Coordinates: 52°49′38″N 91°22′15″E
Sayano-Shushenskaya power station
accident
On 17 August 2009, a turbine at the hydroelectric power station
of the Sayano-Shushenskaya Dam near Sayanogorsk in Russia
failed catastrophically, flooding the turbine hall and killing 75
people. A section of the roof of the turbine hall collapsed; all but
one of the ten turbines were damaged or destroyed. The entire
plant output, totalling 6,400 megawatts (MW) – a significant
portion of the supply to the local area – was lost, leading to
widespread power outages. An official report on the accident was
released in October 2009.
Contents
Sayano-Shushenskaya
power station accident
The power station after the accident,
with the roof of the turbine hall
partially collapsed
Background
Turbine 2
Date
17 August 2009
Accident
Time
Investigation
Media speculation
08:13 KRAST
(UTC+8)
Location
SayanoShushenskaya Dam,
near Sayanogorsk,
Khakassia, Russia
Rescue operation
Aftermath
Damage
Power supply
Environmental impact
Financial impact
Share prices
Compensation
Personnel
Repairs
Attack on journalist
See also
References
External links
Background
Coordinates 52°49′38″N
91°22′15″E
Deaths
75
The Sayano-Shushenskaya Dam is located on the Yenisey River in
south-central Siberia, Russia, about 30 kilometres (19 mi) south of
Sayanogorsk, Khakassia. Before the accident, it was the largest
hydroelectric power station in Russia and the sixth-largest in the
world by average power generation. On 2 July 2009, RusHydro,
the power station's operator, announced the station's all-time
highest electricity output in 24 hours.[1]
Turbine 2
Turbines of the type used in this power plant have a very narrow
working band at high efficiency regimes. If this band is exceeded
the turbines begin to vibrate, caused by the pulsation of water flow
and water strokes. These vibrations and shocks cause the turbines
to degrade over time.[2]
Cross-section of the SayanoShushenskaya Dam
Turbine 2 had experienced problems for a long time prior to the 2009
accident.[3] The first of these appeared after its installation in 1979.
Throughout 1980–1983, numerous problems with seals, turbine shaft
vibrations and bearings surfaced. From the end of March to the end of
November 2000, a complete reconditioning of turbine 2 was performed.
Cavities up to 12 millimetres (0.47 in) deep and cracks up to 130
millimetres (5.1 in) long were found on the turbine runner and repaired.
Many other defects were found in the turbine bearings and subsequently
repaired. In 2005, further repairs were made to turbine 2. The problems
found were similar in several aspects to the defects observed during the
previous repair.[3]
A model of a power unit,
comprising turbine and
generator, of the SayanoShushenskaya power plant
From January to March 2009, turbine 2 was undergoing scheduled
repairs and modernization. It was the first and only turbine in the station
which was equipped with a new electro-hydraulic regulator of its
rotational speed supplied by the Promavtomatika company.[4] During the
course of the repair, the turbine blades were welded, because after a long
period of operation, cracks and cavities had once again appeared. The turbine runner was not
properly rebalanced after these repairs,[5] following which turbine 2 had increased vibrations, ca 0.15
millimetres (0.0059 in) for the main bearing during the full load of the turbine. While this did not
exceed specifications, the increased vibrations were unacceptable for long term use. The elevated
vibration levels compared to other turbines were apparent for turbine 2 before the repair as well. The
vibrations exceeded the allowed specification in the beginning of July[3] and continued to increase
with accelerated speed.[3]
On the night of 16–17 August, the level of vibration increased substantially,[5] and there were several
attempts to stop the turbine. During 16 August up to 20:30, the load of turbine 2 was 600 MW, then it
was reduced to 100–200 MW. On 17 August 2009 at 03:00, the load was increased again to 600 MW;
at 03:30, the load was decreased to 200 MW; and at 03:45, it was increased again to 600 MW.[5]
During this time, the level of vibration was very high, and was also registered by seismic instruments
in the plant. During attempts to shut it down, the rotor inside the turbine was pushed up, which in
turn created pressure pushing up on the turbine cover, which was kept in place by 80 bolts, each 8 cm
in diameter.
During the morning of 17 August 2009, 50 people were gathered around turbine 2. As the plant
general director, Nikolai Nevolko, was celebrating his anniversary, early in the morning he went to
Abakan to greet the arriving guests, and none of the workers present wanted, or had the authority, to
make decisions about further actions regarding the turbine. It seems they were used to the high levels
of vibration.[5]
Turbine 2 was started on 16 August 2009 at 23:14 local time. At 23:44 it was running at a full load of
600 MW. During the night, its load varied between 10 and 610 MW. At the moment of the accident,
which was 08:13 local time (00:13 GMT), its load was 475 MW and water consumption was 256 m3/s
(9,000 cu ft/s). Vibration of the bearing was 0.84 millimetres (0.033 in), which far exceeded the
values of the other turbines by more than fourfold. The working life defined by the manufacturer for
the turbines was specified as 30 years. At the moment of the accident, the age of the turbine was
29 years and 10 months.
On 17 August 2009, the turbines were at a working level of 212 metres (696 ft). At this pressure the
recommended power band for the turbines is 570–640 MW (band III) and the allowed band is 0–
265 MW also (band I). Band 265–570 MW (band II) at this pressure is not recommended and output
over 640 MW (band IV) is forbidden.[3] On the day of the accident, turbine 2 worked as the plant's
power output regulator and due to this, its output power changed constantly. The turbine often
operated in the band II regime, which is accompanied by pulsation and strokes in the water flow.
Accident
The turbine hall before and after the accident. Turbine No. 2, the one that failed, is visible in the foreground (left
image).
The accident occurred on 17 August 2009 at 08:13 local time (00:13 GMT).[6] There was a loud bang
from turbine 2. The turbine cover shot up and the 920-tonne (910-long-ton; 1,010-short-ton) rotor
then shot out of its seat.[5] After this, water spouted from the cavity of the turbine into the machinery
hall.[7] As a result, the machinery hall and rooms below its level were flooded.[7] At the same time, an
alarm was received at the power station's main control panel, and the power output fell to zero,
resulting in a local blackout. The steel gates to the water intake pipes of the turbines, weighing 150
tonnes (150 long tons; 170 short tons) each, were closed manually by opening the valves with
hydraulic jacks, keeping them up[3][5] between 08:35 [3] and 09:20 hours[8] (09.30 by official
report[3]). The operation took 25 minutes, which is near the minimum time (highest speed) allowed
for this operation.[9] The emergency diesel generator was started at 11:32.[7] At 11:50, the opening of
11 spillway gates of the dam was started and was finished at 13:07.[8] Seventy-five people were later
found dead.[10]
Nine out of the ten turbines were operating at the time, with a total output 4,400 MW.[7] Turbine 6
was undergoing scheduled maintenance, but was ready for a restart.[11]
Oleg Myakishev, a survivor of the accident, described it as follows:[12]
...I was standing upstairs when I heard some sort of growing noise, then I saw the
corrugated turbine cover rise and stand on end. Then I saw the rotor rising from
underneath it. It was spinning. I could not believe my eyes. It rose about three meters.
Rocks and pieces of metal went flying; we started to dodge them... At that point the
corrugated cover was nearly at roof level, and the roof itself had been destroyed... I made a
mental calculation: the water is rising, 380 cubic meters per second, so I took to my heels
and ran for the turbine 10. I thought that I wouldn't make it. I climbed higher, stopped,
looked down, and saw everything getting destroyed, water coming in, people trying to
swim... I thought: someone must urgently shut the gates to stop the water, manually...
Manually, because there was no power, none of the protection systems had worked...
On 9 September 2009 at 17:40 local time (09:40 GMT), a fire started in the turbine hall during repair
works. Around 200 people were evacuated. There were no fatalities or injuries. According to
RusHydro the fire was extinguished "within a few minutes".[13]
Investigation
On 4 October 2009, the official report about Sayano-Shushenskaya hydro accident was published by
the Federal Environmental, Technological and Atomic Supervisory Service (Rostekhnadzor) on its
website.[3] However, later the report and the press release on the report were removed from the
website.
Names of people killed and those who bear responsibility for the accident, and other data including a
historical and technical review about the plant and plans for its future, are given in the report. The
report states that the accident was primarily caused by the turbine vibrations which led to the fatigue
damage of the mountings of the turbine 2, including the cover of the turbine. It was also found that at
the moment of accident at least six nuts were missing from the bolts securing the turbine cover. After
the accident 49 recovered bolts were investigated, of which 41 had fatigue cracks. On 8 bolts, the
fatigue damaged area exceeded 90% of the total cross-sectional area.[3]
According to this report, on 17 August 2009 at 01:20 (local time) there was a fire at the hydroelectric
power station of Bratsk which broke both communications and the automatic driving systems of other
power plants in the region, including Sayano-Shushenskaya. The situation was recovered on 17
August 2009 at 15:03. At 08:12 local time, turbine 2's output power was reduced by the turbine
regulator and it entered into the non-recommended powerband II. Shortly after this, the bolts
keeping the turbine cover in place broke, and under water pressure of about 20 bars (2,000 kPa), the
spinning turbine with its cover, rotor, and upper parts started to move up, destroying machinery hall
installations. At the same time, pressurized water flooded the rooms and damaged plant
constructions.[3]
According to Rostekhnadzor, the automatic shutdown system of the water intake pipes' gates failed
after failure of the turbine 2.[14][15] This accusation was dismissed by Rakurs, the company which
designed the automated safety system for the plant.[16]
Media speculation
According to the newspaper Izvestia, the increased vibration of turbine 2 was going on for some
10 years and was well-known to the plant personnel.[5] According to the former director of
Irkutskenergo, Viktor Bobrovski, the accident could have been caused by an incorrect start-up process
of the turbine which resulted in a hydraulic pressure surge, or excess load of the turbine caused by
peak consumption of electricity. According to Bobrovski, it is common practice in the region to
compensate for a peak load by overloading hydroelectric power plants, and the energy system of the
region is near collapse, as the main goal of its owners is to take out as much profit as possible,
typically by cutting down on maintenance, investment, safety, and educational costs. Since the load
for other turbines ceased after the collapse of the turbine 2, they probably started to spin without load
at increasing speed until they failed.[14] He said that the former director of Sayano-Shushenskaya
hydroelectric power station, Valentin Bryzgalov, had alerted that it is dangerous to operate the plant
at its maximum loads when the turbines are starting to vibrate in the axial direction. He said that the
accident probably would not have had such catastrophic results if the safety systems had worked and
the safety rules had been followed.[14]
The former general director of the plant, Alexander Toloshinov, has said that the accident was most
likely due to a "manufacturing defect" in a turbine.[17] According to Toloshinov, the construction of
the turbine blades of this type of turbine is not very reliable and cracks are known to develop in them
under some working conditions.[18]
On 11 September 2009, RusHydro disputed allegations that the dam overwhelmed the machinery hall
leading to the destruction of turbine 2. According to RusHydro, displacements of the dam are
seasonal and have been reduced in recent years. The maximum displacement (141.5 millimetres or
5.57 inches) was recorded in 2006, which was below the allowed maximum of 145.5 mm (5.73 in).
According to RusHydro, the scope of displacement between the anchor legs and the machinery hall
does not exceed 2.3 mm (0.091 in), which is less than the width between them (50 mm or 2.0 in), and
therefore the dam cannot overwhelm the machinery hall.[19]
On 21 August 2009, a website supporting rebel groups in Chechnya claimed that they were
responsible for the blast, part of a new "economic war" which they were declaring on Russia. These
claims were dismissed by authorities as "idiotic".[20][21]
A November 2010, peer-reviewed article in International Water Power and Dam Construction
suggested a previously unpublicized direct cause for the turbine failures: draft tube waterhammer.[22]
The immediate cause of this is proposed to be simply the too-sudden closure of the turbine wicket
(flow-control) gates. Too-rapid closure results in rupture of the liquid column as the local pressure
downstream of the gates goes to vapor pressure. This frees the draft tube liquid to first surge towards
the tailrace and then reverse, eventually slamming rapidly into the turbine with great force. Only such
a phenomenon seems capable of producing the extremely sudden, extremely large, and extremely
vertical force which is evident from photographic and verbal descriptions of the damage. From the
article:
This hypothesis is that the explosion was caused by water column separation in the draft
tubes of the destroyed units. This condition can readily be caused by a too-rapid wicket
gate closure during unit load rejection. Adjustment of governor times to unsafe values to
achieve fast response to operating load changes may have occurred in recent times in
response to a need to improve grid frequency control. This, combined with compromised
stud connections due to poor maintenance, can explain the extreme violence of this
accident.
A subsequent review for the 10th anniversary of the incident, published by the International
Association for Hydro-Environment Engineering and Research (IAHR),[23] concluded that no
intervening revelations had lessened the feasibility of this explanation.
Rescue operation
After the accident, the spillway was regulated to decrease the water level of the reservoir by 3 to 5
centimetres (1.2 to 2.0 in) per day.[24] Flood water was pumped out from the engine room by
24 August 2009.[25] On 28 August, the search and rescue operation was completed, and the state of
emergency imposed in Khakassia on 17 August 2009, was lifted.[11]
Aftermath
As a result of the accident, 75 people were killed. On 19 August 2009, a mourning day was announced
in Khakassia.[26] RusHydro declared 25 August a day of mourning at the company.[27] A festival in the
city of Abakan on 22 August was canceled.
Due to the accident, the town of Cheryomushki banned the sale of strong alcoholic beverages.[28]
Damage
In addition to turbine 2, turbines 7 and 9 also suffered severe damage and were destroyed, while the
turbine room roof and ceilings fell on and caused additional damage to turbines 1 and 3, with slight
damage to turbines 4, 5, 8, and 10.[29] Turbine 6, which was in scheduled repair at the time of the
accident, received only minor damage and was the only one of the station's 10 turbines that did not
receive electrical damage due to shorting of the associated transformers.[30] Water immediately
flooded the engine and turbine rooms and caused a transformer explosion.[31] Transformers 1 and 2
were destroyed, while transformers 3, 4, and 5 were left in satisfactory condition. Other damage was
also severe as the machinery hall was destroyed, including the roof, ceilings, and floor.
On 9 September 2009, RusHydro announced the damage caused by the incident:
Turbine 6: Flooded
Turbine 5: Flooding and electrical damage
Turbines 3 and 4: Moderate electrical and mechanical damage. Some damage to the concrete
structures around them.
Turbines 1, 8, and 10: Severe electrical and mechanical damage. Some damage to the concrete
structures around them.
Turbines 7 and 9: Completely destroyed, with extreme damage to the concrete structures around
them.
Turbine 2: Destroyed completely, including the concrete structures around it.[8]
Power supply
Power generation from the station ceased completely following the incident. The resulting blackout in
residential areas was alleviated by diverting power from other plants. Aluminium smelters in
Sayanogorsk and Khakassia were completely cut off from the grid before power supplies were
replaced using alternate power sources.[6][32] Power to blacked out areas was fully restored by 19
August 2009.[33] Although smelters continue to work at their normal rate, RUSAL warned that in the
longer term it may lose up to 500,000 tonnes (490,000 long tons; 550,000 short tons) of aluminum
output due to the power shortage, and called for accelerating the construction of the Boguchany
hydroelectric power station to replace the lost generating capacity.[34]
Environmental impact
The accident caused an oil spill, releasing at least 40 tonnes (39 long tons; 44 short tons) of
transformer oil which spread over 80 km (50 mi) downstream of Yenisei.[17][35] The oil, which spilled
during the approximately 2–3 hour cutoff of river flow when all the gates of the dam were closed,
killed 400 tonnes (390 long tons; 440 short tons) of cultivated trout in two riverside fisheries, with its
impact on wildlife as yet unassessed. On 19 August 2009, the 15 km (9.3 mi)-long spill had reached
Ust-Abakan, where it was cordoned off with floating barriers and chemical sorbents.[36] The oil spill
was fully removed by 25 August 2009.[37]
Financial impact
Share prices
Trading in RusHydro shares at the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange was suspended for two
days.[6] After trading resumed on 19 August 2009, the shares dropped 11.4%.[38] On the London Stock
Exchange, the share price dropped more than 15%.[6] It is expected that RusHydro's business losses
will amount to 16.5 billion roubles (US$523 million) by 2013.[39] The power plant was insured for
US$200 million by Russian insurance company ROSNO, part of Allianz group, and re-insured by
Munich Re.[40]
Compensation
The Russian government decided to pay compensation of 1 million rubles (US$31,600) to each
victim's family, and 100,000 rubles (about US$3,100) to each survivor, while RusHydro decided to
pay a further 1 million rubles in compensation.[41] RusHydro also decided to buy housing for
13 families of killed workers with underage children. There are also programs to support these
children in kindergartens and schools and to provide higher education. In addition, a special program
is planned for the reconstruction and development of the Cheryomushki settlement, the main
settlement where the power plant workers live.[42]
Personnel
The director of the plant, Nikolai Nevolko, was replaced by Valerii Kjari.[43] Several people were
awarded for their heroic actions during the accident.[9] Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin,
awarded Juri Salnikov and Oleg Melnitchuck each with an Official Letter of Commendation.[9]
Repairs
At the time, repairs were estimated to take up to four years.[32]
Over 2,000 people were involved in the rescue work and
liquidation of the consequences after the disaster.[44] According to
Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko, the rebuilding of the
engine room alone was estimated to cost 40 billion rubles
(€880 million, US$1.3 billion).[34] Russia's Sberbank agreed to
lend 20 billion rubles (€440 million, US$630 million) for the
repair works.[45] RusHydro also negotiated a loan with the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.[46]
According to RusHydro, turbines 4, 5, and 6 would probably be
repaired. Turbines 7 and 9 were too damaged and are being
disassembled.[47] The machinery hall, heating system, electricity
supply, and sewage tunnels were under repair.[47] As the spillway
works all the time, several methods of preventing the dam from
icing were also under consideration.[48] The machinery hall and
its heating system also underwent repairs. The repair work was
performed continuously, 24 hours a day.[49]
Construction of the station and
assembly of turbine 2
For movement of the spillway well crane КБГС-1000 the spillway
was reduced to 1,105 m3/s (39,000 cu ft/s).[50]
Near the end of 2009, there was an ongoing battle with icing. All
11 spillway gates were opened to 0.5 from the first step. 70 heat
guns with a total output of 1,500 kW were provisionally installed
under part of the recovered machinery hall roof to prevent it from
icing. Chemical (MgCl2 6 H2O) and mechanical methods were also
used against icing.[51]
Repairs on a turbine, in 2011
By 27 December 2009, there were on-going or prepared dismantling of turbines 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and
10. Only turbines 5 and 6 were to be repaired in situ. The other turbines were to be replaced, repaired
in the factory and/or modernized.[52]
Turbine 6 was restarted on 24 February 2010. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin personally
switched turbine 6 to the load. Turbine 5 was brought under load on 22 March.[53]
On 14 April 2010, the process of dismantling turbine 2 and the infrastructure surrounding it was
finished.[54] By the year 2014 all turbines in the plant will be replaced with new ones.[54]
On 30 June 2010, turbine 4 was started without a load to dry its electrical coils, to test it and to
prepare it for switching under load later in 2010.[55] It was fully restarted on 4 August 2010.
By July 2010 the replacement of turbine 3 was underway and expected to be completed in December
2010. The new turbine has better electrical and hydrodynamic characteristics and a 40-year working
life.[56]
On 6 July 2011, a ship loaded with new parts for the turbines left Saint Petersburg.[57]
On 8 July 2011, turbines 3, 4 and 5 were working under full load and turbine 6 was in reserve.[58]
On 11 November 2014 the renovations and repairs were fully completed.
Attack on journalist
It was reported that on 9 September 2009, Novy Fokus Mikhail Afanasyev, the editor of a regional
news website, was attacked and beaten near his house in Abakan. Earlier, he was charged for
"spreading false information and defaming rescuers in his reports" by the local prosecutor's office.
Afanasyev believes that the attack is "probably connected to his articles about the accident".[59]
See also
August curse
List of hydroelectric power station failures
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External links
Photo series of 32 images of the disaster from the Boston Globe's "The Big Picture" online series
(http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2009/09/the_sayanoshushenskaya_dam_acc.html)
Photoessay by Mitya Aleshkovsky (on flickr) (https://www.flickr.com/photos/aleshru/sets/72157622
182129480/)
Investigating the Sayano-Shushenskay Hydro Power Plant Disaster, Power Magazine December
2010, retrieved 2010 12 20 (http://www.powermag.com/issues/features/Investigating-the-SayanoShushenskaya-Hydro-Power-Plant-Disaster_3229.html)
Water hammer causes power plant tragedy (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6hVUeNp3o3M)
RT news YouTube archival footage, uploaded on 18 August 2009 (eyewitness images filmed at
the foot of the dam immediately after the event)
Horror Footage: CCTV cameras catch dam burst (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bfW5MqT7
CSA) RT news YouTube archival footage, uploaded on 9 September 2009 (filmed inside the
dam's turbine hall during the event]
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=SayanoShushenskaya_power_station_accident&oldid=1092537542"
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