HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND
RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA)
AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Bokaro Steel
plant
1. INTRODUCTION
Hazard Identification and Risk analysis (HIRA) deals with the identification and
quantification of risks that are exposed to, due to accidents resulting from the hazards
present or handling of hazardous substances in the workplace.
This involves Hazard analysis which essentially is identification and quantification of the
various hazards that are likely to occur in the industry as well as quantification of the
consequences due to a particular hazard. The risk analysis estimates the probability as
well as severity of a particular hazard over an exposed group of people, plant equipment
or both.
HIRA assists in identifying the most likely hazards which can have significant impact on
workplace safety in an industry. It helps in devising effective management measures as
well as engineering measures for both preventive as well as post-disaster management.
2. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The scope of this report includes the study of proposed operations, storage and handling
of hazardous materials with respect to Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and
updation of existing Disaster Management plan (DMP). Based on the Hazard Identification
and analysis, the major disaster scenarios would be worked out to estimate the
consequence of failure. Bokaro Steel plant already has a comprehensive Disaster
Management plan (DMP) and the same would be evolved to also meet the emergency
situations due to the proposed expansion-cum-modernization project.
The present report includes hazard identification and consequence analysis for the new
projects included in the proposed expansion-cum-modernization of Bokaro Steel plant
(BSL) as well as ongoing HIRA for existing critical units of BSL.
The primary potential hazards due to the proposed units are identified based on a detailed
Primary Hazard analysis (PHA) along with consequence analysis for the risk assessment.
The same has been elaborated in Chapter-7 of the EIA-EMP report and briefed hereunder.
Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL)
Bokaro Steel Plant
-KDUNKDQG
The proposed expansion-cum-modernization units/departments considered in this report
are as below:
A) Proposed Expansion-cum-modernisation projects
i.
Modernised BOF gas holder in modernised SMS-I
ii.
New BOF gas holder in SMS-II
iii.
Revamped propane storages within modernised SMS complex
iv.
Additional gas pipelines with new Gas mixing station
The HIRA for these proposed expansion-cum-modernization units at BSL have been
elaborated in Clause 3.0 of this report.
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Bokaro Steel
plant
The HIRA process is an ongoing and continual process for existing units and are
undertaken on periodical basis for ensuring good workplace safety at Bokaro Steel plant.
It also involves a periodic review of the same as well as dissemination of information to
various employees through instruction and along with adequate documentation and
record-keeping.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Bokaro Steel
plant
3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION & RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) FOR PROPOSED
FACILITIES
3.1. Background
BSL is engaged the production of Steel from iron ore and other required raw materials.
During the process of manufacture of steel and other associated materials hazardous
gases are generated which are stored and used in the plant. In addition to this, some
other hazardous substances, which are required as feed/fuel in the process or produced
as a by-product, will also be stored/handled by BSL.
This information primarily includes:
≠ Hazard identification
≠ Assessment of risks associated with the identified hazards
≠ Control measures to manage the exposure to the risks
≠ Monitoring and review of the effectiveness of the controls.
The procedure for carrying out Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) in
different units at BSL is well defined and the same has been briefed in Annexure-1A of
this report.
The HIRA under implementation for the following existing units are included in this report:
B) Existing Facilities of Bokaro Steel plant
i.
Energy Management Department (Fuel gases etc.)
ii.
Blast Furnace
iii.
Coke Oven and By-product plant
iv.
Steel making Shop
v.
Cold Rolling mill
vi.
Sinter Plant
vii.
Raw Material handling plant
These have been elaborated in details in Clause 4.0 of this report.
The major substances handled / stored by BSL includes Coke Oven gas (primarily H2&
CH4), Blast furnace gas (primarily CO), LD Gas (primarily CO, N2 & CO2), Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG)/Propane, etc.
In view of this, BSL’s existing and proposed activities are scrutinized in line of the above
referred “Manufacture, storage and import of hazardous chemicals rules” and observations
/ findings are presented in this chapter. An elaborate and well-documented Disaster
Management Plan covering all substances/gases handled by BSL for their existing plant
covering all the chemicals / gases handled by BSL is already in place. The same shall be
upgraded and extended to the units under the expansion programme of BSL.
The assessment has been made in a systematic manner covering the requirements of the
abovementioned rules. Accordingly subsequent sections have been divided as follows:
≠ Brief Process description
≠ Applicability of the rule
≠ Description of hazardous substances
≠ Hazard Identification
≠ Hazard Assessment (& hazard scenarios)
≠ Consequence analysis
≠ Brief description of the measures taken and
≠ On site emergency plan
3.2. Brief Process Description
BSL is producing steel products via BF- BOF Route of steel making. Iron ore lumps, sinters
and coke (made from coking coal) and fluxes such as limestone, dolomite are the major
raw materials. The major steps in the manufacturing process are as follows:
≠ Coke making - coal carbonisation
≠ Sintering
≠ Hot metal production (blast furnace)
≠ Steel production (basic oxygen furnace)
≠ Continuous casting
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Bokaro Steel
plant
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
The detailed analysis of the plant processes at BSL indicates that the process of Iron &
Steel manufacturing via BF-BOF route requires considerable thermal energy. This thermal
energy is supplied through fuel gasses generated in the plant e.g. Coke oven gas (COG),
Blast Furnace gas (BFG), BOF gas as well as LPG/Propane gas. If there is any shortfall of
these generated gasses then fuel gas is also supplied from outside source also.
The present proposal of BSL for expansion will create additional energy requirements,
which will be catered to by in-plant COG, BFG, BOFG and/or Mixed Gas. In addition, use
of LPG/Propane has also been considered for catering to the cutting requirements of SMS,
Caster and auxiliary shops. In addition to these fuel gasses, a number of chemicals are
being produced in the by-product plant of Coke Oven. Further Oxygen is also required as
mentioned above. Therefore to run the plant, it is required to store and/or handle all these
chemicals along with their distribution arrangement.
The expansion-cum modernization programme of BSL primarily envisages replacement as
well as installation of new storage facilities such as replacement of existing BOF gas holder
(50,000 m3) in modernized SMS-1, new BOF Gas holder in SMS-II (80,000 m3),and
revamped existing Propane storages of 2 x 100 tonnes within the SMS complex to meet
its requirements.
The major hazardous materials to be stored, transported, handled and utilized within the
facility have been summarized in Table 1:
3.3. Applicability of the MSIHC Rules
As per MSIHC Rules, 1989 with subsequent amendments, the galvanization process is
classified as an “industrial activity” storing/handling hazardous substances.
To decide whether the above mentioned industrial activities/substances are likely to come
within the scope of the above mentioned “Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous
Chemicals Rules, 1989 & subsequent amendments”, the threshold quantities mentioned
in the rules are used for comparison, as given in Table 2.
Table-2. : Threshold Quantity & Identified Hazardous Substances to be
Handled as per MSIHC Rules, 1989 & Subsequent Amendments
Sn Hazardous
substance
handled/
stored
Hazardous
Quantity handled/ Type of vessel used for handling Nature of
substance
stored
/ storage
hazard
handled/stored
associated
1
1. Coke Oven gas (major 2.5 tonnes handled
In-plant Steel pipelines to new Gas Flammable
Mixing Station (GMS)
gas
components being CH4, via in-plant piping
H2 and CO)
network
2
2.
Blast Furnace Gas
86 tonnes handled In-plant Steel pipelines to new GMS. Flammable
via in-plant piping
gas
network
3
3.
Mixed Gas
81 tonnes handled
In-plant Steel pipelines from new
Flammable
GMS.
gas
via plant piping
network
Stored in steel Cylindrical shaped gas
4.
BOF gas1
102.1 T + 63.8 T =
Flammable
gas
165.9 Tonnes stored holder (Wiggin’s type) with Dry Rubber
seal and handled via In-plant Steel
in 02 BOF Gas
pipelines
holders
Horizontally placed steel Bullet with
5.
Propane
2 x 100 T = 200
Flammable
hemispherical ends.
Tonnes stored in 02
pressurized
bullets
liquid
Note:1Coke Oven Gas density as 0.499 kg/m3 calculated at 25°C, 1 atm pressure conditions considering
tentative gas mixture composition
2Blast Furnace Gas density 1.145 kg/m3 as calculated at 25°C, 1 atm pressure conditions considering
tentative gas mixture composition
3Mixed Gas density as 1.08 kg/m3 calculated at 25°C, 1 atm pressure conditions
4BOF Gas quantity computed considering density as 1.37 kg/Nm3
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Maximum
Quantity
handled/
stored
Whether
Type of vessel
Included in The
used for
handling /
List of
Hazardous &
storage
Toxic Chemicals
Lower
Threshold
Qty. (In
Tonne) [For
Upper
Threshold
Qty. (In
Tonne) [For
Remarks
In-plant Steel
pipelines to
new Gas
Mixing station
(GMS)
In-plant Steel
pipelines to
new GMS
15
200
15
200
Below the lower threshold
limit. Does not require
additional However,
consequence analysis carried
out due to COG’s high
flammability potential
Exceeds lower threshold
limit but below upper
threshold limit.
Consequence analysis
required to be carried out.
Exceeds lower threshold
limit but below upper
threshold limit.
Consequence analysis
required to be carried out.
Exceeds lower threshold
limit but below upper
threshold limit.
Consequence analysis
required to be carried out.
rules 5,7 to 9 &
13 to 15]
rules 10 to 12]
1.
Coke Oven 2.5 tonnes
gas
handled
Yes,
As per Sch. 3(i)
2.
Blast
Furnace
Gas
86 tonnes
handled
Yes,
As per Sch. 3(i)
3.
Mixed Gas
81 tonnes
handled
Yes,
As per Sch. 3(i)
In-plant Steel
pipelines from
new GMS
15
200
4.
BOF gas
102.1 T +
63.8 T =
165.9
Tonnes
stored in 02
BOF Gas
holders
Yes,
As per Sch. 3(i)
15
200
5.
Propane
2 x 100 T =
200
Tonnes
stored in 03
bullets
Yes,
As per Sch. 3(i)
Steel Cylindrical
shaped gas
holder (Wiggin’s
type) with Dry
Rubber seal and
handled via Inplant Steel
pipelines
Horizontally
placed steel
Bullets with
hemispherical
ends.
15
200
Table-1. : List of Major Hazardous Substances to be Stored /Handled
Sn.
Bokaro Steel
plant
Equal to upper threshold
limit. Consequence analysis
required to be carried out.
After comparison of the stored / handled and threshold quantities, it can be noticed that
BOF gas and propane exceed the lower threshold limits and come under the purview of
MSIHC Rules, 1989 amended in 2000. Accordingly, Rule-7 i.e. notification of site requires
submission of a written report containing among other information.
Further, rule 17 i.e. preparation and maintenance of material safety data sheets are
required for both the substances.
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
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Bokaro Steel
plant
Owing to the hazardous nature of BOF gas, Mixed gas and propane, consequence analysis
of the facility has been done, taking in consideration all hazardous substances identified
at Table 2 above. MCAA (maximum credible accident analysis) approach has been used
to identify plausible worst case scenarios for hazard identification and risk assessment.
3.4. Hazard Identification
Hazards associated with the identified hazardous chemicals based on NFPA (National Fire
Protection Association) ratings as well as other parameters are presented in Table 3.
Table-3. : Type of Hazards Associated With Identified Hazardous Chemicals
Type
NFPA Hazard Rating
Flash Flammability
Remarks
IDLH
of
point
range (for
Health Flammability Reactivity Value
Hazard
(°C)
gases)
LEL = 4%
1,6,9
0
4
0
Hydrogen
(<13%)
All gases
LEL = 4.4%
1,6,9
2
4
0
Methane
transported
(<13%)
directly through
1200
Carbon
LEL = 12%
pipelines.
2
4
0
1,3,9
Release:
(<13%)
ppm
monoxide
Leak/rupture
300
LEL = 16%
3
1
0
Ammonia(NH3) 4,8
LD gas stored in
ppm
UEL = 25%
Steel Gas holders.
Hydrogen
100
LEL = 4.3%
Release: Leak/
1,4,8
4
4
0
ppm
UEL = 46%
sulphide(H2S)
Rupture
250
LEL = 0.9%
1,7,8
2
2
0
79°
Naphthalene
UEL = 5.9%
ppm
Constituents of COG/ BFG/
BOFG/ Mixed Gas
Name of Chemical
Propane (C3H8)
1,3,9
2
4
Note: IDLH: Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health
Type of Hazard :
1 Flammable substance
2 Oxidising substance, reacts with reducing agents
3 Emits a toxic gas or vapour
4 Emits an irritating gas or vapour
5 Emits a narcotic gas or vapour
NFPA HAZARD Rating
a) HEALTH
1 - None
2 - Minor
b) FLAMMABILITY
1-None, Material
2- Minor, material
does not burn
must be preheated
to ignite
c) REACTIVITY
1-None, stable
when exposed to
fire
0
2100
-104°
ppm
LEL = 2.2%
UEL = 9.5%
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Bokaro Steel
plant
which also confirms high levels of safety of mounded bullets, diminishing possibilities of
BLEVE from the bullets. The summarised
The catastrophic potential of a hazardous substance depends on its flammability, toxicity
and volatility. The ambient temperature vapour pressure of a substance is used as a
measure of the ability to become air borne. Although COG, BFG and Mixed gas are not
proposed to be stored in the plant and also, as per applicability of MSIHC Rules, 1989,
there is no specific requirement for carrying out its consequence analysis, the fire hazards
associated have been quantified owing to its toxic as well as high flammable nature. BOF
gas and propane being highly flammable and stored in significant quantities in the plant
require consequence analysis to be carried out for them.
The primary potential hazards due to the identified hazardous facilities is summarised in
Table-4 as below.
Stored in
mounded bullets.
Release:
Leak/rupture
6 Gas or vapour not dangerous other than displacing air
7 Causes skin irritation or burns
8 Toxic substance
9 Explosive material under certain conditions
3 - Moderate, could
4 - Severe, short
5 - Extreme, short
cause temporary
exposure may cause exposure may cause
incapacitation or injury serious injury
death
3- Moderate, moderate 4- Severe, material
heating is required for ignites at normal
ignition and volatile
temperature
vapours are released
2-Minor, unstable at 3-Moderate, unstable
high temp. or press but does not explode,
and may react with may form explosive
water
mixture with water
4-Severe, Explodes
if heated or water
added
5- Extreme, very
flammable substance that
readily forms explosive
mixtures
5-Extreme, readily
explosives under normal
condition
From the above table it can be observed that Coke Oven gas, BF gas, BOF gas, mixed gas
and propane are the hazardous materials of concern for the proposed project. Propane is
proposed to be stored in mounded bullets, as per the design guidelines of OISD-150,
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
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Bokaro Steel
plant
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Table-4. : Primary Hazard Analysis of Proposed facilities
Unit/ facility Hazardous activity
Failure Scenario
Nature of Potential Hazard
SMS-I
Storage of BOF gas Failed tank or associated fittings, ≠ Fire and explosion
(modernized holder) pump or pipework or operator ≠ Toxic cloud dispersion
error or mechanical damage
Storage of BOF gas Failed tank or associated fittings, ≠ Fire and explosion
(new holder)
pump or pipework or operator ≠ Toxic cloud dispersion
error or mechanical damage
SMS-II
Storage of BOF gas Failed tank or associated fittings, ≠ Fire and explosion
(new holder)
pump or pipework or operator ≠ Toxic cloud dispersion
error or mechanical damage
Storage of Propane Failure in inlet, outlet or vapour ≠ Fire and explosion
gas
(modernized balancing line or associated
holder)
fittings, pump or pipe-work or
operator error leading to
impacts including chemical or
fuel contamination
Unit/ facility Hazardous activity
Control measures
≠ Design of storage structures / tanks to relevant standards
and legislations.
≠ Regular inspections and maintenance.
≠ Operator induction and ongoing training.
≠ Operational procedures.
≠ Material safety data sheet (MSDS) register and MSDSs
kept on-site at different locations in form of signage etc.
≠ Hazard Signage.
≠ Design of storage structures / tanks to relevant standards
and legislations.
≠ Appropriate storage of all chemicals, fuel and dangerous
substances in accordance with relevant Hazardous
Chemical Rules, 2000 with subsequent amendments and
associated legislations.
≠ Housekeeping activities – site would be kept clean and tidy
and fire hazards removed where practicable.
≠ Availability of firefighting equipment, such as overhead
water spray system, mounted on top of gas holders.
≠ Regular inspections and maintenance of firefighting
equipment and storage areas, where required.
≠ Site policies, management plans and procedures.
≠ Protection of storage facilities (e.g. bollards).
≠ Operator induction and ongoing training.
≠ Location of explosive storage should be such that it has
minimum interaction with people and property.
≠ Design of storage structures / tanks to relevant standards
and legislations.
≠ Design of pipelines (i.e. wall thickness and stress relief),
well sites, Central Processing Facility and related
infrastructure to relevant standards and legislation.
≠ Installation of pressure monitoring systems.
≠ Regular inspections and maintenance.
≠ Housekeeping activities – site would be kept clean and tidy
and fire hazards removed where practicable.
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Coke
plant
Failure Scenario
Nature of Potential Hazard
Oven Handling of Coke Failure of pipeline, bursting of ≠ Fire and explosion
oven gas and BF gas pipeline due to Corrosion, ≠ Toxic cloud dispersion
(new Gas mixing Vibration, external
loading,
station)
Operation error, Over pressure,
Maintenance failure, or
Sabotage
Bokaro Steel
plant
Control measures
≠ Availability of firefighting equipment.
≠ Maintenance of fire breaks to slow the progress of
bushfires.
≠ Routine hazard reduction burns.
≠ Fire-fighting equipment located in on-site vehicles and
infrastructure (wherever appropriate).
≠ Regular inspections and maintenance of firefighting
equipment and storage areas, where required.
≠ Operator induction and ongoing training.
≠ Operational procedures.
≠ Material safety data sheet (MSDS) register and MSDSs
kept on-site at different locations in form of signage etc.
≠ Hazard Signage.
≠ Location of explosive storage shall be such that it has
minimum interaction with people and property.
≠ Design of pipelines (i.e. wall thickness and stress relief),
well sites, Central Processing Facility and related
infrastructure to relevant standards and legislation.
≠ Installation of pressure monitoring systems.
≠ Conduct regular inspections, maintenance and testing of
equipment.
≠ Site policies, management plans and procedures.
≠ Operator induction and ongoing training.
≠ Maintenance of fire breaks to slow the progress of
bushfires.
≠ Routine hazard reduction burns.
≠ Fire-fighting equipment and spill kits located in on-site
vehicles and infrastructure (where appropriate).
≠ Restriction of access to storage areas, including securing
storage facilities.
≠ Provision of adequate lighting around storage facilities.
≠ Signage (i.e. unauthorized entry warning and information
signs).
≠ Police would be notified as soon as possible in case of a
suspected breach.
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
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3.5. Consequence Analysis for fire and explosion as well as toxic hazards
Subsequent to the accidental release of hazardous chemicals, the consequence depends
on various factors e.g. type and inventory of released hazardous materials, presence and
location of an ignition source, meteorological conditions, etc. Consequence analysis for
the selected accident scenarios has been carried to estimate the vulnerable zones.
DNV’s PHAST (Version 6.4) software, which is a consequence and risk assessment
software for calculation of physical effects (fire, explosion, atmospheric dispersion) of the
escape of hazardous materials has been used to perform the consequence calculations.
The software allows detailed modeling and quantitative assessment of release of pure
chemicals as well as mixtures from different scenarios.
Consequence analysis quantifies vulnerable zone for a conceived incident and once the
vulnerable zone is identified for an incident, measures can be proposed to eliminate
damage to plant and potential injury to personnel. Consequence analysis for existing BOF
gas stored in gas holders, additional COG, BFG and Mixed Gas proposed to be handled via
pipelines of new Gas mixing station and Propane envisaged to be stored in Mounded
bullets at BSL has been carried out. The release scenarios selected and associated hazards
based on MCA Analysis are listed below in Table 5.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
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plant
Table-6. : Worst Case Hazard Extents for Identified Hazardous Facilities
Plant Unit Failure size Nature of hazard
Hazard effects
GAS
Hole
Fire & Explosion
Jet fire
MIXING
Flash Fire
STATION Rupture
Fire & Explosion
Fireball
Flash Fire
Vapour Cloud Explosion
Toxic effect
Toxic effect safe distance
BOF GAS Rupture
Fire & Explosion
Fireball
HOLDERS
Flash Fire
Vapour Cloud Explosion
Toxic effect
Toxic effect safe distance
MOUNDED Vessel failure Fire & Explosion
Jetfire
PROPANE at pipe
Flash Fire
BULLET
junctions
Vapour Cloud Explosion
Worst case Hazard extent (m)
11m @ 4.0 kW/m2
8m @ LFL
38m @37.5 kW/m2
65m @LFL
48m @0.21 bar(g)
> 25m @ no probability of fatality
84m @37.5 kW/m2
127m @LFL
136m @0.21 bar(g)
> 50m @ no probability of fatality
45m at 12.5 kW/m2
8m @ LFL
45m @0.21 bar(g)
The worst case Hazard extents of all identified major hazardous units is shown in
Figures. 1(a) to 1(f).
Table-5. : Probable Release & Accident Scenarios Identified as per MCAA
Sl.
No.
1.
2.
3.
Hazardous
substance
BOF gas
Credible Release scenario
Credible identified accidents
Complete failure of Gas holder leading to Fireball, Flash fire, Vapour Cloud
catastrophic release of BOF gas
explosion,
Toxic
Cloud
dispersion
Propane
Complete failure of inlet-outlet and other Fireball, Flash fire, Vapour Cloud
lines connected to the bullets leading to explosion
release from connecting points.
Coke
Oven Leak from hole (100mm dia. hole) [for Jet fire, Flash fire
Gas, BF Gas, COG only]
Mixed gas
Full bore rupture of piping [for all gases] Fireball, Flash fire, Vapour Cloud
explosion,
Toxic
Cloud
dispersion
The modelling of hazardous situations using DNV’s PHAST indicate the hazardous
consequences have highest hazard extents in the atmospheric stability class D. The worst
case results for the different releases enumerated above have been observed in the
atmospheric scenario similar to 3D. The worst case results are summarized in Table 6.
For assessing maximum damage from most credible scenarios, results have been shown
for end point criteria corresponding to maximum observed damage due to a particular
hazard effect.
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
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Fig.1 (a) Hazard Extents For Thermal Fire Radiation Effects
GAS MIXING STATION WITH ASSOCIATED PIPEWORK
BOF GAS HOLDERS
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Bokaro Steel
plant
MOUNDED PROPANE BULLET
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
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Bokaro Steel
plant
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
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Fig.1 (b) Hazard Extents For Flash Fires In Identified Hazardous Facilities
GAS MIXING STATION WITH ASSOCIATED PIPEWORK
BOF GAS HOLDERS
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Bokaro Steel
plant
Fig.1 (c) Hazard Extents For Flash Fires In Identified Hazardous Facilities
MOUNDED PROPANE BULLET
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
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Fig.1 (d) Hazard Extents For Vapour Cloud Explosion Effects In Identified Hazardous Facilities
GAS MIXING STATION WITH ASSOCIATED PIPEWORK
BOF GAS HOLDERS
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Bokaro Steel
plant
Fig.1 (e) Hazard Extents For Vapour Cloud Explosion Effects In Identified Hazardous Facilities
MOUNDED PROPANE BULLET
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The proximity of nearest habitations to Identified Hazardous facilities is shown
in Figure 2 below:
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
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Bokaro Steel
plant
Fig.1 (f) Hazard Extents For Toxic Cloud Dispersion Effects In Identified Hazardous Facilities
GAS MIXING STATION WITH ASSOCIATED PIPEWORK
BOF GAS HOLDERS
Fig.2 Safe Distances From Hazardous Installations Of BSL To Nearest
Habitations
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
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3.6. Conclusion on consequence analysis
Bokaro Steel
plant
3.6.3. Mounded Propane bullet
BSL has envisaged two (2) propane bullets, each of 100Tonne capacity, located within the
BSL’s Bokaro Steel Plant for heating and cutting purposes. The results of MCA analysis
indicates a maximum fire hazard distance for causing significant damage (@12.5 Kw/m2
thermal radiation) extending up to 45 m in the case of complete failure of the pipeline
connections on the bullets and release of propane, subsequently being ignited during
worst meteorological conditions resulting in a jetfire. Explosion effects having significant
potential for damage (@0.21 bar(g) overpressure) is also observed to be upto a distance
of 45 m.
3.6.1. Gas Mixing station
A maximum total of 75,000 m3/hr of mixed gas is proposed to be handled by a new Gas
mixing station envisaged at BSL’s Coke Oven complex, wherein BF Gas and Coke Oven
gas will be tapped from existing as well as future producing units and will be mixed in
suitable proportions to produce Mixed gas of desired calorific value for use at the existing
and new coke oven batteries. The results of MCA analysis indicates a maximum fire hazard
distance for causing significant damage (@37.5 Kw/m2 thermal radiation) extending up to
38 m in the case of complete failure of the holder and catastrophic release of BOF gas,
subsequently being ignited during worst meteorological conditions resulting in a fireball.
The hazard extent for flash fire extends till 65 m (@ LFL concentration). Explosion effects
having significant potential for damage (@0.21 bar(g) overpressure) is observed to be
upto a distance of 48m.
Overall, a minimum safe distance of 45 m from the Propane bullets will ensure no damage
to personnel as well as property, outside the plant premises. As observed from the overall
analysis, the hazard extents will be contained within the plant premises and will not extend
beyond plant boundary into any nearby settlement in the area. Also, pressure-monitoring
systems shall be installed to detect leaks or cracks in the pipeline. Fire-fighting facilities
will also be installed to check any fire incident that may occur.
The toxic effect of BFG, COG as well as Mixed gas (attributed to presence of Carbon
Monoxide in the gases) will be limited to 25m from the gas holder, beyond which there
will be no probability of fatality due to toxic effect in case of a release.
3.7. Risk Analysis for proposed projects
Overall, a minimum safe distance of 65 m from the Gas mixing station will ensure no
damage to personnel as well as property, outside the plant premises. As observed from
the overall analysis, the hazard extents will be contained within the plant premises and
The hazardous event scenarios likely to make the significant contribution to the risk of
potential fatalities are enlisted in Table 7. The risks to people at plant site are categorized
as “On-site” risks while the risks to communities outside the plant premises is categorized
as “Off-site” risks.
will not extend beyond plant boundary into any nearby settlement in the area.
3.6.2. BOF Gas holders
Table 7: Hazardous Events Contributing to Risk and their Risk Ranking
There are two (2) BOF gas holders, i.e. a replaced BOF gas holder of SMS-1 of 50,000 m
capacity and a new gas holder of 80,000 m3 capacity, both located within the SMS complex
of BSL’s Bokaro Steel Plant. The results of MCA analysis indicates a maximum fire hazard
distance for causing significant damage (@37.5 Kw/m2 thermal radiation) extending up to
84 m in the case of complete failure of the holder and catastrophic release of BOF gas,
subsequently being ignited during worst meteorological conditions resulting in a fireball.
Explosion effects having significant potential for damage (@0.21 bar(g) overpressure) is
observed to be upto a distance of 136m.
(A)
3
The toxic effect of BOF Gas (attributed to Carbon Monoxide in BOFG) will be limited to 50m
from the gas holder, beyond which there will be no probability of fatality due to toxic effect
in case of a release.
Overall, a minimum safe distance of 136 m from the BOF Gas holders will ensure no
damage to personnel as well as property, outside the plant premises. As observed
from the overall analysis, the hazard extents will be contained within the plant
premises and will not extend beyond plant boundary into any nearby settlement in
the area.
Page 20 of 32
Sn.
Hazardous event
Consequence of
significant damage
Consequence
severity*
(1=least severe;
5=most severe)
1.
2.
Onsite vehicle impact on
personnel
Entrapment/struck by
Machinery
3.
Fall from heights
4.
Electrocution
5.
6.
7.
Potential for single fatalities,
onsite impact only
Potential for single fatalities,
onsite impact only
Potential for single fatalities,
onsite impact only
Potential for single fatalities,
onsite impact only
Gas Mixing Station fire & Potential for multiple
explosion as well as toxic
fatalities, onsite impact only
dispersion
BOF gas holder failure and Potential for multiple
fire & explosion as well as
fatalities, onsite impact only
toxic dispersion
Potential for multiple
Propane Bullet’s fire &
fatalities, onsite impact only
explosion
(B)
Likelihood*
(1=least likely;
5=most likely)
C=
A*B
RISK
RANK
3
3
9
3
2
6
1
3
3
2
3
6
4
1
4
5
1
5
3
1
3
*based on Historical survey of similar facilities
Page 21 of 32
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Bokaro Steel
plant
The above risk analysis indicates that although the most severe consequences will be due
to rupture of BOF Gas holders followed by Gas Mixing station and Mounded propane
bullets, their chances of occurrences are low due to implementation of better safety
features in the installations and constant monitoring of vessel/pipework integrity for
regular repair and maintenance, and hence these facilities have low levels of risk in the
facility.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
≠
≠
≠
3.8. Summary & Conclusions of Risk Assessment
The risk assessment and analysis for BSL’s steel plant for most severe hazardous events
is broadly summarized below:
≠
≠
The nearest habitations in the vicinity of the BSL Plant are Tupkadih village at
distance >4000min NW, Balidih village at distance >3000m in SW, LakdaKhanda
village in SEat distance >2500mand Agardih village at distance >2300m in the NE,
which are far away from the hazard distances observed for thermal effects
(maximum at 127m) as well as toxic effects (maximum at 50m) due to failure of
above identified hazardous facilities of BSL. Also, these facilities are located in the
central part of the Bokaro steel plant away from each other to prevent multiple
hazards, initiated due to fire in one facility and leading to a hazard in another
facility, also known as domino effect. So, there will be no significant impact on the
local community or damage to property / environment.
The most severe damage effects due to the identified hazardous facilities will be
limited to the plant premises and adequate safety controls as well as
implementation of recommended control strategies in the design as well as
operation stage will ensure effective management of the associated risks.
≠
≠
≠
≠
≠
Bokaro Steel
plant
- First-aid appliances
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) shall be provided for additional protection
to workers exposed to workplace hazards in conjunction with other facility
controls and safety systems.
Restricted access to these areas to have minimum casualties in an event of
exposure.
The onsite Emergency Plan will be integrated with the Bokaro district’s Offsite
Emergency Plan for comprehensive management of emergencies in minimum
response time and maximum rescue results in an event of a disaster
/emergency. Co-ordination with nearby industries will also be maintained for
creating unified Disaster management resource pool to be utilised in case of
any disaster occurrence.
The plant structures shall be designed for cyclone floods and seismic events to
prevent structural collapse and integrity of weather (water) proofing for
storage of dangerous goods.
Isolate people from load carrying/mechanical handling systems, vehicle traffic
and storage and stacking locations.
Security of facility to prevent unauthorized access to plant, introduction of
prohibited items and control of onsite traffic; and
Development of emergency response management systems commensurate
with site specific hazards and risks (fire, explosion, rescue and first aid).
Regular safety audits shall be undertaken to ensure that hazards are
clearly identified and risk-control measures are maintained within tolerable
limits.
Bokaro Steel plant has a well laid down Onsite-emergency plan for the existing plan. The
same will be extended to the proposed modernization and expansion projects also.
3.9. Recommended Risk Reduction and Mitigation Measures
The following opportunities shall be considered as a potential means of reducing identified
risks during the detailed design phase:
≠ The zones identified from consequence modelling as affected areas due to
≠
≠
thermal radiations greater than 12.5 kW/m2 shall be marked as “Heat Zones”
and provisions for fire fighting will be made available close to these zones.
It is also recommended to provide portable gas detectors within the site in
order to facilitate manual gas leak monitoring and regular leakage checks.
Constant monitoring of gas leak shall be ensured for immediate identification
of leaks and subsequent implementation of action plan to prevent development
of any hazardous situation.
Further, all major units / equipment shall be provided with the following safety
facilities:
- Smoke / fire detection and alarm system
- Water supply
- Fire hydrant and nozzle installation
- Foam system
- Water fog and sprinkler system
- Mobile fire-fighting equipment
Page 22 of 32
Page 23 of 32
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Bokaro Steel
plant
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Additionally, the HAZOP study for existing gas holder in SMS-II is also attached with
Annexure-1B.
4. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION & RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) FOR EXISTING
FACILITIES
Bokaro Steel plant has a well-defined procedure for carrying out Hazard identification and
Risk Assessment for effective risk control management at each unit of the plant. The
procedure has been laid down based on the principles and standards of OHSAS-18001
and is continually reviewed for upgradation and improvement.
All new works are also required to carry out HIRA before commencement and the same
is updated as and when these ongoing projects are completed.
The HIRA under implementation for the following existing units are detailed hereunder
i.
Energy Management Department (Fuel gases etc.)
ii.
New Gas pipeline network
iii.
Blast Furnace
iv.
Coke Oven and By-product plant
v.
Steel making Shop
vi.
Cold Rolling mill
vii.
Sinter Plant
viii.
Raw Material handling plant
The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures
employed are indicated in Table-9(a) below.
Sl. No. Activity
1.
2.
Note: Risk level is Tolerable on the basis of probability up to unusual but possible, exposure up to Occasional
& Consequence is First aid. For NOT ACCEPTALE cases, Risk Control measures have to be taken as per
Hierarchy of control.
4.1. Fuel Management : Gaseous And Liquid
Different liquid and gaseous fuel are used in various departments of BSL during plant
operations and are managed by Energy Management Department (EMD) of BSL. The
details of HIRA for storage and handling of these fuel is managed by EMD BSL.
Page 24 of 32
Table 9(a): Summarised HIRA of fuel management
Hazard
Risk
Risk level Existing
measure
Distribution of in-house
Byproduct fuel gases
Charging of the gas
cleaning plant
3.
Rectification of defects
in charged gas line
4.
Standard Maintenance
Practices
risk
control
Gas leakage
Gas Exposure Substantial
Gas Monitors & Alarms
Gas leakage
& Formation
of explosive
mixture
Gas leakage
Gas Exposure Moderate
& Explosion
Adherence
procedures
Gas exposure Substantial
Flash over +
Elec. Shock
Injury & burn Moderate
Strict adherence to Gas line work
Protocol and use of PPE
Adherence
to
safe
work
procedures
to
safe
work
4.2. Alternate Gas pipeline network
The HIRA carried out for t he new gas network and associated repair and
maintenance works is summarised below.
The summary of HIRA for the above mentioned units are briefed below, indicating major
hazards, probable risks and their levels and control measures employed. The risk
acceptance criteria at Bokaro Steel plant is given in Table-8 below:
Table 8: Risk levels and their acceptance criteria at BSL
Score
Risk level
Risk Assessment Risk Control Measures
400
& Very high
Not Acceptable
PPE + Engg Control/ Modification or
>400
combination to REDUCE RISK LEVEL
200-399
High
Not Acceptable
PPE+ OH&S Program for engineering
control along with RCP
60-199
Substantial
Not Acceptable
PPE+ RCP / OH& S Program / Signages
/warning boards and/or/ administrative
controls ( or combination)
10-59
Moderate
Not Acceptable
PPE + RCP/ Signages / warning boards
and/or/ administrative controls ( or
combination)
Upto 9
Tolerable
Acceptable
PPE
Bokaro Steel
plant
The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures
employed are indicated in Table-9(b) below.
Table 9(b): Summarised HIRA of installation of alternate Gas pipeline network
Sl. Activity
Hazard
Risk
Risk
Existing risk control
No.
level
measure
Electrical
Electrocution
Burn injury or fatal or
Moderate Lockout/Tag out, Work
1.
Installations
2.
Welding
lost time injury
Electric shock due to
unearthed welding
machine / Transformer
Electric shock due to
exposed joints of
welding cable
Electric shock due to
loose connections
without industrial plug
tops
Burn injury due to the
contact with hot
surfaces
Fatal or Cut
injurys/burns/Electric
shocks.
Burn, Fire,
Permit, Daily Checklist, etc.
Strict Supervision is required
from start of work to till
completion of work
Tolerable Work Permit, Daily Checklist,
ELCBs, PPEs, Area
barricading, Use of sheets
Tolerable
Exposure to Eyes,
Breathing problems,
Occupational Diseases.
Tolerable
Burn injury
Tolerable
Page 25 of 32
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Sl. Activity
No.
Material
3.
handling
(Manual)
4.
5.
6.
7.
Bokaro Steel
plant
Hazard
Risk
Risk
level
Non-use of PPE's
(Helmet, gloves, shoes
etc.)
Inadequate manpower
Lack of concentration in
group effort
Wrong body posture
Lifting error
Bur/sharp edges
/corners / projecting
parts /protruding nails.
Fall of materials
Injury
Tolerable Adherence to safe work
procedures defined for
Handling Of Reinforcement &
Tolerable Handling Of Cement /
Tolerable
Concrete Competent riggers,
Tolerable Use of Proper PPEs, Guy
Tolerable ropes, Training & Awareness.
Material
Lack of knowledge
handling
Defective equipment
(Mechanical) Defective lifting jacks
forklift,
Overloading
crane
Improper Slinging
Untrained operator/
Rigger
Working at Fall of Men & Material
Height
Back pain, sprain etc.
Property damage
Accident / injury
Back pain,sprain etc.
Property damage
Serious injury or Lost
time injury
Accident / injury
Impact, crush injury
Impact
Tilting of jacks / boom
Impact, Collision
Injury due to accident
and property damage
Major injury, Fatal
Transporting Cylinders kept horizontal
gas
& near by
cylinders:
Cylinders with no valve
Oxygen,
cap
Acetylene,
Prolonged cylinder
Argon,
exposure to sun light
Nitrogen,
LPG
Fire & explotion
Work in
Oxygen deficiency
near CO gas Fire hazard
line
Asphyxiation
Burn Injury
Gas leakage due to
valve damage
Explosion
Existing risk
measure
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
control
Tolerable
Tolerable
4.3. Blast Furnace
T h e H I R A c a r r i e d o u t f o r t h e B l a st Furnace complex and associated
documents are summarised below.
The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures
employed are indicated in Table-9(c) below.
Sl. Activity
No.
Receiving,
1.
Page 26 of 32
Hazard
Table 9(c): Summarised HIRA of BF complex
Risk
Risk
Existing risk
level
measure
Dust concn. at the Skip
Transporting, Pit
Screening,
Hot Sinter
Storing and Unguarded coupling
Bottom
charging
Spillage of oil from
of raw
G/Boxes
materials.
Spillage of raw Materials
Tolerable Adherence to safe work
Tolerable procedures defined for
Tolerable mechanical material handling
Tolerable
Tolerable
Tolerable
Tolerable Adherence to safe work
procedures defined for work
at height. Height pass shall
be implemented, Work shall
be carried out under direct
supervision of TPL, OCP-07
control measures shall be
followed. Proper working
platform shall be made
where ever it is possible,
proper temp. Ladders should
be provided to access the
height.
Tolerable Adherence to safe work
procedures defined for
Tolerable working with gas storages.
Material secured before
Tolerable
transporting. Material
mobilizing only with strict
supervision & preplanning
using suitable transporting
methods on the basis of right
vehicle, right material,
lashing is done only by
trained persons.
Tolerable Portable CO detector. Use
Tolerable proper PPEs (like nose
mask). Skilled & Trained
person only should carry out.
Bokaro Steel
plant
2.
3.
4.
5.
Receiving
Cold Blast
from TBS,
Heating of
Cold Blast in
Stoves,
Feeding of
Hot Blast
through
Tuyeres.
Tapping of
Hot Metal
and Slag in
Cast House.
Granulation
of Liquid
Slag.
Handling of
Raw CDI
Coal
in Sinter Galleries.
Gas poisoning due to
Heating of Stoves,
Leakage of BF gas at
Stoves, Dust Catcher,
Cooling platforms,
Walkways etc.
Noise & Heat due to Air
Leakage in Snort Valves,
Stoves on Blast,
Leakage of Hot air
through Tuyeres.
Emission of
Flame, spark and back
fire due to Drilling &
lancing of tap hole
Splashing of metal / slag
during preparation /
Cleaning of trough
and runner before
and during tapping
Rolling of ladle, tilting,
splashing during
Coupling / decoupling
metal & Slag
Asphyxia.
Consumption
Burn Injury
Severe Injury
Slip & Fall
Minor Injury
control
Substantial Dust extraction system /
Use of PPE
Moderate Water spray
Substantial Provision of guards
wherever missing
Moderate Changing / Repair of
defective Gear Boxes
Tolerable Manual cleaning
From Minor Health
injury to even Death
Substantial Checking of gas conc.&
Use of PPEs, Repair/
Changing of leaking valves
in Stove. Dust Catcher.
Use of Gas Mask.
Impaired Hearing
& injury
Substantial Use of PPEs. Changing of
Tuyere/ Tuyere stocks.
Eye injury and Burn
Injury
Moderate
Heat resistant dress,
Goggles & fire resistant
dress.
Burn injury
Moderate
Use of fire retardant dress
and face shield etc.
Run Over/ Hit/Pressed
and Burn
Substantial Track maintenance,
Coupling at dead speed of
loco & no overfilling of
ladles. No work on the top
of the tracks at cast house
during placement &
withdrawal of loads.
Provision of handle.
Moderate Aprons & Hand gloves, PPEs
Hot water & Steam.
Corrosive slag
Burn injury
Coal dust concentration
Health injury as well as
Burn Injury
Substantial Dust mask, Special Dress.
Page 27 of 32
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Sl. Activity
No.
Chg. &
6.
7.
8.
9.
Hazard
Gas leakage
Discharging
of Gas Lines.
Puncturing / ≠ Liquid metal / slag
Bursting out
splashing
of Blow Pipes ≠ Splinter of hot pieces
/ Tuyere
of B/Pipes
Stocks
Explosion in ≠ . Liquid metal / slag
Metal / Slag
splashing
≠ Splinter of hot Pieces.
Ladles
Gas leakage
in BF Area
≠ Poisonous CO gas
leakage
Bokaro Steel
plant
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Risk
Risk
level
Existing risk
measure
Serious Injury to fatal.
Moderate
Use of N2 in the operation.
Severe Burn / Fatal or
injury
Substantial Wind reductions & Off Blast
Falling from height,
Gas poisoning
May lead to fatal
accident
control
Substantial Use of Safety belt wherever
required. Physical Inspection
by rods before stepping.
Checking of gas & use of PPE
Moderate Use of Gas mask during wind
reduction / Off blast of the
furnace or prevention of
leakage from given point
2.
Exposure to fine dust
and heat
8.
9.
10.
13.
Burn injury
Foreign bodies in
eyes & lung
problem
Breathing and lung
problem
Foreign bodies in
eyes & lung
problem. Burn
injury
3.
Quenching of hot coke
Exposure to heat, dust,
steam
Burn injury &
smoke exposure
4.
Combustion of Coke
oven/Mixed gas
Exposure to CO/Mixed
gas, explosion
Gas exposure and
burn injury
14.
15.
Table 9(d): Summarised HIRA of Coke oven and BPP
Hazard
Risk
Risk
level
Oven pushing
7.
12.
The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures
employed are indicated in Table-9(d) below.
Exposure to raw gas
Risk
Risk
level
Exposure to heat, gas,
Burn injury,
Breathing and
lung problem
Physical injury
Tolerable Use of PPEs
Burn injury
Tolerable Use of hand Gloves
Heat ,Exposure to hot
tar
Heat ,Exposure to hot
tar sludge
Exposure to Acid
Hot spray in to eye
/ face
Chemical exposure
Tolerable Use of hand Gloves
Eye protection with
Tolerable Goggles
Acid burn
Distillation of Benzolised
oil to produce Crude
Benzol
CO gas line flushing with
Wash oil
Conversion process for
making sulphuric acid
Heat hazard
Exposure to steam
Burn injury
Moderate Use of apron rubber
hand gloves Eye
protective shields
Moderate Use of PPE
Heat hazard
Burn injury
Tolerable Use of PPE
Exposure to acid,
Heat hazard
Irritation to eye
giddiness
Storage and pumping of
tar for distillation
Mixing of crystallized
Naphthalene
Hot tar Exposure
Burn injury
Moderate Use of gas mask &
Eye protection
Moderate Use of PPE
Fall from height
11.
The HIRA carried out for the Coke oven and by-product plant and associated
documents are summarised below.
Exposure to flame
Exposure to hot APC
water
Exposure to coal dust
Hazard
BY-PRODUCT PLANT
Cooling of coke Oven Gas Exposure to hot water
6.
4.4. Coke Oven and By-product plant
Sl. Activity
No.
COKE OVEN
Charging of coal
1.
Sl. Activity
No.
Cleaning and regulation
5.
Existing
risk
control measure
Moderate Use of PPEs
Tolerable Safe Work
instructions
Moderate Use of PPEs &
medical checkup
Moderate
Moderate Use of PPEs &
medical checkup.
Safe Work
instructions
Moderate Insulation of
operation cabin and
use of PPEs
Moderate Safe Work
instructions and
inspection by EMD
Page 28 of 32
Bokaro Steel
plant
with water
Flushing of Primary Gas
coolers with Hot Tar
Removal of Sludge from
Tar decanter
Loading, unloading &
storage of Conc.
Sulphuric Acid
Exposure of
naphthalene
fumes
Handling & Preparation of Exposure to
Orthophosphoric Acid
Orthophosphoric acid,
solution, caustic lye
caustic soda solution
(NaOH) and other
chemicals & its dozing
Burn injury
giddiness due to
toxic vapor
Chemical burn
Existing
risk
control measure
Moderate Railing on platform
Tolerable
Tolerable
4.5. Steel Making Shop
The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures
employed are indicated in Table-9(e) below.
Sl. No. Activity
Tap Hole
1.
Opening And
Closing
Table 9(e): Summarised HIRA of SMS shops
Hazard
Risk
Risk level Existing risk control measure
Flame
Fume
Heat exposure
Hot metal/ slag
Splashes
Minor burn Injury
Respiratory Illness
Heat Stress
Burn Injury
Moderate
Tolerable
Tolerable
Tolerable
Maintain good house-keeping, flame
retardant suits, observation glasses/
Face shield, safe work instruction,
dust pad/mask, safety helmet, safety
shoes, Anklets and safety hand
gloves, training, ensure dryness of
launder, ensure there is no water in
thimble, use protecting sheet,
Page 29 of 32
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Sl. No. Activity
Charging of
2.
Hazard
Heat
exposure, Burn Injuries,
hot metal/ slag
splashes
Moderate
3.
Pouring of hot
metal in to
mixer barrel
And to ladle
Moderate
4.
Ladle Heating
Dust/ fume, fire/
flame,
flying
graphite
Particle,
heat
exposure,
hot
metal/ slag
splashes
Co-oven gas
Exposure
scrap and hot
metal in to
The furnace
Fire/ flame due
to explosion in
Side ladle
Heat exposure
Risk
Burn Injuries,
cuts/
wounds/crush
injuries, heat
stress
Bokaro Steel
plant
Risk level Existing risk control measure
Follow Work Instruction, maintain
safe distance from furnace, PPESdust masks/pad, helmet, safety
boot, hand gloves, anklet, blue
glass, flam retardant suit/ canvass
coat
Follow Work Instruction, PPES- dust
masks/pad, helmet, safety boot,
hand gloves, anklet, blue glass, flam
retardant suit/ canvass coat
Portable CO gas monitor,
Hazard
Risk
Fire,
electrocution,
fall hazard
Burn injury,
Tolerable
electrical
shock, physical
injury
Risk level Existing risk control measure
Double
earthed
welding
m/c,
electrical
connection
through
ELCB/RCCB, proper lug joints and
insulated, adherence to safe work
instructions, removal of flammable
material from hot work areas, area
barricading, fully insulated holders,
Lock-out-tag-out procedures, use of
PPEs.
Heat stress
Use of canvas / jeans coat during
regulating/working on running
burners
Low
T h e H I R A c a r r i e d o u t f o r t h e S i n t e r p l a n t is summarised below.
Good house keeping
The HIRA carried out for the CRM-III is summarised below.
Table 9(f): Summarised HIRA of CRM-III
Hazard
Risk
Risk level Existing risk control measure
Sl. No. Activity
Lifting operation Fall hazard
1.
with crane
Fire, gas
leakage,
explosion, fall
hazard
Injury,
damage to
equipment
Tolerable
Burn injury,
discomfort,
chemical
poisoning,
physical injury
Tolerable
The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures
employed are indicated in Table-9(g) below.
Table 9(g): Summarised HIRA of Sinter plant
Sl. Activity
Hazard Risk
Risk
Existing risk control measure
No.
level
Storage of raw material
Dust,
Injury
Moderate
Casing repair, dust mask
5.
6.
The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures
employed are indicated in Table-9(f) below.
Cutting
Sl. No. Activity
Welding
3.
Bokaro Steel
plant
4.7. Sinter Plant
Discomfort/
Low
toxic
giddiness/
CO poisoning
Burn Injuries
Low
4.6. Cold Rolling Mill
2.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Clearance
of
passage,
Good
housekeeping, area barricading,
adherence to safe work instructions,
proper
signage, Crane load
certificate
Trolley with chains for gas cylinder
transportation, use of valve cap,
working condition pressure gauge,
joint-less
flashback
arrestor,
hosepipe, PPEs-safety helmet, shoes,
face shield, leather hand gloves,
apron, arm & leg guard, goggles,
Provision for fire extinguishers/ sand/
water at site, Use of full body harness
and lifeline during work at height,
area barricading etc.
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7.
8.
9.
Crushing of coke
breeze, flux etc.
Blanking & de-blanking
of gas line. Hearth light
up, gas collector
Sinter screening,
cooling and despatch &
storage
Exhauster operation
spillage
Dust,
noise
Gas
leakage
Chest problems,
deafness
Injury
Moderate
Dusk mask, De-dusting unit, ear plug
Heat,
dust
Burn injury
Tolerable
PPEs, allowing natural cooling
Noise
Deafness
Tolerable
Ear plugs
Substantial Adherence to safe working procedures
for Handling of fuel gases.
4.8. Raw material handling plant
The HIRA carried out for the Raw material handling plant is summarised below.
The summarised HIRA indicating major hazards, probable risk and control measures
employed are indicated in Table-9(h) below.
Table 9(h): Summarised HIRA of Raw material handling plant
Sl. Activity
Hazard
Risk
Risk level Existing
risk
No.
control measure
Unloading of Railway
Uneven floor and manual
slip & fall &
Substantial
Manual signal
1.
wagon in Tippler
Operation Manual operation
in between wagons
hand injury
Body injury
may be fatal
system
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) AT
BOKARO STEEL PLANT
Sl. Activity
No.
Conveying of raw
2.
3.
4.
Hazard
Un even condition of floor ,
material through series confined space between
running conveyors
of conveyors
Stacking of raw material Un even floor condition
with the help of Twin
confined space between
transfer car, Bed, & Stacker
Boom Stacker in predefined Bed.
Screening of raw
Multi floor screen building
materials
Dust sound & vibration
hazard
Bokaro Steel
plant
Risk
Risk level Existing
risk
control measure
Slip & Fall ,
Body injury
Hit by Object
Substantial
Regular cleaning of
mud & slurry
Substantial
Deployment of
skilled/Experienced
personal
Substantial
Use of PPEs ear
plug, nose pad,
safety instruction
5. SAFE WORKING PROCEDURES FOR HIGH RISK ACTIVITIES
Highly flammable gases as well as liquid metal is handled during the operations at Bokaro
Steel plant on day-to-day basis. These activities viz. handling of hazardous gases as well
as handling of liquid metal are categorised as High risk activities due to their higher
damage potential, higher exposure levels despite lower chances of occurrence.
BSL has defined safety procedures to be adhered to while handling hazardous gases as
well as liquid metal in plant. These are elaborated in various Inter Plant Standard – Steel
Industry (IPSS).
6. DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN & ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN
The Disaster Management Plan (DMP) is formulated with an aim of taking precautionary
measures to control the hazard propagation and to take such action that the damage
following a disaster is the minimum.
The on-site emergency plan relates to the laid-down and well-practiced procedure after
taking care of all design based precautionary measures for risk control. This plan is aimed
for tackling any emergency situation, if arises.
Both the DMP and the onsite emergency plan for the existing Bokaro Steel plant has been
already prepared by BSL. The same will be extended to the proposed units also.
The overall Disaster Management Plan and the unit-wise onsite-emergency plan of Bokaro
steel plant is attached as Annexure-3.2.
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