019).
The big question is how to explain this success. Some
suggest Asia is home to a set of ‘values’ that encourage entrepreneurship, while others cite its ability to
Chapter 5 From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order?
shelter under what amounted to an American security umbrella during the cold war. Others point to the
not insignificant role played by ASEAN (Association
of Southeast Asian Nations) in managing relations
between at least ten of the countries in Southeast Asia
(see Ch. 23). But in the end, the key to Asia’s prosperity has rested on the stimulus first provided by an
economically dynamic and prosperous Japan—until
2010, Asia’s biggest economy—and then by China.
Interestingly, China’s economic rise in the 1990s did
not seem to cause much concern at first. A number of
Chinese writers even fashioned their own particular
theory, known as the ‘peaceful rise’, to reassure China’s
neighbours (not to mention the US) that its intentions
were peaceful. The US appeared to respond in kind.
The rise of China, it was agreed, could not be reversed.
China could, however, be integrated into the modern
globalized economy. Not only would this create a major
new market and establish a major offshore producer of
cheap goods, but over time it might even turn China
into what some American policy-makers termed a
‘responsible stakeholder’.
Several developments altered this overly optimistic
analysis. One was Chinese activity in the South China
Sea, where China asserted its sovereignty over 3.5 million square kilometres of international waterways;
another was China’s programme of military modernization; and yet a third was the less accommodating
foreign policy stance adopted by China after President
Xi Jinping assumed office in 2013. Taken together, these
changes—as well as its more aggressive stance towards
Taiwan in 2022, and its increasingly tough policies in
both Hong Kong and the province of Xinjiang—only
confirmed what some realist IR scholars had been
saying all along: that when new great powers rise and
emerge onto the international stage, they are bound to
act in a more assertive fashion (Mearsheimer 2014a).
The impact of all this on the region has been striking. Caught between two great powers—one (China)
growing in economic importance and the other (the
United States) on whom they have always depended for
their security—many Asian countries felt themselves
to be caught between the proverbial ‘rock and a hard
place’. The region may not have been at a ‘1914 moment’,
as some declared 100 years after the First World War.
But there was no denying that the region was beginning to feel increasingly squeezed by opposing forces
(see Opposing Opinions 5.1).
Key Points
cold war in Asia was marked by revolutions, wars, and
• The
insurgencies which led to millions of deaths.
some scholars have predicted an uncertain and
• Although
unstable future for Asia, the region overall has experienced
relative peace and great prosperity since the end of the
cold war.
is one of the most dynamic economic regions of the
• Asia
world.
s rise has transformed the region and led to
• China’
increased tensions with the United States.
5.6 A new Global South
The ultimate economic success of many Asian
­countries—which also experienced Western rule before
the Second World War—poses a much larger question
about the ultimate fate of nationalist movements and
regimes in other countries in what has become known
since the end of the cold war as the ‘Global South’. Each
of these movements of liberation was animated by different ideas and employed quite different strategies to
achieve its many goals, amongst the most important
being to achieve full political independence from the
former colonial powers, foster fast economic development while reducing poverty, and rely more on the state
than the market to achieve both of these objectives.
Though most of the new nations did not adopt communism, they did nonetheless adopt varieties of socialist
ideas and quite often (like India) oriented towards the
former USSR as a working model of how to achieve
speedy economic results.
These high ideals which helped carry the newly
independent countries through some very difficult
times ran up against a series of problems. Some of
the new elites rapidly succumbed to the temptation of
power and high office. Many of the new nations also
experienced domestic turbulence. A good number succumbed to military rule. Quite a few became one-party
dictatorships. Nor did the new postcolonial economies
prove to be especially efficient, and by the 1970s had
run up enormous debts, rendering them vulnerable to
renewed Western economic pressure. Finally, with the
end of the cold war came the collapse of the idea that
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Opposing Opinions 5.1 The twenty-first century will be Asian
For
Against
The GDP of Asia is rising fast. By the middle of the twenty-first
century, it will be bigger than that of the US and the EU combined. At least three of the economies expected to be among the
largest in the world by 2050—China, India, and Japan—are located
in Asia.
Asia still abides by the West’s economic norms and rules.
Asia’s economic rise has largely depended on adopting Western
economic norms, exporting to Western markets, and playing by
the West’s economic rules. There is no Asian model.
The Western-led international order is on the decline. New
economic realities will force the West to give up its monopoly
of global power. In the future, Western countries will no longer
be able to run all the major international institutions, such as
the UN, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
China’s creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a
multilateral development bank, is just a sign of things to come.
China has already begun to take a more assertive role in
global affairs. In a 2017 speech, President Xi Jinping announced
the start of a ‘new era … that sees China moving closer to center
stage’ (Xi 2017). China’s eagerness to take a leadership role on
global issues such as climate change demonstrates its belief that
its economic power entitles it to international influence over a
range of important issues.
The transatlantic region remains central in global security,
economy, and education. The EU and the US taken together
still account for nearly 50 per cent of world GDP and more than
75 per cent of world foreign direct investment. The US dollar also
remains the most important currency in the world and its economy the most innovative. Nearly 90 per cent of the world’s top
universities are located in the EU and the US, while only two are
to be found in ‘mainland’ China.
Asia is composed of countries which have a strong sense of
their own identity, but little common identity. Asia thus has
few regional institutions of its own. It is more divided than united
by history, while culturally and linguistically there is nothing holding the region together. There is no Asian ‘order’.
1. Does Asia’s economic rise pose a challenge to the West?
2. Is the United States an Asian power?
3. Does China pose an opportunity or a threat to other Asian powers?
Visit the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle these questions.
some form of state-led development offered a better way
forward than the market.
The collapse of the ‘Third World’ as a political project left behind a complex legacy, from ongoing civil
wars on some continents (most notably in sub-Saharan
Africa) to the opportunity to rejoin the world economic
order. Certainly, with the USSR no longer playing an
active political role, major change now seemed possible. However, the consequences often proved to be
deeply problematic. Indeed, some states that had been
propped up by one of the two superpowers during the
cold war simply collapsed into complete chaos, a fate
that for example impacted tragically on Somalia. Nor
did economic reform always deliver on its promise. In
fact, in many countries the implementation of Westernstyle structural reform often led to greater inequality, a
decline in public services, and the exponential growth
of ever more rampant forms of corruption as more and
more money began to flood into the newly emerging
economies.
Economic reform and the rapid reintegration of
the ‘Third World’ back into the world economy thus
had profound consequences. To many in the West, the
adoption of structural reforms could have only positive
results. But wealth-creating reforms and integration
into the global economy did not always lead to the alleviation of economic distress. Indeed, by removing the
various forms of economic protection that had been put
in place in previous times, everyday life became more
difficult. A new world economic order may have been in
the making, but that did not mean that the basic needs
of millions of people were being met. Nor did it mean
that many economies in the South had achieved balanced growth.
In these less than propitious circumstances, it was
hardly surprising that millions of ordinary people
in the Global South expressed their frustration not
by taking up arms (though many did) but rather by
doing what poor peoples have always done: migrate
in increasingly large numbers. The new Global South
Chapter 5 From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order?
thus had at least one obvious thing in common with
the old Third World: millions of its people moved to
those parts of the world—the more prosperous North
in effect—where there was at least the chance of a better
life. The Third World as a political project might have
passed, but many of the problems facing the majority of
humanity remained much the same.
This somewhat pessimistic conclusion should however be set against what has been achieved. Africa, for
instance, now has the largest growing middle class in
the world. Many South Asian countries have been relatively successful at eliminating extreme poverty. And
in Latin America there has been no major interstate war
since the so-called Chaco War of 1932–5. Moreover,
one of the biggest countries within the Global South,
India, has achieved quite remarkable economic results
since the 1990s, growing to become the sixth largest economy in 2022, with every chance of becoming
the third largest after China and the United States by
mid-century.
Even so, there is little doubting the massive challenges facing the majority of humanity, exposed most
graphically since 2020 by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Indeed, as one report recently concluded, ‘For countries in the Global South, this pandemic poses challenges every bit as daunting—if not more so—as those
facing industrialized countries in the Global North’
(Alden and Dunst n.d.). Nor is this just a question of
not being able to carry out enough vaccinations to
mitigate the threat of the virus. Other more fundamental problems include weak public health systems, the
collapse of global demand for tourism, and a massive
drop in foreign remittances. The world may have been
experiencing one pandemic, which by March 2022 had
killed well over 5 million people. However, in many
ways it remained a tale of two pandemics—a reflection
of the fact that there were still two international orders
(Alden and Dunst n.d.).
Key Points
‘Third World’ was a political project that aimed to
• The
create ‘real’ independence from the West by pursuing a
different non-Western road to economic modernity.
of the less developed countries continue to be
• Many
burdened by debt, poverty, inadequate health services,
and poor infrastructure.
challenges still facing many countries in the Global
• The
South should not obscure what many of them have
achieved.
has exposed the gap between the Global South
• Covid-19
and the Global North.
5.7 The Middle East in turmoil: 9/11, the Arab Spring, and after
Whether or not there was, or is, a connection between
the unequal distribution of wealth and power in the
world and terrorism remains an open question. What
is not in doubt is the impact that the 11 September
2001 attacks on the United States (9/11) had on international politics. Indeed, if the end of the cold war
marked one of the great turning points in modern
international relations, then 9/11 marked another. Bin
Laden and Al Qaeda were no doubt motivated by far
more than a desire for social justice and a distaste for
globalization. As bin Laden’s many would-be analysts
have pointed out, his political vision appeared to point
backwards rather than forward to something modern.
On the other hand, the weapons he employed—including four jet planes—made him a very modern threat
indeed. Moreover, because his followers sought martyrdom, more traditional methods of waging war—
such as containment and deterrence—were no longer
relevant. If this was the beginning of a ‘new cold war’,
as some argued at the time, then it was one unlikely to
be fought using policies and methods learned between
1947 and 1989.
The way in which the George W. Bush administration initially responded to international terrorism
proved to be highly controversial, and, in the end,
counter-productive too. In fact, turning what many
regarded as a legitimate war of self-defence against the
Taliban in Afghanistan into a ‘war of choice’ to rid the
Middle East of Saddam Hussein in Iraq turned out to
be one of the greatest strategic errors of the age. But
even the most trenchant of his critics could not have
imagined how disastrous the wider Bush response to
the 9/11 attacks would turn out to be, leaving as it did
Iran as the dominant power in the region and jihadi
terrorism more entrenched than ever.
This raises an important question: given its longterm consequences for the region and for the United
States—by 2020 the US had spent up to $3 trillion in
Iraq—why did the Bush administration intervene in
Iraq in the first place? Many had a simple answer: the
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US’ dependency on oil and its desire to maintain access
to oil in Iraq. Others laid the responsibility at the door
of the Israel lobby in Washington. A few even saw it as
part of a wider imperial strategy whose purpose was to
restore US credibility worldwide after the Clinton years.
Whatever the motive—including the official Western
one of eliminating Saddam’s (non-existent) cache of
weapons of mass destruction—the war ultimately
failed to achieve its longer-term objective of creating
a stable and functioning democracy in Iraq. Perhaps
even worse, it fuelled the rise of an extremist group just
as deadly as bin Laden’s Al Qaeda: the so-called Islamic
State. Inspired by the same desire to drive the ‘infidels’
out of the Middle East, by the time it was defeated (and
even then, not completely) large parts of Iraq and Syria
had been devastated.
Amid all this carnage (including that in Afghanistan,
where the war against the Taliban continued unabated
until the US pulled out in late 2021), there was a
momentary glimmer of hope. Starting in 2011 the
peoples in many Middle Eastern countries began to
throw off their autocratic rulers. However, as the revolt
unfolded, it moved from its initial phase—known as
the Arab Spring—to something far more disturbing,
first in Libya where a NATO-led intervention created
a vacuum into which dangerously destabilizing forces
then moved, then in Egypt where the overthrow of the
dictator Hosni Mubarak concluded with his replacement by another autocrat, Abdel Fatteh al-Sisi, and
finally in Syria, where the situation deteriorated rapidly, leaving half the country’s population displaced,
approximately 3 million Syrians as refugees, and at
least 400,000–500,000 dead.
All this raises a much bigger question: why has much
of the Middle East (with the obvious exception of its
oil rich states in and around the Gulf) proved to be so
volatile? There is no easy answer. Some conservatives in
the West ‘blame’ the role Islam has played in fostering
anti-modernist ideas, others the failure of states in the
region to provide meaningful economic opportunities
for their people, and a few blame the deep divide within
Islam itself between Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia
and Shi’a states such as Iran. Yet it would be foolish to
ignore the role of the West itself. Having drawn the
region’s borders as far back as the end of the First World
War, and thereafter propped up whichever autocrat
suited their political or strategic needs, it is unsurprising that those who live in the region itself are inclined
to ascribe their own problems as ultimately caused by
Western countries, from the British who in the 1917
Balfour Declaration first declared their backing for a
‘national home for the Jewish people’ to US interventions following the 9/11 attacks.
Key Points
• The 9/11 attacks transformed US foreign policy.
• It is now agreed that the US failed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Arab Spring led to hope for change followed by deep
• The
disappointment.
Syrian crisis was hugely costly and was only brought to
• The
a conclusion by the most brutal means.
deeper causes of instability in the Middle East remain
• The
highly contested.
5.8 From Obama to Trump to Biden
If 9/11 marked one turning point in the international
relations of the early twenty-first century, then so too
in its own very different way did the election of Barack
Obama in 2008. Obama’s election was regarded at the
time as a massively significant event. It would never
have happened, however, but for two simple facts: the
fallout from an increasingly unwinnable and unpopular war in Iraq—a ‘dumb war’, as Obama called it, to
which he had always been opposed (Fitzgerald and
Ryan: 25–51)—and the greatest economic crisis facing
the US since the 1930s.
Obama’s first challenge was to put the US back
on the road to economic recovery; his second was to
restore US standing abroad. Meanwhile, he hoped that
he would be able to shift the focus of American foreign
policy away from the politically unsettled Middle East
to the economically dynamic region of Asia. But on one
thing he seemed to be clear: the US had to find a way
out of what later President Biden called the ‘never ending’ wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But perhaps Obama’s main contribution to foreign policy was less in terms of specific actions taken
and more in relation to rethinking the US’ position
in the wider international system. If Bush had a theory of international politics, it was that the world was
unipolar and would likely remain so for many years
Chapter 5 From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order?
to come. Obama’s analysis was altogether different.
Though he never subscribed to the notion that the US
was in decline, he did believe the world was becoming what the popular writer Fareed Zakaria called
­‘post-American’, and that China specifically and the
BRIC countries more generally would play more of a
role (see Ch. 6). This economic shift left the US with
two choices: either resist these changes and find itself
on the wrong side of history, or manage and lead these
changes and guarantee the US’ continued leadership in
international affairs.
If Obama’s approach to world affairs was balanced
and pragmatic—his critics argued unfocused—the
same could hardly be said of his successor, Donald
Trump. Elected on a platform which attacked globalization as un-American—the first US president ever
to do so—Trump the populist startled and unsettled
the world in ways that no previous American leader
had ever done before (see Case Study 5.2). Hostile to
nearly everything Obama, and indeed most post-war
presidents, had done in office, Trump attacked what
had hitherto been considered mainstream foreign policy positions. Thus, climate change, he opined, was a
myth; NATO was ‘obsolete’; international institutions
a nuisance; and Putin perhaps somebody with whom
the US could do business. On the other hand, signing
a nuclear deal with arch-enemy Iran was dangerous
nonsense, and being even mildly critical of Israel was
a betrayal of an old and trusted ally in the Middle East.
More generally, Trump made clear that he would not
seek to reform or change authoritarian systems, so long
as those authoritarian countries, such as Saudi Arabia
and Egypt, stayed loyal to the United States.
Trump’s nationalist rhetoric and disregard for
more traditional ways of ‘doing foreign policy’ certainly won him few friends among sections of the liberal establishment at home or democratic friends in
Europe. Yet halfway through his first term in office,
the US economy continued to boom while his approval
­ratings among his own domestic supporters remained
Case Study 5.2 Populism, globalization, and the end of the liberal order?
Nigel Farage (R) praises US President Donald Trump
during a campaign rally
© Chip Somodevilla / Staff / Getty Images
Perhaps the most significant development in world politics since
the 2008 financial crisis has been the rapid rise of a new form
of nationalist or populist politics, which many fear is leading
to increased tensions among states across the world and even
threatening the global economy and globalization itself. The
impact thus far of this new brand of politics, which identifies distant metropolitan elites as the problem, immigrants and refugees
as a threat, and globalization as a challenge to economic security,
has been immense. If nothing else, it made the election of Trump
a reality and has upended ‘normal’ politics in the European
Union. Some insist that this ‘revolt’ is primarily driven by rising
inequality and stagnant wages, all linked to globalization and the
opening up of the world economy. Others view the new populist
wave as expressing a legitimate fear among ordinary citizens of
losing control of borders put there to protect their country from
outsiders. The fact that ‘Brexiteers’ in the UK and Trump in the US
played up nativist fears by suggesting both countries were being
‘swamped’ by unwanted f­oreigners tells us much about one of
the key factors spurring the growth of populist movements in
the West.
This new phenomenon inevitably raises big questions for students of world politics and those concerned about the future of
globalization. The world economy has not yet deglobalized, as
some predicted it might after the 2008 ‘crash’. On the other hand,
growing trade tensions between China and the US, and increased
opposition in Europe to the free movement of people, point to a
world in which the current order is likely to come under increasing scrutiny from disaffected groups, who feel they have gained
little and lost much in the headlong rush towards globalization.
Whether this signals the end of globalization or, as is more likely,
another phase in its evolution remains an open question to
which as yet we do not have a clear answer.
Question 1: Why does populism seem to be appearing much
more in the advanced Western countries than in successful
emerging economies like India and China, where globalization
has been embraced by new rising elites?
Question 2: Has populism become a permanent feature of the
political landscape, and, if so, what will be the likely effect on
international affairs if the nationalism that normally accompanies
populism becomes a more potent force?
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michael cox
relatively steady. Promising to ‘Make America Great
Again’ by rejecting the liberal policies pursued by his
predecessor, he might have won a second term but for
one thing: the Covid-19 pandemic, a health challenge
he at first denied was real and then blamed on China.
To make the situation even worse, Trump went on to
politicize the pandemic with devastating health results
for the American public. Nor could America avoid the
economic fallout from the pandemic. Even so, Trump
still managed to win more votes in 2020 than in 2016
(75 million in all). Then, having lost to Joe Biden by a
margin of 5 million votes, Trump even claimed that the
election had been stolen, a narrative believed by millions of Americans, including those who, in an attempt
to ‘stop the steal’, stormed Congress on 6 January 2021
(see Case Study 29.2).
The legacy left to Biden was thus a most difficult one.
With America’s reputation at an all-time low abroad, a
country more polarized than at any time in its modern
history, and a pandemic that was proving to be very difficult to contain, there were no easy answers to America’s
many problems. Biden, though, was determined to
unite the country and restore US credibility internationally by re-engaging with America’s European allies
while making clear his administration’s commitment
to the wider liberal world order. ‘America is back’, he
proclaimed (Biden 2021b), and for a while the relief felt
elsewhere in the world was palpable.
However, there was no escaping the challenges the
US faced, from the short-term question of how to withdraw from Afghanistan—a mismanaged move that
led to a great deal of recrimination both at home and
abroad—to the longer-term challenge of dealing with
the world’s two dissatisfied powers, Russia and China.
With Putin and Xi working in tandem, they now presented a united front on nearly all of the big international questions. As the two made clear in a lengthy
communiqué issued in February 2022, the world was
entering into a ‘new era’ which would be genuinely
multipolar in character and in which certain undefined ‘outside forces’ (presumably here referring to the
United States) would no longer be able to ‘undermine
security and stability in their common adjacent regions’
(presumably here referring to Russia’s ‘near abroad’ in
which Ukraine happened to be located and the AsiaPacific region in which Taiwan happened to be situated
(Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China
2022). Whether one took the communiqué seriously or
not—and there were many good reasons to take it very
seriously indeed—it was clear that some really testing
times lay ahead for the United States (M. Cox 2022).
Key Points
Obama was elected in 2008 in large part because of
• Barack
the 2008 financial crisis.
s foreign policy aimed to restore US soft power
• Obama’
standing in the world while drawing US troops home from
Iraq and Afghanistan.
rejected the idea that the US was in decline. His
• Obama
view was that the US had to adjust its policies to take
account of new economic realities—most notably in Asia.
Trump’s policies had a deeply divisive impact at
• Donald
home and an equally disturbing impact on world politics.
lost the election in 2020 but falsely insisted that Joe
• Trump
Biden did not win and that therefore the United States is
being run by an illegitimate president.
5.9 Conclusion: beyond the liberal world order?
When the cold war ended and the USSR fell apart, it
was widely believed that the world could look forward
to a peaceful and prosperous new era. For a while, a
new era did indeed beckon. However, as this chapter
has shown, things did not turn out as expected. New
threats like terrorism came to replace old ones. Russia
refused to be brought back into a world run by the liberal West. The US got sucked into an unwinnable war
in Iraq and a highly costly one in Afghanistan. There
was a major economic crash in 2008. Then, the rise of
new ­powers—China, in particular—caused some to
ask if the West’s moment in the sun was coming to a
rapid end. In 2020 the world was then hit by a major
pandemic which over the next three years killed millions of people and had what The Economist called an
‘incalculable’ impact on the world economy. Finally, in
2022 Russia invaded Ukraine, causing massive damage
to Ukraine itself and sending shock waves around the
world economy, while bringing the relatively peaceful
post-cold war order in Europe to a brutal end.
Yet in spite of all these challenges—and still others,
such as climate change (see Ch. 24)—we should beware
of assuming that the international order is about to
tip over the edge into another world war. Events in
Chapter 5 From the end of the cold war to a new world dis-order?
Ukraine certainly do not augur well for the future.
Moreover, the fact that China has backed Russia points
to a deeply divided world which few if any would have
foreseen back in the optimistic 1990s. But perhaps too
much pessimism—like too much optimism—is not a
good place from which to understand the world in the
2020s. After all, we are now all living a lot longer, fewer
people are dying in conflicts, the world economy has
not ‘deglobalized’, and the threat of populism seems
to have been contained even if it has not disappeared
altogether. Nor is it wise to write off the liberal world
order or the power of the West, as many now seem
inclined to do. Indeed, those who insist that power
has already shifted away from the West would be well
advised to recall the important ‘fact’ that the West
as a whole still controls a formidable set of economic
assets, dominates the world’s leading institutions, and
holds manifest forms of soft power. Moreover, in spite
of its many domestic problems—and they should not
be underestimated—the United States still retains massive military capabilities, can project power globally in
ways that no other state can, continues to account for
just over 20 per cent of the world’s GDP, and still prints
the mighty dollar which remains the world’s currency
of choice. Writing bestselling books with eye-catching
titles about American decline may make for good copy.
But it tells us little about the world as it is currently
constituted.
Yet even if we concede that the United States and
the West together retain a great deal of power in a
more ‘connected’ world, one thing appears not to have
changed as much as some might have hoped in the
years immediately following the end of the cold war:
great power rivalry. In an age of nuclear weapons,
direct war between great powers is no longer the most
likely outcome. Yet the relationship between great powers can hardly be described as ‘peaceful’. With Russia
using military power and the threat of force to revise
the security order in Europe following its invasion
of Ukraine, and China intent on either pushing the
United States out of East Asia or at least reducing its
security footprint there, what one realist has described
as ‘the tragedy of great power politics’ (Mearsheimer
2001) shows no sign of becoming any less tragic any
time soon. We may not be facing another century as
bloody as the last one. But it will take a good deal of
diplomatic wisdom and more trust than is on display
at the moment to ensure that we get through it safely.
Questions
1. What was the cold war and why did it end so unexpectedly?
2. What do you understand by the ‘unipolar moment’?
3. Is the West facing a ‘new cold war’ with Putin’s Russia?
4. Why did the UK vote to leave the European Union in 2016 and what impact has that had on
both the UK and the EU?
5. Are the problems confronting the Global South today primarily the result of its colonial past?
6. ‘The world is not heading into a new “Asian century” but rather a new century dominated by
China.’ Would you agree?
7. Why did the United States intervene in Afghanistan and Iraq, and how successful were its
interventions there?
8. In what ways did Donald Trump redefine America’s relationship with the wider world?
9. Why do you think Putin invaded Ukraine, and how has the war there changed world politics?
10. Is there a crisis of the liberal international order and how serious is it?
Visit the online resources to test your understanding by trying the self-test questions.
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Further Reading
Cox, M. (2011), ‘The Uses and Abuses of History: The End of the Cold War and Soviet Collapse’,
International Politics, 48(4–5): 627–46. A critique of the way history can be misused.
Cox, M. (2022), Agonies of Empire: American Power from Clinton to Biden (Bristol: Bristol University
Press). Traces the evolution of US foreign policy since the end of the cold war through the
presidencies of Clinton, Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden.
Dinan, D., Nugent, N., and Paterson, W. E. (eds) (2017), The European Union in Crisis (London:
Palgrave). A useful collection of essays on the many challenges facing the EU.
Eatwell, R., and Goodwin, M. (2018), National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy
(London: Pelican Books). An excellent survey of the challenges facing the liberal order.
Khanna, P. (2019), The Future is Asian: Global Order in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Simon
& Schuster). An important perspective on how ‘global Asianization’ is driving the ‘Asian
century’.
Lucas, E. (2008), The New Cold War: Putin’s Threat to Russia and the West (London: Bloomsbury
Publishing). A highly pessimistic look at the future of the relationship between the West and
Russia.
Tocci, N. (2017), Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World (London:
Palgrave Macmillan). A useful corrective to the more pessimistic portrayals of current
developments in the European Union by the adviser to Federica Mogherini, former High
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and VicePresident of the European Commission.
Toje, A. (2018), Will China’s Rise Be Peaceful?: Security, Stability and Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press). Essays by leading specialists on China and world affairs.
Zakaria, F. (2008), The Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton). Authoritative study which
influenced the debate about America’s changing role in a changing world.
Zubok, V. (2021), Collapse: The Fall of The Soviet Union (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
Questions the notion that the collapse of the USSR was inevitable, based on archival research.
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
Chapter 6
Rising powers and the
emerging global order
andrew hurrell
Framing Questions
●
Were rising powers able to mount an effective challenge to the US-led post-cold war
global order?
●
Are rising powers actually powerful?
●
What is the role of emerging powers in a post-Western order characterized both by
US–China rivalry and by pressing global challenges such as climate change and the
Covid-19 pandemic?
Reader’s Guide
After a period of US dominance of the international
political and economic systems, the world order began
to undergo what many came to see as a fundamental structural change from the early 2000s. This was
initially associated with the rise of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and, from 2010,
South Africa), and was then accelerated by the financial crisis that hit the core Western countries after 2007.
This chapter begins by examining the US-led global
order that emerged at the end of the cold war and the
arguments that this was likely to remain stable and to
endure (see Section 6.1 and Section 6.2). Section 6.3
considers the challenges to the idea of a US-dominated
global order, paying particular attention to the role of
large, emerging developing countries, to the idea of the
BRICS, to the regional role of these countries, and to
the new Southern coalitions that were coming to play
an increasingly influential role in negotiations and institutions affecting trade, climate change, and foreign aid.
Section 6.4 distinguishes between different arguments
about the diffusion of power and discusses what is
involved conceptually when one talks of ‘rising powers’.
Section 6.5 examines some of the major theoretical
arguments about how rising powers affect the international political system. Section 6.6 evaluates the claims
about rising powers in a world marked by the return of
geopolitical tensions, by the growth of nationalist and
populist governments, by serious challenges to multilateralism and global governance, and by the severe
economic and political consequences of the Covid-19
pandemic. It suggests that rising powers matter not
simply because of their current and likely future power
but rather because of the longer-term challenge they
pose to the Eurocentrism and Western dominance of
the international order.
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andrew hurrell
6.1 Introduction
At the end of the cold war the structure of global order
appeared clear and straightforward. The West had won.
The United States was the sole superpower and the
world was living through a period of unipolarity that
many believed would continue well into the twenty-first
century. The US-led order had three pillars: first, the
unrivalled extent and many dimensions of US power;
second, the Western-dominated institutions and multilateral organizations originally created in the wake of
the Second World War—the United Nations, GATT (the
World Trade Organization (WTO) from 1995), and
the World Bank Group and International Monetary
Fund; and third, the dense set of transatlantic and
transpacific relations and alliance systems. The central question, however, was whether this period of US
predominance would last. On one side, analysts considered the stability of US power. To what extent would the
US fall prey to ‘imperial overstretch’, due to the loss of
domestic support for its global hegemonic role? On the
other side, attention quickly came to focus on the large,
fast-growing countries in what had previously been
called the Third World, or the Global South. Even if
one leaves China in a category of its own, in the next tier
down a range of other states were becoming more influential globally, as well as cementing a significant degree
of regional influence: Brazil in South America, India in
South Asia, Nigeria and South Africa in Africa. These
developments came to be seen as a power challenge to
the US and Europe, as well as representing a challenge
to the historic Eurocentrism of the international order.
6.2 The post-cold war order
In the 1990s global order was widely understood
through the lens of liberal internationalism or liberal
solidarism (see Ch. 7) (Hurrell 2007). Globalization
was rendering obsolete the old system of traditional
international relations—the so-called world of great
power rivalries, balance of power politics, and an oldfashioned international law built around state sovereignty and strict rules of non-intervention. Bumpy as
it might be, the road seemed to be leading away from
this—with an expanded role for formal and informal
multilateral institutions; a huge increase in the scope,
density, and intrusiveness of rules and norms made at
the international level; the ever greater involvement of
new actors in global governance; moves towards the
coercive enforcement of global rules; and fundamental
changes in political, legal, and moral understandings
of state sovereignty and of the relationship between the
state, the citizen, and the international community.
Academics, especially in Europe and the United
States, told at least two kinds of liberal stories about
the post-cold war world. Some stressed institutions and
their cooperative logic. As large states, including large
developing states, expanded their range of interests
and integrated more fully into the global economy and
world society—as they ‘joined the world’, in the popular
language of the 1990s—they would be naturally drawn
by the functional benefits provided by institutions and
pressed towards more cooperative and ‘responsible’
patterns of behaviour. They would gradually become
socialized into a Western-led global order. The process
would not necessarily be easy. It would be uneven and
often unsettling. But, on this view, the broad direction
of travel was clear.
Another group told a more US-centred story. The
US was indeed the centre of a unipolar world. But, true
both to its own values and to its rational self-interest,
Washington would have a continued incentive to bind
itself within the institutions that it had created in the
cold war era to reassure smaller states and to prevent
balancing against US power (Ikenberry 2001). A rational hegemon in an age of globalization would understand the importance and utility of soft power and
self-restraint. In return for this self-binding and the
procedural legitimacy it would create, and in return
for US-supplied global public goods and the output
legitimacy that they would confer, other states would
acquiesce and accept the role of the United States as the
owner and operator of the international system.
Through a mix of these liberal logics, those developing states of the old Third World that had previously challenged the Western order (especially in
their demands in the 1970s for a New International
Economic Order) would now become increasingly
enmeshed, socialized, and integrated. The 1990s, then,
were marked by a clear sense of the liberal ascendancy;
an assumption that the US had the right and power to
Chapter 6 Rising powers and the emerging global order
decide what the ‘liberal global order’ was all about; and
a clear belief that the Western order worked and that it
had the answers.
The idea that this US-led order was stable was not
confined to liberals. One group of neorealist thinkers argued that the extent of US power was simply
so great that the normal logic of balance of power no
longer applied, and that no state was likely to emerge
in the foreseeable future with the capacity to disturb
US power and primacy (Wohlforth 1999; Brooks and
Wohlforth 2015/16). This was especially the case since,
for neorealists, military power is the most important
form of power. In terms of military power the United
States is in a class of its own: it accounts for 45 per cent
of the world’s total military spending; it has an enormous lead in new military technologies; and it has a
vast global network of more than 750 overseas bases in
over 100 countries. Since active opposition was ruled
out, the expectation was that weaker states would have
no option but to seek accommodation with the US and
with the US-led global order.
Many critical political economists also saw continuity. Across the developing world, neoliberal economic
reforms were spreading, partly imposed by the US and
the international financial institutions that it dominated, and partly reflecting the choices and class interests of elites in the Global South. The commonality
of worldviews and class interests linking the trans­
national elite that met each year in Davos would ensure
the ongoing dominance of Western-led capitalism
(Arboleda 2020).
Key Points
the 1990s there was near universal agreement that
• During
the global system was led by the power of the United States
and its allies and by the institutions that it dominated.
the perspective of the emerging powers, the US
• From
order involved a powerful move to change many of the
existing rules, norms, and practices of global politics. Seen
from the Global South, the United States has rarely been a
status quo power but has often sought to mould the
system in its own image.
the 1990s, it seemed to many states of the Global
• During
South that there was little alternative but to accommodate
Western power.
6.3 The US order under challenge
By the late 1990s, this picture of a stable, US-dominated
global order was coming under increasing challenge.
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 underscored the darker side of globalization. The experience
of trying to fight a ‘war’ on global terrorism and of using
hard coercive power to dominate weaker societies (as in
Iraq or Afghanistan) brought to the fore the limits of
military power for achieving political goals. The mismatch between Washington’s rhetoric of human rights
and democracy and its systematic willingness to violate human rights in defence of its national security (as
with Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and the policy of socalled rendition of terrorist suspects) undercut Western
claims to moral superiority. And the unilateralism of
the Bush administration, for many people, undercut
the legitimacy and acceptability of US leadership.
One of the most visible signs that something was
changing was increased diplomatic activism by large
developing countries. The activist coalitional policies of
Brazil and India in the WTO provide a good example,
most notably in terms of the G20 coalition of developing
countries created at Cancun in 2003 (known as the Trade
G20). At the fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO at
Cancun in September 2003, developing countries came
together in several overlapping coalitions and decided to
block the negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda
until their demands were met. The conference ended in
deadlock. Cancun represented a symbol of the dissatisfaction of the developing world with globalization and
indicated its greater willingness to act in pursuit of its
collective interests and against the developed world. In
expressing this collective dissatisfaction, the emerging
powers of the developing world—Brazil, China, India,
and South Africa—took the lead, and were joined by
many other developing countries.
A further example was the creation of IBSA: a cooperation project between the three democratic countries
of India, Brazil, and South Africa. The organization
was formalized by the Brasilia Declaration in June 2003
and was followed by other linked initiatives that fuelled
cooperation in a broad range of areas. A third example
is provided by the BASICs (Brazil, South Africa, India,
and China). This group sidelined Europe in climate
change negotiations at Copenhagen in December 2009
and forced the United States to negotiate in a very different institutional context.
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On their own these events might have attracted
only passing attention. Yet, for many, they reflected
a much deeper structural change that was taking
place in the global economy and in the dynamics of
global capitalism. The idea of the BRICS captures this
phenomenon. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, and
China, and South Africa from 2010) comprise the five
largest economies outside the OECD. By the early
years of the twenty-first century, they held around
50 per cent of total global foreign exchange reserves.
They had reduced or eliminated any residual dependence on foreign aid and, in the cases of China, India,
and Brazil, had themselves become major aid donors.
In 2009 these new donors provided around $11 billion of foreign aid. And they had expanded their relations with each other, with China eclipsing the US as
Brazil’s major trading partner and Sino-Indian trade
approaching $60 billion a year. South–South trade
rose from being marginal as late as the early 1990s
to accounting for 17.5 per cent of global merchandise
exports by 2010 (Zoellick 2010).
The language of BRICS and of rising and emerging powers took off from around 2003. Both popular commentary and a great deal of political rhetoric
focused on the diffusion of power and the emergence
of new powers. The central point of these debates was
not where world order is now, but where it would be
going in the future. The BRICS were important not
just because of their recent rapid development, but
because of the predicted changes that were going to
transform the global economy and change the balance of global economic power (see Case Study 6.1
and Case Study 6.2). The financial crisis that hit the
advanced capitalist core in 2007 fed into these changes
Case Study 6.1 The BRICS
A freighter ship, Hong Kong
© Amanda Ahn / Alamy Stock Photo
The ‘BRICS’ began as an acronym that referred to four emerging economies: Brazil, China, India, and Russia. The term was
first coined in the research paper Building Better Global Economic
BRICs by economist Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs in 2001. O’Neill
regarded these four countries as the key emerging market economies, and projected that the relative size and share of the BRICS
in the world economy would rise exponentially. In his report,
O’Neill also described the implications of this for the Group of
Seven (G7) and called for a rearrangement of the representation
in such groupings as the G7. From this start there have been two
ways of thinking about the BRICS as a grouping.
The first, and most common, has been to understand the
BRICS in the context of the future of the global economy. In
2003, a Goldman Sachs report compiled by Dominic Wilson and
Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050,
expanded on O’Neill’s argument. Their report predicted that, in
all likelihood, by 2025 the BRICS would account for over half of
the size of the G7 in terms of GDP. And in less than 40 years, the
BRICS economies together could be larger than the G7. Several
reports have followed up on this, offering more detailed analyses
and readjusted projections of the BRIC economies.
The key underlying argument behind these predictions was
that China and India would rise as the world’s principal suppliers of manufactured goods and services, while Brazil and Russia
would become similarly dominant as suppliers of raw materials.
They all have an enormous potential consumer market, complemented by access to regional markets, and an abundant workforce. As will be discussed in Section 6.6, more recent attention
has shifted to the fragility and vulnerability of the emerging
economies.
The other way of talking about the BRICS has been in terms
of a diplomatic grouping. The foreign ministers of the four BRIC
states—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—first met as a group in
New York at the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly in
2006. The first BRIC summit was held in Russia in 2009, and South
Africa joined the grouping in 2010. Since then, annual summits
have been held. Understandings of the nature of the grouping
vary widely. Some see it as a bargaining coalition or even a protoalliance designed to balance the power of the United States.
Others see it as a caucus for developing common positions on
the part of a group of large states that have been marginalized
by the power of the West. Still others see it as the embryo for
attempts to build an alternative set of global order institutions,
most clearly illustrated in the creation of the New Development
Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and China’s Belt
and Road Initiative (Hameiri and Jones 2018).
Question 1: What are the differences between the ways in which
investors and IR analysts view the emerging world?
Question 2: Is the BRICS grouping an alliance?
Chapter 6 Rising powers and the emerging global order
Case Study 6.2 Brazil
Thousands of protesters gather on Avenida Paulista, São
Paulo’s financial centre, against President Jair Bolsonaro
© NurPhoto / Contributor / Getty Images
In November 2009 The Economist magazine had an illustration
on its cover of the famous statue of Christ the Redeemer taking off from the Corcovado mountain. The idea that Brazil had
finally ‘taken off ’ captured much of the imagery of rising powers.
Brazil developed very rapidly in the period from 1930 to
1980. But, like most of the developing world, it was very badly
hit by the debt crisis of the 1980s. In the 1990s, under President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso—one of the architects of the theory of dependency in International Relations—the focus was on
financial stabilization at home, an important degree of economic
liberalization, and a cautious foreign policy of re-establishing
the country’s credibility through joining agreements such as the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
But it was under Cardoso’s successor President Luis Inácio Lula
da Silva, universally known as Lula, that the notion of Brazil as
a rising power really gained ground. Lula’s speeches repeatedly
stressed the idea that Brazil is not a small or insignificant country
and that it has options in a world where, despite all the challenges, unipolarity is more apparent than real. Brazil should reassert its national autonomy, form coalitions with other developing
states in order to reduce its external vulnerability and to increase
its own bargaining power, and work with others to promote a
more balanced and multipolar world order.
and these perceptions. For many influential figures, it
was historically extremely significant that the financial crisis broke out in the core Western countries. It
not only seriously damaged these economies but also
undermined the technical and moral authority at the
centre of the global capitalist system. Finally, the crisis
reinforced the view that international economic institutions had to be reformed to reflect shifting economic
power. Brazil and India had long demanded reform of
international economic institutions as well as seats
on the United Nations Security Council. Although
The claims about Lula’s Brazil raised many questions about the
nature of power. Although Brazil possesses enormous natural
resources, it does not have any significant degree of military or
hard power. Its rise would therefore have to depend on its soft
power, in particular its diplomatic agility or what has sometimes
been called its ‘diplomatic GNP’, and the legitimacy deriving from
its role as a spokesperson of the developing world and from the
significant successes of the Lula government at home in reducing
economic inequality and hunger.
Yet, in contrast to the image on the cover of The Economist,
Brazil has come to face deep structural economic problems, high
levels of social violence, and stark political polarization. In 2018
the country elected a far-right outsider, Jair Bolsonaro, as president and Brazil seemed to follow the global pattern of populist
nationalism. Lula was imprisoned, but was subsequently released
and returned to frontline politics. The long-standing consensus
on foreign policy broke down in the face of major domestic political alignment. The political and party system was unable to cope
with a sprawling corruption scandal; street protests brought millions onto the streets; and, while Brazil had been able to navigate
the 2008 financial crisis, economic conditions became far more
constraining. Many orthodox commentators blame domestic
policy failure, especially the absence of serious reform during
the boom years of the early 2000s. Others highlight the difficulties facing a traditional political system in incorporating the new
social forces thrown up by the immense social and economic
changes produced by rapid development. Others again point to
the structural weaknesses facing a country like Brazil in trying to
climb the global power hierarchy. Brazil has remained structurally
vulnerable to shifts in the global economy. Success had come on
the back of huge Chinese demand for Brazilian commodities and
Brazil was hit hard by the slowdown in Chinese growth. Brazil
did achieve greater voice in international institutions. But what
appeared as the epitome of an activist emerging and regional
power could quickly shift into the image of a country in deep
crisis with few international options.
Question 1: Can soft power substitute for hard power?
Question 2: To what extent will foreign policy activism always
remain hostage to domestic politics?
there had been little progress with UN reform, considerable change occurred in the WTO, with Brazil
and India becoming members of the inner negotiating circle along with the US and the EU (the so-called
‘new Quad’). For many, a further major symbolic step
occurred with the expansion of the G7 grouping of
industrialized countries into the Group of 20 (G20),
which would now include the major emerging countries. The inaugural leaders’ summit took place in
2008, and the following year it was announced that
the G20 would replace the G7 as the primary grouping
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of major economies, with regular summits of heads
of government and an expanded agenda. Across the
emerging world the G20 appeared to be a symbol of
how the structures of global governance were shifting
in response to the new geometry of power, and a sign
of what the future would bring.
If poverty, weakness, and political marginalization
had previously defined the Third World, something
important seemed to have changed. As The Economist
wrote, ‘The salient feature of the Third World was
that it wanted economic and political clout. It is getting both’ (The Economist 2010: 65). Western governments insisted that emerging powers should no longer
use underdevelopment, poverty, and a prior history
of colonialism or historical marginality as ‘excuses’
to evade their ‘responsibilities’ as emerging major
powers.
Key Points
the first decade of the century, countries such as Brazil,
• InRussia,
India, China, South Africa, the ASEAN states, and
Mexico experienced significant economic development.
believed that the continuation of this trend would
• Many
lead in the longer term to an alteration in the economic
balance in favour of the dynamic emerging markets.
this greater economic share of the world market,
• With
emerging countries felt they deserved a greater political
say in the international community as well. The financial
crisis that began in 2007 seemed to underscore the shift in
relative economic weight and made this call for a seat at
the top negotiating tables stronger and more urgent.
such as China’s implementation of the Belt
• Developments
and Road Initiative and the creation of the New
Development Bank by the BRICS countries suggest the
increasing global influence of rising powers.
6.4 Three questions about the power of rising powers
Debates about the diffusion of power and the emergence of new powers have become ubiquitous. But there
are many more questions than clear answers.
First, if power is shifting, where exactly is it shifting
to? One view is that power is simply shifting to major
emerging states as part of the ongoing dynamic of the
rise and fall of great powers. This is the whole point of
stories about ‘superpower China’, ‘India rising’, or ‘Brazil’s
moment’, and about the rise of the BRICS or the BASICs.
We can debate exactly who these new actors are, how
they have behaved in the past, and what they might want
in the future. But the issues have fundamentally to do
with what ‘they’ will do with ‘their’ power—a limited
number of important new actors acquiring substantial
amounts of new power.
An alternative view, however, is that we are witnessing a much more general diffusion of power, which is
often linked to technological changes, to changes in the
global economy, and to new forms of social and political mobilization. Thus if rising China is one central
part of contemporary global politics, the Arab Spring
is another. Both illustrate how power may be diffusing,
but in very different ways. The ‘general power diffusion’ view holds that the story is really about the ‘rise
of the rest’ (Khanna 2009). This will include other fastdeveloping societies, such as the so-called MINTs—
Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey. But it is also
going to involve a multiplicity of new actors. According
to this account, the international system is increasingly
characterized by a diffusion of power, to emerging and
regional powers but also to many private actors and
transnational groups; by a diffusion of preferences,
with many more voices demanding to be heard both
globally and within states as a result of technology, globalization, and democratization; and by a diffusion of
ideas and values, reopening the big questions of social,
economic, and political organization that were supposedly ended with the conclusion of the cold war and the
liberal ascendancy. The combination of technological
innovation with social and political mobilization has
been extremely powerful. In some cases it has underpinned mass social protests—as with the Arab Spring
and the massive protests in Brazil in June 2013 that
brought 1.5 million people onto the streets, facilitated
by social media and new forms of political mobilization. In others the challenge to the capacity and legitimacy of existing states and regional orders has provided
space for new forms of challenge, as with the so-called
Islamic State.
If this view of a general diffusion of power is true,
then effective power and influence will be harder for
everyone to achieve, including both the currently strong
and the new emerging powers. It will be harder for all
states to control their ‘own’ regions and to secure sustained support from weaker states. The war in Ukraine,
for example, had its origins in Putin’s desire to reassert control over what he viewed as Russia’s own ‘nearabroad’. Yet the course of the war demonstrated the
Chapter 6 Rising powers and the emerging global order
difficulty of using military force to achieve political
goals against socially and nationally mobilized populations. This suggests that we need to pay as much attention to the relations between emerging powers and
weaker actors as we do to relations between emerging
powers and the currently dominant. Another likely consequence is that it will be harder for the governments
of large fast-developing states to maintain coherent and
consistent foreign policies as more groups domestically
are mobilized and empowered. The overall expectation
would be of less effective power, both within states and
internationally.
Second, what is power? Power is one of the most
complex and contested ideas in the social sciences (see
Ch. 13). It is an essentially contested concept in that it is
subject to the kind of debate that is not rationally resolvable. There is no overarching theory of social power
and no single analytical approach that can provide a
magic key. Political scientists differentiate between different levels of power (Barnett and Duvall 2005). These
include:
• relational power and the capacity of a political
unit to impose its will on another and to resist the
attempts of others to impose their will;
• institutional power—power here becomes the ability to control the agenda, to determine what gets
decided, and to exclude those issues that threaten
the interests of the most powerful;
• different forms of structural power that have to do
with the constitution of action and the material and
discursive conditions for action.
Others distinguish between hard, coercive power on
the one hand and soft power on the other—the power
of attraction, of getting others to emulate your own
society and its values. Almost all the arguments that
reject the decline of the US and the West highlight the
importance of combining these different levels: global
military dominance, the economic resilience and
attractiveness of US society, and its continued pivotal
role across global governance institutions. They also
emphasize its unrivalled structural power, including
the capacity to generate and promote the most powerful conceptions of international and global order (Nye
2011, 2019).
When told that a country is an emerging power,
the first question one needs to ask is: influential over
what actors, in what period, with respect to what matters? Thus one might want to trace the growing role of
South Africa, India, or Brazil in terms of their influence within a particular region and how being recognized as a regional power may be an important part of
their growing global influence. Or one might want to
understand Brazil’s influence not in terms of its very
limited military capabilities but rather in terms of its
diplomatic skill and what one analyst called its ‘diplomatic GNP’ (Hurrell 2010).
A further lesson from the literature on social
power is still more important. Discussion of power
and inf luence cannot be separated from the analysis
of motives and values. It may be true that all states,
including emerging powers, seek power and security, but the real question is the one pressed by constructivists: what sorts of power do they seek and
for what purposes? Thus what makes a rising state
want to revise or challenge the system is unlikely
to come solely from calculations of hard power and
material interest. Historically, revisionism has been
far more frequently the result of particular sets of
foreign policy ideas within rising states that explain
why the existing status quo is resented and seen as
unacceptable, even intolerable—for example, that
the existing order embodies historical humiliations
(as in the case of China); or that it does not grant
the social recognition to which the rising state feels
entitled as a result of its power, its values, and its
culture (as in the case of India or Brazil); or that the
existing order works against legitimate claims to
special status within ‘its’ region (as with the Russian
claim that the eastward expansion of NATO represented a direct threat to its own security and to its
proclaimed natural right to regional inf luence or
predominance).
Third, power for what? This is the most important question. It is impossible to make any sense
of the idea of a power shift unless one has in mind
some idea of why shifting power is important and
what it might be affecting (see Opposing Opinions
6.1). The BRICS mattered to Goldman Sachs because
they were emerging markets. They were therefore
important for profits and long-run investment decisions. But this says absolutely nothing about why
these same countries might matter politically or
geopolitically. This is why the analysis of rising
powers cannot just involve lists of power resources
and evaluations of how different kinds of power
have shifted from one state or society to another. It
has to connect with our theoretical understanding
of world politics.
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Opposing Opinions 6.1 Today’s rising powers are powerful enough to affect international order
For
Against
Most change in world politics is incremental and gradual.
There has been a long-term erosion of the Western dominance
of international society. International society today is far more
strongly global—not just in terms of economic globalization but
also in terms of the capacity of a much wider range of states and
societies to mobilize, to express their values and interests, and
to contest the policies of the old powers of the Western, US-led
order. The capacity of the United States to unilaterally reassert its
hegemony and to use its coercive military and other power to
achieve its goals is, and will remain, limited.
Realists are right that military power remains the most
important source of power in international relations. There
is no challenger to the United States, and its dominance of the
new military technologies means that this supremacy is set to
continue well into the future.
Rising powers’ diplomatic achievements have been considerable and have persisted despite a more adverse international environment. In contrast to the Third World movement
in the 1970s, today’s emerging powers are far more centrally a
part of the global economy and international system. South–
South economic exchange is far more deeply rooted than was
the case in the 1970s.
The power of today’s rising powers is not just their economic
resources. It derives from the role they inevitably will need to
play in functional institutions created to deal with ever more
pressing sets of challenges (such as the management of the global
economy, climate change, pandemic response and preparedness, and nuclear proliferation). And it derives from their equally
necessary role in the creation of legitimate institutions and representative structures of global governance that meet powerful
demands for a more just global order.
The United States continues to have unparalleled influence
over international institutions and global governance. It can
use its agenda-setting power to shape new norms and to control
what gets decided. Faced with the deadlock of existing institutions or criticism of its policies, it has a unique capacity to create
alternative options. For example, it has brought together groups
of like-minded states to negotiate so-called mega-regional trade
blocs across the Atlantic and Pacific. The marginal role of the
emerging world in these negotiations is a clear sign of their weakness in the global order.
The BRICS—and similar groupings—face deep divisions
that have prevented them from achieving cohesion and
­influence. For all the talk of new coalitional politics, China,
India, and Russia are competitors for power and their economic
preferences and interests are strongly divergent. They have very
little in common.
1. Does military power help countries to achieve political goals?
2. To what extent does the success of economic development underpin diplomatic influence?
3. Can you assess the influence of rising powers without advancing a clear view of global order?
Visit the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle these questions.
Key Points
believe that power is the common currency of
• Realists
international relations. But for many analysts there can be no
generally accepted definition or understanding of power in
international relations.
diffusion can be understood in two different ways.
• Power
Sometimes it is seen as a shift in the balance or distribution of
power between and among states. Sometimes it is viewed as a
broader and more complex process by which different groups
across the world become economically more important and
politically more mobilized.
both liberals and constructivists, power is always
• For
connected with actors’ values, purposes, and identities.
is very rarely understood in terms of the resources
• Power
that a single actor possesses. It is a relational concept and
usually best understood in a given social context.
Chapter 6 Rising powers and the emerging global order
6.5 Debating the impact of rising powers on international relations
For some, the history and theory of emerging powers is simple and straightforward. International relations has always been a story of the rise and fall of
great powers. For realists, this forms the very heart of
the subject and there is a well-established set of ideas
for understanding what is going on and for guiding
policy responses (see Ch. 9). The names of the countries may change but the logic does not. From this perspective one should most certainly care about power
transitions.
Periods of shifting power are difficult and dangerous times. Rising states will naturally seek to challenge the status quo and to revise the dominant norms
of the system in order to reflect their own interests
and their own values. Established powers will be
tempted to use their power to block the emergence of
rising or revisionist states, including through the use
of military force. Classical realists, neoclassical realists, neorealists, and power transition theorists differ
as to whether conflict derives more from the actions
of revisionist powers seeking to remake the rules of
international order, or from the status quo powers
anxious to preserve their power. However, in the realist camp there is wide consensus that if new powers
are to ‘count’ globally it will be exclusively through
their impact on the global balance of power, and
that power transitions are dangerous and unsettling
(Mearsheimer 2001).
As one would expect, this approach to emerging
powers devotes great attention to the measurement
of material power, the construction of hierarchies of
power, and the implications of power transitions and
power differentials for both institutionalized cooperation and for the outbreak of major war. It is the
possession of material capabilities, and especially
of coercive power, that determines whether a state
counts as a great power. And for many in the realist
tradition, it is the successful deployment of coercive
power, above all in a conflict against another major
power, that is the true entry card into the world of
great power politics.
If the results of power transitions are manifest in
crises, conflicts, and hegemonic wars, the underlying
dynamic results from structural changes in the global
economy. As Paul Kennedy expressed it in the most
influential modern version of this old idea:
The argument of this book has been that there exists a
dynamic for change, driven chiefly by economic and
technological developments, which then impact upon
social structures, political systems, military power, and
the position of individual states and empires … this uneven pace of economic growth has had crucial long-term
impacts upon the relative military power and strategical
position of the members of the state system … economic
prosperity does not always and immediately translate
into military effectiveness, for that depends upon many
other factors, from geography and national morale to
generalship and tactical competence. Nevertheless, the
fact remains that all of the major shifts in the world’s
military-power balances have followed from alterations
in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and
falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the
major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone
to the side with the greatest material resources.
(P. Kennedy 1988: 566–7)
The most powerful and persuasive part of the realist tradition moves beyond material power and stresses instead
the importance of the search for status and the acquisition of prestige. For Robert Gilpin (1981), the existence of
a ‘hierarchy of prestige’ is central to the ordering of international relations; it is precisely the disjuncture between
existing perceptions of prestige and changing material
capabilities that underpins the logic of hegemonic conflict and the dynamics of change in international relations. Prestige is the currency of international politics.
International politics is characterized by a recurring
distance that opens up between changes in material
capabilities and the hierarchy of status, perceptions, and
markers of prestige and esteem. This means that emerging powers are likely to pursue particular policies for reasons of prestige (India’s nuclear test in 1998 is often seen
as an example), or because of feelings of stigma, resentment, and the sense of being denied the status to which
they feel themselves worthy (Zarakol 2010). Equally, we
need to examine the way in which emerging powers
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attempt to persuade their peers that they are worthy of
greater power status through various forms of ‘recognition games’—for example, Brazil sending troops to Haiti
partly to show that it was qualified for membership in
the UN Security Council (Suzuki 2008).
Finally, if power is shifting and if conflict is to be
avoided or limited, then it is crucial that new powers are
accommodated. The ‘Haves’ and the ‘Have Nots’ need to
seek new forms of accommodation and negotiation. This
perspective is stressed by classical realists and especially by
writers about international society, who see great powers
and great power concerts as fundamental to the ordering
of international society. From this perspective, the natural
response to shifting power and to the greater heterogeneity and diversity of culture and values is to return to a
pluralist and power-centred order—both to avoid tensions
and potential conflict among the existing and rising powers, and to achieve the consensus needed to tackle new and
complex challenges such as climate change, terrorism, and
global economic governance. This can involve the reform
of formal multilateral institutions—such as bringing new
members into the UN Security Council. But it can also
involve increasing emphasis on different sorts of informal groupings, clubs, concerts, and coalitions. Indeed,
the proliferation of discussion of new groups such as the
G2 (US–China), the G8 + 5, or the G20 can be viewed in
terms of a revival of concert diplomacy.
Liberal institutionalists look at these same changes
through different lenses (see Ch. 7). From their perspective there has been a combination of power shifts
together with an increased role for countries that have
much more varied interests, preferences, and values.
This has intensified many of the collective action problems facing global governance, leading to the deadlock
of negotiations on many international issues, such as
trade within the WTO. The emerging world has achieved
greater voice and some institutional reform (as with the
G20 and the WTO), and it has certainly achieved a significant level of veto power. Emerging countries have
sought some ways to build alternatives to the existing
institutional order (for example through the creation
of the New Development Bank), but these opportunities have thus far been limited. As the still dominant
country, the United States responded to the challenge
of emerging powers by creating new agreements, such
as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), although it later
withdrew from this agreement because of domestic
pressures. The result is the paralysis or fragmentation of
existing institutions and the danger that significant parts
of the emerging world will be left behind in the new processes of smaller-group and selective multilateralism.
Finally, critical political economists challenge the
whole idea of thinking about international relations in
terms of the rise and fall of great powers. From a neoMarxist perspective, it is simply mistaken to focus on
the emerging nation-states of the Global South (see
Ch. 8). Instead, what we have been witnessing involves
the ongoing transformation of global capitalism from an
old core centred on the advanced industrialized states
into a far more global and far more thoroughly transnationalized capitalist order. A new deterritorialized global
capitalism is emerging that is made up of flows, fluxes,
networked connections, and transnational production
networks, but marked by inequality, instability, and
new patterns of stratification (W. Robinson 2007; Starrs
2014). On this account, trying to count and categorize
the ‘power’ of emerging powers tells us very little. Rather
the intellectual challenge is to understand the ‘transnational whole’ in which so-called emerging powers are
embedded, and to trace the patterns of class conflict
within and across societies, the transformations in the
nature of states in the emerging world, and the structural patterns of instability and inequality produced by
global capitalism.
Key Points
mainstream realist and neorealist writers, rising powers
• For
matter because their growing material power disrupts the
balance of power, resulting in conflict. Hence many neorealists
predict that conflict between the US and China is inevitable.
materially based approaches to rising powers and
• These
global order do not say enough about the potential pathways
that might lead to the emergence of major power
competition. What remains unexplained is precisely how an
international system might move across a spectrum from the
general diffusion of power to a situation of multipolarity.
understandings of power provide an insufficient
• Material
basis for comprehending the crucial importance of status
and recognition as factors in the foreign policy behaviour
of emerging powers. Even if one accepts the idea of rising
states as revisionist, it is difficult to understand the sources
of their dissatisfaction purely within a world of material
power and systemically given incentives.
international society theorists, great powers constitute
• For
a particular social category. Being a great power is of
course related to material power, but also to notions of
legitimacy and authority. Membership in the club of great
powers depends on recognition by others. The stability of
power transitions will be crucially affected by the
accommodation of rising powers.
and critical political economists stress the need to
• Marxist
look at the underlying structural changes in global
capitalism rather than the world of nation-states.
Chapter 6 Rising powers and the emerging global order
6.6 Beyond the BRICS: emerging powers in the twenty-first century
In the early years of the twenty-first century, the narrative of ‘emerging powers’ and ‘rising powers’ seemed
to provide a clear and powerful picture of how international relations was changing. Yet the story has not
unfolded in the way many analysts expected. Indeed,
it is possible to argue that the focus on the BRICS
reflected a moment in time that has now passed and
that, except for China, rising powers have returned
to their role as secondary or supporting actors in
the drama of global politics. The global system has
changed dramatically—due to the return of geopolitics, the structural instabilities and inequalities of
global capitalism, the costs and dislocations of the
Covid-19 pandemic, and the impact of new and disruptive patterns of social and political mobilization,
both within and across countries.
The reality of major power conflict and the potential
for major power war have returned—most prominently
between the United States and both Russia and China;
and regional tensions and conflicts have intensified—as
in Ukraine, the Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East. US
and European politicians have increasingly sought to
frame these conflicts in terms of a deep structural clash
between democracy and authoritarianism. Especially
from a realist perspective, economics does not exist in a
vacuum and economic globalization will inevitably affect
the balance of global power—feeding back into the structures and dynamics of a Westphalian state system rather
than pointing towards its transcendence—as liberals
had expected. Many aspects of economic globalization
(such as global supply chains) have come under strain.
And the state as an economic actor has proved resilient
in seeking to control economic flows and to police borders, and in seeking to exploit and develop state-based
and mercantilist modes of managing economic problems—on such issues as preventing foreign investment
in sensitive sectors, the control of cyberspace, access to
natural resources, and vaccine development.
In addition, the salience of backlash and nationalist
politics has increased across the world: anti-immigrant
sentiment; anti-elite and anti-expert feeling; dissatisfaction with traditional political parties; and a multifaceted
reaction against globalization, ‘free trade’, and global
governance. The spread of backlash politics and populist nationalism in the United States and Europe mean
that the challenges to the existing, so-called ‘global liberal order’ have come not from the emerging world but
rather from powerful political forces at the centre of the
system. As a result, many global governance institutions
are under severe strain. Gridlock, stagnation, fragmentation, contestation, and, most recently, backlash have
become the dominant frame within which to analyse
global governance. And new cleavages have opened
between those in favour of continued global integration
and global governance, on the one hand, and those who
reject the opening of borders, the transfer of political
authority beyond the nation-state, and the promotion of
proclaimed universal values, on the other.
In the North, the focus has been on the losers of globalization, on the ‘left behind’, and on those threatened
both by globalization and trade and by movement and
migration. In the emerging world the global distribution of winners and losers also matters, but it played out
in different ways. Globalization in the 1990s and early
2000s led to significant ‘winners’. As Branko Milanovic
(2016: 20) has argued, ‘In short: the great winners have
been the Asian poor and middle classes; the great losers, the lower middle classes of the rich world.’ But
what did this mean politically? It meant that there were
very large numbers of people who were still poor and
highly exposed to the vulnerabilities and vicissitudes
of the market; at the same time, they had become more
mobilized politically, including in new, technologically
enabled ways, and more effective in raising demands
against governments—over participation, corruption,
and the delivery of basic state services. But this came at
precisely the time when those same governments were
ever less able to satisfy those demands. The global pandemic has only served to increase this expectations gap.
Finally, there has been the impact of the Covid-19
pandemic, which began in late 2019 and which has both
fed into these developments and had a major negative
impact on the world economy and dominant patterns of
globalization. On one side, it seems clear that the global
pandemic reinforces the need for more and better global
governance. ‘No one is safe until we are all safe.’ And
yet, one of the most striking aspects of the pandemic has
been the strength of exactly the opposite tendency. In
many countries it is precisely the building of walls and
the strengthening of national autonomy and national
solidarity that is seen as central to any response. Hence,
the need for travel bans, border walls, and controls over
populations at home and travellers and migrants from
abroad. Equally, in many countries there has been a powerful political desire to shift the blame onto outsiders:
aliens and migrants, but especially onto other countries,
and to exploit the disease for domestic political and for
geopolitical purposes.
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Three implications follow for the debate on emerging powers.
In the first place, the limits to ‘emergence’ have
become more evident. Many emerging economies have
witnessed slower growth or even outright recession,
an intensification of capital flight, and an erosion of
the possibilities for export-led growth on which their
emergence was seen to depend. As Jim O’Neill argued
in 2021, ‘Twenty years on, the BRICS have disappointed’
(see Case Study 6.1). The pandemic has had a disproportionately negative impact on the growth of emerging
markets; inequality has increased; the number of people
in extreme poverty jumped by 80 million in 2020; and
external indebtedness is likely to become increasingly
serious. The emerging and developing world therefore
lacks the institutional, medical, and financial means
to recover from the pandemic. As O’Neill (2021) notes,
‘[T]he great challenge of how these countries successfully transition towards a higher income status for the
whole of society remains unsolved’. At the same time,
social tensions and political instability have spread, often
driven by corruption and by protests against corruption. The political crises in Brazil and South Africa, for
example, are deep, systemic and undoubtedly the most
serious since their respective democratic transitions (P.
Anderson 2019). Expectations that the emerging powers
would overhaul and reform global governance institutions were overly optimistic. Even before Covid-19, analysts were highlighting the hype surrounding the BRICS
and referring to the ‘BRICS fallacy’ (Pant 2013).
Second, these changes have affected the potential
‘pathways to power’ that might underpin emergence.
As noted, much work on rise and emergence has centred on institutions and on global governance. Large
emerging countries mattered because of their obvious
centrality to tackling global challenges such as climate
change. Equally, if one is concerned with bolstering
the legitimacy of global governance institutions, then
greater inclusion of the largest and most dynamic
countries of the Global South and greater regional representation are obvious political avenues to explore.
For emerging countries, institutions are logical ‘paths
to power’ both as domains for voice and as constraints
on the powerful. But in a world where international law
and global governance institutions are under challenge,
then such pathways to power will inevitably be undermined. For realists, power has been exposed for what it
really is: hard power and especially military and coercive power. On this calculus of ‘who is up and who is
down’, the generalized pretensions to greater influence
made by, or on behalf of, the emerging world fall away.
Third, these changes lead are leading naturally
towards greater differentiation among emerging powers
and will make collaboration among them harder. This is
true economically. Rather than a single collective story
about the BRICS’ linear trajectory to greater growth
and power, we have observed instead multiple narratives of more measured and uneven growth across the
emerging world, together with a much greater emphasis
on both domestic and systemic instability and vulnerability (on India, see Narlikar 2017; Basrur 2017 and on
Brazil, see P. Anderson 2019; Spektor 2022). It is true in
terms of global governance with a decreasing ability of
the BRICS to act together within the G20. And it is also
true in terms of foreign policy. The idea that the BRICS
were engaged in a strategy of soft-balancing to delegitimize US hegemony or to argue for alternative conceptions of legitimacy has faded as signs of a new cold
war grow stronger (Paul 2018). In India, for example,
foreign policy is increasingly shaped by the intensification of US–China rivalry and by the Indo-Pacific as the
most important regional focus of geopolitical calculations. Under Modi, Hindu nationalism has grown far
stronger, going hand in hand with the desire to expand
the country’s hard power. The stress on India’s civilizational and religious identity represents a break with the
long-standing Nehruvian identity as a spokesperson for
the developing and post-colonial world.
Yet it is important to note the powerful factors that
push against these arguments. The emerging and developing world remains central to understanding both the
causes of current challenges to global order and the
debates on what kind of order is likely to emerge.
In the first place, the countries of the Global South
are indeed indispensable for addressing global challenges—for objective reasons (the location of forests,
the sources of greenhouse gas emissions, the home
countries from which migrants move); for political reasons (emerging powers may not be able to shape global
politics but they have very substantial veto power); and
for legitimacy reasons (global solutions cannot work
without the buy-in from the most populous countries
of the world). Cooperation in International Relations is
often framed as a problem of collective action: ‘I will
not agree to forgo my short-term interests unless I can
be sure that others will cooperate’. But the deeper problem has to do with the distributional effects of cooperation on the already highly skewed distribution of
capabilities and vulnerabilities. Cooperation over the
pandemic is not (only) about better surveillance or better exchange of scientific knowledge—or even about
vaccine distribution. It is far more about weak and
Chapter 6 Rising powers and the emerging global order
failing health systems, and the lack of the capacity to
produce vaccines and implement vaccine and treatment programmes against a background of economic
weakness and slowing development.
Second, there is the historic distinctiveness of today’s
Global South. Even if we place China in a category of its
own, countries such as India, Brazil, and South Africa
are large developing societies that will continue to be
relatively poor in per capita terms. They are very different from the rising powers of the early twentieth century:
the US, Germany, and Japan. For all their economic success, they remain developing economies and developing
societies marked both by incomplete development and
by incomplete integration into a global economy whose
ground rules were set historically by the West.
More important, dominant foreign policy ideas are
often shaped by the legacy of historical perceptions of
second-class treatment, of subalternity, of marginalization, and of subordinate status within what has been
widely viewed across the Global South as an unequal
and exploitative global political and economic system
(see Ch. 11; de Koeijer and Shilliam 2021). What distinguishes today’s emerging powers is their historic position outside, or on the margins of, some notion of the
West. Historically, large parts of the world have sought to
reject or revise a Western-dominated order that was built
around their marginalization and around structured
patterns of hierarchy and inequality, in which they suffered consistently at the hands of US and Western intervention, and in which they now face powerful political
forces within the West proclaiming new versions of the
very old ideologies of racist, religious, and civilizational
superiority. In the war in Ukraine, the United States and
its allies have sought not just to oppose Russia’s invasion
but also to portray the conflict as part of a much broader
global struggle between liberal democracies on the one
hand and autocracies on the other. Yet many countries of
the Global South, India most notably, have been unwilling to take sides in this way. On the one hand, perceptions of the hollowness of the post-cold war ‘global
liberal order’ are hard to dislodge; on the other, concrete
interests on many issues from climate change to technology transfer do not map easily onto a clear division
between democracies and autocracies.
One side of the debate on emerging powers evaluates
‘power shifts’. But another dimension examines ‘justice
shifts’ and questions of race, social justice, and hierarchy. The transnational scope of Black Lives Matter (see
Case Study 22.2) has accompanied powerful demands
for reparations and apologies for slavery, the return of
plundered cultural objects, a heightened awareness of
the continued political power of racism and of the role
of race in global politics, and a general argument that,
in a post-Western world, the stories of the past and the
narratives of the likely future need to be decolonized.
This leads, finally, to the complex question of what
it means to talk about a post-Western global order. It is
important to escape from the shadow of the post-1989
world and to see the BRICS as only one element in the
longer-term historical process by which a previously
Western-dominated international society became
global, and as one stage in a longer-term revolt against
Western dominance that has by no means wholly ended
(Bull and Watson 1985). The focus on the post-cold war
period and on the apparent naturalness of a Westerndominated, self-described ‘liberal’ order has led to a
foreshortening of history. The liberal order was never
global during the cold war. A central part of the problem of global order in the twentieth century involved
the struggle of the Third World (later the Global South)
against what was widely understood as the ongoing
legacy of the Western-dominated international society. The empowerment and social and political mobilization of the previously subordinate has been one of
the great drivers of historic change, indeed perhaps the
most important of all. Consequently, the global order
in which we live is now far more strongly global. The
longer-term movement towards a post-Western world
was interrupted but not fundamentally dislodged by
the brief and fleeting period of US unipolarity. So,
from this perspective, the period from 1989 to the early
2000s is the historical anomaly, and the BRICS do not
stand as some unique and novel development but rather
as one element in a longer-term story.
Key Points
to expectations at the beginning of the twenty• Contrary
first century, emerging powers, with the exception of
China, have returned to their role as secondary actors in
global affairs.
of the emerging powers have experienced economic
• Many
frailties, social tensions, and political instability.
global system has been characterized by the return of
• The
geopolitics, the structural instabilities and inequalities of
global capitalism, and the impact of the Covid-19
pandemic.
Westphalian state system has been more durable than
• The
many expected.
biggest threats to global order come from backlash
• The
and nationalist politics and from intensified US–China
rivalry, rather than from emerging powers.
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6.7 Conclusion
History has not ended and major ideological and geo­
political cleavages about the best ordering of politics,
economics, and international relations have re-emerged.
This applies to questions of economic development
where the developmental success of an illiberal and
non-democratic China poses the greatest ideological
challenge to engrained Western liberal assumptions.
But it also applies to international order. Writers on
international society stressed the way in which the nonWestern world sought ‘membership’ of international
society. They paid far less attention to the complex ways
in which the developing and emerging world has had to
navigate within a still highly unequal but now far more
strongly post-Western system. This navigation has been
marked by battles for recognition and status and by
continued resentment at Western dominance, but also
by ambivalence as to what a post-Western alternative
might entail. The binary categories of West vs non-West
and liberal vs illiberal are unhelpful in understanding
the debates that are taking place across the emerging
world. As a result, it is highly unlikely that emerging
countries will fit into a renewed Western attempt to
divide the world into clear-cut categories of democracy
vs authoritarianism. On the one hand, the interests and
worldviews of many emerging powers do not coincide
with those of the US and Europe on many core issues,
from migration to global health or climate change.
And on the other, geopolitical alliances do not coincide
easily with politicized assessments of who counts as a
democracy.
The most crucial dimension of ‘global’ does not,
therefore, lie in the nature of the problems (such
as climate change or nuclear proliferation), nor in
notions of interdependence and globalization and
the degree to which states, societies, and peoples are
everywhere affected by global processes. It lies rather
in the increased capacity of a far wider range of states
and social actors to become active subjects and agents
in the politics and practices of global politics and different forms of ordering, both around and beyond
states. It is the diffusion of agency and of political
consciousness that has been the most important feature of the globalization of international society and
explains why the emerging world continues to matter. This means that the historical self-understandings
of a much wider and culturally diverse range of players need to be central to the theoretical and practical
analysis of global politics.
Questions
1. Has the United States been a status quo or a revisionist power since the end of the cold war?
2. Should the United States, Japan, and Europe be ‘afraid’ of the BRICS?
3. What is left of the BRICS without China?
4. Does the BRICS grouping represent a cohesive economic unit and power bloc?
5. To what extent does the intensification of US–China rivalry threaten to marginalize the role of
emerging powers as a distinct political grouping or analytical category?
6. Which is more important: to measure changes in the relative power of the nation-states in
the emerging world or to understand the underlying processes of social and economic
change taking place domestically?
7. Is India a great power?
8. Does Brazilian foreign policy indicate that a state can be a major power without significant
military capabilities?
9. Do today’s emerging powers mean the end of the Third World?
10. Do you think that the permanent members in the UN Security Council will ever be willing to
offer an additional seat to countries such as India, Brazil, or South Africa?
Visit the online resources to test your understanding by trying the self-test questions.
Chapter 6 Rising powers and the emerging global order
Further Reading
Alden, C., Morphet, S., and Vieira, M. A. (2010), The South in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan). An analysis of the Global South and of the new Southern coalitions in the early
years of the twenty-first century.
Anderson, P. (2019), ‘Bolsonaro’s Brazil’, London Review of Books, 7 February: 11–22. An analysis of
the complexities of the Brazilian economic crisis and the increasing political polarization,
looking both at the decline of the left and the rise of President Bolsonaro.
Basrur, R. (2017), ‘Modi’s Foreign Policy Fundamentals: A Trajectory Unchanged’, International
Affairs, 93(1): 7–26. An argument about the gap between the rhetoric of change and underlying
continuity.
Brooks, S. G., and Wohlforth, W. C. (2008), World Out of Balance: International Relations and the
Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). A strong argument
in favour of the continued power of the United States.
Hameiri, S., and Jones, L. (2018), ‘China Challenges Global Governance? The Case of Chinese
International Development Finance and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, International
Affairs, 94(3): 573–93.
Hurrell, A. (2007), On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). An analysis of contending approaches to the idea of
international and global order.
Khanna, P. (ed.) (2009), The Second World: How Emerging Powers are Redefining Global
Competition in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House). A broad and influential
account of structural economic changes and the ways in which flows of people, energy, and
economics are shifting the map of global politics.
Paul, T. V. (2018), Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press). An analysis of how balance of power politics can be applied
to emerging powers.
Spektor, M. (2022), ‘Strategies of Rising Brazil: Postmortem Review, Looking Forward’,
Contemporary Politics, 28(1): 20–37. A comprehensive appraisal of writing on the rise of Brazil.
Starrs, S. (2014), ‘The Chimera of Global Convergence’, New Left Review, 87: 81–96. An example of
a neo-Marxist account of why the idea of ‘rising powers’ is illusory.
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
99
Part Three
Theories of world politics
In this part of the book we introduce you to the main
theories that try to explain world politics. We have
two principal aims.
First, we want you to be able to grasp the essential
claims of the theories that have been most influential in explaining world politics. To this end, we have
included chapters on the main theoretical perspectives on world politics: liberalism, realism, Marxism,
feminism, social constructivism, poststructuralism,
and postcolonialism. Of these, liberalism has perhaps
been most influential in shaping the current world
order and realism has been the most influential in the
academic discipline of International Relations. Both
have also attracted fierce criticism for being ideologies masquerading as objective theories. Most of the
history of International Relations theory in academia
has seen a dispute between realist, liberal, and Marxist
rivals, with the debate between realism and liberalism
being the most long-standing and well developed.
We have also included a chapter on the increasingly
important approach of social constructivism. We then
introduce you to other recent theoretical work in
Kilito Chan/Getty Images
world politics, in chapters focusing on feminist, poststructuralist, and postcolonial/decolonial approaches
to international theory. By the end of this part we
hope you will be able to understand the main ideas of
the various theories, and to assess their comparative
strengths and weaknesses.
Our second aim is to give you an overview of
theory that you need to be able to assess the significance of globalization for an understanding of
world politics. After reading these chapters on theory, we hope that you will be in a better position
to see how these theories of world politics might
interpret globalization in different ways. We feel
that you should then be able to decide for yourself
both which interpretation you find most convincing, and what kind of evidence you might find in
the remaining parts of the book to enable you to
work out just how much globalization marks a new
distinct stage in world politics, requiring new theories, or whether it is simply a fad or fashion that
might alter the surface of world politics but not its
main underlying features.
Chapter 7
Liberal internationalism
tim dunne
Framing Questions
●
How has liberal internationalist thinking evolved?
●
Why is there a persistent imperial impulse in the practice of liberal states’ foreign
policy?
●
What influence should liberal internationalism have on the post-American-led world
order?
Reader’s Guide
The practice of international relations has been hostile to liberal internationalism for much of the
history of the modern states system. Whereas the
domestic political realm in many states has witnessed
an impressive degree of progress, with institutions
providing for both order and justice, the international
political realm has been characterized by a precarious order and the absence of justice. Liberal internationalists do not accept that the world has to be
this way. The ‘international’ could be a place where
states follow the rule of law as well as furthering moral
purposes such as civility, prosperity, and peace. The
chapter argues that liberal internationalism became
a significant ideological force after 1945, not least
because of the rise of American dominance over economic and strategic matters. Many influential writers
argue that liberal internationalism is now in crisis—in
particular because of the emergence of China as a
rival to American hegemony—yet liberalism remains
deeply embedded in the language and culture of socalled global governance.
Visit the online resources to access an
interactive timeline of how the discipline of
International Relations has evolved.
104
tim dunne
7.1 Introduction and context
Liberalism as a model of government has been remarkably successful. On one simple but important measure,
over half the countries in the world are broadly liberal in character, which is more than any other regime
type (Desilver 2019). While liberal democracies predominate in Europe and the Americas, and increasingly in parts of Africa and Asia, it is also the case that
liberal values and institutions have made fewer inroads
into global governance. This point was made several
decades ago by Harvard scholar Stanley Hoffmann, who
famously said, ‘international affairs have been the nemesis of Liberalism’. His explanation was equally stark:
‘the essence of Liberalism is self-restraint, moderation,
compromise and peace’, whereas ‘the essence of international politics is exactly the opposite: troubled peace,
at best, or the state of war’ (S. Hoffmann 1987: 396).
Hoffmann’s reasoning comes as no surprise to realists,
who argue that there can be no progress, no law, and no
justice where there is no common power (see Ch. 9). But
despite the weight of this realist argument, those who
believe in the liberal project have not conceded defeat.
Liberal internationalists believe that power politics
itself is the product of ideas, and—crucially—ideas can
change. Therefore, even if international affairs have been
inhospitable to liberal ideas of progressive change, this
does not mean that the international cannot be remade
in liberalism’s own image.
Writers and intellectuals as far back as the
Enlightenment have advocated for conceptions of liberal internationalism in which governments are just
when they face the people, and lawful when they face
each other (see Section 7.2). These great but flawed
thinkers—Immanuel Kant, J. S. Mill, and Jeremy
Bentham—provided the language and concepts used by
later liberals, who were able to embed them in international practice (albeit not without setbacks). Bentham,
for instance, first used the term ‘international’ as he was
dissatisfied with the phrase ‘the law of nations’, used by
predecessors such as Emer de Vattel. Bentham thought
‘international’ was a more accurate adjective to describe
relations between sovereigns—and very soon after
his use of the term in 1780 it was in widespread use
(Suganami 1978: 231).
The second wave of liberal internationalism concerns the ‘idealist moment’ that occurred after the First
World War (see Section 7.3). After the futile slaughter of
around 40 million soldiers and civilians, the League of
Nations was created to solve disputes between countries,
including on how to manage colonies, rather than allowing them to degenerate into open warfare. The birth of
the League coincided with the establishment of the
world’s first dedicated Professorship in International
Politics—appropriately named the Woodrow Wilson
Chair—at what was then called the University College
of Wales in Aberystwyth (see Box 7.1 for a discussion of
one of the prominent holders of the Woodrow Wilson
Chair). Not only was the First World War a trigger for
the teaching of international politics in many countries, but the concern to prevent future destruction on
a global scale was a priority for a large coalition of committed internationalists—activists, writers, representatives, intellectuals, and societies—that sought to build a
new international and imperial order.
A third wave of liberal internationalist thinking takes us to the end of the second decade of the
Box 7.1 E. H. Carr and the critique of liberal
internationalism
In common with many other intellectuals in the period
between Versailles in 1919 and the outbreak of the Second
World War in 1939, E. H. Carr was much more than a scholar—
he was variously a diplomat, commentator, and agitator. His
classic work, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939, wove these
strands together. Carr’s preferred title for the work is worthy
of note: he wanted to call the book Utopia and Reality, but
this was thought by the publisher to be too abstract. What was
important for Carr was to show how liberal conceptions of
a rational and moral world order (utopia) needed to be corrected by an analytical approach to politics that understood
how power operates (realism).
The rise of internationalism, Carr argued, could not be separated from the interests of the most powerful states in the
system. Internationalist ideas of perpetual peace flourished
during the height of French military hegemony in Europe in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; internationalist
ideas of free trade and the right of great powers to dominate
the non-European world flourished as Britain became the
dominant world power in the mid-nineteenth century. As
America became first among equals after 1919, internationalist ideas of democracy, self-determination, and collective
security became the universal moral principles of the era. The
task for political realism is to show that these various articulations of internationalism were all connected to prevailing
patterns of power and interests. Despite the inadequacies of
internationalism, Carr recognized that the struggle to uncover
a moral code that was applicable to all members of international society was an indispensable part of building a theory of
international politics.
Chapter 7 Liberal internationalism
twenty-first century (see Section 7.4). In the US heartland of liberal internationalism, there is a sense of crisis
pervading both leadership and followership in world
politics. Many leading thinkers, such as Princeton’s
G. John Ikenberry, question whether other states and
institutions are able to take up the mantle of leadership
given America’s relative decline. Despite the increased
visibility of and coordination among the rising powers
(such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Russia),
there is no evidence that they believe themselves to
have a special responsibility for managing world order
in a manner paralleling the role played by the US after
1945. Does this mean that a post-Western world will be
hostile to liberal internationalist norms and purposes?
Or do we need to take seriously the belief that there are
moral universals that unify the plurality of peoples and
societies, and that liberal internationalism has come
closer to articulating those shared values than the alternatives? The position adopted in this chapter can be
summed up in the following way: liberal internationalism is inadequate in many respects, yet at the same time
internationalist thinking remains indispensable as a
way of mediating between different values and forms of
life (Chakrabarty 2000).
7.2 Founding ideas of nineteenth-century liberal internationalism
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Jeremy Bentham
(1748–1832) were two of the leading liberal thinkers
of the Enlightenment. Both reacted to the barbarity
of international relations, or what Kant graphically
described as ‘the lawless state of savagery’, at a time
when domestic politics was on the cusp of a new age of
rights, citizenship, and constitutionalism. Their abhorrence of the lawless state of savagery led them separately
to elaborate plans to establish governance over matters
of peace and war. Although written over two centuries
ago, their moral and political philosophies contain the
seeds of core liberal internationalist ideas, in particular
the belief that reason could deliver freedom and justice
in international relations.
The term ‘international’ was invented by Jeremy
Bentham, along with other terms that have also found
their way into the political lexicon such as ‘codification’
(see Section 7.1). Bentham was an expansive thinker,
writer, and publicist. He hoped to do for law and morality what Captain Cook and other voyagers had done for
exploration, namely conquer the world: at one point,
he immodestly declared that ‘The Globe is the field of
Dominion to which the author aspires’ (Armitage 2011:
65). It was in his book Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation (1780) that Bentham argued for
a new concept of international jurisprudence that was
based on the equality of sovereigns. Bentham applied
his utilitarian maxim of ‘the greatest happiness of the
greatest number’ to the international, such that the task
for a judge or legislator would be to establish the greatest happiness among the family of nations.
Forty years later, a new edition of the Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation was published. By this time, the term ‘international’ had come
into widespread usage. And by the middle of the nineteenth century, it had become an ism. Internationalism
became a shorthand to describe the growing band of
activists, feminists, publicists, and organizations all
pushing for various reforms in domestic society and
in the wider international society of European states
(Sluga 2013).
For Kant, the imperative to achieve perpetual
peace required the transformation of individual consciousness, republican constitutionalism, and a federal contract among states to abolish war (rather than
to regulate it, as earlier international lawyers had
argued). This federation can be likened to a permanent
peace treaty, rather than a ‘super-state’ actor or world
government.
Kant’s claim that liberal states are pacific in their
international relations with other liberal states was
revived in the 1980s. In a much-cited article, Michael
Doyle (1986: 1151) argued that liberal states have created a ‘separate peace’. According to Doyle, there are
two elements to the Kantian legacy: restraint among
liberal states and ‘international imprudence’ in relations with non-liberal states. Although the empirical evidence seems to support the democratic peace
thesis, it is important to bear in mind the limitations
of this argument. First, for the theory to be compelling, believers in the thesis need to explain why war has
become unthinkable among liberal states. Kant argued
that if the decision to use force were taken by the people, rather than by the prince, then the frequency of
conflicts would be drastically reduced. Logically, this
argument also implies a lower frequency of conflicts
between liberal and non-liberal states, but this is contrary to historical evidence. An alternative explanation
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for the democratic peace thesis might be that liberal
states tend to be wealthy, and therefore have less to gain
(and more to lose) by engaging in conflicts than poorer
authoritarian states. Perhaps the most convincing
explanation of all is the simple fact that liberal states
tend to be in relations of amity with other liberal states.
War between Canada and the United States is unthinkable, perhaps not because of their liberal democratic
constitutions, but because they are allies who share
the same approach to managing economic and political affairs. Indeed, war among states with contrasting
political and economic systems may also be unthinkable when they have a history of friendly relations. One
such example is Mexico and Cuba, two countries that
maintain close bilateral relations despite their history
of divergent economic ideologies.
Irrespective of the scholarly search for the reasons
why liberal democratic states are more peaceful, it is
important to note the political consequences of this
hypothesis. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama wrote an article entitled ‘ The End of History?’, which celebrated
the triumph of liberalism over all other ideologies,
contending that liberal states were more stable internally and more peaceful in their international relations (Fukuyama 1989: 3–18). Other defenders of the
democratic peace thesis were more circumspect. As
Doyle (1995: 100) recognized, liberal democracies are
as aggressive as any other type of state in their relations with authoritarian regimes and stateless peoples. How, then, should states inside the liberal zone
of peace conduct their relations with authoritarian
governments? How can the positive Kantian legacy of
restraint triumph over liberal states’ historical imperial temptation? These fascinating and timely questions are considered in relation to the great liberal
theorist J. S. Mill in Box 7.2, and they also frame the
final part of this chapter (see Section 7.5).
Box 7.2 Imperialism and internationalism in
nineteenth-century Britain
The life of J. S. Mill illustrates the ambivalent character of
nineteenth-century liberal thinking in Britain. Mill was born
in London in 1806 and became the intellectual protégé of
Jeremy Bentham, the utilitarian philosopher who coined the
term ‘international’. By mid-century, Mill was a dominant figure in Victorian intellectual life. He was no stranger to international issues and concerns; in fact, he was an employee of the
East India Company for 35 years and later became a member
of parliament at a time when Britain was at the height of its
imperial power. Like many other Victorian intellectuals, Mill
regarded liberal government as the highest stage of civilization.
A social reformer domestically, Mill was an imperialist
internationally. He contrasted European liberal modes of governance with barbarism and savagery beyond Europe’s boundaries. These two coexisting but opposite states of development
required the existence of different moral codes. Among ‘civilized’ countries, the only matter to be resolved was ‘the question of interference’ ( Jahn 2006: 195). Between civilized and
barbarian peoples, it was both necessary and proper to permit
imperial—even despotic—systems of authority.
It became commonplace for Victorian intellectuals to divide
international order into the three domains of ‘civilized’, ‘semicivilized’, and ‘barbaric’ (see Ch. 18). As such distinctions entered
the language of international law, they produced a highly stratified view of international society—one in which membership
was based on race and religion (see Case Study 3.1). The consequences of this application of the standard of civilization to
nineteenth-century diplomacy were ‘horrible’, to borrow Mark
Mazower’s (2012: 72) description (see Ch. 11). By the century’s
end, Africa was reordered in ways that reflected the interests of
the great colonial powers; this naked exploitation was justified by
a mission to ‘civilize’ the ‘savages’. Small wonder that one of the territories procured by King Leopold of Belgium in 1885, the Congo
Free State, has been in such turmoil for the last two decades (see
Case Studies 13.2 and 21.2). With millions of civilians murdered,
displaced, beaten, and raped, Congo is at the epicentre of what
has been described as Africa’s first world war. From the time of the
Berlin Conference (1884–5) to today, imperialists and internationalists have conspired to colonize the territory, then decolonize it,
and finally condemn it through neglect and moral indifference.
Key Points
liberal internationalist thought on international relations
• Early
took the view that the natural order had been corrupted by secret
treaties and outdated policies such as the balance of power.
liberals believed that the problem of war
• Enlightenment
could be solved through the development of a body of
international rules and laws constraining the self-interest of
states. In addition, they believed that trade and other
cross-border flows would further facilitate more peaceful
international relations.
Kant argued that a ‘perpetual peace’ could be
• Immanuel
achieved through the transformation of individual
consciousness, republican constitutionalism, and a federal
contract among states to abolish war.
‘The End of History?’ (1989), Francis Fukuyama famously
• Incelebrated
the triumph of liberalism over all other ideologies,
contending that liberal states were more stable internally and
more peaceful in their international relations than illiberal
states. From the vantage point of the early 2020s, ideological
competition and conflict continue to shape the fate of states
and peoples, suggesting that Fukuyama’s argument was
deeply flawed.
Chapter 7 Liberal internationalism
7.3 Internationalism and institutionalism: peace through law
The idea of a natural harmony of interests in international political and economic relations came under
challenge in the early part of the twentieth century. The
fact that Britain and Germany had highly interdependent economies before the First World War (1914–18)
seemed to confirm the fatal flaw in the association of
economic interdependence with peace. From the dawn
of the twentieth century, the contradictions within
European civilization, of progress and exemplarism on
the one hand and the harnessing of industrial power
for military purposes on the other, could no longer
be contained. Europe stumbled into war, killing 15
million people. The war not only brought an end to
three empires and the establishment of new Leagueadministered ‘mandate systems’ to manage empire, but
was also a contributing factor to the Russian Revolution
of 1917.
The First World War shifted liberal thinking
towards a recognition that peace is not a natural condition but is one that must be constructed. In a powerful critique of the idea that peace and prosperity
were part of a latent natural order, the publicist and
author Leonard Woolf argued that peace and prosperity required ‘consciously devised machinery’ (Luard
1992: 465). But perhaps the most famous advocate of
an international authority for the management of international relations was Woodrow Wilson. According to
this US president, peace could only be secured with the
creation of an international organization to regulate
international anarchy, including the transference of
German and Ottoman colonial territories to Britain
and France with oversight from the League of Nations.
Security could not be left to secret bilateral diplomatic
deals and an unthinking faith in the balance of power.
Just as peace had to be enforced in domestic society, the
international domain had to have a system of regulations for addressing disputes and an international force
that could be mobilized if non-violent conflict resolution failed. In this sense, more than any other strand
of liberalism, idealism rests on the domestic analogy
(Suganami 1989: 94–113).
In Wilson’s famous ‘Fourteen Points’ speech,
addressed to Congress in January 1918, he argued that
‘a general association of nations must be formed’ to
preserve the coming peace—and the League of Nations
was to be that general association. For the League to
be effective, it had to have the military power to deter
aggression and, when necessary, to use a preponderance of power to enforce its will. This was the idea
behind the collective security system that was central
to the League of Nations. Collective security refers to
an arrangement where ‘each state in the system accepts
that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees
to join in a collective response to aggression’ (Roberts
and Kingsbury 1993: 30). It can be contrasted with an
alliance system of security, where several states join
together, usually as a response to a specific external
threat (sometimes known as ‘collective defence’). In the
case of the League of Nations, Article 16 of the League’s
Charter noted the obligation that, in the event of war,
all member states must cease normal relations with
the offending state, impose sanctions, and, if necessary, commit their armed forces to the disposal of the
League Council should the use of force be required to
restore the status quo.
The League’s constitution also called for the selfdetermination of nations—another central characteristic of liberal idealist thinking on international
relations—though not all peoples were imagined as sufficiently civilized to determine their own future. Going
back to the mid-nineteenth century, self-determination
movements in Greece, Hungary, and Italy received support from liberal powers and public opinion. However,
self-determination for British and French colonies
received less support. Contradictory support for selfdetermination highlighted a host of practical and
moral problems that were laid bare after Woodrow
Wilson issued his proclamation. What would happen
to newly created minorities who felt no allegiance to
the self-determining state? Could a democratic process
adequately deal with questions of identity—who was to
decide what community should be self-determining?
What would happen if colonial peoples were allowed to
determine their future and control their own resources?
And what if a newly self-determined state rejected liberal democratic norms in favour of socialism or panmovements, such as Pan-Arabism or Pan-Africanism?
The League of Nations experiment with collective security was a disaster. While the moral rhetoric at the League’s creation was decidedly idealist, in
practice states remained imprisoned by self-interest.
There is no better example of this than the US decision not to join the institution it had created. With the
Soviet Union in opposition for ideological reasons, the
League of Nations quickly became a talking shop for
the ‘satisfied’ powers. Hitler’s decision in March 1936 to
re­occupy the Rhineland, a designated demilitarized
zone according to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles,
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effectively pulled the plug on the League’s life-support
system (it had already been put on the ‘critical’ list following the Manchurian crisis in 1931 and the Ethiopian
crisis in 1935).
The collapse of the League of Nations brought
a swift end to the idealist moment in the first half of
the twentieth century. It is important to note that the
thinkers of the inter-war period were not straightforwardly Benthamites who thought that reason and science could resolve political disputes. Instead, there was
a backward-looking and conservative strand to their
internationalism. Idealists such as Gilbert Murray and
Alfred Zimmern opposed the idea that the League of
Nations should have the kind of coercive authority that
was reserved for sovereign states. Such a radical alteration to the structure of the system might have risked
non-Western powers—such as the Bolsheviks, or the
colonized races considered not yet ‘fit’ to govern—taking control. ‘Their dependence on this strikingly conservative understanding of international order became
a kind of supplement . . . for their unwillingness to
imagine political alternatives to sovereignty, to envision a global economy regulated by workers, and to
theorize a democratic form of international governance
with real political (not just moral and symbolic) power’
(Morefield 2009: 15). A powerful strand of internationalism in the inter-war period was radically imperialist,
privileging an international order that was hospitable
to empire and inhospitable to alternative radical internationalist ideas about democracy and the subordination of sovereign authority to the rule of law.
There is no doubt that after 1945 the language of liberal internationalism was more pragmatic; how could
anyone living in the shadow of the Holocaust be optimistic? Yet familiar core ideas of liberalism remained.
Even in the early 1940s, states recognized the need to
replace the League of Nations with another international institution that would have responsibility for
international peace and security, including the new
system of trusteeship with oversight of colonial administration. This time, however, for the United Nations,
the framers of its Charter were aware of the need for
a consensus among the great powers for enforcement
action to be taken—hence the veto system (Article 27
of the UN Charter), which granted the five permanent
members of the Security Council the power of veto.
This revision constituted an important modification
to the classical model of collective security, as each of
the great powers would veto any coercive action proposed by the others (Roberts 1996: 315). It was not until
the end of the cold war that cooperation among the
great powers was sufficiently well developed for some
partial form of collective security to be realized, albeit
briefly, as evident in the UN’s response to the invasion
of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990. Later post-cold
war interventions, particularly Kosovo (1998) and Iraq
(2003), made it abundantly clear that the cooperation
evident in the collective security action taken against
Iraq was only fleeting, and that the UN would once
again be sidelined as the US and its allies forged ad
hoc coalitions of the willing to pursue their particular
brand of ‘liberal internationalism’ (see Case Study 7.1).
Case Study 7.1 The rise and fall of the ‘indispensable nation’
Other great powers increasingly see the liberal world
order as lacking legitimacy, leading them to gesture
towards alternative arrangements such as China’s Belt and
Road Initiative
© ITAR-TASS News Agency / Alamy Stock Photo
As the end of the millennium approached, liberal internationalists saw America as the ‘indispensable nation’ that could
use force without first asking for permission. As Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright announced in 1998 in the context of
disarming Iraq: ‘if we have to use force, it is because we are
America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we
see further than other countries into the future’ (US Department
of State 1998). This imperial impulse lasted well into the twentyfirst century, when the United States fought the so-called ‘war
on terror’ using methods that frequently breached conventional understandings of the laws of war (such as the incarceration and torture of terrorist suspects at Guantanamo Bay). Such
a belief in American exceptionalism continued through the second Obama administration. In a presidential debate in October
2012, President Barack Obama noted that ‘America remains
the one indispensable nation. And the world needs a strong
America’ (NPR 2012).
The claim that the US remains an ‘indispensable nation’ seems,
in the early 2020s, a hollow one. The Trump administration
Chapter 7 Liberal internationalism
rejected the multilateral institutions that underpinned and supported American leadership. At the same time, other great powers
increasingly see the liberal world order as lacking legitimacy, leading them to gesture towards alternative arrangements such as China’s
Belt and Road Initiative. A third reason why the US is no longer considered an indispensable nation is captured in the shift away from
many of the bolder normative ideas associated with the post-cold war period, including democratization and universal human rights.
For many countries in the world, these values were at best a kind of ‘bargain’ which was reluctantly agreed to in return for some of the
economic benefits associated with globalization. These ‘liberal’ norms have weakened over time as the US and its allies are increasingly
regarded as being at best selective in their commitment to them and at worst as actively undermining human rights.
Question 1: Is the idea of an ‘indispensable nation’ simply a self-satisfied phrase used by American leaders, or is there substance to the
idea of the US as the pre-eminent global power?
Question 2: Is China becoming an indispensable nation in the Asia-Pacific region?
Key Points
idea of a natural harmony of interests in international
there are important continuities between
• The
• Although
political and economic relations came under challenge in the
Enlightenment liberal thought and the ‘idealist moment’, the
early part of the twentieth century as Britain and Germany
went to war, despite their high degree of economic
interdependence.
First World War shifted liberal thinking towards a
• The
recognition that peace is not a natural condition but must
•
be constructed. To this end, Woodrow Wilson advocated
for the creation of a League of Nations to regulate
international anarchy through the exercise of collective
security.
The League’s constitution also called for the selfdetermination of all nations. However, despite widespread
agreement on this principle, a host of practical and moral
problems limited its implementation.
thinkers of the inter-war period were flawed. They
overlooked the distribution of power and interests in the
international system (a critique mounted by realists), and
they failed to understand that values and purposes were
inextricably linked to power. Notably, leading
internationalists in the inter-war period tied the future of the
League of Nations to the dominance of international society
by European colonial powers.
imperial impulse of the Anglo-American powers
• The
continued in the post-1945 order such that imperialism and
internationalism remain as interwoven in the twenty-first
century as they were in the minds of formative liberal
thinkers such as J. S. Mill.
7.4 The challenges confronting liberal internationalism
The ascendancy of liberal ideas and institutions has
been one of the most striking trends in world politics
over the last two centuries. Furthermore, with the
demise of the cold war system it seemed like liberalism
had defeated all other contending political ideologies.
At the start of the 1990s, leading Western politicians
hailed a ‘new world order’ as international institutions
such as the United Nations Security Council began to
operate as envisaged by the drafters of the UN Charter
back in 1945. These new patterns of cooperation
prompted British Prime Minister Tony Blair (1999a) to
declare at the end of the 1990s that ‘we are all internationalists now’.
But from the vantage point of the second decade
of the twenty-first century, confidence in the liberal
international order has ebbed and liberalism is now in
question both in international theory and in practice
(see Box 7.3). Recurring crises and disagreements in
the multilateral institutions designed to provide governance over security, trade, and finance have demonstrated that cooperation is harder to achieve and to
sustain than liberals assumed. The ongoing violence in
the Middle East and Africa, the uneven record of postcold war liberal foreign policies in delivering a more
secure and just world order, and continued unrest triggered by global economic inequalities have turned the
triumphalism of the ‘liberal decade’ to despondency. It
is now more common to read about liberal internationalism’s demise than it is to hear about its ascendancy.
G. John Ikenberry is the most prominent analyst of
the influence liberal ideas have exerted over world order
in the last hundred years. In a frequently cited article,
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Box 7.3 Crisis and division in liberalism?
The theme of liberal world order in crisis has received a great
deal of scholarly attention in the first two decades of the
twenty-first century. For example, in his A Liberal World Order
in Crisis, Georg Sørensen compares the optimistic sentiments
of the 1990s with the post-9/11 world in which terror and
great power rivalry darken the horizon of international relations. Sørensen (2011: 12) defines world order as ‘a governing arrangement among states’ and believes that sovereign
states remain the primary building blocks of these governance
arrangements. The book’s main contribution is its account of
the ways in which tensions arise when liberty is pursued in the
world. One example of this tension is the practice of democracy promotion that has been followed by most liberal states,
to varying degrees, in these two decades. Outsiders promoting democracy risk becoming overly paternalistic and thereby
lapsing into a form of imperialism that has no legitimacy in
international politics today. Another example concerns the criteria for membership in international institutions: should they
be open to states with illiberal constitutions, or should they
be restricted to liberal, democratic countries only? Such voices
are frequently heard in Western capitals when the will of liberal great powers has been stymied by others, as was the case
in 2003 when the UN Security Council refused to give its consent to the war against Iraq. Sørensen describes this tension,
and the protagonists’ portrayal of one or other liberal position, as a choice ‘between Imposition and Restraint’ (Sørensen
2011: 64). The values and practices associated with ‘imposition’
include intervention, foreign policy activism, scrutiny of other
states, and the pursuit of universal principles. The values and
practices associated with ‘restraint’ include non-intervention,
toleration, empathy, and pragmatism.
Ikenberry (1999) maps liberalism’s influence through
three phases, conveniently labelled ‘liberal internationalism 1.0’, ‘2.0’, and ‘3.0’. Liberal internationalism 1.0
corresponds with the ‘idealist moment’ of the inter-war
period and the failed attempt to replace the old balance
of power order with the rule of law. After 1945, America
set about constructing liberal internationalism 2.0. It
did this by embedding certain fundamental liberal
principles into the UN Charter while building other
institutions to manage trade and other cross-border
flows of people, goods, and services. Internationalists
in the post-1945 era argued that the realists were wrong
about state behaviour: they pointed to the fact that the
world’s pre-eminent power chose to forsake the pursuit
of short-term gains in return for a durable settlement
that benefited its European allies and those in Asia too.
While America had more power than other states in the
system, it also accepted a greater share of the burden
when it came to setting and upholding the rules of economic and security governance.
Yet Ikenberry is surely right to argue that this model of
an American-led international order—liberal internationalism 2.0—is experiencing a crisis today. Why is this? First
and foremost, American hegemony ‘no longer appears to be
an adequate framework to support a liberal international
order’ (Ikenberry 2009: 79). Even if the US had sufficient
power, there are signs that the rest of the world no longer
wants an order in which a single state is preponderant.
Related to this point is the sense that the liberal principle
of sovereign equality is under threat. The security policies
driven by the United States and its allies in NATO rest on a
conception of sovereignty that has become conditional on
good behaviour, understood either as being on-side with the
war on terror or ensuring basic human rights are protected.
The controversy generated by the 2011 NATO-led
war against Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya is an example of
the deep divisions that Western leadership is generating. Shortly after the no-fly zone began to be enforced
militarily, Russia and China argued that the other three
permanent members of the Security Council (France,
the UK, and the US) had shifted the mandate from one
of protecting civilians to one of regime change. Whether
or not this is a correct interpretation of the NATO-led
enforcement action is less important than understanding the magnitude of the struggle that is under way
between influential Western states and re-emerging
powers such as India, China, and Russia (see Ch. 6). In
the realigned world order, the question of where authority lies to decide on intervention is one that will need to
be answered. The responsibility to protect doctrine (or
R2P) could become a key test for whether liberalism can
endure despite systemic changes to the distribution of
material and normative power (see Ch. 33). Opposing
Opinions 7.1 discusses the arguments for and against
the view that liberal internationalists have a responsibility to protect the victims of atrocity crimes.
In the second decade of the twenty-first century, it
is apparent that the US lacks the capacity, and Western
institutions the legitimacy, to maintain the liberal
world order into the future. Alternative configurations
of liberal internationalism remain a distant possibility. Liberal internationalism 3.0 requires a movement
away from a sovereignty-based order towards one where
global institutions become the new rulers of the world.
While less tied to American power, the governance
institutions of the future will nevertheless be driven by
liberal values. The dilemma for Ikenberry is that liberal
Chapter 7 Liberal internationalism
internationalism 2.0 is in crisis, yet 3.0 remains hopelessly unrealistic.
Given that liberalism has produced such unequal
gains for the West and the rest, it is perhaps unsurprising that contemporary US-based liberal scholars
have become preoccupied with the question of preserving the current order rather than reconstituting it according to more just distributive principles.
Rather than seeing reform as a task that wealthy
Western countries have a responsibility to undertake,
the use of Western power is more often equated with
extending the control of existing institutions, and
protecting markets and securing access to precious
resources. When a hegemonic liberal order comes
under challenge, as it did on 9/11, the response is
uncompromising. It is noticeable in this respect that
former President George W. Bush framed the ‘war on
terror’ in the language of liberal internationalism: he
referred to the 2003 war against Iraq, for example, as
‘freedom’s war’.
Opposing Opinions 7.1 Liberal internationalist governments have a responsibility to protect
other people from atrocity crimes
For
Against
Since the formation of the modern state system in the midseventeenth century, certain influential legal philosophers
have argued that states have a duty to protect non-citizens
in danger of persecution and mass killings. Hugo Grotius, the
seventeenth-century international lawyer, believed that sovereign states had a right to intervene to protect innocents abroad.
A so-called right of humanitarian intervention was largely
rejected during the cold war despite several cases in which
force was used to contain a worsening atrocity. These cases
include India’s invasion of East Pakistan in 1971; Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978; and Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda
in 1979. Arguments against intervention include the negative
impact it would have on international order.
At the heart of R2P is the basic right to security from the following atrocity crimes: war crimes, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The right to life and the
right to security from violence are inalienable and independent
of the fact of cultural diversity in world politics.
The 2005 World Summit codified R2P in relation to a
‘three pillars’ framework. Pillar 1 stipulates that the host
government has the primary responsibility to protect; Pillar
2 notes that other states and regional organizations have a
responsibility to assist the host government when that assistance has been requested; and Pillar 3 requires that the international community take timely and decisive action, including
force, providing coercive measures are supported by a Security
Council resolution.
Normative consensus. While most states reject the argument
that they can be compelled to use force even as a last resort,
there remains a high degree of consensus in international society
that the other duties stipulated in the R2P framework apply to all
states all of the time.
The rules of the global order prohibit the use of force and
intervention in the affairs of another sovereign state. R2P
puts into question two of the key articles in the UN Charter: nonintervention (Article 2.7) and non-use of force (Article 2.4).
The R2P framework has largely been silenced during the
Syria crisis, particularly given the disunity inside the UN
Security Council. This shows that simply codifying sovereign
states’ obligations is not in itself sufficient to galvanize action.
R2P supports the imperialist impulse. The history of UN
peace operations in Africa has been closely tied to wars and
conflicts generated by the retreat of European states in the era
of decolonization. Given the prominence of the United States,
Britain, and France on the UN Security Council, R2P is seen by
critical legal scholars as another regime of control exercised by
wealthy Atlantic powers over countries in the Global South who
have only become ‘independent’ in the era of the UN system
(Orford 2011).
1. Are critics of R2P correct to argue that the framework established by the UN is yet another instrument to enable the Global North to
control the Global South?
2. What, if anything, is new in the R2P principle that the use of force should be a last resort?
3. Is there a risk of becoming fixated on debates about the use of force, rather than thinking about the range of non-coercive measures
that governments, and the international community, can use to prevent or mitigate mass atrocities?
Visit the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle these questions.
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The potential for liberal internationalism to embrace
imperialism is a tendency that has a long history. Liberty
enables the creation of wealth, which can trigger a drive
to find new markets. And how are these new markets to
be configured so that they are hospitable to the needs of
the imperial power? Historically, professional militaries worked in tandem with the great trading companies
to ensure favourable terms of trade. In this sense, US
foreign policy in the post-1945 period has a close resemblance to the great expansionist republican states of the
pre-modern period such as Athens and Rome.
Few liberals today would openly advocate territorial expansion along the lines of nineteenth-century
European colonial powers; at the same time, many have
been drawn to consider the virtues of informal empire
as a way of delivering liberty in an insecure world. In
the first decade of the twenty-first century, intellectuals
in Washington and London advocated for a new liberal
imperialism as a way of managing the security problem
posed by failed and collapsing states. An influential
voice in British foreign policy circles, Robert Cooper,
openly regretted that the supply of imperial governance
was at an all-time historic low at a moment when the
demand for liberal imposition had never been greater.
This was echoed by the influential Canadian intellectual Michael Ignatieff, who argued that only ‘empire
lite’ can manage the chaos and catastrophes happening
in many former colonized countries.
It is important to note that both mainstream scholarship on liberal internationalism and its critics agree
that the sovereign state can no longer be relied on to
sustain the institutions and purposes of the liberal
order. While Ikenberry believes it is ‘unrealistic’ to
expect states to cede sovereignty to the institutions
of global governance, critics of liberal internationalism argue that such narratives about a post-sovereign
state world are unjust. As Mazower (2012: 7) argues,
the scale of Western military involvement around the
world is such that ‘we find ourselves once more in a
hierarchical world in which some states are more sovereign than others’.
Key Points
observers argue that the internationalist principles
• Some
that have been a feature of the liberal order since 1945 are
in crisis.
following arguments support this view: the relative
• The
power of the United States is diminishing and hence its
capacity to deal with global risks is also reducing; rising
powers want a greater share of authority; the hope that the
European Union (EU) could emerge as a second
superpower which could strengthen internationalist rules
and values has proven to be false, and arguably the EU has
been further weakened as a global force by Brexit; and
there is widespread evidence of a return to a form of state
sovereignty in which intervention on internationalist
grounds will not find support in the UN Security Council or
among the majority of member states in the UN.
Ikenberry is right and liberal internationalism is in
• Ifdecline,
it is not clear what will replace it. If the liberal
order associated with the UN system collapses, then
history will have repeated itself: in the first half of the
twentieth century, great power rivalry led to major power
wars which the League of Nations was powerless to
prevent. Is a ‘1914’ scenario likely, or can liberal
internationalism adapt to the challenge of new emerging
powers without losing its distinctively liberal character?
those who lament the inability of the state and
• Alongside
global institutions to deliver a liberal peace are more
critical voices who point out how structural patterns of
hierarchy persist. These patterns are actively reproduced
by security and development doctrines and policies. As a
result, the liberal international order remains conveniently
favourable to the most powerful states in the system.
7.5 Conclusion: incomplete, but indispensable, internationalism
The euphoria with which liberals greeted the end of
the cold war in 1989 has dissipated. The pattern of
conflict and insecurity present at the beginning of
the twenty-first century suggests that liberal internationalism remains at best an incomplete project. At
worst, internationalism continues to be imbued with
an imperial impulse in which new schemes for governing the world reproduce patterns of dominance
and dependence established during the era of
empires. ‘The history of internationalism’, as Glenda
Sluga argues, ‘has always involved forgetting’ (Sluga
2013: 45).
We should not forget the fact that, even during the
high watermark of British imperial rule, liberalism not
only justified empire, but provided the resources ‘to
launch stinging critiques of it’ (Bell 2016: 371). Stinging
Chapter 7 Liberal internationalism
critiques are needed with respect to the ongoing harms
and atrocities that are experienced by vulnerable
­peoples—harms that can only be challenged using a
language of universal rights and responsibilities. Let us
also not forget that many of the ideas and practices of
internationalism have non-Western origins, as is evident in Case Study 7.2 on the African origins of sovereignty as responsibility.
Channelling the great nineteenth-century reformers and the thinkers of the ‘idealist moment’ between
the two world wars, internationalists of the twenty-first
century should continue to advocate for a common
culture based on a shared vision of an ever-wider
community of states and peoples. Internationalists
today need to be activists too. They should demand
that international institutions be more effective, and
insist that decisions are better when they are made
democratically, that good governance requires transparency and fairness, that rights are irrelevant unless
responsibilities are taken seriously, and that economic
and social justice is critical to peaceful change on a
global scale.
Case Study 7.2 Sovereignty as responsibility: an African concept
The United Nations General Assembly, 2005 in
New York City
© Daniel Berehulak/Getty Images
The claim of a ‘right of intervention’ that was becoming popular
in French diplomatic circles in the 1980s stirred up considerable
concern on the part of developing countries. As a counterweight
to this view, the Sudanese diplomat Francis Deng led a collaboration with other Africanists to develop the idea of ‘sovereignty
as responsibility’ (Deng et al. 1996). At its core, Deng and his colleagues argued that governments must aspire to many goals associated with good governance, such as economic prosperity, the rule
of law, and the effective management of ethnic and cultural differences. When state failure generated the conditions for human insecurity, then the international community needed to make it clear
that this was a matter of concern for the global order as a whole.
For Deng and his colleagues, the category of ‘internally displaced persons’ (IDPs) was an example of how traditional conceptions of sovereignty ignored those who were forced to flee
their homes in the context of the armed conflicts under way in
many African countries. Internally displaced persons were not
afforded the protections granted by the Refugee Convention as
they were displaced within their own country rather than being
forced into a neighbouring state (see Ch. 26).
In the 1990s, Deng collaborated with Roberta Cohen, who had
worked at the US State Department during the Jimmy Carter administration. Deng and Cohen advanced the view that the ‘primary
responsibility’ for displaced populations rests with the government
of origin; at the same time, other states had a responsibility to provide assistance and such offers ought not to be rejected (Cohen and
Deng 1998). This idea of a shared responsibility to assist internally
displaced persons evolved into the wider responsibility to protect
(R2P) doctrine that was adopted as a resolution of the UN General
Assembly on 16 September 2005 (see Ch. 33).
Apart from the idea of sovereignty as responsibility being of
significant African origin, the African Union (AU) has been the
leading regional organization to adopt policies and principles
consistent with R2P. Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the
African Union (adopted in 2000) enables the AU to intervene
in respect of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Kwesi Aning and Frank Okyere (2016: 536) describe the AU’s
track record in implementing R2P as being one of ‘limited progress’ due to a myriad of factors, including limited enforcement
capability and the difficulty of establishing a consensus among
the members as to when the AU should give effect to Article 4(h).
Nevertheless, Aning and Okyere argue that the AU remains a ‘pioneer regional institution’ in the development of human protection, and that it has been ‘crucial in preventing situations of mass
brutality on the continent independently of the UN, particularly
in Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Somalia’.
Question 1: What is the significance of the claim that an African
diplomatic community has been pivotal in terms of the evolution
of the R2P framework?
Question 2: Why did ‘internally displaced persons’ become a
focus in the post-cold war period for reformist diplomats such as
Francis Deng?
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Questions
1. Do you agree with Stanley Hoffmann that international affairs are ‘inhospitable’ to liberalism?
2. Was E. H. Carr right to argue that the language of international morality, used by liberal
idealists in the inter-war period, was a convenient way of masking the interests of Britain and
France in maintaining their dominance of the international system after the First World War?
3. Should liberal internationalists promote their values abroad? Is force a legitimate instrument
in securing this goal?
4. Is the ascendancy of democratic regimes explained by the superiority of liberal institutions
and values?
5. What does R2P tell us about rights and responsibilities in the global order?
6. Is the African Union a good example of how a regional security organization should respond
to atrocity crimes?
7. What explains the imperial impulse in the liberal internationalist tradition?
8. Despite the formal end of colonial rule, is there a new standard of civilization in international
relations today? If so, how would you characterize it?
9. Is the liberal order in crisis?
10. Are emerging global powers a threat to the liberal international order?
Visit the online resources to test your understanding by trying the self-test questions.
Further Reading
Armitage, D. (2011), ‘Globalising Jeremy Bentham’, History of Political Thought, 32(1): 63–82. Offers
a rich account of Bentham’s soaring ambition as a public intellectual and moral philosopher,
and shows how his hopes of creating a ‘universal jurisprudence’ were dashed by developments
in nineteenth-century international law.
Bell, D. (2016), Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press). Provides detailed portraits of leading Victorian-era thinkers, including Mill,
Spencer, and Hobhouse, and their efforts to advance free trade, liberty, and the rule of law,
while at the same time defending the civilizing mission of the British Empire.
Chakrabarty, D. (2000), Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). See the introduction to the book, in which the
author talks about Western thinking on modernity as being both ‘inadequate’ and
‘indispensable’ (p. 16). Note how the argument in this chapter appropriates Chakrabarty’s
terms to chart a course between the attractions of internationalism and its many flaws.
Doyle, M. W. (1997), Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W. W.
Norton). Doyle classifies liberalism into the following strands: liberal pacifism, liberal
imperialism, and liberal internationalism.
Dunne, T., and Flockhart, T. (eds) (2013), Liberal World Orders (Oxford: Oxford University Press/
British Academy). Critical reflections on liberal world orders by leading International Relations
scholars, including Emanuel Adler, Richard Devetak, Stefano Guzzini, John Hobson, Kim
Hutchings, and Christopher Reus-Smit.
Ikenberry, G. J. (2009), ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World
Order’, Perspectives in Politics, 71(1): 71–87. A pivotal case for the reform of the post-1945 order,
by an influential liberal thinker.
Mazower, M. (2012), Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New York: Penguin Press). A
brilliant study of liberal internationalist policies and programmes. It traces governance back to
Chapter 7 Liberal internationalism
the early nineteenth century and shows how many of the flaws in the current global order have
causes that reach far back into history.
Morefield, J. (2009), Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). An excellent contemporary account of liberal
thought in the inter-war period that also touches on the return to empire by some
contemporary intellectuals who should know better.
Sluga, G. (2013), Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press). Offers an intellectual history of internationalism as it was forged through
‘five ages’ in the twentieth century.
Sørensen, G. (2011), A Liberal World Order in Crisis: Choosing Between Imposition and Restraint
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). A good account of the division within liberalism between
advocates of ‘imposition’ and advocates of ‘restraint’.
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
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Chapter 8
Marxist theories of
international relations
stephen hobden ∙ richard w yn jones
Framing Questions
●
Is the analysis of ‘class’ just as important as the analysis of ‘state’ for our understanding
of global politics?
●
Is globalization a new phenomenon or a long-standing feature of capitalist
development?
●
Is ‘crisis’ an inevitable feature of capitalism, and if so, does this mean that capitalism
contains the seeds of its own destruction?
Reader’s Guide
This chapter introduces, outlines, and assesses the
Marxist contribution to the study of international
relations. It first identifies several core features common to Marxist approaches and then discusses how
Marx’s ideas were internationalized by Lenin and subsequently by writers in the world-system framework.
It then examines how Frankfurt School critical theory,
and Gramsci and his various followers, introduced an
analysis of culture into Marxist analysis, and, more
recently, how new (or orthodox) Marxists have sought
a more profound re-engagement with Marx’s original
writings. The chapter argues that no analysis of globalization is complete without an input from Marxist
theory. Indeed, Marx was arguably the first theorist of
globalization, and from the perspective of Marxism,
the features often pointed to as evidence of globalization are hardly novel, but are rather the modern
manifestations of long-term tendencies in the development of capitalism.
Visit the online resources to access an
interactive timeline of how the discipline of
International Relations has evolved.
Chapter 8 Marxist theories of international relations
8.1 Introduction
When the cold war ended in the late 1980s with the
defeat of communism and the victory of global ‘free
market capitalism’, it became commonplace to assume
that the ideas of Karl Marx and his numerous disciples
could be safely consigned to the dustbin of history.
The future, it seemed clear, was capitalist and liberal
democratic. Ironically enough, the fate of those communist parties that managed to retain power in China,
Vietnam, and Cuba seemed only to underline the
extent to which ‘the Western model’ had triumphed. In
the wake of the failed attempt to build an alternative
to the global capitalist system, they had all been forced
to adapt themselves to its hegemony. For many it
appeared only a matter of time before this was accompanied by the wider liberalization and democratization
of those societies. Resistance would ultimately prove to
be futile.
That was then. In the early 2020s, things appear very
different. Even if its mortal enemy was defeated, the
problems of capitalism have persisted and even intensified. Not only have the regular crises that characterize
capitalism continued to wreak havoc, but the everdeepening crisis that is humanity’s relationship with
the natural world raises fundamental questions about
the sustainability of our current patterns of production
and consumption. Massive global corporations may
continue to be remorselessly successful in their efforts
to persuade the already sated to buy more of what they
do not really need, but the resulting environmental
degradation is becoming increasingly hard to ignore.
All the while, of course, even the most basic needs
of many hundreds of millions of our fellow humans
remain unfulfilled (see Ch. 27).
Not only that, but the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy can no longer be taken for granted.
China, for example, appears to have arrived at a
new, extremely dynamic social model that combines
authoritarian political control with state-directed
capitalism (see Case Study 8.1). To what extent will
it be this model, rather than the ‘Western model’, that
invites emulation among the countries of the Global
South over the coming decades, especially as some
Case Study 8.1 The capitalist development of Communist China
Rapid urbanization in China
© Bloomberg / Getty Images
Marx and those who have developed his work since his death
are famous for their critique of capitalism. It is easy to forget
that Marx also acknowledged its transformative power, albeit as
a necessary stage towards the development of a classless society. Indeed, it is hard to think of any writer before or since who
has been more fulsome in his admiration of capitalism’s ‘constant revolutionizing of production’, to quote the words of The
Communist Manifesto: it has ‘accomplished wonders’ (Marx and
Engels 1967). It nonetheless remains a considerable irony that
there is no better example of the transformative power of capitalism than the People’s Republic of China under the rule of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
When in 1949 the CCP finally emerged victorious from the civil
war against the Nationalists, they inherited a country that had
undergone a ‘century of humiliation’ at the hands of European imperialist powers, as well as invasion and brutal occupation by Japan
prior to and during the Second World War. Subsequent economic
and social development remained limited, not least due to the disastrous impacts of the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and ‘Cultural Revolution’.
Since 1979, however, China has undergone an economic
and related social transformation that has few if any parallels in human history. Starting from a comparatively low base,
China is now by some measures the largest economy in the
world, accounting for approximately one-fifth of the world’s
gross domestic product, as well as the world’s largest producer
of exports (nearly twice those of either the United States or
Germany). Most accounts of this transformation cite the central importance of the economic reforms introduced by Deng
Xiaoping when he became the effective leader of China in late
1978. While these reforms were ultimately very extensive, they
were introduced gradually. Deng spoke of ‘crossing the river by
feeling for stones’, indicating the need for careful experimentation and the imperative of maintaining stability. The eventual
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result was a reversal of the collectivist policies of Mao Zedong,
widespread marketization, and an opening up to the global
economy—the latter boosted by China’s membership in the
World Trade Organization from 2001.
The embrace of capitalism—or in Deng’s words, ‘socialism
with Chinese characteristics’—led to major changes in China’s
society and economy. According to the World Bank, more than
800 million people have been lifted out of poverty because of
China’s growth. This has been accompanied by rapid urbanization. According to International Labour Organization figures,
more than 225 million people moved from the rural west of the
country to the industrialized east, representing the largest population movement in history. It is a development that has ‘rescued
a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life’,
to cite the words of Marx and Engels. China has also emerged as a
technological innovator, with its own space programme and the
potential to develop sophisticated weaponry.
Potentially more puzzling for Marxists is that despite the emergence of a middle class and a wealthy bourgeoisie, developments
in the superstructure have lagged behind economic changes.
Indeed, rather than China adapting to the Western model of
‘bourgeois democracy’, a Chinese social model combining
authoritarian political control with economic dynamism may yet
emerge as a serious alternative to it.
countries in the Global North themselves appear to be
succumbing to more politically and socially authoritarian tendencies? While it may be too soon to measure the impacts of the global Covid-19 pandemic,
it is also hard to imagine that the way it has served
to exacerbate pre-existing inequalities will not have
long-term repercussions for a global system that has
inequality at its core (see Case Study 8.2).
Against this background, Marx is back as an intellectual force to be reckoned with. This is not only
because there are some uncanny parallels between his
own times and our own—both periods of huge technological, socio-economic, and political turmoil and
transformation (for Marx’s life and times, see Liedman
2018). More fundamentally, Marx’s forensic examination of both the extraordinary dynamism and inherent contradictions of capitalism has arguably never
been improved upon. Its great strength is that it allows
us to see how so many apparently different crises and
instances of resistance, from the global to the most
Question 1: Assess the implications of China’s economic transformation for the Marxist analysis of international relations.
Question 2: What are the implications of China’s rapid economic
transformation for its role in global politics?
Case Study 8.2 The global Covid-19 pandemic
Frontline medical workers during the Covid-19 pandemic
© ADDICTIVE STOCK CREATIVES / Alamy Stock Photo
Daniel Defoe’s account of the great plague that ravaged London
in 1665 noted that ‘the plague was chiefly among the poor’.
Three hundred and fifty years later, even if the geographic
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic is far wider—with globalization enabling very rapid worldwide transmission—in terms of
its social impact, the pattern observed by Defoe remains largely
unchanged. Whether comparing within or between different
countries, it is the poorest who have tended to suffer most, with
Covid-19 exacerbating pre-existing inequalities based on nation,
class, race, and gender. In this way, the pandemic has served to
confirm one of the most basic insights of the Marxist approach to
international relations: our life chances are shaped to a very significant extent by our location within the global capitalist system.
Even if Northern societies differ considerably in terms of
social welfare provision, a general pattern is nonetheless
observable. During the pandemic, workers in the more protected and privileged parts of the economy, including academics such as ourselves, tended to be able to work from the
relative safety of their own homes. Furthermore, those working
on secure contracts often found themselves ‘furloughed’—that
is, their was income supported either directly or indirectly by
the government. By contrast, relatively low-paid ‘frontline’ or
‘key’ workers such as nurses, bus drivers, and delivery workers were required to daily put themselves at risk through close
interaction with other members of the public. Furthermore,
many of those on insecure contracts fell beyond the purview
of furlough schemes and had to keep working to maintain an
income. In other words, those who were already the lowest
paid and most insecurely employed found themselves being
put at most risk during the pandemic, whether to keep society
functioning or to avoid destitution.
Chapter 8 Marxist theories of international relations
Another striking feature of the global response to the pandemic has been the unwillingness of the countries of the privileged North to provide meaningful support to the Global South.
The various pledges of financial support that have been made
remain largely unfulfilled. Even more strikingly, almost nothing
has been done to reduce extreme inequalities in terms of access
to vaccines. Thus, while a high proportion of the population of
developed countries have now received multiple doses, vaccination rates in the developing world are dramatically lower.
Part of the explanation for this is that governments in the
Global North continue to support pharmaceutical companies in
their refusal to waive patents on vaccines, even where companies
received government money to develop those vaccines in the
first place (see Case Study 25.2). Setting aside the immorality of
this position, given that in a globalized world even the most privileged will never be able to insulate themselves from the threat of
the pandemic until the poorest are protected, this situation highlights another feature of capitalism emphasized by Marxists—its
irrationality.
personal and local, link together. Thus, even if Marx
and Marxism failed to supply a prescription that would
guarantee progressive social change, as a diagnosis of
what ails us they remain essential tools for those who
continue to strive for that goal.
Compared to liberalism and realism (see Chs 7
and 9), Marxist thought presents a rather unfamiliar view of international relations. While the former
portray world politics in ways that resonate with
those presented in the foreign news pages, Marxist
theories aim to expose a deeper, underlying—indeed
hidden—truth. This is that the familiar events of
world politics—wars, treaties, international aid
operations—all occur within structures that have an
enormous influence on those events. These are the
structures of a global capitalist system. Any attempt
to understand world politics must be based on a
broader understanding of the processes operating in
global capitalism.
Marxist theories are also discomfiting, for they
argue that the effects of global capitalism are to ensure
that the powerful and wealthy prosper at the expense
of the powerless and the poor. We are all aware that
there is gross inequality in the world. Statistics concerning the human costs of poverty are numbing in
their awfulness (global poverty is further discussed in
Ch. 27). Marxist theorists argue that the relative prosperity of the few is dependent on the destitution of the
many. In Marx’s own words, ‘Accumulation of wealth
at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation
of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality at
the opposite pole.’
Section 8.2 outlines some of the central features of the Marxist approach. Following from this,
subsequent sections will explore some of the most
important strands in contemporary Marx-inspired
thinking about world politics. Given, however, the
richness and variety of Marxist thinking about
world politics, the account that follows is inevitably
destined to be partial and to some extent arbitrary.
Our aim is to provide a route map that we hope will
encourage readers to explore further the work of
Marx and of those who have built on the foundations
he laid.
Question 1: Evaluate the ways in which the Covid-19 pandemic
has revealed inequalities at a national and global level.
Question 2: What can we learn about the operation of capitalism
from a study of vaccine availability in different countries?
Watch the video on the online resources to see the
authors discuss these questions.
8.2 The essential elements of Marxist theories of world politics
In his inaugural address to the Working Men’s
International Association in London in 1864, Karl
Marx told his audience that history had ‘taught the
working classes the duty to master [for] themselves
the mysteries of international politics’. However,
despite the fact that Marx himself wrote copiously
about international affairs (see K. Anderson 2010),
most of this writing was journalistic in character.
He did not incorporate the international dimension into his theoretical mapping of the contours
of capitalism. This ‘omission’ should perhaps not
surprise us. The staggering ambition of the theoretical enterprise in which he was engaged, as well
as the nature of his own methodology, inevitably
meant that Marx’s work would be contingent and
unfinished.
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Marx was an enormously prolific writer, and his
ideas developed and changed over time. Hence it is not
surprising that his legacy has been open to numerous
interpretations. In addition, real-world developments
have also led to the revision of his ideas in the light of
experience. Various schools of thought have emerged
that claim Marx as a direct inspiration, or whose work
can be linked to Marx’s legacy. Before discussing what
is distinctive about these approaches, it is important to
examine the essential common elements that connect
them.
First, all the theorists discussed in this chapter
share with Marx the view that the social world should
be analysed as a totality. The academic division of the
social world into different areas of enquiry—history,
philosophy, economics, political science, sociology,
international relations, etc.—is both arbitrary and
unhelpful. None can be understood without knowledge of the others: the social world has to be studied as
a whole. Given the scale and complexity of the social
world, this exhortation clearly makes great demands
of the analyst. Nonetheless, for Marxist theorists, the
disciplinary boundaries that characterize the contemporary social sciences need to be transcended if we are
to generate a proper understanding of the dynamics of
world politics.
Another key element of Marxist thought is the
materialist conception of history (or ‘historical
materialism’). The central contention here is that
processes of historical change are ultimately a
ref lection of the economic development of society.
That is, economic development is effectively the
motor of history. The central dynamic that Marx
identifies is tension between the means of production and relations of production that together
form the economic base of a given society. As the
means of production develop, for example through
technological advancement, previous relations of
production become outmoded, and indeed become
fetters restricting the most effective utilization of
the new productive capacity. This in turn leads
to a process of social change whereby relations
of production are transformed in order to better
accommodate the new configuration of means.
Developments in the economic base act as a catalyst
for the broader transformation of society as a whole.
This is because, as Marx argues in the Preface to his
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,
‘the mode of production of material life conditions
the social, political and intellectual life process in
general’ (Marx 1970 [1859]: 20–1). Thus the legal,
political, and cultural institutions and practices of
a given society ref lect and reinforce—in a more or
less mediated form—the pattern of power and control in the economy. It follows logically, therefore,
that change in the economic base ultimately leads
to change in the ‘legal and political superstructure’.
(For a diagrammatical representation of the base–
superstructure model, see Fig. 8.1.) The relationship between the base and superstructure is one of
the key areas of discussion in Marxism, and for critics of Marxist approaches.
Class plays a key role in Marxist analysis. In contrast to liberals, who believe that there is an essential
harmony of interest between various social groups,
Marxists hold that society is systematically prone to
class conflict. Indeed, in the Communist Manifesto,
which Marx co-authored with Engels, it is argued that
‘the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggle’ (Marx and Engels 1967 [1848]). In
capitalist society, the main axis of conflict is between
the bourgeoisie (the capitalists) and the proletariat (the
workers).
Despite his commitment to rigorous scholarship,
Marx did not think it either possible or desirable for
the analyst to remain a detached or neutral observer of
this great clash between capital and labour. He argued
that ‘philosophers have only interpreted the world in
various ways; the point, however, is to change it’. Marx
was committed to the cause of emancipation. He was
not interested in developing an understanding of the
dynamics of capitalist society simply for the sake of it.
Rather, he expected such an understanding to make it
easier to overthrow the prevailing order and replace it
with a communist society—a society in which wage
labour and private property are abolished and social
relations transformed.
It is important to emphasize that the essential elements of Marxist thought, all too briefly discussed in
this section, are also fundamentally contested. That is,
Base
Means of production
relations of production
Superstructure
Political system, legal system,
culture, etc.
Figure 8.1 The base–superstructure model
Chapter 8 Marxist theories of international relations
they are subject to much discussion and disagreement
even among contemporary writers who have been
influenced by Marxist writings. There is disagreement
as to how these ideas and concepts should be interpreted and how they should be put into operation.
Analysts also differ over which elements of Marxist
thought are most relevant, which have been proven to
be mistaken, and which should now be considered as
outmoded or in need of radical overhaul. Moreover,
they diverge substantially in terms of their attitudes to the legacy of Marx’s ideas. The work of the
new Marxists, for example, draws more directly on
Marx’s original ideas than does the work of the critical theorists.
Key Points
himself provided little in terms of a theoretical
• Marx
analysis of international relations.
s ideas have been interpreted and appropriated in a
• Marx’
number of different and contradictory ways, resulting in a
number of competing schools of Marxism.
these different schools are several common elements
• Underlying
that can be traced back to Marx’s writings: a commitment to
analysis of the social world as a totality, a materialist conception
of history, and a focus on class and class struggle.
Marx and Marxists, scholarship is not a disinterested
• For
activity: the ultimate aim is to assist in a process of human
emancipation.
8.3 Marx internationalized: from imperialism to world-systems theory
Although Marx was clearly aware of the international
and expansive character of capitalism, his key work,
Capital, focuses on the development and characteristics of nineteenth-century British capitalism. At the
start of the twentieth century a number of writers
took on the task of developing analyses that incorporated the implications of capitalism’s transborder
characteristics, in particular imperialism (see Brewer
1990). Rosa Luxemburg was a major contributor to
these debates. Her 1913 book, The Accumulation of
Capital (Luxemburg 2003 [1913]), argued that by
analysing capitalism as a closed system, Marx had
overlooked the central role played by the colonies. In
order to survive, Luxemburg argued, capitalism constantly needed to expand into non-capitalist areas.
A 1917 pamphlet by Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest
Stage of Capitalism, made similar arguments. Lenin
accepted much of Marx’s basic thesis, but argued
that the character of capitalism had changed since
Marx published the first volume of Capital in 1867
(Marx 1992 [1867]). Capitalism had entered a new
stage—its highest and final stage—with the development of monopoly capitalism. Under monopoly
capitalism, a two-tier structure had developed in the
world economy, with a dominant core exploiting a
less-developed periphery. With the development of a
core and periphery, there was no longer an automatic
harmony of interests between all workers as posited
by Marx. The bourgeoisie in the core countries could
use profits derived from exploiting the periphery
to improve the lot of their own proletariat. In other
words, the capitalists of the core could pacify their
own working class through the further exploitation
of the periphery.
Lenin’s views were taken up by the Latin American
Dependency School, adherents of which developed
the notion of core and periphery in greater depth. In
particular, Raúl Prebisch (1949) argued that countries
in the periphery were suffering as a result of what he
called ‘the declining terms of trade’. He suggested
that the price of manufactured goods increased more
rapidly than that of raw materials. So, for example,
year by year it requires more tons of coffee to pay for
a refrigerator. As a result of their economies’ reliance
on raw material production, countries of the periphery become poorer relative to the core. Other writers
such as André Gunder Frank (1967) and Fernando
Henrique Cardoso (who was President of Brazil from
1995 to 2003) developed this analysis further to show
how the development of less industrialized countries
was directly ‘dependent’ on the more advanced capitalist societies. It is from the framework developed by
such writers that contemporary world-systems theory
emerged.
World-systems theory is particularly associated
with the work of Immanuel Wallerstein (1930–2019).
For Wallerstein, global history has been marked by
the rise and demise of a series of world systems. The
modern world system emerged in Europe at around
the turn of the sixteenth century. It subsequently
expanded to encompass the entire globe. The driving force behind this seemingly relentless process
of expansion and incorporation has been capitalism, defined by Wallerstein (1979: 66) as ‘a system of
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production for sale in a market for profit and appropriation of this profit on the basis of individual or
collective ownership’. In the context of this system,
all the institutions of the social world are continually being created and recreated. Furthermore, and
crucially, it is not only the elements within the system that change. The system itself is historically
bounded. It had a beginning, has a middle, and will
have an end.
In terms of the geography of the modern world
system, in addition to a core–periphery distinction,
Wallerstein added an intermediate semi-periphery,
which displays certain features characteristic of
the core and others characteristic of the periphery.
Although dominated by core economic interests, the
semi-periphery has its own relatively vibrant indigenously owned industrial base (see Fig. 8.2). Because
of this hybrid nature, the semi-periphery plays important economic and political roles in the modern world
system. In particular, it provides a source of labour
that counteracts any upward pressure on wages in the
core. It also offers a new home for those industries
that can no longer function profitably in the core (e.g.
car assembly and textiles). The semi-periphery plays
a vital role in stabilizing the political structure of the
world system.
According to world-systems theorists, the three
zones of the world economy are linked together in an
exploitative relationship in which wealth is drained
Core
Democratic government
High wages
Import:
Raw materials
Export:
Manufactures
High investment
Welfare services
Semi-periphery
Authoritarian governments
Export:
‘Mature’ manufactures
Raw materials
Import:
Manufactures
Raw materials
Low wage
Low welfare services
Periphery
Non-democratic governments
Export:
Raw materials
Import:
Manufactures
Below subsistence wages
No welfare services
Figure 8.2 Interrelationships in the world economy
away from the periphery to the core. As a consequence,
the relative positions of the zones become ever more
deeply entrenched: the rich get richer while the poor
become poorer.
Together, the core, semi-periphery, and periphery make up the geographic dimension of the world
economy. However, described in isolation they
provide a rather static portrayal of the world system. A key component of Wallerstein’s analysis has
been to describe how world systems have a distinctive life cycle: a beginning, a middle, and an end.
In this sense, the capitalist world system is no different from any other system that has preceded it.
Controversially, Wallerstein (1995) argues that the
end of the cold war, rather than marking a triumph
for liberalism, indicates that the current system has
entered its ‘end’ phase—a period of crisis that will
end only when it is replaced by another system. On
Wallerstein’s reading, such a period of crisis is also a
time of opportunity. In a time of crisis, actors have
far greater agency to determine the character of the
replacement structure. In his final years, Wallerstein
sought to promote a new world system that is more
equitable and just than the current one (Wallerstein
1998, 1999, 2006; Wallerstein et al. 2013). From
this perspective, to focus on globalization is to
ignore what is truly novel about the contemporary
era. Indeed, for Wallerstein, current globalization
discourse represents a ‘gigantic misreading of current reality’ (Wallerstein 2003: 45). The phenomena evoked by ‘globalization’ are manifestations of
a world system that emerged in Europe during the
sixteenth century to incorporate the entire globe: a
world system now in terminal decline.
Feminist Marxists have also played a significant
role in theorizing the development of an international
capitalist system. A particular concern of feminist
writers (often drawing their inspiration from Engels’s
(2010 [1884]) work The Origin of the Family, Private
Property, and the State) has been the role of women,
both in the workplace and as the providers of domestic labour necessary for the reproduction of capitalism. For example, Maria Mies (1998 [1986]) argued
that women play a central role in the maintenance
of capitalist relations. There is, she argues, a sexual
(or one could say gendered) division of labour: first,
women in the developed world working as housewives,
whose labour is unpaid but vital in maintaining and
reproducing the labour force; and second, women in
the developing world as a source of cheap labour. She
Chapter 8 Marxist theories of international relations
later argued that women were the ‘last colony’ (Mies,
Bennholdt-Thomsen, and von Werlhof 1988), a view
that can be traced back to Rosa Luxemburg’s claim
regarding the role of the colonies in international capitalism (Luxemburg 2003 [1913]).
In the wake of the attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent response by the US administration of George W.
Bush, questions of imperialism returned to the political
and academic agenda. A number of authors called for
the creation of a new empire with the United States at
its centre, supposedly recreating the stabilizing and positive role that Britain had played in the nineteenth century (Ferguson 2003). A number of Marxist-influenced
authors responded with critiques both of empire and of
US foreign policy after 9/11 (for example, Harvey 2003).
Key Points
theorists have consistently developed an analysis
• Marxist
of the global aspects of international capitalism—an aspect
acknowledged by Marx, but not developed in Capital.
theory can be seen as a direct development
• World-systems
of Lenin’s work on imperialism and that of the Latin
American Dependency School.
to world-systems theorists, the three zones of the
• According
world economy—the core, periphery, and semi-periphery—
are linked together in an exploitative relationship in which
wealth is drained away from the periphery to the core.
writers have contributed to the analysis of
• Feminist
international capitalism by focusing on the specific roles of
women.
8.4 Gramscianism
8.4.1 Antonio Gramsci—the importance of
hegemony
This section examines the strand of Marxist theory
that has emerged from the work of the Italian Marxist
Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci’s work has become particularly influential in the study of international political
economy, where a neo-Gramscian or ‘Italian’ school
continues to flourish. Here we shall discuss Gramsci’s
legacy and the work of Robert W. Cox, the contemporary theorist who did most to introduce his work to an
International Relations audience.
Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) was a Sardinian
and one of the founding members of the Italian
Communist Party. He was jailed in 1926 for his
political activities and spent the remainder of his life
in prison. Although many regard him as the most
creative Marxist thinker of the twentieth century, he
produced no single, integrated theoretical treatise.
Rather, his intellectual legacy has been transmitted
primarily through his remarkable Prison Notebooks
(Gramsci 1971). The key question that animated
Gramsci’s theoretical work was: why had it proven
to be so difficult to promote revolution in Western
Europe? After all, Marx had predicted that revolution, and the transition to socialism, would occur
first in the most advanced capitalist societies. But,
in the event, it was the Bolsheviks of comparatively
backward Russia that had made the first ‘breakthrough’, while all the subsequent efforts by putative
revolutionaries in Western and Central Europe to
emulate their success ended in failure. The history of
the early twentieth century seemed to suggest, therefore, that there was a flaw in classical Marxist analysis. But where had they gone wrong?
Gramsci’s answer revolved around his use of the
concept of hegemony, his understanding of which
reflected his broader conceptualization of power.
Gramsci developed Machiavelli’s view of power as a
centaur—half beast, half man—a mixture of coercion
and consent. In understanding how the prevailing
order was maintained, Marxists had concentrated
almost exclusively on the coercive practices and
capabilities of the state. On this understanding,
it was simply coercion, or the fear of coercion, that
kept the exploited and alienated majority in society
from rising up and overthrowing the system that
was the cause of their suffering. Gramsci recognized
that while this characterization may have held true
in less developed societies, such as pre-revolutionary
Russia, it was not the case in the more developed
countries of the West. Here the system was also
maintained through consent.
Consent, on Gramsci’s reading, is created and recreated by the hegemony of the ruling class in society.
It is this hegemony that allows the moral, political,
and cultural values of the dominant group to become
widely dispersed throughout society and to be accepted
by subordinate groups and classes as their own. This
takes place through the institutions of civil society: the
network of institutions and practices that enjoy some
autonomy from the state, and through which groups
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and individuals organize, represent, and express themselves to each other and to the state (for example, the
media, the education system, churches, and voluntary
organizations).
Several important implications flow from this
analysis. The first is that Marxist theory needs to take
superstructural phenomena seriously, because while
the structure of society may ultimately be a reflection
of social relations of production in the economic base,
the nature of relations in the superstructure is of great
relevance in determining how susceptible that society
is to change and transformation. Gramsci used the
term ‘historic bloc’ to describe the mutually reinforcing and reciprocal relationships between the socioeconomic relations (base) and political and cultural
practices (superstructure) that together underpin a
given order. For Gramsci and Gramscians, to reduce
analysis to the narrow consideration of economic
relationships on the one hand, or solely to politics and
ideas on the other, is deeply mistaken. It is their interaction that matters.
Gramsci’s argument also has crucial implications
for political practice. If the hegemony of the ruling class is a key element in the perpetuation of its
dominance, then society can only be transformed if
that hegemonic position is successfully challenged.
This entails a counter-hegemonic struggle in civil
society, in which the prevailing hegemony is undermined, allowing an alternative historic bloc to be
constructed.
Gramsci’s writing reflects a particular time and
a particular—in many ways unique—set of circumstances. This has led several writers to question the
broader applicability of his ideas (see Burnham 1991;
Germain and Kenny 1998). But the most important test, of course, is how useful ideas and concepts
derived from Gramsci’s work prove to be when they
are removed from their original context and applied
to other issues and problems. It is to this question that
we now turn.
8.4.2 Robert W. Cox—the analysis of ‘world
order’
It was the Canadian scholar Robert W. Cox (1926–
2018) who arguably did most to introduce Gramsci
to the study of world politics. He developed a
Gramscian approach that involves both a critique
of prevailing theories of international relations and
international political economy, and the development
of an alternative framework for the analysis of world
politics.
To explain Cox’s ideas, we begin by focusing on
one particular sentence in his seminal 1981 article,
‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond
International Relations Theory’. The sentence, which
has become one of the most often-quoted lines in
all of contemporary International Relations theory,
reads: ‘Theory is always for some one, and for some
purpose’ (R. Cox 1981: 128). It expresses a worldview that follows logically from the Gramscian, and
broader Marxist, position that has been explored in
this chapter. If ideas and values are (ultimately) a
reflection of a particular set of social relations, and
are transformed as those relations are themselves
transformed, then this suggests that all knowledge
(of the social world at least) must reflect a certain
context, a certain time, a certain space. Knowledge,
in other words, cannot be objective and timeless in
the sense that some contemporary realists, for example, would like to claim.
One key implication of this is that there can be no
simple separation between facts and values. Whether
consciously or not, all theorists inevitably bring their
values to bear on their analysis. This leads Cox to suggest that we need to look closely at each of those theories, those ideas, those analyses that claim to be objective
or value-free, and ask who or what is it for, and what
purpose does it serve? He subjected realism, and in particular its contemporary variant neorealism, to thoroughgoing critique on these grounds. According to Cox,
these theories are for—or serve the interests of—those
who prosper under the prevailing order: the inhabitants
of the developed states, and in particular the ruling elites.
The purpose of these theories, whether consciously or
not, is to reinforce and legitimate the status quo. They
do this by making the current configuration of international relations appear natural and immutable. When
realists (falsely) claim to be describing the world as it
is, as it has been, and as it always will be, what they are
in fact doing is reinforcing the ruling hegemony in the
current world order.
Cox contrasted problem-solving theory (that is,
theory that accepts the parameters of the present
order, and thus helps legitimate an unjust and deeply
iniquitous system) with critical theory. Critical
theory attempts to challenge the prevailing order by
seeking out, analysing, and, where possible, assisting
social processes that can potentially lead to emancipatory change.
Chapter 8 Marxist theories of international relations
One way in which theory can contribute to these
emancipatory goals is by developing a theoretical
understanding of world orders that grasps both the
sources of stability in a given system, and also the
dynamics of processes of transformation. In this
context, Cox drew on Gramsci’s notion of hegemony
and transposed it to the international realm, arguing that hegemony is as important for maintaining
stability and continuity there as it is at the domestic
level. According to Cox, successive dominant powers in the international system have shaped a world
order that suits their interests, and have done so not
only as a result of their coercive capabilities, but also
because they have managed to generate broad consent for that order, even among those who are disadvantaged by it.
For the two hegemons that Cox analyses (the UK
and the US), the ruling hegemonic idea has been ‘free
trade’. The claim that this system benefits everybody
has been so widely accepted that it has attained ‘common sense’ status. Yet the reality is that while ‘free
trade’ is very much in the interests of the hegemon
(which, as the most efficient producer in the global
economy, can produce goods which are competitive in
all markets, so long as it has access to them), its benefits for peripheral states and regions are far less apparent. Indeed, many would argue that ‘free trade’ is a
hindrance to their economic and social development.
The degree to which a state can successfully produce
and reproduce its hegemony is an indication of the
extent of its power. The success of the United States
in gaining worldwide acceptance for neoliberalism
suggests just how dominant the current hegemon has
become.
But despite the dominance of the present world
order, Cox did not expect it to remain unchallenged.
Rather, he maintained Marx’s view that capitalism is
an inherently unstable system, riven by inescapable
contradictions. Inevitable economic crises will act as
a catalyst for the emergence of counter-hegemonic
movements. The success of such movements is, however, far from assured. In this sense, thinkers such as
Cox face the future on the basis of a dictum popularized by Gramsci—that is, combining ‘pessimism of the
intellect’ with ‘optimism of the will’.
Key Points
on the work of Antonio Gramsci for inspiration,
• Drawing
writers in an ‘Italian’ school of International Relations have
made a considerable contribution to thinking about world
politics.
shifted the focus of Marxist analysis more towards
• Gramsci
superstructural phenomena.
explored the processes by which consent for a
• Gramsci
particular social and political system was produced and
reproduced through the operation of hegemony.
Hegemony allows the ideas and ideologies of the ruling
stratum to become widely dispersed, and widely accepted,
throughout society.
such as Robert W. Cox have attempted to
• Thinkers
‘internationalize’ Gramsci’s thought by transposing several
of his key concepts, most notably hegemony, to the global
context.
8.5 Critical theory
Both Gramscianism and critical theory have their roots
in Western Europe in the 1920s and 1930s—a place and
a time in which Marxism was forced to come to terms
not only with the failure of a series of attempted revolutionary uprisings, but also with the rise of fascism.
However, contemporary critical theory and Gramscian
thought about international relations draw on the ideas
of different thinkers, with differing intellectual concerns. There is a clear difference in focus between these
two strands of Marxist thought, with those influenced
by Gramsci tending to be much more concerned with
issues relating to the subfield of international political economy than critical theorists. Critical theorists,
on the other hand, have involved themselves with
questions concerning international society, international ethics, and security (the latter through the
development of critical security studies). This section
introduces critical theory and the thought of one of its
main proponents in the field of International Relations,
Andrew Linklater.
Critical theory developed out of the work of the
Frankfurt School. This was an extraordinarily talented group of thinkers who began to work together
in the 1920s and 1930s. As left-wing German Jews, the
members of the school were forced into exile by the
Nazis’ rise to power in the early 1930s, and much of
their most creative work was produced in the US. The
leading lights of the first generation of the Frankfurt
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School included Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno,
and Herbert Marcuse. A subsequent generation has
taken up the legacy of these thinkers and developed it
in important and innovative ways. The best known is
Jürgen Habermas, who is regarded by many as the most
influential of all contemporary social theorists. Given
the vast scope of critical theory writing, this section
can do no more than introduce some of its key features.
The first point to note is that their intellectual concerns are rather different from those of most other
Marxists: they have not been much interested in the
further development of analysis of the economic base
of society. They have instead concentrated on questions
relating to culture, bureaucracy, the social basis and
nature of authoritarianism, and the structure of the
family, and on exploring such concepts as reason and
rationality as well as theories of knowledge. Frankfurt
School theorists have been particularly innovative in
terms of their analysis of the role of the media, and
what they have famously termed the ‘culture industry’.
In other words, in classical Marxist terms, the focus of
critical theory is almost entirely superstructural.
Another key feature is that critical theorists have
been highly dubious as to whether the proletariat in
contemporary society does in fact embody the potential
for emancipatory transformation in the way that Marx
believed. Rather, with the rise of mass culture and the
increasing commodification of every element of social
life, Frankfurt School thinkers have argued that the
working class has simply been absorbed by the system and no longer represents a threat to it. This, to use
Marcuse’s famous phrase, is a one-dimensional society,
to which the vast majority simply cannot begin to conceive an alternative.
Finally, critical theorists have made some of their
most important contributions through their explorations of the meaning of emancipation. Emancipation,
as we have seen, is a key concern of Marxist thinkers,
but the meaning that they give to the term is often very
unclear and deeply ambiguous. Moreover, the historical record is unfortunately replete with examples of
unspeakably barbaric behaviour being justified in
the name of emancipation, of which imperialism and
Stalinism are but two. Traditionally, Marxists have
equated emancipation with the process of humanity gaining ever greater mastery over nature through
the development of ever more sophisticated technology, and its use for the benefit of all. But early critical
theorists argued that humanity’s increased domination over nature had been bought at too high a price,
claiming that the kind of mindset that is required for
conquering nature slips all too easily into the domination of other human beings. In contrast, they argued
that emancipation had to be conceived of in terms of
a reconciliation with nature—an evocative, if admittedly vague, vision. By contrast, Habermas’s understanding of emancipation is more concerned with
communication than with our relationship with the
natural world. Setting aside the various twists and
turns of his argument, Habermas’s central political
point is that the route to emancipation lies through
radical democracy—a system in which the widest
possible participation is encouraged not only in word
(as is the case in many Western democracies) but
also in deed, by actively identifying barriers to participation—be they social, economic, or cultural—
and overcoming them. For Habermas and his many
followers, participation is not to be confined within
the borders of a particular sovereign state. Rights
and obligations extend beyond state frontiers. This,
of course, leads Habermas directly to the concerns
of International Relations, and it is striking that his
recent writings have begun to focus on the international realm. In particular, he has become an impassioned defender of European integration. However,
thus far, the most systematic attempt to think through
some of the key issues in world politics from a recognizably Habermasian perspective has been made by
Andrew Linklater.
Linklater has used some of the key principles and
precepts developed in Habermas’s work to argue that
emancipation in the realm of international relations
should be understood in terms of the expansion of
the moral boundaries of a political community (see
Ch. 12). In other words, he equates emancipation
with a process in which the borders of the sovereign
state lose their ethical and moral significance. At
present, state borders denote the furthest extent of
our sense of duty and obligation, or at best, the point
where our sense of duty and obligation is radically
transformed, only proceeding in a very attenuated
form. For critical theorists, this situation is simply
indefensible. Their goal is therefore to move towards
a situation in which citizens share the same duties
and obligations towards non-citizens as they do
towards their fellow citizens.
To arrive at such a situation would, of course,
entail a wholesale transformation of the present institutions of governance. But an important element
of the critical theory method is to identify—and, if
Chapter 8 Marxist theories of international relations
possible, nurture—tendencies that exist in the present
conjuncture that point in the direction of emancipation. On this basis, Linklater (here very much echoing
Habermas) identifies the development of the European
Union as representing a progressive or emancipatory
tendency in contemporary world politics. If true, this
suggests that an important part of the international
system is entering an era in which the sovereign state,
which has for so long claimed an exclusive hold on its
citizens, is beginning to lose some of its pre-eminence.
Given the notorious pessimism of the thinkers of the
Frankfurt School, the guarded optimism of Linklater
in this context is indeed striking. Indeed, the increasingly obvious authoritarian tendencies pointed to in
Section 8.1 may suggest a case for returning to the
work of that first generation of critical theorists for
ideas and inspiration.
Key Points
theory has its roots in the work of the Frankfurt
• Critical
School.
theorists have tended to focus their attention on
• Critical
culture (especially the role of the media), bureaucracy, the
social basis and nature of authoritarianism, and the
structure of the family, and on exploring such concepts as
reason and rationality.
Habermas is the most influential contemporary
• Jürgen
advocate of critical theory; he advocates radical
democracy as a means of unlocking the emancipatory
potential inherent in the realm of communication.
Linklater has developed critical theory themes to
• Andrew
argue in favour of the expansion of the moral boundaries
of the political community, and has pointed to the
European Union as an example of a post-Westphalian
institution of governance.
8.6 New Marxism
8.6.1 ‘New Marxists’
This section examines the work of writers who derive
their ideas more directly from Marx’s own writings. To
indicate that they represent something of a departure
from other Marxist and post-Marxist trends, we have
termed them ‘new Marxists’. They themselves might
well prefer to be described as ‘historical materialists’
(one of the key academic journals associated with this
approach is called Historical Materialism); however, as
that is a self-description which has also been adopted
by some Gramsci-inspired writers, the appellation may
not be particularly helpful for our present purposes. At
any rate, even if there remains no settled label for this
group of scholars, the fundamental approach that they
embody is not hard to characterize. They are Marxists
who have returned to the fundamental tenets of
Marxist thought and sought to reappropriate ideas that
they regard as having been neglected or somehow misinterpreted by subsequent generations. On this basis,
they have sought both to criticize other developments
in Marxism, and to make their own original theoretical
contributions to the understanding of contemporary
trends.
The most outstanding advocate of what one might
term ‘the return to Marx’ is the geographer David
Harvey, whose explorations and explanations of Marx’s
masterpiece Capital have reached an enormous online
audience as well as being published in book form (see
davidharvey.org; Harvey 2018). In another important
contribution, Kevin B. Anderson’s Marx at the Margins
(2010) focuses on Marx’s little-known writing on the
world politics of his day to recover his ideas about
nationalism, ethnicity, and race.
8.6.2 Uneven and combined development
Meanwhile, in a series of articles, Justin Rosenberg
(1996, 2013; also see Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008)
has developed an analysis based on Leon Trotsky’s
idea of uneven and combined development, which
Trotsky outlined primarily in his history of the
Russian Revolution. Contrary to the traditional
Marxist line, Trotsky observed that capitalism was
not having the effects that were anticipated. Certainly
it was spreading around the globe at a rapid rate as
Marx and Engels had predicted in the Communist
Manifesto. However, Marx and Engels had predicted
that capitalism would create a world ‘after its own
image’. Elsewhere Marx (1954 [1867]: 19) had stated
that ‘the country that is more developed industrially
only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own
future’. Marx at this point appeared to have a unilinear perspective on historical development and, while
there is evidence in some of his later writing that he
became sceptical about this view, it was not an issue
that he had time to develop. Therefore it became
Marxist orthodoxy that capitalist development was
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a singular road, with countries joining the process
at different times. There was just one route through
capitalist modernization, the path having been
mapped out by Britain as the pioneering capitalist economy. While some countries would start the
journey at different times, the sequence and destination would be the same.
Trotsky’s insight was that paths to development
were indeed uneven in that different countries
started the road to capitalism at different times, and
from differing starting points. They were also, however, combined, in the sense that the development
of capitalism in the states that had already started
on the process had implications for those that followed. In other words, the context for capitalism in
any one country would be set by all the other countries that had already embarked on capitalist development. Hence the process in Russia occurred in
the context of capitalist developments elsewhere,
and particularly in Western Europe. The advance
of capitalism can thus be seen as an international
process, with latecomers having certain disadvantages but also some advantages. One particular
advantage was what Trotsky called the ‘privilege of
historic backwardness’ (cited in Rosenberg 1996: 7).
Countries joining the capitalist road had the possibility of leapfrogging states that had started earlier,
because they had access to investment and technology that had not been previously available. However,
this came at a potential cost: a distorted political
structure. Whereas in Britain, the country on which
Marx had focused his attention, the political system
had evolved over a lengthy period of time and was
relatively stable, in Russia the political structure that
emerged from a rapid process of modernization was
highly unstable. It was characterized by an authoritarian state leading the process of development in
conjunction with international finance, a growing
but concentrated working class, an enormous peasantry on which the state was reliant for raising tax,
but only a small and weak bourgeoisie. Hence the
social formation in Russia was markedly different
from that of Britain, and its structure made sense
only in the context of the international development
of capital.
While Trotsky used the concept of uneven and
combined development to analyse the events leading up to the Russian Revolution, Kamran Matin
(2013) has employed it to consider the history of Iran.
Criticizing Eurocentric accounts of historical progress that focus on European states as the model for
state development, Matin argues that while the study
of International Relations is crucial to understanding Iran’s history, it has to be considered in conjunction with an assessment of Iran’s domestic history.
Matin shows how Iran’s history is a complex interaction between its domestic social and economic
systems and the priorities of international politics
and economics. The country’s historical progress
has been impacted by both the influence of events
such as the Russian Revolution, and the economic
and political incursions by European countries and
subsequently the United States. This has resulted in
a largely unstable combination, in which attempts
at modernization, for example by the last Shah,
have faced a system combining a modern industrial
sector, largely dominated by the state in collaboration with foreign capital, and a small cosmopolitan
middle class along with a large agricultural and merchant class with established institutions and close
links to the religious establishment. During the economic downturn of the 1970s, and in conjunction
with pressure from the US Carter administration,
this combination became increasingly unstable until
the revolutionary overthrow of 1979. Development
in Iran, then, Matin argues, can be understood only
as uneven, in that Iran commenced on the capitalist path at a later time and from a different starting point, yet combined in terms of the influence of
already existing global capitalism.
Key Points
Marxism is characterized by a direct re-engagement
• New
with and reappropriation of the concepts and categories
developed by Marx himself or other classic Marxist
thinkers.
example of New Marxist scholarship is Justin
• One
Rosenberg’s work on uneven and combined development,
which draws on Trotsky’s examination of the development
of Russia in the global political economy.
and combined development suggests that rather
• Uneven
than all countries following a single path of economic and
political development, each country’s path will be affected
by the international context.
uneven and combined development approach has
• The
been utilized to analyse Iran’s economic and political
development in the twentieth century.
Chapter 8 Marxist theories of international relations
8.7 Conclusion
As outlined in Chapter 2, globalization is the name given
to the process whereby social transactions of all kinds
increasingly take place without accounting for national
or state boundaries, with the result that the world has
become ‘one relatively borderless social sphere’. Marxist
theorists would certainly not disagree that these developments are taking place, nor would they deny their
importance, but they would reject any notion that they
are somehow novel. Writing in the mid-nineteenth century, Marx and Engels were clearly aware not only of the
global scope of capitalism, but also of its potential for
social transformation. In a particularly prescient section
of the Communist Manifesto, they argue:
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world
market given a cosmopolitan character to production
and consumption in every country . . . All old-established
national industries have been destroyed or are daily being
destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose
introduction becomes a life and death question for all
civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up
indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the
remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed,
not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe.
(Marx and Engels 1967 [1848]: 83–4)
According to Marxist theorists, the globe has long been
dominated by a single integrated economic and political entity—a global capitalist system—that has gradually
incorporated all of humanity within its grasp. In this system, all elements have always been interrelated and interdependent. The only thing that is ‘new’ is an increased
awareness of these linkages. Similarly, ecological processes have always ignored state boundaries, even if it is
only recently that growing environmental degradation has
finally caused this fact to permeate public consciousness.
While the intensity of cross-border flows may be
increasing, this does not necessarily signify the fundamental change in world politics proclaimed by so
many of those who argue that we have entered an era
of globalization. Marxist theorists insist that the only
way to discover how significant contemporary developments really are is to view them in the context of
the deeper structural processes at work. When this is
done, we may well discover indications that important
changes are afoot. For example, many Marxists regard
the apparent delegitimation of the sovereign state as a
very important contemporary development. However,
the essential first step in generating any understanding
of those trends regarded as evidence of globalization
must be to map the contours of global capitalism itself.
If we fail to do so, we will inevitably fail to gauge the
real significance of the changes that are occurring.
Another danger of adopting an ahistoric and uncritical
attitude to globalization is that such an attitude can prevent
us from noticing the way in which reference to globalization
has become part of the ideological armoury of elites in the
contemporary world. ‘Globalization’ is now regularly cited
as a reason to promote measures to reduce workers’ rights
and lessen other constraints on business. Such ideological
justifications for policies that favour the interests of business can only be countered through a broader understanding of the relationship between the political and economic
structures of capitalism (see Opposing Opinions 8.1). The
understanding proffered by the Marxist theorists suggests
that there is nothing natural or inevitable about a world
order based on a global market. Rather than accept the
inevitability of the present order, the task facing us is to
lay the foundations for a new way of organizing society—
a global society that is more just and more humane than
our own. In our world of multiple crises, Rosa Luxemburg’s
observation that we have a choice between socialism or barbarism appears more relevant than ever.
Opposing Opinions 8.1 The global economy is the prime determinant of the character of global politics
For
Economic power determines states’ capability to project
military power. Economic resources are needed to purchase
military equipment or to maintain the research and development necessary to keep military capability at the highest level. It
is no coincidence that the most militarily powerful states in the
international system (the US and China) are also the most economically powerful.
Periods of economic turmoil are linked to increased instability in the international system. The Second World War was
preceded by a long period of economic instability caused by the
Great Depression. Marxists, following Lenin, locate the cause of
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the First World War in the competition among capitalist states
for control over the colonies. Since the economic crisis of 2008,
international tensions have been mounting, particularly between
Russia and the United States. By contrast, the ‘long peace’ of the
cold war was marked by a period of relative economic stability.
Capitalist interests determine states’ foreign policy. For example, Paul Wolfowitz, who was Deputy Secretary of Defense in the
George W. Bush administration, openly declared that the 2003
invasion of Iraq was about securing access to oil. There is a long
history of large corporations influencing US policy towards Latin
America. For instance, United Fruit played a key role in lobbying
for the overthrow of the Arbenz administration in Guatemala in
1954.
Against
The balance of power determines the character of international politics. Periods of relative balance coincide with greater
stability in the international system. The ‘long peace’ of the second half of the twentieth century occurred because there was
a relative balance of power between the United States and the
Soviet Union, particularly since ‘mutual assured destruction’
meant that neither side could ‘win’ a nuclear conflict. The current
instability in the international system derives from the relative
decline of the United States.
The spread of democracy produces greater global stability.
While we may not have reached ‘the end of history’ in Francis
Fukuyama’s term, the claim that democracies don’t go to war with
each other retains its validity, and democracy promotion is the
best hope for a more peaceful and stable future. Europe, which
is now a peaceful community of democracies, was historically
the most war-torn region in the world. With the exception of the
break-up of post-communist Yugoslavia, Europe has not experienced a major conflict since the end of the Second World War.
Reducing state behaviour to the expression of capitalist
interests does not explain actions that appear at least partly
motivated by genuine altruistic or other concerns. Behaviour
such as contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations,
for example, or pressure-group-inspired debt forgiveness, cannot
readily be explained in terms of the operation of crude economic
interests. More controversially, it might even be argued that some
behaviours—such as the United States’ continuing and largely
uncritical support for Israel—may well work against the state’s
long-term economic interests. Simplistic, reductionist readings of
the influences on state behaviour are almost always inadequate.
1. Does the balance of power provide a better explanation for periods of stability than economic prosperity?
2. Can state actions be reduced purely to economic interests?
3. What is the connection between economic power and military capability?
Visit the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle these questions.
Questions
1. How would you account for the continuing vitality of Marxist thought?
2. How useful is Wallerstein’s notion of a semi-periphery?
3. Why has Wallerstein’s world-systems theory been criticized for its alleged Eurocentrism?
Do you agree with this critique?
4. In what ways is ‘combined and uneven development’ a useful lens through which to view the
development of world politics?
5. In what ways does Gramsci’s notion of hegemony differ from that used by realist International
Relations writers?
6. How might it be argued that Marx and Engels were the original theorists of globalization?
7. What do you regard as the main contribution of Marxist theories to our understanding of
world politics?
8. How useful is the notion of emancipation employed by critical theorists?
9. Do you agree with Cox’s distinction between ‘problem-solving theory’ and ‘critical theory’?
10. Assess Wallerstein’s claim that the power of the United States is in decline.
Visit the online resources to test your understanding by trying the self-test questions.
Chapter 8 Marxist theories of international relations
Further Reading
Anderson, K. B. (2010), Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity and Non-Western Societies
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press). A brilliant reconstruction of Marx’s own writing on
world politics.
Brincat, S., Lima, L., and Nunes, J. (eds) (2012), Critical Theory in International Relations and
Security Studies: Interviews and Reflections (London: Routledge). Interviews with some of the key
proponents of critical theory in the field, along with further reflections both supportive and
more critical.
Cox, R. W. (1981), ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’,
Millennium, 10(2): 126–55. Cox’s much-quoted essay continues to inspire.
Derluguian, G. M. (2005), Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System Biography
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press). This unconventional book is a dazzling display of the
insights generated by the world-system approach.
Eagleton, T. (2018), Why Marx was Right (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). A short, highly
entertaining and deceptively erudite defence of the core tenets of Marx’s worldview.
Lenin, V. I. (1917), Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (multiple editions available). While
of limited contemporary relevance, it is still worth reading this once-influential pamphlet.
Linklater, A. (2007), Critical Theory and World Politics: Sovereignty, Citizenship and Humanity
(London: Routledge). An important book from one the most influential critical theorists
working on international relations.
Marx, K., and Engels, F. (1848), The Communist Manifesto (multiple editions available). The best
introduction to Marx’s thinking. Essential reading even after 150 years.
Wallerstein, I., Collins, R., Mann, M., Derluguian, G., and Calhoun, C. (2013), Does Capitalism
Have a Future? (New York: Oxford University Press). A fascinating exploration of the problems
of contemporary global capitalism by prominent world-system theorists and their
(sympathetic) critics.
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
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Chapter 9
Realism
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Framing Questions
●
What is the role of power in realist international theory?
●
How do realists explain international conflict?
●
Can realism provide a universal explanation of world politics? - discussing limitations
Reader’s Guide
This chapter discusses realism as a family of
approaches to the study and analysis of international
relations. Historical studies show that the realist school
of thought in International Relations (IR) emerged in
the mid-twentieth century, but many scholars argue
that the key tenets of realism—power struggle, statism,
self-help, and pessimism about human nature—can be
found in the works of earlier thinkers and constitute
a profound wisdom about international affairs. For
many IR scholars, the realist perspective provides persuasive guidelines for practice and a powerful explanation for events in international affairs. The chapter
surveys key aspects of realist international theory. It
first introduces the theory of realism (see Section 9.1)
and its fundamental concepts (see Section 9.2).
Section 9.3 then examines the history of this theoretical approach. Section 9.4 focuses on geopolitics as a
central part of realist thought in the twentieth century.
While realist theories typically share a core of common fundamental ideas, there are multiple versions of
realist thought. Section 9.5 examines the main realist
approaches in contemporary English-language scholarship, and provides insights on Russian and Chinese
realism. Section 9.6 concludes the chapter by examining the relevance of realism for understanding international politics today.
Visit the online resources to access an
interactive timeline of how the discipline of
International Relations has evolved.
Chapter 9 Realism
9.1 Introduction
The tradition of political realism includes a range of
theoretical positions that share key ideas but differ in
the emphasis on, and interpretation of, these ideas.
Typically, the realist tradition emphasizes the powerseeking behaviour of human beings and the constant
uncertainty of foreign politics. For some scholars, this
renders realism a timeless and universal theory, applicable in any time and place.
Scholars and practitioners have found in realism a
rational theory of foreign policy which aims to explain
the world as it is, and not as they wish it to be. Since the
Second World War, ‘realist’ approaches have influenced
both the practice of international relations and the academic study of world politics. Indeed, for many decades
realism was considered the dominant approach to the
study of international relations in Western Europe and
the United States (Boucher 1998).
According to a widely shared narrative in the academic discipline of International Relations (IR), realism rose to prominence in the mid-twentieth century
in reaction to the failure of international organizations to end major war between great powers. British
and American scholars, such as E. H. Carr and Hans
Morgenthau, dubbed those who believed that international cooperation could prevent global conflicts ‘idealists’ and ‘utopians’. These self-proclaimed realists
offered an alternative view which placed power at the
core of international politics (Molloy 2006). Realism
relied on national interests rather than ideology,
sought peace through strength, and accepted pluralism
in the international domain. Realist theorists embraced
statism, highlighting the role of states over other actors
in international relations, such as international organizations, individuals, or corporations. On this early view
of the history of IR, the debate between ‘realism’ and
‘idealism’ became a cornerstone of the academic study
of international relations, and each theory represented
an opposing ‘paradigm’, or an essential set of concepts
that can be used to explain international politics.
Since the 1990s, revisionist historians have challenged the historical accuracy of this narrative, suggesting that the distinction between ‘realism’ and the
opposing approaches is less clear-cut (Wilson 1998;
Schmidt and Guilhot 2019). At the same time, the
academic study of international relations has moved
towards a ‘post-paradigm’ era, which means that scholars tend to rely less on all-encompassing theories such
as ‘realism’, ‘liberalism’, ‘constructivism’, or ‘Marxism’.
Instead, they seek more nuanced and critical ways to
analyse world politics. The contemporary importance
of realism as an international theory remains, therefore, an open question.
9.2 Fundamental ideas
Realism is a family of approaches marked by recurrent
concerns and conclusions about international relations.
There are no theoretical elements that can be found in
all realist theories, yet realists characteristically argue
that human nature and the lack of international government impose constraints on international relations, resulting in a primary emphasis on power and
self-interest.
Watch the video on the online resources to see
the author consider ‘What is Realism?’
9.2.1 Human nature
Realists typically describe human nature as essentially selfish. In his book of advice for political leaders,
the renaissance political thinker Niccolò Machiavelli
argued that ‘men are excessively self-interested’ (2019
[1513]: 58). The realm of politics is, therefore, conditioned by the egoistic passions of human nature (see
Box 9.1). While Machiavelli did not reject morality
as such, or the duty to act morally, he argued that in
international politics, where the political leader shoulders the responsibility for the state’s security, a different
conception of morality was needed. This type of morality is subordinated to the ‘reason of state’: it is judged
by its consequences for the state’s survival, rather than
by conventional ethical considerations or individual
ethics (Knoll 2019).
Realists acknowledge competing conceptions of
morality and conclude that human egoism and the
lack of an international sovereign imply that the international realm is dominated by concerns of power
and interest (Donnelly 2000: 10). They often object to
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political acts being measured by conventional ethical standards, drawing a substantial body of criticism
from liberal theorists (see Ch. 7). Yet many realists
reject views of human nature as immoral or exclusively egoistic and recognize that the quest for power
is not the only motivation for human action (Niebuhr
2011 [1944]; Spykman 2017 [1942]). On the basis of this
premise, the rest of this section examines five of the
recurrent concepts that feature in many, though not all,
realist theories.
9.2.2 Statism
Realists consider the state as the main actor in international relations. The fundamental trait of states is
sovereignty, which is often described as the legitimacy
to use force both internally and externally. Sovereignty
means that the state has supreme authority to make and
enforce laws within its territorial space. Realist theory
Box 9.1 Realism and morality
Realists typically accept that international politics is based primarily on considerations of power, not on principles of justice.
This assumption, however, does not mean that realists advocate in favour of immoral behaviour, or that they are impervious to moral arguments. Instead, realists often recognize
the importance of conventional ethical considerations, but
claim that they have no place in international politics (Kennan
1985; Hobbes 2017 (1651)). Some, including Machiavelli (see
Section 9.2.1), suggest that in politics, a moral act is judged by
its contribution to the state’s survival, thus endorsing a consequentialist view of morality.
In his book The History of the Peloponnesian War, which is
a core text in the realist tradition, Greek historian Thucydides
considers the tension between politics and morality. In the
‘Melian Dialogue’, which relates the Athenian invasion of
Melos in 416 bce, Thucydides describes how the Athenian
envoys invited the Melian people to choose between surrender or destruction, arguing that only the law of the strongest
can prevail in foreign affairs, with no room for considerations
of justice. Thucydides, however, suggests that the neat opposition between realism and morality is false. He shows that utopian thinking without concrete military capabilities led to the
defeat of Melos, but also implies that Athens’ misguided use of
political power contributed to its later demise in Sicily.
In the twentieth century, realist thinkers such as Morgenthau
and Raymond Aron (1905–83) argued that interests of power
and survival motivate states in the international realm, but
political actors remain subject to moral judgement (Aron 2003
(1962)). While principles of justice alone cannot direct foreign
policy, they are still important for providing states with public
support and legitimacy.
assumes that the sovereign state can guarantee domestic order by setting up a system of law and enforcement,
but argues that there is no sovereign authority to establish such a system in the international domain. Thus, in
the uncertain conditions that characterize the international system, the state’s primary aim is to guarantee its
survival and security.
For realists, the quest for survival in conditions of
international anarchy and uncertainty raises the ‘security dilemma’, which argues that ‘many of the means by
which a state tries to increase its security decrease the
security of others’ (Jervis 1978: 169). As Robert Jervis
and others (e.g. Herz 1950; Butterfield 1951) have argued,
states cannot be certain about the ambitions and intentions of other states. When states resort to power accumulation for defensive aims, they may inadvertently
appear as a threat to other states. Consequently, the
other side might take countermeasures against these
defensive measures, generating a spiral of uncertainty
and hostility. These unintended dynamics can lead to a
decrease in international security and, potentially, war
(Tang 2009). The security dilemma provides a theory of
war and peace based on the interaction between states,
in which anarchy, uncertainty, and fear influence state
behaviour and its outcomes.
9.2.3 Power
The struggle for power is, for many realists, one of the
fundamental characteristics of the international system. Realists such as Morgenthau saw power as ‘man’s
control over the minds and actions of other men’
and argued that ‘the struggle for power is universal
in time and space’ (Morgenthau 1955 [1948]: 26, 17).
Consequently, international conflict is always possible:
political leaders can mitigate—but not eliminate—the
risk of war. Thus, states typically operate in conditions
of uncertainty about the power of other states and about
their intentions to use power offensively or defensively
(Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1999: 1–10).
Power is a relational and relative concept. Power is
exercised in interaction with other entities and measured in comparison with them. There are various ways
in which realist theory proposes to assess and measure
a state’s power in the international system. Neorealists
like Kenneth Waltz use the term ‘capabilities’ to provide a more accurate ranking of the strength of states
according to ‘size of population and territory, resource
endowment, economic capability, military strength,
political stability and competence’ (Waltz 1979: 131).
idk i sorta want to say that contemporary realists like Morgenthau or Aron believed that political actors remained
subject to moral judgement to garner public support and maintain legitimacy.
Chapter 9 Realism
On this view, military resources can be a token of a
state’s power even if they are not put to actual use, for
example in the case of the deterrent effect of nuclear
weapons (see Ch. 30). This approach raises other difficulties, including measuring and comparing ‘capabilities’ and ‘resources’, and proving their impact on a state’s
military success or international influence. For example, India’s large population has not, so far, translated to
dominant political influence on international politics.
9.2.4 Anarchy
Many realists claim that international affairs take place
in a state of anarchy. This does not imply a state of
chaos, but the absence of political authority above states
in the international system. The condition of anarchy
defines the interaction of states in world politics, each
striving to accumulate power to guarantee its survival.
Realists believe that under international anarchy, states
compete for power, economic profit, security, and
influence. In other words, anarchy means that interaction between states is a zero-sum game: one state’s
gain is another’s loss. Moreover, international anarchy
increases the chances of war, ‘even in the absence of
aggressivity or similar factors’ (Herz 1976: 10). When
each state is focused on its own national interests, cooperation under anarchy—let alone arriving at a common
agreement about shared principles—is very difficult.
Neorealism sees the anarchic structure of the international system as the main constraint on state behaviour. The pressures of anarchy condition state behaviour
more than the decisions of individual state leaders or
domestic political factors (Waltz 1979). The principle
of the balance of power (see Box 9.2) is therefore the
main instrument for states to guarantee their survival
and security in the anarchic international system. Yet,
as Jervis (1978) has shown, international anarchy and
uncertainty may lead security-seeking states into costly
spirals of mistrust and rivalry.
9.2.5 Survival
While classical realists such as Morgenthau emphasized
the primary role of the struggle for power in international affairs, neorealists (see Section 9.5.1) argue that
the pre-eminent goal of states in the international sphere
is survival. Thus, for Waltz (1979: 91), ‘beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied’.
Neorealists are divided in their interpretation of the
ways in which states seek to guarantee their security and
Box 9.2 The balance of power
The core proposition of most balance of power theories is that
‘hegemonies do not form in multistate systems because perceived threats of hegemony over the system generate balancing behavior by other leading states in the system’ (Levy 2004:
37). A state or group of states would seek to match its power
against the power of its rival by building military and economic
capabilities (internal balancing) and forming alliances (external balancing). This process would eventually generate a stable
equilibrium in the international system, which could prevent
conflicts.
The term ‘balance of power’ emerged in eighteenth-century
Europe when political thinkers sought ways to foster peace
and stability among the European states (Molloy 2013). Later,
it described existing and desired relations between European
states from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the First World
War, when the British Empire was denoted as the ‘balancer’,
using its political and military power to reinforce one side or
another in the European state system. After 1918, the balance
of power was reconsidered. The Second World War ended
with a bipolar equilibrium between the United States and
the Soviet Union, while the period following the break-up of
the Soviet Union in 1991 is usually described as unipolar or
multipolar (Little 2007).
Classical realists (Morgenthau 1948) challenged the usefulness of the balance of power theory because, for them, it
lacked a clear measure of power, wrongly assumed a tendency
to balance over a tendency towards struggle, and ignored the
role of common moral principles in fostering peace. Structural
realists suggested that the international system has an inherent balancing tendency. Thus, for Waltz (1979: 127), when two
international ‘coalitions’ are formed, secondary states freely
choose to join the weaker party to avoid being threatened
by the stronger one. Others, like John Mearsheimer (2001),
acknowledged that aspiring powers may actively challenge the
existing equilibrium to attain a hegemonic position.
With no single definition of the balance of power, some
scholars have described it as a useful metaphor for thinking
about the international structure. Yet others doubt the theory’s
usefulness and its universal applicability, suggesting that it
should be integrated with other perspectives on hegemony
and power (Wohlforth et al. 2007).
survival. According to one approach, ‘defensive neorealism’, states pursue power only to the degree that would
guarantee their survival in a balanced international system of states or coalitions of equal power (see Box 9.2).
A different approach, ‘offensive neorealism’, argues that
states seek to maximize their power—beyond what is
needed for survival—and seek superiority rather than
equality in the anarchic international system. According
to Mearsheimer (2001: 33), ‘states quickly understand
that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the
most powerful state in the system’.
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The emphasis on survival among ‘defensive neorealists’ has been criticized by other realists for its
‘status-quo bias’. These realists argue that states adopt
revisionist goals that seek to transform the balance
of power—rather than merely guarantee their own
survival—through aggressive expansion (Schweller
1996). Although the quest for survival means that
war is always possible, some realists seek ways to prevent it by claiming that states may achieve security
through cooperation (Jervis 1978). Jervis’s theoretical
proposals generated offence–defence theory, which
contends that when it is relatively easy for a state to
attack, this makes war more probable, but when the
defence has the advantage, this decreases the probability of war (Van Evera 1999). This theory provides
an optimistic perspective on state survival and war
prevention that has informed foreign policy analysis.
9.2.6 Self-help
The principle of state action in the international
domain is self-help. Under international anarchy,
without a central authority, each state is responsible for its own security and well-being. According
to realists, international organizations such as the
United Nations cannot provide a sufficient guarantee of states’ security or even survival. Therefore,
in a system characterized by uncertainty and selfinterest, states can rely only on themselves; they
must define their own political objectives, and they
should increase their power capabilities or join an
alliance to defend themselves against external threats
(Waltz 1979: 107).
Key Points
realism is a diverse approach, six central concepts
• While
are shared by most realist thinkers: a pessimistic view of
human nature, power, anarchy, statism, survival, and
self-help.
is often defined in terms of resources, military
• Power
capability, gross national product, and population, which
realists believe translate into political influence.
refers to the lack of a central political authority in
• Anarchy
the international sphere, which means that states must
pursue their own interests to guarantee their survival.
is the doctrine which argues that states are the
• Statism
main actors in international relations, at the expense of
individuals and international organizations. Statism means
that the sovereign state has supreme authority within its
territorial space and operates in an anarchic international
system.
ultimate concern of the state is its own security and
• The
survival, although some realists (for example,
Mearsheimer) argue that states act to maximize power
beyond what is necessary for their survival.
refers to the belief that each state is responsible
• Self-help
for its own security and survival, as other states cannot be
trusted, and international organizations are too weak.
9.3 Realism in historical perspective
In the years following the Second World War, realism
emerged as an approach to the study of international
relations in the United States and Britain. Realism is in
fact a product of the twentieth century, yet realists often
claim that their ideas rely on an ancient tradition of
thought and turn to historical thinkers—whose works
have attained the status of ‘classics’—for descriptive
insights about the world as it is (positive realist theory)
and prescriptions for how leaders should act (normative realist theory). Although not all scholars who are
today considered as part of IR’s realist canon would
have defined their work as such, their ideas continue to
influence contemporary thinking about world politics
from a realist perspective (M. Williams 2004).
Recent scholarship has sought to diversify existing narratives on the historical development of realist
IR ­
theory, showing the relevance of this theoretical
tradition to a range of geographical and cultural contexts
beyond the West. This section provides an overview of
key thinkers who have become part of the realist tradition of thought in International Relations and continue to
influence scholars today (see Section 9.3.1), and includes
a brief historical account of realism in the academic study
of International Relations (see Section 9.3.2).
9.3.1 Realism ‘before realism’
Ideas associated with the realist tradition have existed
in political thought since before the foundation of
International Relations as an academic discipline
in the twentieth century. Figures such as the Indian
political thinker Kautilya (fourth century bce) (see
Case Study 9.1), the Greek historian Thucydides
(460–400 bce), the Arab historian and sociologist Ibn
Chapter 9 Realism
Case Study 9.1 Kautilya’s realist thought
As key adviser to Indian king Chandragupta Maurya (c.317–293
bce), Kautilya advanced a ‘realist’ vision of politics intended to
teach the king how to govern the first united empire in the Indian
subcontinent. As an influential political writer in the ancient
world, Kautilya endorsed monarchic rule, but emphasized the
importance of welfare provisions. His discussions of diplomacy and war offered a political analysis based on the notions
of power, deceit, and harsh measures against opponents. He
was recognized by Max Weber (2004 [1919]) as an early ‘realist’
thinker who anticipated Machiavelli’s theory of modern politics.
In his treatise, Arthashastra (c.300 bce ), which has been translated as the ‘science of politics’ (Olivelle 2013), Kautilya suggested
that the timeless law of foreign policy was the quest to maximize
power and self-interest. The book encouraged readers to take an
active stance in politics, condemning those who rely on religion,
fate, or superstition. While the king is expected to do what is right
for his own people, morality and goodwill are irrelevant considerations in government. Thus, nations wage war or make peace
according to their political, military, and economic self-interest,
and should expect other states to do the same. Similar assumptions can be found in the works of Thucydides, who wrote on
great power struggle a century before Kautilya, and in the works
of the Chinese scholar Han Feizi, written about 50 years after
Arthashastra.
Kautilya is most famous for his so-called foreign policy theory
in which one’s immediate neighbour is considered as an enemy
but any state on the other side of one’s neighbour is regarded as
an ally. He suggested that there are six possible forms of state policy: peace, war, neutrality, marching, alliance, and selective conflict strategy. These policies served the king to obtain the three
goods of life: material gain, spiritual good, and pleasures. Yet
since conflict was the defining feature of the international realm,
a successful king must be able to overcome enemies to provide
the goods of life to his people. For Kautilya, foreign relations consisted mainly of war and conquest, while diplomacy and alliances
provided additional means to maximize power.
Khaldun (1332–1406), the Florentine thinker Niccolò
Machiavelli (1469–1527), and the English philosopher
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) have all been associated
with a positive or normative realist perspective on
international affairs. These thinkers embraced a pessimistic view of human nature, arguing that war was the
natural state of human existence, and prioritized selfinterest and power as the defining elements in politics
(see Box 9.1).
Realists have often depicted the international realm
as anarchical and governed not by law but by the will
of the strongest, generating a constant risk of war. Ibn
Khaldun (2020: 223), a Muslim scholar of the early
modern period, suggested that ‘wars and different
kinds of fighting have occurred in the world ever since
The would-be conqueror shall apply the six methods of foreign policy [as appropriate] to the various constituent elements of his Circle of States with the aim of progressing from
a state of decline to one of neither decline nor progress and
from this state to one of progress. The king who understands
the interdependence of the six methods of foreign policy, as
explained in this treatise, will bind other rulers by the chains
of his intellect and can play with them as he pleases. The Six
Methods:
1 Making peace is entering into an agreement with specific
conditions [i.e. concluding a treaty]. A king shall make peace
when he finds himself in relative decline compared to his
enemy.
2 Active hostilities is waging war. A king superior to his enemy
in power shall attack him.
3 Being indifferent to a situation is staying quiet. When a king
considers that neither he nor his enemy can harm the other,
he shall remain quiet.
4 Augmenting one’s own power is preparing for war. A king
with special advantages shall make preparations for war.
5 Getting the protection of another is seeking support. A king
depleted in power shall seek help.
6 Dual policy is making peace with one king and war with
another. A king whose aim can be achieved [only] with the
help of another shall pursue a dual policy.
(Kautilya 1992: p. 563)
Question 1: Is peace only attractive to the weak, according to
Kautilya?
Question 2: Does Kautilya believe that good state leaders can be
moral?
God created it . . . It is something natural among human
beings; no nation or generation is free from it.’ Thus, he
claimed that international conflict can be attributed to
certain characteristics of human nature, which cannot
be eliminated.
Ancient political thinkers reflected on the struggle for power as a central attribute of politics. For
Kautilya, a combination of human propensity to conflict and a systemic competition for power made war
the natural condition of politics (see Case Study 9.1).
Similarly, Thucydides considered the thirst for power
and the need to follow self-interest as the defining elements of individuals and states alike. He recounted the
Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta as an
example of the centrality of power politics to human
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138
or rosenboim
behaviour and noted that the unequal distribution
of power in the international realm further exacerbated warlike tendencies arising from human nature.
Thucydides highlighted a now famous example from
the Peloponnesian War, in which Athens’ attempt to
expand its empire made the Spartans less secure, leading to a war. Ambition, fear, and honour motivated
their conflict which, Thucydides argued, ignored moral
considerations with disastrous results (see Box 9.1).
The pursuit of glory and honour was an important motivation in international politics, according
to Machiavelli, one of the first theorists of the modern state (see Section 9.2.1). A leader’s glory and
honour depended on their ability to govern well and
advance the common good, and reflected the state’s
power (Machiavelli (2019 [1513]): 50–53, 69–70). Thus,
Machiavelli acknowledged that leaders waged wars not
only for the security of their state—which they were
entrusted to defend—but also to aggrandize the state
and their own personal glory.
According to Thomas Hobbes, human nature and
the lack of supreme authority were the main causes
of war, which was only contained by establishment of
the state. In his political treatise, Leviathan (1651), he
argued that ‘during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that
condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as
is of every man, against every man’ (Hobbes 2017: 283).
Thus, in the anarchic state of nature, the threat of war
of all against all was ever-present. For Hobbes, people
agree to limit their liberty and confer power to the state
in exchange for security that permits them to pursue
‘higher’ human aspirations. Yet no similar authority is
available in the international sphere, where states must
perpetually struggle for power and security under conditions of anarchy.
9.3.2 Realism in the twentieth century
The First World War gave an important impetus to the
early academic discipline of International Relations,
leading greater numbers of scholars to the study of
world politics, initially in the attempt to explain interstate conflicts and promote peace between the main
imperial powers. As more
universities
in the
end, the engaged
goal is in teaching and studying international affairs, scholars sought
to provide the new scholarly field with a solid theoretical grounding. International Relations scholars like
E. H. Carr (1892–1982), Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–80),
and John Herz (1908–2005) developed theories of
international affairs which they defined as ‘realist’,
emphasizing the importance of the state, power struggle, and a pessimistic understanding of human nature.
Through a process of writing history backwards, they
claimed a lineage with the historical figures discussed
in Section 9.3.1. In their teaching and publications,
realist scholars Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson
(1950) sought to enhance realism’s authority, and to
establish a separate discipline of IR, by depicting it as
a theoretical approach that was universal. Their survey
of almost entirely white, European, and male ‘canonical
thinkers’ claimed that IR theory’s intellectual roots lay
in Ancient Greece and Renaissance Europe. Recently,
scholars have suggested that the standard ‘canon’ of
thinkers in IR fails to account for the wide variety of
thinkers and approaches to world politics that characterized the early field of IR, a ‘tradition’ invented
for contemporary political and intellectual purposes
(Ashworth 2013; Owens et al. 2022).
Following the Second World War, IR scholars—
including émigrés from Europe who joined American
academia—developed ‘classical realism’ as a theoretical framework to explain the fundamental laws of
international relations. Thinkers in the classical realist tradition include Carr, Morgenthau, Herz, George
Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Reinhold Niebuhr, Nicholas
Spykman, Martin Wight, and Arnold Wolfers.
Morgenthau (1948), one of the leading scholars in this
tradition, argued that ‘international politics, like all
politics, is a struggle for power’, which in turn calls for
an effort to maintain peace. Reflecting a key aspect of
classical realism, he saw the pursuit of power as part of
human nature and focused his analysis on the different
forms that power could take in the international realm.
Morgenthau outlined six principles of realism: human
nature generates the laws that govern politics; power
is the main concept in international politics; power
is an objective and universal category; no moral laws
can claim universal validity; national interests are not
universally valid; and politics is an autonomous sphere
of human action (Morgenthau 1948: 4–15). He distinguished between the preservation of power (status quo),
its augmentation (imperialism), and its demonstration
(prestige). The ability of each state to pursue its own
interests was limited, he posited, by the power that it
possessed (see Box 9.3).
The inevitable instability of the anarchical international system encouraged scholars such as Morgenthau
to seek a global ‘balance of power’ that could guarantee
stability, at least temporarily (see Box 9.2). Yet, in the
Chapter 9 Realism
Box 9.3 Key quote
International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.
Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is
always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. They
may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic,
economic, or social ideal. They may hope that this ideal will
materialize through its own inner force, through divine intervention, or through the natural development of human affairs.
But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of
international politics, they do so by striving for power.
(Hans J. Morgenthau [1955] 1948: 13)
139
international system, Herz offered an alternative interpretation of realism, which highlighted the irrationality of human nature.
Key Points
approaches to international politics have a long
• Realist
history, with scholars in diverse intellectual traditions
advancing a view of politics as motivated by power and
self-interest.
ancient and early modern thinkers held a pessimistic
• Many
view of human nature, where self-interest, fear, and
•
ambition inevitably lead to conflict.
(argue that this is less feasible after nuclear power invented - ifRealism
both assides
haveinnuclear
trying
to persuade via
an approach
academic power,
IR emerged
in Britain
millitaryface
force
is less
of the
threateffective)
posed by nuclear weapons after 1945,
and the United States in response to the atrocities of the
world wars, and many of its leading proponents claimed to
Morgenthau abandoned the balance of power and probe part of a longer tradition that included these earlier
posed a form of global governance in its place (Craig
thinkers.
2007). For Herz (1950: 157–180), the balance of power
Classical realists typically perceive power struggle between
could not offer security against the violence and prestates as an important factor in shaping international
cariousness that characterized the bipolar system
relations.
of the cold war. By highlighting the fragility of the
•
9.4 Geopolitics
The study of physical space has been a central part of
realist thought in the twentieth century. Geopolitical
thought emerged at the turn of the twentieth century in the context of imperial rivalry. As European
empires competed for territorial expansion, geopolitics provided a historical-sociological explanation
of international relations, as well as a plan for political action. Inspired by German geographers such as
Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), the British geopolitical
thinker Halford Mackinder (1861–1947) suggested
that geographical knowledge—including, for example,
topography, cartography, population density, and natural resources—should direct the foreign policy of the
British Empire. Based on cartographic analysis, he provided a power-driven interpretation of world politics
aimed at extending and reinforcing the British Empire
on a global scale (Mackinder 1904).
In the United States, Ratzel’s ideas inspired international thinkers including the geographer Ellen
Churchill Semple (1863–1932), who saw international
relations as the interaction between the physical environment and competing civilizations. In contrast to
Mackinder, whose geopolitical thought centred on
the ‘Heartland’ landmass as the ‘geographical pivot
of history’, the American naval officer and historian
Alfred T. Mahan (1840–1914) provided an influential
geopolitical thesis focused on sea power. His major
work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (Mahan
1918 [1890]), argued that the United States could no
longer embrace a policy of international isolation, and
aimed at normalizing the United States’ imperial and
expansionist aspirations. Reflecting his anxiety about
rising Japanese power in the early twentieth century,
Mahan’s geopolitical military strategy was grounded
in white supremacist beliefs; he predicted a global race
war (Ashworth 2022). a global race war - ideological
The interplay of the natural environment and world
politics interested both International Relations scholars
such as Yale professor Nicholas Spykman (1893–1943),
and Princeton geographers Harold Sprout (1901–80)
and Margaret Sprout (1903–2004), who saw space as
a condition of state power and endeavoured to understand how material conditions could shape the international system. For Spykman (2017 [1942]), geopolitics
was the core of realist thinking in IR because it formed
the foundational conditions for political strategy. After
the Second World War, Harold and Margaret Sprout
reinterpreted Mahan’s sea power theory to envision a
new strategy for American imperial expansion overseas.
Later, they described a two-way relationship between
environmental factors and international relations,
encouraging American scholars and policy-makers to
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or rosenboim
Box 9.4 Key quote
All over the world the peoples of color are aroused, although
in varying degrees, to the Imperium of the white nations . . .
Once the colored races feared the white man; today that fear has
turned to secret contempt. Once they were filled with terror at
the white man’s power; today they know that they themselves
are power. Their past weakness has not been due to their lack of
numbers nor to inferior physical stamina but to the fact that the
white man had guns, cared little for God and much for his guns.
Today the yellow, brown, black peoples know that the whites
are in a minority with no special ‘capacities’ which mean ‘innate
superiority’; moreover, that minority is divided and is slaughtering itself. The . . . man of color . . . has participated in the
wars and revolutions of the ruling nations and perforce has been
initiated into the former dark mysteries of their armaments, economics and diplomacy, and has thus come to question the reality
of the white man’s superiority and to contemplate the possibilities of attack and victories for himself. What is the alternative to
the white man’s refusal to assume the responsibilities for a global
peace, for his refusal to abandon the old policy of putting limits
on freedom for others? That alternative is an inter-continental
war between the East and West, the greatest war the human race
has ever seen, a war between whites and non-whites. That war
will come as a result of the white man’s unwillingness to give up
his superiority and the colored man’s unwillingness to endure his
inferiority.
(Merze Tate 1943: 521–2, 531).
consider the environment as an indispensable factor in
foreign policy.
Earlier geopolitical writers such as Ratzel, Mackinder,
and Mahan embraced a conservative approach which
emphasized great power politics, racial hierarchies, and
imperial expansion. Yet alternative geopolitical visions
of the relationship between nature and politics emerged
after the Second World War, when thinkers like Merze
Tate (1905–96) offered a radical, anti-racist realist reading of geopolitics (Savage 2021) (see Box 9.4). For Tate,
the greatest global threat to humanity is race war, a
transcontinental conflict that humanity should avoid
by rejecting racism and its practices of domination.
The geopolitical approach to realism persisted
through the twentieth century, when Jean Elshtain
(1941–2013) offered a gendered geopolitical reading of
realist theory. Her feminist scholarship draws attention
to the embodied and gendered world of soldiers in warmaking and to female experiences and motherhood.
Her realism changes the level of analysis of realism,
moving from the abstract scale of the state to the individual. Thus, she sought to blur the distinction between
the private and the public when analysing geopolitical
strategy in war (Elshtain 1995 [1987]). Ann Tickner
(1992) similarly highlighted and more powerfully critiqued the ‘masculine’ aspects of realist IR theory, and
proposed ecofeminism as an alternative approach to
the study of the relations between politics and nature
(see Ch. 10).
Key Points
or the study of physical space and its
• Geopolitics,
relationship to international relations, was a central part of
realist thought in the twentieth century.
geopolitical scholars drew on German thinkers
• American
to conceptualize foreign policy in terms of the relations
between political power and geographical conditions.
thinkers such as Halford Mackinder, Friedrich
• Geopolitical
Ratzel, and Alfred Mahan advanced racist arguments as
part of their geographical studies, aiming to sustain British,
German, and American policies of imperial conquest.
some geopolitical thinkers like Nicholas Spykman
• While
saw geographic conditions as permanent and stable,
others, such as Merze Tate, emphasized the dynamic and
radical potential of geopolitical analysis.
thinkers such as Jean Elshtain showed the gendered
• Realist
aspects of geopolitics, offering a feminist alternative.
9.5 Multiple realisms?
Contemporary realist international theory is not a
unified and monolithic theory but incorporates many
different approaches. Realism has been described as a
paradigm, or a family of theories that are united by a
set of shared ideas (see Section 9.2).
9.5.1 Neorealism/structural realism
One way to differentiate between different types of
realist theories is temporal: scholars often distinguish between ‘classical realism’, which is associated
Chapter 9 Realism
with the emergence of IR as an academic discipline
in the mid-twentieth century (see Section 9.3.2),
and ‘neorealism’/‘structural realism’, which typically
takes as its starting point the publication of Waltz’s
Theory of International Politics in 1979. Two influential approaches to structural realism in contemporary
theories of international relations are ‘defensive neorealism’ and ‘offensive neorealism’ (see Section 9.2.5).
Inspired by new economic and social science methodologies, Waltz outlined an abstract model for the
analysis of international relations. His realist theory
was based on the view that the international sphere was
characterized by a persistent structure of anarchy, in
which formally equal political units rely on their own
resources to protect and advance their interests. Unlike
earlier classical realists, Waltz’s theory focuses less on
individuals or on human nature, and more on states,
and specifically on the ‘structure’ of the international
system of states. The internal constitution of the state—
whether it is democratic or not—matters less than its
position in the international balance of power. While
states have an equal place in the anarchical structure,
they differ in their power, which Waltz conceptualizes
as ‘capabilities’.
Waltz’s approach is often described as ‘defensive
realism’ because it suggests that states should adopt
moderate and restrained policies to attain security.
According to this view, the decisive factor in international relations is the distribution of power, or ‘capabilities’, across different states. Each state is concerned with
its own survival, and therefore worries about the possibility that other states may gain greater capabilities
and become a threat. Thus, while states pursue power
in the international realm, their goal is security and
survival, and not maximizing power for its own sake.
The structure of the international system has a strong
tendency to balance powerful revisionist states—states
that seek to challenge the status quo—through the formation of balancing coalitions. For structural realists,
the number of ‘great powers’ in the international system determines the overall structure of the system. In
the contemporary period, we live in a ‘multipolar’ order
with several centres of power (see Ch. 6), while the
post-1989 era was defined as ‘unipolar’, dominated by
the United States (see Ch. 5), and the cold war ‘bi­polar’
system was dominated by the United States and the
Soviet Union (see Ch. 4).
A different interpretation of structural realism is
the ‘offensive’ approach of John Mearsheimer (2001),
who provides an alternative account of the dynamics
of power in the anarchical system. Mearsheimer agrees
with Waltz that the survival and security of the state
depend on the structure of the international system,
but doubts that this structure can generate balancing
coalitions. Unlike Waltz, he suggests that the offensive
pursuit of power is a central feature of international
relations because, despite the often frequent and tragic
outcomes of war, it provides the only guarantee of a
state’s survival. Mearsheimer argues that states must
maximize their accumulation of power because of their
uncertainty regarding the behaviour of other states. In
an anarchical system dominated by constant potential
threat, states are rationally interested in maximizing
their power in the short term to defend their interests and survival in a potentially hostile environment.
Mearsheimer does not suggest that states should pursue power and hegemony for their own sake. Rather,
the security dilemma implies that under anarchy and
inevitable uncertainty about states’ future intentions,
being as powerful as possible is the best way to survive
(Mearsheimer 1990).
Under international anarchy, the fear for survival
leads states not only to seek to increase their absolute
power, wealth, and influence, but also to increase their
advantage over other states. This is the problem of relative gains, which is a concurrent concern for realist
thinkers (Powell 1991; Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993).
More than liberals, realists focus on how the gains
from cooperation are distributed among partners: they
argue that if one state gains more than another, it will
become more powerful, and could eventually threaten
its weaker partner. Thus, improving a state’s position in
absolute terms does not necessarily entail more security (Walt 1998). Other realists, however, criticize the
distinction between ‘relative’ and ‘absolute’ gains, suggesting that states seek to gain more than their rivals in
the short term out of conviction that these advantages
will lead, in the long term, to absolute gains (Donnelly
2000: 60).
Neorealism seeks to provide an elegant, simple, and
abstract theory of the dynamics that govern the international system. Neorealists have drawn on rational
choice theory, a methodological approach that explains
social outcomes in terms of goal-seeking agents who
act under constraints, and which often stresses the
benefits of simple, generalizable, and formal theoretical models. Some neorealists have employed—to varying degrees—mathematical models, game theory, and
economics scholarship to develop theoretical knowledge about international relations (e.g. Schelling 1960;
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Keohane 1984; Oye 1986). During the cold war, rational
choice theory informed attempts to theorize strategies
of nuclear deterrence and models that could predict
the outcomes of government actions in a nuclear crisis
(Allison 1969).
constrains states’ ability to respond to foreign policy
stimuli. Finally, Type III neoclassical realists actively
challenge the assumptions and claims of structural
realism as a paradigm/theory of international relations
(Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016).
9.5.2 Neoclassical realism
9.5.3 Realism and rising powers
Neoclassical realism seeks to merge classical realism’s
emphasis on domestic institutions, leadership, and
political perceptions with neorealism’s systemic view of
international affairs (Lobell, Taliaferro, and Ripsman
2009). It is also an effort to embed classical realist concepts in the rigorous scientific methodologies of neorealism. For neoclassical realists, structure is important,
but so are the agents who are tasked with interpreting
the structural constraints of the international system.
Therefore, states do not always respond to stimuli from
the international system or act to maintain a balance of
power as realists would expect (Zakaria 1998). While
accepting the priority of the anarchic international
structure for shaping foreign policy decisions, neoclassical realists argue that the internal cohesion of the
state and society can directly and causally affect how it
behaves in the world and in ways that neorealists would
not be able to predict by looking at the structure of the
international system on its own.
Unlike neorealists, neoclassical realists emphasize
the role of poor decisions and ineffective bureaucracies
in weakening the state regardless of its material power.
Neoclassical realism draws on the work of earlier classical realists to contend that foreign policy experts
shape decision-making through their interpretation of
stimuli in the international system. Thus, neoclassical
realists recognize that decision-makers, foreign policy
institutions, and state bureaucratic structures must
manage and channel material resources to achieve
national interests (Wohlforth 1993). Yet, compared to
classical realism, neoclassical realism puts less emphasis on human nature and the pursuit of power.
Scholars have identified three types of neoclassical
realism. Type I tries to explain foreign policy anomalies that are not explained by structural realism by
combining the dynamics of internal state factors with
structural realist analysis (Rose 1998). Type II neoclassical realists (Kitchen 2010; E. Götz 2019) attempt to
explain the broader foreign policy and grand strategies of states, not just their errors. They emphasize the
structure, perceptions, and political calculations of
leaders and states, accepting that irrational behaviour
The realist perspective has appealed to many scholars trying to understand international affairs from
the perspective of non-Western states. Chinese and
Russian realists have examined the relevance of realism for explaining and guiding the foreign policy of
their countries as new rising powers and for analysing power transition in the international system (see
Box 9.5).
In China, the realism of Yan Xuetong (2020b)
embraces the fundamental tenets of classical realism,
including the balance of power, state-centrism, and the
pursuit of hegemony, to discuss the current challenges
Box 9.5 Power transition theory
Power transition theory (PTT) seeks to understand the changing structure and dynamics of hierarchy among states, and
how states compete and cooperate in the international system. In doing so, it highlights the importance of relative power
relationships. It primarily examines why and how states gain or
lose hegemony in a global or regional context.
PTT is related to—yet distinct from—realist theory. Like realism, PTT finds that power is the currency in world politics. Yet
PTT rejects the realist assumption that the international sphere
is anarchical and assumes that it is ordered hierarchically. The
theory highlights how domestic politics and inter-state relations affect how states engage in world politics by shaping
state identity, norms, and types of regimes. PTT attempts to
outline what makes certain states ‘great powers’ by analysing
their economic and military power, and their ability to influence the outcome of events (Tammen, Kugler, and Lemke
2000). By analysing both structural and dynamic features in the
international system, PTT offers a probabilistic theory that tries
to predict when war might break out among great powers and
their allies, and among smaller regional powers.
Like mainstream IR theories, PTT has implications for realworld foreign policy objectives. The current public and scholarly debate in the US about power transition between the US
and China draws on PTT to discern what US foreign policy
ought to do. Graham Allison’s (2017) work on US–China relations argues that underestimations and misinterpretations
among elites in both the US and China make war more likely,
but not inevitable. He draws on economic growth data to suggest that China is a rising power and that it aspires to displace
the United States (see Opposing Opinions 9.1).
Chapter 9 Realism
in US–China relations. Drawing on Morgenthau, he
suggests that both military capabilities and moral principles ground a state’s claim to political power in the
international realm. Rejecting the notion of a single
comprehensive ‘Chinese realism’, he advances a vision
of China as an authoritative—yet humane—world
hegemon. For Yan, transformations of the balance of
power depend not only on systemic factors, but also
on the quality and ability of political leadership (see
Opposing Opinions 9.1).
Modern Russian international theorists draw on
classical realism to highlight the importance of national
Opposing Opinions 9.1 Realist theory shows that China can become a superpower peacefully
For
Against
Economic development. In the past decades, China has developed its domestic economy and expanded its markets internationally (A. Goldstein 2005). China is now the world’s leading
manufacturing nation and is predicted to surpass the United
States as the world’s largest economy in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) by the early 2030s. China’s rise through economic growth has not been nearly as competitive or dangerous
as feared, because structural forces driving major powers into
conflict are relatively weak and allow for peaceful economic
development (Gilpin 1981). As Kirshner (2012) argues, although
American resistance to the hegemonic claims of China could lead
to a violent clash, it may be avoided with good leadership that
accommodates some of China’s economic ambitions.
Economic competition could lead to war. Mearsheimer (2001)
argues that economic capabilities could lead China to seek military and political hegemony to defend its interests. Such claims
could shake the stability of the international system if the United
States chose to deter China’s ambitions and China responds with
offensive action. Thus, economic competition could eventually
lead to a military conflict.
Ideology of ‘peaceful rise’. As suggested by Zheng Bijian in 2003,
China proposes to rise to global hegemony by assuming global
responsibilities, building good neighbourhood relations, and maintaining world peace. For some realists, this approach shows that
China is not a revisionist state but wishes to uphold the existing
status quo ( Jalil 2019). China seeks to reassure its neighbours of its
peaceful intentions by shelving territorial disputes to attain its bigger objective of global hegemony. For Schweller (2018), the unparalleled nuclear capabilities of the United States guarantee its security.
Thus, if the US leadership would be content with less global influence—which he argues to be the current trend—China’s peaceful
hegemonic claims could generate a new bipolar system.
Effective soft power. Classical realists (Morgenthau 1948) saw
diplomacy as an important means to increase political power.
Through skilful international projects such as the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative, and
‘Covid-diplomacy’ (providing medical aid and preventive equipment), China is gaining international clout in its regional sphere,
in Africa, and in Latin America. Thus, economic and aid diplomacy
provide China with important sources of hegemony (Cooley and
Nexon 2020).
The hubris/fear paradox could prevent alternative solutions. For Robert Gilpin (1981), emerging great powers who
challenge existing hegemons risk undermining the stability of the
international system. Following Carr, Gilpin suggested that revisionist states reject the power equilibrium and demand difficult
political concessions from leading states (Carr 1946; Gilpin 1981;
Kirshner 2012). Thus, China and the US find themselves trapped
in the ‘hubris/fear paradox’, in which hubris (arrogance) leads the
US to overestimate its power, and fear of appearing weak makes
diplomatic solutions difficult to achieve.
Mistrust between the US and China could lead to spirals of
tension. According to the ‘security dilemma’, under international
anarchy, mistrust between potential rivals can lead each state to
seek defensive measures that its adversary may consider as an
offensive threat. This dynamic can spark spirals of regional and
global conflict. China’s hegemonic claims in Asia may generate
tensions with its neighbours, who may perceive its growing capabilities as a threat (Christensen 1999). For Christensen (2002), the
United States could act as an intermediary in regional conflicts in
Asia to provide reassurance against conflict, but such intervention could also increase the chances of war.
1. Do you agree that economic influence can sustain China’s peaceful rise to global hegemony?
2. Why, according to Mearsheimer, could China’s growth lead to conflict?
3. How does the ‘hubris/fear’ paradox increase the chances of conflict?
Visit the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle these questions.
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Case Study 9.2 Russia’s annexation of Crimea
Extraordinary meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence with
Finland, Georgia, Sweden, Ukraine, and the European
Union
Photo courtesy of NATO
In 2013, demonstrations and civil unrest erupted in Ukraine
following pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych’s declaration that he would not sign the association agreement that
had been offered by the European Union, choosing instead to
strengthen ties with the Eurasian Economic Union led by Russia.
In February 2014, these protests culminated in a revolution,
ousting Yanukovych, and replacing the Ukrainian government
with a new pro-Western leadership. In response, Russian forces
invaded, and subsequently annexed, the Crimean peninsula.
Ukraine, like most other countries, did not recognize this annexation and considered it a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and
international law. Russia, for its part, defended the annexation as based on the principle of popular self-determination,
as established by a referendum of the people of Crimea. This
has heightened tensions between Russia and Ukraine’s Western
allies, the European Union, and the United States, which continue, culminating in the Russian invasion and occupation of
Ukraine in 2022.
What explains Russia’s decision to intervene in the Ukrainian
crisis and annex the Crimean peninsula and later invade Ukraine
as a whole? According to defensive neorealism, Russia’s actions
in Ukraine reflect its concern with the expansion of Western
military, economic, and political influence in the region. On
this view, Russia wanted to maintain the post-cold war status
quo and considered the 2008 expansion of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) as a threat to the existing balance
of power. The 2008 NATO Summit Declaration stated that the
sovereignty, security, and power in international politics. Challenging the traditional divide between domestic and international politics, these thinkers embrace a
particular ‘Russian’ realism inspired by national moral
values. Russian realists characterize their perspective
as essentially ‘defensive’, using the notion of ‘Derzhava’
to capture the aims of a strong state, protection from
alliance ‘welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership’. Additionally, the launch of the European
Union’s Eastern Partnership Programme in 2008, had it been
signed by Yanukovych, would have meant the further integration of Ukraine into the European economy. Finally, Russia has
been concerned with the US government’s sponsorship of proWestern individuals and organizations in Ukraine. Thus, some
argue that Russia’s occupation of Crimea and then invasion of
Ukraine reflected concerns about its security following Western
attempts to alter the stable balance of power (Mearsheimer
2014b; Chotiner 2022).
Offensive neorealism offers an alternative interpretation of
the Crimea annexation, which sees Russia as a revisionist power
that aims to become hegemonic and overturn the post-cold
war status quo. Uncertain of the West’s intentions, Russia, as a
regional power, rationally chose to act aggressively and establish
dominance over Ukraine. For some scholars, both Russia and the
US are revisionist powers engaged in an ‘offensive-realist spiral’
of mutual aggression (Sushentsov and Wohlforth 2020). Russia’s
strategic interests require it to deny the use of neighbouring
states as military staging areas by competing powers, secure lines
of communication and transport, and maintain access to geographically important locations near its border (E. Götz 2016).
Russia’s actions in Ukraine, therefore, were in line with its actions
in Moldova and Georgia, which preceded the NATO expansion.
Neoclassical realism emphasizes the relationship between
Russia’s place in the international system and domestic and ideational factors. Russia interpreted the influence of the European
Union and NATO on Ukrainian politics as a threat, due to domestic concerns about instability and foreign intervention, amplified
by the authoritarian character of Vladimir Putin’s government.
In addition, nationalist sentiment in Russia amplified the threat,
given Ukraine’s historical and cultural significance to Russian
national identity and the ‘natural unity’ between the two countries. Given its self-perception as a major actor in world politics,
Russia seeks to overcome the humiliation of the collapse of the
Soviet Union, which Putin called ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century’ (BBC 2005).
Question 1: Can Russia’s actions in Ukraine be explained solely by
the structure of the international system?
Question 2: Do you agree that the Russian annexation of Crimea
was a defensive war?
foreign threats, and defence of national values. Often,
these thinkers perceive Russia’s historical position
in the international system as peripheral and vulnerable, thus prompting an embrace of a politics of
power equilibrium aimed at transforming the international status quo (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2021)
(see Case Study 9.2).
Chapter 9 Realism
Key Points
can be helpfully seen as a family of views, sharing
realism seeks to address discrepancies in
• Realism
• Neoclassical
key ideas but differing in the emphasis on, and interpretation
neorealist theory by embedding a broad range of unit- and
of, these ideas.
classical realists who focused on human nature as the
• Unlike
cause of international conflict, neorealists point to the
anarchical structure of the international system as the major
determinant of great power war.
neorealists, like Waltz, argue that international
• Defensive
anarchy pushes states to secure a balance of power, which
sometimes demands internal state reforms. Conversely,
offensive neorealists, like Mearsheimer, argue that states’
self-interest drives them to maximize their power and seek
hegemony as the only means to security.
subunit-level explanations of foreign policy decisions.
Neoclassical realists seek to show that leader preferences,
ideology, domestic politics, and perceptions are constraints
on states’ response to stimuli from the international system.
on classical realism and Morgenthau’s views,
• Drawing
Chinese scholar Yan Xuetong advances an idea of China as a
world hegemon reliant on both military power and moral
authority. Russian realists embrace a politics of power
equilibrium aimed at fostering national sovereignty and
security.
9.6 Conclusion
The realist approach to international theory emerged
in a specific historical context. During the 1940s,
American and British thinkers sought to respond to
the supposed failure of international organizations to
prevent the Second World War. With its emphasis on
the inevitability of conflict and the eternal pursuit of
power, realism seemed to provide a persuasive account
of state action in the international domain. This chapter has shown that, despite its relatively recent origins,
realist thinkers have claimed a longer legacy for this
approach that places state power, anarchy, and selfinterest at the heart of political behaviour. Drawing
on the writings of past political thinkers who engaged
with similar topics, realists tend to see continuities as
more important than change in international relations.
One question for consideration is whether theorizing
conflict from a realist perspective serves not only to
maintain the international status quo but also to offer
alternative visions of radical change, whether linked to
postcolonial liberation or to global governance.
Realism continues to be a major theoretical approach
to international relations that includes a range of
perspectives on politics beyond the state. Various interpretations of realism share common tenets, such as
an emphasis on a pessimistic view of human nature,
conflict, power, statism, survival, and self-help. While
realists do not reject morality as such, they offer an
alternative ethics in international politics which aims
to guarantee the security and survival of the state.
Although, for some, globalization’s promise of prosperity, peace, and unity and its fundamental assumption
of global interconnectedness were seen as the end of realist politics, realist thinkers have adapted their theories
to current global political conditions. Realists therefore
argue that the process of globalization has not abolished
the political importance of states, in either theory or
practice. States continue to be the main actors in international relations. Unlike liberals, who typically see the
global dissolution of national boundaries and increased
cultural uniformity as a promise of peace and harmony,
many realists diagnose an increased international vulnerability. Realism recognizes the challenges of conflict,
competition, and violence in contemporary politics, and
offers a vision of careful and responsible political action.
Questions
1. What is the principle of the ‘balance of power’?
2. Do you agree with the conception of human nature in the realist approach to IR?
3. Do you think there is one realism, or many?
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or rosenboim
4. How would a realist analyse the global political response to the Covid-19 pandemic?
5. How would a neorealist describe the international role of the United Nations?
6. What is the role of violence in realist international theory?
7. How does realism explain international cooperation?
8. What is Machiavelli’s view on the role of morality in politics?
9. What is the influence of mistrust on security?
10. According to neorealism, should states be more concerned with relative or absolute gains,
and why?
Visit the online resources to test your understanding by trying the self-test questions.
Further Reading
Carr, E. H. (2016 [1939]), The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
A classical realist argument about the importance of power to international politics.
Henderson, E. (2015), African Realism?: International Relations Theory and Africa’s Wars in the
Postcolonial Era (London: Rowman & Littlefield). An analysis of realist international theory from
the vantage point of Africa.
Mearsheimer, J. (2001 [1992]), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton).
A major account of offensive realism.
Morgenthau, H. J. (1955 [1948]), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf). Presents an influential realist interpretation of power politics.
Tate, M. (1942), The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907
(London: Macmillan). A critical appreciation of the difficulties of disarmament in international
relations.
Waltz, K. (1979), Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley). The foundational
work on structural realism.
Williams, M. C. (2004), The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press). A re-examination of key thinkers in the realist tradition.
Yan, X. (2020), Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
A contemporary realist international theory from a Chinese perspective.
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
Chapter 10
Feminism
helen m. kinsell a
Framing Questions
●
Are feminist International Relations theories necessary for understanding international
politics?
●
What do feminist International Relations theories provide for understanding
international politics?
●
How have feminist International Relations theories influenced the practice of
international politics?
Reader’s Guide
Feminist international relations theories are diverse,
proliferating, and transforming the field and practice of international politics; in different forms,
they have been part of the field of International
Relations since its inception ( Ashworth 2014). This
chapter introduces the reader to international
feminism, highlighting the gains made during the
United Nations Decade for Women (1975–85) in
collecting information about, and data on, women’s
experiences, roles, and status globally. Feminist
International Relations theories that emerged
soon after the decade’s end drew from varieties of
feminism and the wealth of knowledge developed
during that time to critique the exclusion of women
and gender from the discipline of International
Relations, and the erasure of female scholars of
international relations (Owens 2018). This chapter
defines liberal, critical, postcolonial, and poststructural international feminist theories and illustrates
the purchase they provide on issues such as global
governance, war and violence, and international
political economy.
Visit the online resources to access an
interactive timeline of how the discipline of
International Relations has evolved.
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helen m. kinsella
10.1 Introduction
The end of the cold war and the emergence of new theoretical debates set the broader context for the revitalization of feminist theories of international relations.
These two events, one global and the other disciplinary, together reduced the credibility of the dominant
approaches in the discipline of International Relations
in two ways. Both the unexpected political alteration
in the international system and the introduction of
influential new actors in world politics—such as international networks, non-state actors, and users of social
media—required new forms of understanding and new
methods of research. Additionally, in the social sciences, explanatory theory (which holds that the world is
external to and unaffected by theories of it) was rapidly
losing credence because identity and cultural politics
challenged its ontology (ways of being), epistemology
(ways of knowing), and methodology (ways of studying) (see Ch. 1). Instead, what is often called constitutive theory (which holds that the world is intrinsic to
and affected by theories about it) was deemed the better
choice, because it eschews ahistorical and transcendental explanation. It also allows for the study of language,
identity, and difference—all of which seemed necessary for understanding the complexity of world politics
in which struggles over social identities and cultural
meanings are inextricable from demands for reforms
in institutions and law.
Feminist International Relations theories are constitutive, interdisciplinary theories, and the only ones
in the field of International Relations that consistently
prioritize the study of women and/or engage in significant debates over the meaning of gender (see Box 10.1).
The meaning(s) of gender is (are) contested in feminist
theories and in feminist International Relations theories. For now, we can start with Terrell Carver’s (1996)
Box 10.1 The social construction of gender
‘Throwing like a girl’ is one way in which we can understand
social construction—having female sex characteristics is presumed to define the innate capacity to throw a ball. And yet
we know that access to sports and training opportunities, and
expectations and encouragement to do so, have nothing to do
with biological sex. Instead, they have everything to do with
social order and expectations. Therefore ‘throwing like a girl’
is neither natural nor accidental. Moreover, the very statement
is laden with judgement as to the worth of such a throw. To
throw ‘like’ a girl is an insult. To throw like a girl is to be lesser in
relation to throwing like a boy—supposedly its only and natural
opposite.
According to feminist theorists, these binary oppositions—
in which the primary and superior one (i.e. man) defines the
desired norm (i.e. masculinity) and the secondary inferior one
(i.e. woman) functions as the failure of the norm (i.e. femininity)—structure most social, political, and economic meanings.
The opposition is not simply symmetrical but is also hierarchical. In other words, what we associate with masculinity is
encoded as privileged and positive, while what we associate
with femininity is encoded as subordinate and negative. This
encoding ‘de-valorizes not only women, but also racially,
culturally, or economically marginalized men’ (Peterson
2003: 14). For example, to be rational, autonomous, and
independent is associated with men and masculinity, while
to be irrational, relational, and dependent is associated with
femininity. Feminists argue that these hierarchical binaries
function as ahistorical and fixed, and they are presumed to
be self-evident and universal. This constrains understanding
of the construction of differences, which cannot be reduced to
the simple opposition of men versus women, because these
binaries are falsely taken to explain differences.
statement that ‘gender is not a synonym for women’.
Although more will be said on definitions of gender
(see Ch. 17), it is fair to say that at the start of feminist
International Relations theorizing, gender was understood to be primarily about social construction of biological sex differences.
10.2 What is feminism?
An introduction to feminist International Relations
theories must begin with a working definition of
f­ eminism. There is no single definition of feminism,
just as there is no single definition of liberalism or
Marxism. Notwithstanding this, it would be correct
to say that feminism is fundamentally rooted in an
analysis of the global subordination of women—which
can occur economically, politically, physically, and
socially—and is dedicated to its elimination. Feminism
promotes equality and justice for all women, so that
women’s expectations and opportunities in life are not
unfairly curtailed solely on the basis of being a woman.
Consequently, feminism is also an analysis of power
and its effects.
Feminism has contributed to the development of
new methods of research and forms of knowledge.
Chapter 10 Feminism
Making women’s diverse experiences, roles, and status
visible required that feminists re-examine and rewrite
histories which either excluded women altogether or
treated them as incidental, and that they reformulate
basic concepts to address their gendered definitions.
For example, feminist historians re-conceptualized
conceptions of power to demonstrate how women
exercised indirect, personal, or private forms of power
when denied the opportunity to exercise power directly,
socially, or publicly. In doing so, feminists have tried to
understand what women are saying and doing, rather
than relying on what men are saying about, and doing
to, women. This effort had the effect of denaturalizing
women’s experience, roles, and status as simply given
by their biological sex, instead exposing the ways in
which social, political, economic, and cultural relations constructed interpretations of women’s identities,
experiences, status, and worth.
Feminism informs both theories and vibrant social
movements, making the interplay among theorists,
practitioners, policies, and practice a vital part of its
definition and generating an evolving sense of what
it means to be a feminist or to practise feminism.
Consequently, definitions of feminism have changed
over time, reflecting changes in both social contexts and
understandings of the situation and status of women.
Issues of race, imperialism, and sexuality emerged in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, as they had in earlier
decades of women’s international thought—e.g. the
early twentieth-century writings of Rosa Luxemburg,
Emma Goldman, and Merze Tate bring this into particularly sharp focus, and they continue to inflect feminist
theories and feminist movements today (see Chs 11, 17,
and 18).
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, both Global
South and Global North feminisms struggled to
accept and incorporate the experiences of lesbian/
bisexual women into their analyses of subordination
and into their movements for liberation, while women
of colour (in both the Global North and South) challenged white women (in both the Global North and
South) to confront their racism and their privileging
of white experiences as a template for feminist action.
Although it may be harder to imagine now, lesbian/
bisexual women were explicitly and implicitly asked to
hide their sexuality for fear that it would jeopardize the
credibility of the feminist movement. Cast as ‘abnormal’ and ‘deviant’, lesbian/bisexual women confronted
the homophobia of the feminist movement and questioned its claim to universal ‘sisterhood’. Transwomen
have been forced to do the same, confronting the
exclusionary elements of feminist thought and holding feminism accountable to its claim of an inclusive,
intersectional politics. Barbara Smith, an influential
political activist and a founder of the powerful Black
feminist Combahee River Collective (see Box 10.2),
wrote in the 1990s: ‘Feminism is the political theory
and practice that struggles to free all women: women
of colour, working-class women, poor women, disabled
women, lesbians, old women, as well as white, economically privileged heterosexual women. Anything
less than this vision of total freedom is not feminism’
(B. Smith 1998: 96). Twenty-one years later, she notes,
‘gaining rights for some while ignoring the violation
and suffering of others does not lead to justice. At best
it results in privilege’ (B. Smith 2019).
Similarly, women from the Global South argued
that ‘feminism as appropriated and defined by the west
has too often become a tool of cultural imperialism’.
In the words of Madhu Kishwar, a pioneering Indian
scholar and activist, ‘the definitions, the terminology,
the assumptions . . . even the issues are exported west
to east . . . and we are expected to be the echo of what
are assumed to be the more advanced movements of the
west’ (Kishwar 1990: 3). These critiques challenged the
presumptions of particular Western, European feminisms that perjured, rejected, or colonized indigenous
forms of feminism, and ignored the legacies of imperialism and exploitation. Many women from the Global
South were loath to define themselves as feminist. The
great Nigerian novelist Buchi Emecheta explained it this
way: ‘I do believe in the African type of feminism. They
call it womanism because, you see, Europeans don’t
worry about water . . . you are so well off’ (Emecheta
Box 10.2 The Combahee River Collective
Statement (United States, 1977)
We are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual,
heterosexual, and class oppression . . . [because the] synthesis
of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives . . .
As Black women we see Black feminism as the logical political
movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face . . . We realize that the
liberation of all oppressed peoples necessitates the destruction
of the political-economic system of capitalism and imperialism
as well as patriarchy . . . If Black women were free, it would
mean that everyone else would have to be free since our freedom would necessitate the destruction of all the systems of
oppression.
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1990). The words of Kishwar and Emecheta also highlight the disconnect that many women from the Global
South felt about the agendas of Global North feminism.
Who decides on the priorities of a feminist agenda? Is
there just one? Who shares in it? One answer is found
in the Women’s Manifesto for Ghana (2016 [2004])
which identified a ‘set of demands for the achievement
of gender equality and equity and sustainable national
development’, drawn from the experiences of African
feminists.
It is difficult to convey the depth and intensity of
these earlier debates among women and the intensity
and nuance they expressed. Yet these tensions and
debates informed the evolution of feminism and feminist movements as—in a process not yet ended nor fully
successful—each strove for a more integrative understanding of women’s experiences and status and, in
particular, strove to gain purchase on the ways in which
they intersected with other elements of identity—such
as race, sexuality, class, geographical location, and age.
To understand women’s experiences, status, and roles,
the differences among women, as well their similarities,
had to be at the forefront of any organizing. Thus, feminism is not only about asking, in the words of feminist
International Relations theorist Cynthia Enloe, ‘where
are the women?’, but also ensuring that her question is
nuanced to ask which women are where?
It was not until the 1970s that we were even able to
begin to answer these questions, for until then we lacked
the information to do so. The International Women’s
Year conference of 1975, held in Mexico City, was the
most visible origin of women’s global organizing for the
twentieth century. As a result, in 1975 the United Nations
formally designated 1976–85 as the United Nations
Decade for Women. This was pivotal because it encouraged and legitimized research and action on the experiences, roles, and status of women globally, highlighting
not only the stark absence of attention to women, but
also the magnitude of women’s contributions. Research
on women’s lives and opportunities signalled the validity and importance of women’s issues. If at the start of
the Decade for Women ‘study after study revealed the
lack of statistical data and information about women’,
by its end this was less true (Fraser 1987: 21). It was during this decade that the United Nations Development
Fund for Women (now known as UN Women) and
the International Research and Training Institute for
the Advancement of Women (INstraw) were founded,
and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) entered into force. Think about that: it was
only about 50 years ago that the international community accepted—and somewhat grudgingly at that—that
knowledge and understanding of women’s experiences,
status, contributions, and concerns were worth pursuing. The knowledge subsequently gained was groundbreaking, revelatory, and revolutionary.
For instance, Ester Boserup’s book Women’s Role
in Economic Development, published in 1970, challenged conventional economic and social development
programmes by proving that women were essential to
productive—as well as reproductive—processes and
to developing nations’ economic and social progress.
This led to an entirely new development agenda at the
United Nations, ‘Women in Development’. Until that
time, international and national actors and organizations did not recognize or support women’s essential economic roles, productive and/or reproductive.
Moreover, the waged and unwaged work of women was
seen as incidental to the overall progress and development of the state. Most significantly, the work undertaken during this decade exposed the fundamental
inequalities of women’s status and experience, both
globally and domestically. To be clear, it was not that
there were no international movements or organizations dedicated to increasing the opportunities and status of women before this time (for example, see Case
Study 10.1). Rather, it was because the United Nations
Decade for Women was the first extended period of
time when the United Nations and its member states
were forced to grapple with the experiences, status, and
roles of women globally, as a direct result of lobbying by
women, and ultimately to take responsibility for alleviating the subordination of women.
International Women’s Day 2016 march held in downtown
Toronto
© WENN Rights Ltd / Alamy Stock Photo
Chapter 10 Feminism
Case Study 10.1 Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom
An Italian peacekeeper paints on a wall of the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) headquarters
during the International Day of Peace in the southern
Lebanese town of Naqura
© MAHMOUD ZAYYAT / Stringer / Getty Images
The Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom
(WILPF) is the oldest formal women’s international peace organization in the world. It began in 1915 at an international gathering
of women who had come together during the First World War
endeavouring to end that war and all wars. In the decades since,
WILPF has been a strong and vocal actor in pursuing world peace
through economic and social justice, women’s rights, and disarmament. From its inception, WILPF articulated the necessity of
including women, and women’s experiences, in all elements of
international and domestic politics. One of its first efforts was to
ensure that the mandate of the League of Nations addressed the
participation and status of women in international politics, and
that the League undertook an inquiry into the legal, social, and
economic status of women—the first of its kind.
Throughout its history, WILPF has been forced to deal with
many of the divisive issues caused by its original membership and
Thus, we can argue that women suffer global subordination because we now know, through data collected
over several decades, that neither states nor households
distribute resources and opportunities equally between
men and women. Consider some relevant statistics.
Globally, women earn 19 per cent less than men, and
while it was previously estimated it would take 257
years to close the global gender pay gap, the impact of
Covid-19 added decades to that estimate (ILO 2018,
2022; UN Women 2020a).
In the United States, women make approximately 82
cents for every dollar that men make. When this figure is broken down in terms of race, African American
women earn 62 cents for every dollar that white men
make, Native American women 57 cents, and Latinas
organization as Western, primarily European, affluent women.
However, as historian of its work Catia Cecilia Confortini writes,
even if WILPF was not founded as a self-consciously radical
organization, it evolved into ‘a leading critic of militarism, racism,
sexism, environmental destruction, and unfettered capitalism,
emphasizing the connection between all forms of oppression
and exclusion’ (Confortini 2012: 8). One of its recent notable successes has been its leadership (through its spin-off PeaceWomen)
in monitoring the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda.
The WPS agenda is the result of the concerted effort of feminist
organizations and civil society to educate the United Nations and
other international and national actors and organizations as to
the necessity of the equal and full involvement of women in all
processes of peace and security. Since the adoption of the historic
resolution SC 1325 in 2000, the first ever Security Council resolution to directly address the role of gender in conflict, nine more
resolutions have advanced and detailed the ways in which gender, understood as one axis of difference, matters in understanding and resolving conflict. Although these resolutions have been
widely hailed, there is a significant gap between aspirations and
actual support, and implementation is plagued by a lack of political will and economic commitment by member states. Moreover,
as women’s rights become more contested globally, due in part to
the rise of far-right and authoritarian governments, efforts have
been made to weaken the WPS agenda and undermine progress.
For example, SC 2467 (2019), which sought to further address
sexual violence in armed conflict, was only adopted after explicit
references to women’s rights to sexual and reproductive health
were omitted (Aoláin 2019).
Question 1: WILPF’s trajectory has changed over its decades of
activism; what might have influenced this change?
Question 2: The WPS agenda has only taken root in the United
Nations since 2000; what changes in international politics contributed to its introduction?
only 54 cents. Worldwide, women do three times as
much unpaid and care work as men, which directly
impacts their capacity to engage in waged work.
Further, 40 per cent of global economies have genderspecific job restrictions which impede women’s ability
to earn an income outside of the home (World Bank
2021b). In 2020 only 26 women were heads of state,
while violence against women human rights defenders
and women in politics has increased with the rise in
authoritarian governments (UN Women 2020a; Kishi
2021). Gathering statistics such as these was and is crucial to feminist knowledge, politics, and practice. Thus
in 2011, due to feminist organizations’ work and lobbying, the United Nations recommitted itself to researching and collecting accurate statistics on women. This
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helen m. kinsella
commitment is all the more crucial considering the
regressive gendered and racialized impact Covid-19 has
had on equality and equity, and the particular burden
borne by women of colour globally (Oxfam 2021b).
The United Nations Decade for Women sparked an
outpouring of resources and information through the
work of women’s organizations, networks, and gatherings, as well as the flourishing of research and analysis
on women’s experiences, roles, and status. It could no
longer be said that women did not matter to the study
of international relations, or that feminists had no
claim on influencing and explaining the events of international politics. And yet the discipline of International
Relations was silent. It was in this context that feminist International Relations theorists began to make
their mark on the discipline of International Relations.
Importantly, the revitalization of feminism and of attention to women in international politics that occurred
during the United Nations Decade for Women does not
mean that forms of feminism or active women scholars were utterly absent prior to this. As International
Relations scholars have demonstrated, the histories of
feminist international relations and of women scholars
were erased after the Second World War (Ashworth
2011; Owens 2018). Thus, the UN Decade for Women
marked a revitalization of feminism and recognition of
female scholars of international relations.
Key Points
• Feminism has no single definition.
is concerned with equality, justice, and the
• Feminism
elimination of women’s subordination and oppression.
and feminist movements struggle with issues of
• Feminism
inclusion and exclusion, specifically regarding race,
sexuality, class, and geographic location. By asking not only
‘where are the women?’, but also ‘which women are
where?’, feminism and feminist movements work towards
overcoming exclusions.
feminism and feminist movements, women’s
• Without
experiences and roles would have remained of little
importance or interest to states.
and feminist movements have succeeded in
• Feminism
radically changing the understanding of international
organizations and states regarding women’s significance
for, and contribution to, international politics.
10.3 What is feminist International Relations theory?
Feminist International Relations theories that emerged
in the late 1980s arose from a disciplinary dissatisfaction with the conventional and dominant theories and
methods of International Relations. Feminist scholars had no interest in advocating or defending any
particular dominant approach. Rather, the positivist,
rationalist theories of realism/neorealism and liberalism/neoliberalism were seen as restricting the pursuit
of knowledge about international politics writ large, as
well as excluding different post-positivist approaches to
international politics, such as interpretive, ideational,
or sociological approaches (see Chs 7, 9, and 13).
Feminist International Relations scholars pointed out
that neither the positivist nor post-positivist approaches
paid particular attention to women, much less to gender. To remedy this, feminist International Relations
scholars were intent on identifying and explaining how
the essential theories, concepts, and case studies of
International Relations were, at the very least, partial,
biased, and limited because they reflected only (certain) men’s experiences, roles, and status. As Charlotte
Hooper explains, feminist scholars made obvious how
‘the range of subjects studied, the boundaries of the
discipline, its central concerns and motifs, the content
of empirical research, the assumptions of theoretical
models, and the corresponding lack of female practitioners both in academic and elite political and economic
circles all combine and reinforce each other to marginalize and often make invisible women’s roles and
women’s concerns in the international arena’ (Hooper
2001: 1).
While feminist International Relations theorists
first advocated, at a minimum, for including women in
the study of international politics, it was with the full
recognition that to do so was not simply to expand the
scope of the field, but also to radically alter its predicates. The study of women would not only introduce
a new subject, it would also demand a critical analysis
of the presuppositions and presumptions of the existing discipline. V. Spike Peterson (1992) describes these
initial efforts as simultaneously deconstructive, in their
critique of the state of the field, and reconstructive, in
introducing new methods and theories for understanding international politics.
One of the most obvious examples of feminist
International Relations theorists’ deconstructive and
Chapter 10 Feminism
reconstructive work is their analysis of the concept and
practice of the state. Women have long been absent from,
or sorely underrepresented in, institutions of state and
global governance. Representation of women is one of
the ways that the United Nations measures the degree
of inequality within and across states (see the United
Nations Development Programme Gender Inequality
Index). The absence of women and/or low numbers of
women in positions of government indicates a state that
is gender unequal. Gender unequal means that not only
are women underrepresented empirically, they are also
neglected conceptually as their particular experiences
and skills are not integrated into the practice of government. In addition, women are denied the social and
political, and sometimes economic, power imparted
by these positions. Once this was empirically demonstrated, feminist International Relations scholars queried: why and how had this occurred? And why had the
discipline, through liberalism or realism and its derivatives, not previously addressed these questions? One of
multiple, complex answers pivoted on the very concept
of the state itself: how it had been theorized and defined
historically and politically.
Drawing on feminist work in history, anthropology,
and political theory, international feminist theorists
demonstrated how the concept and practices of the
state in its emergence, and even as it changed over time,
consistently excluded women from full participation. In
addition, feminist International Relations scholars critiqued the discipline’s uncritical reliance on such texts
and scholars as Hobbes’s Leviathan and Machiavelli’s
The Prince in articulating its basic precepts. Most immediately, as feminist philosophers and theorists made
clear, these authors wrote at a time and in a context in
which women lacked full legal status and were considered the property of a male guardian. Women were relegated to ancillary, privatized, and apolitical roles that
undermined their economic and social stature and centralized male control. Broadly speaking, this relegation
was justified through recourse to arguments that held
that women were to be protected from politics due to
their innate weakness and emotionality, rooted in their
reproductive capacity. Feminist political theorists agree
‘the tradition of Western political thought rests on a
conception of “politics” that is constructed through
the exclusion of women and all that is represented by
femininity and women’s bodies’ (Shanley and Pateman
2007: 3). Feminist theorists demonstrated that this tradition of thought, to which conventional International
Relations scholars turn, was fundamentally predicated
on the absence and insignificance of women, as well as
highly constructed interpretations of women’s character and, essentially, reproductive heterosexuality.
In fact, as Carol Pateman underscores, according
to Hobbes, the subordination of women through heterosexual marriage is a necessary step in the establishment of civil society and eventually the state. She
writes ‘through the civil institution of marriage men
can lawfully obtain the familiar “helpmeet” and gain
the sexual and domestic services of a wife, whose permanent servitude is guaranteed by the law and sword’
(Pateman 2007: 67). Thus, the state regulated that men
were rulers and women were to be ruled through a constant state of legal and social violence. Consequently,
the state could not be said to be a neutral concept or
institution, but is a ‘main organizer of the power relations of gender’ in both its formal expression and
effects (Peterson 1992: 9).
Evidence of this organization of the power relations
of gender emerges through an examination of how gender affects the beliefs about, and the institutions and
actions of, soldiering and the military. Feminist scholars study how beliefs about masculinity and the roles
men are expected to play as protectors of women and
as rulers of the state directly impact conceptions of soldiers as male and militaries as masculine. Expectations
and beliefs about masculinity are constitutive with
expectations and beliefs about soldiers, such that states
institutionalize militaries to reflect and consolidate
men as soldiers, in part by excluding women from
combat as incapable. As Megan MacKenzie demonstrates through her research in Sierra Leone and the
United States, holding to this premise requires that we
ignore the history and evidence of women’s participation in combat. She argues that women’s forceful exclusion from the military simply reaffirms male prowess
in combat and persists ‘primarily because of myths
and stereotypes associated with female and male capabilities and the military’s “band of brothers” culture’
(MacKenzie 2015: 1). As Aaron Belkin points out, this
construction of masculinity through the military also
has repercussions on men who are not, in effect, soldiers in the band of brothers. These men must justify
and defend their own manifestations of masculinity.
Soldiers ‘attain masculine status by showing that they
are not-feminine, not-weak, not-queer, not-emotional’
(Belkin 2012: 4). In this way, masculinity is dissociated from some men and is no longer their property by
birth, and the fixed binary distinction of men (protectors/rulers) and women (protected/ruled) is shown to
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be constructed through the interaction of beliefs, institutions, and politics, which in turn informs and reflects
gendered states. Now, the inclusion of women and the
relaxation of the norms and requirement of heterosexuality in many state militaries points to the possibility of
new configurations of the relationship among military,
state, and gender.
The simple empirical question initially posed—
where are the women?—led to a re-examination of the
historical, conceptual question of the state’s formation
and emergence. This, in turn, prompted investigation of
the effects of the state’s historical and conceptual evolution, which ultimately helped to explain the absence
of women in state governance and the fundamental
gendering of the state. The regulation of social and
political relations that ground the state (marriage and
the subordination of women) and structure the state
(military) are fundamentally relations of power which
take women and gender as central to their operation.
This analysis also suggests that International Relations
scholars’ theorizing about state and militaries must
deconstruct any facile notions of protector/protected as
a natural relationship. Such a conception is decidedly
not natural but legislated; and its effects lead to, for
example, the erasure of violence done in the name of
protection and violence wielded by women, as well as,
as post-colonial feminist scholars detail, the intersection of gender and race in state formation and schemas
of protection (Kapur 2018).
Key Points
International Relations theories are
• Feminist
deconstructive and reconstructive.
to the late 1980s, International Relations theories did
• Prior
not consider the role of gender or of women.
International Relations theories introduced the
• Feminist
study of gender and of women, and prompted a critical
analysis of the existing discipline and its fundamental
concepts, such as states and power, as defined by realism,
liberalism, and their derivatives.
is not a synonym for women, but includes both
• Gender
men and women in its purview.
International Relations theories conceptualize the
• Feminist
state as a gendered organization of power.
10.4 Gender and power
Among scholars of gender, how gender and power are
defined and understood to be related varies according
to the conceptualization of gender itself. Birgit Locher
and Elisabeth Prügl (2001) distinguish the use of gender in at least three ways, each of which has implications for understandings of power. As they note, some
scholars treat gender as an empirical variable that
explains social, political, and economic inequalities,
whereby gender is understood as the biological (sex)
difference between men and women. Power, then, rests
in social, political, and economic hierarchies. This is
the approach of liberal feminist international relations. Others identify gender as a social construct that
exists in social practices, identities, and institutions.
Gender becomes the social interpretation of biological (sex) differences, and power rests in the practices,
identities, and institutions that interpret and fix those
differences. This is the approach of critical feminist
international relations. Finally, some argue that gender is an effect of discourses of power. In this reading, gender is neither biological difference, nor is it
the social interpretation of biological difference, but is
itself constitutive of that difference. This understanding of gender identifies it as ‘code’ for the operation
of power, and gender becomes an analytical category
that is not necessarily linked to male and female bodies. This understanding of gender requires thinking of
gender as a useful analytic even if male and female
bodies are absent. This is the approach of poststructural feminist international relations (see Ch. 12).
Postcolonial feminism is defined less by its theorization of gender, as it encompasses at least two of the
approaches—critical and poststructural—in its scope
(see Ch. 11).
Considering these differences in interpreting gender, it is logical that gender scholars rely on a diverse
range of methodological approaches that examine
institutions, agents, discourses, and symbols in the
production and reproduction of gender in international politics. And, although this chapter discusses
four types of feminist International Relations theories,
this is an analytic separation for ease of explanation; it
does not mean that there are only four, or indeed that
these four are wholly conceptually distinct.
Chapter 10 Feminism
Key Points
definitions of power and of gender are linked in feminist
definitions of power and of gender influence the kinds of
• The
• The
International Relations theory.
methods and analysis undertaken.
• There is more than one definition of power and of gender.
10.5 Four feminist International Relations theories
10.5.1 Liberal feminist international
relations
Liberal feminism challenges the content of International
Relations, but it does not challenge its fundamental epistemological assumptions (see Ch. 7). Liberal feminist
International Relations theorists advocate that the rights
and representation conventionally granted to men be
extended to women. To correct gender inequality, liberal
feminists focus on changing institutions, in particular
increasing the representation of women in positions of
power in the primary institutions of national and international governance. They also highlight the need to
change laws to allow for women’s participation, which
they believe will also correct the distribution of power
between the sexes. A recent global initiative to achieve
gender parity in international tribunals and monitoring
bodies exemplifies this approach. Noting that lack of
gender parity has ‘serious consequences for international
and national justice . . . [and] the u
­ nder-representation
of women in these spaces affects democracies and the
guarantee of people’s rights’, Gqual was founded in 2015
to advocate for change (Gqual n.d.).
According to liberal feminist International Relations
theorists, gender inequality is a major barrier to human
development and leads to greater incidences of war and
violence. In their book, Hudson et al. (2012) maintain
that gender inequality, by which they mean the subordination of women, is itself a form of violence. Through
a collation of quantitative data (available at http://www.
womanstats.org/), the authors argue that the higher
the domestic index of social, political, and economic
inequality between men and women in a state, the more
likely it is that force and violence will be used to settle
disputes both within and among states. They contend:
‘the fate of nations is tied to the status of women’. Mary
Caprioli (2004) similarly claims that gender inequality makes conflict both within and among states more
likely. For these authors, systemic gender inequality
and discrimination against women are the root causes
of violence.
These are fascinating studies and are well received
by policy-makers and the discipline of International
Relations. They also raise important questions regarding
what exactly is the mechanism by which gender inequality increases risks of violence. Is it, as Hudson et al. (2012)
and Hudson and den Boer (2004) suggest, rooted in male
sexuality (and a surplus male population) and the evolutionary heterosexual reproductive practices? Caprioli
cautions that ‘rather than focusing on the genesis of, or
justification for differences between the sexes, the more
important question should concentrate on how those differences are used to create a society primed for violence’
(Caprioli 2005: 161). Other feminists comment that these
scholars do not make clear why both questions cannot
be investigated simultaneously. They suggest that a more
comprehensive approach addresses questions regarding the genesis, justification, and use of the differences
between the sexes, rather than presuming that we know
in advance what these differences are and that accepting
them is the necessary starting point.
10.5.2 Critical feminist international
relations
Critical feminists question liberal feminisms for relying
too faithfully on the neutrality of their methods, and for
their vision of power as a positive social good that can be
successfully redistributed without fundamental social
change. Many of these feminists highlight the broader
social, economic, and political relationships that structure relational power, and they often draw from Marxist
theories to prioritize the role of the economy, specifically
critiquing the dominance of capitalism as the desired
mode of exchange. Critical international relations feminists, drawing on socialist ideas, pay particular attention
to the unequal diffusion of global capital accumulation.
As Iris Young puts it, ‘women’s oppression arises from
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two distinct and relatively autonomous systems. The system of male domination, most often called “patriarchy”,
produces the specific gender oppression of women; the
system of the mode of production and class relations
produces the class oppression and work alienation of
most women’ (I. Young 1990: 21). Therefore, drawing
from both Marxist and socialist thought, critical feminist scholars identify gender and class oppressions as
interdependent and intertwined (see Ch. 8). Scholars
including Sandra Whitworth (1994) and Elisabeth Prügl
(1999, 2017), studying international institutions such
as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the
International Planned Parenthood Federation, and the
World Bank, demonstrate how gender is produced and
reproduced through the institutionalization of divisions
of ‘paid’ and ‘unpaid’ labour. V. Spike Peterson’s innovation of ‘triad analytics’ broadens the view of institutions
and economies by analysing globalization through the
intersection of reproductive, productive, and ­virtual economics on which the global economy rests. In her analysis, Peterson draws attention to the ‘explosive growth in
financial markets that shape business ­decision-making
and flexible work arrangements’ and the ‘dramatic
growth in informal and flexible work arrangements
that shapes income generation and family well being’
(Peterson 2003: 1). The devaluation of women’s work;
the still extant differential valuing of reproductive and
productive work; the ‘double burden’ of household
labour and waged labour that women carry disproportionately; and the massive global shifts in the structure
of work itself all influence the worldwide feminization
and racialization of poverty. Indeed, these factors help to
explain why, worldwide, women and especially women
of colour were those who were most hard hit economically by Covid-19 (UN Women 2020b, 2021a).
Like postcolonial feminist theories, these critical
feminist theories are wary of gender essentialism,
which is the assumption of the sameness of all women’s
experiences by virtue of being female. They critique
the normalization of white, affluent women’s experiences as universal and instead highlight the dynamic
and intersectional facets of identity, of which gender
and sex are but two elements. Like postcolonial feminist theorists, critical feminist theorists also emphasize
the tight link between feminist theorizing and feminist
actions, in part due to their recognition that the marginalized, exploited, and colonized have much to teach
about the violent practices of global politics in particular locations. Maria Stern (2005) illuminates how the
violence of war affects the intimacies of self and family.
Stern questions why the experiences of Mayan women
are not considered ‘valid texts of world politics’, as
they illuminate the constitutive topics of war, violence,
and security central to the discipline of International
Relations (Stern 2005: 56).
Critical and postcolonial feminists were united in
their excoriation of the use of feminism, specifically
liberal feminism, by former President George W. Bush
and his administration to justify the ground wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan; to distinguish the United States
from those whom it targeted; and, subsequently, to
appropriate the putative emancipation of Afghan and
Iraqi women as evidence of their victories. According to
many feminists, however, not only did this ‘embedded
feminism’ falsely claim a monolithic feminism to be
wielded against a supposedly savage Islam, in order to
once again ‘save’ Muslim women, it distracted from the
detailed empirical evidence that Afghan women are not
now free from violence but rather continue to experience it in other forms (K. Hunt 2006: 53; Kinsella 2019).
10.5.3 Postcolonial feminist international
relations
During Covid-19, women were particularly hit by the
double burden of household labour and waged labour
© coolmilo / iStock
Postcolonial feminism ‘link(s) everyday life and local
gendered contexts and ideologies to the larger, transnational political and economic structures and ideologies of capitalism’ (Mohanty 2003: 504). Focusing on
the particular situations, experiences, and histories as
materializing colonialism within these larger patterns
is a means to confront the universalizing tendency
found in much of feminist theorizing.
Postcolonial feminism seeks to situate historical
knowledge of the contours of colonialism and postcolonialism as intersecting with economic, social, and
Chapter 10 Feminism
political oppression and change, highlighting the centrality of conceptions of gender and of women to colonial regimes and their continuing effects. Imperialism
demanded ‘complex household arrangements where
white colonizers officially mandated a system of superiority and disdain against’ local communities and peoples.
‘Yet colonization would not have functioned without
these local communities and peoples—especially nannies, maids, houseboys, gardeners, prostitutes, pimps,
soldiers, and other coerced workers for the colonial state’
(Agathangelou and Ling 2004: 518).
Rules governing proper and improper sex were key
to the maintenance of difference between the colonized and the colonizer, and control of sexualities was
fundamentally differentiated according to race and
position. Only white men were free to have sex with
whomever they so desired, often in exploitative proprietary relations of rape and concubinage with women
of colour. In contrast, men of colour were policed as
savage sexual libertines against whom white women
were to be protected and preserved. Highlighting the
link between individual households, materiality, and
sexuality, postcolonial feminists remind feminism
that not all women are colonized equally. Women
from the Global North benefited from imperialism as
the ‘inferior sex within the “superior race”’ (quoted in
Pettman 1996: 30).
Postcolonial feminism takes as its point of entry the
recognition that the feminism of the Global North is
rooted in and dependent on discourses of rights and
equality that were, and arguably are, of pre-eminent
concern to and defined by Western Europe. Rey Chow
describes this as the Eurocentric ‘hierarchizing frame
of comparison’ (Chow 2006: 80). Postcolonial feminists
also underscore that while colonialism and imperialism may be formally past, their effects are not. Norma
Alarcón describes this as the ‘cultural and psychic dismemberment . . . linked to imperialist racist and sexist practices [that are] not a thing of the past’ (Alarcón
1999: 67). Certainly, the expansion of characteristics
said to identify the enemy in a time of global war rejuvenates and vivifies racial and colonial characterizations. For example, in the contemporary war on terror,
the freedom of Muslim and Arab men and women, or
those who appear to be so, is subject to increased scrutiny through policing and surveillance. The number
of traits said to identify the threat—‘travelling while
brown’—intensifies the alliances consolidated by race
and class, while testing those made only by sex (Sharma
2006: 135).
Additionally, women from the Global South are all
too often depicted and treated as ‘an object of protection from her own kind’, to justify the concerted efforts
of ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’
(Spivak 1988: 296). Thus, as feminist scholars note, the
existence of those so designated as in need of protection frequently becomes a rationale for violence, as it
did when the United States launched its ground wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan. For this reason, postcolonial
feminists resist the imposition of women’s rights as
‘all too often conceived in terms of paternal relations
of protection and benign salvation rather than exercises of agency and sovereignty of women for themselves’ (Kinsella 2007: 218; see Case Study 10.2). The
embedded feminism of the United States’ efforts in Iraq
and Afghanistan obscured the decades of agency and
mobilization of Iraqi and Afghan peoples on their own
behalf. Instead, former President Bush and his administration (standing in for the Global North) portrayed
such efforts as the exclusive actions of the United States.
In addition, postcolonial feminists suggest that the
individualism and autonomy implicit in the definitions
of rights and liberties are culturally ill-suited, and that
collective and relational rights are a better fit.
Lastly, with the international community only
now beginning to respond to climate change and the
devastating impacts of resource extraction and environmental exploitation, postcolonial feminists call
attention to it as another manifestation of the legacies
of imperialism (see Ch. 24). They highlight its differential impact on the Global South, the global poor, and
specifically women and girls within those categories.
Among the global poor, climate change disproportionately affects women and girls. They comprise the
majority of the globe’s small-scale farmers and are
primarily responsible for producing food to feed their
families and their communities. Yet women and girls
are struggling due to climate-induced changes affecting temperatures, rainfall, disease, weather patterns,
and crop failure which cause widespread food, water,
health, and physical insecurities. For this reason, the
2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change specifically
identified gender equity and empowerment of women
as fundamental to combating climate change (IPCC
2015). While recognizing this fact, postcolonial feminism cautions against the construction of women and
girls as especially responsible for conservation, as being
‘closer to nature’, and as especially vulnerable, without any corresponding increases in their authority or
agency (Arora-Jonsson 2011).
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Case Study 10.2 The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan
The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan
(RAWA) was founded in Kabul, Afghanistan in 1977. It was
founded to promote women’s rights and social justice; to
increase women’s participation in social, political, and economic
activities; and to advocate for a secular democratic state. Its goals
were women’s emancipation, the separation of religion and
politics, economic democracy, eradication of poverty, and networking with other national/international pro-democracy and
­pro-women’s rights groups based on the ‘principle of equality
and non-interference in internal affairs’ (Brodsky 2004: 169).
Founded only a year before the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan,
RAWA expanded its activities to resist Soviet rule. RAWA never
aligned itself with any other resistance movements, many of
which adhered to a more stringent interpretation of Islam than
that practised by RAWA’s members. RAWA is ­anti-fundamentalist,
but not anti-Islam. Meena, the charismatic founder of RAWA,
was murdered in 1987 because of her unrelenting criticism of
both sides in the war—Soviet and fundamentalists. In response,
RAWA began to hold more public events and to reach out for
international support from other women’s and human rights
organizations. One of RAWA’s members, all of whom use pseudonyms for safety, shared: ‘we knew there would be more assassinations and imprisonment if we kept silent. If we had a public
face and we could make ourselves more known, we could scare
the enemy’ (Brodsky 2004: 98).
During the Soviet rule and the resultant civil war that preceded
the advent of Taliban rule, RAWA members (women and ‘male
supporters’) opened schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan, housing, educating, and employing men and women who fled from
Afghanistan due to unremitting war. Under the Taliban, RAWA
members in Afghanistan went into hiding; many members were
10.5.4 Poststructural feminist
international relations
Poststructural feminism draws most specifically from
the scholarship of Judith Butler. Butler argued, contrary
to the commonplace and accepted definition that gender
is the social construction of sex, that sex is in fact constructed by gender. As might be imagined, her argument
caused no end of consternation, for it challenged the
seemingly stable and shared attribute of a biological sex of
all women. Without this fixed and permanent referent in
sex itself, how could it be that ‘women’ could exist, much
less be united across differences of class, sexuality, race,
and location? Butler explains that ‘originally intended to
dispute the “biology is destiny” formulation, the distinction between sex and gender’ in fact masks the cultural
construction of sex itself. In other words, sex is not the
foundation or origin of gender, but is itself an effect.
To understand gender as ‘a social category imposed on
a sexed body’ assumes that the sexed body is itself not
an effect of power (Scott 1999: 32). To help us grasp this
killed or wounded, and their families threatened and harmed by
the Taliban. Notwithstanding this threat, under which it had always
operated, RAWA opened underground schools to educate women
and girls and founded a magazine which members circulated
clandestinely. Every activity RAWA undertook meant its members
risked immediate death if discovered, and their lives were actively
circumscribed by daily and minute security concerns.
According to RAWA, the rule of the Soviets, the warlords, and
the Taliban were marked by similarity in repression and brutality
that varied primarily in degree and justification. RAWA roundly
criticized the invasion by the United States, not only for its premise but also because of its effects. Moreover, RAWA members
noted that indigenous women’s rights networks and organizations’ expertise and knowledge were utterly ignored in the push
to ‘liberate’ them. RAWA itself was characterized as too radical
and dogmatic in its critique of all forms of economic, political, and
social repression, and in its advocacy for an Afghan democracy.
Yet RAWA stated in October 2001, during the first months of
US military operations, that ‘[t]he continuation of US attacks and
the increase in the number of innocent civilian victims not only
gives an excuse to the Taliban, but also will cause the empowerment of the fundamentalist forces in the region and even in the
world’ (Afghan Women’s Mission 2021). Considering the chaotic
US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, and the subsequent
takeover by the Taliban, this analysis proved sadly prescient.
Question 1: What forms of feminism can you identify in this short
description of RAWA?
Question 2: Why would RAWA be or not be an ally to the United
States’ ground war in Afghanistan?
argument, Butler introduces the concept of gender performativity, which simply means that gender is not what
we are, but rather what we do. Cautioning against misinterpretation, Butler points out that gender is not simply what one freely chooses to do (it is not an unfettered
performance), but that performativity occurs in highly
regulated contexts including that of normative heterosexuality. Socially, one becomes a woman by taking on
the imperative to identify with the female/femininity and
to desire the male/masculinity. This production of identity is not accomplished in one act, but rather requires
constant iteration and bears with it the constant possibility of failure. As Sarah Salih (2002: 58) explains, ‘gender is a “corporeal style”, an act (or a sequence of acts),
a “strategy” which has cultural survival as its end, since
those who do not “do” their gender correctly are punished by society’. Evidence of this is seen in the worry,
discussed previously in Section 10.2 with regard to the
United Nations Decade for Women, that the presence of
lesbian/bisexual women, and now transwomen, would
undermine the credibility or coherency of the feminist
Chapter 10 Feminism
movement. Cynthia Weber (2015), along with other
queer theorists, draws from the insight about normative heterosexuality, or the ‘heterosexual matrix’, to continue to analyse how bodies are never merely described,
but are constituted in the act of description, calling on
International Relations theories to recognize the punitive
and productive circulation and regulation of homo/heterosexualities as fundamental to world politics.
As well as subversively reworking gender, poststructural feminism illuminates the constitutive role of language in creating gendered knowledge and experiences.
Laura Shepherd (2008) shows this in her analysis of the
constitutive effects of the discourses formalized in UN
Security Council Resolution 1325. While purporting
an emancipatory intent, the resolution consistently
reifies women and girls as passive victims of violence
even as it seeks to promote them as agents of change.
In a slightly different vein, Kathy Moon (1997) uses
interviews, archival research, and discourse analysis
to demonstrate how the sexual economy of sex workers figured in the US–Korean security relationships of
the mid-1970s. Charlotte Hooper (2001) examines the
masculinization of states and states’ masculinization of
men through a rereading of central economic texts and
journals. Overall, what these scholars demonstrate is
how gender is created through the workings of international politics and, in turn, how paying attention to this
construction reveals relations of power that are otherwise overlooked.
See Opposing Opinions 10.1 for discussion on
whether feminism influences states’ foreign policy
decision-making.
Opposing Opinions 10.1 Feminist foreign policy changes states’ foreign policy decisions
For
Against
Feminist foreign policy places gender equality at the crux of
foreign policy decisions. During her US Senate confirmation
hearings to become Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton vowed, ‘I
want to pledge to you that as secretary of state I view [women’s]
issues as central to our foreign policy, not as adjunct or auxiliary
or in any way lesser than all of the other issues that we have to
confront.’ Margot Wallström, former Deputy Prime Minister of
Sweden, stated that the ‘Three Rs’ of feminist foreign policy are
rights, resources, and representation.
Feminist foreign policy does not place gender equality at the
crux of foreign policy decisions for its own sake, but merely
to legitimate conventional policy goals. Margot Wallström
explained that ‘striving toward gender equality is not only a goal
in itself but also a precondition for achieving our wider foreign,
development, and security-policy objectives’. Likewise, Hillary
Clinton stated in an interview: ‘This is a big deal for American
values and for American foreign policy and our interests, but it is
also a big deal for our security.’
Feminist foreign policy makes a difference in how states act.
In 2018, Sweden insisted that peace consultations to end Yemen’s
civil conflict include women delegates and, when president of
the United Nations Security Council, mandated gender parity in
all briefings. In 2010, the United States Quadrennial Diplomacy
and Development Review—a blueprint for the US Department of
State and the US Agency for International Development—integrated gender into its foreign policy goals and began tracking
dollars spent on women-focused programming. The US renewed
these commitments in 2020.
Feminist foreign policy makes no difference in how states
act. Although she was a prime proponent of feminist foreign policy, as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton never sanctioned other
states for their treatment of women and girls. For example, Saudi
Arabia remained a vital partner for the US national security strategies in the Middle East. Similarly, although both former President
Barack Obama and President Joe Biden share a commitment to a
feminist foreign policy, the US did little to ensure the security of
Afghan women and girls or heed their concerns during the drawdown of US troops in Afghanistan in 2014 and in 2021. Sweden’s
relatively weak stature internationally allows it to proclaim a feminist foreign policy without any real risks, and it has yet to engage
in any complicated issues of multilateral foreign policy (such as
the conflict in Ukraine) under a feminist foreign policy.
1. As Swedish scholar Ulf Bjereld suggests, do ‘military defense and feminism represent two branches of the same tree: that citizens’
security is guaranteed by having a strong military and that the feminist agenda is guaranteed through diplomacy, aid, and other
arsenals beyond defense’ (quoted in Rothschild 2014)?
2. Are feminist foreign policy and the Hillary Doctrine iterations of an imperial feminism that serves the interests of only (some) sovereign states and obscures their true goals of military and economic dominance?
3. Does it matter if feminist foreign policy doesn’t change state behaviour? How else could it have significant effects on international politics?
Visit the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle these questions.
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Key Points
four approaches to feminist International Relations
• These
theory help explain the range of feminist theorizing, but do
not sum it up completely.
approach can be understood best in relation to the
• Each
other—e.g. postcolonial feminism as a critique of liberal
feminism—and in conversation with the others.
approach offers different insights into the operations of
approach has different historical origins and
• Each
• Each
power in international and domestic politics.
developments, and all continue to evolve.
10.6 Conclusion
Feminist International Relations theories have been
present in the discipline of International Relations in various forms since its inception (Tickner and True 2018).
In its incarnations since the UN Decade for Women,
feminist International Relations theories have demonstrated the crucial importance of including women, and
theorizing gender, when attempting to make sense of
international politics. Feminist International Relations
theories draw from a long history of feminist theorizing and actions to make specific claims about the concepts of International Relations—such as security, the
economy, war, and trade—as well as its methods of
study. Feminist International Relations theories employ
a wide range of methodological approaches, but they
share a focus on understanding gender as an analytical
category, not simply a descriptive one. In addition, feminist International Relations scholars straightforwardly
examine how gender is a relationship of power, one that
affects all individuals, institutions, and interactions in
international politics. Bringing this to the fore of their
research and methods, feminist International Relations
scholars demonstrate the difference that gender makes.
Looking ahead, like all scholars of international politics, feminist International Relations scholars must
continue to do more to include and heed ‘the voices of
feminist IR theorists who are people of color, disabled,
from Indigenous backgrounds, and/or from the global
South (as well as those whose first language may not
be English or another western European language)’
(Weerawardhana 2018: 192).
Questions
1. Name two ways in which the United Nations Decade for Women changed international
politics.
2. What methods do feminist International Relations theories draw on to conduct their
research?
3. How does the study of gender affect our understandings of the role of women and men in
politics?
4. How do theories of power differ among the four different categories of feminist International
Relations theories?
5. Which feminist International Relations theory posits that ‘gender is doing’, and what does this
mean?
6. The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) is best described as
what type of feminist organization: liberal, critical, postcolonial, or poststructural?
7. The Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom (WILPF) is best described as what
type of feminist organization: liberal, critical, postcolonial, or poststructural?
8. Why is postcolonial feminism concerned with the question of climate change?
Chapter 10 Feminism
9. Would a liberal feminist find a poststructural feminist critique of heterosexuality convincing?
Why or why not?
10. In which ways are international feminist theories necessary for the study of international
politics?
Visit the online resources to test your understanding by trying the self-test questions.
Further Reading
Ackerly, B. A., Stern, M., and True, J. (eds) (2006), Feminist Methodologies for International
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Introduces a wide variety of feminist
methodologies and examples of their use.
Agathangelou, A. M., and Ling, L. H. M. (2009), Transforming World Politics: From Empire to
Multiple Worlds (London: Routledge). A stimulating theoretical and empirical discussion of the
impact of imperialism on world politics.
Al-Ali, N. S., and Pratt, N. C. (2010), What Kind of Liberation?: Women and the Occupation of Iraq
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press). An informed critique of the United States’ claim to
liberate the women of Iraq.
Alexander, M. J., and Mohanty, C. T. (1997), Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic
Futures (New York: Routledge). A feminist classic and a continuation of the discussion of
colonialism and feminist practices and theories.
Bhambra, G. K., Bouka, Y., Persaud, R. B., Rutazlbwa, O. U., Thakur, V., Bell, D., Smith, K.,
Haastrup, T., and Adem, S. (2020), ‘Why is Mainstream International Relations Blind to Racism
and Colonialism?’, Foreign Policy, 3 July, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/03/why-ismainstream-international-relations-ir-blind-to-racism-colonialism/ A sharp review of the
failures of the field to confront historical and contemporary injustices of racism and
colonialism.
Biswas, S., and Nair, S. (2010), International Relations and States of Exception: Margins, Peripheries,
and Excluded Bodies (London: Routledge). An analysis of contemporary international relations
discipline and practice, with specific regard to marginalized and excluded peoples and subjects.
Jauhola, M. (2013), Post-tsunami Reconstruction in Indonesia: Negotiating Normativity through
Gender Mainstreaming Initiatives in Aceh (London: Routledge). A critical, postcolonial feminist
examination of institutions and redevelopment in Indonesia.
Runyon, A. S. (ed.) (2018), ‘Decolonizing Knowledge in Feminist World Politics’, International
Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(1): 3–8. A survey of scholarship on feminism and decolonization.
Tickner, J. A. (2014), A Feminist Voyage through International Relations (New York: Oxford
University Press). An overview of the work of one of the most influential feminist International
Relations theorists, with old and new writings over the course of her career.
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
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Chapter 11
Postcolonial and decolonial
approaches
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Framing Questions
●
What are the most important features of world politics according to postcolonial and
decolonial approaches?
●
How do postcolonial and decolonial scholars approach the study of international
relations?
●
Is it possible to decolonize world politics?
Reader’s Guide
This chapter focuses on postcolonial and decolonial
approaches to studying world politics, arguing that
these are multilayered and diverse. These do not constitute a single ‘theory’ of the international but rather
a set of orientations to show how the world works and
how we should think about it. The chapter begins by
separating some different elements involved in theorizing the world, and how postcolonial and decolonial approaches look at them. These include questions
of epistemology (how we know things), ontology
(what we know), and norms/ethics (what values
are important to us). It goes on to examine the historical context in which postcolonial and decolonial
approaches arose, showing that there was a dynamic
relationship between political struggles for decolonization and the development of different intellectual arguments. It examines where postcolonial and
decolonial approaches have emerged and where they
depart from each other in terms of analysis and focus.
Having traced these traditions through the twentieth
century, the chapter examines the key concepts used
in postcolonial and decolonial thought across different disciplines, before looking at their impact on the
field of International Relations (IR). Within IR, postcolonial and decolonial approaches have examined the
forms of hierarchy that characterize the world, as well
as the ways in which they are discussed. The chapter
also explores the similarities and differences between
these approaches and other theories in the field of IR.
Finally, the chapter contemplates the ongoing popularity of postcolonial and decolonial approaches in
the present day.
Visit the online resources to access an
interactive timeline of how the discipline of
International Relations has evolved.
Chapter 11 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches
11.1 Introduction
Postcolonialism is one of the fastest growing areas of
research in International Relations. It begins with the
insight that the modern world has been deeply shaped
by experiences of empire and colonialism, particularly
as conducted by European countries over the last five
centuries. It says that our theories of international relations and accounts of world order need to deal with this
issue directly, and also asks why the majority of them
fail to do so. Postcolonial and decolonial approaches to
the field are therefore seen as forms of critical theory
because they challenge the very foundations of the field.
However, these approaches also seek to develop their
own alternative ways of theorizing the world.
In postcolonial and decolonial approaches, special
attention is paid to the history, ideas, and practice of
decolonization around the world. Decolonization usually refers to the processes of formal colonial and imperial withdrawal from many countries in Asia, Africa,
the Caribbean, and South America, especially in the
twentieth century. As a result of decolonization struggles and processes, the number of states recognized
in the international system increased from around
70 in 1945 to more than 190 in 2018. These struggles
involved the mobilization of huge numbers of people,
the development of intellectual critiques of empire and
colonialism, and often armed struggles against imperial rule where colonial powers attempted to maintain
their control.
In IR, postcolonial and decolonial approaches interrogate the claims of existing theoretical approaches
such as liberalism and realism (see Chs 7 and 9), often
arguing that these are flawed because they are built
on faulty premises, such as the assumption of international anarchy or that sovereign states are all essentially alike. These theories obscure the role of empire
and colonialism in producing patterns in international
order. Postcolonial and decolonial approaches also note
that virtually all other recent approaches to IR have left
out questions of race and racism from their analysis
(see Ch. 18). Finally, they argue that these theories are
built on very narrow philosophical grounds, which use
a specific tradition of Western philosophy as a universal template for thinking through questions of being,
society, and ethics.
By bringing questions of empire, colonialism, and
race back into the study of world politics, postcolonial
and decolonial approaches present alternative accounts
of many of the thematic issues in IR presented in this
book, such as globalization, war, sovereignty, trade,
international law, weapons control, gender, security,
environmental crises, development, and labour. These
alternative accounts trace the ways in which imperial
hierarchies continue to orient identities, policies, and
actions in these fields, examine the kinds of resistance
that they encounter, and imagine alternative ways of
thinking about these issues.
11.2 What are postcolonial and decolonial approaches?
Like social constructivism (see Ch. 13) or feminism
(see Ch. 10), postcolonial and decolonial approaches in
IR and other social sciences should be understood as
a way of thinking about the world rather than a single
theory of how the world works. These approaches draw
their influences from a range of sources, including
anti-colonial thought from around the world, as well
as research in the fields of history, philosophy, education, literary theory, anthropology, and political economy. The variety of influences on the field also means
that there are considerable differences among these
approaches. However, they can be understood as being
united by three levels of theoretical engagement—
epistemological, ontological, and normative.
Postcolonial and decolonial approaches share a concern with the ways we generate knowledge about the
world—our epistemologies. Like many social theories, they reject the assumption that knowledge is
ever objective or neutral. They argue that the way that
many people know and represent the world depends
on hierarchies established by colonial attitudes, and
the perspectives of the colonially or racially privileged.
Consider, for example, the language used to describe
people living in countries that are not their countries
of birth; for Westerners living in formerly colonized
countries, Westerners often use the term ‘expats’, but
for people from formerly colonized countries moving
into the West, they use the term ‘immigrants’. The use
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of these and similar terms means that the orientation
towards and treatment of particular groups is very different depending on their position in the hierarchy.
Some postcolonial and decolonial approaches identify
these epistemological habits as deeply rooted in the
racialized and supremacist assumptions of influential
Western philosophers such as Kant and Hegel, who saw
white Europe as the pinnacle of humanity, and nonwhite peoples as backward or uncivilized (see Box 7.2).
By contrast, postcolonial and decolonial approaches
have emphasized the importance of seeing and knowing the world from the perspectives and worldviews
(that is, the epistemologies) of those who are disempowered or dispossessed by imperial and racial hierarchies. However, there are some differences between
postcolonial and decolonial approaches. Postcolonial
approaches have emphasized the importance of subaltern perspectives (see Section 11.4) as a site for
thinking through relations of power. These can include
criticisms rendered back in the language of the colonial
power—for example, the use of Christianity to criticize slavery in the Americas. In decolonial approaches,
more emphasis is put on retrieving indigenous epistemologies and cosmologies with which to think about
relations among humans, and often non-humans.
Postcolonial and decolonial approaches also take
issue with the ontological assumptions of conventional
social science and IR—that is, what it is that is being
studied, who is being studied, and more generally what
the world consists of. Since 1945, IR has understood
itself as being concerned with sovereign states, focusing mostly on Western great powers and the relations
between them. It has sought to devise theories that
explain these relations, specifically where they result
either in forms of conflict or cooperation. Postcolonial
and decolonial approaches, however, note that the histories they use and the cases they pay attention to miss
out the experiences of most of the world’s peoples and
polities, which are located outside the West. They also
miss out the experiences of empire and colonialism in
the shaping of Western international histories themselves. For postcolonial and decolonial approaches,
this means that conventional IR cannot fully explain
or understand world politics. Decolonial approaches
engage the idea of ‘modernity/coloniality’ (see Section
11.4) as a way of talking about how the modern world is
fundamentally structured by colonial hierarchy.
This ontological shift causes a re-examination of
knowledge in IR. For example, the conflict known
as the First World War (1914–18) is a very important
reference point in the conventional story of IR. It is
understood to be the point at which the ‘Long Peace’
of the nineteenth century broke down, the point at
which the balance of power was being tested, a point
at which states became averse to violence, and the point
at which they established the principle of national selfdetermination. It is sometimes called the ‘graveyard of
empires’, referring to the break-up of the Ottoman and
Austro-Hungarian empires. However, the conventional
story treats the key players (Britain, France, Germany,
and the United States) as themselves nation-states
rather than empires. Yet the protection or assertion of
imperial territorial claims was a major source of competition between them, meaning that fighting also took
place across Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, and heavily
involved troops from those areas fighting for imperial
powers. The principle of national self-determination
espoused by US President Woodrow Wilson was only
really intended for application in Eastern Europe, leading to the violent repression of anti-colonial protests
in India and Ireland by Britain immediately following the war. The break-up of the Ottoman Empire also
directly facilitated British and French colonial control
of the Middle East and the establishment of new territorial borders to regulate their spheres of influence.
For postcolonial and decolonial approaches, then, colonialism and imperialism are crucial ontological foundations for understanding world politics. Moreover, it
becomes impossible to disentangle the ‘West’ from the
‘non-West’ in terms of thinking about world history
because of imperial and colonial experience (see Case
Study 11.1).
These considerations are also connected to the
normative or ethical foundations for world politics.
Postcolonial and decolonial approaches have tended to
understand the attitudes, practices, and structures supporting Western supremacy in the world as unequal,
racist, and dehumanizing. This is because they tend to
elevate Western states and peoples as being fundamentally more important, historically significant, and worthy of attention than non-Westerners. They often lead
to the consequences of producing attitudes of superiority, entitlement, and indifference towards the nonWest. They also produce what many see as hypocritical
attitudes towards the non-West.
For example, in the field of economics, it is understood that the ways in which the West became wealthier
are now effectively banned by international agreements
and treaties. Some of these are seen to be morally appropriate, such as agreements against the use of enslaved
Chapter 11 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches
Case Study 11.1 Imperial wars after decolonization? Rethinking Vietnam
Air Force helicopters in the Vietnam War
© LOU Collection / Alamy Stock Photo
Postcolonial approaches to international relations often highlight
the continuities between ideas and practices during and after
colonial rule. One of the areas in which they highlight continuities is in the practice of imperial wars waged by Western powers
in smaller states in the Global South, even after ‘independence’.
During the height of European imperialism, it was common
for imperial and colonial powers to use military force to achieve
dominance or control of territories and people around the world,
such as in the wars against indigenous peoples in North America,
the Opium Wars in China, and the ‘Scramble for Africa’ (see Case
Study 3.2).
Imperial wars had several key characteristics. They were expansionist, because they sought to extend the power and influence
of imperial states into new spaces or maintain recent gains. They
were often asymmetric in terms of the more destructive military
technologies usually available to the imperial powers, such as
naval bombardment, machine guns, and air power. They were
often population-centric, targeting not just control of land but
aiming for the domination, terror, and disciplining of the people
within it. Finally, while these wars often used troops and commanders from Europe, they were also often fought by locally hired
proxies or imperial forces brought from elsewhere, and depended
on ‘friendly’ local partners who would maintain imperial interests.
labour and colonial territorial expansion. However, it
is argued that the West also became rich through the
assertion of control over markets and state financial
and legal support for particular sectors, which poorer
countries are not permitted to do under contemporary
development regimes. This has been called ‘kicking
away the ladder’ by economist Ha-Joon Chang (2002),
because it deprives poorer countries of the same opportunities for economic growth. Moreover, the West continues to enforce unfair trade and taxation rules that
benefit their own economies at the expense of poorer
Until recently, conventional approaches to IR did not usually
count these wars as part of the record of ‘inter-state’ wars, which
are recorded in databases such as the Correlates of War project,
because many of the political formations involved were not recognized as ‘states’ (with the exception of China, for example).
Imperial wars in this sense are explicitly excluded from the picture by influential scholars such as Kenneth Waltz (1979). More
recent wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan were seen by conventional scholars as part of US national security strategies during
the cold war and the ‘war on terror’, respectively.
However, by looking at the historical record of intervention
in these spaces and reflecting on the kinds of practices that
this warfare involves, postcolonial approaches highlight their
characteristically imperial nature. The Vietnamese liberation
movement, for example, had declared independence in 1945 at
the end of the Second World War, but continued to fight, first
against French colonialism (with American and British backing)
until 1954, at which point Vietnam was temporarily partitioned,
and then against the US and the US-installed South Vietnamese
government from 1955 until 1975, when American forces finally
withdrew and Vietnam was reunified. The war killed over 2 million people, including a high number of civilians. In terms of its
expansionist, asymmetric, population-centric, and even proxybased character, many have understood this as an imperial war
based on the attempted maintenance of Western influence and
interests in the region.
Historians have also traced the sharing and circulation of
military counter-insurgency strategies developed by colonial French strategists in Algeria and Indochina (which drew
on techniques used against Native Americans in earlier periods) into British practices in Malaya and Kenya, and forward
to the American-led ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
elsewhere (Khalili 2012). They note that in each of these cases,
liberal values, civilization, and security were invoked as justifications for imperial violence.
Question 1: What are the key features of imperial wars?
Question 2: Are imperial wars a legitimate response to a perceived national security threat?
producers and governments (see Ch. 28). Given the role
of Western imperialism in shaping the economic structures that govern the world economy today, many argue
that there are strong moral obligations on the West to
make reparations for the effects these have had, particularly towards the descendants of formerly enslaved
people.
Watch the video on the online resources to see
the author discussing ‘What are postcolonial
and decolonial approaches?’
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Key Points
and decolonial approaches are a way of thinking
seek to think about world politics by keeping
• Postcolonial
• They
about the world rather than a rigid theory.
imperialism and colonialism in view as a structure of power
which influences and shapes many other forms of power in
approaches include insights about how we think
• The
the world, such as sovereignty.
about and know the world (epistemology), what we
study (ontology), and our ethical or normative
challenge the West in terms of its moral responsibility
• They
responsibilities.
for inequalities in the world today, arguing that the West is
often hypocritical and dehumanizing because it fails to
and decolonial approaches seek to understand
• Postcolonial
recognize the bases for its own wealth and power, which are
things from the perspectives of the colonized/formerly
colonized and to challenge the ways that such people are
often represented in mainstream approaches.
rooted in domination over and exploitation of people and
resources around the world.
11.3 Where did postcolonial and decolonial ideas come from?
Postcolonial and decolonial ideas are inspired by the
history and practice of decolonization. They share
many common historical reference points, but the differences between them are also shaped by different
geographic and philosophical locations. Whereas postcolonial approaches have been commonly associated
with thinkers of Asian and African descent, decolonial
approaches have been principally cultivated by Latin
American thinkers. We will consider the common historical roots of the two approaches before looking at the
differences between them.
An important foundation is a shared understanding of the history of Western empires. Many Western
countries controlled and dominated other parts of
the world, beginning with the Spanish conquest and
occupation of the Americas in the sixteenth century,
continuing through the Dutch occupations around
the Indian Ocean, and reaching a high point in the
British and French empires of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, which claimed territorial sovereignty over large sections of Asia and Africa (see
Fig. 11.1). At its height, the British Empire is said
to have controlled over a quarter of the world’s land
area. Empires engaged in many different forms of
control and transformation, usually based on their
ability to militarily subdue or co-opt the rulers of
the area. However, sometimes colonial control also
involved forms of extensive land dispossession and
Figure 11.1 Map of empires in 1914
© Andrew0921/Wikimedia Commons. Distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0): https://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en.
Chapter 11 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches
genocidal violence against the indigenous peoples,
as in the Americas and Australasia. While there have
been other powerful empires in world history, such
as in Japan, China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey, their
influence has often been curtailed and overwritten by
Western influence in recent centuries.
Whatever kind of imperial or colonial control was
exercised by European powers, however, there were a
number of common patterns to these practices (see Box
11.1). Politically, they forced a formal recognition of
imperial rule in the area, for instance through declaring loyalty to a European monarch. Economically, they
often forced indigenous or imported enslaved peoples
to work and produce mostly for imperial markets, for
little or no reward. They also extracted raw materials
and established trade monopolies on key imports and
exports. Culturally, they promoted and imposed their
own languages, laws, and often religions. Socially, they
often invented, appropriated, or reinforced racial hierarchies, tribal divisions, and gender norms among people in order to divide and manage them.
Resistance to this system of control could be found
in multiple places, right from the beginning of imperial
practices, but then was particularly facilitated by the
improved transport and communication infrastructures of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries
(see Box 11.2). From the earliest times, many ordinary
people subjected to enslavement and/or colonial rule
simply ran away, either by temporarily evading the
imperial officials or through establishing communities beyond their reach, with their own cultures and
economies. These low-profile zones of independence
and autonomy became important in facilitating wider
forms of resistance.
Others rejected their unequal treatment through
asserting themselves politically and militarily, ultimately demanding independence from colonial powers.
A key episode here was the Haitian Revolution starting
in 1791, in which the currently and formerly enslaved
ousted French masters and troops, declaring themselves
free and slavery abolished (see Ch. 18). In Haiti, as in the
Indian independence movement over the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, there was simultaneously an
appropriation of ‘Western’ ideals (such as the Rights
of Man, national self-determination, and democracy)
alongside the retention/cultivation of alternative religious, cultural, and political standpoints (such as those
rooted in Voodoo or Hindu asceticism) in the search
for independence and freedom. Transnational forms of
identification were also cultivated and celebrated as part
Box 11.1 Aimé Césaire’s Discourse on
Colonialism
Between colonizer and colonized there is room only for
forced labor, intimidation, pressure, the police, taxation, theft,
rape, compulsory crops, contempt, mistrust, arrogance, selfcomplacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses.
No human contact, but relations of domination and submission which turn the colonizing man into a class-room monitor,
an army sergeant, a prison guard, a slave driver, and the indigenous man into an instrument of production.
My turn to state an equation: colonization = ‘thing-ification.’
I hear the storm. They talk to me about progress, about
‘achievements,’ diseases cured, improved standards of living.
I am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands
confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations
destroyed, extraordinary possibilities wiped out.
They throw facts at my head, statistics, mileages of roads,
canals, and railroad tracks.
I am talking about thousands of men sacrificed to the
Congo-Océan. I am talking about those who, as I write this, are
digging the harbor [sic] of Abidjan by hand. I am talking about
millions of men torn from their gods, their land, their habits,
their life-from life, from the dance, from wisdom.
I am talking about millions of men in whom fear has been
cunningly instilled, who have been taught to have an inferiority
complex, to tremble, kneel, despair, and behave like flunkeys.
They dazzle me with the tonnage of cotton or cocoa that has
been exported, the acreage that has been planted with olive
trees or grapevines.
I am talking about natural economies that have been disrupted—harmonious and viable economies adapted to the
indigenous population—about food crops destroyed, malnutrition permanently introduced, agricultural development oriented solely toward the benefit of the metropolitan countries,
about the looting of products, the looting of raw materials.
They pride themselves on abuses eliminated.
I too talk about abuses, but what I say is that on the old
ones—very real—they have superimposed others—very detestable. They talk to me about local tyrants brought to reason; but
I note that in general the old tyrants get on very well with the
new ones, and that there has been established between them,
to the detriment of the people, a circuit of mutual services and
complicity.
They talk to me about civilization. I talk about proletarianization and mystification.
(Césaire 2000 [1955]: 42–4)
of the resistance to the West, including Pan-Africanism
and Pan-Arabism. Their legacies are now present in the
African Union and the Arab League. Violent military
and political struggles for independence continued well
after the Second World War, particularly in French and
British colonies such as Indochina, Malaya, Kenya, and
Algeria (see Case Study 11.1). These struggles produced
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Box 11.2 Selected instances of anti-colonial
revolt
1791–1804
Haitian Revolution
1798
Irish Rebellion
1808–33
Spanish–American wars of independence
1857
Indian Revolt
1881–99
Mahdi Rebellion
1893
Franco-Siamese War
1896
Battle of Adwa
1899
Philippine Insurgency
1899–1901
Boxer Rebellion
1915
Chilembwe Uprising
1916
Easter Rising
1920–2
Indian Non-Cooperation Movement
1929
Aba Women’s Riots
1946–54
First Indochina War
1952–64
Mau Mau Rebellion
1954–62
Algerian War of Independence
famous intellectuals and leaders such as Frantz Fanon
(1925–1961) and Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969).
Anti-colonial movements also contributed to and
were influenced by Marxist critiques of imperialism
and capitalism, which were associated with left-wing
movements around the world. Although Marx and
Engels themselves considered India backward and did
not accord the 1857 Rebellion much historical importance, non-white thinkers on the left such as W. E. B.
Du Bois, C. L. R. James, and M. N. Roy saw the development of global capitalism as fundamentally dependent
on colonial structures. Such views were shared by some
European leftists such as Rosa Luxemburg, and the climate of anti-imperial and anti-capitalist thought was
also cultivated among Chinese thinkers such as Liang
Qichao. Many intellectuals who became prominent
in the anti-colonial movements of the twentieth century also studied, trained, and travelled outside their
own countries, often in the metropole and sometimes
extensively, sharing ideas with other anti-imperial and
anti-colonial movements. Not only were critiques of
colonial capitalism shared, but also strategies of worker
organization and strikes, mass non-cooperation, and
monopoly breaking became part of the core repertoire
of anti-colonial and anti-imperial resistance.
During and after formal political independence, a
common Third World identity took shape in different
international forums, such as the Bandung Conference
of 1955 and the Havana Tricontinental Conference of
1966. In these spaces, Asian, African, and Latin
American leaders came together to discuss their mutual
concerns, which included ongoing forms of racial discrimination and imperial control in the world economy. The United Nations (UN) also became a space for
Global South collaboration, despite its initial design
as a vehicle for continuing imperial control (Mazower
2009). For example, the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established
in 1964 and led by Raúl Prebisch, an Argentinian
economist who had contributed to the development of
dependency theory, which explained why formerly
colonized countries remained relatively poor and in
many cases got poorer.
In addition, universities in formerly colonized
countries often became an important space where anticolonial and postcolonial thought flourished. The
University of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania was associated
with the ongoing fight for southern African liberation,
resistance to apartheid in South Africa, and postcolonial struggles in the Caribbean. In India, the University
of Delhi was home to a number of leftist historians who
developed a form of postcolonial historiography known
as Subaltern Studies, and in the United States a number
of exiled and diasporic intellectuals continued to write
about imperial rule, culture, and governance.
Simultaneously, in Latin America a range of interconnected intellectual projects associated with liberation were growing, including liberation theology,
radical pedagogies, and the recovery of indigenous
philosophies. These were historically contextualized by
the ongoing problems of global dependency as well as
the emergence of authoritarian governments in Latin
America and the repression of different groups. Key intellectual figures of this time included Enrique Dussel and
Rodolfo Kusch, who drew historical critique and philosophical dialogue with European thinkers together with
indigenous and popular forms of political resistance.
In Western scholarship, the field which became
known as ‘postcolonial studies’ evolved in the 1980s
and 1990s, in dialogue with debates within history,
philosophy, and literature. Famous thinkers in these
circles included Ranajit Guha, Edward Said, Homi
Bhabha, and Gayatri Spivak. In the years that followed,
writers from Latin America such as Aníbal Quijano
and María Lugones developed ‘decolonial’ thinking, which functioned as a sympathetic critique both
of dependency theory and of the cultural emphasis in
postcolonial studies.
Chapter 11 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches
Key Points
and decolonial approaches are inspired by the
• Postcolonial
history and practice of decolonization struggles, which
entailed intellectual, political, and military strategies against
colonial empires.
and imperial rule had a number of common
• Colonial
political, economic, cultural, and social features, most of
•
which were functionally related to the control of territories
and people, despite differences in historical context.
Resistance to imperialism and colonialism took place at
many historical moments, but picked up organizational and
political momentum in the early twentieth century due to
improved infrastructures and mobility as well as the growth
of anti-colonial ideas.
intellectuals had many transnational influences
• Anti-colonial
and connections which shaped their ideas, political
strategies, and material capabilities for resistance. Many
were linked to communist organizations in the USSR and
China.
Third World identity and way of thinking continued after
• Aformal
political independence, consolidated at conferences
such as the Bandung Conference in Indonesia and the
Tricontinental Conference in Havana.
and decolonial approaches are strongly
• Postcolonial
influenced by this history of transnational anti-colonial
activity.
11.4 What are the main ideas underpinning postcolonial
and decolonial thought?
In line with the idea that postcolonial and decolonial approaches are a way of thinking about the
world rather than a rigid theory, they are guided by
a number of key concepts and ideas. In this section,
we will examine some of the most influential ideas
in the tradition and the thinkers they have been
associated with. Although not necessarily originating in the field of IR, they clearly have insights into
the functioning of world politics. We will see in
Section 11.5 how they have been used in more recent
IR scholarship.
11.4.1 Colonialism as a system of (total)
violence
Frantz Fanon argued that, as a system, colonialism represents a totalizing form of violence. This is because it
operates not only at physical, economic, and political
levels, putting colonizers and settlers above ‘natives’ in
the colony, but also involves their psychological, social,
and cultural destruction through forms of racism and
linguistic/cultural imperialism. Fanon, a trained psychiatrist, wrote about the alienating and dehumanizing
character of racism in French colonial metropolitan
culture in Black Skin, White Masks (Fanon 2008 [1954]),
as well as the nature of the struggle against colonialism
based on experiences in Algeria in The Wretched of the
Earth (Fanon 2001 [1965]). In Fanon’s view, there was
no possibility of political reconciliation or accommodation with colonialism since it was founded on this
fundamental negation of the humanity and rights of
the colonized. This situation meant that the colonized
needed to completely overturn colonialism, ultimately
through forms of violent resistance which could form
the basis for a more equal, fraternal footing in the
future.
11.4.2 Neo-colonialism as an economic
and political structure
The term ‘neo-colonialism’ was coined by Kwame
Nkrumah, an anti-colonial activist and the first leader
of independent Ghana, in the early 1960s. He published
Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism in 1965.
According to Nkrumah (1965), ‘The essence of neocolonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in
theory, independent and has all the outward trappings
of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.’ Nkrumah was specifically referring to situations
(often former French colonies) where, despite independence, foreign military troops had stayed in the country,
where foreign investors or corporations owned land,
industries, and mining concessions, and where policies
on a range of domestic and international affairs were
being directed by external forces—typically the former
colonial power, but also often superpower interference.
Neo-colonialism was seen as a key driver of violence
and economic impoverishment in newly independent
countries.
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11.4.3 Orientalism and Otherness as
modes of representation
The word ‘Orientalists’ at one time referred to scholars
who studied Eastern cultures, religions, and languages
in Western universities. In Edward Said’s famous work,
Orientalism (Said 2003 [1978]), however, he argued that
Orientalism was also a way of imagining and representing the world in ways that justified and supported imperialism. This meant depicting Europeans as rational, strong,
enlightened, and liberal, in contrast to non-Europeans
who were shown as barbaric, effeminate, weak, dangerous, and irrational Others. He showed these romanticizing attitudes and forms of representation to be widespread
in English literature of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Valentin Mudimbe (1988) has made a related
argument about the imagination of ‘Africa’ through relations of Otherness in Western thinking. For both scholars, the ways in which we represent the non-Western
Other is a significant factor in justifying imperial control
and paternalistic practices towards them.
11.4.4 Eurocentrism as an intellectual
habit/practice
‘Eurocentrism’ can be understood as the widespread
tendency to treat Europe as the primary subject of and
reference point for world history, civilization, and/or
humanity. The use of the term was popularized by a number of critical thinkers associated with dependency theory,
such as Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein, although
it is also associated with postcolonial historians such as
Dipesh Chakrabarty. Eurocentric thinking, for example
in economics or history, might involve the assumption
that all societies will or should evolve along the lines of
European ones, or a comparison of other societies’ failures in relation to a European ‘universal’ standard. It
also generally entails the ignoring of histories, cultures,
and knowledges originating from outside Europe in the
discussion of world affairs. In many cases, this is because
such knowledges and cultures are represented as stagnant
or non-dynamic.
11.4.5 Subaltern as the social position of
the colonized
The term ‘subaltern’ is often connected with the thought
of Sardinian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci (1891–
1937). Gramsci reflected on how power was exercised not
just through violence but also through culture and ideology in society. He described the forms of ideological and
cultural domination exercised by the ruling classes as
‘hegemony’, and those groups excluded from these forms
of representation as ‘subaltern’. In researching the colonial
histories of India’s peasantry, the Subaltern Studies collective established by Ranajit Guha used this framework
to analyse the political, economic, and cultural exclusion
of peasants from imperial hegemonic structures of law,
rights, languages, and property. However, due to the fact
that such groups were subaltern, they were not well represented in the historical record, posing methodological
challenges which needed to be overcome. Gayatri Spivak’s
(1988) cautious critique of attempting to write such histories drew attention to the intersecting roles of colonialism
and patriarchy in rendering Indian peasant women doubly colonized/subaltern.
11.4.6 Modernity/coloniality as
overarching historical/philosophical
structure
‘Modernity/coloniality’ is a term developed among
Latin American thinkers, principally Enrique Dussel,
Aníbal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, and María Lugones.
It is a central idea in decolonial theory. Contrary to the
conventional view of modernity as progressive, equalizing, and democratic, it says that the philosophical and
political project of modernity is foundationally premised on coloniality—that is, a racialized, hierarchical
binary that empowers people and ideas seen as ‘modern’
over those seen as ‘non-modern’. Such a hierarchical
structure is seen to animate modern global processes
such as capitalism, science, state-building, and development, and has been expanding since the Spanish conquest of the Americas in 1492. As argued by Lugones
(2007), it has also shaped a particular form of colonial
patriarchy and remade gender relations along colonial
lines. This ‘dark’ side of modernity is rooted deeply in
the conceptions of man and knowledge that underpin
European philosophy. This structure of modernity/coloniality monopolizes and universalizes its own ways of
thinking, erasing and exploiting others through forms
of modern power.
11.4.7 ‘Border thinking’ as a way to think
decolonially
The term ‘border thinking’ was coined by Chicana
thinker Gloria Anzaldúa (2012 [1987]) and is associated
with Walter Mignolo. It can be understood as thinking
from the ‘underside’ of modernity. It means to think
with the perspectives of people who are marginalized,
undervalued, or excluded by the ideals of modernity—
for example, indigenous peoples, non-white migrants,
Chapter 11 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches
and women. This kind of thinking is subversive because
it rejects the authority of European ‘reason’ and introduces the possibility of alternatives to colonial modernity. Ramón Grosfoguel offers the Zapatista philosophy
as an example of border thinking. The Zapatista movement has combined indigenous Mexican ideas about
land and spirituality with leftist critiques of capitalism
and the state in their project to create and defend an
alternative way of life in Chiapas, Mexico. The concept
of border thinking resonates strongly with longerestablished historical practices of resistance to colonial
ideas and systems of rule.
11.4.8 Decolonization as practices to
overturn colonialism and coloniality
The term ‘decolonization’ has been experiencing something of a renaissance in recent years. In the midtwentieth century, during the widespread struggles
against colonialism, ‘decolonization’ usually referred
to processes of gaining political independence in the
framework of national self-determination. However, it
was also used by intellectuals such as Fanon, Ngũgĩ wa
Thiong’o, and Ashis Nandy to refer to the psychological
and intellectual struggle against colonialism through
the retrieval of indigenous agency, language, and spirituality—that is, to ‘decolonize the mind’. More recently,
‘decolonization’ has been used to refer to a range of critical projects across many social, cultural, and scientific
fields that seek to interrogate and overturn the legacies
of colonialism, such as decolonizing the curriculum
(see Opposing Opinions 11.1). This usage of ‘decolonization’ has attracted some criticism from indigenous
scholars in settler-colonial societies (see Box 11.3), such
as Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang (2012), who argue that
its principal meaning in terms of regaining territorial
sovereignty is being diluted and therefore its political
potential is being neutralized or co-opted.
Opposing Opinions 11.1 Universities can be decolonized
For
Against
Universities have changed in line with the times, with lots
more women, working-class students, and students of colour. This means that some of the barriers of colonial prejudice
keeping various students out of the classroom are being broken down. Different types of students can expand the horizons
of knowledge that universities provide, meaning that they can
become less tied to the imperial attitudes of the West.
Universities tend to promote elite knowledges and worldviews. Precisely because the West has dominated the world, its
universities have promoted forms of knowledge and worldviews
that reinforce this domination. Many universities in the Global
South have sought to emulate, rather than to challenge, this
organization of knowledge.
Thanks to globalization, there are more resources available in
terms of knowledge, resources, and perspectives available in
different subjects. One of the factors limiting the kinds of knowledge taught by universities has been access to sources of knowledge
from different groups, in different languages, and made in different
media. Due to the revolution in communication, knowledge production has become more global and more democratic. ‘Decolonizing’
the university must mean drawing on these wider perspectives and
sources of information to understand different issues.
Education has historically functioned as a tool of liberation.
Many activists involved in decolonization struggles and other
struggles for rights have found that universities across the world
are spaces to develop their ideas, create social networks, and
produce writing of their own. The university is therefore not a
static institution, but rather becomes whatever its students and
staff make of it.
The domination of the English language and expensive publishing formats limits access. As long as English is the dominant language for academic research, there will be inequalities
in terms of access to knowledge. The globalization of academic
publishing has not meant an end to imperial hierarchies either—
corporate publishers located in the West dominate the market
and set the agenda for universities around the world. They control access to the most prestigious knowledge in order to extract
income from it.
Most people across the world regard university education
as a means to help them participate in a capitalist, Westerndominated world economy. For most people, surviving in the
world they encounter is a more important priority than trying to
change it. This means that it is more likely that the university education they seek will be about training them to fit in with established fields of knowledge or ways of doing things rather than
radically changing them.
1. Do you agree that today we have more democratic forms of knowledge-making and knowledge-sharing than in the past?
2. Is the predominance of the English language a barrier to decolonization?
3. Are more people interested in trying to survive in the world than in trying to change it?
Visit the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle these questions.
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Key Points
and decolonial approaches have developed
• Postcolonial
their own conceptual apparatus for understanding the world
through terms such as ‘neo-colonialism’, ‘Orientalism’,
‘Eurocentrism’, ‘modernity/coloniality’, and others. These
terms have specific meanings when used by writers in this
context, but are sometimes used in a more general way.
and decolonial approaches emerge in slightly
• Postcolonial
different geographical and historical locations, with
postcolonial approaches mostly associated with thinkers
from regions formerly colonized by Britain or France such as
Asia and Africa, and decolonial approaches associated with
thinkers from regions formerly colonized by Spain or
Portugal such as Central and South America.
are some different emphases between postcolonial
• There
and decolonial approaches in terms of vocabulary and
thinking, such as the emphasis in decolonial thought on the
cosmologies of indigenous peoples.
is a contested term with multiple meanings,
• Decolonization
but it is a term increasingly applied to activity in different
spheres such as art, education, and culture, that seeks to
dislodge the centrality of Western epistemologies and
viewpoints.
Box 11.3 Settler colonialism
‘Settler colonialism’ refers to forms of colonialism which involve
eliminating ‘native’ society and establishing other populations
and their laws as sovereign in a territory. This type of colonialism has been most recently associated with European settlement in North and South America, North Africa, Southern
Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Palestine. In these instances,
European empires acquired land through a combination of
force and agreements (many of which are contested/forgotten), and set about establishing control of entire territories or
continents. They often did so by claiming that the land was
unoccupied (‘terra nullius’), and by encouraging mass immigration from Europe. ‘Natives’ were initially displaced from strategic rivers, coasts, and farming land and often contained in
poorly resourced ‘reservations’. Many died either from direct,
sometimes genocidal, violence or from famine and disease
incurred by displacement (such as in the US). Native rulers,
languages, and laws were ignored or discouraged, and in many
territories (such as Canada and Australia) native children were
forcibly removed from their families and sent to settler families
or boarding schools in order to make them ‘assimilate’ to settler
culture. Patrick Wolfe (2006) has famously argued that settler
colonialism is a ‘structure’ rather than an event. Many indigenous groups continue to press for their rights, either as granted
to them in particular treaties (such as the Waitangi Treaty in
Aotearoa/New Zealand) or for sovereignty that was never officially ceded (such as in Canada and Australia). Some of these
dynamics are also key features of the ongoing conflict between
Israel and the Palestinians.
11.5 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches to studying world politics
Questions of empire, race, and colonialism were
pressing issues in the early twentieth century, when
International Relations was being established as a
scholarly field. As Robert Vitalis (2000) has shown in
political science, there was a distinct subfield of study
known as ‘Colonial Administration’. The famous
International Relations journal Foreign Affairs began
life as the Journal of Race Development in 1900, unusually including contributions from African-American
scholars such as W. E. B. Du Bois.
Du Bois’s contributions have been overlooked until
recently in IR, but he was prominent in his time. In
1902, Du Bois argued that the ‘global colour line’ was
the major problem of the twentieth century. In his analysis, developed over the following years, he argued that
one of the main causes for war between European states
was competition for control of colonies and imperial
possessions, and that this itself was driven by racial
discrimination and a sense of white superiority. For
Du Bois (1917), the invention of ‘whiteness’ as a sense
of identity was linked to the emergence of capitalism
and democracy in Europe. This had produced a mass of
people who wanted to consume different goods and to
feel a sense of political pride—imperialism was a solution to both problems for them.
Du Bois’s work, and that of others around him such
as the Howard School (Vitalis 2015), however, was not
retained as part of the canon of IR. For various reasons,
not least the chilling political climate associated with
the cold war in the West, anti-colonial and postcolonial thinking did not receive much attention on its own
terms in the field of IR until the 1990s. At most, people
were familiar with dependency theory and conventional accounts of decolonization such as that of Hedley
Bull (1984). However, following work in the 1990s by
Roxanne Doty (1993), Sankaran Krishna (1993), Siba
Chapter 11 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches
Grovogui (1996), and Phillip Darby and A. J. Paolini
(1994), postcolonial and decolonial approaches began
to flourish in the field from the 2000s onwards.
11.5.1 International relations theory
One major line of attack was on conventional
International Relations theory. Scholars such as
Krishna (2001) argued that IR theory abstracted too
much from reality when it treated states as independent
units and only wrote about the Western states. This
enabled IR scholarship to depict the nineteenth century as a ‘Hundred Years’ Peace’ in the international
system, for example, completely ignoring the dynamics
of empire. It also allowed a view of international law
that saw it as part of the civilizing influence of the West
(Grovogui 1996). By contrast, viewed from the perspective of colonized peoples, the nineteenth century was
anything but peaceful, involving the violent, sometimes
genocidal, suppression of resistance to imperial control. Instruments such as international law and trade
were not developed because the West was naturally
civilizing, but because it was attempting to assert sovereign rule over non-European spaces on sea and land.
From this perspective, International Relations theory
was part of the problem of imperial violence, allowing
Western intellectuals to sanitize and limit their understanding of international order through selective forgetting, especially the forgetting of commitments made
by colonizing powers (see Case Study 11.2).
Case Study 11.2 Indigenous peoples between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’
Anti-pipeline protesters hang protest signs on a blocked
train in solidary with the Wet’suwet’en nation
© Puffin’s Pictures / Alamy Stock Photo
Our common impression of the modern nation-state in
International Relations is of a territorially bounded, fully sovereign
entity containing a group of people (i.e. a ‘nation’) who are citizens
of the state, governed by a single set of laws. ‘Western’ states are
often seen to express these norms or expectations most fully.
However, many Western states, including Canada, the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand, are ‘settler states’, meaning
that they were built on territories expropriated from indigenous
peoples (see Box 11.3). Although the process of colonization violently and negatively impacted the presence of indigenous peoples, they were not fully eliminated, and continue to exist and
self-organize within and between settler states (Lightfoot 2021).
For example, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy (known to settlers as the Iroquois) is a political federation of five nations—the
Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca—whose
members are located across the borders of the settler states of
Canada and the United States, and which dates back to 1142 in
some records. Extremely powerful, particularly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it is widely understood that
the structures of shared decision-making and democracy in the
Confederacy influenced the drafters of the settler US Constitution.
However, as colonization expanded, the power and land of the
Haudenosaunee was challenged both militarily and politically.
Nonetheless, various treaties were signed by the settler governments with both the Confederacy and member nations which
recognized their sovereignty and their land rights in perpetuity, as
well as their rights to pass through territories separated by the settler border. But despite these treaties, the acquisition of indigenous
land has continued, albeit in a highly contested way, over the centuries. Indigenous peoples affirm in many areas that territories are
‘unceded’—i.e. that their settlement was never legally agreed.
In 2007, after several decades of negotiation, the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was
adopted by the General Assembly. Although the US, Canada,
New Zealand, and Australia initially opposed the resolution, they
later came to adopt it and in principle incorporate it into law.
The Declaration affirms the right of collective self-determination
for indigenous people, their land rights, their cultural rights, their
rights to custodianship of their children, and so on. Alongside
historic treaty rights, indigenous law, and international human
rights norms, the Declaration now forms part of the international
and national legal infrastructure which is supposed to ensure the
rights of indigenous peoples.
Canada has recently attempted a reconciliation process
between settlers and indigenous peoples to recognize the violence and dispossession that has attended their relationship over
time, such as the forcible enrolment of indigenous children in
violent residential schools over more than a century and the disappearance and abuse of indigenous women and girls. However,
the Canadian government continues to support fossil fuel and
mining companies in their use of indigenous land and water supplies, even though indigenous peoples have highlighted its illegality and severe health and environmental consequences.
Question 1: Should relations between settler colonial states and
indigenous peoples be understood as a form of ‘international
relations’?
Question 2: How do indigenous practices of sovereignty-making
change how we understand sovereignty?
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Other scholars further developed the idea that
Eurocentric or colonial thinking was a constitutive part
of Western IR theory, and even forms of ‘critical’ theory
(Gruffydd Jones 2006; Hobson 2012; Sabaratnam 2013).
They argued that many theories created a mythologized
image of the West (either positive or negative) which
was then the only focus of attention in developing the
theory. This persistent tendency to look ‘inwards’, to
have a stereotyped understanding of the West, and to
ignore the rest of the world (except as areas where the
West might project power) meant that IR had a limited
understanding of the world. These tendencies sustain a
white-racialized positioning in IR theory (Sabaratnam
2020). Many postcolonial and decolonial scholars in
IR have suggested alternatives. These include taking
an approach to historical development which incorporates non-Western political, economic, and military
formations (Bhambra 2007; Zarakol 2010; Phillips and
Sharman 2015), studying the thought, perspectives,
and practices of people and scholars outside the West
(Shilliam 2010, 2015; Tickner and Blaney 2012, 2013;
Persaud and Sajed 2018), imagining different geographical starting points for analysis (Ling 2002, 2013; Laffey
and Weldes 2008; Acharya 2014b; Niang 2018), and
widening our understanding of where ‘politics’ takes
place (Agathangelou and Ling 2009). These different
mechanisms can help widen perspectives and historical understandings. The similarities and differences
between postcolonial and decolonial approaches compared to other approaches in IR are given in Table 11.1.
11.5.2 Alternative takes on mainstream
issues
A second aspect of research has been to study specific
‘traditional’ issues in world politics through postcolonial and decolonial approaches. A significant early
work in this vein was Roxanne Doty’s book Imperial
Encounters (1996) on US foreign policy. Most conventional views of US foreign policy in IR at the time
were either realist or liberal, with some looking at
bureaucratic elements in foreign policy-making. Doty,
however, demonstrated, using a form of discourse
analysis, that aspects of US foreign policy, as well as
that of Britain, were enabled by imperial, racialized
representations of the Philippines and Kenya. These
representations were a critical factor in enabling specific foreign policy options to be pursued. In a related
vein, Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes (2008) examine
the Cuban Missile Crisis from the perspectives of its
Cuban participants, rather than those of the US and
Soviet strategists. Seen in this light, the missile crisis
Table 11.1 Similarities and differences between postcolonial and decolonial IR compared to other IR theories
Theory
Similarities
Differences from this theory
Realism
Agree on the self-interested character of elites and
states, and the centrality of power
Emphasize system as hierarchical and imperial rather
than anarchic and sovereign, and power as much
more multifaceted
Liberalism
Agree that cooperation is possible and durable
Emphasize that cooperation is only generally among
states considered ‘developed’/‘civilized’ for the
purposes of securing their privileges
Marxism
Agree in general that capitalism is a major
organizing structure in world politics and that its
tendencies are exploitative and immiserating
Emphasize roles of racialization and colonial
expansion in determining the character and pattern
of exploitation (such as enslavement of Africans, poor
conditions for workers in Asia)
Feminism
Agree that patriarchy is a major element in
structuring international politics
Emphasize (as many feminists do) that gender
intersects with race, class, and nationality in
producing structures of power/entitlement
Constructivism
Agree that the world is ‘socially constructed’ in
important ways—particular images produce political
possibilities (for example, portrayal of Muslims as
violent/irrational)
Emphasize the asymmetric, colonial, and purposive
character of these constructions
Poststructuralism
Agree with critique of knowledge and power as
being always intertwined, and the idea of meaning
as being intertextually produced
Emphasize the material as well as discursive character
of oppression, exploitation, and violence, plus the
importance of strategic essentialism in advancing
critical claims (rather than only deconstruction)
Chapter 11 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches
is not a surprising example of nuclear brinksmanship,
but rather its causes are seen in the series of attempts
made by the US in the 1950s and 1960s to destabilize
the Cuban government.
The utility of postcolonial and decolonial approaches
to world politics became more pronounced in light of
the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001
and the global war on terror that ensued. Following
these attacks, conservative and liberal US intellectuals
actively encouraged the US to see itself as a benevolent kind of empire and to embrace the assertion of its
power in different spaces. Leftist intellectuals, however, attacked the US for its imperialist policy towards
the Middle East, which they considered illegitimate,
criticizing the 2003 invasion of Iraq in particular.
Postcolonial and decolonial scholars were, however,
able to contextualize US policy in a longer historical
structure of imperial and colonial power in Iraq and
Afghanistan (Gregory 2004; Khalili 2012; Manchanda
2017), demonstrating the significance of those relations
to the kinds of decisions made about the region, including the techniques of counter-insurgency (see Case
Study 11.1).
11.5.3 Retrieving the (formerly) colonized
as subjects of IR
A third area of research paid attention to the histories,
ideas, and practices of (formerly) colonized peoples
around the world. This aimed both to deal with the
problem of their neglect in the discipline, as well as
to demonstrate the alternative possibilities for politics
that could be understood within them. A significant
body of decolonial work in this area has been produced by Robbie Shilliam (2006, 2011, 2015; see Ch.
18), who examines the political thought and practice
of the descendants of enslaved Africans around the
world. This examination reveals alternative forms of
sovereignty, rights, solidarity, and justice which are
attentive to histories of colonial violence and the possibilities of rethinking the ‘human’. The work serves as
a counterpoint to liberal narratives that see ideas for
emancipation, rights, and solidarity as fundamentally
Western in their origins and orientations.
Other work in the field has emphasized the ways in
which postcolonial/colonized subjects present alternative ways of thinking about international issues (this
is similar to ‘border thinking’; see Section 11.4.7). For
example, Rahul Rao (2010) has looked at Third World
cosmopolitanisms as a series of creative responses to
the twin problems of nationalism and imperialism.
For Rao, these thinkers demonstrate that it is possible
to address conundrums in international ethics usually
posed as an opposition between the domestic and the
international (see also Gruffydd Jones 2010; Jabri 2012).
More widely, postcolonial and decolonial scholars have
thought about how starting with the perspectives and
worldviews of the colonized can build alternative forms
of theory and structural analysis about world politics
(Blaney and Tickner 2017; Sabaratnam 2017).
Key Points
and empire were central to the early discipline
• Colonialism
of IR, particularly among African-American thinkers such
as Du Bois and the Howard School, but were later ignored
by the central traditions in the field.
cold war environment meant that criticisms of the
• The
West were often suppressed because of a real or imagined
relationship with communism, which had a chilling effect
on the development of International Relations as a field of
study.
and decolonial scholarship in international
• Postcolonial
relations has been growing steadily since the 1990s
alongside other critical traditions, with an increasing
presence of scholars with heritage in the Global South.
and decolonial scholarship has challenged
• Postcolonial
mainstream IR theory in terms of its fundamental
categories and assumptions, developed alternative
readings of particular issue-areas such as war and security,
and paid attention to the political thought of (formerly)
colonized people as a basis for analysing global order. As
such, it offers many alternative perspectives from which to
view central problems in the field.
11.6 Decolonization: the struggle continues?
It is an interesting historical fact that the rise of postcolonial and decolonial approaches has continued, and
perhaps even grown, several decades after many countries successfully claimed political independence from
European empires. This has coincided with the fall of
many leaders associated with decolonization struggles,
either through death or a political fall from their image
as liberator (such as Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe). It
has also coincided with the growth of many countries
in the Global South to positions of relative wealth and
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power, such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa.
In fact some of these countries are themselves accused
of acting in an ‘imperial’ manner towards others. What
do postcolonial and decolonial approaches have to offer
in an era of relatively decreasing Western power?
One set of contributions reflects the continued persistence of imperial relations in different aspects of
world order. These are readily apparent when examining such diverse issues as the composition and practice
of the UN Security Council, the debates about nuclear
disarmament, negotiations about the environment,
trade, and international law, the militarization of the
Middle East, the conditions of aid and development, the
debates around Brexit, the resurgence of extreme rightwing views, the conduct of war, and the regimes around
migration. For postcolonial and decolonial approaches,
in each case the field is structured through the assumptions of Western superiority and rationality developed
during the colonial period, and through forms of collaboration among formerly imperial powers.
Moreover, the conceptual tools developed by postcolonial and decolonial approaches may also be critically
applied to the behaviour of non-Western governments.
For example, farmers’ movements and Green movements in Brazil have criticized the alliance between
their own governments, foreign governments, multinational corporations, and Western-dominated international organizations for the state of environmental
policy and food policy. For these groups, all members of these alliances are complicit in a form of neocolonial management of land across the world.
Relatedly, an explosion in anti-racist movements
and activities across the world has also generated
more interest in the global and historical dimensions
of empire and colonialism. Movements such as
#RhodesMustFall/#FeesMustFall on South African
university campuses and #BlackLivesMatter in the
United States have inspired many students across the
globe to take issue with the colonial foundations of
their education and other forms of racial injustice on
campus. The ongoing drowning of thousands of Middle
Eastern and African migrants in the Mediterranean
at the borders of the European Union has also drawn
attention to the double standards at work in the global
human rights regime when it comes to the difference
between white and non-white lives.
Key Points
and decolonial approaches have remained
• Postcolonial
popular despite the achievement of political
independence, the fall in popularity and stature of
anti-colonial leaders, and the rise of non-Western powers
such as China, India, and Brazil.
and decolonial approaches seek to explain
• Postcolonial
many features of the contemporary world order through a
consideration of relations of imperialism and colonialism,
which they see as persisting in global institutions,
international trade, identities in the West, arms control,
and other issues.
decolonization struggles have turned against
• Increasingly,
non-Western governments for their continuation of, or
complicity with, forms of colonial development, such as in
the struggles over land in Brazil and education in South
Africa.
are ongoing political struggles which link their
• There
objectives to the overturning of imperial and colonial
hierarchies, particularly where these relate to the unequal
and violent treatment of people who are racialized as
non-white in both ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ contexts.
11.7 Conclusion
Postcolonial and decolonial approaches consider the
study of world politics at many different levels. At the level
of theory in IR, they draw attention to the categories that
are used, the way that knowledge is constructed, and the
histories that are remembered and forgotten. For these
approaches, International Relations has been too ready
to ignore its imperial origins, the questions of racism and
colonialism in the constitution of international order,
and the ongoing inequalities that have been produced.
Postcolonial and decolonial research has, however, sought
to retrieve these and bring about a more globally comprehensive perspective on the foundations of world order.
Historically speaking, postcolonial and decolonial approaches have emerged in a close relationship
with the political struggles for decolonization from
European rule in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many do not believe that a politically neutral
approach to international relations can exist per se,
although there can be better and worse understandings
of what is going on in the world. Postcolonial and decolonial approaches are generally sympathetic to ethical
interests in promoting a more equal world order, or at
least one in which colonialism and racism become less
powerful.
Chapter 11 Postcolonial and decolonial approaches
The key intellectual challenge ahead for postcolonial and decolonial approaches will be to see how
the heralded geopolitical shifts in power between
West and East affect the behaviour of states and
other international actors. Will new powers in the
East remember their struggles for decolonization
and make a new set of rules for running the world?
Or will they conform to existing imperial patterns
of power and domination? Either way, postcolonial
and decolonial approaches will have much to offer
the understanding of world politics for some time to
come.
Questions
1. Where did postcolonial ideas begin?
2. What are the main differences between postcolonial and decolonial approaches?
3. Is there a difference between the ideas that influence political activists involved in
decolonization struggles and the academic approaches to decolonization?
4. Is it fair to say that International Relations is a colonial discipline?
5. Is it possible to ‘decolonize’ International Relations?
6. Who are the main driving forces behind ‘decolonizing’ the field?
7. Does neo-colonialism present the same ethical problems as formal colonialism?
8. Can we separate the effects of capitalism from the effects of colonialism?
9. ‘Decolonization is not a metaphor’ (Tuck and Yang 2012). Discuss with reference to
education.
10. With which other theories in IR are postcolonial and decolonial approaches most
compatible?
Visit the online resources to test your understanding by trying the self-test questions.
Further Reading
Barkawi, T., and Laffey, M. (2006), ‘The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies’, Review of
International Studies, 32(2): 329–52. A critical examination of Eurocentric tendencies in
mainstream studies of security.
Doty, R. L. (1996), Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North–South Relations
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press). An analysis of foreign policy discourses in
the US and UK which explores questions of racialization and imperialism.
Du Bois, W. E. B. (1915), ‘The African Roots of War’, The Atlantic, 115(5): 707–14. An early critique
of the failure to account for the colonial origins of inter-imperial competition in the First World
War.
Fanon, F. (2001 [1965]), The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington (London: Penguin).
A rousing analytical polemic working through the challenges of decolonization, the problem of
violence, and the future to come.
Gruffydd Jones, B. (2006), Decolonizing International Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield). A collection of work from scholars in International Relations examining diverse
colonial dynamics in the field and proposing analytic alternatives.
Krishna, S. (2001), ‘Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations’, Alternatives:
Global, Local, Political, 26(4): 401–24. An engaged critique of dominant narratives in
international relations which brings colonial violence into view.
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Lugones, M. (2007), ‘Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System’, Hypatia, 22(1):
186–219. A prominent statement of the relationship between coloniality as a structure and its
remaking of gender relations in South America.
Mignolo, W. D. (2011), The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press). A historical-philosophical critique of modernity as always
constituted by coloniality.
Sabaratnam, M. (2017), Decolonising Intervention: International Statebuilding in Mozambique
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield). A critique of Eurocentric debates in critical International
Relations and a reconstruction of analysis using decolonizing methods.
Sabaratnam, M. (2020), ‘Is IR Theory White? Racialised Subject-Positioning in Three Canonical
Texts’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 49(1): 3–31. An examination of foundational
International Relations through the lens of critical race theory.
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
Chapter 12
Poststructuralism
lene hansen
Framing Questions
●
Does language matter for international relations?
●
Do all states have the same identity?
●
Is the state the most important actor in world politics today?
Reader’s Guide
This chapter focuses on poststructuralism, one of the
international relations perspectives furthest away from
the realist and liberal mainstream. Poststructuralists in
International Relations (IR) draw on a larger body of
philosophical texts known as poststructuralism. They
argue that the state stands at the centre of world politics
and that we should understand the state as a particular
form of political community. This challenges mainstream
IR’s conception of the state as a rational actor driven by
a self-help imperative and relative or absolute gains.
Poststructuralism argues that this conception is ahistorical and that it marginalizes non- and trans-state actors,
stateless people, and those persecuted by ‘their own’
states. The central status that the state now has is not
inevitable, but rather the result of political and academic
practices that reproduce this status. Poststructuralists
hold that foreign policies always imply a particular representation of our and others’ identities. These identities
have no fixed meaning, but are constituted in language.
Using the concept of discourse, poststructuralists argue
that material ‘things’ only come to have meaning as
they are represented by particular words and images.
Poststructuralists also argue that world politics is practised not only by governments and international organizations, but through popular culture including film,
video games, and television shows.
Visit the online resources to access an
interactive timeline of how the discipline of
International Relations has evolved.
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12.1 Introduction
Like constructivism, poststructuralism became part
of International Relations (IR) in the 1980s (see Ch. 13).
And similar to constructivists, poststructuralists in
IR were influenced by social and philosophical theory,
which had played a major role in the humanities since
the 1970s. Politically, the second cold war’s domination
of the early and mid-1980s impacted poststructuralists,
who feared that the two blocs would destroy each other
in a nuclear holocaust (see Ch. 4). Poststructuralists
held that the key to the cold war lay in the enemy constructions that both East and West promoted. The cold
war is now long gone, but poststructuralism is still very
much focused on high politics (themes high on the
foreign policy agenda, such as war, security, and the
military), and it maintains a concern with states’ constructions of threats and enemies.
Poststructuralists bring a critical perspective to the
study of world politics in two important respects. They
are critical of the way that most states conduct their
foreign policies and how most IR theories tell us to
study what states do. Poststructuralists disagree with
realism (see Ch. 9) that we should see the state as a
self-help actor or as a unit that stays the same through
history. Rather, the state is a particular way of understanding political community—that is, who we can
trust and who we feel we have something in common
with (see Ch. 31). Likewise, if the international system is anarchic, it is because states and other actors
reproduce this system, not because it is a given, once
and for all. Poststructuralism wants us to take seriously what existing policies and theories exclude and
marginalize, and it tells us to think critically about how
we construct the world. To poststructuralists, there is
no objective yardstick that we can use to define threats,
dangers, enemies, or underdevelopment. We need to
investigate how constructions of the world, and the
people and places in it, make particular policies seem
natural and therefore legitimate.
12.2 Studying the social world
Because poststructuralism adopts a critical attitude
to world politics, it raises questions about ontology (what is in the world) and epistemology (how
we can know what is in the world). For students of
world politics, the most important ontological questions concern the state. Is the state the only actor that
really matters, or are non-state actors as—or more—
important? Does the state that we know today act in
essentially the same terms as states in the past, or are
the historical changes so important that we need specific theories for other times and places? Are states
able to change their views of others from hostility
and fear to collaboration? As you have learned from
previous chapters, there has never been a consensus
in IR on how to answer these ontological questions.
Realists hold that the self-help state is the essential
unit in international relations and that its drive
for power or security makes it impossible to move
beyond the risk of war (see Ch. 9). Liberalists (see
Ch. 7) disagree, arguing that states can build a more
cooperative and peaceful international system. Both
realism and liberalism agree, though, that the state is
the main building block.
Although ontological assumptions are absolutely
central for how we think about the world, scholars and
students often go about studying world politics without
giving ontology much thought. That is because it comes
into view only when theories with different ontological
assumptions clash. As long as one works within the same
paradigm, there is no need to discuss one’s basic assumptions, and energy can be devoted to more specific questions. For example, instead of discussing what it requires
to be a state, one tests whether democratic states are
more or less likely to form alliances than non-democratic
ones. One of the strengths of poststructuralism has been
to call attention to how much the ontological assumptions we make about the state actually matter for how we
view the world, and for the more specific explanations of
world politics that we formulate.
Poststructuralism also brings epistemology—
questions of knowledge—to the fore. As with ontology,
the importance of epistemology is clearest when theories clash over which understanding should be adopted.
Mainstream approaches adopt a positivist epistemology.
They strive to find the causal relations that ‘rule’ world
politics, working with dependent and independent variables. In the case of democratic peace theory, for example, this implies a research agenda where the impact
of state type (democratic/non-democratic) on foreign
policy behaviour (going to war or not) can be tested
systematically (see Chs 7 and 15). Poststructuralists, by
contrast, embrace a post-positivist epistemology. They
Chapter 12 Poststructuralism
Box 12.1 Causal and constitutive theories—
the example of piracy
Causal and constitutive theories produce different research
questions, and thus create different research agendas. Taking
the example of contemporary piracy, a causal theory might
ask: ‘what explains variation in the level of piracy in different
states in the Global South? Is the cause economic deprivation,
military capabilities, or failed political structures?’ A constitutive theory asks instead: ‘which activities are being included
when governments define piracy? And do such definitions
constitute military measures as legitimate policy responses?’
argue that the social world is so far removed from the
hard sciences where causal epistemologies originate that
we cannot understand world politics through cause–
effect relationships. Compared to constructivists, who
adopt a concept of causality as structural pressure, poststructuralists hold that causality conceptualized as such
is inappropriate, not because there are no such things as
structures, but because these structures are constituted
through human action. Structures cannot therefore
be independent variables (see Box 12.1). Constitutive
theories are still theories, not just descriptions or stories about the world, because they define theoretical concepts, explain how they hang together, and instruct us on
how to use them in analysis of world politics. Thus it is
not easier or less rigorous to develop non-causal, constitutive theories; it is just different.
The distinction between causal and non-causal theories is also captured by the distinction between explanatory theories and constitutive theories. As you read
through the literature on world politics, you will encounter other labels that point to much the same things,
with causal–constitutive, explanatory–constitutive, and
foundationalist–anti-foundationalist being the most
common ones. Foundationalists hold that we can say
whether something is true or not if we examine the facts;
anti-foundationalists, by contrast, hold that what counts
as ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ differ from theory to theory, and that
we cannot therefore find ‘the’ truth. Different IR theories
take different views on whether we can and should agree
on one set of facts, and thus on whether we should adopt
a foundationalist position. Explanatory, positivist theories
are usually foundationalist, and constitutive, non-positivist
theories are usually anti-foundationalist. Because poststructuralism argues in favour of a constitutive, post-positivist,
anti-foundationalist position, it is seen as one of the most
alternative approaches in IR.
Epistemology is also important at a more concrete
level of analysis, because one’s epistemology leads one
to select different kinds of ‘facts’ and to treat them
differently. To take the example of ethnic war, realist
and liberal analyses look for the factors that explain
why ethnic wars occur. Here, the relevant facts are
the number of ethnic wars, where and when they took
place, and facts we hypothesize might explain them: for
instance, forms of government or economic capabilities. Poststructuralism, by contrast, asks what calling
something an ‘ethnic war’ implies for our understanding of the war and the policies that could be used to
stop it. Here, the facts come from texts that document
different actors’ use of ‘war labels’.
Key Points
raise questions about ontology and
• Poststructuralists
epistemology.
is critical of statism and of taking the
• Poststructuralism
anarchical system as fixed and timeless.
• Poststructuralism adopts a constitutive epistemology.
count as facts depends on the ontological and
• What
epistemological assumptions a theory makes.
12.3 Poststructuralism as a political philosophy
As mentioned in the Introduction, IR poststructuralists bring philosophical ideas and concepts to the study
of world politics. Some of the leading poststructuralist
philosophers were French, and many of their ideas about
identity, power, and conflict developed in the context of
the decolonization of the French empire, especially the
wars of Algerian independence. Poststructuralist concepts
can be quite complex and hard to explain, but let us begin
with four of them that have been particularly influential:
discourse, deconstruction, genealogy, and intertextuality.
12.3.1 Discourse
Poststructuralism holds that language is essential to
how we make sense of the world. Language is social
because we cannot make our thoughts understandable
to others without a set of shared codes. This is captured by the concept of discourse, which the prominent French philosopher Michel Foucault defined as a
linguistic system that orders statements and concepts.
Foucault introduced his concept of discourse in the
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late 1960s, in part as a critique of Marxist theories that
privileged economic structures. This, to poststructuralist theorists like Foucault, overlooked the way in
which humans use language to make sense of the social
world in ways that are not determined by the economy.
Politically, language is significant because politicians—
and other actors relevant to world politics—must legitimate their foreign policies to audiences at home and
abroad. The words we use to describe something are
not neutral, and the choice of one term over another
has political implications. To take an example, if what
happens in a place is described as ‘a genocide’, there
is a strong moral pressure on the international community to ‘do something’, but not if what happens is
described as ‘tribal warfare’.
As this example demonstrates, poststructuralism
understands language not as a neutral transmitter, but
as producing meaning. Things do not have an objective
meaning independently of how we constitute them in
language. This does not mean that things do not happen
in the real world—for instance, if someone fires a loaded
gun at you, then you will get hurt. But it does mean that
there is no given essence to ‘a thing’ or ‘an event’: is the
shooting an accident, an attack, or divine retribution for
something bad you did? The possible meanings that can
be assigned to a specific event thus depend on the discourses that are available. For example, we might attribute an illness such as a heart attack to either our lifestyle
(how we eat, live, drink, and exercise), or to our genes
(which we cannot do much about), or to divine punishment. Using the concept of discourse, we can say that
heart attacks are constituted differently within a ‘lifestyle
discourse’, a ‘genetic discourse’, and a ‘religious discourse’.
Each discourse provides different views of the body, what
can be done to prevent disease, and thus what policies of
disease prevention should be adopted. Poststructuralists
stress that discourses are not the same as ideas, and that
materiality or ‘the real world’ is not abandoned (see Box
12.2). To take materiality seriously means, for example,
that advances in health technologies can change the way
that discourses construct those afflicted by heart attacks
or other diseases such as cancer or HIV/AIDS. Video and
photography can also be understood as a way of communicating the materiality of what is taking place at a given
point in time (see Case Study 12.1).
Box 12.2 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe
on the materiality of discourse
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external
to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in
the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will.
But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of
‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends
upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not
that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects
outside any discursive condition of emergence . . . we will affirm
the material character of every discursive structure. To argue the
opposite is to accept the very classical dichotomy between an
objective field constituted outside of any discursive intervention,
and a discourse consisting of the pure expression of thought.
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108; emphasis in original)
Case Study 12.1 Discourses, images, and the victory of the Taliban regime
A United States Air Force plane taking off from Kabul
airport, Afghanistan, August 2021
© Verified UGC via AP
On 16 August 2021 a short video caught the world’s attention. It showed dramatic scenes of people hanging onto a plane
belonging to the United States Air Force as it took off from the
airport in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. At the end of the
video, at least two people could be seen falling to their deaths.
As the Taliban regime had taken control of Afghanistan, and at
a faster pace than anticipated, many Afghans were trying to flee
the country. The airport in Kabul, still under American control,
became the place to get out.
The video from 16 August was a particularly striking example
of the videos and photographs that were documenting events
at the Kabul airport. Those images provided a way of representing ‘Afghans’ not as a general, abstract group of people, but as
living human beings. The images from the airport also showed
that the American exit from Afghanistan was hurried, chaotic
even. As such, they were a challenge to dominant American—and
Chapter 12 Poststructuralism
Western—discourses which normally constitute their armies as
being powerful and in control. From a poststructuralist theoretical perspective, images can play central roles in supporting and
questioning foreign policy discourses.
Later on the same day, President Biden gave a long speech
on the situation in Afghanistan (Biden 2021a). He described the
scenes as ‘gut-wrenching’, particularly for those Americans who
had spent ‘time on the ground working to support the Afghan
people’. Biden echoed a general discourse in Western media
which constituted the images as showing how truly desperate Afghans were to get out of Afghanistan and how much they
feared the incoming Taliban regime. Some asked whether the US
and other countries should be leaving Afghanistan, handing over
the country to a regime which had terrorized the population 20
years earlier.
This was not the discourse that Biden adopted. He was adamant that leaving Afghanistan was the right decision. As the
president of the United States, Biden held that his goal was
to pursue the ‘only vital national interest’ of America—that is,
‘preventing a terrorist attack on American homeland’. Looking
back on past policies, Biden argued that the US should not
have attempted to conduct ‘nation-building’ in Afghanistan.
What was happening in Afghanistan right at that moment was a
product of Afghan political leaders fleeing and Afghan military
12.3.2 Deconstruction
To see language as a set of codes means that words (or
signs) make sense only in relation to other words. We
cannot know what ‘horse’ means unless that word is
connected to other words: ‘animal’, ‘furry’, ‘hoofed’,
and ‘fast’. Moreover, we know what something is only
by comparing it to something it is not. A ‘horse’ is not
‘human’, ‘feathered’, ‘legless’, or ‘slow’. To see language
as connected signs underscores the structural side of
poststructuralism (see Box 12.3).
What differentiates poststructuralism from structuralism (or more precisely structural linguistics) is
that poststructuralism sees sign structures as unstable because connections among words are never given
once and for all. To take the ‘horse’, it might be ‘an
animal’, but in many situations it is seen as more
‘human’ than ‘real animals’ such as ‘pigs’ or ‘worms’.
Its ‘animalness’ is itself unstable and given through
other signs at a given time and place. This might at
first seem quite far removed from world politics, but
it tells us that the ways we describe events, places,
peoples, and states are neither neutral nor given by
the things themselves. For example, in 2002, when
President George W. Bush spoke about an ‘axis of
evil ’ threatening the Western world, this implied a
radical difference between the US and the countries
forces ‘not willing to fight for themselves’ even though America
had provided them with ‘every tool they could need’. American
troops should not, in short, ‘fight on endlessly in another . . .
country’s civil war’.
Protecting the rights of Afghan women and children played a
central role when the West intervened in 2001 (Shepherd 2006).
Because of the traditional constitution of ‘women and children’
as subjects worthy of protection, they figured strongly in discussions in August 2021 of how the international community should
respond to the return of the Taliban regime (see Section 17.5).
What was noteworthy in Biden’s speech was that he made a brief
reference to his continued support for ‘the Afghan people’ and
the basic rights of ‘women and girls’, but only a vague gesture
to ‘diplomacy, our international influence, and our humanitarian
aid’ as ways to protect such rights.
Question 1: What theory/theories of world politics is Biden articulating in his speech?
Question 2: What is the relationship between the following subjects in Biden’s speech: ‘Afghan political leaders’, ‘Afghan forces’,
‘the Afghan people’, and ‘Afghan women and children’? Is it possible to identify an unstable relationship between some of these
subjects?
Box 12.3 ‘Postmodernism’ and
‘poststructuralism’
Poststructuralism does not mean ‘anti-structuralism’, but a
philosophical position that developed out of structuralism
. . ., a position which in many ways shares more with structuralism than with its opponents.
(Wæver 2002: 23)
‘Postmodernism’ refers to a historical period (usually after the
Second World War) and also to a direction in art, literature,
and architecture; it is used to describe new empirical phenomena such as ‘postmodern war’ [see Ch. 14]. In contrast,
poststructuralism refers to a body of thought that is not confined to a specific historical period. Poststructuralism and
postmodernism are often conflated by non-poststructuralists
in International Relations.
(D. Campbell 2007: 211–12)
(Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) claimed to make up
this axis.
The French philosopher Jacques Derrida’s theory
of deconstruction posits that language is made up of
dichotomies, for instance between the developed and
the underdeveloped, the modern and the pre-modern,
the civilized and the barbaric. These dichotomies are
not ‘neutral’, because in each case one term is superior to the other. There is a clear hierarchy between the
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developed–modern–civilized on the one hand and the
underdeveloped–pre-modern–barbaric on the other.
Deconstruction shows how such dichotomies make
something look like an objective description—for
instance how developed a country is—although it is in
fact a structured set of values. Poststructuralists disagree on whether one might describe deconstruction as
a methodology (see Box 12.4), but agree that a central
goal is to problematize dichotomies, show how they
work, and thereby open up alternative ways to understand world politics.
12.3.3 Genealogy
Genealogy is another of Foucault’s concepts, defined
as a ‘history of the present’. Foucault drew on earlier
writings on genealogy by the late-nineteenth-century
German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche—
and Foucault—held that a key element of the European
tradition is to speak of history as having clear beginnings and endings. This, however, makes a far too
homogeneous story out of what are in fact gradual,
contested, and often forgotten histories. A main aim of
genealogy in the tradition of Nietzsche is to draw attention to the politics that are involved in making history
look a particular way. Genealogy starts from something contemporary, say climate change (see Ch. 24),
Box 12.4 Views on poststructuralist
methodology
Poststructuralists differ in their assessment of whether a poststructuralist methodology is possible and desirable.
Lene Hansen holds that
Many of the methodological questions that poststructuralist
discourse analysis confronts are those that face all academic
work: what should be the focus of analysis?, how should
a research design be built around it?, and how is a body of
material and data selected that facilitates a qualitatively and
quantitatively reliable answer? Poststructuralism’s focus on discourses as articulated in written and spoken text calls in addition for particular attention to the methodology of reading
(how are identities identified within foreign policy texts and
how should the relationship between opposing discourses
be studied?) and the methodology of textual selection (which
forums and types of text should be chosen and how many
should be included?).
(L. Hansen 2006: 2)
Others, including Rita Floyd, are more sceptical, holding that
‘Derrida would have been fundamentally opposed to even the
possibility’ (Floyd 2007: 216).
and asks two questions: what political practices have
formed the present and which alternative understandings and discourses have been marginalized and often
forgotten? A genealogy of climate change might start
by asking who are allowed to speak and make decisions
at events such as the United Nations Climate Change
Conferences. Then it asks what constructions of ‘the
climate’ and ‘global responsibility’ are dominant, and
how these constructions relate to past discourses. By
looking into the past, we see alternative ways to conceptualize humans’ relationship with ‘the climate’ and
gain an understanding of the discursive and material
structures that underpin the present.
12.3.3.1 The concept of power
The concepts of genealogy and discourse point us
towards Foucault’s conception of power. Power, to
Foucault, is ‘productive’: it comes about when discourses constitute particular subject positions as the
‘natural’ ones. ‘Actors’ therefore do not exist outside
discourse; they are produced through discourse and
need to be recognized by others. We can see such actorrecognition processes unfold when oppositional movements challenge existing governments, as occurred
during the Arab Spring, making the question of who
represents ‘the people’ become crucial. It is also an
instance of power when states and institutions establish themselves as having the knowledge to govern a
particular issue. Knowledge is not opposed to power—
as in the classical phrase ‘speaking truth to power’—
but is integral to power itself. As a concrete example,
take the way Western scholars have ‘gained knowledge’ about non-Western peoples by describing them
as inferior, backward, underdeveloped, and sometimes
threatening. This takes for granted that a foreign identity exists and that it can be studied (see Ch. 11). More
broadly, to speak from a position of knowledge is to
exercise authority over a given issue.
Poststructuralists in IR have also picked up one of
Foucault’s more specific conceptualizations of power:
that of ‘biopower’. Biopower works at two levels: at
the individual level we are told to discipline and control our bodies, and at the collective level we find that
governments and other institutions seek to manage
whole populations (Epstein 2007). A good example of
biopolitics is that of population control, where states
have promoted such ‘body-disciplining’ practices as
abstinence from sex before marriage and use of contraceptives in an attempt to reduce the number of births
or prevent particular groups of women from getting
Chapter 12 Poststructuralism
pregnant. Practices targeted at the individual are built
around the idea that there is ‘a’ population that can be
studied and steered in a particular direction.
It is clear that poststructuralism’s concept of power
goes beyond that of realism, which defines power as
material capabilities (see Ch. 9). Compared to constructivism, which also considers knowledge and
identities (see Ch. 13), poststructuralism looks more
critically at how actors get to be constituted as actors in
the first place. One of the key issues in the discussions
over poststructuralism as an approach to international
relations is whether it provides a good account of the
way that materiality and power impact world politics
(see Opposing Opinions 12.1).
12.3.4 Intertextuality
The theory on intertextuality was developed by the
semiotic theorist Julia Kristeva. It argues that we can
understand the social world as comprised of texts. This
is because texts form an ‘intertext’—that is, they are connected to texts that came before them. In some situations
this is self-evident. Take, for example, declarations made
by international institutions such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union
(EU), and the United Nations, which quote previous
declarations and perhaps statements by member countries. But intertextual relations are also made in more
abstract ways. For example, to say that ‘the Balkans’ is
filled with ‘ancient hatred’ is to draw on a body of texts
that constitutes ‘the Balkans’ as pre-modern and barbaric.
Intertextuality might also involve images, or interpretations of events that are not exclusively written or spoken.
For instance, when presidents meet in front of television
cameras expressing their commitment to solve international crises, we look not just at what is said but at what
having such a meeting signifies. The presidential press
conference is, in other words, an important ‘sign’ within
Opposing Opinions 12.1 Poststructuralism provides a good account of the role that materiality
and power play in world politics
For
Against
Material objects get their meaning through discourse. Taking
the hard case of nuclear weapons, it clearly matters which country has them: some countries are considered ‘safe’ owners, others
are not. For example, it is impossible to understand policies that
seek to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons without an
analysis of how ‘Iran’ is represented in discourse.
Material objects exist and matter independently of discourse.
Poststructuralists overly emphasize representations in language;
this causes them to overlook the importance of non-linguistic
factors. For example, there is a real threat that rising sea levels
will eradicate small island states such as Tuvalu, independently of
whether the threat is talked about or not.
Discourse is a form of power. Representations of states, institutions, and other actors in world politics are not neutral descriptions
that describe the world as it ‘really is’. For instance, to constitute
migrants drowning as they seek to cross the Mediterranean Sea as
a ‘tragedy’ provides a different representation than to constitute
such deaths as a product of ‘Fortress Europe’.
Discourses may overlook structures of power. Poststructuralism
misses differences in material power that are not put into language. For instance, gender-based violence is often not articulated by those subjected to such violence.
Foreign policies are justified through historical discourse.
Foreign policy discourse is saturated with references to history, for
example to ‘we’ as the legitimate inhabitants of a given territory.
Such historical claims are also practices of power and often deeply
politicized. For example, the Russian government has pointed to
the history of Crimea as supporting its ‘return’ to Russia in 2014.
Not all of history is constructed. Although history might be
contested from time to time, we should not dispense with the
idea that objective historical facts exist. For example, it is a fact
that around 8,000 men and boys were killed by Bosnian Serbian
forces at Srebrenica in July 1995.
1 Do you agree with critics that poststructuralism cannot be used to understand the materiality of issues such as nuclear weapons and
climate change?
2 What forms of power are most significant, in your view? What are the strengths and weaknesses of poststructuralism when analysing
those forms of power?
3 What role do historical facts—and representations of historical facts—play in the relationship between Russia and Ukraine, for example? What can you add to the debates over poststructuralism based on this case?
Visit the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle these questions.
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the larger text that defines diplomacy. Intertextuality also
implies that certain things are taken for granted because
previous texts have made the point so many times that
there is no need to state it again. If you read through
NATO documents from the cold war, you will find that
they might not necessarily mention the Soviet Union all
that much. That is because everyone at the time knew that
NATO’s main purpose was to deter the Soviet Union from
attacking members of NATO. Working with intertextuality, we should therefore ask ourselves what a given text
does not mention, either because it is taken for granted or
because it is too dangerous to say.
At the same time that intertextuality points to the
way in which texts always ‘quote’ past texts, it also holds
that individual texts are unique. No text is a complete
reproduction of an earlier one. Even when one text
incorporates another by quoting it in full, the new context modifies the older text. This is of significance to the
study of world politics because it underscores the fact
that meaning changes when texts are quoted by other
texts. Take the Muhammad cartoons that were printed
by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in September
2005. They have now been reproduced by many other
newspapers and on the internet, and many different
interpretations have been offered. If you look at the
cartoons today, you cannot therefore ‘read’ them in the
same way as when they were first published.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, became the subject of North Korean government protest and hacking
against Sony Pictures, the company that produced the
movie. Another reason why we should take popular
culture seriously—and why states do too—is that film,
television, music, and video are watched and listened
to by millions of people across the world. As the world
has become increasingly globalized, popular culture
can spread quickly from one place to another and new
media technologies, such as smartphones, Facebook,
and Twitter, have fundamentally changed who can produce the ‘texts’ of world politics. Think, for example, of
the photos showing inmates being abused by American
guards working at the Iraqi prison Abu Ghraib, which
caused a global uproar in 2004, and the videos of beheadings that circulate on the internet today. Finally, popular
culture provides us with complex, critical, and thoughtprovoking visions of world politics. For example, films
made about the Vietnam War such as The Deer Hunter
and First Blood (the first of the Rambo movies) helped
generate debate over the war itself and the traumas faced
by returning soldiers. Another example is the widely
acclaimed graphic novel Persepolis by Marjane Satrapi,
which shows what it was like growing up in Iran during
and after the revolution in 1979.
Key Points
concepts from poststructuralist philosophy have been
• Four
used to produce new knowledge about world politics:
12.3.4.1 Popular culture
The argument that we should understand world politics through the lens of intertextuality has prompted
poststructuralists to look at forms of text that are not
normally discussed by IR theories. James Der Derian
has studied the intertext of popular spy novels, journalism, and academic analysis (Der Derian 1992). Others,
including Michael J. Shapiro (1988, 1997) and Cynthia
Weber (2006), analyse television shows, film, and photography. Poststructuralists hold that there are several
reasons why we should pay attention to popular culture. For one, states take popular culture seriously, even
if it is ‘just fiction’. In 2014, the American comedy The
Interview, which features an assassination plot against
discourse, deconstruction, genealogy, and intertextuality.
look at world politics as discourse is to study the
• Tolinguistic
structures through which materiality is given
meaning.
argues that language is a system of
• Deconstruction
unstable dichotomies where one term is valued as
superior.
asks which political practices have formed the
• Genealogy
present and which alternative understandings and
discourses have been marginalized and forgotten.
holds that we can see world politics as
• Intertextuality
made up of texts, and that all texts refer to other texts yet
each is unique.
12.4 Deconstructing state sovereignty
Poststructuralists use the four key concepts (discourse, deconstruction, genealogy, and intertextuality) to answer the ‘big questions’ of IR. What is
the status of the state? Is the international system
doomed to recurring conf licts and power politics,
as realism holds? Or is it possible to move towards
more cooperative arrangements, as liberalism
argues?
Chapter 12 Poststructuralism
12.4.1 The inside–outside distinction
Poststructuralists agree with realists that the state is
absolutely central to world politics. Yet, in contrast
to realists, who take the state for granted, poststructuralists deconstruct the role the state plays in world
politics as well as in the academic field of IR. Arguing
that the state is not ‘a unit’ that has the same essence
across time and space, R. B. J. Walker (1990) holds
that the state is a particular way to organize political
community. The question of political community is of
utmost importance to national as well as international
politics because it tells us why the forms of governance
that are in place are legitimate, who we can trust,
who we have something in common with, and who
we should help if they are under attack, suffering, or
hungry (see Ch. 31). The significance of political community is perhaps most striking when states fall apart
and separate into new states, such as happened with
the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia in
the 1990s, and more recently with Sudan. Such processes involve reconstruction of who ‘we’ are and an
idea of how new collectives differ from those who were
part of the old state.
The sovereign, territorial state’s unrivalled position as the unit of political community in contemporary world politics resulted from a series of events and
processes that began with the Treaties of Westphalia
(see Ch. 3). Walker tells us that this transition from
the medieval to the modern state system is important
because it shows us two different ways of organizing political community. In the medieval world there
were so-called overlapping authorities. This means
that religious and political authorities—the Pope and
the emperors and those below them—were interwoven,
and there was no single institution that could make
sovereign decisions. This changed with the Treaties of
Westphalia as states became the sovereign authorities
in their own territories and in relations with each other.
In terms of relations among people, the medieval world
worked according to what Walker calls a principle of
‘hierarchical subordination’. Hierarchical subordination assigns each individual to a particular position
in society. At the top were the Emperor and the Pope,
next came the bishops and the kings, then the priests
and local nobility, and at the bottom were those who
owned nothing and who had no rights. The Treaties of
Westphalia began a process whereby people became
more closely linked to states, and after the French
Revolution each citizen had the same status. This did
not mean that all individuals were citizens or that all
citizens had the same amount of wealth, education, or
property, but there was no longer anything in a person’s nature, as with the principle of hierarchical subordination, that made him or her inherently superior
or inferior.
State sovereignty implies, in Walker’s words, a division of the world into an ‘inside’ the state (where there
is order, trust, loyalty, and progress) and an ‘outside’
(where there is conflict, suspicion, self-help, and anarchy). Walker then uses the principle of deconstruction
to show that the national–international distinction is
not simply an objective account of how the ‘real world’
works. The distinction is not maintained by something
that is externally given, but rather by the way in which
the two sides of the dichotomy reinforce each other: we
know the international only by what it is not (national),
and likewise the national only by what it is not (the
international). The world ‘inside’ states not only differs
from the international realm ‘outside’; the two are constituted as each other’s opposition. The inside–outside
dichotomy is stabilized by a long series of other dichotomies, including those of peace and war, reason and
power, and order and anarchy (see Fig. 12.1).
Poststructuralists have shown how the inside–
outside dichotomy, which like all dichotomies is inherently unstable, is held in place by being reproduced
again and again. For example, the Covid-19 pandemic
illustrates how state sovereignty is reinforced and also
challenged (see Case Study 12.2). States reproduce
state sovereignty, and so do academic texts. For example, Richard K. Ashley points to realism’s ‘double move’
(Ashley 1987: 413–18). The first move is to assume that
Inside—the state
Outside—the international
Order
Anarchy
Community
Difference
Reason
Power
Trust
Suspicion
Progress
Repetition
Cooperation
Self-help
Law
Capabilities
Peace
War
Figure 12.1 The inside–outside dichotomy and its
stabilizing oppositions
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Case Study 12.2 Covid-19, state sovereignty, and vaccines
Covid-19 vaccination campaign in South Sudan
© Andreea Campeanu / Stringer / Getty Images
The Covid-19 virus which was first detected in Wuhan, China,
became a global pandemic in 2020. Many countries closed their
borders and adopted large-scale societal lockdowns. The terminology of the pandemic as coming in ‘waves’ was used to identify
the rises and falls in the numbers of infections and deaths. The
introduction of the first vaccines at the end of 2020 was constituted as a landmark event in combating the virus. The discovery
of new mutations of the virus then constituted other landmark
events raising concerns about the effectiveness of vaccines.
A central question from a poststructuralist perspective is
whether Covid-19 reinforces or challenges state sovereignty. Was
the pandemic constituted as calling for ‘national communities’ to
be protected, or were there articulations of ‘global responsibility’
too? Travel restrictions can be seen as states (re)turning to a classical conception of state sovereignty. The calls for citizens abroad
to ‘return home’ and foreign ministries assisting such returns can
also be interpreted as based on a traditional understanding of
who belongs to the national community. As the vaccines were
introduced, countries who had access to vaccines prioritized
their own populations.
we can only understand ‘community’ in one way: the
one we know from domestic politics. When we think
of ‘international community’, our understanding of
this concept is built on what we know from the state.
The second move consists of arguing that such a community is possible only within the territorial state. The
harmony, reason, and justice that are possible within
states cannot be extended to the international sphere,
as this is fraught with anarchy, recurring warfare, and
power politics.
12.4.2 The strength of state sovereignty
When poststructuralists write about the inside–
outside dichotomy, however, they are not claiming that
But it is also possible to see aspects of the Covid-19 pandemic
that challenge state sovereignty. The way in which the virus
spread is a strong indication of how many people actually move
across borders every day. In late November 2021, for example,
many countries stopped flights from Southern Africa in response
to the Omicron mutation. In spite of this action, Omicron was discovered within days in countries across Europe, North America,
South America, Asia, and Australia.
The distribution of vaccines has also taken place within
international frameworks that show that states might not just
be concerned with their own populations. The main such
framework is COVAX, which was set up to create ‘global equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines’. As stated on the World
Health Organization (WHO) website, with a fast-moving
pandemic, ‘No one is safe, unless everyone is safe’ (WHO
2021a). By 29 November 2021, as the world’s concern centred on Omicron, a joint statement by COVAX, the African
Vaccine Acquisition Trust (AVAT), and the Africa Centres for
Disease Control and Prevention reported that COVAX and
AVAT had distributed over 90 million doses to African countries (WHO 2021b). The statement held that more donations
were needed for Africa to reach the recognized ‘global goal
of immunising 70% of the African population’ and that both
the quality and the shelf life of the donated vaccines had to
improve. This, in short, gave the impression that even though
wealthier countries were providing vaccines to those in need,
they were doing so when they had doses to spare, not on a
continuous basis.
Question 1: Does the statement ‘no one is safe, unless everyone
is safe’ challenge state sovereignty? Is there a way to respond to
Covid-19 that emphasizes global ethical responsibility?
Question 2: Is the representation of Covid-19 as a pandemic the
same today as in 2020–1? Has there been a strengthening of state
sovereignty or not?
the world works neatly in that way. There are plenty
of states where domestic politics does not follow the
description of the ‘inside’ as one of progress, reason,
and justice, yet the national–international dichotomy
still manages to govern much of world politics. More
critically, we might say that the success of the inside–
outside dichotomy is shown by how well it silences
numerous ‘facts’ and ‘events’ that should undermine
it. For example, we can see the national–international
dichotomy at work when states choose not to intervene
in other states that are persecuting their ‘own’ citizens,
despite increased invocation of the ‘right to protect’
principle in recent years.
One of poststructuralism’s strengths is that it points
to how state sovereignty is often both questioned
Chapter 12 Poststructuralism
and supported. For instance, the 9/11 attacks and the
war on terror undermined state sovereignty at the
same time that Western states saw them through the
lens of state-based territoriality: ‘American soil’ was
attacked and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was
held responsible for what happened on ‘its’ territory.
Before we declare the inside–outside distinction dead
and gone, we should therefore take its flexibility and
resilience into account.
12.4.3 Universal alternatives
Poststructuralists warn that although our deconstruction of state sovereignty makes it look less like an objective fact, it is not easy to transcend, nor can it be replaced
by a ‘global community’. As R. B. J. Walker puts it, ‘The
state is a political category in a way that the world, or the
globe, or the planet, or humanity is not’ (Walker 1997:
72). To engage a dichotomy is not simply to reverse the
hierarchy between its terms (that is, replace ‘the state’
with ‘the global’), but rather to rethink all the complex
dichotomies around which it revolves. If we leave the
state in favour of the global, a crucial question becomes
how to prevent a return to the model we know from the
medieval world—that is, one of a global community
where individuals are ranked and given different value.
Poststructuralists hold that claims to ‘global’, ‘universal’
solutions always imply that something else is different
and ‘particular’. And that which is different is almost
always in danger of being forced to change to become
like the universal. Poststructuralists are therefore sceptical of idealists or liberals who advocate universal principles, but who overlook the power involved in defining
what is the ‘universally’ good and right (see Ch. 32).
The dangers—and power—of universal discourse
are demonstrated by the discourse of Western governments with troops in Iraq and Afghanistan in the
mid- and late 2000s (see Ch. 7). In this discourse,
‘fighting terrorism’ sought to defend ‘freedom’,
‘liberty’, ‘security’, and ‘democracy’ (see Ch. 29).
Although this might at first sound unproblematic—
even appealing—the problem is that this set of universally good categories is spoken and defined not by a
truly global voice, but by a particular set of states. The
good ‘universal’ categories were aimed at those who
were not—yet or ever—part of that universal project,
and this universalist discourse reinforced ‘the West’
as the only entity that could define ‘real’ universalism.
To many, and not only poststructuralists (see Ch. 11),
this echoes the time when the colonial West had the
power, right, and ‘obligation’ to define what was good
for the rest of the world.
Poststructuralism’s critique of universalism shows
that although poststructuralists are critical of realism,
they agree with realists that we should take power and
the state seriously. Many poststructuralists see much
of value in classical realism because it is historically
sensitive and concerned with the big political and normative questions of world politics. On the other hand,
they criticize neorealism for its ahistorical view of the
state, its reification of the international structure, and
its positivist epistemology.
Key Points
sovereignty is a practice that constitutes identity and
• State
authority in a particular manner.
deconstruct the distinction between the
• Poststructuralists
national and the international by showing that the two
terms stabilize each other and depend on a long series of
other dichotomies.
global is not a political category like the state, and
• The
therefore cannot replace it.
warn against the danger of universalist
• Poststructuralists
discourse because it is always defined from a particular
position of power.
12.5 Identity and foreign policy
Poststructuralists have also moved from the general study of state sovereignty to ask how we should
understand foreign policy. In traditional foreign policy
analysis, foreign policies are designed to defend the
state (security policies), help it financially (economic
policies), or make it do good in the world (development policies). By contrast, poststructuralists hold that
there is no stable object—the state—from which foreign
policies are drawn, but that foreign policies rely on and
produce particular understandings of the state. Foreign
policies constitute the identity of the Self through the
construction of threats, dangers, and challenges—that
is, its Other(s). As Michael J. Shapiro puts it, this means
that the politics of representation is absolutely crucial.
How we represent others affects the representation of
our selves, and this representation is decisive for which
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foreign policies we choose (Shapiro 1988). For example, debates in the EU over whether Turkey should be
accepted as a new member centre on judgements about
whether Turkey is a European country and whether it is
possible to be European and Muslim at the same time.
The way in which EU countries answer these questions has implications not only for the construction of
Turkey’s identity, but for that of Europe’s. Foreign policies are thus not protecting a given and fixed identity,
but rather are discourses through which identities are
(re)produced.
12.5.1 Identity as performative
Theoretically, poststructuralism conceptualizes
identity as relational and performative. The concept of performativity comes from Judith Butler: it
holds that identities have no objective existence,
but rather that they depend on discursive practices
(D. Campbell 1992). Identities are socially ‘real’, but
they cannot maintain their ‘realness’ if we do not
reproduce them. Because identities have no existence
independently of the foreign policies that produce
and reproduce them, we cannot say that identities
cause foreign policy. To take the example of the EU
and Turkey, there is no objective European identity
that can be used to arbitrate a decision on Turkish
membership. Rather, it is through debates over
Turkey’s membership application that European
identity is being defined. Does this mean, then, that
foreign policies cause identities? No, because foreign
policies are at the same time made with reference to
understandings of identity that are to some extent
already in place. In the case of the EU, the discourse
on Turkey does not start from scratch, but with historically powerful constructions of Europe as white,
Christian, civilized, and modern. In short, identities
are simultaneously a product of and the justification
for foreign policies. If we go back to the discussion
of epistemology at the beginning of this chapter, we
see that we cannot theorize the relationship between
identity and foreign policy in causal terms. Instead,
this is a constitutive relationship (see Fig. 12.2). This
also means that poststructuralism theorizes identity
differently from liberalism. As you may recall from
Chapter 7, liberalists incorporate identity, but hold
that it might determine a state’s outward orientation. According to this account, identity has a causal
impact on foreign policy.
Identity
Foreign policy
Figure 12.2 The constitutive relationship between identity
and foreign policy
Probably the most important development of a
performative theory of identity and foreign policy
is David Campbell’s Writing Security: United States
Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, first published in 1992. Campbell takes a broad view of what
foreign policy is and distinguishes between ‘Foreign
Policy’ (the policies undertaken by states in the international arena) and ‘foreign policy’ (all those discursive practices that constitute something as ‘foreign’
in relation to the Self). ‘Foreign policy’ might just
as well take place within states as between them. It
might, for instance, involve gender and sexual relations, as when women are deemed unfit to participate
in the military because they lack the proper ‘mindset’ (and thus would be dangerous for male soldiers to
fight alongside), or when homosexual or queer people
are described as alien to the national sense of self. By
looking not only at Foreign Policy, but also at ‘foreign
policy’, poststructuralism casts light on the symbolic
boundaries that are constituted within and across
states.
Much of poststructuralist scholars’ concern has
focused on what Campbell calls the ‘discourses of
danger’. Because such discourses work with very clear
dichotomies, it is easy to see how the Other defines
the Self. Yet poststructuralism also investigates those
identities that are not so radically different from
the Self. Beyond the simple construction of Self–
radical Other, more complex identity constellations
exist that can involve several Others. Such Others
might threaten each other rather than the Self and
be constituted by different kinds of otherness. One
case that highlights such more complex constellations is the war in Bosnia in the 1990s, where one
Other (Bosnian Muslims) was threatened by another
Other (Bosnian Serbs). This challenged the international community to undertake a humanitarian
intervention (see Ch. 33). Poststructuralists have
Chapter 12 Poststructuralism
shown that this was legitimized in a discourse that
split the Other into ‘innocent civilians’ and ‘Balkan
governments’ (D. Campbell 1998). As Western responsibility was extended only to the ‘innocent civilians’,
a full—and more political—understanding of Western
involvement was avoided. Another example of how
foreign policy discourses try to establish the identity of
the Other is the ongoing debate in the EU over whether
the UK is becoming a different country after Brexit.
12.5.2 Subject positions
When poststructuralists write about identities as constituted in discourse, they usually use the terms ‘subjectivities’ or ‘subject positions’ to underscore the fact that
identity is not something that someone has, but rather
that it is a position that one is constructed as having.
Individuals and institutions navigate among different
subject positions and might identify with the positions
they are given by others to a greater or lesser extent.
Think, for example, about the way the subject position
of ‘the Muslim’ has come to be used in Western Europe.
Some ‘Muslims’ embrace this subject position and seek
to give it a positive status by showing, for example, that
Muslim organizations are as democratic as, say, ‘normal’ French, Danish, or Austrian ones. Other ‘Muslims’
protest that they do not see themselves as Muslim at all,
but rather as women, Swedes, or athletes. As you can
see, it is crucial which subject positions are defined as
important, because they create the ‘identity landscape’
that we have to operate within. We need to ask not only
what constructions of ‘the Muslim’ are available, but
why ‘the Muslim’ has become such an important identity to construct.
Obviously, some subject positions are more desirable than others because they provide a superior position compared to other identities. Again, take ‘the
Muslim’ in Western discourses. Here the starting
point is that the Muslim is inferior to the European,
Western, or Danish subject. Thus, when institutions
and individuals try to present a more positive view of
Muslims, this happens in critical response to a reigning discourse of ‘the Muslims’ as not quite as good
as the ‘real’ Europeans. A superior subject position
also usually provides the subject with more room
for agency. If you recall poststructuralism’s view of
power as productive, it becomes apparent that power
is very much involved in the construction of subject
positions.
Poststructuralism’s critical take on subjectivity
makes it ask ‘who can speak within this discourse?’
and ‘how can the subject speak?’ These questions also
draw attention to those who cannot speak or who can
speak only with limited authority and agency. One
example of how discourses exclude and marginalize is that of statism in the UN system. Consider the
United Nations General Assembly, which has 193
members, all of them states. Because Palestine is not
recognized as a state, it is allowed access only as an
observer. To the extent that a state-centric discourse
rules world politics, non-state actors and stateless
individuals have severe difficulty gaining a voice.
Another example of the ‘who can speak and how’ issue
is development discourse, where those who receive aid
are constituted as less knowledgeable than Western
donors. As a consequence, the development subject is
unqualified to say what kind of aid it wants, and can
only listen and learn.
As explained in the presentation of the concept of
discourse in Section 12.3.1, discourses are also material. The constitution of subjectivity happens not only
as a linguistic process, but as we engage our physical
surroundings. Poststructuralists such as Charlotte
Epstein (2007) and Mark Salter (2006) have studied
how biometric passports, visa restrictions, and the way
entry is regulated at airports ‘govern’ who gains access,
and how one should look and act. Material technologies—the incorporation of chips into passports, online
applications for entry into a country, large data systems containing huge amounts of information—work
together with discourses and policies to affect everyday life.
Key Points
keeping with poststructuralism’s non-foundationalist
• Inontology,
there are no natural or objective identities, only
those that are produced in discourse.
terms ‘subjectivities’ or ‘subject positions’ underscore
• The
the fact that identity is not something that someone
objectively has, but rather a position that one is
constructed as having.
relationship between identity and foreign policy is
• The
performative and mutually constitutive.
asks ‘who are the subjects and how can
• Poststructuralism
they speak?’ and ‘what subjects are prevented from
speaking?’
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12.6 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the main ideas and concepts of poststructuralism. Poststructuralism is particularly good at drawing your attention to the fact
that actors, entities, and ‘things’ that we assume are
given actually depend on how we construct them.
Academic perspectives play an important role in the
reproduction of particular visions of world politics: if
we are told over and over again that the state is concerned only with its national interest , power politics,
and survival, then we act according to that picture of
the state. Poststructuralists also warn that there are
no easy solutions to state sovereignty and that liberal
calls for universal human rights, freedom, liberty, and
democracy inevitably involve constructions of power
and exclusions. While sympathetic to much in critical
theory’s account of the structures that produce global
inequalities, poststructuralists are also sceptical that
emancipation can tackle power and avoid the pitfalls of
universalist discourse (see Ch. 8).
Poststructuralism might not offer grand solutions, but it has a critical impact on world politics.
Deconstructions of policy discourses and the dominant
realist and liberal positions force us to reconsider what
basic ontological assumptions guide our way of thinking. Moreover, poststructuralists have always been
keen to point to the ways in which responsibility is
constructed.
Like all other theories of international relations,
poststructuralism has also been the subject of criticism. Critics have held that poststructuralists use such
dense philosophical vocabulary that it borders on the
incomprehensible, or that once one cuts through the
fancy language there is not much substance. Others
argue that poststructuralism fails to account adequately for material processes, and hence for much of
what actually happens ‘outside of discourse’. Another
line of critique centres on epistemological and methodological differences. Those IR scholars who hold
that theories should make causal claims, like most of
the US mainstream, simply do not accept poststructuralists’ embrace of constitutive epistemologies. As
in the case of the other theoretical perspectives in this
book, we advise you to think critically about poststructuralism too.
Questions
1. Do you believe all theories should make causal claims?
2. How do you think that material technology influences discourses, for example in discussions
of border control?
3. How would a genealogy of contemporary migration from the Global South to the Global
North differ from a liberal or realist study of the same issue?
4. Do you agree that it is a good idea to incorporate popular culture in the study of world
politics?
5. How do you see identity constituted in policies on the transnational trafficking of illegal
drugs?
6. What identities are significant in debates over how to prevent climate change?
7. What alternative forms of political community could replace the state?
8. Discuss how realism, liberalism, Marxism, constructivism, and poststructuralism would
analyse the war in Ukraine. What are the differences and similarities among them?
9. Is ‘terrorism’ still an important way to describe ‘Others’ in world politics? If so, what are the
implications of this?
10. Which subject positions are central in the discourses on hunger? Who can speak and how?
What are the consequences for international policy-making?
Visit the online resources to test your understanding by trying the self-test questions.
Chapter 12 Poststructuralism
Further Reading
Campbell, D. (1992; 2nd edn 1998), Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of
Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Theorizes the importance of otherness for
states’ foreign policy and provides a thorough analysis of the US case.
Der Derian, J. (1992), Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (Cambridge, MA, and Oxford:
Blackwell). Uses multiple forms of text to explore how diplomatic interactions take place in
many settings, including computer simulations and real-time media coverage.
Der Derian, J., and Shapiro, M. J. (1989), International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings
of World Politics (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books). Early application of the theory of
intertextuality to world politics, with contributions by R. K. Ashley, W. E. Connolly, B. S. Klein, R.
B. J. Walker, and others.
Hansen, L. (2006), Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London:
Routledge). Presents a theory of non-radical otherness and a poststructuralist methodology.
Hansen, L., and Wæver, O. (eds) (2002), European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge
of the Nordic States (London: Routledge). Offers a poststructuralist framework for analysing
discourses on European integration and applies it to the Nordic states.
Lisle, D. (2006), The Global Politics of Contemporary Travel Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press). Demonstrates how poststructuralism can be used in an analysis of travel
writing.
Shapiro, M. J. (1988), The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography,
and Policy Analysis (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press). Shows that foreign policy
relies on representations of identity and takes place across multiple genres.
Walker, R. B. J. (1993), Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press). Explains how state sovereignty builds on particular
understandings of identity, community, authority, order, and power.
Weber, C. (2006), Imagining America at War: Morality, Politics, and Film (London: Routledge).
A study of the way films engaged national identity and foreign policy after 9/11.
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
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Social constructivism
michael barnet t
Framing Questions
●
Are states motivated by power or by ideas?
●
What are the underlying factors that condition patterns of conflict and cooperation?
●
Do the norms and rules underlying international order reflect enduring inequality or
the possibility of moral progress?
Reader’s Guide
This chapter provides an overview of constructivist approaches to International Relations (IR) theory.
Constructivism explores how the world is made and
remade through action, how the structures of world
politics do not merely constrain but also constitute
the identities, interests, and practices of the actors of
world politics, how these actors unwittingly or purposely reproduce these structures, and how human
action is responsible for both stability and change in
world affairs. Constructivism generates many distinctive insights, including alternative ways of thinking
about power, how norms shape world orders, and the
importance of transnational movements and other
non-state actors in the internationalization of global
politics.
Visit the online resources to access an
interactive timeline of how the discipline of
International Relations has evolved.
Chapter 13 Social constructivism
13.1 Introduction
Constructivism rose from rather humble beginnings
to become one of the leading schools in IR. Just 30
years ago constructivism in IR did not exist. Today it
is widely recognized for its ability to capture important
features of global politics, it is viewed as an important
theory in IR, and is the most followed theory among
IR scholars in the United States (Teaching, Research
and International Policy 2018). This chapter explores
constructivism’s origins, its core commitments, and
features of its research agenda as it relates to global
change. Realist and many liberal theories, as covered
in Chapters 7 and 9, assume that states have enduring
interests such as power and wealth, and are constrained
in their ability to further those interests because of
material forces such as geography, technology, and the
distribution of power. Critics counter that social forces
such as ideas, knowledge, norms, and rules also influence states’ identities and interests and the very organization of world politics.
Constructivism is not the only IR theory to recognize the importance of international norms and to
conceptualize international politics as a society, rather
than a system. Various theories that predated constructivism made similar claims, including Marxism, the English
School, and feminist approaches (see Chs 8 and 10).
But constructivists spoke more directly to the issues that
mattered to neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists—
how identity, norms, and culture shape patterns of war
and peace. Eventually constructivism developed different branches, with some emphasizing structure and others agency, some stability and others transformation.
The concern with the making and remaking of world
politics underscores constructivism’s strong interest in
global change. Although constructivism has investigated
various features of global change, this chapter focuses on
three: the convergence by states towards similar ways of
organizing domestic and international life; how norms
become internationalized and institutionalized, influencing what states and non-state actors do and their
conceptualizations of legitimate behaviour; and whether
these underlying norms and changes maintain relations
of inequality or reflect new possibilities of progress.
13.2 The rise of constructivism
Once upon a time, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism dominated American IR theory. Neorealism
assumed that states are the primary actors in the world;
that they exist in a condition of anarchy (the absence
of supranational authority); that this condition implies
that states must be consumed by security, power,
and survival; that states do not and should not have
patience for ethics or norms; and that the distribution
and balance of power tell us just about everything
we need to know about patterns in world politics (see
Ch. 9). Neoliberalism lightened neorealism’s dark view
of international politics by demonstrating that states
cooperate extensively in order to further their interests,
which extend beyond security (see Ch. 7). Because a
primary obstacle to cooperation is the absence of trust
among states, states construct international institutions that can perform various trust-enhancing functions, including monitoring and publicizing cheating.
As recounted in Chapters 7 and 9, despite disagreements, these camps shared a commitment to individualism and materialism. Individualism is the view that
actors have fixed interests and that the structure constrains their behaviour. Although neorealists believe
that the pursuit of security is primary while neoliberals can envision other goals such as wealth, for empirical and theoretical reasons they both assume that state
interests are hard-wired and not malleable. Materialism
is the view that the structure that constrains behaviour
is defined by the distribution of material power, technology, and geography. While neorealism holds that
interests trump ideas and norms, neoliberal institutionalism recognizes that states might willingly construct
norms and institutions to regulate their behaviour
if doing so will enhance their long-term interests.
Although both approaches allow for the possibility that
ideas and norms can constrain how states pursue their
interests, neither contemplates the possibility that ideas
and norms might define their interests.
This commitment to materialism and individualism
was challenged by the scholars who eventually became
associated with constructivism. Constructivism enjoyed
a meteoric rise in the 1990s because of two principal factors. First, drawing from sociological and critical theories,
during the 1980s some IR scholars began to make visible
and significant certain key elements—norms, ideas, identity, and rules. Whereas neorealist and neoliberal IR had
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made the social elements of human activity invisible and
trivial, these dissidents argued that their inclusion was
central for the self-understandings of states and nonstate actors, their understanding of how the world works,
and how they made sense of their behaviour. What was
more counter-intuitive: rationalism’s belief that the world
was asocial and without norms, or sociological theory’s
view that the world was highly social and congested with
norms? The proposition that ideas did not matter or that
ideas played a role in shaping who actors think they are
and what counts as appropriate practice in the world?
Because neorealism had stripped everything social from
world politics, Waltz and others had little to say about
the first principle of modern IR: sovereignty. Did sovereignty truly not matter, as neorealists suggested? Or was
it a social capacity, a licence with rights and responsibilities, as constructivists argued? Claims about sovereignty
as a social capacity meant that norms and institutions did
more than constrain and regulate actors, which was the
limit of neoliberal institutionalist thinking. Instead, they
observed how norms and institutions could constitute
the actors themselves.
Early constructivist claims that neorealism and neoliberalism were missing the big picture were supported
by a second factor—the end of the cold war. Most
observers had predicted that the cold war would end
with a bang, not a whimper. What made the end of the
cold war particularly challenging for neorealists and
neoliberals was that they had explicitly jettisoned the
intellectual tools required to explain this outcome: the
revolutionary impact of ideas to transform the organization of world politics. Nor did these mainstream
approaches provide insight into what might come next.
The US was enjoying a unipolar moment, but the distribution of power could not determine whether it would
aspire to become a global hegemon or work through
multilateral institutions. Moreover, the end of the cold
war caused states to debate what the national interest is
and how it relates to national identity—who are ‘we’ and
where do ‘we’ belong? Neorealism treated this question
as irrelevant. The end of the cold war also clipped the
prominence of traditional security themes, and raised
the importance of human security, transnationalism,
human rights, and other subjects that were outside its
wheelhouse. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism were not just unable to explain what happened, but
had voluntarily disarmed themselves of all the intellectual tools they might need for just this occasion.
If neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists were
the immediate losers from the end of the cold war, the
dissidents of the 1980s were the immediate winners. And
soon some of the dissidents became a tribe called constructivists; others continued with their Marxist, feminist, and other approaches to international theory. The
end of the cold war gave constructivists the opportunity
to speed past critique to offer genuinely novel, compelling understandings of the world in areas that neorealists
considered their bread-and-butter—including alliance
patterns, military intervention, arms races, and great
power transformation—and demonstrate how identity
and norms shape state interests and must be incorporated to generate superior explanations. Constructivism
was already working with concepts, such as legitimacy
and world order, that were part of policy conversations.
It was pointing to the importance of transnationalism—
which many claimed had played a role in the downfall
of the Soviet Union and was a transformative force in
world politics. A scholarly agenda that seemed constipated because of the overbearing study of the security
and economic needs of great powers now had space to
expand. Constructivism offered a fresh take on the world
at a time when the world needed new ways of thinking.
Constructivists of the period were borrowing from
various sociological insights that suggested international society was moving in a more orderly and progressive direction. The very idea of ‘society’ emerged in
the eighteenth century because of various challenges
to domestic order. There were liberal views that suggested society was something of a contract, reminiscent of contemporary institutionalist arguments. There
were Marxist views that argued society was organized
around classes that were in constant and preordained
conflict because of property relations—not entirely
unlike how realists viewed the world as organized
around states that were in constant conflict because of
anarchy. And then there were late nineteenth-century
sociological arguments that imagined how a society
going through stress and transformation, in this case
because of modernization, might nevertheless remain
orderly and possibly even progressive because of the
development of underlying norms and rules. The first
generation of constructivists tended to draw from these
latter sorts of arguments, as they imagined a post-cold
war world that had or might develop a sense of community and unity of purpose because of shared norms,
interests, and outlooks. A consequence was that constructivists did not give power and domination the
attention they deserved, and inadvertently obscured
the inequalities that continued with what appeared to
be progressive change.
Chapter 13 Social constructivism
Key Points
and neoliberal institutionalism dominated
first wave of constructivist thought tended to
• Neorealism
• The
American IR theory in the 1980s.
emphasize how international society could develop
shared identities, norms, and outlooks to create a
• Both theories subscribed to materialism and individualism.
stable order that even permitted some possibility of
scholars critical of neorealism and neoliberalism
• Various
progress.
drew from critical and sociological theory to demonstrate the
of an international community and an international
effects of ideas and norms on world politics.
• Thoughts
order integrated by egalitarian values often hid the
end of the cold war created an intellectual space for
• The
continued existence of power and domination.
scholars to challenge existing theories of international politics.
13.3 Constructivism
Before detailing constructivism’s tenets, a caveat is
in order. Constructivism is a social theory and not
a substantive theory of international politics. Social
theory concerns how to conceptualize the relationship between agents and structures: for instance,
how should we think about the relationship between
states and the structure of international politics?
Substantive theory offers specific claims and hypotheses about patterns in world politics: for instance,
how do we explain why democratic states tend not to
wage war on one another? In this way, constructivism is best compared with rational choice. Rational
choice is a social theory that offers a framework for
understanding how actors attempt to maximize fixed
preferences under a set of constraints. It makes no
claims about the content of those preferences; they
could be wealth or religious salvation. Nor does it
assume anything about the content of the constraints;
they could be guns or ideas. Rational choice offers
no claims about the actual patterns of world politics.
Although neorealism and neoliberalism subscribe
to rational choice, they arrive at rival claims about
patterns of conflict and cooperation in world politics
because they make different assumptions about the
effects of anarchy and the efficacy of human-built
international institutions. Like rational choice, constructivism is a social theory that concerns the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a
substantive theory. For instance, constructivists have
different arguments regarding the rise of sovereignty
and the impact of human rights norms on states. To
generate substantive claims, scholars must delineate
the principal actors, their interests and capacities,
and the content of normative structures.
Although there are many kinds of constructivism,
there is unity within diversity: ‘Constructivism is about
human consciousness and its role in international life’
(Ruggie 1998: 856). This focus on human consciousness suggests a commitment to idealism and holism,
which, according to Wendt (1999), represent the core
of constructivism (see Box 13.1). Idealism demands
that we take seriously the role of ideas in world politics.
The world is defined by material and ideational forces.
But these ideas are not akin to beliefs or psychological
states that reside inside our heads. Instead, these ideas
are social. Our mental maps are shaped by collectively
held ideas such as knowledge, symbols, language, and
rules. Idealism does not reject material reality but
instead observes that the meaning and construction of
that material reality is dependent on ideas and interpretation. The balance of power does not objectively
exist out there, waiting to be discovered; instead, states
debate the meaning of the balance of power and how
they should respond. Constructivism also accepts some
form of holism or structuralism. The world is irreducibly social and cannot be decomposed into the properties of already existing actors. Nevertheless, holism
allows for agency, recognizing that agents have some
autonomy and their interactions help to construct,
reproduce, and transform those structures. Although
the structure of the cold war seemingly locked the
United States and the Soviet Union into a fight to the
death, leaders on both sides creatively transformed
their relations and, with them, the very structure of
global politics.
This commitment to idealism and holism has
important implications for how we think about and
study world politics. To appreciate these insights, we
must learn more about constructivism’s conceptual
vocabulary, and demonstrate the value of learning this
‘second language’. This chapter contrasts constructivism’s vocabulary with that of rational choice. The core
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Box 13.1 Key concepts of constructivism
Agent–structure problem: how to think about the relationship
between agents and structures. One view is that agents are born
with already formed identities and interests and then treat other
actors and the broad structure that their interactions produce
as a constraint on their interests. But this suggests that actors
are pre-social, to the extent that there is little concern with
their identities or the possibility that they might change their
interests through their interactions with others. Another view
treats the structure as constituting the actors themselves, rather
than as a constraint. Yet this might treat agents as cultural dupes
because they are nothing more than artefacts of that structure.
The proposed solution to the agent–structure problem is to find
a way to understand how agents and structures constitute each
other.
Constructivism: an approach to international politics that
focuses on the centrality of ideas and human consciousness. It
stresses a holistic and idealist view of structures, and considers
how structures construct actors’ identities and interests, how
their interaction is organized and constrained by structures, and
how this interaction serves to either reproduce or transform
those structures.
Holism: the view that structures cannot be decomposed into
the individual units and their interactions because structures are
more than the sum of their parts and are irreducibly social. The
effects of structures do not merely constrain the actors but also
construct them.
Idealism: although often associated with the claim that it is
possible to create a world of peace, idealism as a social theory
argues that the most fundamental feature of society is social
consciousness. Ideas shape how we see ourselves and our interests, the knowledge that we use to categorize and understand
the world, the beliefs we have of others, and the possible and
impossible solutions to challenges and threats. Idealism does not
disregard material forces such as technology, but instead claims
that the meanings and consequences of these material forces are
driven by human interpretations, not given by nature.
Identity: the social understanding of the self in relationship
to an ‘other’. Constructivists generally hold that identities shape
interests; we cannot know what we want unless we know who
we are. Because identities are social and are produced through
interactions, they can change.
Individualism: the view that structures can be reduced to the
aggregation of individuals and their interactions. IR theories that
subscribe to individualism assume the nature of the units and their
interests (usually states and the pursuit of power or wealth), and
then examine how the broad structure (usually the distribution of
power) constrains how states can act and generates certain patterns in international politics. Individualism contrasts with holism.
Materialism: the view that material forces, including technology, are the bedrock of society. For IR scholars, this leads to
technological determinism or emphasis on the distribution of
military power for understanding a state’s foreign policy and patterns of international politics.
Normative structure: IR theory traditionally defines structure in material terms, such as the distribution of power, and
then treats structure as a constraint on actors. In contrast to a
materialist structure, a normative structure includes collectively
held ideas such as knowledge, rules, beliefs, and norms that not
only constrain actors—they also construct categories of meaning,
constitute actors’ identities and interests, and define standards
of appropriate conduct. Critical here is the concept of a norm:
‘a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Actors adhere to norms
not only because of benefits and costs, but also because they are
related to a sense of self.
Practices: socially meaningful patterns of action which, in
being performed more or less competently, produce and reproduce background knowledge and discourse. Action is not simply
a product of individual rational thought, but also an enactment
of how things are done according to a given community.
Rational choice: an approach that emphasizes how actors
attempt to maximize their interests and select the most efficient
means to achieve them, and endeavours to explain collective
outcomes by virtue of individual actors’ attempts to maximize
their preferences under a set of constraints. Deriving largely from
economic theorizing, the rational choice approach to international politics has been immensely influential and has been
applied to a range of issues.
observation is the social construction of reality. This
has a number of related elements. One is an emphasis
on the socially constructed nature of actors and their
identities and interests. Actors are not born outside of
and prior to society, as individualism claims. Instead,
actors are produced and created by their cultural
environment: nurture, not nature. This points to the
importance of identity and the social construction of
interests. The American identity shapes national interests and even what are considered to be acceptable and
unacceptable means to achieve them.
Another element is how knowledge—symbols, rules,
concepts, and categories—shapes how individuals
construct and interpret their worlds. Reality is not just
out there waiting to be discovered; instead, historically
produced and culturally bound knowledge enables
individuals to construct and give meaning to reality. Existing categories help us to understand, define,
and make sense of the world. For instance, there are
many ways to classify collective violence, from civil
war to ethnic cleansing, to crimes against humanity, to
genocide.
This constructed reality frequently appears to us
as an objective reality, which relates to the concept of
social facts. There are things whose existence depends
on human agreement, and things whose existence
Chapter 13 Social constructivism
does not. Brute facts such as rocks, flowers, gravity,
and oceans exist independently of human agreement,
and will continue to exist even if humans disappear or
deny their existence. But social facts depend on human
agreement although they are taken for granted. Money,
refugees, terrorism, human rights, and sovereignty
are social facts. They will only exist so long as human
agreement endures, and their existence shapes how we
categorize the world and what we do. Human agreement does not depend on the existence of a contract
made between two voluntary actors, but rather comes
from underlying structures that give us the language,
categories, and meanings to make sense of the world.
Accordingly, constructivists often refer to background
knowledge, scripts, and the taken-for-granted nature of
many aspects of our world.
Constructivists differ in how they describe human
activity. In contrast to rationalists, who often speak of
behaviour, constructivists frequently use the language
of practices. Practices are an attempt to capture how
things are done, to situate these ‘doings’ within a social
context. Adler and Pouliot (2011a: 4–5) define practices as ‘socially meaningful patterns of action which,
in being performed more or less competently’ produce
and reproduce background knowledge and discourse.
Practices suggest that there is a proper way of doing
something, that it exhibits an enduring and routinized
pattern, which often comes from knowledge contained
within a smaller community such as a profession, and
actors invest meaning in it. For instance, humanitarian
organizations that provide life-saving relief to victims
of conflict and natural disasters have a set of clear practices: there are right and wrong ways to deliver relief
(ideally through principles of impartiality, independence, and neutrality); these practices are learned by
doing, through networks of professionals, and training;
following these standards demonstrates not just competence but also membership in the community; and
these practices often connote ethical commitments to
humanity.
Constructivists are also concerned with norms and
rules. Rules come in two basic varieties. Regulative
rules regulate already existing activities—rules
for the road instruct how to drive; the World Trade
Organization’s rules regulate trade. Constitutive
rules create the very possibility for these activities.
The rules of rugby not only prohibit blocking but
also help to define the very game (and distinguish it
from American football); after all, if forwards began
to block for backs, not only would this be a penalty,
but it would change the game itself. The rules of sovereignty not only regulate state practices but also make
possible the very idea of a sovereign state. Rules also
vary in terms of their institutionalization. Not all is
fair in love, war, or any other social endeavour. But
we also know that what counts as playing the games
of love or war can vary over time, which means that
we should be concerned with their origins, evolution,
and corresponding effects. Furthermore, rules are not
static; they are revised through practice, reflection,
and arguments by knowledgeable actors regarding
how they should be applied to new situations. Indeed,
actors can engage in strategic social construction
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Actors attempt to
change the norms that subsequently guide and constitute state identities and interests. Human rights activists, for instance, try to encourage compliance with
human rights norms not only by naming and shaming
those who violate these norms, but also by encouraging states to identify with the norms because it is the
right thing to do.
Constructivists’ claim that the world is not just
material but also normative leads them to contrast different kinds of world order. Realists begin with a world
of anarchy, defined by the absence of a supranational
authority, from which they identify a logic of state
action, almost always bound up with suspicion, rivalry,
and conflict. But would a world of Mahatma Gandhis
be the same as a world of Osama bin Ladens? Alexander
Wendt’s (1992) claim that ‘anarchy is what states make
of it’ calls attention to how different beliefs and practices will generate divergent patterns and organization
of world politics (see Box 13.2).
The existence of different normative environments
points to a concept central to constructivism but
neglected in rationalism: legitimacy. World orders need
to have legitimacy if they are to survive; their continuation depends not only on coercion but also on consent.
All actors crave legitimacy—the belief that they are acting according to and pursuing the values of the broader
international community, for reasons of identity and
interest. Do states always choose what is most ‘efficient’?
Do the ends always justify the means? Many states want
to be seen as acting with the established conventions
and norms, and feel the need to explain or justify their
actions when they are seen otherwise. There is a direct
relationship between their legitimacy and the costs of
a course of action: the greater the legitimacy, the easier
it is to convince others to cooperate with their policies;
the less the legitimacy, the more costly the action. This
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Box 13.2 Alexander Wendt on the three
cultures of anarchy
[T]he deep structure of anarchy [is] cultural or ideational rather
than material . . . [O]nce understood this way, we can see
that the logic of anarchy can vary . . . [D]ifferent cultures of
anarchy are based on different kinds of roles in terms of which
states represent Self and Other. [T]here are three roles, enemy,
rival, and friend . . . that are constituted by, and constitute,
three distinct macro-level cultures of international politics,
Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, respectively. These cultures
have different rules of engagement, interaction logics, and systemic tendencies . . .
The logic of the Hobbesian anarchy is well known: ‘the war
of all against all . . .’ This is the true self-help system . . .
where actors cannot count on each other for help or even to
observe basic-self-restraint . . . Survival depends solely on
military power . . . Security is deeply competitive, a zero-sum
affair . . . Even if what states really want is security rather than
power, their collective beliefs force them to act as if they are
power-seeking . . .
The Lockean culture has a different logic . . . because it is based
on a different role structure, rivalry rather than enmity . . . Like
enemies, rivals are constituted by representations about Self
and Other with respect to violence, but these representations
are less threatening: unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to
act as if they recognize their sovereignty, their life and liberty, as
a right, and therefore not to try to conquer or dominate them
. . . Unlike friends, however, the recognition among rivals does
not extend to the right to be free from violence in disputes.
The Kantian culture is based on a role structure of friendship
. . . within which states expect each other to observe two simple rules: (1) disputes will be settled without war or the threat
of war (the rule of non-violence); and (2) they will fight as a
team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party.
(Wendt 1999: 43, 279, 251, 298–9)
means, then, that even great powers will frequently feel
the need to alter their policies in order to be viewed as
legitimate—or bear the consequences. Such considerations help explain why materially challenged human
rights activists are able to use ‘naming and shaming’
tactics; many law-breaking governments change their
behaviour to be seen as law-abiding citizens.
The earlier distinction between constitutive and
regulative rules parallels the conceptual distinction
between the logic of consequences and the logic of
appropriateness. The logic of consequences attributes
action to the anticipated costs and benefits, mindful that other actors are doing the same. The logic of
appropriateness, however, highlights how actors are
rule-following, worrying about whether their actions
are legitimate. The two logics are not necessarily
distinct or competing. What is viewed as appropriate
and legitimate can affect the possible costs of different actions; the more illegitimate a possible course of
action appears to be, the higher the potential cost for
those who proceed on their own. The US’ decision to
invade Iraq in 2003 without the blessing of the UN
Security Council meant that other states viewed the
US’ actions as illegitimate and were less willing to
support them; this raised the costs to the US when it
proceeded.
By emphasizing the social construction of reality and
questioning how the world is put together, constructivists become archaeologists of the existing world—
wanting to understand the origins of things that now
appear to us as natural and are part of our vocabulary.
Understanding the origins of concepts usually requires
attention to the interplay between existing ideas and
institutions, political calculations by leaders with ulterior motives, morally minded actors who attempted to
improve humanity, and contingency. Constructivism’s
concern with origins and recognition of historical contingencies means that it is attentive to counterfactuals
and the roads not taken. But it is mainly concerned
with unearthing the origins of what is now taken for
granted.
For instance, sovereignty did not always exist; it was
produced by historical forces that challenged the power
of religious actors, state interests, and human interactions, which generated new distinctions regarding
where political authority should reside. Although individuals have been forced to flee their homes ever since
the exile from Eden, the political and legal category of
‘refugees’ is only a century old (see Case Study 13.1).
Constructivists also examine how actors make
their activities meaningful. Following Max Weber’s
(1949: 81) insight that ‘we are cultural beings with
the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude
towards the world and to lend it significance’, constructivists attempt to identify the meanings actors
give to their practices and the objects they construct.
These derive not from private beliefs but rather from
culture . In contrast to the rationalist presumption
that culture, at most, constrains action, constructivists argue that culture informs the meanings
people give to their actions. Sometimes constructivists presume that such meanings derive from a
hardened culture. But because culture is fractured
and society comprises different interpretations of
what is meaningful activity, scholars must consider
Chapter 13 Social constructivism
Case Study 13.1 Social construction of refugees and the contemporary migration crisis
Nets and barbed wire erected at the Greece/Macedonia
border, 2016
© AGENZIA SINTESI / Alamy Stock Photo
Who is a refugee, why does this category matter, and how has
it changed? There are many ways to categorize people who leave
their homes, including migrants, temporary workers, displaced
people, and refugees. Before the twentieth century, ‘refugee’ as
a legal category did not exist, and it was not until the First World
War that states recognized people as refugees and gave them
rights.
Although the First World War displaced many, Western
states limited their compassion to Russians fleeing the
Bolsheviks (it was easier to accuse a rival state of persecuting its people); only they were entitled to assistance from
states and the new refugee agency, the High Commission for
Refugees. However, the High Commissioner began to apply
his mandate and the category to others in Europe who had
also fled their countries and needed assistance. Although
states generally acceded in the immediate aftermath of the
war, as new urgencies emerged they backtracked on their
pledges and refused to assist many in need—most notably
Jews seeking to escape Nazi Germany.
After the Second World War, and because of mass displacement, states re-examined who could be called a refugee and
what assistance they could receive. Because Western states
worried about having obligations to millions around the
world, they defined a refugee in the 1951 Refugee Convention
as an individual who, ‘owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted . . . is outside the country of his nationality ’, as a
consequence of events that occurred in Europe before 1951
(Article I.A(2)). This definition excluded all those outside
Europe who were displaced by war or natural disasters, or by
events after 1951. Objecting to this arbitrary definition that
excluded so many, the new refugee agency, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, working with aid agencies
and permissive states, seized on events outside Europe and
argued that there was no principled reason to deny to them
what was given to Europeans.
Over time the political meaning of ‘refugee’ came to
include anyone who was forced to flee and cross an international border; eventually states changed the international
legal meaning to reflect new political realities. Today, we are
likely to call people refugees if they are forced to flee their
homes because of human-created circumstances; crossing
an international border is of less concern. To describe people
forced to flee but who do not cross an international border, we now have the term ‘internally displaced people’. One
reason why states wanted to differentiate ‘statutory ’ refugees
from internally displaced people is because they have little
interest in extending their international legal obligations to
millions more people, or in becoming overly involved in the
domestic affairs of other states. As states refined the category
of refugee, they also created other categories of people on
the move, such as migrants, who would not be entitled to the
same protections.
The power and politics of the category of refugee became
increasingly evident as the Syrian civil war triggered a migration
crisis in Europe in 2015, the United States began to develop
a ‘zero tolerance policy’ towards migrants crossing its southern border, and states were not able to develop a compact on
global migration or refugees. The Syrian conflict prompted
one of the world’s greatest forced migrations in this century.
Although the majority of Syrian refugees settled in neighbouring countries, upwards of a million have sought refuge in
Europe. Attempting to limit their exposure and duties, many
European countries began arbitrarily denying these people the
protection of refugee status, with the implication that these
countries had no moral or legal obligations towards them.
The European Union continues a policy of deterrence and
denial of fundamental refugee rights. Similarly, from 2017 the
US government began treating all displaced people as if they
were illegal migrants; doing so allowed the US to obscure how
it is obligated under international law to recognize the rights
of refugees and asylum seekers. One of the major obstacles to
creating a global migration regime is the difficulty of distinguishing between those categories of people that states feel
they are obligated to protect and those that deserve no protection whatsoever. Classifications such as ‘refugee’ are political
and moral categories that have expanded and contracted over
time, and can mean the difference between life and death for
millions of displaced people around the world.
Question 1: Why would states accept a distinction between
refugees and other kinds of displaced peoples that cross a
border?
Question 2: There are many different kinds of people who
are forced to leave their homes. Is there a reason why ‘refugees’ should be accorded more rights than, say, economic
migrants?
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these cultural fault-lines and treat the fixing of
meanings as an accomplishment that is the essence
of politics. Some of the most important debates in
world politics are about how to define particular
activities. Development, human rights, security,
humanitarian intervention, and sovereignty are
all important orienting concepts that can have any
number of meanings. States and non-state actors
have rival interpretations of the meanings of these
concepts and will fight for collective acceptance of
their preferred meaning.
The very fact that these meanings are fixed through
politics—with consequences for people’s ability to determine their fates—suggests an alternative way of thinking about power. Most IR theorists treat power as the
ability of one state to compel another state to do what it
otherwise would not, and tend to focus on material technologies, such as military firepower and economic statecraft, which have this persuasive effect. Constructivists
have offered two important additions to this view of
power. First, the forces of power go beyond the material;
they also can be ideational (Barnett and Duvall 2005).
Consider, for instance, the earlier discussion of legitimacy. Moreover, second, the effects of power go beyond
the ability to change behaviour. Power also includes how
knowledge, the fixing of meanings, and the construction
of identities allocate differential rewards and capacities.
If development is defined as per capita income, then
some actors, namely states, and some activities, such as
industrialization, are privileged; however, if development
is defined as basic needs met, then other actors, namely
peasants and women, gain voice, and other activities,
such as small-scale agricultural initiatives and cottage
industries, become visible. International humanitarian
law tends to assume that ‘combatants’ are men and ‘civilians’ are women, children, and the elderly; consequently,
men and women might be differentially protected by the
laws of war (see Opposing Opinions 13.1).
Opposing Opinions 13.1 The laws of war have made war less horrific
For
The laws of war prove that not ‘all is fair in love and war’.
Notwithstanding war’s incredible destructiveness, it could be
even worse. Chemical weapons and landmines are banned not
because they are ineffective but because they are perceived as
inhumane. It is acceptable to kill, but not to maim. Military forces
are expected to distinguish between civilians and soldiers. There
are more laws governing the conduct of war than ever before,
making a difference for lives at risk.
The laws of war have reduced the reasons states can give
when going to war. A hundred years ago states waged war for
various reasons, including territorial acquisition and debt collection. But since the Second World War, self-defence is the only
justification for going to war. By narrowing the range of acceptable reasons to go to war, the laws of war reduce its frequency.
The laws of war provide civilians with greater protection
during armed conflict. Since the Second World War, states
have increasingly altered their military operations to avoid civilian casualties and to demonstrate that any civilian suffering was
unavoidable. Despite the huge civilian death toll in Afghanistan
and Iraq because of American military operations, US civilian and
defence officials went to extraordinary lengths to avoid unnecessary civilian harm.
Activists and NGOs are able to use the laws of war to persuade
state and non-state actors to demonstrate that they are good
members of the international community. By creating new
categories to shape what kind of behaviour is considered civilized,
organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
pressed states to follow the laws of war. These categories are not just
‘soft norms’ but rather ‘laws’ that demand adherence and obligation.
Grounds for optimism exist despite the realities of war. The
laws of war should be judged not by a perfect compliance rate
or by whether war is outlawed, but rather by whether there are
more limits on how and when war can be waged.
The laws of war provide a framework that is useful for
identifying what kinds of future technologies are potentially lawful and which ones are unlawful. States increasingly employ new kinds of technology—including drones, robots,
lasers, and artificial intelligence—that are changing the character
of war. If it were not for the existing laws regulating what kinds
of weapons are legal and illegal, there would be no brake on the
kinds of weapons states would be willing to use.
Against
The laws of war do not tackle the real issue: war itself. The
laws of war are conservative: they are intended not to outlaw war
but rather to make it less brutal. Accordingly, they give the illusion that war can be humane and civilized, thus making it more
acceptable to wage war. We should work to eliminate war and
violence, not just to control its excesses.
States respect the laws of war only when it is in their selfinterest to do so. Reciprocity and self-interest, not any sense of
humanity, account for the creation of and compliance with these
laws. And when states decide they can gain a military advantage
by violating the laws of war, they do.
Lack of punishment for violators means that compliance
will be minimal. States, like all actors, obey laws and norms
because of a cost–benefit calculus. But there is no mechanism
at the global level for punishment. The International Criminal
Court is the closest approximation, but few would-be violators
are scared.
Chapter 13 Social constructivism
Non-state actors are not expected to obey the laws of war.
The laws of war apply to states, but non-state actors—such as the
so-called Islamic State—cause much of today’s mayhem. Moreover,
forcing states to comply with laws while allowing non-state combatants to run wild gives the latter a battlefield advantage.
Everything is different after 9/11. The laws of war are inappropriate for today’s asymmetrical wars. Terrorists do not play
by the rules of war and therefore should not benefit from them.
For instance, when these combatants are captured they do
not deserve the rights of prisoners of war, but rather should be
treated as terrorists.
States and non-state actors are using international humanitarian law as a weapon of war. States are supposed to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and many states that
violate this principle face international condemnation. There are
some combatants, though, who are willing to exploit this norm
to advance their goals. How? They place their forces in densely
populated civilian areas, which enables them to use civilians as
human shields. And if the opposing state proceeds to fire on
these forces and harms civilians, then they will gain sympathy and
the opposing state will suffer negative publicity.
1 To what extent are those who focus on the growing web of the laws of war too energized about what is ‘on the books’ rather than
what actually exists in the theatre of war?
2 If the laws of war disappeared, would states still regulate their conduct?
3 Would the world be better or worse off without the laws of war?
Visit the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle these questions.
Key Points
are concerned with human consciousness and
• Constructivists
knowledge. They treat ideas as structural factors that
influence how actors interpret the world, consider the
dynamic relationship between ideas and material forces as a
consequence of how actors interpret their material reality,
are interested in how agents produce structures and how
structures produce agents, and focus on the practices that are
situated between agents and structures.
and constitutive norms shape what actors do, but
• Regulative
only constitutive norms shape states as actors, the identity of
states, and what counts as legitimate behaviour.
structures imprint how state and non-state actors
• Normative
understand themselves and the world: their beliefs, their
practices, their sense of right and wrong, and their notions of
legitimacy.
the underlying culture shapes the meanings that
• Although
actors bring to their activities, meanings are not always fixed;
the fixing of meaning is a central feature of politics.
construction denaturalizes and excavates what is
• Social
taken for granted, and considers the alternative pathways
that might have produced, and can produce, alternative
worlds.
is not only the ability of one actor to get another actor
• Power
to do what they would not do otherwise, but also the
production of identities, interests, and meanings that shape
the ability of actors to control their fate.
13.4 Constructivism and global change
Constructivism’s focus on how the world ‘hangs together’
(Ruggie 1998), how normative structures construct the
identities and interests of actors, and how actors are rulefollowing might seem ideal for explaining why things
stay the same but useless for explaining why things
change. This is hardly true. Constructivism claims that
what exists might not have existed, and need not exist—
inviting us to consider alternative worlds and the conditions that make them more or less possible. Some of
the most important constructivist statements are about
global transformation. Constructivism got its big break
by besting neorealism and neoliberalism regarding how
to explain the end of the cold war. Constructivists have
delved into the origins of sovereignty and the principle
of non-interference, and more recent developments that
have shaken that principle and made sovereignty conditional on how states treat their populations—best known
as a responsibility to protect. World orders are created
and sustained not only by great power preferences but
also by changing understandings of what constitutes a
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legitimate international order. Until the Second World
War, the idea of a world organized around empires was
hardly illegitimate; now it is.
Constructivism has a reputation for tracking not
just normative change but also change that fuels
global integration and represents moral progress. The
internationalization and institutionalization of norms
is associated with reduced diversity and greater homogeneity. Many of the norms under study are associated
with liberalism—equality, human rights, liberty, private property. In this spirit, this section begins by surveying global convergence around norms and norm
diffusion. Yet all international orders, even those that
orient around seemingly universal ethics that preach
equality and justice, produce inequality and domination. I conclude this section by revealing the presence
of power in a moral concept such as humanity.
Diffusion is a central theme in any discussion of
global change. It is implicit in almost all theories of
globalization and internationalization. Accounts of
diffusion concern how particular models, practices,
norms, strategies, or beliefs spread within a population. Constructivists have highlighted two important
issues. One is institutional isomorphism, which
observes that organizations that share the same environment will, over time, resemble each other. In other
words, diversity of models within a population yields
to convergence around a single model. There used
to be various ways to organize state structures, economic activity, and free trade agreements. But now
the world is organized around the nation-state,
many states favour democratic forms of governance
and market economies, and most international organizations are multilateral. It is possible that the reason for this convergence is that states now realize that
some institutions are just superior to others in terms
of effectiveness. An additional possibility is that states
look alike because they want acceptance, legitimacy,
and status. How to explain the post-cold war wave of
democratization? Perhaps states accepted that democratic elections are a more efficient and superior way
to organize politics. Another possibility is that many
states wanted to be identified as modern and civilized,
and receive the benefits associated with being a legitimate state.
How do things diffuse? Why are they accepted
in new places? One factor is coercion. Colonialism
and great power imposition figured centrally
in the spread of capitalism. Another is strategic
competition. Heated rivals are likely to adopt similar
weapons systems to try to stay even on the military
battlefield. States will also adopt similar ideas and
organizations for at least four other reasons. First,
states want resources, and to attract these resources
they will adopt and reform their institutions to signal to various communities that they are part of
the ‘club’ and are utilizing ‘modern’ techniques. In
other words, they value these new institutions not
necessarily because they believe they are superior,
but because of their symbolic value. And often these
symbols have material benefits. Eastern European
countries seeking entry into the European Union
have adopted various reforms not only because they
believed in their effectiveness, but also because these
reforms were symbols that were the price of admission into the European club.
Second, during periods of uncertainty states are
unsure of how to address existing challenges, and
in response often adopt those models that are perceived as successful or legitimate. For instance, at the
end of the cold war, the ‘Western’ model appeared
to be particularly attractive precisely because it
was viewed as the ‘gold standard’. Third, frequently
states adopt particular models because of their symbolic standing. For example, many governments in
the Third World have acquired very expensive weapons systems although they have very little military
value, because they convey to others that they are
sophisticates and are part of the ‘club’. Iran’s nuclear
ambitions might reflect its desire for regional dominance, but it might also covet this status symbol.
Finally, professional associations and expert communities also diffuse organizational models. Most
associations have established techniques, codes of
conduct, and methodologies for determining how to
confront challenges in their areas of expertise, and
they learn them through informal interactions and
in formal settings such as universities. Economists
have a standard way of analysing and responding to
an economic crisis, international lawyers of defining
and accusing a state of human rights violations, and
humanitarians of organizing and running a refugee camp. In addition to using accepted practices to
address ongoing challenges, experts also communicate these standards to others, making them agents
of diffusion. In general, institutional isomorphism
highlights how a world once characterized by diversity is increasingly uniform.
Chapter 13 Social constructivism
Discussions of diffusion draw attention to a related
constructivist concern: the internationalization and
institutionalization of norms. A norm is ‘a standard
of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Norms of
humanitarianism, citizenship, military intervention,
human rights, trade, arms control, and the environment not only regulate what states do, they can also
be connected to their identities and thus express how
they define themselves and their interests. Norms
constrain behaviour because actors are worried about
costs and because of their sense of self. ‘Civilized’ states
are expected to avoid settling their differences through
violence, not because war might not pay but rather
because it violates how ‘civilized’ states are expected
to act. We often use the label of ‘victims’ to distinguish
those whose suffering is prioritized over the suffering
of others (see Case Study 13.2).
Similar to diffusion, expectations of what constitutes
proper behaviour can globalize and become taken for
Case Study 13.2 ‘Victims’
The category of victim demonstrates the various kinds
of effects a social construction may have. The world now
attends to more kinds of suffering of more kinds of people
than ever before. But how do we decide whose suffering matters? Humanity demands that we decide based on need. But
often we discriminate among suffering others, distinguishing between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’. The world has a
label for the truly deserving—‘victims’. But the victim does not
naturally exist—it is a social construction. It began to circulate
widely starting in the seventeenth century, when it came to
mean a ‘living creature sacrificed to a deity ’, and thus had a
religious meaning (A. Cole 2007: 16). A century later a victim
became someone who suffered acute loss (Shklar 1990: 35).
Since the twentieth century the category of victim has concerned not just those who have suffered gravely but also those
who meet four other criteria. First, they must be viewed as
part of humanity. Enslaved persons rarely registered. Second,
the suffering must be grave. Yet what counts as serious is
itself culturally determined. For centuries ‘domestic’ violence
against women was ordinary and in many contexts it still is.
But now those who experience this form of violence are often
labelled victims. Third, victims are understood to be weak,
vulnerable, and passive. Gender and race shape such judgements. Many women are assumed to meet these qualities, but
not men because some constructions of masculinity do not
allow space for vulnerability and passivity. Fourth, they must
have done nothing to have brought the suffering on themselves. They are ‘innocent’. The more of these qualities possessed by the sufferer, the more likely they will be seen as an
‘ideal’ victim.
Women who have suffered during war from gender-based violence (GBV), violence against individuals based on their gender
identity, are now often considered ‘ideal’ victims, and deserving of assistance. But this is a recent development. Historically,
for example, the rape of women in war was either neglected or
treated as a tragic but inevitable effect of war. But GBV gained
attention after the cold war because of the rise of human security and expansion of women’s rights, compelling evidence of
rape as an instrument of war, more media coverage, and the
dogged campaigns by many women’s movements. Those who
suffered from GBV became defined as ‘victims’ because they
were assumed to meet all the necessary criteria.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has become so
closely associated with GBV that it was crowned the ‘rape capital of the world’ (Kristof 2010), and the ‘most dangerous place
on earth to be a woman’ (Wanga 2010) (see Case Study 21.2).
In October 2004 the human rights group Amnesty International
said that 40,000 cases of rape had been reported over the previous six years in the DRC, the majority occurring in South Kivu.
This is an incomplete count, as the humanitarian and international organizations compiling the figures do not have access to
much of the conflict area; only women who have reported for
treatment are included. It is estimated that there are as many
as 200,000 surviving rape victims living in the DRC (Amnesty
International 2004: 12–13). Another report claimed that at the
peak of the conflict 48 women were raped every hour (Peterman,
Palermo, and Bredenkamp 2011).
As ideal victims, these women received more international
care and attention than ever before. Yet labelling them ‘ideal
victims’ had various effects. Some of these women were
far from ‘ideal’ but rather were ‘complex victims’ because
they too had been perpetrators—and even perpetrators
of sexual violence. And because men were considered the
natural perpetrators, they were overlooked as possible victims themselves. Numbers alone did not focus the West on
GBV; the reporting, images, and discourses surrounding sexual violence tapped into racist narratives of Africa and the
Congo. The colonizing West viewed Africa as a ‘dark continent’ and the Congo as the ‘heart of darkness’. In this narrative, Africans were viewed as less than human, defined by
barbarianism and savagery (see Ch. 18). African men were
placed in a category unto themselves—viewed as violent,
menacing, oversexed, and predatory. These images lingered
long after colonialism ended and became a dominant frame
in the West for making sense of the sexual violence in the
DRC. The use of highly persuasive but not entirely reliable
statistics about astronomical rates of sexual violence in the
DRC further perpetuated a colonial view of the DRC in the
minds of international policy-makers, activists, and journalists (see Ch. 11). Even when these accounts attempted to
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avoid stereotypes of Africa, Western viewers often drew from
these very stereotypes to make sense of these ‘otherworldly ’,
‘primitive’ evils. The combination of women as ideal victims
and Africa as an uncivilized land reinforced the modern-day
version of the civilizing mission—a ‘white saviour’s complex’
that demanded Western intervention.
granted—what is now called the life cycle of norms.
Introduced by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 894–905),
the life cycle has three stages. First is ‘norm emergence’,
which can often be traced to a norm entrepreneur who
is able to ‘call attention to issues or even “create” issues
by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them’ and in ways that capture the attention and
concern of the broader public. Because they are interested in introducing change, many norm entrepreneurs
work from non-governmental organizations and international organizations. Their success, though, depends
on persuading states to join with them to help create
new rules. For instance, several decades ago scholars,
jurists, and policy-makers objected to the very idea of
humanitarian intervention because it violated sovereignty’s principle of non-interference and allowed great
powers to try to mask their true intentions. Over the last
20 years, however, there has been a growing acceptance
of humanitarian intervention and a ‘responsibility to
protect’—when states are unable or unwilling to protect
their citizens, then the international community inherits
that responsibility. This revolutionary concept emerged
through fits and starts, in response to tragedies such as
the genocide in Rwanda and propelled by various states
and humanitarian organizations.
Once accomplished, norm emergence reaches a tipping point, leading to the second stage, ‘norm cascade’,
when the norm spreads through the rest of the population. Although there are many reasons for this diffusion, often it is because of ‘a combination of pressure
for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their
self-esteem’. The final stage is ‘norm internalization’,
when ‘[n]orms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and
are no longer a matter of . . . debate’ and thus are automatically honoured: ‘For example, few people today
discuss whether women should be allowed to vote,
whether slavery is useful, or whether medical personnel should be granted immunity during war’ (adapted
from Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 894–905).
Question 1: What distinguishes between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ victims?
Question 2: Women and children are more often described as
‘innocent victims’ than are men. Why? What happens if women
are no longer assumed to be ‘ideal victims’?
If handled without care, diffusion and life cycle
models can be misinterpreted as suggesting a world
that is moving towards uniformity and harmony. But
bear in mind the following. First, there is no inevitability either to the life cycle or diffusion. There is a
relatively high rate of mortality because lots of norms
never make it past infancy. To understand why some
norms succeed where others fail—patterns of receptivity and resistance—constructivists have used concepts
such as a ‘cultural match’. Liberal human rights norms,
for instance, have been embraced in some contexts
but have met fierce resistance in others; acceptance is
largely predicated on these norms being understood
as consistent with the local culture. Second, the same
norms can become transmuted and take on different
meanings as they are adopted in different contexts.
The United States and European countries prohibit
cruel and unusual punishment, but many in the United
States do not see capital punishment as either cruel or
unusual, which many Europeans find incredible. Third,
just because states look alike does not mean that they
act alike. After all, recall that many states gravitate
towards particular models to improve their legitimacy,
not because they think the model is better. If so, we can
expect a disjuncture between the formal adoption of
the model and the observed behaviour. For instance,
if governments adopt democratic forms of governance
and elections solely for symbolic reasons, then we
should expect the presence of democratic institutions
to exist alongside authoritarian and illiberal practices.
Fourth, even those norms that seem quite established
can become contested, resisted, and replaced. World
orders rise and fall.
Fifth, power is always present in any normative
order. Sometimes constructivists are accused of being
‘utopian’ because of the impression that they believe
norms are inherently good and that global life cycles
invariably lead to moral progress. Section 13.2 argued
that constructivists have not always been as attentive
to power as they should have been, but constructivists
Chapter 13 Social constructivism
have the analytic tools to cast light on the hidden
forms of power and domination that exist even in
seemingly hopeful discourses. Consider the concept
of humanity: the belief that all humans are equal,
deserving of equal respect and compassion, and
should be protected from unnecessary harm. But
humanity always has been and always will be uneven.
Humanity has not always been out there but rather
emerged in the eighteenth century from Christian
and secular thought. Humanity was not automatically
extended to all humans because some people were
seen as inhuman (often because of race) or less than
human (because of race, gender, religion, and other
markers of difference) (see Ch. 18). Humanity became
attached to civilizing processes during colonialism and attempts to transform the ‘uncivilized’ into
the ‘civilized’. In other words, humanity generated
inequalities and notions of superiority and inferiority.
Since the Second World War it is no longer acceptable
to have such thoughts, but these inequalities remain.
If Black Lives Matter has reminded us of anything it
is that surface notions of equality mask deep inequalities. Also consider the very idea of compassion for
suffering others, the hallmark of humanitarianism,
humanity, and cosmopolitanism. Do we feel compassion when we give? Or pity? What do we know of the
recipient besides their suffering? Can acts of giving
across long distances generate anything more than a
stick-figure humanity? Acts of charity, in short, help
to reproduce feelings of superiority and inferiority.
Key Points
recognition that the world is socially constructed
• The
means that constructivists can investigate global change
and transformation.
is a key issue in any study of global change,
• Diffusion
captured by the concern with institutional isomorphism
and the life cycle of norms.
diffusion sometimes occurs because of the view
• Although
that a given model is superior, frequently actors adopt a
model either because of external pressures or because of
its symbolic legitimacy.
isomorphism and the internationalization of
• Institutional
norms raise issues of growing homogeneity in world
politics, but homogeneity does not mean calm or a world
without conflict.
is always embedded in norms and is always present
• Power
in normative orders.
13.5 Conclusion
This chapter has surveyed the global-historical, intellectual, and disciplinary forces that make constructivism
a particularly attractive way of thinking about international politics, as it considers the different factors that
shape the durable forms of world politics, those rare
moments of transformation, and alternative worlds. It
is not a substantive theory like other theories in this
volume, but rather a social theory that reshapes our
way of understanding how the world hangs together. In
doing so, it challenges received wisdoms and opens new
lines of enquiry. It insists that the vision of international
politics as driven only by materialist forces is strange,
not the idea that it is fundamentally social. It demonstrates the social alternative in areas that are central to
the research agenda of the discipline’s mainstream. It
helps uncover the world being made and unmade.
This chapter emphasized how constructivists have
tended to be interested in the relationship between
the underlying normative structure and patterns of
international order. In part because of the post-cold
war context in which constructivism originated, there
was an emphasis on order as produced not through
domination but rather through consensus around fundamental values and norms. The obvious danger was
that constructivism might neglect how power ripples
throughout the normative order, and how states and
non-state actors will compete, sometimes violently, to
redefine international society’s fundamental norms and
the boundaries of communities. Alternative schools of
constructivism emphasized power and conflict, and
insisted that an international society that appeared to
be bound by agreement was in fact in constant combat. If our favoured models of international society are
those that fit the times, then arguably the models that
were adopted after the end of the cold war to understand
the possibility of a denser and more legitimate normative world order will lose ground to those versions of
constructivism that emphasize how international society is unmade and disordered. Social construction is an
ongoing, and sometimes quite bloody, process.
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Questions
1. What were the silences of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism?
2. What is the core of constructivism?
3. Do you find constructivism a useful approach for thinking about world politics?
4. Do you agree that we should try to understand how actors make their behaviour meaningful
in world politics? Or is it enough to examine behaviour?
5. How are meanings fixed in world politics?
6. What sort of relationship can exist between rational choice and constructivism?
7. What do you think are the core issues for the study of global change, and how does
constructivism help you to address those issues? Alternatively, how does a constructivist
framework help you to identify new issues that you had not previously considered?
8. How does the concept of diffusion help you to understand why and how the world has
changed? Is constructivism better for thinking about conformity or diversity?
9. Does the internationalization and institutionalization of norms imply some notion of
progress?
10. Where does the power lurk in concepts such as humanity and international community?
Visit the online resources to test your understanding by trying the self-test questions.
Further Reading
Adler, E. (2003), ‘Constructivism’, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of
International Relations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). Reviews the origins and fundamentals of
constructivism and its relationship to existing theories of international politics.
Adler, E., and Pouliot, V. (eds) (2011), International Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press). A wide-ranging collection of essays on the value of focusing on what actors do in
international affairs.
Barnett, M. (1998), Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia
University Press). Examines how Arab leaders played the game of Arab politics and, in doing so,
transformed the very nature of Arab politics. An example of how constructivists might think
about how strategic action is shaped by a normative structure.
Fearon, J., and Wendt, A. (2003), ‘Rationalism vs Constructivism’, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and
B. A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). Surveys
how rational choice and constructivism overlap.
Finnemore, M., and Sikkink, K. (1999), ‘International Norms and Political Change’, in
P. Katzenstein et al. (eds), Explorations and Controversies in World Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press). A pathbreaking article that helped to frame thinking about the emergence and
evolution of international norms.
Finnemore, M., and Sikkink, K. (2001), ‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in
International Relations and Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, 4(1):
391–416. An insightful account of constructivism’s insights.
Katzenstein, P. (ed.) (1996), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University
Press). Explores how identities and norms shape state interests in a range of security areas.
Chapter 13 Social constructivism
Price, R. (ed.) (2008), Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press). Constructivist scholars gather to consider the relationship between ethics and
various outcomes in world affairs.
Stuurman, S. (2017), The Invention of Humanity: Equality and Cultural Difference in World History
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). A major statement on the precarity of humanity.
Wendt, A. (1999), Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
The ‘bible’ of modern constructivism.
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
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Part Four
Structures and processes
In this part of the book we want to introduce you
to the main underlying structures and processes in
contemporary world politics. There will obviously be
some overlap between this part and the next, since
the division between structures and processes and
international issues is largely one of perspective. For
us, the difference is that by structures and processes
we mean relatively stable features of world politics
that are more enduring and constant than the issues
addressed in Part Five. We have two aims in this part.
Our first aim is to provide a good overview of
some of the most important structures and processes
in world politics at the beginning of the twenty-first
century. We have therefore chosen a series of ways of
thinking about world politics that draw attention to
these underlying features. Again, we realize that what
marqs/Getty Images
is a structure and what is a process is largely a matter
of debate, but it may help to say that, together, these
provide the setting in which the issues dealt with in
the next part of the book will be played out. All the
features examined in this part will be important for
the resolution of the issues we deal with in Part Five,
since they comprise both the main structures of world
politics that these issues surround and the main processes that will determine their fate.
Our second aim is that these structures and processes will help you to think about globalization by
forcing you to ask again whether or not it is a qualitatively different form of world politics than hitherto.
Does globalization require or represent an overthrow
of the structures and processes that have been central
in world politics to date?
Chapter 14
War and world politics
tar ak bark awi
Framing Questions
●
What is war?
●
What is the relationship between war and politics?
●
How should we study war?
Reader’s Guide
Along with trade and diplomacy, war is one of the
oldest and most common elements of international
relations. Like trade and diplomacy, war has evolved
over time and changes with social context. War elicits strong reactions. Many believe it is necessary to
prepare for and to fight wars against potential and
actual enemies. Others believe war itself is the problem and that it should be eliminated as a means to
settle differences and disputes between states and
groups of people. This chapter discusses what war is,
how it fits into the study of international relations,
and how it affects societies and politics in the Global
North and South. The chapter begins by examining
the work of the leading philosopher of war, Carl von
Clausewitz, in order to outline the nature of war, the
main types of war, and the idea of strategy. It then
turns to important developments in the history of
warfare, both in the West and elsewhere. It highlights
the close connections between the modern state,
armed force, and war.
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14.1 Introduction
Questions of war and peace are central to the study
of international relations. Scholars debate whether
war is declining or transforming (see Opposing
Opinions 14.1). Constructivists look at how friends
and enemies define one another, and at the social
construction of threats. Scholars of civil and ethnic wars, particularly those fought in developing countries, study ways to resolve conflicts and
build a durable peace. Gender scholars draw attention to the centrality of war for masculinity, and to
how changing constructions of masculinity shape
war and violence against women, as for example in
the prevalence of rape in war (see Chs 10 and 17).
International lawyers study the legal dimensions of
declaring and waging war (see Ch. 19). Moral philosophers also study war. Yet other scholars advise
governments on how to wage war more effectively.
They study what kinds of weapons to acquire, consider strategies to pursue, and investigate the character and goals of potential adversaries.
A paradox of war is that it is both a violent conflict
between groups, and a way in which groups become
connected with one another. That is, war is a social relation among the parties to the conflict. Understanding
what kind of social relation war is helps to situate it in
the study of world politics. Doing so reveals that different parts of the world have experienced war very
differently.
Opposing Opinions 14.1 War has declined over time and world politics are becoming more peaceful
For
Long-term civilizing processes have progressively pacified
human societies. Violence was brought under state control and
subjected to cultural, social, and legal regulation (Elias 2000).
Today, humans are much less likely to die by violent means than
in the past (Pinker 2012). The Second World War was the last
major war (Mueller 2004).
Some statistical findings support the thesis that war has
declined historically. Depending on the definitions and data
used, some types of war have declined over time. Inter-state
war has declined since 1945 and there are fewer violent deaths
in conflicts as a percentage of population ( J. Goldstein 2011;
Human Security Report Project 2012).
Nuclear weapons have made war between nuclear-armed
states unthinkable. For fear of nuclear escalation, nuclear-armed
powers avoid fighting one another directly. However, a nucleararmed state on the verge of defeat might risk nuclear escalation.
The liberal international order has effectively outlawed
war, while democratic states do not go to war with one
another. While intra-state (or civil) wars still occur, and states
may engage in hybrid or liminal uses of force, a norm against
inter-state war has been progressively entrenched in the
international system since the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928
(Hathaway and Shapiro 2017). Moreover, depending on definitions, none or very few liberal democratic states have waged
inter-state war on one another since 1816 (Russett et al. 1993;
Rummel 1997).
Against
The statistical finding that fewer humans die violently over
time is dependent on relative not absolute numbers. For
Steven Pinker, the Mongol invasions were more deadly than the
Second World War because they killed a greater percentage of
people living at the time, even though the Second World War
killed many more people in absolute terms (Pinker 2012: 62,
235–6).
War has not so much declined as transformed, particularly with respect to regional variation. Since 1945,
one has been much more likely to die in war in the Global
South than in the Global North (Mann 2018). Nuclear deterrence led the superpowers to conduct the cold war through
proxies in the Third World (Westad 2007). International
involvement in war often takes place through intervention
in internal conflicts, as in UN peacekeeping or the provision
of military advice and assistance. That said, as the Russian
invasion of Ukraine in 2022 demonstrates, large-scale warfare remains possible even in Europe, and entails the risk of
nuclear escalation.
Statistical findings mean little in the absence of compelling theoretical and historical explanations. Correlation is
not explanation. In the absence of a convincing account of why
it matters, a statistical finding is an artefact of databases, definitions, and procedures. Statistical variation in warfare may be
accounted for by changes in technology, international orders
(Braumoeller 2019), or other historical developments, such as
modern medicine. Moreover, in human affairs, there is no necessary reason for present trends to continue.
The future of the liberal, rules-based world order is in question, while liberal democracy is under renewed challenge
around the world. The global war on terror, with its defeats
in Afghanistan and Iraq, threatens an end to the era of US and
liberal dominance that followed the cold war. Authoritarian,
racial, and ethno-nationalist politics are on the rise.
Chapter 14 War and world politics
Geopolitics, the climate emergency, and new technologies signal the advent of new forms of warfare and political violence.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 brings together many of
these developments, among them perceptions of Western
weakness as well as novel combinations of new and old ways
of making war.
Watch the video on the online resources to see the author discussing the impact of the Russia–Ukraine war and what it means
for world politics.
1 Can statistical trends about war in the past predict what will happen in the future?
2 How do new technologies change war and ideas about it?
3 Are liberalism and democracy forces for peace in world politics?
Visit the online resources to discover pointers to help you tackle these questions.
14.2 Defining war
What is war? How should one think about it in the
study of world politics? Wars have happened in all
known recorded histories. War predates the world
of sovereign states, as well as that of globalization. It
will likely be with us long into the future. If war is
a historical constant in one sense, in another it varies endlessly. War takes many different forms, from
violent feuds between local clans to the world wars
of the twentieth century. In essence, war happens
when two or more groups conduct their relations
with one another through violence. They organize
themselves to fight each other. Many different kinds
of groups have done this: tribal peoples, nation-states,
street gangs, guerrilla and terrorist groups. They have
used diverse weapons, from swords to rifles, slings
to drones, wooden ships to nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers.
War is organized violence between political entities. A political entity is any kind of group capable
of waging war. Such a group has a leadership and it
has resources—the human and material means—to
organize violence. To organize violence means to
assemble an armed group, one capable of fighting
other armed groups. War happens when such groups
actually fight each other. War varies greatly because
fighting takes so many different forms. War is shaped
by the kinds of societies that fight it, by the prevailing level of technology, by culture, by economic circumstances, and by many other factors. War always
has an underlying similarity—violence between
groups—but this shifts and changes depending on
when and where it is fought, and between whom.
This changing character of war can be captured
through the idea of war and society: society shapes
war, and war shapes society.
This yields a definition of war (organized violence
between political entities) and a broad approach to
studying it (war and society). However, one last element of war remains missing. When a political entity
fights a war, its leadership has in mind a purpose for
the violence. They have some idea of what they might
gain, or protect, by going to war. This determines
how a political entity plans and prepares for war,
and the moves it makes once it goes to war. Thinking
about the purposes pursued in war, and the planning
and preparation involved, is the subject of strategy.
Political and military leaders try to make war serve
as an instrument, a means to an end they are trying
to achieve. They think strategically, trying to connect
the means—war, violence—to some purpose, such as
defending their homeland; seizing a piece of territory;
gaining independence; or pursuing an ideological goal,
such as spreading communism or Islam, or making the
world safe for democracy or from terror. In contrast to
strategy, tactics are the techniques employed by armed
forces to fight other armed forces, to win the combats or
battles that make up a war. Classically speaking, strategy is the art of arranging battles to serve the purposes
of the war, while tactics are the art of winning battles
(see Box 14.1).
In sum, war is organized violence among groups; it
changes with historical and social context; and, in the
minds of those who wage it, it is fought for some purpose, according to some strategy or plan.
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Box 14.1 Clausewitz on strategy and tactics
The conduct of war . . . consists in the planning and conduct
of fighting. [Fighting] consists of a greater or lesser number
of single acts, each complete in itself, which . . . are called
‘engagements’ [or battles]. This gives rise to the completely
different activity of planning and executing these engagements themselves, and of coordinating each of them with the
others in order to further the object of the war. One has been
called tactics, and the other strategy . . . According to our
classification, then, tactics teaches the use of armed forces in
the engagement; strategy, the use of the engagement for the
object of the war.
(Clausewitz 1976: 128; emphasis in original)
Key Points
is organized violence among political entities, including
• War
both states and non-state actors.
has occurred frequently in history, but changes with
• War
context.
kinds of groups can wage war, but in order to do so
• Many
they have to ‘organize violence’ or create an armed force.
’ approach to the study of war looks at
• Ahow‘warwarandhassociety
shaped society and at how society has
shaped war.
is a plan to make war serve a political purpose, while
• Strategy
tactics are the techniques that armed forces use to win
battles.
14.3 War: international and global
How does war fit into the study of world politics?
A first cut at this question begins with the sovereign
state. Today’s world can be described as nationalinternational. National refers to nation-states, the main
‘units’ of the international system; international refers
to relations among sovereign nation-states.
From this national–international perspective, there
are two types of war: civil war within a state and international war between two or more states. A civil war
happens when internal groups battle over control of a
sovereign state, or when a group or groups within a state
want to secede and form their own state. In the Spanish
Civil War (1936–9), republicans and fascists fought
over who was to govern Spain. The American Civil War
(1861–5) started when southern states organized a confederacy and tried to secede from the United States. An
international war occurs when two or more sovereign
states fight each other. An example is the Iran–Iraq War
(1980–8), which began when Iraq invaded Iran.
International and civil wars comprise an important tradition in the study of war. However, war is both
older than the sovereign state and likely to endure into
any globalized future. This suggests that we should
think also about war outside of the sovereign state system. Until the 1960s, much of the world was made up of
empires and colonies. The way in which these empires
broke up set the stage for many of the conflicts that followed (see Case Study 14.1 and Case Study 14.2).
Many wars fought to build and defend empires do
not fit into the model of a world made up of sovereign
nation-states. Wars today, and in the past, involve complex
combinations of state and non-state actors fighting in a
single territory, or across many territories. Civil wars often
involve an array of international actors and dimensions
(see Box 14.2). War has evolved both within and beyond
the nation-state. The global war on terror (GWOT) has
brought together police, intelligence, and military forces,
within and across countries, to share information and conduct operations. A bewildering array of actors, separately
and in combination, engage in contemporary conflict.
The imperial past and the transnational present
point to a second, global approach to the study of war
in world politics. Globalization involves the circulation
of people, goods, and ideas around the planet, and war
is one form that this circulation takes (Barkawi 2005).
War connects the groups waging it. During the US
invasion and occupation of Iraq (2003–11), Iraqi and
American histories became entangled (see Case Study
14.2). What happened in Iraq affected the United States,
and what happened in the United States affected Iraq.
War reorganizes the political entities and societies that
wage it, and in doing so, war can have global effects. The
Second World War was composed of many different,
but connected, conflicts in Europe and the Asia-Pacific,
and is conventionally dated between 1939 and 1945. As
the war developed, it conjoined conflicts across vast
Chapter 14 War and world politics
Case Study 14.1 What’s global about the global war on terror?
Newspapers with a headline reading ‘Osama is still alive’
to be distributed during a protest outside the presidential
palace in Jakarta, Indonesia
© Dita Alangkara/AP/Shutterstock
The global war on terror (GWOT) arose out of the interaction of
many peoples and places. In turn, in different ways, the events
of the GWOT shaped politics and societies around the world.
Militant Islam is one of modernity’s many sectarian trajectories,
like Hindutva and white supremacy. With roots in the era of formal empire, it gave rise to social and political forces which won
decisive victories in the latter part of the cold war, most notably
in Iran and Afghanistan. The US and its allies helped assemble
the combination of local and transnational jihadis, among them
Osama bin Laden, that forced the Soviets to withdraw from
Afghanistan in 1989. Bin Laden was the leader of Al Qaeda, which
attacked the US on 11 September 2001. Having participated in
the defeat of one superpower, bin Laden set his sights on the US
and its allies.
Bin Laden distinguished between the ‘far enemy’ and the ‘near
enemy’. With the fall of the Ottoman caliphate after the First
World War, the Middle East came under the rule of Western
powers and their clients, among which bin Laden counted the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the keeper of Islam’s holiest sites.
The ‘far enemy’ was the West, principally the US, while the
‘near enemy’ was what bin Laden saw as apostate governments
in Muslim lands. For the ‘far enemy’, Al Qaeda favoured complex plots carried out by carefully vetted cadres, exemplified by
9/11. To target the ‘near enemy’, it affiliated with local Islamist
spaces, killing over 60 million people. It was a global
experience, even if remembered—and dated—differently by different countries. Some consequences of the
Second World War were the formation of the United
Nations; the fatal weakening of the European empires;
and new technologies, such as jet aircraft and nuclear
weapons, which fundamentally altered the world that
followed. The Second World War demonstrates how
the war and society approach described in Section 14.2
resistance movements, channelling funds, weapons, and expertise to Islamic insurgencies on a substantial scale.
Bin Laden originally conceived 9/11 as a knockout blow that
would cause the US to withdraw from Muslim countries. But
when the US and its allies responded by invading Afghanistan
and Iraq, and by shoring up counter-terror programmes in countries around the world, Al Qaeda and other jihadi organizations
turned to a protracted war strategy on a global scale. The idea
was to bleed and bankrupt the US by overextending its resources.
As bin Laden put it, ‘All that we have to do is to send two mujahidin to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which
is written al-Qaida, in order to make the generals race there to
cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses
without their achieving for it anything of note other than some
benefits for their private companies’ (bin Laden 2004).
The jihadi insurgencies and other terror operations became
increasingly sectarian and astonishingly violent, compromising
Al Qaeda’s brand and bin Laden’s vision, even as they ultimately
led to the US withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. The socalled Islamic State (ISIS) began as an Al Qaeda affiliate in Iraq,
but came to embody an alternate model of global mobilization
via social media. People anywhere could imagine themselves into
this caliphate and its jihad. Al Qaeda’s pious and disciplined operators, who brought down jet airliners on national landmarks with
box cutters and their wits, were overshadowed by ordinary, angry
young fighters let loose with AK-47s. Why bother with complex
plots like 9/11 when murderous raids on tourist sites and downtown districts had local and global effect?
Badly battered by the US and its allies, Al Qaeda has sought
survival through adaptation. ISIS’ territorial caliphate in Syria
and Iraq has been defeated, but its model for mobilizing jihadis
remains. The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan will likely energize
future jihadi efforts. The GWOT linked peoples and places across
the globe in its origins, course, and outcomes, and instead of
simple defeat or victory, it led to change. The conflict has transformed everything from travel and tourism worldwide to the
domestic politics of powerful states like the US.
Question 1: How did the 9/11 attacks on New York and
Washington, DC become a global conflict?
Question 2: How would you distinguish between the local and
global effects of the GWOT?
applies not only to the societies directly engaged in war,
but to the shape of world politics as a whole.
War, then, connects peoples and places and has global
dimensions (see Case Study 14.1). At the same time, the
contemporary world remains organized around sovereign nation-states. Both the international and the global
are important in the study of war and world politics. To
think more deeply about what war is, Section 14.4 turns
to the principal philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz.
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Case Study 14.2 War and society: Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United States
US soldiers in Iraq
© US Department of Defence
During the GWOT (see Case Study 14.1), the United States
invaded, occupied, and withdrew from Afghanistan (2001–21)
and Iraq (2003–11). These wars violently entwined the histories
of the three countries in ways which continue to play out. For
superpowers, defeats in ‘small wars’ can lead to crisis and rupture
at home, in part because these defeats are perceived as humiliating. For the countries in which these wars are fought, these conflicts often entail large numbers of dead and long-term social,
cultural, and material devastation.
Notably, these wars were only the latest episodes in histories
of violent relations. The United States had a tense relationship
with Iraq during the cold war until the Iran–Iraq War (1980–8),
when it supported Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In 1990, following disputes over debts, territory, and Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas, Iraq invaded and occupied
Kuwait. The United States assembled a coalition and liberated
Kuwait in a short war (1990–1), but did not invade Iraq or remove
Saddam. For the next 12 years, Iraq suffered from sanctions, nofly zones, and occasional Western military action.
In 1979, the Soviet Union sent troops to Afghanistan to support a communist government that had come to power the
previous year. The US helped arm and finance the mujahideen
opposing it. In 1996, the Taliban won the civil war that followed
the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. When the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan refused to hand over or expel Al Qaeda after the
attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, the United States
invaded. The Taliban began an insurgency against US and NATO
forces. The occupying powers established an Afghan government
and armed forces, but the Taliban were victorious 19 years later.
Iraq was not involved in 9/11 and was led by the nominally
secular and nationalist Ba’ath party of Saddam Hussein. But the
United States used the GWOT to seek his removal, amid claims
that Iraq had developed weapons of mass destruction. Following
the US-led invasion in 2003, the Iraqi government and military
were disbanded, Iraqi society splintered, and a many-sided insurgency developed. No weapons of mass destruction were found.
Both Iraq and Afghanistan were multi-ethnic polities with
borders drawn through imperial competition. War, like imperial divide and rule, sharpened sectarian divisions and created
new ones, often across borders. The Taliban are a predominantly
Pashtun movement from the south and east of Afghanistan.
Pashtuns are spread across Afghanistan and the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, divided by an old imperial
line that has become a sovereign border.
In Iraq, the invasion displaced the ruling Sunni minority
and left behind a struggling democracy dominated by parties
from the Shi’a majority, some connected with Iran, as well as
relatively autonomous Kurdish areas, which extend beyond
Iraq. During the Arab Spring of 2010–12, the Iraqi insurgency
spilled over into Syria and helped initiate the still ongoing Syrian civil war (see Box 14.2). The rise of the so-called
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria followed the US withdrawal
from Iraq in 2011.
As can be seen, wars set the stage for further war as they transform combatant societies. The defeat in Iraq, and the seemingly
endless war in Afghanistan, helped fuel the rise of Donald Trump
to the US presidency in 2016. For many Americans, losing wars
to Muslim insurgents is an indication that something is deeply
wrong with the United States. One response, as after their defeat
in Vietnam, was a surge in membership of white nationalist
militias (Belew 2018). Another response was to focus on nationbuilding at home. These wars continue to shape society and politics in all three countries.
Question 1: Why do wars have such potent consequences for
society and politics?
Question 2: What do the outcomes of these wars have to tell us
about the nature of military power in world politics?
Box 14.2 The international dimensions of ‘civil war’
Many contemporary wars are ‘civil’ wars in that they are fought
on the territory of a sovereign state. They ultimately concern
how and by whom that territory is to be governed. But civil
wars typically involve an array of international actors, such as
the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), humanitarian organizations and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), foreign fighters, and the covert or overt
involvement of foreign states.
NATO intervention was decisive in civil conflicts in Kosovo
in 1999 and Libya in 2011. In the Syrian civil war that began
in 2011, several foreign states have been directly and indirectly involved, including Russia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
Chapter 14 War and world politics
the United States, France, and Britain. Also involved in Syria
is Hezbollah, a political party and armed group in Lebanon.
Important populations and groups in the Syrian civil war
stretch across different states, for instance the Kurds, who
are also in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Religion and politics bond
together actors across borders, as with Hezbollah, Shi’a Iraqi
militias, and Iran. The so-called Islamic State, another party
involved in the Syrian civil war, at one point controlled territory across Iraq and Syria and had links to affiliates based in
Libya, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Nigeria, among other states.
These international dimensions of ‘civil’ war show how the
political groups and forces that wage war are in tension with,
and spread across, the sovereign territories of the national–
international world.
Key Points
war is a war fought between two or more
• International
sovereign states.
civil war is a war fought inside a sovereign state, but
• Awhich
in practice may involve many different international
actors.
connect the combatant societies; through war, the
• Wars
parties to the conflict shape one another.
• Wars lead to the global circulation of people, goods, and ideas.
can shape world politics and have long-lasting
• Wars
consequences.
14.4 Clausewitz’s philosophy of war
Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) was a Prussian officer
in the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802) and the
Napoleonic Wars (1803–15). He served on the staffs of
generals and directed Prussia’s war college. He died
unexpectedly in a cholera epidemic, leaving behind
unfinished papers which his wife, Marie, drew together
and published as On War (Clausewitz 1976). This text
is read in nearly every military academy and staff college in the world. Clausewitz was still working out his
ideas when he died, and his lengthy papers are subject
to multiple, even contradictory interpretations.
14.4.1 Clausewitz’s trinities
Clausewitz tried to capture the nature of war through
the idea of ‘trinities’. A trinity is made up of three different factors or tendencies, each of which can vary, creating many different possible combinations. According
to Clausewitz, war has three dominating tendencies—
passion, chance, and reason—which come together in
varying combinations in any given historical instance
of war. War always involves passion, in the motives for
fighting and in the enmities that inspire and sustain
killing in war. War is also a sphere of radical contingency, of sheer chance. Anything can happen. All the
different elements involved in military operations, from
human error to the weather, create infinite, unpredictable combinations that shape the outcomes of wars and
the fates of peoples. Finally, as in the notion of strategy,
Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831)
© The Picture Art Collection / Alamy Stock Photo
war involves reason. Political leaders and military staffs
seek to achieve objectives through war. In doing so,
they subject the use of violence to rationality; they try
to contain and direct the violence to particular military
and political purposes.
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Clausewitz went on to connect this primary trinity
to a second one, associating each of the three tendencies
with a component of a political entity. The realm of passion he connected to the people, their feelings and beliefs
about a war, and their will—or lack thereof—to wage it.
Chance he gave to the armed forces, who have to test their
abilities against the trials and fortunes of war. Reason he
attributed to leadership, to the political authorities who
decide on the war and set its ultimate aims, and to the
generals and other military leaders who have to translate these aims into reality. Like the primary trinity of
passion, chance, and reason, the elements of this second
trinity come together in variable configurations in any
actual instance of war. The characters of the combatant
peoples, the qualities of their armed forces, and the abilities of their leaders determine the course of wars.
14.4.2 Limited and total war
From the basic framework of the two trinities,
Clausewitz developed several additional points about
the nature of war. One is that there are broadly two
types of war: limited and total. A limited war is fought
for a lesser goal than political existence, for example a
war over a disputed territory or access to markets. The
Falklands/Malvinas War (1982) was a limited war for
both Argentina and the United Kingdom; whatever
happened to the islands they fought over, both states
would survive the war. A total war occurs when a state
or other political entity is fighting for its existence. In
the Second World War, the Allies demanded unconditional surrender from Nazi Germany—the war ended
Adolf Hitler’s regime, the Third Reich. Note that a war
can be limited for one participant, and total for another.
During the First Indochina War (1946–54), Vietnamese
forces fought for liberation from the French empire.
The war was total for the Vietnamese—about the possibility of independence—while France would continue
as a state with or without its empire in Indochina. The
war was a limited one for France.
The distinction between limited and total wars is
connected to another distinction: between real, or
actual, war on the one hand, and the true, or absolute,
nature of war on the other. Real wars, wars that historically happened, were always limited by certain factors.
Human beings could only do so much violence to one
another (Clausewitz was writing before nuclear and
biological weapons). Things conspired to limit, to some
degree, the amount of violence that might occur in war.
One limiting force Clausewitz called ‘friction’. Friction
was like a Murphy’s Law of war: everything that can go
wrong, will go wrong. Clausewitz thought that another
limiting force was policy, the strategy a political entity
was following. Leaders would try to keep the war on
track, to achieve its purpose, but when that was accomplished, or when it was no longer possible, the war
would be drawn to a close.
In contrast to these limiting factors of real war, the
true or absolute nature of war was escalatory. Clausewitz
thought that war has an inherent tendency to extremes,
to ever more violence. Each side is tempted to increase
the amount of force it is using to try to defeat the enemy,
to compel surrender. War draws into its cauldron ever
more human and material resources. Left to its own
devices, in the absence of policy and friction, war escalates in scale, becomes more violent, goes on longer, and
extends over more space. For Clausewitz (1976: 77), war
is an act of force and there is no logical limit to an act of
force. Each move is checked by a stronger countermove
until one of the combatants is exhausted.
14.4.3 War and politics
For Clausewitz, limits to the use of force potentially
arose from reason, in the form of strategic policy, the
goal or purpose leaders were pursuing in going to war.
His most famous aphorism was that war is a continuation of politics, with the use of other means (see Box
14.3). By this he meant that war does not put a stop to
politics, to relations with the other side—what happens is that violence is added to those relations. A state
can threaten or use force as a negotiating move, to get
another state or political entity to do what it wants.
For example, in order to get the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (DRV, or North Vietnam) to sign the Paris
Peace Accords in January 1973, the United States heavily
bombed Hanoi and Haiphong in December 1972. The
political purpose behind the use of force both enables
and limits the use of force. In a war, force becomes part,
but not all, of the ongoing political intercourse between
states and other combatants. In making war an instrument to achieve purposes, politics could limit or contain its violence.
But Clausewitz was well aware of a problem with
this thesis. A different kind of politics, such as nationalism for example, could have the opposite effect on
violence. Especially when it comes to war, passions
can overcome reason. Some political ideologies have
Chapter 14 War and world politics
Box 14.3 Clausewitz on the primacy of
politics in war
Policy [or political purpose] is the guiding intelligence and
war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility
exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to
the political . . . In short, at the highest level, the art of war
turns into policy—but a policy conducted by fighting battles
rather than by sending diplomatic notes. We can now see
that the assertion that a major military development, or the
plan for one, should be a matter for purely military opinion is
unacceptable and can be damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible
to summon soldiers, as many governments do when they are
planning a war, and ask them for purely military advice . . . No
major proposal for war can be worked in ignorance of political
factors; and when people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not
really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the
policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is right—that is,
successful—any intentional effect it has on the conduct of the
war can only be to the good. If it has the opposite effect the
policy itself is wrong . . . Once again: war is the instrument of
policy. It must necessarily bear the character of policy and [be
measured] by its standards.
(Clausewitz 1976: 607–8, 610; emphasis in original)
irrational aims that can only be achieved through
extreme violence, such as Hitler’s vision of eradicating European Jews. In Clausewitz’s own time,
the French Revolution had mobilized the people
for war, creating large armies of revolutionary citizens. Politics fuelled rather than limited the violence
of war: ‘War, untrammeled by any conventional
restraints, had broken loose in all its elemental fury’
(Clausewitz 1976: 593).
Revolutionary and Napoleonic France pursued ultimate aims. In seeking to establish French-allied republics
in states and principalities across Europe, France posed
an existential challenge to the monarchical regimes of
the continent. Consequently, the French Revolutionary
and Napoleonic Wars were total in character; they provided the historical models for Clausewitz’s theories.
The twentieth century, with its two world wars and the
cold war, opened up new and horrifying possibilities
for the totalization of war. The capacities of modern
states to organize unprecedented levels of violence seem
unlimited.
Clausewitz’s aphorism about war being the continuation of politics draws our attention to how politics can
both limit and fuel the violence of war. It also highlights
that war connects the politics of combatant societies.
What happens at the war front affects what happens
back home. For example, the wars in Vietnam and
Iraq shaped presidential politics in the United States.
President Lyndon B. Johnson ended his campaign for reelection in the wake of the Vietnamese communist Tet
Offensive of 1968. Conversely, what happens at home,
like the election of a new president, can shape the war.
In the 2008 US presidential campaign, American voters
chose candidate Barack Obama, who promised to end
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and bring the troops
home. So war is a continuation of politics in a more
fundamental sense. The political entities at war impact
one another, and make one another different in myriad
ways, because war connects them together. They continue their relations together by other means, their histories and societies co-mingling in the violence of war.
Key Points
developed two trinities to describe the nature
• Clausewitz
of war: a primary one consisting of passion, chance, and
reason, and the other of political leadership, armed forces,
and the people.
divided war into two types: limited war fought
• Clausewitz
for a purpose less than political existence, and total war in
which existence was at stake.
made a distinction between ‘real war’, or war as
• Clausewitz
it actually happens, and ‘true war’, the inherent tendency
of war to escalate.
for Clausewitz is a continuation of politics between
• War
combatant societies with the addition of other—violent—
means.
• Political purposes both limit and fuel the violence of war.
14.5 War, state, and society in the West
The modern nation-state, the basis of the national–
international world, developed in Western Europe from
the sixteenth century onwards. Changes in the organization of armed force were central to this process: the
state became a war-making machine which monopolized violence in its sovereign territory. Western states
went on to dominate world politics through the twentieth century.
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14.5.1 From feudalism to the nation-state
Particular kinds of armed forces—military technologies and weapon systems—make possible particular
kinds of politics. The control of force provides a basis
for political power, so it matters what kind of armed
forces are available. Consider the armoured knight of
medieval Europe. Historically, when knightly cavalry
dominated the battlefield, political power fragmented.
Small groups of knights, under a lord and with a fortified place such as a castle, could both hold off central
authorities—the king—and dominate their local area.
They extracted taxes and rents from the peasantry and
from commerce. Territorial rule was parcelled out, and
the king was dependent on the fealty of his lords to
assemble an army or otherwise exercise power.
Two military developments changed this: the emergence of infantry armies and advances in military
technology (McNeill 1982). During the Renaissance,
European soldiers and scholars recovered ancient
Greek and Roman texts on the training of disciplined,
regular infantry. Armed with pikes and willing to stand
against cavalry, infantry could defeat knights. But soldiers took time to train and cost money to equip, pay,
and supply. Central authorities had to have sufficient
funds on a regular basis, as did the Roman Empire at
its height. The second development was the invention of
gunpowder, and of effective cannon and muskets. Such
weapons ended the dominance of knightly cavalry and
were eventually able to breach castle walls and other
fortifications.
In order to pay for the new armies, European sovereigns drew on the wealth of the great trading cities.
These cities wanted protection for themselves and their
trade, too often taxed as it crossed every lord’s fief.
Disciplined armies were raised, bringing more territory under control of the sovereign. A kind of positive
feedback loop was created—larger territories meant
more taxes, which could sustain armies and further
conquest. From this fiscal–military cycle, the modern
territorial state grew.
Sovereigns went into debt paying to administer,
defend, and extend their territories. To help raise funds,
from the sixteenth century onwards, sovereigns, cities,
and elites turned to long-distance trade in slaves, sugar,
cotton, spices, precious metals, and other goods, and
to the establishment of colonies and trading posts in
Asia, Africa, and the Americas. The new disciplined
soldiers—many recruited locally in the colonies—and
their firearms helped to secure these nascent empires.
The state in Europe became a kind of ‘bordered
power container’ (Giddens 1985: 120). Inside its territory, it subjected society and economy to rule by a
central authority. The state had ‘hard’ borders, imposing tariffs and controlling what came in and out of its
territory, and it defended these borders with its armed
forces. For the leading states of Western Europe, webs
and networks of trade and of colonies outside Europe
spoked out from these borders. The home population
developed new, larger-scale national identities. They
came to speak a common language, read about their
country and its politics in the newspapers, and were
administered under a common set of customs and laws.
They imagined themselves part of the same nation (B.
Anderson 1983). The ‘nation-state’ emerged as a form of
political organization, in which a national people live
on the sovereign territory of their national state (see
Ch. 31).
The composition of the new infantry armies shifted
to male citizens enlisted through mass conscription.
Until the French Revolution, the new infantry armies
were often described as mercenary. They were paid
troops, many recruited abroad. But in 1793, at war with
most of Europe, the French Revolutionary government
turned to mass conscription, a levée en masse. The idea
was that male citizens had an obligation to serve the
nation in exchange for their increased say in public
affairs. Nationalism and citizenship became bound up
with military service. Since military service at the time
was seen as suitable only for men, this had implications
for the extension of voting rights to women, which did
not occur until the twentieth century. Nationalism also
gave political leaders a new tool to stir the passions of
their populations, to encourage them to support the
war effort. National conscription made military service
a national experience. In continental Europe, many
states required obligatory military service throughout the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth
(when women, too, started to formally participate in
the armed forces in significant numbers).
Max Weber, a German social and political thinker
from the turn of the twentieth century, captured the
centrality of war-making to the nation-state. For
Weber, the European state had an administrative staff
that upheld its claim to the monopoly on the legitimate
use of force in a given territorial area (M. Weber 1978:
54). The state, the people, and the territory are sealed
together by the monopoly on force.
From today’s perspective, the idea that we all live
in nation-states and typically possess a single national
Chapter 14 War and world politics
citizenship seems natural. But the nation-state is a
particular historical development, and a relatively
recent one. Only in the second half of the nineteenth
century were Germany and Italy unified as nationstates through a succession of wars. Western European
nation-states became extraordinarily dynamic political, economic, and military entities. The territorial
and popular nature of the nation-state made it a particularly effective basis for mobilizing military power,
as the world wars of the twentieth century proved. But
even in Europe, the nation-state was not everywhere. In
the Balkans, in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, and
in Russia, large multinational empires—the Ottomans,
Austria-Hungary, and the Russian Empire—held sway
until the First World War. Moreover, all the great
nation-states of Western Europe were also empires,
their colonies mostly outside of Europe. Spain,
Portugal, Holland, Britain, France, and Belgium had
large overseas empires, important elements of which
survived into the 1960s and 1970s. Angola, for example,
won its independence war from Portugal only in 1974.
By the time the Angolans started fighting for independence, the nation-state had already come to be seen
as the principal vehicle for self-determination. The
problem was that, both in and beyond Europe, populations and identities were not sorted into neat territorial packages. Ethnic identities did not always match
national identity. Population movements from wars,
famines, and other causes left people under foreign rule.
How could the patchwork of populations and identities be made to fit a map of nation-states? Attempts to
answer this question bedevilled politics, and often led
to war in and beyond Europe during the twentieth century and after.
14.5.2 From the world wars to
the cold war
Observing Napoleonic France, Clausewitz wrote that
war had become the business of the whole people, not
just a matter for governments and their mercenary
armies. But the state could not actually conscript every
young male. For one thing, it could not afford to feed,
house, and clothe such a big army. The economy could
not produce enough weapons or supply enough ammunition. At the height of the Napoleonic Wars, armies
numbered in the hundreds of thousands. But over the
course of the nineteenth century, industrialization,
fossil fuels, and modern methods of mass production
made possible the raising and equipping of armies of
millions. With steam-powered ships and railways,
states could mobilize, move, and sustain these armies
in the field. Truly total wars became possible. For
instance, Germany mobilized over 10 million to serve
in its armed forces in the First World War and nearly 20
million in the Second World War (Bond 1998).
During the world wars, the nation-state was a vehicle
for the mobilization of military power and the pursuit
of war. State bureaucracies provided the administrative backbone necessary to run wartime militaries and
economies. Nationalism and nationalist ideologies,
such as National Socialism or fascism in Germany,
legitimated the war effort and inspired people to participate. The experiences and sacrifices of war could
bond together people, state, and armed forces, if properly managed by political leadership.
However, the world wars also proved bigger than the
nation-state. War was waged at such scale, over such
vast spaces, that multinational alliances, the Axis and
the Allies, formed to fight it. Wartime planning, both
for military operations and for the economy, accustomed the Western allies to working together, laying the
basis for NATO during the cold war. Imperial powers
such as Britain and France drew heavily on their colonies for recruits and resources. The British Indian army
numbered over 1.5 million during the First World War
and over 2 million during the Second World War, while
hundreds of thousands of West and North Africans
fought for France. Imperial Japan ruled Manchuria and
much of China as well as Korea. Hundreds of thousands of Koreans served in the Japanese army during
the Second World War.
There was another, more deadly sense in which war
seemed to outgrow the nation-state: nuclear weapons.
The United States ended the war against Japan by dropping nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The
Japanese had little choice but to capitulate. To avoid
being put in such a position during the cold war, both
the United States and the Soviet Union built large
nuclear arsenals. But the problem with nuclear weapons from a strategic point of view was that they were
too destructive. They threatened to destroy whatever
it was one might be fighting over. Had nuclear strikes
on the scale imagined by cold war planners ever been
carried out, they would have caused a ‘nuclear winter’,
the collapse of life on the planet. In such a situation,
total war, or anything that might lead to it, had to be
avoided.
This created a paradoxical situation known as
nuclear deterrence, a cold war between ideologically
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hostile blocs. Each side had to have nuclear weapons
to keep the other side from using them or threatening to use them. They prepared to wage nuclear war
in order to stop each other from waging nuclear war.
But just how the Soviet Union and the United States
could deter each other was far from obvious. What
mix of nuclear and conventional forces was necessary? How was each side to know what the other was
capable of?
Concerns like these led to enormous military budgets and huge, redundant nuclear forces composed of
thousands of warheads. Jet bombers and intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles were developed to deliver them. Both the Soviet Union and the
United States devoted enormous resources to each
new generation of weaponry, while each spied on its
adversary. Across the Western world during the cold
war, transnational peace movements and a campaign
for nuclear disarmament got under way. People in
many different places protested against the apparent
insanity of preparing for nuclear war. In the cold war,
as in earlier periods in history, the nature of warfare
and the kinds of weapons available shaped political
developments, inside countries as well as across and
between them.
The two sides in the cold war formed blocs, or alliances, of states, each led by one of the superpowers.
Both blocs maintained large conventional armed forces
in Europe, along the border between East and West
Germany. Any actual use of these forces against one
another threatened to escalate into nuclear war. Another
meaning of cold war was this continual preparedness
to wage old-style, conventional war, but never actually
doing so. The actual fighting in the cold war occurred
outside Europe, across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
These parts of the world were known then as the Third
World, the areas from which European empire had
retreated. In the Third World, the cold war was often
conducted by proxy. The superpowers advised and supported their allies, or covertly intervened in civil wars.
As a global experience, the cold war was mostly cold in
Europe and North America, and hot nearly everywhere
else (Westad 2007).
When the cold war ended, large conventional
armed forces were scaled back, and conscription was
finally stopped in many European states. Nuclear
weapons were retained by most of the powers that had
them. But without the ideological contest between
Soviet communism and Western democracy, the fear
of a nuclear war receded. Instead, the concern soon
became that unstable states or a terrorist or other militant group might be able to acquire a nuclear weapon
(see Ch. 30).
Key Points
force is an important basis for political power, and
• Armed
the types of military technology available shape politics.
states claimed a monopoly of legitimate violence
• Modern
within their territories.
and war had a symbiotic relationship:
• Nationalism
nationalism motivated many people to go to war, while
war increased national feeling.
Western states were both sovereign states and
• Since
empires, their wars had both international and global
dimensions.
14.6 War, state, and society in the Global South
War and society in the Global North and South are connected, both historically and in the present. The wars
of decolonization and other violence that accompanied
the retreat of empire shaped much of today’s world,
and the fraught outcomes of these wars lie behind
many contemporary conflicts. In much of the Global
South, armed forces came to be directed primarily at
their own populations, on missions of internal security.
They regularly fought ethnic and civil conflicts within
their sovereign territories, but these conflicts were rife
with foreign intervention of various kinds. While in
the West conflict often took the form of international
war, in the Global South conflict ran in and through
sovereign states and involved many non-state actors.
What made the GWOT so different from previous eras
of armed conflict involving the Global North and South
was that non-state actors from the non-European world
directly attacked Western societies.
14.6.1 Wars of empire
If war and society in Europe from the sixteenth century was about state-building, in the non-European
world it was about empire-building. European powers
penetrated and defeated political entities in the nonEuropean world, beginning with the Spanish conquest of
Chapter 14 War and world politics
the Americas. As Section 14.5 showed, imperial expansion was an important dimension of state-building
in the West. Conflicts among European sovereigns
had imperial dimensions as they fought over colonies
and trade routes. The War of the Spanish Succession
(1701–14) was fought partly in North America, where it
involved Spain, France, England, and Native Americans
and was known as Queen Anne’s War (1702–13). The
Seven Years’ War (1755–64) involved interconnected
campaigns fought in North America, Europe, South
Asia, and the Philippines. Along with the War of
Austrian Succession (1740–8), which involved fighting
in Europe, North America, and South Asia, these wars
are good candidates for the title of ‘world war’ (see Box
14.4). But because wars are usually studied and named
from a Western perspective, only the twentieth-century
wars which devastated Europe to an unprecedented
degree are known as world wars.
Most of the time, for the states of Europe, the primary threat came from other states and their armed
forces. Near continual warfare among European states
helped improve European war-making abilities, eventually giving the West the world’s most impressive
armed forces. But in an empire, the primary security
threat is often from rebellion. The Europeans raised
armed forces from the populations they colonized,
Box 14.4 What is a ‘world war’?
What makes a war a ‘world’ war? The wars listed below consisted of linked campaigns fought across different continents
and oceans. In the Seven Years’ War, for example, Britain
sought to defeat France by attacking its colonies in South Asia
and North America as well as by fighting in Europe. A higher
standard for considering a war a world war is whether or not
a war has led to a new world order. The Second World War,
for example, brought an end to the era of formal European
empire. Wars that arguably changed world order are marked
with an asterisk.
Possible world wars:
War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14)*
War of the Austrian Succession (1740–8)
Seven Years’ War (1755–64)
French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802)*
Napoleonic Wars (1803–15)*
First World War (1914–18)*
Second World War (1939–45)*
Cold war (1947–91)*
Global war on terror (2001–ongoing)*
often recruiting minorities. They used these troops to
put down challenges to imperial rule. They also used
them in wars of imperial expansion, and as reserves
for wars in Europe. The British Indian army was used
in the Opium Wars in China (1839–42, 1856–60), in
Afghanistan in several wars, and in Southeast Asia and
the Middle East. It also fought in the First and Second
World Wars in Europe and the Mediterranean. During
the era of European empire, armed forces in much of
the non-European world were extensions of Western
military power.
14.6.2 The imperial legacy in the Global
South
The imperial legacy meant that armed forces had a very
different relationship to state and society in the Global
South than in the West. In countries that obtained
independence without much struggle, the old colonial
militaries became the armed forces of the new, independent states. Yet these armed forces retained close links
with the former colonial powers. Nigerian and Kenyan
officers trained at Sandhurst in Britain, while those
from former French colonies in Africa went to St Cyr.
In other cases, the United States or the Soviet Union
took over the role of imperial patron, training officers
and soldiers and supplying arms and equipment. For
example, in 1946 the United States established a School
of the Americas in Panama, where it trained Latin and
Central American officers. When civil wars and insurgencies broke out in the Third World during the cold
war, the Western and Soviet bloc countries used their
links to armed forces to intervene. In other cases, they
supported the insurgents. Security assistance became
a primary way to influence the outcomes of wars and
to protect favoured clients in the non-European world.
Much of the fighting and other uses of force was directed
against local populations in revolt, rather than against
foreign invaders. In the Global South, broadly speaking, war and society was a matter of internal security,
civil war, and foreign intervention.
To be sure, many formerly colonized countries
developed robust armed forces on the nation-state
model. In the Middle East and South Asia, states
fought a number of international wars. But the use
of armed forces for internal security, in a context of
civil war and foreign intervention, remained a pattern in much of the Global South. Foreign powers,
sometimes under United Nations auspices, would
try and train enough local troops to establish a
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monopoly on violence over the sovereign territory;
other foreign powers might assist the insurgents or
rebels. This pattern has reasserted itself in the global
war on terror initiated by the United States after the
9/11 terrorist attacks. For example, after invading
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, the United
States and its allies devoted considerable resources
to building up the armed forces of these two countries so that they could fight insurgents and militant
Islamic terrorists.
14.6.3 War and society today in the Global
South and North
A striking feature of contemporary world politics
is the way in which the national–international and
global dimensions of war have become bound together
(Barkawi and Laffey 2006). Attacked by a non-state
actor on 9/11, the United States and its allies responded
by invading two sovereign states (Afghanistan and
Iraq). In response, Al Qaeda, the so-called Islamic
State, and other terrorist groups took advantage of
Islam’s global presence, expanding their recruiting and
cells to new countries. Even though these groups were
often small and more concerned with local than global
conflicts, they were connected by shared beliefs and
common enemies. The US-led coalition expanded its
use of tried and tested tools of security assistance and
military training for states in the Global South. At the
same time, it adopted new modalities of waging war.
Some of these involved blurring the line between war,
policing, and terror, with the United States and some
of its allies abducting and torturing suspects while
holding them in special prisons and intelligence ‘black
sites’. Another departure was the increasing use of air
and drone strikes to assassinate suspected terrorists in
the territory of other countries, such as Pakistan and
Yemen.
As the West reached for new ways to wage war in
the non-European world, it was forced to police its
own societies to combat the threat of terrorist attacks.
Civil liberties were curtailed as democratic governments acquired new rights to surveil the internet, social
media, and electronic communications. Religious,
racial, and class tensions with Muslim minority populations in the West were stoked. Some Muslims left to
join the global jihad, others plotted terrorist attacks in
their home countries in the West, while the vast majority sought to live their lives peacefully amid increasingly hostile host societies. Racial prejudice and fears
of immigration among Westerners became bound up
with the GWOT (see Chs 18 and 29). Western military
action in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and elsewhere killed
more civilians as so-called ‘collateral damage’ than
jihadi terrorists managed to do on purpose. As in earlier periods in history, but in new ways, war and society
in the Global North and South were bound up together.
Violent events and actions in one part of the world
impacted people in another part of the world, through
a global chain of cause and effect.
Key Points
in Europe meant imperial wars in the
• State-building
non-European world.
were concerned with internal security and used
• Empires
armies and security forces raised from colonized
populations.
powers used military assistance to intervene in the
• Great
Global South after decolonization.
and society in the Global South and North have
• War
become interconnected in new ways in the war on terror.
14.7 Conclusion
Armed forces and war have been central to world politics. Military power shaped the kind of politics that
were possible, while war decided which powers and
ideologies dominated. War and armed force have had
affinities and tensions with the nation-state and the
national–international world; they have also had global
dimensions. War-fighting required multinational alliances. Western nation-states were also global empires.
What was happening in Europe, or between the Soviet
Union and the United States, had consequences for the
Global South, and vice versa.
War remains an unpredictable, creative, and very
violent force in world politics. New ways of organizing
violence, and of making war, are evolving. Neither the
national–international nor the global dimensions of war
and society look set to disappear any time soon. Much
will depend on how and in what ways these dimensions
continue to intersect with one another in the future.
Chapter 14 War and world politics
Questions
1. Explain and evaluate Clausewitz’s two trinities.
2. What is the difference between a limited war and a total war?
3. In what ways is war the continuation of politics by other means?
4. Analyse a war using the war and society approach.
5. What is strategy? What are tactics?
6. How did war and armed force shape the development of the modern state?
7. What is the relationship between nationalism and war?
8. Explain the difference between the national–international and global dimensions of war.
9. How are the national–international and global dimensions of war connected?
10. Explain how patterns of warfare differ in the Global South and North.
Visit the online resources to test your understanding by trying the self-test questions.
Further Reading
Anderson, F., and Cayton, A. (2005), The Dominion of War: Empire and Conflict in America,
1500–2000 (London: Atlantic Books). A retelling of American history that emphasizes the role
of empire and war in shaping the US, as opposed to a narrative of the expansion of equality,
democracy, and freedom.
Baugh, D. (2014), The Global Seven Years’ War 1754–1763 (London: Routledge). A book about one
of the ‘world wars’ that is not counted as such. Read this to learn about the interconnections
between warfare in and beyond Europe during the age of European imperialism.
Belew, K. (2018), Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). A history of how defeat in Vietnam fuelled the rise
of white nationalist militias in the United States.
Howard, M. (2002), Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A very
readable and insightful guide to Clausewitz’s life and thought.
Lovell, J. (2011), The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China (London: Picador). An
analysis of how the two Opium Wars connected war and society in Britain and China during
the nineteenth century; an insightful look into the politics of colonial wars.
Martin, M. (2014), An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict (London: Hurst).
Written by a former British officer, and based on extensive interviews with Helmandis, this is
the best single-volume account of the war in Afghanistan.
McNeill, W. H. (1982), The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since ad 1000
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press). A good introduction to the development of the modern
state, the new infantry armies, and the totalization of warfare in the twentieth century.
Westad, O. A. (2018), The Cold War: A World History (London: Penguin). A concise history of the
global and international dimensions of the cold war and how they shaped the contemporary
world.
Visit the online resources to access the latest updates in the field of International Relations.
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Chapter 15
International and global
security
john baylis
Framing Questions
●
Does globalization increase or decrease international security?
●
Which International Relations theories best help to provide an understanding of global
security and insecurity?
●
How do the challenges to globalization and the resurgence of nationalism and
geopolitics affect the prospects of contemporary international security?
Reader’s Guide
This chapter considers the impact of globalization on
international security and the significance of the contemporary ‘return of geopolitics’. It begins by looking
at existing disagreements about the causes of war and
whether violence is always likely to be with us. It then
turns to traditional/classical realist and more contemporary neorealist and neoliberal perspectives on
international security, before considering a range of
alternative approaches. The chapter goes on to examine recent debates about globalization and geopolitics.
It concludes by considering the continuing tension
between national and international security and suggests that, despite the more cooperative aspects of
globalization, there seem to be few signs that a fundamentally different, more peaceful paradigm of international politics is emerging. Indeed contemporary
international politics and global security are going
through a particularly uncertain and difficult period.
Chapter 15 International and global security
15.1 Introduction
Students of international politics deal with some of
the most profound questions it is possible to consider.
Among the most important of these is whether it is
possible to achieve international security in the world
in which we live. For much of the intellectual history
of the subject, a debate has raged about the causes of
war. For some writers, especially historians, the causes
of war are unique to each case. Other writers believe
that it is possible to provide a wider, more generalized
explanation. Some analysts, for example, see the causes
lying in human nature, others in the internal organization of states, and yet others in international ­anarchy.
In a major work on the causes of war, Kenneth Waltz
considers what he calls the three ‘images’ of war (man,
the state, and the international system) in terms of
what thinkers have said about the origins of conflict
throughout the history of Western civilization (Waltz
1959). Waltz himself puts particular emphasis on the
nature of international anarchy (‘wars occur because
there is nothing to stop them from occurring’), but
he also recognizes that a comprehensive explanation
requires an understanding of all three.
In this ongoing debate, as Waltz points out, there is
a fundamental difference among political philosophers
over whether conflict can be transcended or mitigated.
In particular, there is a difference between ‘realist ’ and
‘idealist ’ thinkers, who have been respectively pessimistic and optimistic in their response to this central
question in the international politics field (see Ch. 9).
After the First World War, a diverse range of thinkers
that later became labelled as ‘idealists’ suggested that
widespread support of the League of Nations offered
some hope for greater international order. In contrast,
during the cold war, which developed after 1945, realism became the dominant school of thought. War and
violent conflict were seen as perennial features of interstate relations stretching back through human history.
With the end of the cold war in 1989, however, the
debate began again. For some, the end of the intense
ideological confrontation between East and West was
a major turning point in international history, ushering in a new paradigm in which inter-state violence
would gradually become a thing of the past and new
cosmopolitan values would bring greater cooperation between individuals and human collectivities of
various kinds (including states). This reflected more
optimistic views about the development of a peaceful
global society. For others, however, realism remained
the best approach to thinking about international security. In their view, very little of substance had changed
as a result of the events of 1989. Although the end of
the cold war initially ushered in a new, more cooperative era between the superpowers, realists argued that
this more harmonious phase in international relations
was only temporary. Some believe that contemporary
events confirm this view.
This chapter focuses on this debate in an era of
increasing challenges to globalization, highlighting the
different strands of thinking in these two optimistic
and pessimistic schools of thought, and discusses different views about the labels ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’.
Before this can be done, however, it is necessary to
define what is meant by ‘security’ and to probe the relationship between national security and global security.
15.2 What is security?
Most writers agree that security is a ‘contested concept’.
There is a consensus that it implies freedom from threats
to core values (for both individuals and groups), but there
is a major disagreement about whether the main focus
of inquiry should be on ‘individual’, ‘national’, ‘international’, or ‘global’ security. For much of the cold war
period most writing on the subject was dominated by
the idea of national security, which was largely defined
in militarized terms. The main area of interest for both
academics and statespeople tended to be the military
capabilities that their own states should develop to deal
with the threats they faced. More recently, however,
this idea of security has been criticized for being ethnocentric (culturally biased) and too narrowly defined.
Instead, several writers have argued for an expanded
conception of security, outward from the limits of parochial national security, to include a range of other considerations. Barry Buzan, in his study People, States and
Fear (1983), argues for a view of security that includes
political, economic, societal, and environmental as well
as military aspects, and that is also defined in broader
international terms. Buzan’s work raises interesting and
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Box 15.1 Notions of ‘security’
A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of
having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is
able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.
(Walter Lippmann)
Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats
to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear
that such values will be attacked.
(Arnold Wolfers)
Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development,
social justice, environmental protection, democratization, and
respect for human rights and the rule of law . . . Moreover, these
pillars are interrelated; progress in one area generates progress
in another.
(Kofi Annan)
important questions about whether national and international security considerations can be compatible, and
whether states, given the nature of the international
system, are capable of thinking in more cooperative
international and global terms (see Box 15.1). There has
also been a growing interest in the concept of ‘human
­security’, with writers like Kofi Annan and Amitav
Acharya emphasizing the individual as the main focus
of security analysis (see Section 15.4.2).
These ideas were taken a stage further by the global
Covid-19 pandemic, with calls for a rethink and new
strategies to recognize that public health and national
security should no longer be regarded as separate and
disconnected spheres of government responsibility (see
Ch. 25). This was recognized in April 2020 when UN
Secretary-General António Guterres argued that ‘the
pandemic . . . poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security’ (UN SecretaryGeneral 2020). Like his predecessor, Kofi Annan,
Guterres emphasized the importance of ‘human security’ with the global death toll reaching many millions.
Climate change has also become a feature of globalization that is seen as having security implications
(see Ch. 24). In 2015 President Barack Obama called
climate change ‘a serious threat to global security’
(BBC 2015). Those like Joshua Goldstein (2016) who
argue along these lines highlight the opening up of the
Arctic region to new shipping routes as the sea ice melts
and the resulting geopolitical rivalry emerging in the
region (see Case Study 24.2). Another potential problem arises from the attempts to rely less on coal and
the switch to nuclear energy, with the risks of increased
nuclear proliferation. Water conflicts as a result of
drought are also becoming more common. Robert
Keohane has argued that climate change poses a severe
challenge to the adequacy of political institutions. In
his view, there has been a failure of global governance
to deal with the threats that climate change poses for
humanity (Keohane 2015). For writers like Paul Rogers,
the era of pandemics and climate breakdown, together
with growing inequality and unsustainability, requires
a completely different approach to thinking about ‘the
real solutions to global insecurity’ (Rogers 2021).
Increasingly there is a recognition that the emphasis
on state and inter-state relations ignores the fundamental changes that are taking place in world politics. This
has led some writers to argue that the dual processes of
integration and fragmentation associated with globalization that characterize the contemporary world mean
that much more attention should be given to ‘societal security’ and ‘human security’. According to this
view, growing integration in regions such as Europe
is undermining the classical political order based on
nation-states, leaving nations exposed within larger
political frameworks (such as the European Union,
or EU). At the same time, the fragmentation of various states, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,
has created new problems of boundaries, minorities,
and organizing ideologies that are causing increasing
regional instability (Wæver et al. 1993: 196). This has
led to the argument that ethno-national groups, rather
than states, should become the centre of attention for
security analysts.
At the same time, other commentators argue that
the emergence of an embryonic global society in the
post-cold war era renders the stress on national and
international security less appropriate. Like the ‘societal security’ theorists, they point to the fragmentation of the nation-state; however, they argue that
more attention should be given, not to society at the
ethno-national level, but to global society. These writers argue that one of the most important contemporary
trends is the broad and ongoing process of globalization. They accept that this process brings new risks and
dangers—including the risks associated with international terrorism, a breakdown of the global monetary
system, global warming, cyber conflict, and the dangers of nuclear proliferation. These threats to security,
on a planetary level, are viewed as being largely outside
the control of nation-states. Only the development of
a global community, they believe, can deal with this
adequately.
Chapter 15 International and global security
Other writers on globalization stress the transformation of the state (rather than its demise) and the new
security agenda in the early years of the twenty-first
century. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in
September 2001 and the new era of violence that followed
it, Jonathan Friedman argues that we are living in a world
‘where polarization, both vertical and horizontal, both
class and ethnic, has become rampant, and where violence has become more globalized and fragmented at the
same time, and is no longer a question of wars between
states but of sub-state conflicts, globally networked and
financed, in which states have become one actor, increasingly privatized, amongst others’ (J. Friedman 2003: ix).
For many of those who feel like this, the post-9/11 era
ushered in a new and extremely dangerous period in
world history. Whether the world is so different today
from in the past is a matter of much contemporary discussion. To consider this issue we need to begin by looking at the way ‘security’ has been traditionally conceived.
Key Points
• Security is a ‘contested concept’.
meaning of security has been broadened beyond
• The
military considerations to include political, economic,
societal, public health, and environmental aspects.
arguments exist about the tension between
• Differing
national and international security.
views have also emerged about the significance
• Different
of globalization for the future of international security.
15.3 The traditional approach to national security
15.3.1 Realism
As Chapter 3 shows, states have been regarded as by
far the most powerful actors in the international system for a very long time. They have been ‘the universal standard of political legitimacy’, with no higher
authority to regulate their relations with each other.
This has meant that security has been seen as the
priority obligation of state governments. States have
taken the view that there is no alternative but to seek
their own protection in what has been described as a
s­ elf-help world.
In the historical debate about how best to achieve
national security, realist thinkers drew on figures such
as Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Rousseau to paint a pessimistic picture of the implications of state sovereignty.
They viewed the international system as a rather brutal
arena in which states would seek to achieve their own
security at the expense of their neighbours. Inter-state
relations were seen as a struggle for power, as states
constantly attempted to take advantage of each other.
According to this view, permanent peace was unlikely
to be achieved. All that states could do was to try to balance the power of other states to prevent any one from
achieving overall hegemony. This view was shared
by writers such as E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau,
who developed what became known as the realist (or
‘classical’ realist) school of thought in the aftermath
of the Second World War. More recent attempts to
update these ideas can be seen in the works of Alastair
J. H. Murray, Thomas Christensen, Randall Schweller,
William Wohlforth, and Fareed Zakaria. Their work is
sometimes referred to as neoclassical realism.
The realist, pessimistic view of international relations
is shared by other writers, such as Kenneth Waltz and
John Mearsheimer. The pessimism of these neorealists
rests on a number of key assumptions they make about
the way the international system works and its inherent
propensity for violence. According to the neorealist view,
national security, or insecurity, is largely the result of the
structure of the international system (this is why these
writers are sometimes called ‘structural realists’). The
structure of anarchy is seen as highly durable. The implication of this is that international politics in the future is
likely to be as violent as international politics in the past.
In an important article entitled ‘Back to the Future’, John
Mearsheimer (1990) argued that the end of the cold war
was likely to usher in a return to the traditional multipolar
balance of power politics of the past, in which extreme
nationalism and ethnic rivalries would cause widespread
instability and conflict. Mearsheimer viewed the cold
war as a period of peace and stability brought about by its
prevailing bipolar structure of power. With the collapse
of this system, he argued, there would be a return to the
kind of great power rivalries that had blighted international relations since the seventeenth century.
15.3.2 Liberal institutionalism
One of the main characteristics of the neorealist
approach to international security is the belief that
international institutions do not have a very important
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part to play in the prevention of war. Institutions are
seen as the product of state interests and the constraints
imposed by the international system itself. It is these
interests and constraints that shape states’ decisions
about whether to cooperate or compete, rather than the
institutions to which they belong. Neorealists point to
the contemporary problems faced by several international institutions (such as the UN and EU) to reinforce
their view.
Both statespeople and several International Relations
specialists challenge these neorealist views on institutions. For example, former British Foreign Secretary
Douglas Hurd made the case in June 1992 that institutions themselves had played a crucial role in enhancing security, particularly in Europe. He argued that the
West had developed ‘a set of international institutions
which have proved their worth for one set of problems’.
He went on to argue that the great challenge of the postcold war era was to adapt these institutions to deal with
the new circumstances that prevailed (Hurd, quoted in
Mearsheimer 1994/5).
Hurd’s view reflected a belief, widely shared among
many statespeople, that a framework of complementary, mutually reinforcing institutions—the European
Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
and the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE)—could be developed to promote
a more durable and stable European and international security system. This view was also shared by
a distinctive group of academic writers that developed from the 1980s and early 1990s. These writers
shared a conviction that the developing pattern of
institutionalized cooperation among states opens up
unprecedented opportunities to achieve greater international security in the years ahead. Although the
past may have been characterized by constant wars
and conflict, important changes were taking place
in international relations, they argued, creating the
opportunity to mitigate the traditional security competition between states.
Liberal institutionalist writers suggest that in a
world constrained by state power and divergent interests, international institutions operating on the basis of
reciprocity will at least be a component of any lasting
peace. In other words, international institutions themselves are unlikely to eradicate war from the international system, but they can play a part in helping to
achieve greater cooperation among states.
Key Points
and neorealists emphasize the perennial problem
• Realists
of insecurity.
writers see the ‘security dilemma’ as the essential
• Some
source of conflict among states.
reject the significance of international
• Neorealists
institutions in helping many states to achieve peace and
security.
politicians and academics who write under the
• Inlabelcontrast,
of liberal institutionalism or neoliberalism see
institutions as an important mechanism for achieving
international security.
institutionalists accept many of realism’s
• Liberal
assumptions about the continuing importance of military
power in international relations, but argue that institutions
can provide a framework for cooperation that can help to
mitigate the dangers of security competition among states.
15.4 Alternative approaches
15.4.1 Social constructivism
Another group of writers who describe themselves as
‘constructivist theorists’ posit that international relations are affected not only by power politics but also
by ideas and identities. According to this view, the fundamental structures of international politics are social
rather than strictly material. This leads social constructivists to argue that changes in the nature of social
interaction among states can bring a fundamental shift
towards greater international security (see Ch. 13).
At one level, many constructivists, such as
Alexander Wendt, share a number of the major realist
assumptions about international politics. For example,
some accept that states are the key referent in the study
of international politics and international security; that
international politics is anarchic; that states often have
offensive capabilities; that states cannot be absolutely
certain of the intentions of other states; that states have
a fundamental wish to survive; and that states attempt
to behave rationally. Some, such as Wendt, also see
themselves as structuralists; that is, they believe that
the interests of individual states are, in an important
sense, constructed by the structure of the international
system.
Chapter 15 International and global security
However, constructivists think about international
politics in a very different way from neorealists. The
latter tend to view structure as comprising only a
distribution of material capabilities. Constructivists
view structure as the product of social relationships.
Social structures are made possible by shared understandings, expectations, and knowledge. For example,
Wendt argues that the security dilemma is a social
structure composed of inter-subjective understandings
in which states are so distrustful that they make worstcase assumptions about each other’s intentions and as a
result define their interests in ‘self-help’ terms. In contrast, a security community (such as NATO) is a rather
different social structure, composed of shared knowledge and identity in which states trust one another to
resolve disputes without war.
Emphasis on the structure of shared knowledge is
important in constructivist thinking. Social structures
include material things, such as tanks and economic
resources, but these acquire meaning only through the
shared knowledge in which they are embedded. The
idea of power politics, or realpolitik, has meaning to
the extent that states accept the idea as a basic rule of
international politics. According to social constructivist writers, power politics is an idea that affects the
way states behave, but it does not describe all inter-state
behaviour. States are also influenced by other ideas,
such as the rule of law and the importance of institutional cooperation and restraint. In his study, ‘Anarchy
is What States Make of It’, Wendt (1992) argues that
security dilemmas and wars can be seen, in part, as the
outcome of self-fulfilling prophecies. The ‘logic of reciprocity’ means that states acquire a shared understanding about the meaning of power and act accordingly.
Equally, he argues, policies of reassurance can bring
about a structure of shared knowledge that can help to
move states towards a more peaceful security community (Wendt 1999).
Although constructivists argue that security dilemmas are not acts of God, they differ over whether they
can be escaped. For some, the fact that structures
are socially constructed does not necessarily mean
that they can be changed. This is reflected in Wendt’s
(1995: 80) comment that ‘sometimes social structures
so constrain action that transformative strategies are
impossible’. However, many constructivist writers are
more optimistic. They point to the changes in ideas
introduced by Gorbachev during the second half of
the 1980s, which led to shared knowledge about the
end of the cold war. Once both sides accepted that the
cold war was over, it really was over. According to this
view, understanding the crucial role of social structures
is important in developing policies and processes of
interaction that will generate cooperation rather than
conflict. For the optimists, there is sufficient ‘slack’ in
the international system to allow states to pursue policies of peaceful social change rather than engage in a
perpetual competitive struggle for power.
15.4.2 Critical, feminist, postcolonial, and
discursive security studies
Despite the differences between constructivists and
realists about the relationship between ideas and material factors, they agree on the central role of the state
in debates about international security. Other theorists, however, believe that the state has been given too
much prominence. Keith Krause and Michael Williams
have defined critical security studies in the following
terms: ‘Contemporary debates over the nature of security often float on a sea of unvoiced assumptions and
deeper theoretical issues concerning to what and to
whom the term security refers . . . What most contributions to the debate thus share are two inter-related
concerns: what security is and how we study it’ (Krause
and Williams 1997: 34). What they also share is a wish
to de-­emphasize the role of the state and the need to
conceptualize security in a different way. Critical security studies, however, includes a number of different
approaches. These include critical theory, the concept
of human security, ‘feminist’ approaches, and ‘poststructuralist’ approaches (see Buzan and Hansen 2009).
Given that these are covered in other chapters, they are
dealt with only briefly here.
Robert Cox draws a distinction between problemsolving theories and critical theories. Problem-solving
theorists work within the prevailing system. They take
the existing social and political relations and institutions as starting points for analysis, and then see
how the problems arising from these can be solved
or ameliorated. In contrast, critical theorists focus
their attention on the way these existing relationships
and institutions emerged and what might be done to
change them (see Ch. 12). For critical security theorists, states should not be the centre of analysis because
they are not only extremely diverse in character but
are also often part of the problem of insecurity in the
international system. They can be providers of security, but they can also be a source of threat to their own
people.
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According to this view, attention should be focused
on the individual rather than on the state. This led to
greater attention being given from the 1970s and 1980s
onwards to what has been called human security,
resulting in a further broadening of the conception of
‘security’ to include areas such as poverty, disease, and
environmental degradation. The concept was developed
largely by non-Western scholars such as Mahbub al
Haq and Amartya Sen, who felt that traditional national
security approaches did not take sufficient account of
conflicts that arise over cultural, ethnic, and religious
differences. According to Amitav Acharya, ‘the most
pressing challenges to security come not from great
power rivalry or interstate wars, as in the past but from
multiple and complex forms of internal conflicts and
transitional challenges that defy military action by
state actors and that demand economic, political and
normative action by the international community’.
He argues that we are experiencing the emergence of
a very different and much more complex world than
in the past, and this brings with it new challenges
and approaches to global stability and order. In light
of this, he calls for a new Global International Politics
approach which focuses on the contemporary threats to
peace given the challenges brought about by globalization (Acharya 2014c).
In many ways, human security is a contested concept. Some critics argue that it widens the boundaries
of the meaning of ‘security’ too much and that it is too
vague to have much conceptual value. Others believe
that the focus on internal conflicts ignores the very
dangerous geopolitical changes that are currently taking place in international relations. Detractors also
argue that it is too moralistic, as well as being unattainable and unrealistic in practice. Even among supporters
of the concept there is disagreement between those who
focus on the need for greater ‘freedom from fear’ and
those who emphasize the need for more ‘freedom from
want’. Other supporters, however, argue that there is
considerable overlap between the two, and both are
important in the search for greater human security. For
all supporters of the concept, human security provides
an essential non-Western approach to international
security (neglected in the past) and is a vital concept in
understanding the new world order.
Academics championing the human security
approach argue that there is a close relationship
with feminist writers who study international conflict. Feminist writers also challenge the traditional
emphasis on the central role of the state in studies of
international security. While there are significant differences among feminist theorists, all share the view
that works on international politics in general, and
international security in particular, have been written
from a ‘masculine’ point of view (see Chs 10 and 17). In
her work, J. Ann Tickner argues that women have seldom been recognized by the security literature, despite
the fact that conflicts affect women as much as, if not
more than, men. The vast majority of casualties and refugees in war are women and children and, as the war in
Bosnia confirmed, the rape of women is often used as a
tool of war (Tickner 1992).
In a major feminist study of security, Bananas,
Beaches and Bases, Cynthia Enloe points to the patriarchal structure of privilege and control at all levels
that, in her view, effectively legitimizes all forms of violence (Enloe 2014 [1989]). She highlights the traditional
exclusion of women from international relations, suggesting ‘that they are in fact crucial to it in practice and
that nowhere is the state more gendered in the sense
of how power is dispersed than in the security apparatus’ (Terriff et al. 1999: 91). She also challenges the
concept of ‘national security’, arguing that the use of
such terms is often designed to preserve the prevailing male-­dominated order rather than protect the state
from external attack.
Feminist writers argue that if gender is brought
more explicitly into the study of security, not only
will new issues and alternative perspectives be added
to the security agenda, but the result will be a fundamentally different view of the nature of international
security. According to Jill Steans, ‘Rethinking security
involves thinking about militarism and patriarchy,
mal-­development and environmental degradation. It
involves thinking about the relationship between poverty, debt and population growth. It involves thinking
about resources and how they are distributed’ (Steans
1998; S. Smith 2000).
Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen highlight both the
gendered character of security in theory and practice
and its Western-centrism in their major study, The
Evolution of International Security Studies (2009). Many
other writers have also highlighted the Eurocentric
character of traditional security studies, which emphasizes the importance of great power conflicts and often
ignores the insecurities which affect people and social
groups in different parts of the world. In her work,
Pinar Bilgin (2010) considers the impact and significance of ‘historical absences from security studies of
non-Western insecurities and approaches’. She calls for
Chapter 15 International and global security
these ‘silences’ to be remedied by greater insights into
those marginalized by a largely Western-dominated
approach to security. A similar point is made by Tarak
Barkawi and Mark Laffey, who call for a postcolonial
approach to security studies. They argue that the ‘historical geographies that underpin security studies systematically misrepresent the role of the global South in
security relations and lead to a distorted view of Europe
and the West in world politics’ (Barkawi and Laffey
2006: 329). In particular, they point to the inadequate
‘understanding of the nature or legitimacy of the armed
resistance of the weak’ in the traditional Eurocentric
approach to security (Barkawi and Laffey 2006: 329).
This has led Bryony Vince to argue that ‘scholars should
detach themselves from the parochial boundaries of the
Western academic discipline of IR and security studies,
and look to the international realm more broadly for
approaches that may not necessarily look like orthodox
(Western) theory’ (Vince 2018, italics in original).
The emergence of poststructuralist approaches to
international relations have produced a related but
somewhat different perspective towards international
security (see Ch. 12). Poststructuralist writers share
the view that ideas, discourse, and ‘the logic of interpretation’ are crucial in understanding international
politics and security. Like other writers who adopt a
‘critical security studies’ approach, poststructuralists
see ‘realism’ as one of the central problems of international insecurity. This is because realism is a discourse
of power and rule that has been dominant in international politics in the past and has encouraged security
competition among states. Power politics is seen as
an image of the world that encourages behaviour that
helps bring about war. As such, the attempt to balance
power is itself part of the very behaviour that leads to
war. According to this view, alliances do not produce
peace, but lead to war. The aim for many poststructuralists, therefore, is to replace the discourse of realism or
power with a different discourse and alternative interpretations of threats to ‘national security’. The idea is
that once the ‘software program’ of realism that people carry around in their heads has been replaced by
a new ‘software program’ based on cooperative norms,
then individuals, states, and regions will learn to work
with each other and global politics will become more
peaceful.
Key Points
thinkers base their ideas on two main
• Constructivist
assumptions: (1) that the fundamental structures of
international politics are socially constructed; and (2) that
changing the way we think about international relations
can help to bring about greater international security.
security theorists contend that most approaches
• Critical
put too much emphasis on the state.
concept of human security focuses on the individual
• The
and the threats that arise from poverty, disease, and
environmental degradation.
writers argue that gender tends to be left out of
• Feminist
the literature on international security, despite the fact that
war impacts men and women differently.
approaches highlight the bias of Eurocentric
• Postcolonial
approaches to security studies and call for a broadening of
the subject to include the voices and insights of those
marginalized by past colonialism.
writers believe that the nature of
• Poststructuralist
international politics can be changed by altering the way
we think and talk about security.
15.5 Globalization and the ‘return of geopolitics’
In recent years there has been a debate among scholars about whether ‘globalization’ and ‘geopolitics’ are
compatible in the changing world in which we live (see
Case Study 15.1). There have also been debates about
whether the world is reverting to ‘traditional power
dynamics with untraditional players’ or whether a
‘new geopolitics’ can successfully emerge based on the
importance of soft power rather than traditional hard
military power. This section will consider these important contemporary debates.
Some writers argue that ‘globalization’ and ‘geopolitics’ represent fundamentally different approaches to
policy. Brian Blouet argues that ‘Geopolitical policies
seek to establish national or imperial control over space
and the resources, routeways, industrial capacity and
population the territory contains.’ In contrast, he sees
globalization as ‘the opening of national space for the
free flow of goods, capital and ideas’. ‘Globalization’,
he says, ‘removes obstructions to movement and creates conditions in which international trade in goods
and services can expand’ (Blouet 2001). Another writer,
Ellen Frost, contends that globalization is changing
the world in a radical way. We are moving, she argues,
towards a much more ‘interconnected world system
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Case Study 15.1 Insecurity in the post-cold war world: the Nagorno-Karabakh War
The Turkish ‘Bayraktar TB2’ drone
© Bayhaluk / Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0)
The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War from September to
November 2020 provides a good illustration of some of the complexities of contemporary conflict in terms of the role of history,
identity politics, external intervention, geopolitics, modern technology, and social media in warfare.
Ottoman Empire troops invaded the area in 1724 and it
was absorbed into the Russian Empire in 1813. In 1923, following the Russian Revolution, Joseph Stalin established the
Armenian-majority autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijan
Soviet Socialist Republic. With the break-up of the Soviet Union,
both Azerbaijan and Armenia declared their independence and
Armenia demanded jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh. This
led to a period of guerrilla warfare between 1988 and 1991, and
to the First Nagorno-Karabakh War between 1992 and 1994
(known as the Artsakh Liberation War in Armenia). This was followed by a period of low-intensity conflict between 1994 and
2020. During this period, the Christian Armenian majority in
Nagorno-Karabakh controlled the self-declared Republic of
Artsakh and the Muslim Azerbaijani government sought to bring
the region back under its control. The period saw ethnic cleansing and a widespread refugee problem.
in which independent networks and flows surmount
traditional boundaries (or make them irrelevant)’.
For Frost, ‘external threats have increasingly assumed
transnational forms’, which renders traditional geopolitics, with its emphasis on balance of power and interstate conflict, largely irrelevant (Kugler and Frost 2001).
Not all writers, however, accept that globalization
and geopolitics are incompatible (or that geopolitics is
no longer important). Douglas E. Streusand rejects the
idea that there is opposition between the two concepts,
‘both as historical forces and as policy alternatives’. He
argues that ‘the era of globalization has not ended the
need for geopolitical analysis’ and ‘the policy imperatives that geopolitical analysis generates do not contradict the principles of globalization’ (Streusand 2002).
Becoming increasingly frustrated, Azerbaijan started hostilities
again in September 2020, supported militarily by Turkey, which
was anxious to retain and extend its influence in the region.
The conflict which ensued saw the very effective use of Turkish
‘Bayraktar TB2’ drones and sensors by the Azerbaijani forces,
together with heavy artillery and missiles. This affected how other
states planned their future strategies. Social media, state propaganda, and information warfare were also features of the conflict.
Russia, generally a supporter of Armenia, but also traditionally concerned to bring stability to a region important to its own
security, attempted to broker a series of ceasefire agreements,
which initially failed. However, with the capture of Shusha, the
second largest settlement in the region, by Azerbaijani forces,
Russia managed to secure a ceasefire on 10 November 2020
signed by the president of Azerbaijan and the prime minister of
Armenia. Under this agreement, the warring sides kept control
of the areas they currently held within Nagorno-Karabakh, and
Armenia agreed to hand back the surrounding territories it had
occupied since 1994. Azerbaijan was also given control of land
access to an enclave bordering Turkey and Iran. Russian soldiers
were to act as peacekeepers in a corridor between Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh for five years. The agreement was
highly unpopular in Armenia and was followed by several skirmishes in the months that followed. Violence erupted again in
September 2022.
The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was an ethnic and territorial conflict, in which the geopolitical stakes were high. It is a
region located between the powerful regional forces of Russia,
Turkey, and Iran, close to strategic oil and gas pipelines.
Question 1: Given its large Armenian majority, why did the
Republic of Artsakh fail to gain more international support
between the 1990s and 2020?
Question 2: Why was geopolitics an important feature of the
conflict?
Those who take this position argue that traditional
ideas of geopolitics remain as important as ever in the
twenty-first century, indeed that they are becoming
more important. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro
(1998) argue that ‘the central issue for the United States
and its Asian allies and friends is whether an increasingly
powerful China is going to dominate Asia, as its leaders
intend, or whether the United States, working primarily with Japan, can counterbalance China’s emergence to
great power, and eventually to super-power, status’. The
outcome will be determined, they continue, ‘on Asia’s
eastern rim—in the band of territory that begins in the
Russian Far East and continues through the Korean peninsula, Japan and Taiwan and probably the Philippines
and Indonesia as well’ (Bernstein and Munro 1998).
Chapter 15 International and global security
For writers like Bernstein and Munro, traditional
geopolitics is just as important as ever, and requires a
significant shift in American grand strategy. For those
who support this view, the shift (or ‘pivot’) of US strategic priorities from the Middle East towards the Pacific
under the Obama presidency and the radical changes
to US foreign policy under President Donald Trump,
as well as President Joe Biden’s support for Taiwan over
growing contemporary pressure from China, all indicate that such geopolitical analysis remains an important element in contemporary strategic thinking in
Washington. Equally, it is argued that the rise of China
and Chinese policies regarding islands in the disputed
South and East China Seas indicate similar thinking in Beijing (see Case Study 15.2). Graham Allison
has argued that America and China are currently in
a ‘Thucydides’ Trap’. This refers to the fifth-century
bc clash between the rising power of Athens (akin to
modern China) and the established military hegemon
Sparta (akin to modern America). In Allison’s view,
disaster is likely unless each shows more respect for the
other (Allison 2017).
Case Study 15.2 Growing tensions in the South and East China Seas
Although the origins of territorial disputes in the South and East
China Seas go back centuries, there has been a recent upsurge of
tension between China and its neighbours (and among the neighbours themselves). In the South China Sea the disputes centre on
the ownership of the Paracel and Spratly islands, together with
various uninhabited atolls and reefs, especially the Scarborough
Shoal (see Fig. 15.1). In the East China Sea the dispute is largely
between Japan, China, and Taiwan over what the Chinese call the
Diaoyu islands and what the Japanese call the Senkaku islands
(see Fig. 15.2). These disputes are leading to growing anxiety in
the Pacific region.
The South China Sea disputes
The main dispute over the Paracel and Spratly islands is between
China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. China claims historical rights
to the islands dating back 2,000 years; China’s claims are mirrored
by those of Taiwan. Vietnam rejects these historical claims and
says it has ruled over both the island chains since the seventeenth century. The Philippines also claims the Spratlys because
geographically they are close to its territory. The Philippines also
has a further dispute with China over the Scarborough Shoal.
These islands lie 100 miles from the Philippines and 500 miles
from China. To complicate matters further, Malaysia claims that
some of the Spratlys fall within its economic exclusion zone.
The most serious conflicts, however, have been between China
and Vietnam. In 1974 China seized the Paracels from Vietnam,
and in the late 1980s clashes took place in the Spratlys, with further Vietnamese losses. Tensions have risen higher in recent years
due to a belief that the region contains vast quantities of natural
gas and oil. Recent rumours suggest that China has plans for an
undersea base to exploit the natural resources near the Spratlys.
In 2018 Vietnam became increasingly alarmed by further Chinese
reclamation work, the development of military airstrips and
munitions warehouses, and the reported deployment of missiles
on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef.
Miles
0
200
NORTH
KOREA
Miles
CHINA
0
HAINAN
South
China Sea
200
MALAYSIA
Shanghai
East China
Sea
PHILIPPINES
BRUNEI
CHUNXIAO
GAS FIELDS
(Approximate area)
Figure 15.1 Disputed areas in the South China Sea
Boundary
claimed by Japan
Boundary
claimed by China
DISPUTED
AREA
INDONESIA
China’s claimed territorial waters
UNCLOS 200 nautical mile
Exclusive Economic Zone
Disputed islands
JAPAN
Yellow
Sea
MALAYSIA
Source: UNCLOS and CIA
SOUTH
KOREA
CHINA
Paracels
Scarborough
VIETNAM
Shoal
Spratlys
Sea of
Japan
TAIWAN
OKINAWA
SENKAKU ISLANDS
(Administered by Japan,
claimed by China and Taiwan)
Pacific
Ocean
Figure 15.2 Disputed areas in the East China Sea
Source: UNCLOS and CIA
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john baylis
The East China Sea disputes
Japan’s claims over eight uninhabited islands and rocks that it
calls the Senkaku islands date back to 1895, when they were
incorporated into Japanese territory. It claims that this right was
recognized under the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. In contrast,
China argues that what it calls the Diaoyu islands have been part
of its territory since ancient times. Taiwan also claims the islands
with a similar argument. Clashes have occurred in recent years
between Japanese patrol boats and Chinese and Taiwanese fishing vessels. A confrontation involving a Chinese fishing vessel
in 2010 prompted anti-Japanese protests in multiple Chinese
cities and diplomatic protests until the Chinese crew were released.
In 2012, tensions re-emerged after Chinese and Japanese activists
landed on a number of the islands. These tensions escalated after
the Japanese government bought three of the islands from private
owners. In recent years new tensions have arisen over Chinese oil
rigs near the disputed islands and in 2018 when Japan dispatched
a submarine to the disputed waters southwest of Scarborough
Shoal as part of an anti-submarine warfare exercise.
In both cases, while major military conflict among the states
involved has been avoided in recent years, the renewed disputes have raised the level of regional insecurity. In July 2016
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague ruled against
China and its claims to rights in the South China Sea in a case
brought by the Philippines. The Court said that China’s ‘nine-dash
line’, which it uses to demarcate its territorial claims, is unlawful under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
China declared that the ruling was ‘unfounded’ and that it would
not be bound by it. More recently, however, there has been a
rapprochement between China and the Philippines.
China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ of providing major investment
in infrastructure projects in Pacific countries (as well as in Africa,
Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas) has caused fears in
Australia, Japan, and India that China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy
was designed to establish a chain of air and naval bases from the
South China Sea to the Horn of Africa. This led Australia to reopen
a major military base (with US support) in Papua New Guinea in
2018, and to a US, Australian, and Japanese initiative to establish
‘an alliance of friendly nations’ for joint overseas investment to
counter Chinese economic diplomacy in the region. A new trilateral Australian, UK, and US (AUKUS) arrangement was also set up
in 2021 by which the US and UK agreed to provide Australia with
a range of technology, including nuclear-powered submarines, to
help counter China’s more assertive role in the region.
The crisis in Ukraine, with the Russian annexation
of Crimea in 2014 and the major invasion in February
2022, has also highlighted the growing contemporary
challenge posed by global geopolitical rivalries. Hybrid
warfare, involving disinformation, deception, and
cyberattacks, together with the use of mass conventional forces, threatens to destabilize the whole basis of
European and global security, ushering in a new epoch
of cold war and geopolitical competition. For Russia,
the expansion of NATO since the end of the cold war
and the increasing tendency of Ukraine to look west
to Europe represented a perceived threat to its own
security, justifying ‘the raw use of power’. Some writers argue that the conflict should be seen in a broader
global context. According to this view, both Russia and
China saw the chaotic withdrawal of US and Western
forces from Afghanistan as providing an opportunity
to develop a strategic partnership which challenges the
post-cold war, liberal rules-based international order
(Lo 2020).
A more critical view of geopolitics is provided by
Richard Falk. Falk contends that traditional geopolitics
‘was dominated by the United States, and operationally
administered from Washington, and continued despite
the collapse of colonialism to be West-centric when
it came to the shaping of global security policy’. The
problem, he argues, is that this ‘Old Geopolitics’ has not
registered the implications for the world order of the
collapse of the colonial order or the relative weakening
of US primacy. However, he argues that while the ‘Old
Geopolitics’ remains embedded, especially in Western
thinking, a ‘New Geopolitics’ is emerging which rests
less on the importance of military power and more on
the importance of soft power. This trend, enhanced by
the processes of globalization, is exemplified by the
emergence of the BRIC countries and the rise in importance of a wide variety of non-state actors. Falk also
argues that the ‘winless withdrawals’ of the US from
Iraq and Afghanistan are evidence that superiority in
hard military power ‘is no longer able to reach desired
political outcomes in violent conflicts’. The US should
learn that depending on military power, the main currency of the ‘Old Geopolitics’, will bring only ‘frustration and defeat’. The problem, he says, is that the aged
architects of the ‘Old Geopolitics’, for a variety of reasons, are unable to learn from failure, and so the cycle
of war and frustration goes on and on with disastrous
human results (Falk 2012).
In summary, different views of globalization and
geopolitics give rise to very different conclusions about
world order. For some, globalization can bring greater
peace and security, while for others it can lead to
Question 1: What do you understand by the term ‘Thucydides’
Trap’ in relation to the rise of China?
Question 2: What role does the ‘security dilemma’ play in the territorial disputes between China and its neighbours?
Chapter 15 International and global security
Opposing Opinions 15.1 The US-led liberal world order is over
For
Against
Global power is shifting from the West to ‘the rest’. The rise
of China and the other BRIC countries will reshape the management of world order as they pursue globalization in a different
form to the traditional US-led approach to globalization.
The US remains the most powerful state in the world in terms
of military, economic, and soft power. Despite its decline, the
order created by the US is so deeply rooted and legitimate that it
is likely to continue to shape world order for many years to come.
The US is no longer in a position to create the rules and
dominate the institutions of global governance and world
order (Acharya). The Trump admini