UN General Assembly - I​
Disarmament & International Security Affairs Committee​
Demilitarisation & Step Towards Peace in the Arctic Region
Nascent Model United Nations Conference 2025
Table of Contents
Table of Contents​
Letter from the Executive Board​
Important Points​
About the Committee​
About the UNGA I - DISEC​
About the Agenda​
Climate Change​
Arctic Resources​
Preservation of Peace in the Arctic​
Maritime Dispute Settlement Mechanisms​
Potential shipping routes​
Resource extraction​
Territorial Ambitions and Claims​
European Union​
Russian Federation​
Canada​
China​
Arctic Military Security​
Questions to Consider​
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Letter from the Executive Board
Dear Participants,
It is my pleasure to preside over this simulation of the UN General Assembly DISEC at the
Nascent Model United Nations 2025.
This background guide is designed to provide you with a foundation for the discussions ahead.
However, it is just that—a starting point. The depth of your preparation, the perspectives you
bring, and the arguments you put forward will define your experience. MUNs differ because
they, unlike a lot you likely do in everyday life, are not about memorising facts. They are rather
about understanding perspectives, questioning assumptions, and building solutions that are both
practical and impactful. I encourage you to go beyond the confines of this document, conduct
thorough research, and develop a nuanced understanding. Going beyond the scope of this guide
during preparation is not only suggested but is a necessity if you wish to perform well.
As soon as you enter the committee, we would expect you to step into the shoes of a diplomat. It
requires critical thinking, adaptability, and the ability to engage with differing perspectives. There
are no absolute answers—only well-reasoned solutions.
Approach this conference with curiosity, discipline, and the willingness to challenge yourself and
others. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to reach out.
Godspeed! I look forward to an engaging and insightful committee.
Regards,
Mr Vedansh Arora​
President - DISEC​
vedansh.arora@ucdconnect.ie / vedansh.arora.in@gmail.com
Ms Vaishnavi Baluni, Ms Manibha Jain​
Vice President(s) - DISEC​
​
Important Points
1.​
Information contained in this research brief does not possess any evidentiary value, nor
does it qualify as proof of the occurrence/non-occurrence or existence/non-existence of any fact.
The brief is meant only to provide the participants with a modicum of information upon which
further research can be built and does not in any manner whatsoever reflect the views or political
leanings of the President, Vice-President or Rapporteur. They shall at all points in time maintain
neutrality and not have any political affiliations.​
2.​
There would be a Zero Plagiarism policy followed by the Executive Board for all written
communications (Chits, Documents, etc). Using citations does not qualify as plagiarism.​
3.​
The Executive Board shall be open to only 4 types of documents for marking purposes
(none of them being compulsory to submit) a.​ Draft Resolutions (final document)
b.​ Working Papers/Plan of Actions
c.​ Press Release/Joint Statements
d.​ Position Papers
(Position Papers in case submitted, need to be mailed to
vedansh.arora.in@gmail.com before 30th May 10:00 hours (10 AM). This is
optional, but highly advisable. A guide to making position papers can be easily
found online.)
4.​
Attached is a link to the official UNA USA Rules of Procedure. The committee shall
follow a modified version of these rules. Delegates may give it a read if they feel necessary:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/158xnrNSNpRbGzLFhPmxwO00xmqabRXl0/view?usp=sharing
About the Committee
The UN General Assembly is the only universally representative body of the United Nations. The
other major bodies are the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat,
and the International Court of Justice. As delineated in the Charter of the United Nations, the
function of the General Assembly is to discuss, debate, and make recommendations on subjects
about international peace and security, including development, disarmament, human rights,
international law, and the peaceful arbitration of disputes between nations.
It elects the non-permanent members of the Security Council and other UN bodies, such as the
Human Rights Council (HRC), and appoints the secretary-general based on the Security
Council’s recommendation. It considers reports from the other four organs of the United Nations,
assesses the financial situations of member states, and approves the UN budget, its most concrete
role. The assembly works with the Security Council to elect the judges of the International Court
of Justice.
About the UNGA I - DISEC
The First Committee deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect
the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security
regime.
It considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or
relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general
principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as
principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative
arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments.
The Committee works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission
and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament.
About the Agenda
The Arctic region ‐ comprising the Arctic Ocean and all surrounding land ‐ covers an area
that ⅙ of World’s landmass (30 million square km). It is home to four million people. 80% of
Arctic inhabitants are Russian by nationality, but most of the Arctic lands belong to the Canadian
Arctic Archipelago, also referred to as Northern Canada (550,000 million square km). Arctic
boundaries are difficult to draw. The delineation of boundaries between Arctic states remains
therefore an unresolved matter. Climate change has made that this region is increasingly
accessible, both for possible energy exploitation and for maritime trade routes. The Arctic
constitutes one of the planet last frontiers, and all states bordering it are racing to make sure they
will get their piece of the action. This region entails very serious issues of military security,
energy security, environmental security and governance.
A pivotal first question constitutes the
status of the North‐West Passage ‐ a
crucial trade route where several
countries are opting to extend the 200
nautical miles Exclusive Economic
Zone limit. Is this an internal Canadian
route, or an international maritime
route?
The Arctic countries and territories can be divided into those situated entirely within the Arctic
Circle (Iceland, Faroe Islands and Greenland) and those which territories transcend the Circle.
Both types of countries acquired the title of Arctic states, and form the core of the Arctic
Council: the Russian Federation, Norway, Denmark, Canada, USA, Iceland, Finland, Sweden
and Finland. One of the distinct features of Arctic demographics is that the Arctic’s population is
more related to each other, regardless of nationality, in comparison with rest of the population of
their respective country. In this light we can also argue that the Arctic is populated mostly by
indigenous people whose fertility rate is relatively higher in comparison with the southern
population. In regard of average Arctic population, Denmark has the highest density.
The Arctic is a bitter cold region where winter rules. Winter temperatures range from ‐40°C to
0°C, but can even drop further. The land is covered by permafrost, or tundra, making living
conditions relatively harsh. Ubiquitous ice however is the primal habitat of a unique fauna and
flora. Seals, polar bear, reindeers, walrus, Arctic wolves can be found in the Arctic littoral.
Contrary to popular misconception, penguins do not live in the Arctic Circle. Unfortunately,
Arctic biodiversity is largely in decline ‐ assessments show a 26% drop in species populations.
i Climate change and increasing human activity in the area, are the causes. Although some
species continue to adapt to the changing conditions, the majority of the wildlife cannot
endlessly respond to climate change in a sustainable fashion.
Climate Change
Over the last two centuries Earth’s temperature has increased on average by 0.6°C, putting clear
pressure on the Arctic’s fragile ecosystems. While global temperatures are expected to increase
substantially, an increase is forecasted on the Arctic region with a projected precipitation level of
a 20% increase.
Most scientists agree that global warming will cause a substantial reduction in polar ice within
no more than 10 years. During the summer, the North Pole would be completely ice‐free. It is all
going much faster than one could have thought a few years ago. Due to the dramatically
decreasing ice cap, the world is now facing very serious environmental threats indeed: i.e.
extinction of species, rising water levels, migration of fishing stocks, a speeding up of climate
change, deforestation, as well as certain related security implications. On one hand we note
global aims to reduce carbon emissions and the growing prospect to protect endangered species.
On the other hand, the earth’s growing population is exerting serious pressures on the existing
resources. In addition, the instability in Middle Eastern energy producing countries pushes
consumer states to look to opportunities elsewhere, e.g. in the North. However, anyone who
wants to drill in the Arctic must take into account the region’s harsh physical conditions. Remote
extraction fields cost much more to operate, and make it hard to export materials because
transportation costs. Additionally, they will encounter serious technological constraints.
Arctic Resources
According to the US Geological Survey (USGS), the Arctic contains 25% of World’s
undiscovered hydrocarbon resources: 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,670 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas. The opportunities for oil and gas industries are massive, if they manage to overcome
the issues related to exploration restraints. In addition, the Arctic is also rich in organic resources
such as fish, timber, and minerals. Mineral deposits comprise of a vast range of crude ores:
chromium, iron, lead, magnesium, nickel, zinc etc. In this sense Arctic resources are already
heavily exploited by their owners. For example, Canada and Russia produce timber (Russia is the
world’s biggest forest owner), and both operate diamond mines on a commercially valuable
scale. Moreover, since 10% of the world’s fish catch comes from the Arctic Ocean (the High
North’s fisheries are among the best existing stocks on the planet) fishery constitutes a tangible
gain. The Bering Sea supplies a third of Russia’s and a half of the United States’ total annual
catch, while fisheries in the Barents Sea are Norway’s second largest earner of foreign exchange.
As ice melts and waters warm, fish will move even further northward, making management of
these fisheries a potentially contentious issue among Arctic nation.”
The US Geological Survey reckons that the Arctic’s share in the global conventional resources
yet to be found amounts to 13 per cent for crude oil and 30 per cent for natural gas. These
resources are probably offshore for the most part (84 per cent). Of the Arctic’s natural gas
resources, 70 per cent are attributed to the Russian exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Large gas
fields have already been discovered in this 200‐nautical‐mile zone off the coast line, where the
littoral nation holds exclusive exploitation rights.
The Arctic may well constitute the “ultimate prize” in the remaining energy resources on the
planet, if humanity decides to develop it – that is. Development and consumption of so much
fossil resources will of course prolong the current fossil economy and delay the transfer to
renewables. Especially Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund are actively speaking and
campaigning against the development of the Arctic’s resources.
Preservation of Peace in the Arctic
The Arctic is mainly a vacant domain, a wild north where law and order are nebulous. However,
thus far, oceans at large have proven to be labor intensive and difficult to govern. It is enough to
study the problems of piracy in Somalia or Northeast Asia to observe that it are not only the
efforts of coastal guards that preserve order in the waters. The attempts to suppress lawlessness
in the seas have been largely futile, and it is difficult to make sense out of the existing web of
treaties and agreements concerning maritime management. The prime document addressing a
naval practice is the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which assembles customary
rules into one piece of legislation.
Maritime Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Territorial claims regarding international waters are read in light of the Convention on the Law of
the Sea which settles such disputes with the help of the UN Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf. This convention provides that if a country wishes to extend the limit beyond
200 nautical miles, it may refer its case to be reviewed under Art.76, § 8:
“Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by
the coastal State to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under
Annex II on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The commission shall
make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the
outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State
on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding.”
However, if two or more countries claim the same marine territory Art.83, § 1 applies: “The
delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be
effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.” The criteria for
establishment of outer limits of the continental shelf are included in Annex II of the Final Act of
the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea which took place in 1980. Those however are
non‐specific and scarce ‐ the emphasis is put on relative equity of delineation.
Potential shipping routes
As explained previously, climate change has resulted in the emergence of new shipping routes in
the Arctic Ocean. These routes promise shorter distances and hence, could be more
commercially feasible for suppliers. A unique characteristic of such routes is that the vessels
using them often need to be escorted by ‘icebreakers’ which prevent these ships from getting
stuck in the sea ice by clearing the route before them. This is a requirement for both commercial
as well as military vessels and thus, a respectable icebreaker fleet is a necessity for any nation
determined to exercise its authority in the Arctic Ocean. Currently, Russia boasts the largest and
most advanced fleet of icebreakers in the world and remains the only country with
nuclear-powered icebreakers in active service.
Nonetheless, it continues to invest heavily in the construction of more such vessels with the
production of ‘heavy’ icebreakers (icebreakers with the power necessary to break the thick polar
ice) being a clear priority. Additionally, it recently announced the inception of an entirely new
class of icebreakers, termed the ‘Leader’ class, which, with a weight approximately 7 times that
of conventional heavy icebreakers, would assume the title of the most powerful icebreaker in the
world with ease. Hence, as maritime traffic in the Arctic Ocean increases, continued Russian
domination in the supply of icebreakers for both commercial and military purposes is assured.
Furthermore, though currently in their infancy, as the volume of sea ice in the ocean continues to
decrease, these routes will witness increased productivity and commercial activity. The Northern
Sea Route and Northwestern Passage are some of the most important sea routes in the Arctic
Ocean.
Resource extraction
Another critical incentive to invest in the Arctic is the resources available in the region. As the
world’s reserves of oil and natural gas are constantly depleting, countries are actively searching
for new deposits to sustain their economies. This has led to them turning their attention towards
the Arctic. According to the United States Geological Survey, nearly 22 percent of the Earth’s
undiscovered oil and natural gas resources are located in the Arctic. Furthermore, approximately
84 percent of these resources are expected to be situated offshore. This evaluates to 90 billion
barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of gas and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids which
are estimated to be present in the Arctic.
While these appealing figures might seem appealing, the commercial feasibility of procuring
these resources remains unclear. Due to the extreme climatic conditions of the Arctic,
conventional equipment and machinery used in the extraction process are unable to function with
the same efficiency. They need to be specialised to perform under these conditions and this
usually demands severe expenses. Moreover, the infrastructure to transport these commodities to
the required facilities is underdeveloped. Thus, currently, many private corporations while
recognising the potential of the Arctic, expect to incur losses should they attempt to extract these
resources. Nonetheless, countries remain undeterred as they regard it as an opportunity to
safeguard their future and ensure continued prosperity.
Territorial Ambitions and Claims
European Union
The European Union aspires to be a player in the Arctic struggle, and does it via two ways: it
pursues its collective authority and aims to influence individual Arctic countries to support EU
ambitions. On 20th November 2008 the EU expressed the initiative to subject the Arctic to
multinational governance which should be ad‐hoc “upgraded and adjusted” to changing realities.
The EU is willing to renegotiate the existing web treaties justifying it with environmental
concerns, but the existing hunger for resources is clearly evident. They argue for “new specific
sectoral instruments” simultaneously hinting that the main aspect is environmental sustainability.
The language of resource allocation is however evident, especially in regard talks between the
EU and Norway. The Norwegian memorandum, voiced on 12th November 2008, contradicts the
views of the European Commission and forcefully states that according to Norwegian
government there are no legal gaps regarding the Arctic. vii Although Norway is not an EU
member, the EU does push for increased cooperation between them while reiterating that more
written instruments concerning the Arctic are unnecessary. The EU seems to feel threatened by
the established treaty between Norway and Russia opening vast areas of the littoral for
commercial exploitation. This friction can also be observed vis‐à‐vis the EU and Canada
because of EU‐US support to the claim of constituting the North‐West Passage to international
waters. Further, the EU applied for an observer status in the Arctic Council but its presence has
been blocked by Canada because of an earlier EU ban on seal exports.
Russian Federation
Russian appetite for Arctic’s oil resources demonstrated most manifestly amongst all Arctic
states. The pace at which the Arctic ice reaches its historic minimum appears to be directly
proportional to the tempo of Russian Arctic expansion. The resource‐rich region is subjected to
intense geological research that will assist Russia back up its territorial claims. Thus far
geologists have preliminarily indicated that the Lomonosov Ridge crust structure matches the
structure of continental rocks. Nonetheless, more thorough research is needed to finally affirm
those revelations.
According to international law, and if Russia manages to prove that geological structure of
oil‐rich seabed conforms to the type found on the continental shelf, the area under Arctic Ocean
will be considered the extension of Siberia and hence, belong to Russia. However, geologist
Boris Morgunov points out some complications, and accordingly warns that “to determine the
ownership of the Lomonosov Ridge more samples from various locations are required.” Even if
portions of the ridge belong to Russia there might be vast areas of detachment, so additional
drilling must take place to verify the total extent of mainland. Uncertainties related to geological
mapping did not prevent Russia from planting its national flag at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean
as a part of research operation Arktika 2007. This act, in legal perspective, does not proclaim the
land to be Russian, but yet provoked international outrage (Art.77, § 3 of the Convention on the
Law of the Sea). However controversial, the expedition was a response to the 2002 decision of
the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. This commission demanded more
research. If Russian claims succeed, the country will acquire economic rights which extend to the
North Pole. However, Denmark and Norway actively contest Russian claims and carry out their
own scientific research.
Canada
Canada is fighting on many fronts to win their alleged territories, and accordingly responds
vigorous to any perceived violation of their national sovereignty. Territorial disputes relate to the
small, uninhabited Hans Island (vs. Denmark), the status of the Northwest Passage (vs. USA)
and a portion of the Beaufort Sea (vs. USA). Prognoses regarding settlement of those conflicts
are despairing mainly for two reasons: Firstly, since the USA has not ratified the earlier
mentioned convention the cases cannot go to any tribunal for settlement. Therefore, ratification
appears unlikely due to Canada’s strong claims which could easily prevail over the issue of the
Northwest Passage. Furthermore, Canada is positioning itself as sensitive and ready to confront
any country willing to contest its boundaries. Accordingly, its – conservative guided ‐
government aggressively aims to assert Canadian sovereignty. When in 2009 two Russian
Tupolev 95Ms flew over Beaufort Sea, the Canadian Prime Minister took a hard line against
Russians stating that “Canada will not be bullied and expressed “deep concerns our government
has with increasingly aggressive Russian actions around the globe and Russian intrusions into
our space.” Similar subversive talks could be also heard within the Canadian establishment when
American USSS Charlotte crossed into Canadian territorial waters after spending two weeks in
the Arctic region. xii Canadian sentiment in respect to the Arctic makes them perceive foreign
actions more negatively. The country is not going to give up easily on contentious areas.
United States of America The United States of America (USA) did not ratify and hence, is not
bound by the Convention. Nor, have they filed a claim to the Commission. Ratification of the
Convention constitutes the backbone of contention for the Arctic ‐ territorial disputes with
Canada could be promptly resolved before a Tribunal if the USA had ratified the Convention.
Meanwhile, the Americans concentrate on Arctic research in and around Alaska, and play a
nuclear cat and mouse with Russian nuclear submarines. Since the Bush administration the USA
follows the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66, which handles of national
security and environment protection. However, as one can read from Centre for Strategic and
International Studies documents, xiii the USA’s strategic interests in the Arctic are only partially
referable to the official policy. On one hand the USA wants to prevent contraband,
drug‐smuggling, human trafficking and pollution in the Arctic and addresses concerns related to
that. On the other hand it officially downplays the significance of Arctic trading routes which
“overlooks” the competitors. Nevertheless, the Presidential Directive speaks openly that the USA
must “assert a more active and influential national presence to protect its Arctic interests and
project sea power throughout the region.”
Prioritization of Arctic research seems therefore imminent. American Secretary of State, Hillary
Clinton, already levied tensions between Arctic states in March 2010 during the Ottawa
Conference. There she expressed here discontent over the Canadian invitation for new states to
the Arctic Council, emphasizing that only countries with “legitimate interests” should be
included in the council. xv In the line of this she did not welcomed the presence of Iceland,
Sweden, Finland and the representation of indigenous. It is more than clear that the USA is
against the Arctic Council growing power and prefers a more forum‐like discussion body.
China
The Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) takes clear pride in China’s scientific
contributions in the Arctic region, and highlights the establishment of four Arctic expeditions (in
1997, 2003, 2008 and 2010). China, a country without easily recognizable rights to the Arctic,
first laid a claim in March 2010 when Admiral Yin Zhuo voiced that “the Arctic belongs to all
people around the world.” xvi The overall stakes remain high ‐ if their claims prevail ‐ and the
assumptions are that China might may go ahead in demanding a share of the Arctic proportional
to its population size. China bases its perceptions on the interpretation of the Convention on the
Law of the Sea, which must be approached dubious but might be successful. Other Asian states,
such as South Korea and Japan, simultaneously have filed an application to become permanent
observers in the Arctic Council in 2009, and may support China’s fawned interpretation of the
Convention in the hope to secure more resources. Although the overall opinion is that China has
not yet developed a clear Arctic policy, several diplomats are arguing that the turnaround in
China’s attitude is clearly remarkable. xvii It is therefore generally perceived that China will play
a leading role in the debates and might act as an inspiration for those who would want to see the
Arctic as a communally shared asset.
China’s recently renewed its strategic interest in the north. The most recent manifestation is the
current voyage of the world’s largest icebreaker, the Xuelong to Iceland. The Xuelong left
Qingdao July 2 for the 17,000 km voyage through the so‐called “north‐east” route along the
coast of Russia. This follows on earlier Chinese interest in Arctic research going back to the
1990s. Another element of China’s northern strategy is its push to be accepted as a permanent
observer at the Arctic Council. China’s interests in the Arctic, whether regarding possibilities for
expanded navigation and shipping, access to resources, concerns over the environmental impact
of the melting ice packs or possibly even defence and security issues in the region, are only
going to grow.
Arctic Military Security
In spite of the increased threat and manifestations of territorial ambition, the issue of who can
control the Arctic is highly dependent on military potential. Although the Arctic does not let any
ship enter its pristine waters, as such amphibious warfare is highly depended on specific
technology. Military speaking, there are only two ways to manoeuvre in the region ‐ by air,
using bombers, and beneath the surface, using submarines.
Bombers are easy to detect on radar and can be intercepted by air‐to‐air fighters. Moreover, the
extensiveness of the Arctic requires military planes to have an intercontinental range in order to
operate, which is clear restriction to their employment.
Submarines are of more applicable in the Arctic region ‐ there is no way of monitoring or
identifying them, interception is not possible either. Stealth is the key aspect as submarines are
ineffective if they cannot avoid detection.
Submarines are also capable of undertaking
prolonged missions. For example: in their efforts to monitor the Arctic the USA keeps their
submarines submerged for periods longer than 100 days. However, only nuclear‐powered
submarines can ‘survive’ in the Arctic. This means that only the US, France, Russia and the UK
are able to patrol this region.
Questions to Consider
1.​ What are the military implications of the Northern Sea Route becoming navigable
year-round, and how should the UNGA address this shift?​
2.​ Should the Arctic be considered a potential theater of future great-power conflict? If so,
what preventive diplomatic mechanisms should be institutionalized now?​
3.​ What thresholds of military activity in the Arctic should be defined as destabilizing or
aggressive under international norms?​
4.​ Is UNCLOS sufficient to regulate future military presence in the Arctic, or is a
complementary Arctic Security Protocol required?​
5.​ What model should guide Arctic governance in security terms — Antarctica
(demilitarization), UNCLOS (sovereignty), or something entirely new?​
6.​ How can dual-use infrastructure (e.g., airstrips, ports) be categorized and regulated under
a security framework?​
7.​ What tools can the UNGA employ to detect and limit creeping militarization disguised as
scientific or economic development?​
8.​ How should the UNGA address undersea cable networks and their vulnerability to
sabotage in the Arctic?​
9.​ What norms should guide the deployment of autonomous surveillance and defense
systems in Arctic waters?​
10.​Are security zones around Arctic installations (e.g., oil platforms, research stations)
legitimate under current international law?​
11.​How should new shipping chokepoints (e.g., Bering Strait, GIUK Gap) be treated in
military and security doctrine?​
12.​Who should bear the responsibility for securing resource extraction sites in the
Arctic—host states, multilateral forces, or private entities?​
13.​How might rare earth and fossil fuel competition escalate into direct military
confrontation, and how can the UNGA preempt this?​
14.​How can the UNGA regulate the use of Arctic waters and airspace by non-Arctic military
powers?​
15.​What legal distinction should be made between legitimate freedom of navigation and
provocative power projection?​
16.​What limits should exist on foreign military partnerships with indigenous Arctic
populations or territories?​
17.​If an Arctic nation unilaterally claims part of the extended continental shelf and deploys a
defensive garrison, what recourse should exist?​
18.​Could Arctic military cooperation between non-traditional partners (e.g.,
China–Russia–Iran) be treated as a strategic alarm bell?​
19.​How can Arctic disputes be quarantined from broader geopolitical tensions (e.g.,
NATO-Russia, US-China) to avoid spillover?