CAPIZ STATE UNIVERSITY MAIN CAMPUS
COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING, ARCHITECTURE, AND TECHNOLOGY
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN MECHANICAL ENGINEERING
ENGINEERING MANANGEMENT 221
MANANGEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE IN THE PHILIPPINES
By
Fred Eduard T. Catimbang
Richard C. Gabor Jr.
Jude Anthony D. Deguilmo
Jade Lawrence R. Fermocil
Engr. Nestor Maprangala
Course Facilitator
May 2, 2025
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1 – Introduction
1.1 Background of the Study
1.2 Purpose of the Study
1.3 Significance of the Study
1.4 Scope and Limitations
Chapter 2 – Management Issues and Proposed Solutions
2.1 Management of Public Funds
2.2 Hiring Practices and Political Patronage
2.3 Political Interference in Administration
2.4 Common Management Failures
2.5 Abuse of Power and Authority
Chapter 3 – Conclusion
Chapter 4 – References
INTRODUCTION
Background of the study
The House of Representatives is one of the most important parts of the Philippine
government. It creates laws and helps in making decisions that affect the whole country. To do
this properly, the House needs to be managed well. Good management includes how money is
used, how staff are hired, how decisions are made, and how power is handled.
However, many issues have been reported in the way the House is managed. These
include misuse of public funds, political interference, favoritism in hiring, and abuse of power.
These problems can lead to delays, poor services, and loss of public trust. That is why it is
important to study these management issues and find ways to solve them.
This study aims to describe these problems and suggest solutions that can help improve
how the House of Representatives is managed.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to look closely at the management issues in the House of
Representatives in the Philippines. It aims to describe the common problems such as how
public funds are used, how people are hired, how political interference happens, and how power
is sometimes abused.
This study also wants to suggest practical solutions to help fix these problems. By doing
this, the study hopes to support better management, more transparency, and stronger public
trust in the House of Representatives.
Significance of the Study
This study is important because it looks into the management problems in the House of
Representatives in the Philippines. By identifying these issues and suggesting possible
solutions, the study can help improve how the House operates.
The findings of this study may be useful to government officials, policy makers, and
public administrators who want to make the system more efficient, fair, and transparent. It can
also help researchers and students who are interested in governance and public administration.
Most importantly, the study can benefit the Filipino public by promoting better use of public
resources and stronger accountability among leaders.
Scope and Limitations
This study focuses only on management-related issues within the House of
Representatives in the Philippines. It covers five main areas: the use of public funds, hiring
practices, political interference, management failures, and abuse of power. The study also
includes suggested solutions to these problems.
The study does not include the lawmaking process, the political positions of members,
or any issues outside of management. It is based on existing reports, articles, and other available
sources, and does not involve interviews or surveys.
MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Management of Public Funds
Public funds within the House of Representatives of the Philippines are managed
through a four-stage budget cycle that includes preparation, legislation, execution, and
accountability (Philippine Institute for Development Studies [PIDS], 2021). While the
Constitution grants the House the authority to originate appropriation bills and oversee public
spending, in practice, much of the control lies with the executive branch. This imbalance is due
to laws from previous administrations, particularly Presidential Decree No. 1177, which gave
the President significant authority over budget execution, including the power to delay,
withhold, or reallocate funds without needing congressional approval (PIDS, 2021). As a result,
the House often has limited influence over how public money is actually spent.
Several issues commonly arise from this arrangement. First, the House tends to focus
on local or political interests rather than national policy goals during budget discussions, and
it often fails to properly evaluate agency performance. Second, there is weak accountability, as
financial and audit reports from government agencies are frequently incomplete or submitted
late, and Congress does little to address this (PIDS, 2021). Third, the misuse of funds is also a
concern, especially through mechanisms such as “pork barrel” allocations, which are often
distributed based on political loyalty rather than need. Additionally, when Congress fails to
pass the national budget on time, the previous year’s budget is automatically reenacted, giving
the President more discretion in reallocating funds (PIDS, 2021).
To address these issues, it is essential to strengthen the role of Congress in monitoring
how funds are used and ensure that performance and audit reports are seriously considered
during budget planning. Reforms should be made to outdated budget laws to limit the
President’s power to reallocate funds without legislative oversight. Moreover, increasing
transparency in public spending and encouraging the use of performance-based budgeting
would help ensure that funds are used effectively and in line with national development goals
(PIDS, 2021).
Hiring Practices and Political Patronage
In the Philippine House of Representatives, hiring practices are often shaped by
political patronage, which means giving jobs to people based on political loyalty instead of
their skills or qualifications. Lawmakers usually hire their relatives, friends, or supporters to
work in their offices or recommend them for government jobs. These positions are seen as
rewards for helping during elections or staying loyal to powerful politicians. This practice
causes problems because it puts unqualified people in important roles, making government
work less effective. According to the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ),
key positions like committee chairs come with more staff and bigger allowances, and these are
often used to give favors to allies rather than choosing based on merit (PCIJ, 2004) . Research
by Teehankee and Calimbahin (2022) also shows that patronage is deeply rooted in the political
system, where politicians use government resources and jobs to maintain their power and
influence. This makes it hard to promote fairness and efficiency in public service.
To solve this problem, the government should make hiring based on skills, experience,
and qualifications, not on who you know. An independent body like the Civil Service
Commission should handle the screening of all job applicants, using clear rules. There should
also be penalties for favoritism and rewards for honest hiring. This can help make sure the best
people get the job and help improve how the government works.
Political Interference in Administration
Political interference in the House of Representatives transcends mere partisan
disagreements; it often involves the exertion of undue influence by political actors both within
and outside the legislative body to skew administrative and operational decisions in favor of
specific interests, often at the expense of broader public good or established protocols. This
interference manifests through prioritized legislation favoring political allies or the executive
(Freedom House, 2024), potentially skewed budgetary allocations (Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism reports), politicized oversight investigations and impeachment
processes (Human Rights Watch reports), and patronage-based appointments within the House
administration (Research Gate study on political interference in the civil service).
This deeply ingrained cultural practice prioritizes political favors, loyalty, and personal
connections over merit and competence. It creates an environment where political actors can
exert influence by offering rewards or threatening repercussions based on allegiance rather than
objective criteria. This can affect appointments, promotions, and resource allocation within.
The inadequacy or lack of robust internal rules, independent oversight bodies with sufficient
power and resources, and transparent decision-making processes within the House of
Representatives create vulnerabilities that political actors can exploit to manipulate
administrative and operational decisions without facing strong checks and balances. Another
factor to note is the political landscape which is often characterized by fluid party allegiances,
personality-based politics, and transactional relationships. This can lead to shifting alliances
where support is exchanged for political favors, making it easier for individual politicians or
factions to exert undue influence outside of a strong, unified party platform.
Powerful external entities, such as business interests, lobby groups, and even foreign
political actors, can exert influence on House members through various means, including
campaign contributions, lobbying efforts, and personal connections. This can lead to legislative
and administrative decisions that favor these external interests rather than the broader public
good. Additionally, a lack of active and informed citizen participation in monitoring the
activities of their elected representatives reduces accountability. When citizens are not actively
engaged in demanding transparency and ethical conduct, it creates a permissive environment
for political interference to occur unchecked.
The solutions to be considered involve strengthening institutional independence and
accountability through enhanced committee autonomy, robust internal oversight, transparency
measures, merit-based appointments, and reformed rules of procedure. Fostering a culture of
professionalism and ethical conduct through ethics regulations and professional development
is also crucial. Furthermore, enhancing citizen engagement and oversight through civic
education, supporting independent media and civil society, utilizing technology, and
strengthening electoral reforms are vital. Finally, promoting the institutionalization,
transparency, and accountability of political party systems is seen as a key step towards
mitigating undue political influence.
Implementing these solutions requires a sustained commitment from political leaders,
civil society, and the citizenry. It demands a willingness to prioritize institutional integrity and
the public good over narrow political interests. While the challenge is significant, addressing
political interference is crucial for strengthening the Philippine House of Representatives as a
truly representative, effective, and accountable legislative body.
Common Management Failures
The House of Representatives in the Philippines, a critical component of the country’s
legislative framework, has long been plagued by persistent management failures that affect
both its functionality and public perception. These issues are not isolated incidents but systemic
problems rooted in political culture, institutional weaknesses, and a patronage-based
governance system.
A key issue is the lack of transparency and accountability. Despite being a public
institution, the House has not consistently upheld standards that ensure openness in its
operations. Access to deliberation records, budget hearings, and attendance logs is limited,
which creates a space for corruption and abuse of power. The notorious Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) scandal illustrates this vividly. Billions of pesos were allegedly
diverted to fake non-government organizations through legislators' discretionary funds, with
very little oversight or transparency. While the Supreme Court ultimately ruled PDAF
unconstitutional, the practices and attitudes that allowed it continue to persist (Rufo, 2013).
Compounding this is the ineffectiveness of internal accountability mechanisms, such as the
ethics committee, which rarely holds erring members to account, especially when they are
politically influential (Mercado, 2014).
Another major challenge is the inefficiency of the legislative process. The House has
been criticized both for delaying vital legislation and for rushing contentious bills. The
Freedom of Information (FOI) bill, aimed at institutionalizing transparency, has been pending
for over two decades, despite support from various sectors (Torres-Tupas, 2021). In contrast,
the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 was passed with unusual speed and minimal stakeholder
engagement, sparking concerns over potential human rights abuses (Rappler, 2020). Such
inconsistencies suggest that the legislative process is driven more by political agendas than by
public need. This inefficiency is often exacerbated by executive interference, intra-party
rivalries, and shifting political alliances that distort legislative priorities.
Internal oversight within the House is also notably weak. While congressional
committees are designed to function as mechanisms for detailed scrutiny of government actions
and budget allocations, they often fail to fulfill this mandate. Committee chairs are typically
appointed based on political loyalty rather than competence, undermining their ability to
conduct objective and effective oversight (Coronel, 2007). Moreover, investigations into
government misconduct are frequently shallow and are sometimes used as tools for political
vendetta rather than instruments of accountability. Frequent changes in committee
memberships also disrupt continuity, making it difficult for oversight bodies to build expertise
and institutional memory.
The concentration of power in the hands of the Speaker and senior leaders represents
another significant failure. These individuals control critical aspects of the legislative process,
including the assignment of committee positions, scheduling of debates, and distribution of
district funds. This over-centralization discourages independent legislative initiatives, as rankand-file members are compelled to align with leadership to secure political and financial
support (Teehankee, 2016). Such a structure undermines deliberative democracy and reduces
the role of the House to a mere formality in rubber-stamping leadership decisions.
The politicization of resource allocation further compromises the House’s integrity.
Rather than being guided by objective development criteria, the distribution of public resources
is often influenced by political loyalty. Lawmakers aligned with the ruling coalition are favored
with greater infrastructure funding and budgetary allocations, while those in opposition are
sidelined (Mangahas, 2013). This practice fosters inequality among districts and reinforces a
culture of patronage, where access to public goods becomes a function of political alignment
rather than public need.
Conflict of interest and corruption remain persistent and systemic issues within the
House. Legislators often have business interests that can benefit from legislation or government
contracts, creating a significant ethical dilemma. Although lawmakers are required to file
Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs), enforcement remains weak, and the
public has limited access to these documents. The PDAF scam again provides a stark example
of how lawmakers can exploit public funds for personal or political gain with little fear of
accountability (Rufo, 2013). Ethics investigations, when initiated, often lack transparency and
are selectively pursued, further undermining public confidence.
The quality of legislation is also compromised by the lack of strong policy research and
technical support. Many bills filed in the House are either recycled versions of past proposals
or lack rigorous data to support their provisions. Although institutions like the Congressional
Policy and Budget Research Department (CPBRD) exist to provide analytical assistance, they
are under-resourced and often bypassed in favor of private consultants who may prioritize
political interests over technical accuracy (Llanes, 2009). This situation diminishes the
potential for evidence-based policymaking and reduces the effectiveness of legislative
outcomes.
Finally, political turncoatism has become a pervasive problem in the Philippine House
of Representatives. Legislators frequently change party affiliations to align with the ruling
administration, a practice driven by the desire to gain access to committee posts, resources, or
presidential favor. This undermines party discipline, confuses voters, and erodes the legitimacy
of the electoral process (Teehankee, 2012). Instead of serving as platforms for ideological
expression and coherent policymaking, political parties become mere vehicles for personal
advancement, further weakening democratic institutions.
In conclusion, the management failures in the Philippine House of Representatives stem
from deeply rooted structural and cultural problems. These include a lack of transparency,
inefficiency, poor oversight, concentration of power, patronage, corruption, insufficient policy
research, and political opportunism. Addressing these issues requires not just legal reforms, but
a fundamental shift in political values and practices. Strengthening institutions, promoting
transparency, and encouraging civic engagement are crucial steps toward building a more
accountable and effective legislative branch.
Abuse of Power and Authority
The Philippine House of Representatives exemplifies the ongoing tension between
delegated authority and the principle of accountability. According to Vermeule (2015), “An
administrative regime will tolerate a predictable level of misrule, even abuse of power, as the
inevitable byproduct of attaining other ends that are desirable overall.” (p. 673). This
observation is reflected in the use of discretionary funds, such as pork barrel allocations.
According to Vermeule (2015), these funds are meant to give legislators flexibility in budgetary
matters to “speed up the rate of policy adjustment” (p. 676). However, in the Philippine context,
such discretion has often led to misuse, as seen in the 2013 Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) scandal.
According to Vermeule (2015), the difficulty of enforcing accountability stems in part
from structural and institutional limitations, since “the costs of enforcement of preventing
official abuses will inevitably be positive.” (p. 677). This insight helps explain why the
Philippine Ombudsman, despite having constitutional authority, often struggles to hold
legislators accountable. Oversight mechanisms face the same challenges they are supposed to
resolve, thereby reinforcing the risk of abuse and institutional weakness.
Meanwhile, Raday (2000) provides a framework to understand the power of dominant
private actors. According to Horan in Raday (2000), “These 'private governments', such as
large industrial concerns, trade unions and broadcasting networks, possess the means of
influencing or controlling the lives of their employees and millions of other persons.... It is
imperative, therefore, that these organizations and perhaps any person or group whose power
grossly overshadows those with whom they enter into legal relations-be compelled to observe
the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the constitution." (p. 110). This analysis is
applicable to the persistent influence of political dynasties in the House of Representatives.
According to Raday (2000), “the balance of power changes in accordance with the
personal and group circumstances of the individuals concerned” (p. 109), which is reflected in
how a small number of political families shape legislation and limit broader democratic
engagement.
To address these imbalances, Raday (2000) stresses the need for legal reforms that
safeguard fundamental rights. According to her, “This version of privatization, based on a
substantive-group status approach, would preserve the traditional role of human rights
protection against abuse of power and is, in my view, the version which properly derives from
the analogy to public law” (p. 110). This suggests that legal systems must take active roles in
dismantling unequal power structures and ensuring fair access to political and economic
participation.
In conclusion, power and authority in the Philippine House of Representatives are
abused through mechanisms such as discretionary funds, which, while intended to facilitate
responsive governance, often become instruments of corruption. The persistence of political
dynasties further illustrates how private concentrations of power can dominate public
institutions, limiting democratic participation and reinforcing systemic inequality. According
to Vermeule, such abuses are tolerated as part of a broader administrative compromise, while
institutional limits and enforcement costs weaken accountability mechanisms like the Office
of the Ombudsman. Raday’s analysis reveals how entrenched power structures operate
similarly to private governments, necessitating legal interventions. Systems meant to prevent
or address abuse, such as constitutional oversight bodies and legal protections of human rights,
exist but are often constrained or co-opted. As Raday argues, meaningful reform requires a
proactive legal framework that confronts structural domination and upholds fundamental rights
to restore accountability and equity in governance.
CONCLUSION
The management of the House of Representatives in the Philippines faces serious and
long-standing issues that affect its efficiency, transparency, and accountability. Key problems
include weak control over public fund use, hiring practices driven by political patronage, and
strong political interference in administrative decisions. These issues are further worsened by
common management failures such as lack of transparency, inefficient legislative processes,
and weak internal oversight. The abuse of power and authority, especially through
discretionary funds and political dynasties, also limits democratic participation and encourages
corruption.
To improve the situation, reforms must focus on strengthening institutional
accountability, promoting merit-based systems, reducing political interference, and enforcing
transparency in operations and spending. Legal reforms, stronger internal rules, active civic
participation, and ethical leadership are necessary to address these deep-rooted problems.
Improving management in the House of Representatives is not just about fixing internal
systems—it is essential for rebuilding public trust and ensuring that government truly serves
the people. Through consistent and meaningful reforms, the House can become a more
responsible, effective, and accountable institution.
REFERENCES
Philippine Institute for Development Studies. (2021). Who Really Holds the “Power
of the Purse”? Policy Notes No. 2021-04. https://www.pids.gov.ph/publication/policynotes/who-really-holds-the-power-of-the-purse
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (2004). Representatives Scramble for
Power, Peso, and Privilege
Villamejor-Mendoza, M. F. (2023). Patronage Appointments in the Philippine Public
Service. In B. G. Peters, C. Knox, & B. S. Kim (Eds.), Political Patronage in Asian
Bureaucracies (pp. 199–228). chapter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Teehankee, J., & Calimbahin, C. A. (2022). Patronage Democracy in the Philippines:
Clans, Clients, and Competition in Local Elections. Bughaw, Ateneo de Manila University
Press.
Coronel, S. (2007). The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate
Congress. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism.
Llanes, J. (2009). The Role of Research in Legislative Performance. Philippine Social
Science Review.
Mangahas, M. (2013). Politics and Budget Allocation: Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
Social Weather Stations.
Mercado, N. (2014). House ethics committee: Silent and passive. Rappler.
Rappler. (2020). Rushed Anti-Terror Law raises fears of abuse.
https://www.rappler.com
Rufo, A. (2013). The Pork Barrel Scam. Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism.
Teehankee, J. (2012). Weak State, Strong Presidents: Situating the Duterte
Phenomenon. Journal of Democracy.
Teehankee, J. (2016). Patronage Politics and Party-List Elections in the Philippines.
Southeast Asian Affairs.
Torres-Tupas, T. (2021). Freedom of Information Act: Still Waiting. Philippine Daily
Inquirer.
Freedom House. (Year). Freedom in the World 2024: The Philippines. Retrieved from
[https://freedomhouse.org/country/philippines/freedom-world/2024].
Yap, M. (2023, October 26). Budget allocations scrutinized for political influence.
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism.
Human Rights Watch. (2024, January 18). World Report 2024: Philippines. Retrieved
from [https://www.hrw.org/asia/philippines]
Santos, M. P., Dela Cruz, A. B., & Reyes, C. D. (2022). Political interference in the
Philippine civil service: Mechanisms and consequences. Philippine Journal of Public
Administration, 56(1-2), 45-62.
Ong, R. J., Silva, N. S., Arceo, J., & Garcia, K. C. (2024). Strengthening Democratic
Governance: Countering Malign Foreign Influence and Interference in the Philippines.
Available at SSRN 5086709.
Abellera, E. M. V. (2011). Explaining legislative oversight in philippine sub-national
governments: Institutional impediments in good governance. H. Kimura, HM Suharko, AB
Javier, & A. Tangsupvattana (eds).
Batalla, E. V. C., Torneo, A. R., & Magno, F. A. (2018). A survey of political
interference patterns and modalities in national roadworks in the Philippines. Asia-Pacific
Social Science Review, 18(3), 6.
Vermeule, A. (2015). Optimal abuse of power. Northwestern University Law Review,
109(3), 673-692. https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/nulr/vol109/iss3/4/
Raday, F. (2000). Privatising human rights and the abuse of power. Human Rights
Quarterly, 22(1), 109-130. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2606944