18. Pangilinan v. Cayetano.pdf
G.R. No. and Date: G.R. No. 238875. March 16, 2021
Petitioners
SENATORS FRANCIS "KIKO" N.
PANGILINAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
PAOLO BENIGNO "BAM" AQUINO IV,
LEILA M. DE LIMA, RISA
HONTIVEROS, AND ANTONIO
"SONNY" F. TRILLANES IV
Topic: R65
Key Words: ICC
Ponente: LEONEN, J.
Respondents
ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO,
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,
TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., AND
SALVADOR S. PANELO
Digest Maker: PACULAN,
Malaika
& PANGAN,
Marcela Gilliana & LOTA,
Miguel
RECIT-READY SUMMARY
On March 15, 2018, the President announced the withdrawal from the Rome
Statute, the treaty that established the International Criminal Court (ICC), which
the Philippines had ratified in 2011. On March 16, a formal Note Verbale was
submitted to the United Nations, who received it the following day on March 17.
The official withdrawal took effect a year later. Petitioners led by Pangilinan filed
Petitions for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65, arguing that the President
acted unconstitutionally by unilaterally withdrawing from the treaty without
Senate concurrence, which they claimed was required under Article VII, Section
21 of the 1987 Constitution. They sought to invalidate the withdrawal and compel
the government to revoke it. Respondents, represented by Foreign Affairs
Secretary Cayetano, countered that the withdrawal was a political act and fell
within the President's exclusive authority over foreign policy, not subject to
judicial review or ministerial compulsion. They maintained that Rule 65 remedies
were improper, as the President’s action was neither judicial nor quasi-judicial in
nature.
The issue is W/N petitioners' resort to the procedural vehicles of petitions for
certiorari and mandamus is proper?
The Court held no, it was not proper and agreed with the respondents, holding
that petitions for certiorari and mandamus could not be used to challenge
executive acts rooted in discretionary foreign policy decisions. The Court
emphasized that certiorari applies only to acts of judicial or quasi-judicial
bodies done with grave abuse of discretion, which did not apply to the
President’s foreign affairs functions. Similarly, mandamus requires a clear legal
right and a corresponding ministerial duty, both of which were absent. The
Court held that treaty withdrawal is not ministerial but discretionary, and that
there is no constitutional or statutory provision requiring Senate concurrence for
such withdrawal. Therefore, the petitions were dismissed, reinforcing the
principle that matters involving political questions and discretionary executive
powers are beyond the reach of judicial intervention under Rule 65.
DOCTRINE
●​ A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will prosper only when the following
requisites are present:
1.​ the writ "must be directed against a tribunal, a board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions";
2.​ "the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion"; and
3.​ "there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law."
●​ A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations:
1.​ "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station"; OR
2.​ "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person . . .
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled."
●​ Matters involving political questions and discretionary executive powers are
beyond the reach of judicial intervention under Rule 65.
FACTS
●​ On March 15, 2018, the Philippine government publicly announced its
decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC), which it
had joined through the ratification of the Rome Statute in 2011.
●​ The following day, March 16, 2018, the government formally submitted a
Notice of Withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a Note Verbale
addressed to the Chef de Cabinet of the United Nations Secretary-General.
●​ On March 17, 2018, the UN Secretary-General officially received the
communication, starting the one-year period after which the withdrawal
would take effect under the Rome Statute.
[Petitioner] Pangilinan’s arguments
●​ Filed Petitions for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking judicial intervention to question the
constitutionality of the Philippines' withdrawal from the ICC.
●​ The President's unilateral withdrawal from a treaty that the Senate had
ratified violated the constitutional process.
○​ According to petitioners, withdrawing from a treaty requires the
concurrence of at least two-thirds of all Senate members, similar
to the requirement for ratification.
●​ The Instrument of Withdrawal was unconstitutional and legally ineffective,
since it bypassed the legislative check that the Senate's concurrence
provides under Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution.
●​ They also sought a writ of mandamus to compel the executive branch to
inform the United Nations that the withdrawal was being revoked,
cancelled, or withdrawn, essentially requiring the government to reverse
the act and reassert its commitment to the Rome Statute.
[Respondents] Cayetano’s arguments
●​ Contended that a Petition under Rule 65 is not the appropriate remedy, as
the President's action in withdrawing from the Rome Statute was not an
act involving judicial or quasi-judicial powers, which is a necessary
requirement for a certiorari petition.
●​ The President’s decision to withdraw from a treaty is an executive
prerogative and inherently discretionary, which means it cannot be
controlled or compelled by mandamus.
●​ No constitutional or statutory provision requires the President to obtain the
Senate’s concurrence when withdrawing from a treaty.
○​ They insisted that the Constitution is silent on treaty withdrawal,
and thus, the act remains within the domain of foreign policy, which
is traditionally the President's exclusive authority.
●​ Emphasized that mandamus cannot lie against the President to compel
performance of an act that is not a ministerial duty, particularly one
rooted in foreign affairs and diplomacy.
RATIO AND DISCUSSION
W/N petitioners' resort to the procedural vehicles of petitions for certiorari and
mandamus is proper?
NO, the special civil actions under Rule 65 of petitions for certiorari and
mandamus cannot afford petitioners the reliefs they seek.
●​ Rule 65 petitions are not per se remedies to resolve constitutional
issues. Instead, they "are filed to address the jurisdictional excesses of
officers or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."
●​ A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will prosper only when the
following requisites are present:
1.​ the writ "must be directed against a tribunal, a board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions";
2.​ "the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion"; and
3.​ "there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law."
●​ Not every instance of abuse of discretion should lead this Court to
exercise· its power of judicial review. The abuse of discretion must be
grave, amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction.
●​ By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
●​ A writ of certiorari is unavailing here. The assailed government act is
the President's withdrawal from the Rome Statute. This, by any stretch
of the imagination, may not be considered an exercise of judicial or
quasi-judicial power. Courts cannot resolve a political question. It is not
within the purview of judicial functions, and must be left to the sound
discretion of the political agents — the executive or the legislature.
●​ A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations:
1.​ "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station"; OR
2.​ "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person . . .
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled."
●​ The first situation demands a concurrence between a clear legal right
accruing to petitioner and a correlative duty incumbent upon
respondents to perform an act, this duty being imposed upon them by
law. Petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly established. It
cannot be a prospective entitlement that is yet to be settled. Mandamus
will not issue to establish a right, but only to enforce one that is
already established.
○​ A writ of mandamus "never issues in doubtful cases."
●​ Respondents must also be shown to have actually neglected to perform
the act mandated by law. Clear in the text of Rule 65, Section 3 is the
requirement that respondents "unlawfully neglect" the performance of a
duty. The mere existence of a legally mandated duty or the pendency of
its performance does not suffice.
●​ The duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather than
discretionary. A court cannot subvert legally vested authority for a body
or officer to exercise discretion.
○​ Mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a
public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised
and not that of the court.
○​ Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power
or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially, under
certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own
judgments and consciences, uncontrolled by the judgments or
consciences of others.
○​ A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a
discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
his own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done.
○​ If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed,
such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.
○​ The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
●​
●​
●​
●​
judgment … Mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of
discretion of an inferior tribunal … when the act complained of is
either judicial or quasi-judicial … It is the proper remedy when
the case presented is outside of the exercise of judicial
discretion.”
Mandamus, too, will not issue unless it is shown that "there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
○​ This is a requirement basic to all remedies under Rule 65, i.e.,
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
A writ of mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are
purely ministerial, and not those that are discretionary.
Petitioners must show that they have a clear legal right and that there
was a neglected duty which was incumbent upon the public officer.
Here, however, there is no showing that the President has the
ministerial duty imposed by law to retract his withdrawal from the
Rome Statute.
○​ Certainly, there is no constitutional or statutory provision
granting petitioners the right to compel the executive to
withdraw from any treaty. It was discretionary upon the
President, as primary architect of our foreign policy, to perform
the assailed act.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the consolidated Petitions in G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483, and
240954 are DISMISSED for being moot.
OTHER NOTES