Technological Arms Race and the potential path from
value-claiming to collaborative security in nuclear
disarmament negotiations
A Ph.D. proposal by Giacomo Cassano
Abstract
The research proposal introduces the project Technological Arms Race and the potential path from value-claiming to collaborative security in nuclear disarmament negotiations. The research addresses the preconditions and the effects of bilateral agreements
between Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS). Secondly, it studies the determinants of cooperative security treaties such as NWFZ agreements.
The proposal first presents the literature in the field, showing its potential limitations and introducing a novel data set for proliferation linked to NWS. It then introduces
a methodology for the project, together with potential challenges.
Keywords: Nuclear Proliferation; Nuclear treaties negotiations; Large-N studies; Nuclear
Latency; Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
1
Research rationale and literature context
The research here proposed intends to pursue a two-fold objective: on the one hand it will
analyse the shortcomings of the present arms control structure, with a specific focus on the
role of technology, and address the negative effects of such flaws on nuclear proliferation in
regional contexts. On the other, it will explore the available options for nuclear-disarmament
negotiations with a focus on the cooperative security approach present in Nuclear Weapon
Free Zones (NWFZs) agreements.
1
The project thus starts with the question: what is the most effective agreement towards
regional nuclear disarmament, and what are the most relevant determinants for effective
negotiations to access such accords?
To address such a question the project first aims to create a novel data set on what might
be called “Vertical Technology Proliferation” (VTP). This data set would collect data on
nuclear military technology programmes by Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS)1 . The purpose
is to study how NWS have managed to work around NPT Article VI2 , and to explore the
effects of such programmes on both bilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in the past
and overall nuclear proliferation3 . This first part aims to critically assess the structure of
arms control among NWS in order to explore its shortcomings, with particular attention to
“spillover” effects in regional contexts.
Some preliminary questions arise. Has VTP seen relevant reductions compared to the
reduction in number of physical nuclear weapons? What has been the role of VTP on
bilateral negotiations between NWS and is VTP related to latent horizontal proliferation4 ?
Secondly, the project will explore the potential of negotiations already developed within
the nuclear realm. NWFZ agreements will be studied with a focus on the determinants for
positive negotiations. A preliminary question that ensues is: what are the determinants of
cooperative security agreements such as NWFZ treaties?
The purpose is to focus more on the conditions for effective negotiations rather than the
negotiation dynamics itself.
1.1
State of the art
Military nuclear technology arms race: a way around NPT article VI? - This part of the
project falls mainly within the research devoted to the effectiveness of the NPT and on
its potential shortcomings in preventing military nuclear proliferation (see., Fuhrmann and
Lupu 2016, Wohlstetter 1976).
The literature has typically been ranging between effectiveness and non-effectiveness of
the NPT. In addition to that, recent studies have tried to put forth a quantitative analysis
1
The focus will not be posed on the number of new warheads but on nuclear-related projects that are
connected to technological developments in nuclear armaments. Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015) have recently
introduced a data set on enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology. This will be expanded to taechnology that have a significant role in improving the nuclear-related capabilities of a country.
2
With Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nuclear-weapon states
undertakes to negotiate in good faith the cessation of the nuclear arms race together with a treaty on general
disarmament. The text of the treaty can be found at: https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/
npt/text/
3
In this case much attention will be posed on enrichment and reprocessing latent capabilities of non-nuclear
states.
4
Horizontal proliferation is typically conceived as the increase in the number of states having nuclear
arsenals (see., Arbatov 2004). Latent nuclear proliferation is instead understood as the increase in the
knowledge, infrastructure and management of the process of creation of a military nuclear device and has
been mainly described in terms of Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) facilities (see., Fuhrmann and Tkach
2015)
2
of the effectiveness of the NPT in reducing the spread of nuclear weapons, addressing the
problem of ex ante treaty commitment preferences of states (Fuhrmann and Lupu 2016).
Moreover, NPT Article VI, has attracted the attention of scholars (see., Ford 2007, Hopmann 2020, Kiernan 2011) in terms of interpretation in addition to effectiveness. Accordingly,
the problem of commitments to the cessation of the arms race 5 , contained in the text of article VI, has typically led researchers and practitioners to address the role of technology
and modernization of nuclear arsenals onto the understanding of the term Arms Race (see.,
Kristensen and Norris 2014)
In terms of potential effects on the credibility of the NPT, some authors have shifted
the attention from proliferation in terms of number of nuclear weapons to “proliferation”
in terms of endless modernisation(see., Arbatov 2004, Kristensen 2014). According to this
literature, whether on one side the overall number of nuclear weapons has decreased, on
the other nuclear weapons modernisation programmes has been on the rise and has also
maintained relevant roles in nuclear postures.
The present project will take stock of the foregoing considerations and dwell in the, often
neglected, approach to technology that goes under the name of technological determinism
(see., MacKenzie 1989). Accordingly, the causal relation between politics and technological
development, with a focus on nuclear armaments, is analysed starting from technology and
observing the effects on politcs, in the sense that the independent evolution of technology is
addressed, in a later stage, by politics. Eventual political decisions are more often considered
as justifications of technological developments rather than the other way around (see., Bethe
1985, Zuckerman 1980).
This strand of literature has brought scholars to look at nuclear disarmament agreements,
mainly between US and Russia, as consequences of technological developments rather than
autonomous stances (see., Bethe 1985).
Moreover, there is the possibility that the signature of fundamental treaties and agreements, in the nuclear realm, has seen an ex ante selection approach into them. An example
is provided by the ABM treaty6 . The argument goes like this: the two parties involved in
negotiations accepted to put some limits to ABM technology because both of them already
had MIRV7 technology that rendered ABM technolgy less useful (see., York 1973)
This body of literature presesents specific limitations. First, it lacks reliance on a quantative collection of data on military nuclear modernisation and development projects that would
allow a more systematic study. Secondly, it does not address, in a comprehensive way, the
effect of the technological imperative on fundamental negotiated agreements between nuclear
powers in the past. Thirdly, it does not consider the effects of technological developments
in nuclear armaments, by NWS, on the overall proliferation of nuclear weapons-related technology throughout the world.
5
The text of the treaty can be found at: https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) posed limits to technology against strategic nuclear ballistic
missiles. The text of the treaty is available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/101888.htm
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Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology represents missiles able to carry
multiple nuclear warheads. A portion of these warheads are typically decoys that follow the same ballistic
trajectories in the absence of a medium such as air (see., York 1973)
6
3
Cooperative security and NWFZ - The second part of the research falls within the study
of cooperative security 8 in relation to multilateral agreements in arms control.
The problem of selection between value-claiming (distributive bargaining) and cooperative approaches to negotiations in arms control has been studied extensively (see., Hopmann
2020). Moreover, a growing understanding of negotiation dynamics and outcomes in multilateral arrangements seems to suggest that distributing bargaining typically leads to suboptimal agreements in terms of the potential gains to the involved parties (see., Hopmann
2019, Sebenius 1992).
Arms control and disarmament agreements, also in the nuclear realm, seem to have typically been pervaded by value-claiming approaches (see., Hopmann 2020). A potential exception to such a trend is provided by Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) (see., Finaud
2014, Hamel-Green 2009, Riet 2015, Thakur 1998).
The main limitation that this literature shows, for instance in evaluating how to implement new NWFZ, is provided by a scarcity of quantitative studies oriented towards a detailed
identification of the major determinants for effective negotiations within this realm.
1.2
Beyond the state of the art: preliminary structure of the
project
My research will thus address questions related, on one side, to the effects of technological
developments on bilateral nuclear agreements between mainly the US and USSR/Russia. On
the other side, a search for relevant determinants for states to get access to NWFZ treaties
will characterise the second group of questions.
Technological imperative: quantitative evaluation of ex-ante selection into bilateral nuclear agreements between US and USSR/Russia and its effects - The first research questions
that the phd project will address are: has technological modernisation in the military represented an ex-ante determinant for military nuclear agreements between the United States
and USSR/Russia? What has been the role of the “technological arms race” among Nuclear
Superpowers on the global increase in military-oriented nuclear knowledge (Nuclear Latency)?
NWFZ agreements determinants - The second batch of research questions that the phd
project will answer is related to the determinats that proved central in prompting states into
NWFZ cooperative security agreements. In particular, a starting question to answer will be:
what are the most important determinants that proved highly effective in prompting states
into NWFZ cooperative security agreements in the past?
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A different term used instead of cooperative security is mutual security
4
1.3
Contributions
The research project will contribute in many ways to the research on preconditions for effective nuclear negotiations. The first part of the project will impose a conceptual separation
between “classic” proliferation and “latent” one, grounded in quantitative data. The novel
data collection will simultaneously contribute to the strand of research dealing with the role
of technological developments in prompting nuclear states into nuclear military agreements
(see., Bethe 1985, Zuckerman 1980). Moreover, the data collection will allow to study the
effects of such latent proliferation on latent horizontal proliferation as well. Classic vertical proliferation9 has been showed to be connected to horizontal proliferation in many ways
(see., Arbatov 2004, Lodgaard 1991). A central purpose of the dataset is to allow studies
that connect VTP to horizontal proliferation in order to “measure” the effects technological
developments, by nuclear weapon states, on regional, and overall, nuclear proliferation.
A second contribution will be in terms of quantitative research in NWFZ creation and
effectiveness in preventing nuclear proliferation. Analysing why states access negotiations
and finally ratify multilateral treaties in the nuclear realm (e.g. NPT) has been addressed
by scholars (see., Fuhrmann and Lupu 2016). The research project will address the reduced
problem of accession and effectiveness of NWFZ treaties as examples of cooperative security
accords. This has never been addressed quantitatively.
2
Methodology
Large-N methods will represent the main tool adopted by the project. Nonetheless, some case
studies will be invoked as well along the research. Accordingly, a mixed-methods approach
will characterise my research. Moreover, the study of the technologies involved in military
nuclear projects will summon Physics.
Large-N analysis - Econometric regression techniques will have a central role in the research. Panel analysis, in particular, will be used to answer the research questions whenever
suitable for the collected data. Moreover, more complex multi-stage research designs will
be explored in order to provide more precise claims regarding causal relationships in treaty
accession and effectiveness (see., ibid.).
Finally, network theory will be explored while addressing specific batch of subquestions.
In particular, in the evaluation of internal and external determinants on nuclear latent proliferation, network theory might prove necessary (see., Borrie et al. 2006, Goldblum et al. 2019).
Case studies - Both the first and the second part of the research could also be supported
by case-study analysis.
The large-N methodology will be paired with this latter tool in a mixed-methods approach,
with potential benefits to causal relationships (see., Fearon et al. 2008).
9
Vertical proliferation is considered to be the way in which states that posses nuclear weapons improve
and expand their arsenals (see., Sidel 2007)
5
Case studies will be selected, either in the first or the second part of the research, both
according to their “typicality” or “outlier” traits (see., Gerring 2008) in order either to
provide typical examples or put forth explanations in atypical cases (see., Gerring 2004).
Moreover, cases like the 6-party talks and the negotiations around the JCPOA will be
discussed, in a comparative fashion, in order to assess the main traits that characterised such
processes.
2.1
Challenges
Data collection - One main obstacle to the creation of a novel dataset on nuclear-related
military technology (what we called the VTP dataset) is the typical secrecy in which military
programmes are shrouded.
Nonetheless, Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015) have taken up the challenge to create a dataset
dealing mainly with Enrichment and Reprocessing Facilities (ENR). In order to move forward, a potential novel dataset will take into account every project that bears significance
in relation to nuclear arsenals. This will be including, but not limited to, missile technology,
nanotechnology and computer simulation algorithms. The purpose is to move beyond the
“classic” proliferation technology as it has typically been conceived of (see., Zentner et al.
2005). The unit of analysis could be, similarly to Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015), the research
facility.
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