Powering the future of mobility: The merger between PSA and FCA .
I
Executive Summary
This report examines the merger between Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) and Peugeot S.A.
(PSA), which resulted in the creation of Stellantis, now one of the largest car manufacturers in the world,
regarding the strategic rationale behind the deal, its financial and operational impacts, the regulatory
challenges involved, stakeholder reactions, and broader lessons this case offers in the automotive industry.
At the time the merger was announced, the auto sector was undergoing major changes.
Companies were under pressure to respond to electrification, digital transformation, environmental
regulations, and intensifying global competition. FCA and PSA brought different strengths to the table. FCA
was heavily concentrated in North America and needed to accelerate its transition to electric vehicles. PSA
had a stronger presence in Europe and was already investing in electrification. Their merger, announced
in 2019 and completed in early 2021 (Stellantis, 2019), was presented as a merger of equals.
Shareholders of both companies became co-owners of the new company, and a new board was formed
with representatives from each side to reflect a balanced governance structure.
The deal aimed to generate substantial synergies. By combining operations, sharing platforms
and suppliers, and simplifying logistics and support functions, the companies projected annual savings of
around five billion euros by 2024 (Barbosa, 2023). In the first few years, Stellantis performed well: profit
margins improved, cost savings exceeded expectations, and the stock rose sharply. However, momentum
soon faded. During 2024, financial and operational indicators began to deteriorate. Profit margins
shrank, free cash flow turned negative, and the company lagged behind competitors in the electric vehicle
segment. Investment in research and development remained low compared to industry leaders (Winton,
2025). Internally, integrating the two firms proved harder than expected. Cultural differences and
overlapping brands created tensions, and those issues came to a head when CEO Carlos Tavares
resigned unexpectedly in December 2024, well before the end of his mandate. This move raised
concerns about internal alignment and strategic clarity (Winton, 2024).
Stakeholder responses reflected the complexity of the deal: shareholders overwhelmingly
supported the merger, seeing its potential to boost competitiveness; unions accepted the plan but
demanded guarantees on jobs and production sites; and regulators, particularly in Europe, raised
concerns over reduced competition in light commercial vehicles. Approval was granted only after
Stellantis agreed to conditions, including cooperation with Toyota and fairer access to repair networks
(European Commission, 2020). While in the first five years the market response was positive, the
company’s share price declined sharply in late 2024. Several smaller brands within the group struggled
to remain competitive, and critics pointed to the lack of a clear innovation strategy.
Although the merger achieved many of its short-term goals, its longer-term impact remains
mixed. In fact, while joining forces gave FCA and PSA the global reach and breathing room they might not
have achieved alone, Stellantis is still striving to define its place in a rapidly evolving industry. Thus,
Stellantis highlights that even well-planned mergers carry real risks, and success relies not just on scale
or cost-cutting, but on cultural alignment, strategic clarity, and adaptability. Moving forward, it is
paramount that Stellantis focuses on innovation, considers trimming underperforming brands, and
pursue smaller and targeted acquisitions that promote technological capabilities without adding
complexity, because in today’s auto industry, staying ahead requires more than size, it demands
intelligence, agility, and a readiness to lead through change.
I
Index
1.
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 2
2.
Case Description ................................................................................................................................. 3
2.1. Companies’ Profiles .............................................................................................................................. 3
2.2. The Deal ............................................................................................................................................... 4
2.3. Market and Industry Context ................................................................................................................ 6
2.4. Main Stakeholder Reactions................................................................................................................. 7
3.
Case Analysis and Discussion ............................................................................................................ 9
3.1. Motivations Behind the Deal ................................................................................................................. 9
3.2. Value Creation vs. Value Destruction ................................................................................................. 12
3.3. Regulatory Challenges ....................................................................................................................... 13
3.4. Market Reaction and Performance ..................................................................................................... 16
4.
Critical Analysis and Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................... 19
References ................................................................................................................................................ 22
Appendix A: Composition of the Board of Directors of Stellantis .............................................................. 28
Appendix B: Number and volume of M&A transactions in the automotive industry by sub-sector ........... 29
Appendix C: Ranking of automotives companies based on their competitive position in ten industry
indicators. .................................................................................................................................................. 30
Appendix D: Stellantis’ economic and financial ratios evolution. ............................................................... 31
List of Figures
Figure 1 Evolution of FCA and PSA stock prices, and PSA trade volume.. .............................................. 16
Figure 2 Evolution of Stellantis shares and Euro STOXX Automobile & Parts. ........................................ 18
Figure 3 Evolution of the shares price of Stellantis and selected peers.................................................... 18
I
1. Introduction
Living in an era marked by technological disruption, regulatory shifts and intensifying global
competition, the automotive industry has emerged as a focal point of economic and strategic
transformation.
Undeniably, this sector frequently captures media and public attention, whether due to trade
disputes, ambitious sustainability goals, or bold corporate moves. Therefore, mergers, acquisitions and
restructuring processes have become increasingly common, as traditional automakers seek to adapt to
evolving market pressures and remain competitive in a rapidly changing landscape.
This report was developed within the scope of the course unit of “Mergers, Acquisitions, and
Restructuring” and centers on one of the most significant merger processes in the recent history of the
automotive sector: the merger between Fiat Chrysler Automobiles and Peugeot S.A. to create Stellantis.
The decision to analyze this case stems from the high relevance of the deal itself, but also from its
broader implications in the industry. Most importantly, the creation of Stellantis, which is now one of the
largest car manufacturers in the world (Ferris, 2024) offers a rich opportunity to examine strategic
motivations, operational and financial synergies, regulatory responses and market dynamics within a
sector undergoing profound transformation.
Structure-wise, the report begins by presenting a detailed overview of the two companies involved
in the deal, the specific terms of the transaction, and the industry context that framed it. This is followed by
an analytical section that explores the underlying drivers of this merger, evaluating its value creation and
value destruction potential, discussing regulatory challenges, and reflecting critically on its performance.
Finally, we conclude with broader considerations on the long-term viability of the deal and the lessons it
offers for broader M&A activity in such a complex, innovative and capital-driven industry.
2
2. Case Description
2.1. Companies’ Profiles
FCA
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. (FCA) emerged on January 2014, from the full merger of Fiat S.p.A.
and Chrysler Group LLC, creating an Italian American automotive powerhouse with twelve heritage brands
spanning mass-market, premium and commercial segments (Fiat Investments N.V., 2014). Headquartered
in London, with its legal seat in the Netherlands, FCA became publicly traded in October 2014 when its
shares began trading on the New York Stock Exchange (Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V., 2014).
Although FCA’s shares were widely held after the October 2014 listing, Exor N.V., the Agnelli
family’s investment vehicle, remained the largest single shareholder with 28.7 percent of the equity and
proportionally greater voting power under FCA’s share class structure. This ensured that Exor continued
to drive FCA’s strategic decisions, from board appointments to capital allocation, alongside a broad base
of institutional and retail investors (Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V., 2014).
Under Chairman John Elkann and CEO Sergio Marchionne, FCA pursued a dual strategy by
leveraging Chrysler’s North American scale to accelerate growth in SUVs and pickups, while revitalizing
its Italian and European brands (Fiat, Alfa Romeo, Lancia) with fresh platforms and electrification initiatives.
In October 2014, it completed the spin-off of Ferrari N.V., raising nearly $10 billion and narrowing FCA’s
focus to core automotive operations (Kreitmair, 2020). In May 2019, it sold Magneti Marelli, FCA’s longstanding auto-parts division, for €5.8 billion to further streamline the group (Cristovão, 2021).
Financially, FCA’s first full stand-alone year demonstrated its scale. Global revenues approached
€110 billion, with adjusted EBIT margins of 6.4 percent in North America rising to 8.8 percent by 2018 on
the strength of Ram Trucks and Jeep launches. By 2019, FCA’s sales were heavily weighted toward North
America, which accounted for €73.8 billion or 68.3 percent of revenues (Gouveia, 2021).
Key managers beyond Marchionne and Elkann included CFO Richard Palmer, who oversaw the
group’s deleveraging from peak net industrial debt to below €5 billion by 2018, and Global Head of Product
Development Dr. Harald Wester, responsible for a streamlined portfolio of 7 plug-in hybrid electric vehicle
(PHEV) and 7 battery electric vehicle (BEV) models launched from 2019 onward (Cristovão, 2021). FCA’s
governance structure featured a 15-member Board, with independent directors forming a majority and welldefined lock up clauses for major shareholders to ensure stability (FCA and Groupe PSA, 2019).
Throughout its five-year run, FCA combined the heritage and design flair of its European brands
with the volume and profitability focus of its American operations, all underpinned by Marchionne’s “WorldClass Manufacturing” ethos and Elkann’s family-driven long-term vision (FCA and Groupe PSA, 2019).
PSA Group
Peugeot S.A. (PSA) is one of France’s most prominent automotive companies. It was officially
formed in 1976 when Peugeot acquired a majority stake in Citroën, bringing the two historic brands under
one umbrella (LiquiSearch, n.d.). Based in France, PSA Group quickly grew into a major player in the
European car industry, producing and distributing passenger cars and light commercial vehicles through
well-known brands like Peugeot, Citroën, Opel, Vauxhall, and DS (European Commission, 2020).
Over time, PSA broadened its operations through strategic acquisitions and partnerships. In
addition to taking over Chrysler’s European subsidiaries earlier in its history (1978), it made a significant
3
move in 2017 by acquiring Opel and Vauxhall from General Motors leading to a successful turnaround of
the two loss-making brands. The deal allowed PSA to stand out as the second European automaker with
2.5 million units sold, trailing only Volkswagen (3.6 million units sold) as of 2016 figures. These deals
helped PSA expand its reach and diversify its offerings. The company also invested in after-sales services,
used car businesses, and international partnerships focused on electric mobility and battery development.
In 2019, PSA sold its remaining stake in Peugeot Motorcycles, officially stepping away from the twowheeler segment (Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V., 2020).
By the end of 2019, PSA operated in over 160 countries and had 17 production plants worldwide,
employing around 209,000 people. The company’s structure was divided into three main business units.
The automotive division was responsible for designing, manufacturing, and selling both passenger and
light commercial vehicles, as well as managing repair services and spare parts. The components division,
led by Faurecia, focused on vehicle interiors, clean mobility, and electronics. PSA also had a financial
services arm, Banque PSA Finance, which operated in 17 countries, primarily through partnerships.
Additional operations were grouped under “Other Businesses,” which included the company’s
holding functions, a 25% stake in the logistics firm GEFCO, and its mobility service brand, Free2Move. In
2019, PSA reported €74.7 billion in revenue and €4.7 billion in operating profit.
PSA’s business remained heavily focused on the European market, which accounted for roughly
86-87% of its total vehicle sales in both 2019 and the first half of 2020. The company operated under a
dual-board governance model, with a Managing Board handling daily operations and a Supervisory Board
overseeing broader strategy. Under French law and PSA’s bylaws, shareholders who held fully paid-up
shares for at least two years were entitled to double voting rights.
At the time of the merger, the CEO of PSA Group was Carlos Tavares. As of November 2020,
PSA’s major shareholders included EPF/FFP and BPI, each holding 12.36% of the company, along with
Dongfeng Motor Group, a Chinese company, which owned 11.24%. Ahead of the merger with Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles, Dongfeng agreed to sell 30.7 million PSA shares, of which 10 million were repurchased and
cancelled by the company itself (Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V., 2020).
2.2. The Deal
Speculations around a potential merger between FCA, Detroit’s third biggest car manufacturer and
PSA, Europe’s second largest, started to arise in March 2019. At the time, FCA had just emerged from a
failed merger attempt with Renault S.A., while PSA had begun actively seeking for a deal to turn the
company into a global player (Noble, 2019). It was clear that both companies were pursuing strategic
partnerships, and in that same month, PSA’s CEO Carlos Tavares and FCA’s CEO Michael Manley met to
discuss the possibility of a business combination (Stellantis, 2019).
Given FCA interest in entering the European market and PSA history of taking American brand
businesses, after assessing the synergies and benefits resulting from this deal, on October 31, 2019, the
companies officially announced an agreement to a merger of equals (Stellantis, 2019), signing the
Combination Agreement on December 17. FCA N.V. was the surviving company in the merger, although
the accounting treatment recognizes PSA as the acquirer. This means that, for financial reporting purposes,
PSA’s assets and liabilities were carried forward, while FCA’s assets and liabilities were remeasured at fair
market value. This reflects PSA’s dominant influence in the transaction, as determined by the management
4
of both companies after assessing the indicators outlined in IFRS 3 and considering all relevant facts and
circumstances (Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V., 2020, p.58). Throughout the following year, the deal
advanced through the necessary regulatory and shareholder approvals. In December 2020, it obtained the
European Commission conditional approval, focused on preserving competition in the light commercial
vehicle market (Murphy, 2021). Shareholders from FCA and PSA approved the merger on January 4, 2021
(Murphy, 2021; Stellantis, 2021).
Before finalizing the merger, FCA would pay a €5.5 billion extraordinary dividend to its
shareholders, while Groupe PSA would distribute its 46% stake in Faurecia to its shareholders. As part of
the merger agreement, both companies planned to distribute an ordinary dividend of €1.1 billion in 2020,
based on their fiscal year 2019 financial results, pending board and shareholder approval. These measures
were intended to equalize the enterprise value of both parties.
Furthermore, following the closing of the deal, FCA planned to spin off its interest in the company
Comau and distribute them to shareholders of the new combined entity. Following the merger, ownership
of the combined PSA-FCA group was expected to reflect existing shareholders in the respective
companies, EXOR N.V. holding approximately 14%, the Peugeot family (EPF/FFP) approximately 6%,
Bpifrance around 6%, and Dongfeng Motor Group 6%, latter eventually being reduced to about 4.5% at
closing (FCA and Group PSA, 2019).
Finally, on January 16th the merger was finalized, culminating in the creation of Stellantis N.V., that
started trading on January 18th (Murphy, 2021; Stellantis, 2021). This deal is best characterized as a
friendly horizontal merger of equals, where two companies, usually competitors, operating in the
automative industry combined with the mutual agreement between the companies’ shareholders. Unlike a
hostile takeover or buyout, both companies agreed upon terms and engaged in open negotiation, being
the deal presented as a partnership rather than a takeover. Therefore, there was no tender offer to
shareholders. Instead, the merger was structured as a stock-for-stock transaction, in which existing shares
of both companies were exchanged for shares in the combined entity, making the shareholders of both
firms co-owners of Stellantis. Which allowed both companies to preserve cash, align long-term interests,
and reduce the tax burden typically associated with cash acquisitions that share swap doesn’t have in
some jurisdictions (DePamphilis, 2021).
As resulting from a merger of equals, Stellantis N.V.’s global scale and resources were owned
equally by Group PSA and FCA shareholders, with 50% ownership for each (Stellantis, 2019). Concerning
shares distribution, PSA shareholders earned 1.742 shares of Stellantis for each share of PSA, while FCA
shareholders had one share of Stellantis for each share of FCA (Noble, 2021). The governance framework
of the company reflected a shared governance structure, with a board of directors composed by 11
members, 5 of each of the companies involved and one independent member (see Appendix A for the full
board). Carlos Tavares, former PSA’s CEO, was elected the CEO of Stellantis, while John Elkann, former
chairman of FCA, become chairman of the group (Cristóvão, 2021).
Despite being a friendly merger, the Combination Agreement included termination fees of €250
million if either party failed to obtain shareholder approval, and €500 million if either party changed its
recommendation. The agreement also contained a clause allowing either party to terminate the
Combination Agreement in the event of a Material Adverse Effect affecting the other party (Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles N.V., 2020).
5
2.3. Market and Industry Context
The global automotive industry is experiencing an era of unprecedented transformation over recent
years. Shaped by technological disruption, environmental imperatives, shifting consumer expectations and
global economic pressures, including the rising of electric vehicle Chinese brands, the sector is undergoing
structural realignment at all levels. These dynamics are compelling companies like Stellantis to embrace
change in order to remain competitive in such an increasingly fast-paced market (Malterer, 2025).
As of 2021, when Stellantis was born, the industry was valued at approximately USD 385.42 billion
and was projected at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.5% through 2028 (Fortune Business
Insight, 2023). Growth in this industry is largely propelled by emerging markets like China and India, while
mature markets such as Europe and North America follow with slower, more stable expansion,
characterized by market saturation and shifting consumer preferences (Barbosa, 2023).
Tendencies wise, electrification stands as the dominant trend shaping the automotive industry. In
the first half of 2021, electric vehicles (EVs) sales rose by 160% compared to the previous year, reflecting
accelerating consumer interest and regulatory pressure (Gouveia, 2021). Governments and automakers
alike are investing heavily to meet rising demand for these vehicles, though adoption remains constrained
by factors such as charging infrastructure gaps, technological concerns, price premiums, and battery
material scarcity (DQS Holding, 2025; Hertzke et al., 2025; Malterer, 2025).
The intensifying global competition in the automotive sector is also undeniable. Incumbents such
as Toyota, Volkswagen and Stellantis are adapting their portfolios and manufacturing platforms to include
a broader range of electrified vehicles and accompany the unprecedent changes in the industry.
Simultaneously, newer entrants, particularly Chinese automakers like BYD, are reshaping the competitive
landscape by offering technologically advanced, cost-efficient EVs, often benefiting from integrated
domestic supply chains and substantial state support (Priddle, 2025).
While firms are investing in transformation, they also contend with considerable systemic
challenges, most of which cannot be foreseen. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical
tensions have exposed vulnerabilities in global supply chains and disrupted international markets.
Additionally, shortages of critical inputs, like semiconductors and lithium for batteries, have led to
production slowdowns and increased costs which undeniably reflect on automotives’ prices (Malterer,
2025; Barbosa, 2023).
Trade policies and regulatory shifts further complicate the operating environment within this
industry. Recently, the US has raised tariffs and imposed new trade restrictions that disproportionately
affect the automotive sector, increasing component costs and introducing policy uncertainty (Brinley, 2025;
Priddle, 2025). Simultaneously, the European Union’s ambitious climate legislation, including greenhouse
gases emissions targets for new passenger cars, exerts pressure on manufacturers to scale zero-emission
vehicle production or face significant penalties (Malterer, 2025; ACEA, 2025).
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) factors have also become essential components of
strategic planning across the industry. Most importantly, transparency and accountability are rising in
importance as companies respond to investor demands and emerging regulatory frameworks such as the
EU’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (DQS Holding, 2025).
Notwithstanding, digitalization and AI are also reshaping the automotive value chain. In fact, AI
applications are enabling predictive maintenance, autonomous driving capabilities, while also improving
6
manufacturing efficiency through real-time data analysis and quality control (Malterer, 2025). However, the
increasing reliance on connected software systems also introduces cybersecurity vulnerabilities,
demanding greater investment in digital risk mitigation (Malterer, 2025).
Looking into production, sales and trade figures, these paint a picture of both recovery and
transformation in the global automotive industry. In 2024, car production climbed to 75.5 million units
worldwide and sales trends mirrored production, with global vehicles sales reaching 74.6 million units
(ACEA, 2025; ACEA, 2024).
The competitive structure of the industry remains consolidated, with ten largest automakers
dominating global sales and revenue. In Europe, the Volkswagen Group held the largest market share at
26.3% in 2024, followed by Stellantis at 15.1% (Bekker, 2025).
Additionally, although the automotive market is characterized by the presence of dominant players,
there is also a persistent trend of mergers, acquisitions and restructuring processes within the industry
(Correa et al., 2025). Notably, the number of M&A transactions in the global automotive sector more than
doubled between 2000 and 2019, and impressively, nearly 40% of all automotive industry mergers were
driven by acquisition processes in China (Wambach & Elbert, 2021).
Furthermore, horizontal mergers, such as the one in analysis, have been shown to drive
consolidation further upstream in the supply chain, thereby enhancing the market power of the involved
firms. Importantly, research suggests that mergers, consolidations, and other acquisition processes among
automotive firms often follow similar movements among their key customers, indicating patterns of M&A
activity moving up the supply chain (Gogoi, 2025).
This growing concentration of market power can further exacerbate existing challenges in the
industry, including rising input costs, electrification pressures (as mentioned above), regulatory demands,
and the need for sustained and substantial investment. As a result, smaller suppliers may struggle to
compete and, ultimately, loose their market shares to massive players. Therefore, the automotive industry
is marked by increasing market concentration and intensifying competitive tensions, dynamics that
companies must learn to navigate in order to maintain their market position and remain competitive
(Matthew, 2025) (please see Appendix B for more M&A data).
All in all, the automotive industry operates at the intersection of technological advancement,
regulatory transformation, and economic volatility. Strategic success increasingly depends on a firm’s
capacity to balance innovation, cost-efficiency and regulatory compliance while responding flexibly to
macroeconomic and geopolitical shifts. Most importantly, as competition intensifies and consumers
preferences evolve, agility, sustainability and digital integration will define the next era of mobility.
2.4. Main Stakeholder Reactions
The reactions of key stakeholder groups to the FCA-PSA merger played a crucial role in shaping
both the immediate outcomes of the deal and the long-term success of Stellantis. Their support or
resistance influenced negotiation dynamics, affected the integration process, and helped determine the
strategic direction of the newly formed company, which are issues that will be analysed in this section of
the report.
7
•
Shareholders
On January 4, 2021, the shareholders of FCA and Groupe PSA approved the merger at their
respective extraordinary general meetings, with over 99% of the votes cast in favour (Stellantis, 2021).
This outcome reflected the strategic fit between the companies, but also the strong support previously
expressed by long-term shareholders such as EXOR N.V., the Peugeot family group, and Bpifrance.
However, as these shareholders were also represented on the board of directors, they had an additional
interest in securing the deal, one that may not have fully aligned with the views or interests of minority
shareholders who lacked board representation.
Nevertheless, this level of approval exceeded the legal thresholds for implementing a squeeze-out
in several jurisdictions, typically between 90% and 95%. In this case, the merger was governed by
European corporate laws: Dutch law for FCA (a Dutch-domiciled company) and French law for PSA. If a
squeeze-out mechanism had been required, it could have been initiated under the applicable national
corporate law of these two countries.
•
Unions and employees
French unions representing PSA workers approved the merger "under vigilance," seeking clear
guarantees on plant investments and assurances against forced redundancies. Most union representatives
acknowledged that the project seems reasonable because the two groups are complementary, financially
healthy, and, through the merger, will achieve the critical scale necessary in today’s automotive industry
(Willems, 2019).
For example, concerns over French jobs and manufacturing contributed to the collapse of the
proposed merger between FCA and Renault earlier in 2019 due to opposition from the French government
(Willems, 2019). Similarly, German and American workers supported the deal but demanded binding
commitments on production sites and wage protections (Reuters, 2019). Furthermore, employee buy-in
can be critical to post-merger integration, helping to prevent strikes, reduce talent loss, and bridge
differences between corporate and workplace cultures.
•
Media Coverage
In general, media coverage of the merger was favourable. The financial press highlighted the
creation of the world’s fourth-largest automaker by volume, emphasizing the potential for cost synergies,
geographic complementarity, and joint electrification strategies, all seen as contributing positively to
performance and global competitiveness. However, some analysts raised concerns about the merger’s
ability to deliver a sustainable competitive advantage. Critical voices also emerged, with some
commentators questioning whether this might turn out to be one of the worst mergers of the decade,
arguing that it involved the combination of two companies seen as laggards in innovation joining forces to
address some of the most complex technological and environmental challenges the automotive sector has
faced in over a century (Strategic Intelligence, 2019). For instance, FCA ranked 53rd and PSA 54th out of
55 companies in GlobalData’s thematic scoredcard for the automotive sector (please see Appendix C for
complete ranking) (Strategic Intelligence, 2019). Others warned that the increased structural complexity of
the new entity could hinder focus on R&D and innovation, as management might prioritize cost savings
over long-term strategic investment, potentially leading to strategic myopia (Knowledge at Wharton, 2020).
8
•
Debtholders
The announcement of the merger had a positive impact on the credit ratings of both FCA and PSA,
as market expectations pointed to improved performance and a stronger financial profile for the combined
entity (Fitch Ratings, 2019). This positive credit momentum continued under Stellantis, until recent
assessments (S&P Global, 2025).
For instance, on November 4, 2019, Moody’s revised the outlook for FCA’s Ba1 rating from stable
to positive, reflecting the potential for a stronger credit profile for the merged FCA-PSA group compared to
FCA’s standalone position. While PSA’s Baa3 rating and its stable outlook remained unchanged following
the signing of the binding combination agreement, Moody’s noted that successful execution of the merger
would likely strengthen PSA’s position within the Baa3 rating category. However, Moody’s also cautioned
that the merger process would be long and complex, with remaining uncertainties in the context of a
challenging global automotive market in 2020 and beyond.
Subsequently, on January 12, 2021, Moody’s Investors Service upgraded FCA N.V.’s issuer rating
from Ba1 to Baa3 and upgraded the rating on bonds issued or guaranteed by FCA from Ba2 to Baa3. This
transition from speculative grade to investment grade signalled a lower risk of default and made the
securities more attractive to conservative investors. This trend continued following the merger with Moody’s
upgrading Stellantis’s rating to Baa2 on August 5, 2022, affirming the group's enhanced creditworthiness
and continued positive performance.
3. Case Analysis and Discussion
3.1. Motivations Behind the Deal
Academic literature identifies several core motivations for M&A processes, particularly in sectors
characterized by high capital intensity, rapid technological change and global competition, which define the
automotive industry. Most importantly, M&A are seen as strategic instruments through which firms seek to
reshape their competitive position, diversify their scope, respond to external pressures and unlock new
sources of value (Candra et al., 2021).
Among the most prominent motives for horizontal M&A processes is the pursuit of operational
synergies, including economies of scale and scope, which reduce unit costs and improve efficiency through
resource integration. Notwithstanding, firms may also seek financial synergies, such as improved access
to capital, risk diversification and tax advantages (Armstrong et al., 2025; Candra et al., 2021).
However, not all M&A activity is driven by purely rational or economically sound motives.
Behavioural and agency-based theories suggest that some deals may be influenced by managerial hubris,
where executives overestimate their ability to extract value from a transaction; or managerialism, in which
M&As are pursued to serve personal interests such as power, job security or compensation rather than
increasing shareholder value. In such cases, transactions may be driven by strategic misalignment, poor
due diligence, or even disregard for long-term performance (Armstrong et al., 2025; Candra et al., 2021).
While the merger between FCA and PSA was officially presented as a rational response to strategic
and industry-wide imperatives, a deeper look at the negotiation dynamics suggests that personal interests
may have subtly influenced the structure and timing of the deal. Notably, the leadership of both companies
9
- particularly John Elkann of FCA’s side and Carlos Tavares on PSA’s - played significant roles in steering
the deal in directions that aligned not only with corporate strategy, but also with personal legacies and
governance preferences (Piovaccari, 2021).
John Elkann, Chairman of FCA and heir to the influential Agnelli family, initially rejected PSA’s
acquisition-style proposal, which would have involved a substantial dividend to FCA shareholders followed
by a share-based takeover. This resistance reflected a concern that the deal would significantly dilute FCA
shareholder influence and reduce his own role in the combined group (Fontanella-Khan, 2019). In this light,
Elkann’s insistence on a merger-of-equals structure, and his eventual confirmation as Chairman of
Stellantis, may be interpreted as both a defense of FCA’s autonomy and a preservation of his personal
legacy. Hence, while these motives are not necessarily in conflict with shareholder interests, they illustrate
how self-preservation and influence retention can shape major strategic decisions (Piovaccari, 2021).
On PSA’s side, CEO Carlos Tavares also demonstrated a degree of strategic manoeuvring that
suggests a blend of professional ambition and tactical leadership positioning. Prior to resuming talks with
PSA, FCA had engaged in an advanced merger discussion with Renault. However, those negotiations
abruptly collapsed in June 2019, in part due to political resistance from the French state, which held a
significant stake in Renault (Kollewe, 2019). At that time, Tavares publicly criticized the FCA-Renault deal
as a “virtual takeover” of Renault, possibly fuelling concerns within the French government and contributing
to the deal’s failure (Nussbaum, 2019). Though PSA was not directly involved in those negotiations,
Tavares intervention appeared calculated to indirectly block the Renault option and position PSA as a more
politically palatable alternative.
When the FCA-PSA talks resumed, the structure of the deal had evolved. While publicly branded
as a merger of equals, several aspects of the agreement, such as the special dividend to FCA shareholders
and the spin-off of Faurecia, as explained previously in this report, revealed economic concessions made
to secure agreement and facilitate governance continuity (Market Screener, 2020). From a financial
perspective, PSA arguably accepted less favourable terms in exchange for ensuring that Tavares would
lead the new entity as CEO, thereby maintaining operational control and long-term strategic influence.
Thus, this trade-off suggests elements of managerialism, where executive ambition and role continuity may
weight as heavily as shareholder return (Armstrong et al., 2025; Candra et al., 2021).
Moreover, the deal’s structure hints at a degree of hubris, especially on PSA’s side. In fact, Tavares
confidence in his ability to extract value through integration and synergy realization may have led PSA to
accept a governance and financial structure skewed in FCA’s favour, banking on operational gains to
outweigh immediate economic imbalances. Most importantly, this belief aligns with literature on managerial
overconfidence, where past success such as PSA’s turnaround of Opel, may inflate expectations in
complex, cross-border mergers (Armstrong et al., 2025). While FCA’s leadership also defended its interest,
the greater economic and integration risks appear to have been absorbed by PSA, indicating that hubris
and overconfidence may have partially shaped the final agreement.
Another central rationale for the merger was the complementarity of market footprints and product
portfolios. For instance, FCA had a dominant position in North and Latin America, with brands such as
Jeep and Dodge excelling in the SUV and pickup segments. PSA, in contrast, was heavily concentrated
in Europe, particularly in the small and mid-sized vehicle markets with brands like Peugeot and Citroën.
Hence, this geographic and segmental complementarity allowed for expansion with minimal overlap,
allowing PSA to enter American markets through FCA’s well-established dealership network, while
10
enabling FCA to strengthen its foothold in the European market and navigate its regulatory frameworks
through PSA’s established presence (Barbosa, 2023; Cristóvão, 2021).
Economies of scale and other operational synergies represented another major pillar of the
merger, with Stellantis projected synergies of approximately €5 billion annually by 2024. PSA’s modular
production platforms which support both internal combustion and electric powertrains, became a key asset
for Stellantis, enabling the company to reduce product development costs and improve manufacturing
flexibility across its brand portfolio. Furthermore, joint procurement activities, especially in areas like battery
and software sourcing, allowed for better negotiation terms and broader supplier access. Adding to that,
duplicated functions in regions where both groups had a presence, such as logistics, marketing, IT, and
HR, were rationalized, driving further operational efficiency (Barbosa, 2023; Stellantis, 2019; Gouveia,
2021).
The technological landscape in the automotive industry, marked by stricter emissions regulations
and increasing demand for electrified mobility, also framed the rationale for the deal. PSA was significantly
more advanced in EVs development than FCA at the time of the merger. Since 2019, PSA had been
introducing electrified variants of all new models, with plans to offer a fully electrified portfolio by 2025.
FCA, by comparison, had lagged in electrification and had faced penalties for non-compliance with
European emissions standards. Thus, the merger granted FCA immediate access to PSA’s electric vehicle
infrastructure and enabled the newly formed Stellantis to develop a robust environmental strategy without
relying on the purchase of carbon credits, as FCA had done prior to the deal (Barbosa, 2023; Gouveia,
2021).
Leadership alignment and execution capabilities further supported the viability of the merger. Both
groups brought considerable experience in restructuring and M&A processes. Most notably, FCA’s
successful revival of Chrysler from bankruptcy, provided valuable experience in restoring financial health
and operational stability. PSA also demonstrated turnaround capabilities in its acquisition and integration
of Opel, a company that while not bankrupt, had been loss-making for years prior to being absorbed by
PSA. Consequently, the FCA-PSA merger leveraged this background to establish a unified operational
model without resorting to plant closures, while ensuring a smoother transition and continuity for the
workforce (Cristóvão, 2021).
At the macro level, the merger responded to mounting industry pressures, including high fixed
costs, intense global competition, and the need for heavy R&D investment to keep pace with evolving
technologies. Stellantis, with combined annual sales of over 8.7 million vehicles, acquired the scale
necessary to compete with automotive giants like Volkswagen, Toyota, and General Motors. The enlarged
group could then diversify risk across multiple regions and vehicle segments, reinforcing its resilience
against market volatility. The merged entity also benefited from a balanced governance structure, with
representation from both legacy companies and a majority of independent directors on the board, further
emphasizing the deal’s strategic and deliberate nature (Stellantis, 2019; Barbosa, 2023).
Shedding light on the above, the creation of Stellantis reflects a strategic response to evolving
industry dynamics, built on a geographic and technological complementarity, cost efficiency and regulatory
alignment. Yet, beneath the surface, the deal also illustrates how large-scale M&A transactions can be
subtly shaped by executive self-interest, leadership ambition and overconfidence, reminding us that
personal motivations can coexist with, and even reinforce, strategic logic.
11
3.2. Value Creation vs. Value Destruction
As previously addressed in the report, the merger of PSA Group and Fiat Chrysler Automobiles
was built on the promise of significant synergies and the creation of an industrial champion in terms of
scale, technology and geographic reach. Combining PSA’s strong European presence with FCA’s North
American leadership unlocked the potential for substantial cost reductions and revenue enhancements.
Technology, product and platform-related savings are expected to account for approximately 40% of the
total EUR 3.7bn in annual synergies, while purchasing, benefiting principally from scale and best price
alignment, will represent a further estimated 40% of the synergies. (FCA and Groupe PSA, 2019; Singh,
2020). Other areas, including marketing, IT, G&A and logistics, will account for the remaining 20%. These
synergy estimates are not based on any plant closures resulting from the transaction. It is projected that
the estimated synergies will be net cash flow positive from year 1 and that approximately 80% of the
synergies will be achieved by year 4 (FCA and Groupe PSA, 2019; Forbes, 2020).
Although not the primary rationale for the deal, another potential source of value creation lies in
the improvement of credit ratings, which can reduce the cost of debt financing. As DePamphilis (2021)
notes, access to lower-cost capital post-merger often results from perceived improvements in financial
strength and creditworthiness. A stronger balance sheet and lower operational leverage driven by improved
profitability (e.g., higher EBIT margins) and reduced business risk through broader geographic
diversification can lead to a lower weighted average cost of capital (WACC). This enhances financial
flexibility by increasing debt capacity and cash reserves, ultimately contributing to higher firm valuation.
Furthermore, the merger creates opportunities for tax optimization. The integration of PSA into a Dutchdomiciled entity (Stellantis) allows the group to benefit from the Netherlands’ more favourable corporate
tax environment compared to France. These mechanisms further support long-term value creation by
improving net cash flows and reducing effective tax rates.
However, the very factors that underpin cross-border value creation also carry risks of value
destruction. Bringing together two long-established carmakers across different continents created a
“double culture” challenge. Not only must management harmonize different corporate cultures, but they
must also overcome the liability of foreignness, which encompasses unfamiliarity with local market
environments, potential discrimination from host-country stakeholders and additional coordination costs
across time zones and regulatory regimes (Meli, 2021).
Additionally, governance structure complexities, given diverse major shareholders, may pose
coordination risks despite balanced executive leadership with Carlos Tavares as CEO and John Elkann as
Chairman. Nevertheless, strategic advantages include PSA’s facilitated re-entry into the U.S. market and
potential revitalization of legacy brands such as Chrysler, leveraging PSA’s technological strengths
(CreditGroup, 2020).
Cultural differences are also a significant factor in merger failures, as suggested by survey data
and anecdotal evidence, as well as discussions in the Organizational Behavior, Economics, and Finance
literatures. In line with the arguments of Xu (2012) and Bouwman (2013), any long-term underperformance
of Stellantis could partly reflect a "cultural mismatch" discount, underscoring the importance of effective
cultural integration in realizing the full value of cross-border mergers.
Due to the merger, market competition concerns emerged, triggering a European Commission
investigation, particularly in the commercial vehicle segment. Although approved, the merger theoretically
12
risks industry-wide reductions in total innovation investment and could lead to higher EV prices, adversely
affecting consumers.
The deal also closed in the middle of a global pandemic, which destabilized supply chains, caused
semiconductor shortages, and led to volatile currencies, putting the planned savings at risk (Detroit News,
2021). Historical evidence shows that large-scale deals often produce only modest initial share-price gains
before underperforming in later years, which could happen in the merger in analysis (Meli, 2021). In fact,
in the automotive sector, the troubled Daimler-Chrysler merger and the more successful Renault-Nissan
alliance demonstrate that meticulous execution, strong cultural alignment and prior M&A experience are
crucial to transforming projected synergies into lasting value (Barbosa, 2023; Automotive Manufacturing
Solutions, n.d.).
Finally, the merger´s financial terms and behavioral biases also influenced its value. The agreed
share swap implied that PSA shareholders received a premium of 20-30 percent over pre-announcement
market prices, broadly in line with industry norms, but high enough to raise questions about potential
overpayment (Detroit News, 2019). Under asymmetric information and competitive bidding, the “winner’s
curse” describes how the acquiring party, in this case PSA, can end up overpaying for its partner, here
FCA, by bidding beyond realistic synergy-adjusted values. While this results in an immediate gain for PSA
shareholders via the 20-30 percent premium, it can erode long-term value for FCA’s investors if the
anticipated synergies fail to materialize (Meli, 2021). Notably, both PSA and FCA were led by turnaround
experienced leaders, Carlos Tavares and Mike Manley, whose success may have fostered overconfidence
in their ability to capture and execute those synergies, potentially amplifying hubris risk (Cristóvão, 2021).
Nevertheless, the sizeable one-time costs, the complexity of post-merger integrations (including
subsequent spin-offs of Faurecia and Comau) and the necessity of capturing full synergies in electrification
and autonomous technologies all highlight the persistent tension between strategic ambition and the
practical realities of mega-merger execution (Kreitmair, 2020).
3.3. Regulatory Challenges
Horizontal mergers often raise red flags for regulators, especially when it comes to competition.
Authorities are more likely to step in when a merger would lead to high market concentration. On the other
hand, they're less likely to intervene if there’s strong competition from imports, low barriers to entry, if
existing players can ramp up production, or if the deal is clearly driven by efficiency gains (Gao et al.,
2017). As DePampillis (2021) points out, horizontal mergers tend to face the most scrutiny because they
can boost market power and increase industry concentration.
In this analysis, we will focus on the role of antitrust regulation in assessing and addressing these
potential risks but will not cover anti-takeover regulation, as it was not of significative relevance due to the
nature of the transaction, conducted through mutual agreement between both parties.
Cross-border mergers, such as the one that led to the creation of Stellantis, are subject to
competition assessments in multiple jurisdictions, each with its own legal standards and thresholds. The
EU, UK, and US apply different approaches to antitrust regulation, which can result in divergent decisions
for the same transaction. This is because antitrust reviews do not follow a single model, they can be
conducted under different frameworks depending on the country, such as the SLC test (used in the US and
UK) or the SIEC test (used in the European Union). In the specific case of the FCA-PSA merger, the deal
13
was notified to antitrust authorities worldwide, including in China, Japan, South Africa, the US, and Brazil,
and was approved in most of these jurisdictions, sometimes with conditions (Slaughter and May, 2021).
However, this report focuses on the European Union, as it was the jurisdiction where the approval process
was most complex and demanding, raising significant concerns and requiring specific commitments.
Furthermore, the EU is also one of Stellantis’s largest markets in terms of sales volume, making it a
particularly relevant region for competition analysis.
The legal entity with the most direct influence on the FCA-PSA merger was the European
Commission, specifically the Directorate-General for Competition (DG Competition) (European
Commission, 2020). Its main role was to assess whether the merger would significantly impede effective
competition within the European Economic Area (EEA) or in any substantial part of it.
The European Commission raised concerns about reduced competition in the market for light
commercial vehicles (vans) under 3.5 tonnes in the EEA, particularly in countries where PSA or FCA
already hold strong positions. The merger would result in high market shares, especially in smaller van
segments with fewer competitors, giving the new entity a significant advantage. Preliminary findings
showed that PSA and FCA had been direct competitors, often pricing similarly. Their merger would remove
this competitive pressure, potentially leading to higher prices. The Commission also noted high entry
barriers in this market, such as the need for extensive service networks, making it hard for new players to
enter. This, combined with fewer direct competitors, raised concerns about weakened competition and
harm to consumers. Due to these initial concerns, the Commission launched a second in-depth
investigation on the deal that was called Phase II (Slaughter and May, 2021).
This second investigation focused on competition issues, particularly in the market for light
commercial vehicles (LCVs) under 3.5 tonnes in nine EEA Member States (European Commission, 2020).
The concern was especially relevant in countries such as Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, and the UK,
where either PSA or FCA already held leading market positions. During the assessment of the merger, the
Commission applied the SIEC test (Significant Impediment to Effective Competition), as set out under the
EU merger control framework. This test, which evaluates whether a merger might substantially reduce
effective competition, was clearly used by the Commission when analysing the potential unilateral effects
of the deal in the LCV segment. The investigation revealed that in many of the affected countries, the two
companies held very high combined market shares and were close competitors. This raised concerns that
the merger would eliminate a key competitive constraint, potentially resulting in higher prices and fewer
choices for consumers (Slaughter and May, 2021).
Another critical concern identified by the Commission was the existence of high barriers to entry
and expansion in the Light Commercial Vehicles (LCV) market. The need for an extensive and established
service network makes it difficult for new players to enter and compete at scale. Combined with the already
limited number of direct competitors, this further reinforced fears of reduced competition and adverse
effects on prices. It's worth noting that no remedies were proposed by the companies during the Phase I
review (Slaughter and May, 2021).
To address the Commission's concerns and secure approval, FCA and PSA submitted a package
of commitments (remedies). The first involved strengthening the existing partnership between PSA and
Toyota Motor Europe, whereby PSA would continue to manufacture LCVs for Toyota, sold under the Toyota
brand, mainly within the EU. This agreement included an increase in production capacity for Toyota and a
reduction in transfer prices for vehicles, parts, and accessories. The second commitment consisted of
14
amending existing repair and maintenance agreements for both passenger cars and light commercial
vehicles, to ensure that rival operators would have fairer access to FCA and PSA’s service networks.
The Commission found that the first commitment would enable Toyota to remain an effective
competitor against the newly merged entity, while the second would help facilitate market entry and
expansion by new players. So, these commitments were considered sufficient to preserve effective
competition in the market after the merger, according to the Commission (Slaughter and May, 2021).
In its final decision, the Commission concluded that the transaction, as modified by the
commitments, would no longer raise serious competition concerns within the EEA or any substantial part
of it (Slaughter and May, 2021). Specifically, the Commission assessed potential vertical effects and
determined that the parties would neither have the ability nor the incentive to engage in input foreclosure
(blocking access to essential components) or customer foreclosure (restricting access to customers), in
ways that could significantly harm upstream or downstream competition (European Commission, 2021).
The decision was taken under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the “Merger Regulation”) and Article
57 of the EEA Agreement (European Commission, 2020).
Although the FCA-PSA merger was approved, it’s important to note that not all mergers receive
clearance, especially if the remedies proposed are insufficient. A notable example is the Siemens-Alstom
case, which the Commission blocked. It was found that the deal would have significantly harmed
competition in the markets for railway signaling systems and high-speed trains by combining the two largest
suppliers in Europe, both of which were also global leaders. The merger would have created an undisputed
market leader in certain signaling segments and a dominant player in high-speed trains, reducing
competition and limiting customer choice. In this case, the proposed remedies were deemed inadequate
to address the raised issues. Hence, this case highlights that when applying the SIEC test, the Commission
is fully prepared to prohibit mergers that pose a substantial threat to competition (European Commission,
2019).
Another significant regulatory challenge for FCA, PSA and the combined company was compliance
with stringent environmental standards, particularly the CO₂ emission targets imposed by the European
Union. These regulations require automakers to reduce fleet-wide average emissions, with substantial
financial penalties for non-compliance. For instance, FCA entered into an agreement with Tesla in 2019 to
pool fleet emissions, paying hundreds of millions of euros to access Tesla’s zero-emission credits in order
to meet regulatory requirements (Morris, 2019).
Although Stellantis invested heavily in electrification following the merger, leveraging PSA’s EV
capabilities to better meet emissions targets without solely depending on pooling, the company remains in
a credit pooling arrangement as of 2025. This ongoing reliance illustrates the continued regulatory pressure
and the need to invest in cleaner products and operations (Reuters, 2025).
Thus, compliance is a key driver of R&D investments, alongside the need to respond to evolving
consumer preferences. The merger had to address not only market competitiveness but also future
regulatory expectations, establishing environmental compliance as both a strategic and regulatory
imperative.
15
3.4. Market Reaction and Performance
Most empirical studies examining the effect of M&A announcements on stock prices find that target
firms typically experience a significant increase in stock value, while acquiring firms often exhibit either
negative or statistically insignificant positive returns (Kellner, 2024). Positive abnormal returns for both the
target and the acquirer can be attributed to anticipated benefits from the transaction. In this context, the
synergy hypothesis suggests that the combined entity is expected to operate more efficiently and profitably
than the individual firms could on their own (Kellner, 2024).
Starting with the evolution of the share prices of FCA and PSA over the two years leading up to
the closing of the merger. In Figure 1 are highlighted the major announcements and key events related to
the merger that will be analyzed in this section.
Figure 1 Evolution of FCA (yellow) and PSA (blue) stock prices, and PSA trade volume, between 15-Jan-2019 and
15-Jan-2021. Source: Refinitiv.
On May 27, 2019, FCA announced that it had delivered a non-binding letter to the board of Groupe
Renault proposing a combination of their respective businesses as a 50/50 merger, following discussions
between the two companies. As a result, the discussions between PSA and FCA ceased. PSA shares
dropped 3.25%, rebounding the next day (+4.62%), while FCA shares jumped by almost 8%, correcting in
the next five days.
On October 29, 2019, The Wall Street Journal and, over the following days, several other media
outlets reported that PSA and FCA were engaged in discussions regarding a potential business
combination. The initial reaction from the market was positive with PSA shares surging by 4.53% and FCA
shares 9.9%. However, after the merger was officially announced on October 31 and all the main terms of
the deal made public FCA shares surged by another 8.24%, while PSA shares dropped 12.86%, a typical
market reaction for the acquiring company. This indicates that, although the deal was publicly framed as a
merger of equals, with the two companies going out of their way to make their combination as equal as
possible, shedding assets, paying special dividends and distributing board seats, investors saw PSA as
paying a premium to acquire FCA. Market reactions and deal structure suggest that PSA acted as the
actual buyer, taking on greater risk and making more financial concessions (Ebhardt & Nussbaum, 2019).
Even though both sides officially described the transaction as a “merger of equals” in governance
and equity terms, PSA effectively paid a 32% premium to assume control of FCA, considering market
capitalizations of approximately €20 billion for FCA and €22.6 billion for PSA (Ebhardt & Nussbaum, 2019).
Such a large upfront payment suggests that PSA may have been overpaying, consistent with the hubris
16
hypothesis of corporate takeovers, which posits that managers sometimes overestimate their ability to
generate post-merger synergies (Roll, 1986; Malmendier & Tate, 2005), especially when they have a
successful track record, as was the case here. Moreover, this willingness to pay a substantial premium can
also reflect self-interest motivations or empire-building behavior, where executives pursue large
transactions to expand their personal power and prestige rather than to maximize shareholder value
(Jensen, 1986).
On December 18, 2019, prior to the opening of European trading markets, PSA and FCA issued a
joint press release announcing the signing of the Combination Agreement, with the market reacting
positively and PSA shares rose by 1.36%. However, some of the effects may have already been priced in
earlier. Starting on December 12, PSA shares began to show a positive trend, and on December 13, trading
volume reached a record high, which could suggest a possible leakage of information prior to the official
announcement.
In August 2020, the merger agreement was revised, reducing FCA’s special dividend from the
initially planned €5.5 billion to €2.9 billion. Additionally, it was agreed that the proceeds from the sale of
Faurecia would be distributed to all Stellantis shareholders after the merger, rather than exclusively to PSA
shareholders as originally planned. These adjustments allowed Stellantis to retain an additional €2.6 billion
in cash on its balance sheet in 2021, thereby strengthening its financial position. It was also agreed that
the Boards of both Groupe PSA and FCA would consider either a €500 million distribution to each
company’s shareholders prior to closing, or alternatively, a €1 billion distribution to all Stellantis
shareholders following the closing. Ultimately, they chose the latter option, with the €1 billion distribution
executed on April 15, 2021. The announcement of the amendment to the Combination Agreement was
made on September 14, 2020. Following the news, PSA shares initially rose by 2.16% but declined
cumulatively by more than 10% over the subsequent four days. In contrast, FCA shares jumped 8.8% on
the announcement day, before correcting over the following four trading sessions. Therefore, once again
the terms of the deal were perceived as more negative to PSA shareholders.
The European Commission cleared up the merger on December 21, 2020. On that day, PSA
shares dipped by 1.89% but rebounded the following day with a gain of 2.71%. Notably, on the previous
trading day (December 18), more than 100 million PSA shares were traded, more than double the average
volume and approximately 3 million more than on the day of official approval. A similar price and volume
pattern was observed in FCA shares, potentially indicating again a leakage of information prior to the formal
announcement.
When Stellantis began trading on January 18, 2021, its shares opened positively, with both the
FTSE MIB and CAC 40 responding favorably to the scale of the new combined entity and its announced
dividend policy (Smith, 2021).
In its first year, Stellantis shares rose by 53.43%, eventually peaking on March 25, 2024 representing a total increase of 134% since the merger took effect. However, the most recent year has
been notably negative, with the stock declining by 68% from its peak and falling approximately 25% below
its initial trading value.
Figure 2 illustrates the performance of Stellantis shares relative to the Euro STOXX Automobiles
& Parts index. For most of the period observed, Stellantis' performance tracked closely with the sector
benchmark. However, a noticeable divergence began in the second quarter of 2024, following the
company's strongest quarter since 2021. This pattern may suggest that the synergies initially anticipated
17
from the merger have started to diminish, potentially indicating a failure to secure a sustainable competitive
advantage within the industry. This observation aligns with findings from Martynova and Renneboog
(2008), whose broad review of merger waves revealed that many acquisitions result in negative abnormal
returns for acquiring firms over the long term. However, it is important to note that assessing long-run
performance post-merger is empirically challenging, as it requires extended event windows and must
account for various confounding factors that can influence firm performance beyond the transaction itself.
Figure 2 Evolution of Stellantis shares (blue) and Euro STOXX Automobile & Parts (white), between January 18,
2021, and June 6, 2025. Source: Refinitiv.
Figure 3 compares Stellantis' performance with a selected group of peers, including Ford, General
Motors, and Volkswagen. The chart shows that Stellantis outperformed its peers throughout 2023 and the
first quarter of 2024. However, this upward trend reversed as the company entered a downturn, coinciding
with emerging reports of operational challenges and leadership concerns. In recent months, automakers
have been particularly affected by growing uncertainty surrounding U.S. trade policy, especially under the
renewed protectionist stance associated with former President Trump's trade agenda.
Figure 3 Evolution of the shares price of Stellantis (blue) and selected peers (Ford - violet, Volkswagen - white and
GM - yellow), between 2021 and 2025. Source: Refinitiv.
The impact of the merger can be assessed through the company’s economic and financial
performance, using detailed analysis of productivity, profitability, solvency, and market ratios. In general,
these indicators improved significantly and exceeded the expected targets set at the time of the merger,
up until 2023. For instance, the EBIT margin more than doubled between 2019 and 2023, and the company
achieved €8.4 billion in cost savings, surpassing expectations (Wayland, 2024). Additionally, Stellantis
18
reported net cash of 29.5 billion euros at the end of 2023, equivalent to 36% of its 81 billion market
capitalization (Wayland, 2024) (please see Appendix D for more data on Stellantis’ performance). These
outcomes reflect that Stellantis delivered or even exceeded its promises regarding financial synergies, cost
reductions, and profitability within the anticipated timeframe (Hall, 2024). However, over the past year,
these ratios have deteriorated significantly, in parallel with the company's declining stock performance.
Recently, the three major credit rating agencies downgraded Stellantis’s credit rating, highlighting the depth
of the crisis currently affecting the company.
Moreover, R&D intensity remained the same after the merger (<4%), below peers and frontrunners,
almost half of Volkswagen (Luzzi, 2024). Despite their commitment to innovation and maintaining
competitiveness, external pressures and shifting market dynamics may have influenced their resource
allocation strategies, which means the company underperformed in innovation enforcement, electrification
and EV transition, lagging competitors such as Volkswagen and Tesla, impacting performance and failing
to achieve the main goal of this merger.
4. Critical Analysis and Concluding Remarks
Growth strategies are a fundamental pillar of business management and competitive strategy
implementation. To succeed in a dynamic global environment, companies must adopt approaches that
address emerging challenges while capitalizing on international opportunities. This research examined the
strategic merger of FCA and PSA to evaluate whether it improved the combined entity’s performance.
The FCA-PSA merger was grounded in solid reasoning backed by many of the classic motivations
for horizontal mergers found in the literature (DePamphilis, 2021). In the first three years after the merger,
Stellantis delivered on many of its promises, particularly in terms of operational efficiency and financial
performance, quickly cutting expenses and selling off non-core businesses to focus on its main brands.
The union was initially praised for its synergies and efficiency gains, achieving more than $8 billion in
savings well above expectations and posting record results in 2023. However, in 2024, familiar issues reemerged. Ongoing supply chain disruptions may reflect deeper integration challenges, while the
company’s lag in innovation and electrification highlights a failure to establish leadership in CASE
(Connected, Autonomous, Shared, and Electric) technologies. The company’s situation had deteriorated
dramatically: operating margins dropped from 12.8% to just 5.5%, cash flow plunged from +€12.9 billion
to - €6 billion, and the stock lost nearly 60% of its value (Winton, 2025).
Behind this decline were structural problems. High inventory levels in North America, especially
Jeep and Ram models, reflected poor forecasting and weak demand. Electrification efforts lagged,
particularly in the U.S., allowing competitors like Tesla and Ford to gain ground. Aggressive cost-cutting,
once seen as a strength, triggered supplier disputes, legal battles, and delays in production. Internally, the
vast portfolio of 14 brands, once promoted as a competitive advantage, became a drag on performance,
with several marques like DS and Alfa Romeo struggling to justify their existence (Ferris, 2024; Winton,
2024).
These effects were compounded by cultural and regulatory challenges. Merging two large, crosscontinental organizations, especially during a global pandemic, created real challenges in uniting different
cultures, systems, and supply chains. EU antitrust rules also forced concessions that reduced some
19
expected benefits, while failure to achieve EU environmental compliance could result in high fines.
Additionally, history shows that big mergers often struggle after an initial boost and paying a 20-30 percent
premium can prove detrimental if savings don’t materialize. However, this was not the case, since strong
leadership helped capture most synergies by year 4, but lasting success depended on keeping teams
aligned, meeting electric-vehicle goals, and handling ongoing market and regulatory pressures.
The sudden resignation of CEO Carlos Tavares in December 2024, a year before his contract
ended, further shocked stakeholders. Once hailed as the architect of the merger and a financial strategist,
his exit followed growing discontent from all corners: suppliers, unions, dealers, and employees. His
departure was also linked to internal disagreements with the board, particularly around the future viability
of weaker brands (Winton, 2024). Highlighting that even four years later the cultures and interests of the
two original companies are still present in the new company, signaling in a certain way an incomplete
merger.
In conclusion, this case reinforces how M&A often struggles to create long-term value despite
short-term gains as empirical evidence presented in the course literature suggested, "in the long run,
acquirers in mergers suffer wealth losses" (Sudarsanam, 2010). While initial cost synergies may boost
early performance, long-term shareholder returns often disappoint. Stellantis' recent profit warnings and
deep stock losses illustrate this reality with Stellantis still falling short of industry leaders in key innovation
areas, the risk is that it may find itself back in a similar position to where it stood in 2019. Furthermore,
rather than a bold step forward, the merger, particularly for FCA, appeared to have been more about
survival. The integration of two large, traditional firms with distinct cultures likely diverted executive focus
toward cost savings, at the expense of fostering an innovative mindset and dynamic R&D. Stellantis’
continued underinvestment in innovation, evidenced by R&D intensity remaining below 4%, significantly
lower than peers like Volkswagen, has limited its ability to compete at the technological frontier.
Nevertheless, this does not invalidate M&A as a strategic tool. Without the merger, both FCA and PSA
might have been in a weaker state today. Looking ahead, Stellantis could improve its position by targeting
technology-driven acquisitions that fill existing capability gaps, smaller and less complex to integrate,
enabling the company to evolve into a more innovative and competitive industry player, focusing more on
technological transformation than scale and efficiency.
20
Originally, plagiarism and unethical use of artificial intelligence disclaimer
We declare that the present academic work, entitled “Powering the Future of Mobility: FCA and PSA’s
merger into Stellantis”, is original and was carried out by the members of the group in accordance with the
following academic and ethical standards:
•
Originality: The ideas, analyses, and conclusions presented are the result of our own work and
have not been copied from other sources without proper citation.
•
References: All sources of information used have been correctly referenced in accordance with
the applicable citation standards.
•
Generative Artificial Intelligence: The use of Generative Artificial Intelligence tools, where
applicable, was conducted in a responsible, ethical, critical, and non-abusive manner
(Carolina Costa)
(Daniela Figueiredo)
(Leonor Oliveira)
(Mª Francisca André)
(Paulo Andrade)
21
References
Armstrong, C., Drnevich, P., Irwin, K. & Schijven, M. (2025). The motives for mergers and acquisitions and
their implications for research and practice. Strategic Management Review. Advance online
publication. https://strategicmanagementreview.net/articles.html
Automotive Manufacturing Solutions. (n.d.). PSA-FCA – the ideal merger or a challenge too far? Retrieved
from https://www.automotivemanufacturingsolutions.com/psa-fca-merger-analysis
Barbosa, J. (2023). Stellantis - Case Study de uma Fusão na indústria automóvel. [Masters dissertation,
Faculty of Economics of University of Porto] Open Repository of University of Porto.
https://hdl.handle.net/10216/154736
Bekker, H. (2025, January 21). 2024 (Full Year) Europe: Best-Selling Car Manufacturers and Brands. Car
Sales Statistics Best-Selling Cars. https://www.best-selling-cars.com/europe/2024-full-year-europebest-selling-car-manufacturers-and-brands/
Bhattacharyya, S., & Nain, A. (2011). Horizontal acquisitions and buying power: A product market analysis.
Journal of Financial Economics, 99(1), 97–115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.007
Brinley, S. (2025, April 4). US Auto Tariffs: Impact on Industry Now More Clear. S&P Global Automotive
Insights.
https://www.spglobal.com/automotive-insights/en/rapid-impact-analysis/us-auto-tariffs-
impact-on-auto-industry
Bouwman, Christa H. S. (2013). The Role of Corporate Culture in Mergers & Acquisitions. Etienne Perrault
(ed.), Mergers and Acquisitions: Practices, Performance and Perspectives, NOVA Science Publishers,
May 2013, retrieved online: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2307740
Candra, A., Dominicus P., Sembel, R. & Zulbainarni, N. (2021). Literature Review On Merger and
Acquisition (Theories and Previous Studies). Studies of Applied Economics, 39(4), 1-12.
10.25115/eea.v39i4.4627
Correa, P., Foucar, D., Yano, Y., Patel, N. & Stein, I. (2025, February 4). M&A in Automotive and Mobility:
Hedging
Bets
until
a
Clear
Future
Emerges.
Bain&Company.
https://www.bain.com/insights/automotive-and-mobility-m-and-a-report-2025/
Cristóvão, R. (2021). PSA-FCA Merger: Carlos Tavares’ Road to glory?. [Master’s dissertation, NOVA
School of Business and Economics] Open Repository of NOVA University of Lisbon.
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/123023
DePamphilis, D. M. (2021). Mergers, acquisitions, and other restructuring activities: an integrated approach
to process, tools, cases and solutions. Academic Press.
DQS Holding (2025). ESG in the Automotive Industry Sector. https://www.dqsglobal.com/enmy/learn/blog/esg-in-the-automotive-industry-sector
Ebhardt, T., & Nussbaum, A. (2019, October 31). Plunging Peugeot Shows Who the Buyer Is in Merger of
Equals.
Bloomberg.com;
Bloomberg.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-
31/investors-know-who-the-buyer-is-in-fiat-peugeot-merger-of-equals?utm_source=chatgpt.com
22
European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA). (2024, September). The automobile industry –
pocket guide 2024/2025. https://www.acea.auto/publication/the-automobile-industry-pocket-guide2024-2025/
European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA). (2025, March). Economic and Market Report –
Global
and
EU
auto
industry:
full
year
2024.
https://www.acea.auto/files/Economic_and_Market_Report-Full_year-2024.pdf
European Commission. (2019, February 6). Mergers: Commission prohibits Siemens' proposed acquisition
of Alstom [Press release]. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_881
European Commission. (2020, December 21). Mergers: Commission approves the merger of Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles
N.V.
and
Peugeot
S.A.,
subject
to
conditions.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2506
European Commission. (2020, December 21). Mergers: Commission approves the merger of Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles
N.V.
and
Peugeot
S.A.,
subject
to
conditions
[Press
release].
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2506
European Commission. (2021, October 25). Case M.10416 – STELLANTIS / FIH / JV: Commission
decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation No 139/2004 and Article 57 of the Agreement
on
the
European
Economic
Area.
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases1/202152/M_10416_8105343_191_3.pdf
FCA and Groupe PSA. (2019). PSA and FCA proposed merger – December 18, 2019: FCA–PSA Merger
Presentation
[PowerPoint
slides].
Fiat
Chrysler
Automobiles
N.V.
&
Peugeot
S.A. https://www.stellantis.com/content/dam/stellantis-corporate/investors/fca-groupe-psamerger/psa_fca_proposed_merger_presentation_dec_18_19.pdf
Ferris,
R.
(2024,
October
10).
Stellantis
is
struggling.
Here’s
why.
CNBC.
https://www.cnbc.com/2024/10/10/stellantis-is-struggling-heres-why.html
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. (2014, October 12). Merger to form Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V.
completed
[Press
release].
Stellantis
Media. https://www.media.stellantis.com/em-en/fca-
archive/press/merger-to-form-fiat-chrysler-automobiles-n-v-completed-fca-debuts-on-the-nyse
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. (2020). Prospectus dated November 20, 2020: Application for listing and
admission to trading in connection with the merger between FCA and Peugeot S.A. Euronext Live
Markets.
Fiat Investments N.V. (2014, July 8). Merger of Fiat S.p.A. with and into Fiat Investments N.V. (to be
renamed
Fiat
Chrysler
Automobiles
N.V.)
[Prospectus].
Stellantis. https://www.stellantis.com/content/dam/stellantis-corporate/archives/fca/past-corporatetransactions/merger-of-fiat-s-p-a-with-and-into-fiat-investments-nv/Bookmarked_FCA_Prospectus.pdf
23
Fitch Ratings. (2019, December 18). Fiat-Chrysler/Peugeot merger credit positive. Fitch Ratings.
https://www.fitchratings.com/research/corporate-finance/fiat-chrysler-peugeot-merger-credit-positive18-12-2019
Fontanella-Khan, J., Keohane, D., Lewis, L. & Massoudi, A. (2019, June 6). Fiat Chrysler withdraws €33bn
Renault merger offer. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/ba034774-87e1-11e9-97ea05ac2431f453
Forbes.
(2020,
March
16).
PSA
+
FCA
merger:
A
mega
industry
player
in
the
making. https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarwantsingh/2020/03/16/psa-fca-merger-a-mega-industryplayer-in-the-making/
Fortune Business Insight. (2023, January). Automotive Finance Market Size [2022-2028] Worth USD
385.42 Billion by 2028 | Exhibiting CAGR of 6.5%. https://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2023/01/31/2598496/0/en/Automotive-Finance-Market-Size-2022-2028-Worth-USD-385-42Billion-by-2028-Exhibiting-CAGR-of-6-5.html
Gardner, G. (2019, December 27). Potential Risks And Rewards Of Groupe PSA’s Merger With FCA.
Forbes.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greggardner/2019/12/27/potential-risks-and-rewards-of-
groupe-psas-merger-with-fca/
Gogoi,
D.
(2025,
April
24).
Auto
Supply
Chain:
Merge
or
Miss
Out?.
S&P
Global.
https://www.spglobal.com/automotive-insights/en/blogs/2025/04/auto-supply-chain-suppliersmergers
Gouveia, P. (2021). Equity Research: Stellantis N.V. [Masters dissertation, Lisbon School of Economics
and Management] Open Repository of University of Lisbon.
Groupe PSA & Fiat Chrysler Automobiles. (2019, December 18). Proposed merger: Building a leader for a
new era in sustainable mobility. Stellantis. https://www.stellantis.com/content/dam/stellantiscorporate/investors/fca-groupe-psamerger/psa_fca_proposed_merger_presentation_dec_18_19.pdf
Hall, A. (2024, March 11). Stellantis shares are up 124% since its merger – but they are still cheap.
Switzerland;
Citywire.
https://citywire.com/ch/news/stellantis-shares-are-up-124-since-its-merger-
but-they-are-still-cheap/a2437694
Hertzke, P., Kampshoff, P., Möller, T., Rupalla, F., Schaufuss, P. & Smith, A. (2025, April 22). New twists in
the
electric-vehicle
transition:
A
consumer
perspective.
McKinsey
&
Company.
https://www.mckinsey.com/features/mckinsey-center-for-future-mobility/our-insights/new-twists-in-theelectric-vehicle-transition-a-consumer-perspective
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American
Economic Review, 76(2), 323–329.
Kellner, T. (2024). The impact of M&A announcements on stock returns in the European Union.
International
Review
of
Economics
&
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2023.10.034
24
Finance,
89,
Part
B,
843–862.
Knowledge at Wharton. (2020, January 28). Is the Groupe PSA-Fiat Chrysler Merger “Smart
Consolidation”? Knowledge@Wharton. https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/groupe-psa-fiatchrysler-merger-smart-consolidation/
Kollewe,
J.
(2019,
June
6).
Renault-Fiat
Chrysler
merger
colapses.
The
Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jun/06/renault-fiat-chrysler-merger-collapses
Kreitmair, S. (2020, February 7). PSA and FCA merger ESG positive. In Sector Report – Automotive.
UniCredit
Research.
https://www.research.unicredit.eu/DocsKey/credit_docs_9999_175901.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=n03ZZ
LYZf5miJJA2_uTR8lhfvqWR3EFovaBCFvp_RBU%3D&T=1
Luzzi, A. (2024). Can a mega-merger allow a company to become an innovative leader? The Stellantis
case in the electric vehicles (EV) industry (Master’s thesis, BI Norwegian Business School). BI Oslo.
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance,
60(6),
2661–2700.
Retrieved
online
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~ulrike/Papers/OCinvestment23november2004_full_jf.pdf
Malterer, M. (2025, January 23). Trends and challenges shaping the automotive industry in 2025. Dentons.
https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2025/january/23/trends-and-challenges-shaping-theautomotive-industry-in-2025
Market Screener. (2020, September 15). Faurecia: Fiat Chrysler shares boosted by PSA merger deal
revision.
https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/FORVIA-EX-FAURECIA-
4647/news/Faurecia-Fiat-Chrysler-shares-boosted-by-PSA-merger-deal-revision-31295274/
Martynova, M., & Renneboog, L. (2008). A century of corporate takeovers: What have we learned and
where
do
we
stand?
Journal
of
Banking
&
Finance,
32(10),
2148–2177.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426608000241
Matthew, B. (2025, January 14). Automotive Suppliers Outlook for 2025: Trends and Challenges. S&P
Global.
https://www.spglobal.com/automotive-insights/en/blogs/2025/01/automotive-suppliers-
outlook-2025-trends-and-challenges
Meli, C. (2021). Value creation through cross-border M&A [Master’s dissertation, LUISS University, Chair
of M&A and Investment Banking]. LUISS University Open Repository. https://tesi.luiss.it/32595/
Morris, C. (2019, April 9). Fiat Chrysler to pay Tesla hundreds of millions for European emissions credits Charged EVs. Charged EVs. https://chargedevs.com/newswire/fiat-chrysler-to-pay-tesla-hundredsof-millions-for-european-emissions-credits/
Murphy, P. (2021). Fiat Chrysler, Peugeot shareholders approve Stellantis Merger. S&P Global.
https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/articles/2021/1/fiat-chrysler-peugeotshareholders-approve-stellantis-merger-61954340?utm_source=chatgpt.com
25
Noble, B. (2019). Fiat Chrysler confirms merger talks with Peugeot’s Groupe PSA. The Detroit News.
https://eu.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/chrysler/2019/10/30/fiat-chrysler-confirms-talkscombine-peugeot-groupe-psa/2498744001/
Noble, B. (2021). Fiat Chrysler, Groupe PSA merger Stellantis closed Saturday. Here's what to expect. The
Detroit
News.
https://eu.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/chrysler/2021/01/15/fiat-chrysler-
groupe-psa-merger-stellantis-close-saturday-heres-what-expect/4156153001/
Nussbaum, A. (2019, May 29). Peugeot Chief Sees Fiat Deal as `Virtual Takeover’ of Renault.
Bloomberg.com;
Bloomberg.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-29/psa-ceo-fiat-
renault-is-virtual-takeover-of-crosstown-rival
Piovaccari, G. (2021, January 16). After long journey, Fiat Chrysler and PSA seal merger to become
Stellantis. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/business/after-long-journey-fiat-chrysler-and-psaseal-merger-to-become-stellantis-idUSKBN29L000/
Priddle, A. (2025, March 3). Power Players, Mergers, and Politics in the Car Industry Make 2025 a Big
Year. MotorTrend. https://www.motortrend.com/features/automotive-industry-mergers-power-playerspolitics-make-2025-a-big-year
Reuters. (2019, December 4). UAW union leaders recommend approval of Fiat Chrysler labor deal.
Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/article/business/uaw-union-leaders-recommend-approval-of-fiat-
chrysler-labor-deal-idUSKBN1Y82V9/
Reuters. (2025, March 29). Stellantis to buy CO2 credits from Tesla “pool” also in 2025, exec says. Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/stellantis-buy-co2-credits-tesla-pool-also2025-exec-says-2025-03-29/
Roll, R. (1986). The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of Business, 59(2), 197–216.
Singh, S. (2020, March 16). Strategic analysis of the Fiat Chrysler Automobiles and PSA Group
merger. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarwantsingh/2020/03/16/psa-fca-merger-a-megaindustry-player-in-the-making/
Slaughter and May. (2021, January 13). Competition & Regulatory Newsletter (23 December 2020 – 12
January 2021). https://www.slaughterandmay.com/insights/importedcontent/competition-regulatorynewsletter-23-december-2020-12-january-2021/
Smith, E. (2021, January 18). World’s fourth-largest carmaker rallies on first day of trade after $52 billion
merger.
CNBC.
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/18/stellantis-rallies-on-first-day-of-trade-after-52-
billion-merger.html
S&P Global. (2025, March 6). Global carmaker Stellantis downgraded to “BBB” on weak margin prospects;
outlook
stable.
Spglobal.com.
https://disclosure.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-
/view/type/HTML/id/3346533?kw=%25252525257bkeyword%25252525257d
26
Stellantis. (2019, October). Groupe PSA and FCA plan to join forces to build a world leader for a new era
in sustainable mobility. https://www.stellantis.com/en/news/press-releases/2019/october/groupe-psaand-fca-plan-to-join-forces-to-build-a-world-leader-for-a-new-era-in-sustainable-mobility
Stellantis. (2021, January 4). Merger of FCA and Groupe PSA approved by shareholders: FCA and Groupe
PSA
expect
to
complete
the
combination
on
January
16,
2021.
Stellantis.com.
https://www.stellantis.com/en/news/press-releases/2021/january/merger-of-fca-and-groupe-psaapproved-by-shareholders
Stellantis (2021). The merger of FCA and Groupe PSA has been completed. Stellantis.
www.stellantis.com/en/news/press-releases/2021/january/the-merger-of-fca-and-groupe-psa-hasbeen-completed
Strategic Intelligence. (2019, November 25). Are we witnessing one of the worst mergers in corporate
history? Verdict. https://www.verdict.co.uk/fca-psa-merger/?cf-view
Sudarsanam, S. (2010). Creating value from mergers and acquisitions: The challenges (2nd ed.). Pearson
Education Limited.
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2025, May 22). PSA Group. Britannica Money.
https://www.britannica.com/money/PSA-Peugeot-Citroen-SA
Wambach, A. & Elbert, S. (2021, January 19). Stellantis Merger Won’t Be the Last of Its Kind. ZEW.
https://www.zew.de/en/press/latest-press-releases/stellantis-merger-wont-be-the-last-of-its-kind
Wayland, M. (2024, June 13). Stellantis aims to correct “arrogant” mistakes in U.S. market, CEO says.
CNBC;
CNBC.
https://www.cnbc.com/2024/06/13/stellantis-has-achieved-9-billion-in-cost-
reductions-from-merger.html
Willems, S. (2019, November 19). French Unions Give FCA-PSA Merger a Tentative Thumbs-up.
Thetruthaboutcars.com.
https://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2019/11/french-unions-give-fca-psa-
merger-a-tentative-thumbs-up/
Winton,
N.
(2024).
Stellantis
shares
dive
8%
after
Tavares
leaves.
Forbes.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/neilwinton/2024/12/02/stellantis-shares-dive-8-after-tavares-leaves/
Winton, N. (2025). Stellantis CEO Filosa to-do list topped by profitability restoration. Forbes.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/neilwinton/2025/05/30/stellantis-ceo-filosa-to-do-list-topped-byprofitability-restoration/
27
Appendix A: Composition of the Board of Directors of Stellantis
Composition of the Board of Directors of Stellantis1.
1 Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. (2020). Prospectus dated November 20, 2020: Application for listing and admission
to trading in connection with the merger between FCA and Peugeot S.A.
28
Appendix B: Number and volume of M&A transactions in the automotive industry by sub-sector
Evolution of M&A transactions in the automotive industry by sub-sector.2
Evolution of M&A transactions number and volume in the automotive industry by activity,
between 2015 and 20243.
2 Wambach, A. & Elbert, S. (2021, January 19). Stellantis Merger Won’t Be the Last of Its Kind. ZEW.
https://www.zew.de/en/press/latest-press-releases/stellantis-merger-wont-be-the-last-of-its-kind
3 Foucar, D., Correa, P., Yano, Y., Patel, N., & Stein, I. (2025, February 4). M&A in automotive and mobility: Hedging
bets until a clear future emerges. Bain & Company. https://www.bain.com/insights/automotive-and-mobility-mand-a-report-2025/
29
Appendix C: Ranking of automotives companies based on their competitive position in ten
industry indicators.
GlobalData’s Thematic Screen ranks companies within a sector based on their
competitive position in the ten themes that matter most to their industry, generating a leading
indicator of future performance4.
Thematic Screen
Automotive
(55 companies)
Weighting
10%
15%
Batteries
Autonomous
Vehicles
10%
20%
10%
10%
5%
10%
5%
5%
India
Electric Vehicles
Internet of
Things
Transport as a
service
Ecosystems
China
Generation
Hashtag
Sustainability
Tesla
60,029
TSLA
USA
5
4
3
5
5
4
3
4
3
4
100%
C
o Thematic
l Ranking
u
1
Intel
250,604
INTC
USA
3
5
3
4
5
3
5
5
3
3
2
CATL
25,294
300750
China
5
4
3
5
3
3
3
5
3
4
3
LG Chem
18,061
51910
Korea
5
4
4
5
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
Panasonic
22,367
6752
Japan
5
4
3
5
4
3
2
3
3
4
5
Baidu
41,124
BIDU
China
3
4
3
4
4
4
2
5
4
4
6
Alphabet
892,802
GOOGL
USA
3
5
4
3
4
5
5
2
4
3
7
Nvidia
129,065
NVDA
USA
3
5
3
4
4
4
5
2
4
3
Uber
50,424
UBER
USA
3
5
3
3
5
5
5
1
5
4
9
Geely
17,378
175
China
3
4
3
5
4
2
3
5
3
3
10
Toyota
232,882
7203
Japan
3
4
4
5
4
2
3
3
3
4
11
Infineon
26,448
IFX
Germany
3
5
3
4
5
3
4
2
3
3
12
STMicroelectronics
21,913
STM
France
3
5
3
4
5
3
4
2
3
3
13
NXP
32,207
NXPI
Netherlands
3
5
3
4
4
3
5
2
3
3
14
Samsung SDI
13,888
6400
Korea
5
4
3
4
3
3
3
3
3
4
15
Volkswagen
97,685
VOW3
Germany
3
4
4
4
4
2
4
4
3
2
16
Qualcomm
96,931
QCOM
USA
3
4
3
4
5
3
4
2
4
3
17
GM
50,479
GM
USA
3
5
2
4
4
3
3
4
3
2
18
Aptiv
23,351
APTV
USA
3
5
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
3
19
Lyft
13,831
LYFT
USA
3
4
3
3
4
5
4
2
5
4
20
BYD
15,716
1211
China
5
2
3
5
3
2
3
4
3
4
21
Honda
51,827
7267
Japan
3
4
4
4
4
2
3
3
3
3
22
Continental
26,833
CON
Germany
4
5
3
3
4
2
4
3
3
3
23
Valeo
9,431
FR
France
3
4
3
4
4
2
4
3
3
3
24
BMW
52,626
BMW
Germany
3
4
3
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
25
SAIC Motor
37,402
600104
China
3
4
3
3
4
2
3
5
3
3
26
Yandex
13,299
YNDX
Russia
3
4
3
3
4
4
3
3
3
3
27
ZF
Unlisted
Unlisted
Germany
3
4
3
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
28
Nissan
25,920
7201
Japan
3
4
3
4
4
2
3
3
3
2
29
Tata Motor
7,062TATAMOTORSIndia
3
4
4
4
4
2
3
2
3
2
30
Nio
2,042
NIO
China
3
3
3
5
3
2
3
3
3
3
31
Veoneer
1,816
VNE
USA
3
5
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
32
Schaeffler
1,747
SHA
Germany
3
3
3
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
33
290,972
5930
Korea
3
3
4
3
5
3
3
2
4
3
34
450
GMM
Germany
3
3
3
3
4
3
3
4
3
3
35
Bosch
Unlisted
Unlisted
Germany
3
4
3
3
4
3
3
3
3
2
36
Daimler
61,352
DAI
Germany
3
4
3
3
4
3
3
3
2
2
37
Magna
16,693
MG
Canada
3
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
38
Adient
2,009
ADNT
UK
3
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
39
Hyundai Motor
26,565
5380
Korea
3
3
4
4
3
2
3
2
3
3
40
Faurecia
7,020
EO
France
3
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
41
Joyson
2,681
600699
China
3
3
3
3
4
3
3
3
3
3
42
Denso
35,818
6902
Japan
3
3
3
3
4
2
4
3
3
2
43
Ford
35,248
F
USA
3
4
3
3
4
2
3
2
3
2
44
Great Wall
10,400
601633
China
3
3
3
3
3
1
3
5
3
3
45
Dongfeng Autos
1,235
600006
China
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
46
Renault
14,386
RNO
France
3
3
3
4
3
2
3
2
3
2
47
BAIC
4,674
1958
China
3
2
3
4
2
1
3
5
3
3
48
Suzuki
21,866
7269
Japan
3
3
4
3
3
2
3
2
3
2
49
Mahindra & Mahindra
9,064
M&M
India
3
2
4
4
2
1
3
3
3
2
50
955
DLPH
UK
3
2
3
3
4
2
3
3
3
2
51
Autoliv
7,148
ALV
Sweden
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
52
Fiat Chrysler
22,826
FCA
Italy
3
3
3
2
4
2
3
2
3
2
53
Peugeot
22,489
UG
France
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
2
3
2
54
Tenneco
931
TEN
USA
3
3
3
1
2
2
3
3
3
2
55
MKT CAP
(US$ M)
Company
Samsung Electronics
Grammer
Delphi Tech
Ticker
Country
8
Source: GlobalData, Thomson Reuters
4 Strategic Intelligence. (2019, November 25). Are we witnessing one of the worst mergers in corporate history? Verdict.
https://www.verdict.co.uk/fca-psa-merger/
30
Appendix D: Stellantis’ economic and financial ratios evolution.
Evolution of Stellantis’ net cash, capex and capex/sales5.
Evolution of Stellantis EV-to-Ebit multiple4.
5 Hall, A. (2024, March 11). Stellantis shares are up 124% since its merger - but they are still cheap. Switzerland;
Citywire.
cheap/a2437694
https://citywire.com/ch/news/stellantis-shares-are-up-124-since-its-merger-but-they-are-still-
31
Evolution of Sales, Ebit and Ebit Margin 6.
Evolution of some profitability ratios of Stellantis, between 2019 and 2024.
Evolution of Debt-to-capital ratio of Stellantis and selected peers, between 2019 and 2024.
6 Hall, A. (2024, March 11). Stellantis shares are up 124% since its merger - but they are still cheap. Switzerland;
Citywire. https://citywire.com/ch/news/stellantis-shares-are-up-124-since-its-merger-but-they-are-stillcheap/a2437694
32
33