US GOVERNMENT AND CIVICS
POL 101
COURSE READINGS
Table of Contents
Part I – Principles of American Politics: The Declaration of Independence ................................ 4
Magna Carta 1215 ...................................................................................................................................... 4
English Bill of Rights 1689 ..................................................................................................................... 12
The Declaration of Independence ......................................................................................................... 17
That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights… ..................................................................................................................................................... 20
Politics: Aristotle.............................................................................................................................................................. 20
The Second Treatise of Civil Government: John Locke ............................................................................................. 22
Genesis 4 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 24
Letter to Roger Weightman: Thomas Jefferson ........................................................................................................... 25
Among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness ............................................................ 26
Letter to Henry Lee: Thomas Jefferson ........................................................................................................................ 26
Nicomachean Ethics: Aristotle ...................................................................................................................................... 27
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom: Thomas Jefferson ....................................................................................... 29
“Memorial and Remonstrance”: James Madison........................................................................................................ 30
Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association: Thomas Jefferson .................................................................................. 34
The Second Treatise of Civil Government: John Locke ............................................................................................. 35
“Property”: James Madison ........................................................................................................................................... 36
“That to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed…” .................................................................................................... 38
Election Sermon: Samuel Cooper .................................................................................................................................. 38
“That whenever any government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the People to
alter or abolish it…”................................................................................................................................ 48
An Election Sermon: Gad Hitchcock ............................................................................................................................ 48
The Right of Revolution ................................................................................................................................................. 55
Romans 13: 1-14 ............................................................................................................................................................... 57
“to reduce them under absolute despotism…” .................................................................................... 59
Aristotle’s Politics Book V, Chapter 11 ......................................................................................................................... 59
“…to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its
powers in such form, as to them shall seem mostly likely to affect their safety and happiness.” .. 61
The Second Treatise of Civil Government, Chapter 9: John Locke .......................................................................... 61
Second Treatise of Civil Government, Chapter 11: John Locke................................................................................ 63
Articles of Confederation ............................................................................................................................................... 67
Vices of the Political System of the United States....................................................................................................... 74
Part II – Principles of American Government: The Constitution of 1787 ................................... 80
The Constitution of 1787 ........................................................................................................................ 80
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The Federalist No. 1 ........................................................................................................................................................ 95
The Federalist No. 10 ...................................................................................................................................................... 96
The Federalist No. 39 .................................................................................................................................................... 100
The Federalist No. 43 .................................................................................................................................................... 104
The Federalist No. 45 .................................................................................................................................................... 107
The Federalist No. 46 .................................................................................................................................................... 108
The Federalist No. 47 .................................................................................................................................................... 109
The Federalist No. 48 .................................................................................................................................................... 111
The Federalist No. 49 .................................................................................................................................................... 113
The Federalist No. 51 .................................................................................................................................................... 116
The Federalist No. 55 .................................................................................................................................................... 119
The Federalist No. 57 .................................................................................................................................................... 121
The Federalist No. 58 .................................................................................................................................................... 124
The Federalist No. 62 .................................................................................................................................................... 127
The Federalist No. 63 .................................................................................................................................................... 131
The Federalist No. 69 .................................................................................................................................................... 135
The Federalist No. 70 .................................................................................................................................................... 139
The Federalist No. 71 .................................................................................................................................................... 143
The Federalist No. 72 .................................................................................................................................................... 146
The Federalist No. 78 .................................................................................................................................................... 149
The Federalist No. 79 .................................................................................................................................................... 155
The Federalist No. 80 .................................................................................................................................................... 156
The Federalist No. 84 .................................................................................................................................................... 161
Brutus No. 1.................................................................................................................................................................... 167
Brutus No. 4.................................................................................................................................................................... 170
Brutus No. 11.................................................................................................................................................................. 173
Brutus No. 12.................................................................................................................................................................. 177
Brutus No. 15.................................................................................................................................................................. 181
Brutus No. 16.................................................................................................................................................................. 185
Centinel No. 1 ................................................................................................................................................................ 188
Cato No. 5 ....................................................................................................................................................................... 191
CATO No. 45 .................................................................................................................................................................. 194
Old Whig No. 5 .............................................................................................................................................................. 196
Part III – The History of American Politics: Revolutions and returns .................................... 201
Washington’s First Inaugural Address ...................................................................................................................... 201
Letter to the Hebrew Congregation at Newport ...................................................................................................... 203
Washington’s Farewell Address ................................................................................................................................. 204
Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address ............................................................................................................................ 214
Northwest Ordinance ................................................................................................................................................... 217
“Socialism and Democracy” ........................................................................................................................................ 221
“The Study of Administration” ................................................................................................................................... 224
“The Future of Liberalism” .......................................................................................................................................... 229
Commonwealth Club Address .................................................................................................................................... 233
“Commencement Address at the University of Michigan” .................................................................................... 240
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Part I – Principles of American Politics: The
Declaration of Independence
MAGNA CARTA 1215
Preamble:
John, by the grace of God, king of England, lord of Ireland, duke of Normandy and Aquitaine, and
count of Anjou, to the archbishop, bishops, abbots, earls, barons, justiciaries, foresters, sheriffs,
stewards, servants, and to all his bailiffs and liege subjects, greetings. Know that, having regard to God
and for the salvation of our soul, and those of all our ancestors and heirs, and unto the honor of God
and the advancement of his holy Church and for the rectifying of our realm, we have granted as
underwritten by advice of our venerable fathers, Stephen, archbishop of Canterbury, primate of all
England and cardinal of the holy Roman Church, Henry, archbishop of Dublin, William of
London, Peter of Winchester, Jocelyn of Bath and Glastonbury, Hugh of Lincoln, Walter of
Worcester, William of Coventry, Benedictof Rochester, bishops; of Master Pandulf, subdeacon and
member of the household of our lord the Pope, of brother Aymeric (master of the Knights of the
Temple in England), and of the illustrious men William Marshal, earl of Pembroke, William, earl of
Salisbury, William, earl of Warenne, William, earl of Arundel, Alan of Galloway (constable of
Scotland), Waren Fitz Gerold, Peter Fitz Herbert, Hubert De Burgh(seneschal of Poitou), Hugh de
Neville, Matthew Fitz Herbert, Thomas Basset, Alan Basset, Philip d'Aubigny, Robert of
Roppesley, John Marshal, John Fitz Hugh, and others, our liegemen.
1. In the first place we have granted to God, and by this our present charter confirmed for us and our
heirs forever that the English Church shall be free, and shall have her rights entire, and her liberties
inviolate; and we will that it be thus observed; which is apparent from this that the freedom of
elections, which is reckoned most important and very essential to the English Church, we, of our pure
and unconstrained will, did grant, and did by our charter confirm and did obtain the ratification of the
same from our lord, Pope Innocent III, before the quarrel arose between us and our barons: and this we
will observe, and our will is that it be observed in good faith by our heirs forever. We have also granted
to all freemen of our kingdom, for us and our heirs forever, all the underwritten liberties, to be had and
held by them and their heirs, of us and our heirs forever.
2. If any of our earls or barons, or others holding of us in chief by military service shall have died, and
at the time of his death his heir shall be full of age and owe "relief", he shall have his inheritance by the
old relief, to wit, the heir or heirs of an earl, for the whole baroncy of an earl by L100; the heir or heirs
of a baron, L100 for a whole barony; the heir or heirs of a knight, 100s, at most, and whoever owes less
let him give less, according to the ancient custom of fees.
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3. If, however, the heir of any one of the aforesaid has been under age and in wardship, let him have his
inheritance without relief and without fine when he comes of age.
4. The guardian of the land of an heir who is thus under age, shall take from the land of the heir
nothing but reasonable produce, reasonable customs, and reasonable services, and that without
destruction or waste of men or goods; and if we have committed the wardship of the lands of any such
minor to the sheriff, or to any other who is responsible to us for its issues, and he has made destruction
or waster of what he holds in wardship, we will take of him amends, and the land shall be committed
to two lawful and discreet men of that fee, who shall be responsible for the issues to us or to him to
whom we shall assign them; and if we have given or sold the wardship of any such land to anyone and
he has therein made destruction or waste, he shall lose that wardship, and it shall be transferred to two
lawful and discreet men of that fief, who shall be responsible to us in like manner as aforesaid.
5. The guardian, moreover, so long as he has the wardship of the land, shall keep up the houses, parks,
fishponds, stanks, mills, and other things pertaining to the land, out of the issues of the same land; and
he shall restore to the heir, when he has come to full age, all his land, stocked with ploughs and
wainage, according as the season of husbandry shall require, and the issues of the land can reasonable
bear.
6. Heirs shall be married without disparagement, yet so that before the marriage takes place the nearest
in blood to that heir shall have notice.
7. A widow, after the death of her husband, shall forthwith and without difficulty have her marriage
portion and inheritance; nor shall she give anything for her dower, or for her marriage portion, or for
the inheritance which her husband and she held on the day of the death of that husband; and she may
remain in the house of her husband for forty days after his death, within which time her dower shall be
assigned to her.
8. No widow shall be compelled to marry, so long as she prefers to live without a husband; provided
always that she gives security not to marry without our consent, if she holds of us, or without the
consent of the lord of whom she holds, if she holds of another.
9. Neither we nor our bailiffs will seize any land or rent for any debt, as long as the chattels of the
debtor are sufficient to repay the debt; nor shall the sureties of the debtor be distrained so long as the
principal debtor is able to satisfy the debt; and if the principal debtor shall fail to pay the debt, having
nothing wherewith to pay it, then the sureties shall answer for the debt; and let them have the lands
and rents of the debtor, if they desire them, until they are indemnified for the debt which they have
paid for him, unless the principal debtor can show proof that he is discharged thereof as against the
said sureties.
10. If one who has borrowed from the Jews any sum, great or small, die before that loan be repaid, the
debt shall not bear interest while the heir is under age, of whomsoever he may hold; and if the debt fall
into our hands, we will not take anything except the principal sum contained in the bond.
11. And if anyone die indebted to the Jews, his wife shall have her dower and pay nothing of that debt;
and if any children of the deceased are left under age, necessaries shall be provided for them in keeping
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with the holding of the deceased; and out of the residue the debt shall be paid, reserving, however,
service due to feudal lords; in like manner let it be done touching debts due to others than Jews.
12. No scutage not aid shall be imposed on our kingdom, unless by common counsel of our kingdom,
except for ransoming our person, for making our eldest son a knight, and for once marrying our eldest
daughter; and for these there shall not be levied more than a reasonable aid. In like manner it shall be
done concerning aids from the city of London.
13. And the city of London shall have all it ancient liberties and free customs, as well by land as by
water; furthermore, we decree and grant that all other cities, boroughs, towns, and ports shall have all
their liberties and free customs.
14. And for obtaining the common counsel of the kingdom anent the assessing of an aid (except in the
three cases aforesaid) or of a scutage, we will cause to be summoned the archbishops, bishops, abbots,
earls, and greater barons, severally by our letters; and we will moveover cause to be summoned
generally, through our sheriffs and bailiffs, and others who hold of us in chief, for a fixed date, namely,
after the expiry of at least forty days, and at a fixed place; and in all letters of such summons we will
specify the reason of the summons. And when the summons has thus been made, the business shall
proceed on the day appointed, according to the counsel of such as are present, although not all who
were summoned have come.
15. We will not for the future grant to anyone license to take an aid from his own free tenants, except to
ransom his person, to make his eldest son a knight, and once to marry his eldest daughter; and on each
of these occasions there shall be levied only a reasonable aid.
16. No one shall be distrained for performance of greater service for a knight's fee, or for any other free
tenement, than is due therefrom.
17. Common pleas shall not follow our court, but shall be held in some fixed place.
18. Inquests of novel disseisin, of mort d'ancestor, and of darrein presentment shall not be held
elsewhere than in their own county courts, and that in manner following; We, or, if we should be out of
the realm, our chief justiciar, will send two justiciaries through every county four times a year, who
shall alone with four knights of the county chosen by the county, hold the said assizes in the county
court, on the day and in the place of meeting of that court.
19. And if any of the said assizes cannot be taken on the day of the county court, let there remain of the
knights and freeholders, who were present at the county court on that day, as many as may be required
for the efficient making of judgments, according as the business be more or less.
20. A freeman shall not be amerced for a slight offense, except in accordance with the degree of the
offense; and for a grave offense he shall be amerced in accordance with the gravity of the offense, yet
saving always his "contentment"; and a merchant in the same way, saving his "merchandise"; and a
villein shall be amerced in the same way, saving his "wainage" if they have fallen into our mercy: and
none of the aforesaid amercements shall be imposed except by the oath of honest men of the
neighborhood.
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21. Earls and barons shall not be amerced except through their peers, and only in accordance with the
degree of the offense.
22. A clerk shall not be amerced in respect of his lay holding except after the manner of the others
aforesaid; further, he shall not be amerced in accordance with the extent of his ecclesiastical benefice.
23. No village or individual shall be compelled to make bridges at river banks, except those who from
of old were legally bound to do so.
24. No sheriff, constable, coroners, or others of our bailiffs, shall hold pleas of our Crown.
25. All counties, hundred, wapentakes, and trithings (except our demesne manors) shall remain at the
old rents, and without any additional payment.
26. If anyone holding of us a lay fief shall die, and our sheriff or bailiff shall exhibit our letters patent of
summons for a debt which the deceased owed us, it shall be lawful for our sheriff or bailiff to attach
and enroll the chattels of the deceased, found upon the lay fief, to the value of that debt, at the sight of
law worthy men, provided always that nothing whatever be thence removed until the debt which is
evident shall be fully paid to us; and the residue shall be left to the executors to fulfill the will of the
deceased; and if there be nothing due from him to us, all the chattels shall go to the deceased, saving to
his wife and children their reasonable shares.
27. If any freeman shall die intestate, his chattels shall be distributed by the hands of his nearest
kinsfolk and friends, under supervision of the Church, saving to every one the debts which the
deceased owed to him.
28. No constable or other bailiff of ours shall take corn or other provisions from anyone without
immediately tendering money therefor, unless he can have postponement thereof by permission of the
seller.
29. No constable shall compel any knight to give money in lieu of castle-guard, when he is willing to
perform it in his own person, or (if he himself cannot do it from any reasonable cause) then by another
responsible man. Further, if we have led or sent him upon military service, he shall be relieved from
guard in proportion to the time during which he has been on service because of us.
30. No sheriff or bailiff of ours, or other person, shall take the horses or carts of any freeman for
transport duty, against the will of the said freeman.
31. Neither we nor our bailiffs shall take, for our castles or for any other work of ours, wood which is
not ours, against the will of the owner of that wood.
32. We will not retain beyond one year and one day, the lands those who have been convicted of
felony, and the lands shall thereafter be handed over to the lords of the fiefs.
33. All kydells for the future shall be removed altogether from Thames and Medway, and throughout
all England, except upon the seashore.
34. The writ which is called praecipe shall not for the future be issued to anyone, regarding any
tenement whereby a freeman may lose his court.
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35. Let there be one measure of wine throughout our whole realm; and one measure of ale; and one
measure of corn, to wit, "the London quarter"; and one width of cloth (whether dyed, or russet, or
"halberget"), to wit, two ells within the selvedges; of weights also let it be as of measures.
36. Nothing in future shall be given or taken for awrit of inquisition of life or limbs, but freely it shall be
granted, and never denied.
37. If anyone holds of us by fee-farm, either by socage or by burage, or of any other land by knight's
service, we will not (by reason of that fee-farm, socage, or burgage), have the wardship of the heir, or of
such land of his as if of the fief of that other; nor shall we have wardship of that fee-farm, socage, or
burgage, unless such fee-farm owes knight's service. We will not by reason of any small serjeancy
which anyone may hold of us by the service of rendering to us knives, arrows, or the like, have
wardship of his heir or of the land which he holds of another lord by knight's service.
38. No bailiff for the future shall, upon his own unsupported complaint, put anyone to his "law",
without credible witnesses brought for this purposes.
39. No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we
go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
40. To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.
41. All merchants shall have safe and secure exit from England, and entry to England, with the right to
tarry there and to move about as well by land as by water, for buying and selling by the ancient and
right customs, quit from all evil tolls, except (in time of war) such merchants as are of the land at war
with us. And if such are found in our land at the beginning of the war, they shall be detained, without
injury to their bodies or goods, until information be received by us, or by our chief justiciar, how the
merchants of our land found in the land at war with us are treated; and if our men are safe there, the
others shall be safe in our land.
42. It shall be lawful in future for anyone (excepting always those imprisoned or outlawed in
accordance with the law of the kingdom, and natives of any country at war with us, and merchants,
who shall be treated as if above provided) to leave our kingdom and to return, safe and secure by land
and water, except for a short period in time of war, on grounds of public policy- reserving always the
allegiance due to us.
43. If anyone holding of some escheat (such as the honor of Wallingford, Nottingham, Boulogne,
Lancaster, or of other escheats which are in our hands and are baronies) shall die, his heir shall give no
other relief, and perform no other service to us than he would have done to the baron if that barony
had been in the baron's hand; and we shall hold it in the same manner in which the baron held it.
44. Men who dwell without the forest need not henceforth come before our justiciaries of the forest
upon a general summons, unless they are in plea, or sureties of one or more, who are attached for the
forest.
45. We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs only such as know the law of the realm
and mean to observe it well.
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46. All barons who have founded abbeys, concerning which they hold charters from the kings of
England, or of which they have long continued possession, shall have the wardship of them, when
vacant, as they ought to have.
47. All forests that have been made such in our time shall forthwith be disafforsted; and a similar
course shall be followed with regard to river banks that have been placed "in defense" by us in our
time.
48. All evil customs connected with forests and warrens, foresters and warreners, sheriffs and their
officers, river banks and their wardens, shall immediately by inquired into in each county by twelve
sworn knights of the same county chosen by the honest men of the same county, and shall, within forty
days of the said inquest, be utterly abolished, so as never to be restored, provided always that we
previously have intimation thereof, or our justiciar, if we should not be in England.
49. We will immediately restore all hostages and charters delivered to us by Englishmen, as sureties of
the peace of faithful service.
50. We will entirely remove from their bailiwicks, the relations of Gerard of Athee (so that in future
they shall have no bailiwick in England); namely, Engelard of Cigogne, Peter, Guy, and Andrew of
Chanceaux, Guy of Cigogne, Geoffrey of Martigny with his brothers, Philip Mark with his brothers and
his nephew Geoffrey, and the whole brood of the same.
51. As soon as peace is restored, we will banish from the kingdom all foreign born knights,
crossbowmen, serjeants, and mercenary soldiers who have come with horses and arms to the
kingdom's hurt.
52. If anyone has been dispossessed or removed by us, without the legal judgment of his peers, from
his lands, castles, franchises, or from his right, we will immediately restore them to him; and if a
dispute arise over this, then let it be decided by the five and twenty barons of whom mention is made
below in the clause for securing the peace. Moreover, for all those possessions, from which anyone has,
without the lawful judgment of his peers, been disseised or removed, by our father, King Henry, or by
our brother, King Richard, and which we retain in our hand (or which as possessed by others, to whom
we are bound to warrant them) we shall have respite until the usual term of crusaders; excepting those
things about which a plea has been raised, or an inquest made by our order, before our taking of the
cross; but as soon as we return from the expedition, we will immediately grant full justice therein.
53. We shall have, moreover, the same respite and in the same manner in rendering justice concerning
the disafforestation or retention of those forests which Henry our father and Richard our brother
afforested, and concerning the wardship of lands which are of the fief of another (namely, such
wardships as we have hitherto had by reason of a fief which anyone held of us by knight's service), and
concerning abbeys founded on other fiefs than our own, in which the lord of the fee claims to have
right; and when we have returned, or if we desist from our expedition, we will immediately grant full
justice to all who complain of such things.
54. No one shall be arrested or imprisoned upon the appeal of a woman, for the death of any other than
her husband.
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55. All fines made with us unjustly and against the law of the land, and all amercements, imposed
unjustly and against the law of the land, shall be entirely remitted, or else it shall be done concerning
them according to the decision of the five and twenty barons whom mention is made below in the
clause for securing the pease, or according to the judgment of the majority of the same, along with the
aforesaid Stephen, archbishop of Canterbury, if he can be present, and such others as he may wish to
bring with him for this purpose, and if he cannot be present the business shall nevertheless proceed
without him, provided always that if any one or more of the aforesaid five and twenty barons are in a
similar suit, they shall be removed as far as concerns this particular judgment, others being substituted
in their places after having been selected by the rest of the same five and twenty for this purpose only,
and after having been sworn.
56. If we have disseised or removed Welshmen from lands or liberties, or other things, without the
legal judgment of their peers in England or in Wales, they shall be immediately restored to them; and if
a dispute arise over this, then let it be decided in the marches by the judgment of their peers; for the
tenements in England according to the law of England, for tenements in Wales according to the law of
Wales, and for tenements in the marches according to the law of the marches. Welshmen shall do the
same to us and ours.
57. Further, for all those possessions from which any Welshman has, without the lawful judgment of
his peers, been disseised or removed by King Henry our father, or King Richard our brother, and which
we retain in our hand (or which are possessed by others, and which we ought to warrant), we will have
respite until the usual term of crusaders; excepting those things about which a plea has been raised or
an inquest made by our order before we took the cross; but as soon as we return (or if perchance we
desist from our expedition), we will immediately grant full justice in accordance with the laws of the
Welsh and in relation to the foresaid regions.
58. We will immediately give up the son of Llywelyn and all the hostages of Wales, and the charters
delivered to us as security for the peace.
59. We will do towards Alexander, king of Scots, concerning the return of his sisters and his hostages,
and concerning his franchises, and his right, in the same manner as we shall do towards our owher
barons of England, unless it ought to be otherwise according to the charters which we hold
from William his father, formerly king of Scots; and this shall be according to the judgment of his peers
in our court.
60. Moreover, all these aforesaid customs and liberties, the observances of which we have granted in
our kingdom as far as pertains to us towards our men, shall be observed by all of our kingdom, as well
clergy as laymen, as far as pertains to them towards their men.
61. Since, moveover, for God and the amendment of our kingdom and for the better allaying of the
quarrel that has arisen between us and our barons, we have granted all these concessions, desirous that
they should enjoy them in complete and firm endurance forever, we give and grant to them the
underwritten security, namely, that the barons choose five and twenty barons of the kingdom,
whomsoever they will, who shall be bound with all their might, to observe and hold, and cause to be
observed, the peace and liberties we have granted and confirmed to them by this our present Charter,
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so that if we, or our justiciar, or our bailiffs or any one of our officers, shall in anything be at fault
towards anyone, or shall have broken any one of the articles of this peace or of this security, and the
offense be notified to four barons of the foresaid five and twenty, the said four barons shall repair to us
(or our justiciar, if we are out of the realm) and, laying the transgression before us, petition to have that
transgression redressed without delay. And if we shall not have corrected the transgression (or, in the
event of our being out of the realm, if our justiciar shall not have corrected it) within forty days,
reckoning from the time it has been intimated to us (or to our justiciar, if we should be out of the
realm), the four barons aforesaid shall refer that matter to the rest of the five and twenty barons, and
those five and twenty barons shall, together with the community of the whole realm, distrain and
distress us in all possible ways, namely, by seizing our castles, lands, possessions, and in any other way
they can, until redress has been obtained as they deem fit, saving harmless our own person, and the
persons of our queen and children; and when redress has been obtained, they shall resume their old
relations towards us. And let whoever in the country desires it, swear to obey the orders of the said five
and twenty barons for the execution of all the aforesaid matters, and along with them, to molest us to
the utmost of his power; and we publicly and freely grant leave to everyone who wishes to swear, and
we shall never forbid anyone to swear. All those, moveover, in the land who of themselves and of their
own accord are unwilling to swear to the twenty five to help them in constraining and molesting us, we
shall by our command compel the same to swear to the effect foresaid. And if any one of the five and
twenty barons shall have died or departed from the land, or be incapacitated in any other manner
which would prevent the foresaid provisions being carried out, those of the said twenty five barons
who are left shall choose another in his place according to their own judgment, and he shall be sworn
in the same way as the others. Further, in all matters, the execution of which is entrusted,to these
twenty five barons, if perchance these twenty five are present and disagree about anything, or if some
of them, after being summoned, are unwilling or unable to be present, that which the majority of those
present ordain or command shall be held as fixed and established, exactly as if the whole twenty five
had concurred in this; and the said twenty five shall swear that they will faithfully observe all that is
aforesaid, and cause it to be observed with all their might. And we shall procure nothing from anyone,
directly or indirectly, whereby any part of these concessions and liberties might be revoked or
diminished; and if any such things has been procured, let it be void and null, and we shall never use it
personally or by another.
62. And all the will, hatreds, and bitterness that have arisen between us and our men, clergy and lay,
from the date of the quarrel, we have completely remitted and pardoned to everyone. Moreover, all
trespasses occasioned by the said quarrel, from Easter in the sixteenth year of our reign till the
restoration of peace, we have fully remitted to all, both clergy and laymen, and completely forgiven, as
far as pertains to us. And on this head, we have caused to be made for them letters testimonial patent of
the lord Stephen, archbishop of Canterbury, of the lord Henry, archbishop of Dublin, of the bishops
aforesaid, and of Master Pandulf as touching this security and the concessions aforesaid.
63. Wherefore we will and firmly order that the English Church be free, and that the men in our
kingdom have and hold all the aforesaid liberties, rights, and concessions, well and peaceably, freely
and quietly, fully and wholly, for themselves and their heirs, of us and our heirs, in all respects and in
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all places forever, as is aforesaid. An oath, moreover, has been taken, as well on our part as on the part
of the barons, that all these conditions aforesaid shall be kept in good faith and without evil intent.
Given under our hand - the above named and many others being witnesses - in the meadow which is
called Runnymede, between Windsor and Staines, on the fifteenth day of June, in the seventeenth year
of our reign.
ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS 1689
An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the
Crown
Whereas the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons assembled at Westminster, lawfully, fully
and freely representing all the estates of the people of this realm, did upon the thirteenth day of
February in the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred eighty-eight [old style date] present unto
their Majesties, then called and known by the names and style of William and Mary, prince and
princess of Orange, being present in their proper persons, a certain declaration in writing made by the
said Lords and Commons in the words following, viz.:
Whereas the late King James the Second, by the assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges and
ministers employed by him, did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion and the
laws and liberties of this kingdom;
By assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws and the execution of
laws without consent of Parliament;
By committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates for humbly petitioning to be excused from
concurring to the said assumed power;
By issuing and causing to be executed a commission under the great seal for erecting a court called the
Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes;
By levying money for and to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative for other time and in
other manner than the same was granted by Parliament;
By raising and keeping a standing army within this kingdom in time of peace without consent of
Parliament, and quartering soldiers contrary to law;
By causing several good subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the same time when papists were
both armed and employed contrary to law;
By violating the freedom of election of members to serve in Parliament;
By prosecutions in the Court of King's Bench for matters and causes cognizable only in Parliament, and
by divers other arbitrary and illegal courses;
12
And whereas of late years partial corrupt and unqualified persons have been returned and served on
juries in trials, and particularly divers jurors in trials for high treason which were not freeholders;
And excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases to elude the benefit of
the laws made for the liberty of the subjects;
And excessive fines have been imposed;
And illegal and cruel punishments inflicted;
And several grants and promises made of fines and forfeitures before any conviction or judgment
against the persons upon whom the same were to be levied;
All which are utterly and directly contrary to the known laws and statutes and freedom of this realm;
And whereas the said late King James the Second having abdicated the government and the throne
being thereby vacant, his Highness the prince of Orange (whom it hath pleased Almighty God to make
the glorious instrument of delivering this kingdom from popery and arbitrary power) did (by the
advice of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and divers principal persons of the Commons) cause letters
to be written to the Lords Spiritual and Temporal being Protestants, and other letters to the several
counties, cities, universities, boroughs and cinque ports, for the choosing of such persons to represent
them as were of right to be sent to Parliament, to meet and sit at Westminster upon the two and
twentieth day of January in this year one thousand six hundred eighty and eight [old style date], in
order to such an establishment as that their religion, laws and liberties might not again be in danger of
being subverted, upon which letters elections having been accordingly made;
And thereupon the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, pursuant to their respective
letters and elections, being now assembled in a full and free representative of this nation, taking into
their most serious consideration the best means for attaining the ends aforesaid, do in the first place (as
their ancestors in like case have usually done) for the vindicating and asserting their ancient rights and
liberties declare
That the pretended power of suspending the laws or the execution of laws by regal authority without
consent of Parliament is illegal;
That the pretended power of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regal authority, as it
hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal;
That the commission for erecting the late Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes, and all
other commissions and courts of like nature, are illegal and pernicious;
That levying money for or to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative, without grant of
Parliament, for longer time, or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal;
That it is the right of the subjects to petition the king, and all commitments and prosecutions for such
petitioning are illegal;
That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with
consent of Parliament, is against law;
13
That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and
as allowed by law;
That election of members of Parliament ought to be free;
That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or
questioned in any court or place out of Parliament;
That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted;
That jurors ought to be duly impanelled and returned, and jurors which pass upon men in trials for
high treason ought to be freeholders;
That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction are illegal
and void;
And that for redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening and preserving of the laws,
Parliaments ought to be held frequently.
And they do claim, demand and insist upon all and singular the premises as their undoubted rights
and liberties, and that no declarations, judgments, doings or proceedings to the prejudice of the people
in any of the said premises ought in any wise to be drawn hereafter into consequence or example; to
which demand of their rights they are particularly encouraged by the declaration of his Highness the
prince of Orange as being the only means for obtaining a full redress and remedy therein. Having
therefore an entire confidence that his said Highness the prince of Orange will perfect the deliverance
so far advanced by him, and will still preserve them from the violation of their rights which they have
here asserted, and from all other attempts upon their religion, rights and liberties, the said Lords
Spiritual and Temporal and Commons assembled at Westminster do resolve that William and Mary,
prince and princess of Orange, be and be declared king and queen of England, France and Ireland and
the dominions thereunto belonging, to hold the crown and royal dignity of the said kingdoms and
dominions to them, the said prince and princess, during their lives and the life of the survivor to them,
and that the sole and full exercise of the regal power be only in and executed by the said prince of
Orange in the names of the said prince and princess during their joint lives, and after their deceases the
said crown and royal dignity of the same kingdoms and dominions to be to the heirs of the body of the
said princess, and for default of such issue to the Princess Anne of Denmark and the heirs of her body,
and for default of such issue to the heirs of the body of the said prince of Orange. And the Lords
Spiritual and Temporal and Commons do pray the said prince and princess to accept the same
accordingly.
And that the oaths hereafter mentioned be taken by all persons of whom the oaths have allegiance and
supremacy might be required by law, instead of them; and that the said oaths of allegiance and
supremacy be abrogated.
I, A.B., do sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to their Majesties
King William and Queen Mary. So help me God.
14
I, A.B., do swear that I do from my heart abhor, detest and abjure as impious and heretical this
damnable doctrine and position, that princes excommunicated or deprived by the Pope or any
authority of the see of Rome may be deposed or murdered by their subjects or any other whatsoever.
And I do declare that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have any
jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm.
So help me God.
Upon which their said Majesties did accept the crown and royal dignity of the kingdoms of England,
France and Ireland, and the dominions thereunto belonging, according to the resolution and desire of
the said Lords and Commons contained in the said declaration. And thereupon their Majesties were
pleased that the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, being the two Houses of
Parliament, should continue to sit, and with their Majesties' royal concurrence make effectual provision
for the settlement of the religion, laws and liberties of this kingdom, so that the same for the future
might not be in danger again of being subverted, to which the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and
Commons did agree, and proceed to act accordingly. Now in pursuance of the premises the said Lords
Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in Parliament assembled, for the ratifying, confirming and
establishing the said declaration and the articles, clauses, matters and things therein contained by the
force of law made in due form by authority of Parliament, do pray that it may be declared and enacted
that all and singular the rights and liberties asserted and claimed in the said declaration are the true,
ancient and indubitable rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom, and so shall be esteemed,
allowed, adjudged, deemed and taken to be; and that all and every the particulars aforesaid shall be
firmly and strictly holden and observed as they are expressed in the said declaration, and all officers
and ministers whatsoever shall serve their Majesties and their successors according to the same in all
time to come. And the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, seriously considering how it
hath pleased Almighty God in his marvellous providence and merciful goodness to this nation to
provide and preserve their said Majesties' royal persons most happily to reign over us upon the throne
of their ancestors, for which they render unto him from the bottom of their hearts their humblest
thanks and praises, do truly, firmly, assuredly and in the sincerity of their hearts think, and do hereby
recognize, acknowledge and declare, that King James the Second having abdicated the government,
and their Majesties having accepted the crown and royal dignity as aforesaid, their said Majesties did
become, were, are and of right ought to be by the laws of this realm our sovereign liege lord and lady,
king and queen of England, France and Ireland and the dominions thereunto belonging, in and to
whose princely persons the royal state, crown and dignity of the said realms with all honours, styles,
titles, regalities, prerogatives, powers, jurisdictions and authorities to the same belonging and
appertaining are most fully, rightfully and entirely invested and incorporated, united and annexed.
And for preventing all questions and divisions in this realm by reason of any pretended titles to the
crown, and for preserving a certainty in the succession thereof, in and upon which the unity, peace,
tranquility and safety of this nation doth under God wholly consist and depend, the said Lords
Spiritual and Temporal and Commons do beseech their Majesties that it may be enacted, established
and declared, that the crown and regal government of the said kingdoms and dominions, with all and
singular the premises thereunto belonging and appertaining, shall be and continue to their said
Majesties and the survivor of them during their lives and the life of the survivor of them, and that the
15
entire, perfect and full exercise of the regal power and government be only in and executed by his
Majesty in the names of both their Majesties during their joint lives; and after their deceases the said
crown and premises shall be and remain to the heirs of the body of her Majesty, and for default of such
issue to her Royal Highness the Princess Anne of Denmark and the heirs of the body of his said
Majesty; and thereunto the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons do in the name of all the
people aforesaid most humbly and faithfully submit themselves, their heirs and posterities for ever,
and do faithfully promise that they will stand to, maintain and defend their said Majesties, and also the
limitation and succession of the crown herein specified and contained, to the utmost of their powers
with their lives and estates against all persons whatsoever that shall attempt anything to the contrary.
And whereas it hath been found by experience that it is inconsistent with the safety and welfare of this
Protestant kingdom to be governed by a popish prince, or by any king or queen marrying a papist, the
said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons do further pray that it may be enacted, that all and
every person and persons that is, are or shall be reconciled to or shall hold communion with the see or
Church of Rome, or shall profess the popish religion, or shall marry a papist, shall be excluded and be
for ever incapable to inherit, possess or enjoy the crown and government of this realm and Ireland and
the dominions thereunto belonging or any part of the same, or to have, use or exercise any regal power,
authority or jurisdiction within the same; and in all and every such case or cases the people of these
realms shall be and are hereby absolved of their allegiance; and the said crown and government shall
from time to time descend to and be enjoyed by such person or persons being Protestants as should
have inherited and enjoyed the same in case the said person or persons so reconciled, holding
communion or professing or marrying as aforesaid were naturally dead; and that every king and queen
of this realm who at any time hereafter shall come to and succeed in the imperial crown of this
kingdom shall on the first day of the meeting of the first Parliament next after his or her coming to the
crown, sitting in his or her throne in the House of Peers in the presence of the Lords and Commons
therein assembled, or at his or her coronation before such person or persons who shall administer the
coronation oath to him or her at the time of his or her taking the said oath (which shall first happen),
make, subscribe and audibly repeat the declaration mentioned in the statute made in the thirtieth year
of the reign of King Charles the Second entitled, _An Act for the more effectual preserving the king's
person and government by disabling papists from sitting in either House of Parliament._ But if it shall
happen that such king or queen upon his or her succession to the crown of this realm shall be under the
age of twelve years, then every such king or queen shall make, subscribe and audibly repeat the same
declaration at his or her coronation or the first day of the meeting of the first Parliament as aforesaid
which shall first happen after such king or queen shall have attained the said age of twelve years. All
which their Majesties are contented and pleased shall be declared, enacted and established by authority
of this present Parliament, and shall stand, remain and be the law of this realm for ever; and the same
are by their said Majesties, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and
Commons in Parliament assembled and by the authority of the same, declared, enacted and established
accordingly.
II. And be it further declared and enacted by the authority aforesaid, that from and after this present
session of Parliament no dispensation by _non obstante_ of or to any statute or any part thereof shall be
allowed, but that the same shall be held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in
16
such statute, and except in such cases as shall be specially provided for by one or more bill or bills to be
passed during this present session of Parliament.
III. Provided that no charter or grant or pardon granted before the three and twentieth day of October
in the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred eighty-nine shall be any ways impeached or
invalidated by this Act, but that the same shall be and remain of the same force and effect in law and no
other than as if this Act had never been made.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
In Congress, July 4, 1776
The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America,
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political
bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to
the separation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to
them shall seem most likely to affect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that
Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all
experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to
right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of
abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under
absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new
Guards for their future security.--Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is
now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of
the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct
object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted
to a candid world.
He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.
He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless
suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly
neglected to attend to them.
17
He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those
people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and
formidable to tyrants only.
He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the
depository of their public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his
measures.
He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions
on the rights of the people.
He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the
Legislative powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise;
the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and
convulsions within.
He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws
for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and
raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.
He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing
Judiciary powers.
He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
payment of their salaries.
He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harrass our people,
and eat out their substance.
He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures.
He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.
He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and
unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation:
For Quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:
For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from punishment for any Murders which they should commit on
the Inhabitants of these States:
For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world:
For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent:
For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury:
For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences
For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an
Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit
instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies:
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For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the
Forms of our Governments:
For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us
in all cases whatsoever.
He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us.
He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our
people.
He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death,
desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled in
the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation.
He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their
Country, to become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their
Hands.
He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of
our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished
destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.
In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our
repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince whose character is thus
marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.
Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our Brittish brethren. We have warned them from time to
time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have
reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their
native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to
disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence.
They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in
the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind,
Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.
We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled,
appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and
by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United
Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all
Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great
Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full
Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts
and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a
firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our
Fortunes and our sacred Honor.
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THAT ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL, THAT THEY ARE
ENDOWED BY THEIR CREATOR WITH CERTAIN
UNALIENABLE RIGHTS…
Politics: Aristotle
Book I, Chapter 2
He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a city or anything else, will
obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist
without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and this is a union which
is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants,
mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves), and of natural ruler and
subject, that both may be preserved. For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature
intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a
subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest.
***
The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants, and the
members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard,' and by Epimenides the Cretan,
'companions of the manger.' But when several families are united, and the association aims at
something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village. And the
most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the
children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.' And this is the reason
why Hellenic cities were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule
before they came together, as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore
in the colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same
blood. As Homer says:
Each one gives law to his children and to his wives.
For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say that the Gods have
a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they
imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like their own.
When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite
self-sufficing, the city comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in
existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the
city, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully
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developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final
cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.
Hence it is evident that the city is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And
he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a polis, is either a bad man or above humanity;
he is like the
Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,
whom Homer denounces -- the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an
isolated piece at draughts.
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident.
Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed
with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is
therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the
intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the
expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of
man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of
living beings who have this sense makes a family and a city.
Further, the city is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of
necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand,
except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be
no better than that. But things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that
they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they have the same
name. The proof that the polis is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual,
when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is
unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast
or a god: he is no part of a polis. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first
founded the polis was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but,
when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more
dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, which
he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most
savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in poleis, for
the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in
political society.
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The Second Treatise of Civil Government: John Locke
Chapter 2
Of the State of Nature.
Sec. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what
state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose
of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without
asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than
another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank,
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also
be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them
all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an
evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
***
Sec. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that state have
an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy
himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare
preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one:
and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all
the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign
master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose
workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with
like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such
subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one
another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to preserve
himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not
in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be
to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life,
the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.
Sec. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one
another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind,
the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a
right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of
nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world 'be in vain, if there were no body that in
the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain
offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one
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may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of
one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
Sec. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute or
arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats,
or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and
conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for
reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to
another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares
himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has
set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye,
which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a
trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature,
every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where
it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath
transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his
example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN
HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF
NATURE.
***
Sec. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one has the executive power of
the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their
own cases, that selflove will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side,
that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but
confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to
restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy
for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be great, where men may be judges
in their own case, since it is easy to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an
injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this
objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of
those evils, which necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature
is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better
it is than the state of nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his
own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to
question or controul those who execute his pleasure and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason,
mistake or passion, must be submitted to. Much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men are not
bound to submit to the unjust will of another. And if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any
other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.
23
Genesis 4
Now the man had relations with his wife Eve, and she conceived and gave birth to Cain, and she said,
“I have gotten a manchild with the help of the LORD.” 2 Again, she gave birth to his brother Abel.
And Abel was a keeper of flocks, but Cain was a tiller of the ground. 3 So it came about in the course of
time that Cain brought an offering to the LORD of the fruit of the ground. 4 Abel, on his part also
brought of the firstlings of his flock and of their fat portions. And the LORD had regard for Abel and for
his offering; 5 but for Cain and for his offering He had no regard. So Cain became very angry and his
countenance fell. 6 Then the LORD said to Cain, “Why are you angry? And why has your countenance
fallen? 7 If you do well, will not your countenance be lifted up? And if you do not do well, sin is
crouching at the door; and its desire is for you, but you must master it.” 8 Cain told Abel his brother.
And it came about when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against Abel his brother and killed
him.
Then the LORD said to Cain, “Where is Abel your brother?” And he said, “I do not know. Am I my
brother’s keeper?” 10 He said, “What have you done? The voice of your brother’s blood is crying to Me
from the ground. 11 Now you are cursed from the ground, which has opened its mouth to receive your
brother’s blood from your hand. 12 When you cultivate the ground, it will no longer yield its strength to
you; you will be a vagrant and a wanderer on the earth.” 13 Cain said to the LORD, “My punishment is
too great to bear! 14 Behold, You have driven me this day from the face of the ground; and from Your
face I will be hidden, and I will be a vagrant and a wanderer on the earth, and whoever finds me will
kill me.” 15 So the LORD said to him, “Therefore whoever kills Cain, vengeance will be taken on
him sevenfold.” And the LORD [g]appointed a sign for Cain, so that no one finding him would slay him.
9
16
Then Cain went out from the presence of the LORD, and settled in the land of Nod, east of Eden.
Cain had relations with his wife and she conceived, and gave birth to Enoch; and he built a city, and
called the name of the city Enoch, after the name of his son. 18 Now to Enoch was born Irad, and
Irad became the father of Mehujael, and Mehujael [l]became the father of Methushael, and
Methushael [m]became the father of Lamech. 19 Lamech took to himself two wives: the name of the one
was Adah, and the name of the other, Zillah. 20 Adah gave birth to Jabal; he was the father of those who
dwell in tents and have livestock. 21 His brother’s name was Jubal; he was the father of all those who
play the lyre and pipe. 22 As for Zillah, she also gave birth to Tubal-cain, the forger of all implements of
bronze and iron; and the sister of Tubal-cain was Naamah.
17
23
Lamech said to his wives,
“Adah and Zillah,
Listen to my voice,
You wives of Lamech,
Give heed to my speech,
For I have killed a man for wounding me;
And a boy for striking me;
24
24
If Cain is avenged sevenfold,
Then Lamech seventy-sevenfold.”
Adam had relations with his wife again; and she gave birth to a son, and named him Seth, for, she
said, “God has appointed me another offspring in place of Abel, for Cain killed him.” 26 To Seth, to him
also a son was born; and he called his name Enosh. Then men began to call upon the name of the LORD.
25
Letter to Roger Weightman: Thomas Jefferson
1826
Respected Sir
The kind invitation I receive from you on the part of the citizens of the city of Washington, to be
present with them at their celebration of the 50th. anniversary of American independence; as one of the
surviving signers of an instrument pregnant with our own, and the fate of the world, is most flattering
to myself, and heightened by the honorable accompaniment proposed for the comfort of such a
journey. It adds sensibly to the sufferings of sickness, to be deprived by it of a personal participation in
the rejoicings of that day. But acquiescence is a duty, under circumstances not placed among those we
are permitted to controul. I should, indeed, with peculiar delight, have met and exchanged there
congratulations personally with the small band, the remnant of that host of worthies, who joined with
us on that day, in the bold and doubtful election we were to make for our country, between submission
or the sword; and to have enjoyed with them the consolatory fact, that our fellow citizens, after half a
century of experience and prosperity, continue to approve the choice we made. may it be to the world,
what I believe it will be, (to some parts sooner, to others later, but finally to all,) the Signal of arousing
men to burst the chains, under which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind
themselves, and to assume the blessings & security of self-government. That form which we have
substituted, restores the free right to the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opinion. All
eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already
laid open to every view. the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles
on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of
god. These are grounds of hope for others. For ourselves, let the annual return of this day forever
refresh our recollections of these rights, and an undiminished devotion to them.
I will ask permission here to express the pleasure with which I should have met my ancient neighbors
of the City of Washington and of its vicinities, with whom I passed so many years of a pleasing social
intercourse; an intercourse which so much relieved the anxieties of the public cares, and left
impressions so deeply engraved in my affections, as never to be forgotten. With my regret that ill
health forbids me the gratification of an acceptance, be pleased to receive for yourself, and those for
whom you write, the assurance of my highest respect and friendly attachments.
Th. Jefferson
25
AMONG THESE ARE LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT
OF HAPPINESS
Letter to Henry Lee: Thomas Jefferson
1825
DEAR SIR, -Your favor of Apr. 29 has been duly recieved, and the offer of mineralogical specimens from Mr. Myer
has been communicated to Dr. Emmet our Professor of Natural history. The last donation of the
legislature to the University was appropriated specifically to a library and apparatus of every kind. But
we apply it first to the more important articles of a library, of an astronomical, physical, & chemical
apparatus. And we think it safest to see what these will cost, before we venture on collections of
mineral & other subjects, the last we must proportion to what sum we shall have left only. The
Professor possesses already what he thinks will be sufficient for mineralogical and geological
explanations to his school. I do not know how far he might be tempted to enlarge his possession by a
catalogue of articles and prices, if both should be satisfactory. If Mr. Myer chuses to send such a
catalogue, it shall be returned to you immediately, if the purchase be not approved. That George
Mason was the author of the bill of rights, and the constitution founded on it, the evidence of the day
established fully in my mind. Of the paper you mention, purporting to be instructions to the Virginia
delegation in Congress, I have no recollection. If it were anything more than a project of some private
hand, that is to say, had any such instructions been ever given by the convention, they would appear in
the journals, which we possess entire. But with respect to our rights, and the acts of the British
government contravening those rights, there was but one opinion on this side of the water. All
American whigs thought alike on these subjects. When forced, therefore, to resort to arms for redress,
an appeal to the tribunal of the world was deemed proper for our justification. This was the object of
the Declaration of Independence. Not to find out new principles, or new arguments, never before
thought of, not merely to say things which had never been said before; but to place before mankind the
common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent, and to justify
ourselves in the independent stand we are compelled to take. Neither aiming at originality of principle
or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular and previous writing, it was intended to be an
expression of the American mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by
the occasion. All its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed
in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle,
Cicero, Locke, Sidney, &c. The historical documents which you mention as in your possession, ought
all to be found, and I am persuaded you will find, to be corroborative of the facts and principles
advanced in that Declaration.
Be pleased to accept assurances of my great esteem and respect.
26
Nicomachean Ethics: Aristotle
Book IX, Chapter 8
But one might raise an impasse whether one ought to love oneself most, or someone else. For people
criticize those who show the most fondness for themselves, and, as though they were in disgrace,
disparage them as self-lovers; and it seems that a base person does everything for his own sake, and
that someone is the more corrupt to the extent that he does so the more– so that people complain about
him, for example, that he does nothing apart from his own interest– but a decent person acts on
account of what is beautiful, and the better a person he is, the more on account of the beautiful, and for
the sake of a friend, while he disregards his own interest. But the facts are not in harmony with these
claims, and this is not unreasonable. For people say that one ought to love one’s best friend most, and a
best friend is someone who wishes for good things for the sake of that person for whom he wishes
them, even if no one is going to know he does; but this belongs most of all to oneself in relation to
oneself, and so too do all the rest of the things by which a friend is defined, for it was said that all the
things that have to do with friendship arise out of oneself and extend to others.1 And all the proverbs
agree with this opinion, such as “one soul” and “the things of friends are common” and “friendship is
equal relationship” and “the knee is closer than the shin,”2 since all these would apply most of all to
oneself, for one is a friend to oneself most of all, and so what he ought to love most is himself. So there
is appropriately an impasse about which side it is right to follow, since both have a certain credibility.
Now perhaps it is necessary to separate these sorts of arguments and to distinguish to what extent and
in what way each of them is truthful. So if we were to grasp the sense in which each side means love of
self, it would probably become clear. Now those who bring it into reproach call people self-lovers who
distribute a greater amount to themselves in the way of money, honors, and bodily pleasures, since
most people crave these and zealously chase after them as though they were the best things, so that
they are also things that are fought over. Those, then, who are greedy for these things gratify their
desires and their passions generally, and the irrational part of the soul, and most people are of this
kind; hence, from its being bad for the most part, the name has become so as well, and people justly
reproach those who love themselves in this way. And it is not unclear that most people are accustomed
to mean by self-lovers those who distribute such things to themselves, for if someone were always
eager to do what is just or what is temperate himself, most of all, or do anything else whatever that is in
accord with the virtues, and in general were to save up for himself what is beautiful to do, no one
would say he was a lover of self or blame him.
But it would seem rather that it is such a person who is a lover of self; at least he takes for himself the
things that are most beautiful and most good, and gratifies what is most authoritative in himself, and
obeys this in all things. And just as a city, or any other organization, seems to be, most of all, its most
authoritative part, so too does a human being; and so the person who loves and gratifies this is most a
lover of self. And people are called self-restrained and unrestrained according to whether intellect
masters them or not, as though this were each person; and the things people seem most of all to have
27
done themselves and willingly are the things they have done with reason. That, then, this is each
person, or is so most of all, is not unclear, nor that a decent person loves this most. Hence such a person
would be a lover of self most of all, though different form from the one that is reproached, differing as
much as living by reason does from living by passion, and as much as desiring either the beautiful or
what seems advantageous.3 Every one, then, approves of and praises those who are exceptionally
zealous about beautiful actions, and if they all competed for the beautiful, and strained to the utmost to
perform the most beautiful actions, then for all in common there would be what is needful, and for
each in particular there would be the greatest of goods, if indeed virtue is that.
Therefore, a good person ought to be a lover of self, since he will both profit himself and benefit the
others by performing beautiful actions, and a corrupt person ought not, since he will harm himself and
those around him by following base passions. So in a corrupt person, what he ought to do and what he
does are out of harmony, but a decent person does what he ought, since every intellect chooses what is
best for itself, and the decent person obeys his intellect. But it is also true of a person of serious worth
that he does many things for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary, dies for them,4
since he will give up money and honors, and all the goods people fight over, to gain what is beautiful;
for he would choose to have an intense pleasure for a short time rather than a mild one for a long time,
and to live in a beautiful way for a year rather than in a random way for many years, and to perform
one great and beautiful action rather than many small ones. And this no doubt is what happens with
those who die for others; they choose something great and beautiful for themselves. Such a person
would also give up money in a case in which his friends would get more money, since there would be
money for the friend, but a beautiful act for himself, so that he distributes the greater good to himself.
And it is the same way with honors and offices, for he will give up all these things to a friend, since this
is beautiful thing for him, and something to be praised. And he seems appropriately to be someone of
serious stature, since he prefers the beautiful above all things. And it is possible that he would even
give up actions to a friend, and it would be a more beautiful thing to become responsible for the
friend’s performing them than to perform them himself.5 So in everything that is praised, a person of
serious worth obviously distributes to himself the greater share of the beautiful. In this way, then, one
ought to be a lover of self, as was said, but one should not be so in the way most people are.
1. See Chap. 4 above.
2. For the first of these sayings, see Euripides's Orestes (1045-6); the second IS
mentioned above at 1159b 31-2 and the third at 1157b 36-1158a 1;the fourth, derived from the poet
Theocritus, has been compared to "charity begins at home"
3. The combination of things in this sentence is important. Even though the thinking part is most
properly oneself, it is only the love of the beautiful that properly satisfies this part. That in turn means
the irrational part of the soul must be brought into its best condition, so that the beautiful can be
discerned (1113a 29-33), and the whole human being can be fulfilled. It is from here to the end of this
chapter that the beautiful is most directly and extensively discussed. The earlier treatment of virtue of
character led up to the beautiful as its only proper aim, but the current question about what makes selflove a good thing converges with that earlier part of the inquiry and extends it.
28
4. These attributes recall those associated with greatness of soul (1124b 8-10), and the narrative or
portrait-like style of this passage is also reminiscent of that discussion. It may be that the aspirations for
the great soul find their only fulfillment in friendship, which expands the soul to encompass another
self. See note to 1169 below.
5. A careful reader may see that one further step would allow the friend the still greater satisfaction of
giving up the action to oneself, and a sophiastical reader might say this led to an infinite regress. A
thoughtful reader will see that the ecuality and communality sought in friendship have here been
realized, and that the pleasure is the same for both in either case.
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom: Thomas Jefferson
Whereas Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by temporal
punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and
meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both
of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as it was in his Almighty power
to do; that the impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical, who being
themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up
their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as such endeavouring to
impose them on others, hath established and maintained false religions over the greatest part of the
world, and through all time; that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to
support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty
of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals he would make his pattern, and
whose powers he feels most persuasive to righteousness, and is withdrawing from the ministry those
temporary rewards, which proceeding from an approbation of their personal conduct, are an additional
incitement to earnest and unremitting labours for the instruction of mankind; that our civil rights have
no dependence on our religious opinions, any more than our opinions in physics or geometry; that
therefore the proscribing any citizen as unworthy the public confidence by laying upon him an
incapacity of being called to offices of trust and emolument, unless he profess or renounce this or that
religious opinion, is depriving him injuriously of those privileges and advantages to which in common
with his fellow-citizens he has a natural right; that it tends only to corrupt the principles of that religion
it is meant to encourage, by bribing with a monopoly of worldly honours and emoluments, those who
will externally profess and conform to it; that though indeed these are criminal who do not withstand
such temptation, yet neither are those innocent who lay the bait in their way; that to suffer the civil
magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation
of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy, which at once destroys all
religious liberty, because he being of course judge of that tendency will make his opinions the rule of
judgment, and approve or condemn the sentiments of others only as they shall square with or differ
from his own; that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government, for its officers to
29
interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order; and finally, that truth
is great and will prevail if left to herself, that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and
has nothing to fear from the conflict, unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons,
free argument and debate, errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict
them:
Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief;
but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters of
religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.
And though we well know that this assembly elected by the people for the ordinary purposes of
legislation only, have no power to restrain the acts of succeeding assemblies, constituted with powers
equal to our own, and that therefore to declare this act to be irrevocable would be of no effect in law;
yet we are free to declare, and do declare, that the rights hereby asserted are of the natural rights of
mankind, and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the present, or to narrow its operation,
such act shall be an infringement of natural right.
“Memorial and Remonstrance”: James Madison
1785
To the Honorable the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia
A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
We the subscribers, citizens of the said Commonwealth, having taken into serious consideration, a Bill
printed by order of the last Session of General Assembly, entitled "A Bill establishing a provision for
Teachers of the Christian Religion," and conceiving that the same if finally armed with the sanctions of
a law, will be a dangerous abuse of power, are bound as faithful members of a free State to remonstrate
against it, and to declare the reasons by which we are determined. We remonstrate against the said Bill,
Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, "that religion or the duty which we owe to
our Creator and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence." The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature
an unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence
contemplated by their own minds cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also,
because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to
render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is
precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any
man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the
Governour of the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the
30
Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by
the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance. True it is, that no
other rule exists, by which any question which may divide a Society, can be ultimately determined, but
the will of the majority; but it is also true that the majority may trespass on the rights of the minority.
Because Religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at large, still less can it be subject to that
of the Legislative Body. The latter are but the creatures and vicegerents of the former. Their jurisdiction
is both derivative and limited: it is limited with regard to the co-ordinate departments, more
necessarily is it limited with regard to the constituents. The preservation of a free Government requires
not merely, that the metes and bounds which separate each department of power be invariably
maintained; but more especially that neither of them be suffered to overleap the great Barrier which
defends the rights of the people. The Rulers who are guilty of such an encroachment, exceed the
commission from which they derive their authority, and are Tyrants. The People who submit to it are
governed by laws made neither by themselves nor by an authority derived from them, and are slaves.
Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy
to be the first duty of Citizens, and one of the noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The free
men of America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entagled the
question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the
consequences by denying the principle. We revere this lesson too much soon to forget it. Who does not
see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may
establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? that the
same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support
of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?
Because the Bill violates the equality which ought to be the basis of every law, and which is more
indispensible, in proportion as the validity or expediency of any law is more liable to be impeached. If
"all men are by nature equally free and independent," all men are to be considered as entering into
Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and therefore retaining no less, one than
another, of their natural rights. Above all are they to be considered as retaining an "equal title to the
free exercise of Religion according to the dictates of Conscience." Whilst we assert for ourselves a
freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we
cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has
convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offence against God, not against man: To God,
therefore, not to man, must an account of it be rendered. As the Bill violates equality by subjecting
some to peculiar burdens, so it violates the same principle, by granting to others peculiar exemptions.
Are the quakers and Menonists the only sects who think a compulsive support of their Religions
unnecessary and unwarrantable? can their piety alone be entrusted with the care of public worship?
Ought their Religions to be endowed above all others with extraordinary privileges by which
proselytes may be enticed from all others? We think too favorably of the justice and good sense of these
demoninations to believe that they either covet pre-eminences over their fellow citizens or that they
will be seduced by them from the common opposition to the measure.
31
Because the Bill implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious Truth; or that
he may employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy. The first is an arrogant pretension falsified by the
contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world: the second an unhallowed
perversion of the means of salvation.
Because the establishment proposed by the Bill is not requisite for the support of the Christian Religion.
To say that it is, is a contradiction to the Christian Religion itself, for every page of it disavows a
dependence on the powers of this world: it is a contradiction to fact; for it is known that this Religion
both existed and flourished, not only without the support of human laws, but in spite of every
opposition from them, and not only during the period of miraculous aid, but long after it had been left
to its own evidence and the ordinary care of Providence. Nay, it is a contradiction in terms; for a
Religion not invented by human policy, must have pre-existed and been supported, before it was
established by human policy. It is moreover to weaken in those who profess this Religion a pious
confidence in its innate excellence and the patronage of its Author; and to foster in those who still reject
it, a suspicion that its friends are too conscious of its fallacies to trust it to its own merits.
Because experience witnesseth that eccelsiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and
efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation. During almost fifteen centuries has the legal
establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride
and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and
persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity for the ages in which it appeared in its greatest
lustre; those of every sect, point to the ages prior to its incorporation with Civil policy. Propose a
restoration of this primitive State in which its Teachers depended on the voluntary rewards of their
flocks, many of them predict its downfall. On which Side ought their testimony to have greatest
weight, when for or when against their interest?
Because the establishment in question is not necessary for the support of Civil Government. If it be
urged as necessary for the support of Civil Government only as it is a means of supporting Religion,
and it be not necessary for the latter purpose, it cannot be necessary for the former. If Religion be not
within the cognizance of Civil Government how can its legal establishment be necessary to Civil
Government? What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on Civil Society? In some
instances they have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of the Civil authority; in many
instances they have been seen upholding the thrones of political tyranny: in no instance have they been
seen the guardians of the liberties of the people. Rulers who wished to subvert the public liberty, may
have found an established Clergy convenient auxiliaries. A just Government instituted to secure &
perpetuate it needs them not. Such a Government will be best supported by protecting every Citizen in
the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which protects his person and his property; by
neither invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade those of another.
Because the proposed establishment is a departure from the generous policy, which, offering an
Asylum to the persecuted and oppressed of every Nation and Religion, promised a lustre to our
country, and an accession to the number of its citizens. What a melancholy mark is the Bill of sudden
degeneracy? Instead of holding forth an Asylum to the persecuted, it is itself a signal of persecution. It
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degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of
the Legislative authority. Distant as it may be in its present form from the Inquisition, it differs from it
only in degree. The one is the first step, the other the last in the career of intolerance. The maganimous
sufferer under this cruel scourge in foreign Regions, must view the Bill as a Beacon on our Coast,
warning him to seek some other haven, where liberty and philanthrophy in their due extent, may offer
a more certain respose from his Troubles.
Because it will have a like tendency to banish our Citizens. The allurements presented by other
situations are every day thinning their number. To superadd a fresh motive to emigration by revoking
the liberty which they now enjoy, would be the same species of folly which has dishonoured and
depopulated flourishing kingdoms
Because it will destroy that moderation and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle
with Religion has produced among its several sects. Torrents of blood have been split in the old world,
by vain attempts of the secular arm, to extinguish Religious disscord, by proscribing all difference in
Religious opinion. Time has at length revealed the true remedy. Every relaxation of narrow and
rigorous policy, wherever it has been tried, has been found to assauge the disease. The American
Theatre has exhibited proofs that equal and compleat liberty, if it does not wholly eradicate it,
sufficiently destroys its malignant influence on the health and prosperity of the State. If with the
salutary effects of this system under our own eyes, we begin to contract the bounds of Religious
freedom, we know no name that will too severely reproach our folly. At least let warning be taken at
the first fruits of the threatened innovation. The very appearance of the Bill has transformed "that
Christian forbearance, love and chairty," which of late mutually prevailed, into animosities and
jeolousies, which may not soon be appeased. What mischiefs may not be dreaded, should this enemy to
the public quiet be armed with the force of a law?
Because the policy of the Bill is adverse to the diffusion of the light of Christianity. The first wish of
those who enjoy this precious gift ought to be that it may be imparted to the whole race of mankind.
Compare the number of those who have as yet received it with the number still remaining under the
dominion of false Religions; and how small is the former! Does the policy of the Bill tend to lessen the
disproportion? No; it at once discourages those who are strangers to the light of revelation from
coming into the Region of it; and countenances by example the nations who continue in darkness, in
shutting out those who might convey it to them. Instead of Levelling as far as possible, every obstacle
to the victorious progress of Truth, the Bill with an ignoble and unchristian timidity would
circumscribe it with a wall of defence against the encroachments of error.
Because attempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts obnoxious to go great a proportion of Citizens, tend
to enervate the laws in general, and to slacken the bands of Society. If it be difficult to execute any law
which is not generally deemed necessary or salutary, what must be the case, where it is deemed invalid
and dangerous? And what may be the effect of so striking an example of impotency in the
Government, on its general authority?
Because a measure of such singular magnitude and delicacy ought not to be imposed, without the
clearest evidence that it is called for by a majority of citizens, and no satisfactory method is yet
33
proposed by which the voice of the majority in this case may be determined, or its influence secured.
The people of the respective counties are indeed requested to signify their opinion respecting the
adoption of the Bill to the next Session of Assembly." But the representatives or of the Counties will be
that of the people. Our hope is that neither of the former will, after due consideration, espouse the
dangerous principle of the Bill. Should the event disappoint us, it will still leave us in full confidence,
that a fair appeal to the latter will reverse the sentence against our liberties.
Because finally, "the equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of his Religion according to the
dictates of conscience" is held by the same tenure with all our other rights. If we recur to its origin, it is
equally the gift of nature; if we weigh its importance, it cannot be less dear to us; if we consult the
"Declaration of those rights which pertain to the good people of Vriginia, as the basis and foundation of
Government," it is enumerated with equal solemnity, or rather studied emphasis. Either the, we must
say, that the Will of the Legislature is the only measure of their authority; and that in the plenitude of
this authority, they may sweep away all our fundamental rights; or, that they are bound to leave this
particular right untouched and sacred: Either we must say, that they may controul the freedom of the
press, may abolish the Trial by Jury, may swallow up the Executive and Judiciary Powers of the State;
nay that they may despoil us of our very right of suffrage, and erect themselves into an independent
and hereditary Assembly or, we must say, that they have no authority to enact into the law the Bill
under consideration.
We the Subscribers say, that the General Assembly of this Commonwealth have no such authority: And
that no effort may be omitted on our part against so dangerous an usurpation, we oppose to it, this
remonstrance; earnestly praying, as we are in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe,
by illuminating those to whom it is addressed, may on the one hand, turn their Councils from every act
which would affront his holy prerogative, or violate the trust committed to them: and on the other,
guide them into every measure which may be worthy of his [blessing, may re]dound to their own
praise, and may establish more firmly the liberties, the prosperity and the happiness of the
Commonwealth.
Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association: Thomas Jefferson
1802
To messers. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, & Stephen S. Nelson, a committee of the Danbury
Baptist association in the state of Connecticut.
Gentlemen
The affectionate sentiments of esteem and approbation which you are so good as to express towards
me, on behalf of the Danbury Baptist association, give me the highest satisfaction. my duties dictate a
faithful and zealous pursuit of the interests of my constituents, & in proportion as they are persuaded
of my fidelity to those duties, the discharge of them becomes more and more pleasing.
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Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God, that he owes
account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach
actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church &
State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience,
I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his
natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection & blessing of the common father and creator of man,
and tender you for yourselves & your religious association, assurances of my high respect & esteem.
Th. Jefferson
The Second Treatise of Civil Government: John Locke
Chapter 4
Of Slavery.
Sec. 22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under
the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of
man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the
commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative
shall enact, according to the trust put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us,
Observations, A. 55. a liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied
by any laws: but freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to
every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own
will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain,
unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the
law of nature.
Sec. 23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man's
preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a
man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to
any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he
pleases. No body can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life,
cannot give another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life, by some act that
deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his power) delay to take it,
and make use of him to his own service, and he does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds the
hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his
master, to draw on himself the death he desires.
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Sec. 24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, but the state of war continued,
between a lawful conqueror and a captive: for, if once compact enter between them, and make an
agreement for a limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the state of war and slavery
ceases, as long as the compact endures: for, as has been said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to
another that which he hath not in himself, a power over his own life.
“Property”: James Madison
This term in its particular application means "that dominion which one man claims and exercises over
the external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individual."
In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a
right; and which leaves to every one else the like advantage. In the former sense, a man's land,
or merchandise, or money is called his property.
In the latter sense, a man has property in his opinions and the free communication of them.
He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, and in the profession and practice
dictated by them. He has a property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of his person.
He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to
employ them.
In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in
his rights.
Where an excess of power prevails, property of no sort is duly respected. No man is safe in his
opinions, his person, his faculties, or his possessions.
Where there is an excess of liberty, the effect is the same, tho' from an opposite cause.
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in various rights of
individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of government, that alone
is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his.
According to this standard of merit, the praise of affording a just security to property, should be
sparingly bestowed on a government which, however scrupulously guarding the possessions of
individuals, does not protect them in the enjoyment and communication of their opinions, in which
they have an equal, and in the estimation of some, a more valuable property.
More sparingly should this praise be allowed to a government, where a man's religious rights are
violated by penalties, or fettered by tests, or taxed by a hierarchy. Conscience is the most sacred of all
property; other property depending in part on positive law, the exercise of that, being a natural and
unalienable right.
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To guard a man's house as his castle, to pay public and enforce private debts with the most exact faith,
can give no title to invade a man's conscience which is more sacred than his castle, or to withhold from
it that debt of protection, for which the public faith is pledged, by the very nature and original
conditions of the social pact.
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where the property which a man has in
his personal safety and personal liberty, is violated by arbitrary seizures of one class of citizens for the
service of the rest. A magistrate issuing his warrants to a press gang, would be in his proper functions
in Turkey or Hindustan, under appellations proverbial of the most complete despotism.
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions,
and monopolies deny to part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice of their
occupations, which not only constitute their property in the general sense of the word; but are the
means of acquiring property strictly called. What must be the spirit of legislation where a manufacturer
of linen cloth is forbidden to bury his own child in a linen shroud, in order to favor his neighbor who
manufactures woolen cloth; where the manufacturer and wearer of woolen cloth are again forbidden
the economical use of buttons of that material, in favor of the manufacturer of buttons of other
materials!
A just security to property is not afforded by that government, under which unequal taxes oppress one
species of property and reward another species: where arbitrary taxes invade the domestic sanctuaries
of the rich, and excessive taxes grind the faces of the poor; where the keenness and competitions of
want are deemed an insufficient spur to labor, and taxes are again applied, by an unfeeling policy, as
another spur; in violation of that sacred property, which Heaven, in decreeing man to earn his bread by
the sweat of his brow, kindly reserved to him, in the small repose that could be spared from the supply
of his necessities.
If there be a government then which prides itself in maintaining the inviolability of property; which
provides that none shall be taken directly even for public use without indemnification to the owner, and
yet directly violates the property which individuals have in their opinions, their religion, their persons,
and their faculties; nay more, which indirectly violates their property, in their actual possessions, in the
labor that acquires their daily subsistence, and in the hallowed remnant of time which ought to relieve
their fatigues and soothe their cares, the influence will have been anticipated, that such a government is
not a pattern for the United States.
If the United States mean to obtain or deserve the full praise due to wise and just governments, they
will equally respect the rights of property, and the property in rights: they will rival the government
that most sacredly guards the former; and by repelling its example in violating the latter, will make
themselves a pattern to that and all other governments.
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“THAT TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS GOVERNMENTS ARE
INSTITUTED AMONG MEN, DERIVING THEIR JUST
POWERS FROM THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED…”
Election Sermon: Samuel Cooper
A sermon preached before his excellence John Hancock, esq. Governour, the honourable Senate, and
the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Being the commencement of the Constitution and Inauguration of the New Government
Their Congregation shall be established before me: and their Nobles shall be of themselves, and their
Governor shall proceed from the midst of them.
XXXth Jeremiah, 20, 21 Ver.
Nothing can be more applicable to the solemnity in which we are engaged, than this passage of sacred
writ. The prophecy seems to have been made for ourselves, it is so exactly descriptive of that
important, that comprehensive, that essential civil blessing, which kindles the lustre, and diffuses the
joy of the present day. Nor is this the only passage of holy scripture that holds up to our view a striking
resemblance between our own circumstances and those of the antient Israelites; a nation chosen by God
a theatre for the display of some of the most astonishing dispensations of his providence. Like that
nation we rose from oppression, and emerged “from the House of Bondage”: Like that nation we were
led into a wilderness, as a refuge from tyranny, and a preparation for the enjoyment of our civil and
religious rights: Like that nation we have been pursued through the sea, by the armed hand of power,
which, but for the signal interpositions of heaven, must before now have totally defeated the noble
purpose of our emigration: And, to omit many other instances of similarity, like that nation we have
been ungrateful to the Supreme Ruler of the world, and too “lightly esteemed the Rock of our
Salvation”; accordingly, we have been corrected by his justice, and at the same time remarkably
supported and defended by his mercy: So that we may discern our own picture in the figure of the
antient church divinely exhibited to Moses in vision, “a bush burning and not consumed.” This day,
this memorable day, is a witness, that the Lord, he whose “hand maketh great, and giveth strength
unto all, hath not forsaken us, nor our God forgotten us.” This day, which forms a new æra in our
annals, exhibits a testimony to all the world, that contrary to our deserts, and amidst all our troubles,
the blessing promised in our text to the afflicted seed of Abraham is come upon us; “Their Nobles shall
be of themselves, and their Governor shall proceed from the midst of them.”
This prophecy has an immediate respect to the deliverance of the Jews from the cruel oppressions of
the king of Babylon. Their sufferings, when they fell under the power of this haughty tyrant, as they are
represented to us in sacred history, must harrow a bosom softened with the least degree of humanity.
They give us a frightful picture of the effects of despotic power, guided and inflamed by those lusts of
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the human heart with which it is seldom unaccompanied. Can we forbear weeping for human nature,
or blushing for its degradation, when we view either the sufferer or the actor in such a scene; the
relentless oppressor, or those who are “sore broken in the place of dragons”? What can be more
pathetic than the description of it given by the same prophet who gave the consolation in our text[?]
How doth the city sit solitary that was full of people? How is she become as a widow: she that was
great among the nations, and princess among the provinces? She weepeth sore in the night, and her
tears are on her cheeks; she hath none to comfort her; her friends have dealt treacherously with her.
Judah is gone into captivity; because of affliction, and because of great servitude, she findeth no rest.
Her mighty men are trodden under foot; her young men are crushed; the young and the old lie on the
ground in the streets—Mine eyes do fail with tears; my bowels are troubled, my liver is poured on the
earth, for the destruction of the daughter of my people.
Such are the fruits of lawless and despotic power in a mortal man intoxicated with it: Such desolations
does it make in the earth—such havock in the family of God, merely for the sake of enlarging it’s
bounds and impressing its terror on the human bosom. It often, indeed, claims a divine original, and
impudently supports itself not barely on the permission, but the express designation of him “whose
tender mercies are over all his works”; though it exactly resembles the grand adversary of God and
man, and is only a “roaring lion that seeketh whom he may devour.” To plead a divine right for such a
power is truly to teach “the doctrine of devils.” It covets every thing without bounds: It grasps every
thing without pity: It riots on the spoils of innocence and industry: It is proud to annihilate the rights of
mankind; to destroy the fairest constitutions of wisdom, policy and justice, the broadest sources of
human happiness: While it enslaves the bodies, it debases the minds of the offspring of God: In its
progress it changes the very face of nature, it withers even the fruits of the earth, and frustrates the
bounties of our common parent. “Before it is the garden of God, behind it is a desolate wilderness.”
Looking upon the Jews when groaning under such a power; their armies vanquished; the flower of
their country cut off by the sword; their fortresses reduced; their cities in ashes; their land ravaged;
their temple and worship destroyed, and the remnant of the nation led in chains to a foreign land; who
would have thought that in a few years, these cities and this temple should rise again from their ruins,
and a people so totally enslaved and widely dispersed be restored to their rights and possessions, their
laws and institutions; peace, liberty and plenty daily augmenting their numbers, and lighting up the
face of joy through their whole land; while the haughty empire of Babylon, from which they had
suffered so much, should set to rise no more! Such, however, were the decrees of heaven; such the
predictions of the inspired prophets; and such the event.
***
When Nebuchadnezzar invaded the land of Judea, and brought upon it such devastations and miseries,
it was governed by a king, who shared in the captivity of his subjects, and was led with them by the
conqueror in chains to Babylon. But in the happy restoration promised in our text, it is observable, that
the royal part of their government was not to be renewed. No mention is made in this refreshing
prediction of a king, but only of nobles, men of principal character and influence, who were to be of
themselves, and such as they would chuse to conduct their affairs; and a governor, who should
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also proceed from the midst of them, and preside over all, cloathed with a tempered authority and dignity,
not with arbitrary power, and the means of gratifying an unbounded avarice and ambition.
The form of government originally established in the Hebrew nation by a charter from heaven, was
that of a free republic, over which God himself, in peculiar favour to that people, was pleased to
preside. It consisted of three parts; a chief magistrate who was called judge or leader, such as Joshua
and others, a council of seventy chosen men, and the general assemblies of the people. Of these the two
last were the most essential and permanent, and the first more occasional, according to the particular
circumstances of the nation. Their council or Sanhedrim, remained with but little suspension, through
all the vicissitudes they experienced, till after the commencement of the christian æra. And as to the
assemblies of the people, that they were frequently held by divine appointment, and considered as the
fountain of civil power, which they exerted by their own decrees, or distributed into various channels
as they judged most conducive to their own security, order, and happiness, is evident beyond
contradiction from the sacred history. Even the law of Moses, though framed by God himself, was not
imposed upon that people against their will; it was laid open before the whole congregation of Israel;
they freely adopted it, and it became their law, not only by divine appointment, but by their own
voluntary and express consent. Upon this account it is called in the sacred writings a covenant,
compact, or mutual stipulation.
A solemn renewal of this covenant was the very last public act of Joshua their renowned leader. “He
gathered all the tribes of Israel to Sechem, and called for the elders of Israel, and for the heads and for
the judges, and for their officers, and they presented themselves before God.” The occasion was great
and important; being nothing less than to renew their acceptance of the constitution they had received
from heaven, and solemnly to confirm the national compact. How august was this assembly of a great
nation, it’s representatives and magistrates of every order, with their brave and faithful leader at their
head; he, who had been foremost to face the dangers of their cause, who had fought so many battles for
their happy settlement, and rendered such various and important services to his country. In a short but
nervous and pathetic address to the assembly, he reminded them of their small original; of the peculiar
favors granted by heaven to their progenitors; of their remarkable deliverance from the slavery of
Egypt; of the wonders wrought for them by a divine hand in their progress thro’ the wilderness; in
their conquests on the borders of Canaan, and their firm possession of that promised land. Deeply
impressed with this interesting recollection, he warmly declares his own resolution to abide by that
noble cause for which they had been led by heaven from an ignominious and servile dependence, and
formed into a distinct and respectable nation. But as the memorable act of the day depended intirely on
the consent of the people, he accordingly refers the matter to their own free determination. “Chuse you
this day whom you will serve.” It was impossible for the people not to be moved by such an address;
not to discern the excellency of the mosaic constitutions; how well they were adapted to the particular
circumstances of the nation, and the noble purposes they were designed to promote. The people
replied, the Lord our God we will serve; we consent, and are determined to be governed by the laws and
the statutes he has been so graciously pleased to afford us. “Then Joshua said unto the people, ye are
witnesses against yourselves that ye have chosen the Lord to serve him; and they said, we are
witnesses.” If ever we renounce the constitution and happy settlement granted to us by heaven; if ever
40
we break the sacred compact; this day, and all the public and voluntary transactions of it, must be a
witness against us. “Thus Joshua made a covenant with the people at Sechem,” which, we are
afterwards told, he recorded in a book, and at the same time erected a monumental stone upon the
spot, as a memorial of these sacred stipulations, and as a perpetual testimony, that the Supreme Ruler
himself had not established their polity without their own free concurrence, and that the Hebrew
nation, lately redeemed from tyranny, had now a civil and religious constitution of their own choice,
and were governed by laws to which they had given their solemn consent.
To mention all the passages in sacred writ which prove that the Hebrew government, tho’ a theocracy,
was yet as to the outward part of it, a free republic, and that the sovereignty resided in the people,
would be to recite a large part of it’s history. I will therefore only add a single instance. When the tribes
of Reuben and Gad, and the half tribe of Manassah had erected a separate altar, tho’ it afterwards
appeared with no bad intention, all the other tribes were extremely alarmed, and being met in general
assembly, determined to make war on their offending brethren. But previous to the intended assault
they agreed to send an embassy to expostulate with them on the occasion. Phinehaz and ten princes, or
principal men, were appointed for this purpose. Here was an act of sovereignty, and an act of the
highest importance to the interest of any nation, involving in it nothing less than the power of making
peace or war. It was not done by Joshua, tho’ he was then alive; it was an act of the congregation of
Israel: The embassy upon this momentous matter was chosen, commissioned, and instructed by them.
“As it was democratically sent,[”] says a great author,* who wrote conclusively, who fought bravely,
and died gloriously in the cause of liberty, [“]it was democratically received: It was not directed to one
man, but to all the children of Reuben, Gad and Manassah, and the answer was sent by them all.” The
report was made to the congregation, who finally determined the grand question, and decided for
peace.
Such was the civil constitution of the Hebrew nation, till growing weary of the gift of heaven, they
demanded a king. After being admonished by the prophet Samuel of the ingratitude and folly of their
request, they were punished in the grant of it. Impiety, corruption and disorder of every kind
afterwards increasing among them, they grew ripe for the judgments of heaven in their desolation and
captivity. Taught by these judgments the value of those blessings they had before despised, and
groaning under the hand of tyranny more heavy than that of death, they felt the worth of their former
civil and religious privileges, and were prepared to receive with gratitude and joy a restoration not
barely to the land flowing with milk and honey, but to the most precious advantage they ever enjoyed
in that land, their original constitution of government: They were prepared to welcome with the voice
of mirth and thanksgiving the re-establishment of their congregations; nobles chosen from among
themselves, and a governor proceeding from the midst of them.
Such a constitution, twice established by the hand of heaven in that nation, so far as it respects civil and
religious liberty in general, ought to be regarded as a solemn recognition from the Supreme Ruler
himself of the rights of human nature. Abstracted from those appendages and formalities which were
peculiar to the Jews, and designed to answer some particular purposes of divine Providence, it points
out in general what kind of government infinite wisdom and goodness would establish among
mankind.
41
We want not, indeed, a special revelation from heaven to teach us that men are born equal and free;
that no man has a natural claim of dominion over his neighbours, nor one nation any such claim upon
another; and that as government is only the administration of the affairs of a number of men combined
for their own security and happiness, such a society have a right freely to determine by whom and in
what manner their own affairs shall be administered. These are the plain dictates of that reason and
common sense with which the common parent of men has informed the human bosom. It is, however,
a satisfaction to observe such everlasting maxims of equity confirmed, and impressed upon the
consciences of men, by the instructions, precepts, and examples given us in the sacred oracles; one
internal mark of their divine original, and that they come from him “who hath made of one blood all
nations to dwell upon the face of the earth,” whose authority sanctifies only those governments that
instead of oppressing any part of his family, vindicate the oppressed, and restrain and punish the
oppressor.
***
Neither does the time allow, nor circumstances require, that I should enter into a detail of all the
principles and arguments upon which the right of our present establishment is grounded. They are
known to all the world; they are to be found in the immortal writings of Sidney and Locke, and other
glorious defenders of the liberties of human nature; they are also to be found, not dishonored, in the
acts and publications of America on this great occasion, which have the approbation and applause of
the wise and impartial among mankind, and even in Britain itself: They are the principles upon which
her own government and her own revolution under William the third were founded; principles which
brutal force may oppose, but which reason and scripture will forever sanctify. The citizens of these
states have had sense enough to comprehend the full force of these principles, and virtue enough, in
the face of uncommon dangers, to act upon so just, so broad, and stable a foundation.
It has been said, that every nation is free that deserves to be so. This may not be always true: But had a
people so illuminated as the inhabitants of these states, so nurtured by their ancestors in the love of
freedom; a people to whom divine Providence was pleased to present so fair an opportunity of
asserting their natural right as an independent nation, and who were even compelled by the arms of
their enemies to take sanctuary in the temple of liberty; had such a people been disobedient to the
heavenly call, and refused to enter, who could have asserted their title to the glorious wreaths and
peculiar blessings that are no where bestowed but in that hallowed place?
***
Happy people! who not awed by the voice of a master; not chained by slavish customs, superstitions,
and prejudices, have deliberately framed the constitution under which you chuse to live; and are to be
subject to no laws, by which you do not consent to bind yourselves. In such an attitude human nature
appears with it’s proper dignity: On such a basis, life, and all that sweetens and adorns it, may rest
with as much security as human imperfection can possibly admit: In such a constitution we find a
country deserving to be loved, and worthy to be defended. For what is our country? Is it a foil of
which, tho’ we may be the present possessors, we can call no part our own? or the air in which we first
drew our breath, from which we may be confined in a dungeon, or of which we may be deprived by
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the ax or the halter at the pleasure of a tyrant? Is not a country a constitution—an established frame of
laws; of which a man may say, “we are here united in society for our common security and happiness.
These fields and these fruits are my own: The regulations under which I live are my own; I am not only
a proprietor in the soil, but I am part of the sovereignty of my country.” Such ought to be the
community of men, and such, adored be the goodness of the supreme Ruler of the world, such, at
present is our own country; of which this day affords a bright evidence, a glorious recognition.
To the disappointment of our enemies, and the joy of our friends, we have now attained a settled
government with a degree of peace and unanimity, all circumstances considered, truly surprizing. The
sagacity, the political knowledge, the patient deliberation, the constant attention to the grand principles
of liberty, and the mutual condescention and candor under a diversity of apprehension respecting the
modes of administration, exhibited by those who were appointed to form this constitution, and by the
people who ratified it, must do immortal honor to our country. It is, we believe, “an happy foundation
for many generations”; and the framers of it are indeed the fathers of their country; since nothing is so
essential to the increase, and universal prosperity of a community, as a constitution of government
founded in justice, and friendly to liberty. Such men have a monument of glory more durable than
brass or marble.
I need not enlarge before such an audience upon the particular excellencies of this constitution: How
effectually it makes the people the keepers of their own liberties, with whom they are certainly safest:
How nicely it poizes the powers of government, in order to render them as far as human foresight can,
what God ever designed they should be, powers only to do good: How happily it guards on the one
hand against anarchy and confusion, and on the other against tyranny and oppression: How carefully
it separates the legislative from the executive power, a point essential to liberty: How wisely it has
provided for the impartial execution of the laws in the independent situation of the judges; a matter of
capital moment, and without which the freedom of a constitution in other respects, might be often
delusory, and not realized in the just security of the person and property of the subject.
In addition to all this, what a broad foundation for the exercise of the rights of conscience is laid in this
constitution! which declares, that “no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, liberty
or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own
conscience, or for his religious profession or sentiments; and that every denomination of christians,
demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good subjects of the commonwealth, shall be equally under
the protection of the law, and no subordination of any one sect or denomination to another shall be
established by law.” It considers indeed morality and the public worship of God as important to the
happiness of society: And surely it would be an affront to the people of this state, as the convention
speak in their previous address, “to labor to convince them that the honor and happiness of a people
depend upon morality; and that the public worship of God has a tendency to inculcate the principles
thereof, as well as to preserve a people from forsaking civilization, and falling into a state of savage
barbarity.”
Of these, and other excellent properties of our present constitution, the citizens of this state are
throughly sensible, or well informed, and jealous as they are of their rights, they never would have
43
adopted and ratified it with so great a degree of unanimity. They know it is framed upon an extent of
civil and religious liberty, unexampled perhaps in any country in the world, except America. This must
highly endear it to them; and while it is written upon their own hearts, they have the satisfaction to
find that it has already received the elogiums of others, whose capacity and distinction render their
testimony truly honorable. But left thro’ the imperfection of human nature, and after all the
deliberation and caution with which it has been formed and approved, some inconveniences should be
found lurking in it, of which experience can best inform us, a right is expressly reserved to the people
of removing them in a revision of the whole, after a fair experiment of fifteen years.
When a people have the rare felicity of chusing their own government, every part of it should first be
weighed in the balance of reason, and nicely adjusted to the claims of liberty, equity and order; but
when this is done, a warm and passionate patriotism should be added to the result of cool deliberation,
to put in motion and animate the whole machine. The citizens of a free republic should reverence their
constitution: They should not only calmly approve, and readily submit to it, but regard it also with
veneration and affection rising even to an enthusiasm, like that which prevailed at Sparta and at Rome.
Nothing can render a commonwealth more illustrious, nothing more powerful, than such a manly,
such a sacred fire. Every thing will then be subordinated to the public welfare; every labour necessary
to this will be chearfully endured, every expence readily submitted to, every danger boldly confronted.
May this heavenly flame animate all orders of men in the state! May it catch from bosom to bosom, and
the glow be universal! May a double portion of it inhabit the breasts of our civil rulers, and impart a
lustre to them like that which sat upon the face of Moses, when he came down from the holy mountain
with the tables of the Hebrew constitution in his hand! Thus will they sustain with true dignity the first
honours, the first marks of esteem and confidence, the first public employments bestowed by this new
commonwealth, and in which they this day appear. Such men must naturally care for our state; men
whose abilities and virtues have obtained a sanction from the free suffrages of their enlightned and
virtuous fellow citizens. Are not these suffrages, a public and solemn testimony that in the opinion of
their constituents, they are men who have steadily acted upon the noble principles on which the frame
of our government now rests? Men who have generously neglected their private interest in an ardent
pursuit of that of the public—men who have intrepidly opposed one of the greatest powers on earth,
and put their fortunes and their lives to no small hazard in fixing the basis of our freedom and honour.
Who can forbear congratulating our rising state, and casting up a thankful eye to heaven, upon this
great and singular occasion, the establishment of our congregation; our nobles freely chosen by
ourselves; and our governour coming forth, at the call of his country, from the midst of us?
***
Our civil rulers will remember, that as piety and virtue support the honour and happiness of every
community, they are peculiarly requisite in a free government. Virtue is the spirit of a republic; for
where all power is derived from the people, all depends on their good disposition. If they are impious,
factious and selfish; if they are abandoned to idleness, dissipation, luxury, and extravagance; if they are
lost to the fear of God, and the love of their country, all is lost. Having got beyond the restraints of a
divine authority, they will not brook the control of laws enacted by rulers of their own creating. We
44
may therefore rely that the present government will do all it fairly can, by authority and example, to
answer the end of its institution, that the members of this commonwealth may lead a quiet and peaceable
life in all godliness as well as honesty, and our liberty never be justly reproached as licentiousness.
***
Neither piety, virtue, or liberty can long flourish in a community, where the education of youth is
neglected. How much do we owe to the care of our venerable ancestors upon this important object?
Had not they laid such foundations for training up their children in knowledge and religion, in science,
and arts, should we have been so respectable a community as we this day appear? Should we have
understood our rights so clearly? or valued them so highly? or defended them with such advantage?
Or should we have been prepared to lay that basis of liberty, that happy constitution, on which we
raise such large hopes, and from which we derive such uncommon joy? We may therefore be confident
that the schools, and particularly the university, founded and cherished by our wise and pious fathers,
will be patronized and nursed by a government which is so much indebted to them for its honour and
efficacy, and the very principles of its existence. The present circumstances of those institutions call for
the kindest attention of our rulers; and their close connection with every public interest, civil and
religious, strongly enforces the call.
The sciences and arts, for the encouragement of which a new foundation* hath lately been laid in this
commonwealth, deserve the countenance and particular favour of every government. They are not only
ornamental but useful: They not only polish, but support, enrich, and defend a community. As they
delight in liberty, they are particularly friendly to free states. Barbarians are fierce and ungovernable,
and having the grossest ideas of order, and the benefits resulting from it, they require the hand of a
stern master; but a people enlightened and civilized by the sciences and liberal arts, have sentiments
that support liberty and good laws: They may be guided by a silken thread; and the mild punishments
proper to a free state are sufficient to guard the public peace.
An established honour and fidelity in all public engagements and promises, form a branch of
righteousness that is wealth, is power, and security to a state: It prevents innumerable perplexities: It
creates confidence in the government from subjects and from strangers: It facilitates the most
advantageous connections: It extends credit; and easily obtains supplies in the most pressing public
emergencies, and when nothing else can obtain them: While the want of it, whatever benefits some
shortsighted politicians may have promised from delusive expedients, and deceitful arts, renders a
state weak and contemptible; strips it of its defence; grieves and provoke[s] its friends, and delivers it
up to the will of its enemies. Upon what does the power of the British nation chiefly rest at this
moment? That power that has been so unrighteously employed against America? Upon the long and
nice preservation of her faith in all monied matters.
***
Our present rulers, as principal founders of the constitution, cannot but regard it with parental
tenderness. They cannot but love their own offspring, especially when it has features and charms to
attract the love and admiration of the world: And hoping that their names and their glory may long
45
live in such an offspring, they have an irresistible motive to guard against every thing that may weaken
or deform it; every thing that may render its existence short, precarious, or dishonourable.
The same kind of motive must excite the body of the people to the same care. It is with you also my
fellow-citizens, by whose appointment this constitution was framed, and who have solemnly
acknowledged it to be your own; it is with you to give life and vigour to all its limbs[,] freshness and
beauty to its whole complexion; to guard it from dangers; to preserve it “from the corruption that is in
the world”; and to produce it upon the great theatre of nations with advantage and glory. We have
now a government free indeed; but after all, it remains with the people, under God, to make it an
honourable and happy one: This must ultimately depend upon the prudence of their elections, and the
virtue of their conduct. A government framed by ourselves for our own benefit, and according to the
fairest models of our own minds, and administred by men of our own choice, ought to be more deeply
respected, and more religiously supported by us than any kind of imposed authority. Having defined
and adjusted its powers by our own decisions, and made those who are vested with such as are
improper to be long continued in the same hands, amenable, at short intervals, to the judgment of the
people, we never can allow it too much weight and energy; we only support ourselves in supporting
such authority: While to oppose or weaken it, or bring it under an undue influence, is with the hand of
a parricide to destroy order, liberty, and happiness. Upon this general principle, and to establish a
dignity and independence, where they must forever operate to the benefit of the community; the
citizens of this state have by their present constitution, most freely and wisely secured to their chief
magistrate, and the justices of the supreme judicial court, permanent and honourable salaries; an article
which, we cannot doubt, will be sacredly observed in the true spirit of the constitution.
In a word, if the rulers and the people act throughout in this spirit; if they mutually watch over and
sustain each other; and those virtues are cultivated among us which support and are supported by a
free republic, our new government will then open with the most happy omens, and the commencement
of it will be the æra of our rising felicity and glory.
***
But what are those illustrious forms that seem to hover over us on the present great occasion, and to
look down with pleasure on the memorable transactions of this day? Are they not the founders and
lawgivers, the skilful pilots and brave defenders of free states, whose fame “flows down through all
ages, enlarging as it flows”? They, who thought no toils or vigilance too great to establish and protect
the rights of human nature; no riches too large to be exchanged for them; no blood too precious to be
shed for their redemption? But who are they who seem to approach nearer to us, and in whose
countenances we discern a peculiar mixture of gravity and joy upon this solemnity? Are they not the
venerable fathers of the Massachusetts; who though not perfect while they dwelt in flesh, were yet
greatly distinguished by an ardent piety, by all the manly virtues, and by an unquenchable love of
liberty—they, who to form a retreat for it, crossed the ocean, through innumerable difficulties, to a
savage land: They, who brought with them a broad charter of liberty, over which they wept when it
was wrested from them by the hand of power, and an insidious one placed in its room. With what
pleasure do they seem to behold their children, like the antient seed of Abraham, this day restored to
46
their original foundations of freedom! their Governor “as at the first, and their Councellors as at the
beginning”? Do they not call upon us to defend these foundations at every hazard, and to perpetuate
their honour in the liberty and virtue of the state they planted?
O thou supreme Governor of the world, whose arm hath done great things for us, establish the
foundations of this commonwealth, and evermore defend it with the saving strength of thy right hand!
Grant that here the divine constitutions of Jesus thy Son may ever be honoured and maintained! Grant
that it may be the residence of all private and patriotic virtues, of all that enlightens and supports, all
that sweetens and adorns human society, till the states and kingdoms of this world shall be swallowed
up in thine own kingdom: In that, which alone is immortal, may we obtain a perfect citizenship, and
enjoy in its completion, “the glorious Liberty of the Sons of God![”] And let all the people say, Amen!
1. See Algernon Sidney upon Government.
2. Voltaire.
3. The Honorable SAMUEL ADAMS, Esq;
4. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
47
“THAT WHENEVER ANY GOVERNMENT BECOMES
DESTRUCTIVE OF THESE ENDS, IT IS THE RIGHT OF THE
PEOPLE TO ALTER OR ABOLISH IT…”
An Election Sermon: Gad Hitchcock
1774
PROVERBS XXIX. 2.
When the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice: but when the wicked beareth rule, the people
mourn.
This is the observation of a wise ruler, relative to civil government; and the different effects of
administration, according as it is placed in good or bad hands- and it having been preserved in the
sacred oracles, not without providential direction, equally for the advantage of succeeding rulers, and
other men of every class in society; it will not be thought improper by any, who have a veneration for
revelation, and the instruction of princes, to make it the subject of our present consideration- Especially
as our civil rulers, in acknowledgment of a superintending Providence, have invited us into the temple
this morning, to ask counsel of God in respect to the great affairs of this anniversary, and the general
conduct of government.
Accordingly, I shall take occasion from it- to make a few general remarks on the nature and end of civil
government- point out some of the qualifications of rulers- and then apply the subject to the design of
our assembling at this time.
First, I shall make a few remarks on the nature and end of civil government.
The people mentioned are a body politic- but whether the speaker had the Jewish state more especially
in view; or, as is most probable, any civil society or kingdom on earth, is a point we need not precisely
determine.- On either supposition, civil government is represented as being already established among
them- rulers framed, and consented to, for the conduct of it- proper officers appointed, and vested with
authority, on this constitutional basis, to make and execute such laws, in future, as should be found
necessary; the public security and welfare being their grand object.- This, at least, appears to be the
most just and rational idea of government that is founded in compact; as, I suppose, all governments,
notwithstanding later usurpations, originally were; and if the compact, in early ages, hath not always
been expressed; yet it has been necessarily implied, and understood, both by governors, and the
governed, on their entering into society.
To this rise of government, the Hebrew polity, so far as it related only to civil matters, is not to be
considered as an exception.- For although God, a most perfect Governor, for wise reasons, and as a
48
distinguished favor, condescended to become the political head of the Jewish state; yet he did not think
proper to exercise his absolute right of government over them, without the consent of the people.
And when they had foolishly and wickedly determined to give up this form of government, which was
so wisely calculated for the public advantage, and substitute another in its room; their alwise and
beneficent Governor did not see fit to exert his omnipotence to prevent it: Nor did he, as he justly
might, abandon them for their impiety and ingratitude.
But analogous to the methods of his moral government, he went into a mode of conduct with them,
adapted to their rational nature.- He treated them as free agents.- He solemnly protested against the
change they were about to make in government; and, in order to disswade them from the rash attempt,
he shewed them the manner of the king which should reign over them. But such paternal
remonstrances proving ineffectual, and the people still persisting in their design, He not only permitted
them to pursue it, but actually afforded them special aid and direction in the choice of their new kingthat they might have one who should save them from their enemies- because their cry had come unto
him.
This instance of the uneasiness of the nation of the Jews, under the most perfect form of government,
may, perhaps, be alledged by some, as an argument of the utter incapacity of a people to judge of the
rectitude of administration, or of their unreasonable peevishness and discontent, when they are
governed well. It ought, however, to be considered, that though God was pleased to put himself at the
head of the Jewish polity, yet officers, or rulers taken from among men, were appointed to act under
Him, and these might not, and in fact did not always keep the great end of their investitute in view.
This was remarkably the case in the instance before us.- The sons of Samuel, who had been appointed
judges over Israel, walked not in his ways, but turned aside after lucre, and took bribes, and perverted
judgment; and the evil effects of their venality, and consequent perversion of public justice being
known, and felt by the people, were the immediate occasion of their general uneasiness and complaint.
In this situation of their affairs, the way, indeed, was open before them. It was their indispensable duty,
instead of withdrawing their allegiance, to have made their application to God their king, in a way of
humble ardent prayer, for a redress of such enormities; and undoubtedly, He would have heard their
petition, and returned an answer of peace, as He had before, in times of other dangers and distresses,
often done.- Their sin and folly consisted in this neglect, and not in groundless suspicions, and
unnecessary complaints: they had manifest cause of uneasiness- they were greatly injured, and
oppressed by some of their executive officers: Bribery, which ought to be the abhorrence of all ranks,
had corrupted the seats of judgment, and rendered their persons and property insecure, and without
the protection of law. Of this they complained, and made it the ground of their request for a king to
judge them like all the nations- And however the Israelites might be guilty of great weakness and folly,
as they certainly were, in desiring, on this account, to depart from a form of government, in which God
himself presided, and wherein they might have had all their grievances redressed; and to adopt one
similar to that of other nations;- and how far soever God might grant their desire, as a punishment of
their ingratitude, yet, as it appears from Jacob’s blessing on the tribe of Judah, not to mention other
things, it was in the divine plan, or permission at least, that the Jews, in future time, should come under
49
the governance of earthly kings, it is no improbable conjecture, that prevailing wickedness, and
corruption among some in high station at this period, was the occasion of God’s so readily complying
with this request.
The passage, however, which stands at the head of our discourse, supposes the people to be judges of
the good or ill effects of administration;- and as the wise king of Israel is the author, it may, perhaps,
have the more weight.- “When the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice.”- They are sensible of
their own happiness in having men of uprightness, honor and humanity to rule over them- Men, who
make a proper use of their authority- who seek the peace and welfare of the whole community, and
govern according to law and equity, or the original rules of their constitution.- “But when the wicked
beareth rule, the people mourn”- they are dissatisfied and grieved when contrary to reasonable
expectation, and the design they had in forming into civil society, it turns out, as the history of states
and kingdoms authorizes us to say it often does, that their rulers possess opposite qualities- are
inhuman, tyrannical and wicked; and instead of guarding, violate their rights and liberties.
***
Rulers are under the most sacred ties to consult the good of society. ‘Tis the only grand design of their
appointment. For the promotion of this valuable end, they are ordained of God, and cloathed with
authority by men.
In a state of nature men are equal, exactly on a par in regard to authority; each one is a law to himself,
having the law of God, the sole rule of conduct, written on his heart.
No individual has any authority, or right to attempt to exercise any, over the rest of the human species,
however he may be supposed to surpass them in wisdom and sagacity. The idea of superior wisdom
giving a right to rule, can answer the purpose of power but to one; for on this plan the Wisest of all is
Lord of all. Mental endowments, though excellent qualifications for rule, when men have entered into
combination and erected government, and previous to government, bring the possessors under moral
obligation, by advice, perwasion and argument, to do good proportionate to the degrees of them; yet
do not give any antecedent right to the exercise of authority. Civil authority is the production of
combined society- not born with, but delegated to certain individuals for the advancement of the
common benefit.
And as its origin is from the people, who have not only a right, but are bound in duty, for the
preservation of the property and liberty of the whole society, to lodge it in such hands as they judge
best qualified to answer its intention; so when it is misapplied to other purposes, and the public, as it
always will, receives damage from the abuse, they have the same original right, grounded on the same
fundamental reasons, and are equally bound in duty to resume it, and transfer it to others.- These are
principles which will not be denied by any good and loyal subject of his present Majesty King George,
either in Great-Britain or America- The royal right to the throne absolutely depends on the truth of
them,- and the revolution, an event seasonable and happy both to the mother country and these
colonies, evidently supports them, and is supported by them.
50
But it has been objected, that the doctrine which teaches that the people are the source of civil
authority, and that they will lawfully oppose those rulers, who make an ill use of it, is likely to be
attended with the worst of consequences- occasion disturbance and revolutions in the state, and render
the situation of rulers perpetually unsafe and dangerous.
If the rulers of the latter character mentioned in our text, the safety of the community forbids any
attempt or disposition to make their situation easy; and I trust the objection is without force in regard
to those of the former.- It is altogether unreasonable to suppose a number of persons by a free and
voluntary contract, should give up themselves, their families and estates so absolutely into the hands of
any rulers, as not to make a reserve of the right of saving themselves from ruin- and if they should, the
bargain would be void, as counteracting the will of heaven, and the powerful law of self-preservation.
It must be granted that the people have a right in some circumstances, or that they have not a right in
any, to oppose their rulers- there is no medium- A sober and rational inquiry into the consequences of
each supposition, is the best method to determine on which side the truth lies- In doing this, I shall take
the liberty to adopt the sentiments and nearly the words of a writer of the first class on Government.
If it be true that no rulers can be safe where the doctrine of resistance is taught; it must be true that no
nation can be safe where the contrary is taught: If it be true that this disposeth men of turbulent spirits
to oppose the best rulers; it is as true that the other disposeth princes of evil minds, to enslave and ruin
the best and most submissive subjects: If it be true that this encourageth all public disturbance, and all
revolutions whatsoever; it is as true that the other encourageth all tyranny, and all the most intolerable
persecutions and oppressions imaginable. And on which side then will the advantage lie?- And which
of the two shall we chuse, for the sake of the happy effects and consequences of it?
Supposing it to be universally admitted, that if rulers contrive and attempt the ruin of the publick, it is
the duty of the people to consult the common happiness, and oppose them in such a design; it must
follow, I think, that the grounds of publick unhappiness would be removed, and those inconveniences,
which by mistake are represented as the consequences of this doctrine, prevented; for, on this
supposition, the worst of Princes would learn to do that out of interest, which the best constantly do
out of a good principle and true love to their subjects- No Prince would have any persons about him, to
advise and incite him to illegal or unjust actions- and if he had at any time been guilty, he would, upon
the first representation, and without being forced to it, readily acknowledge his error, and set all things
right again. And let who will say it, the dispositions of subjects are not so bad, nor their love to public
disturbance so great, but that a Prince of such conduct may be sure of reigning in their affections, and
of being obeyed out of love and gratitude; which is the securest foundation any throne can possibly be
fixed on.- So far is it from being true, that the universal reception of the doctrine of resistance would be
the ground of public confusion and misery, that it would prevent the beginning of evil, and take away
the first occasion of discontent.
It must be acknowledged, it is because this doctrine, whatever is pretended, hath not been received,
that any rulers have been misled, and encouraged to take such measures, as in the end, have proved
fatal to themselves. With respect therefore to rulers of evil dispositions, nothing is more necessary than
that they should believe resistance, in some cases to be lawful. In intend not for a few discontented
51
individuals who may happen to take it into their heads to resist, but for the majority of a community,
either by themselves or representatives. Such rulers, indeed, cannot bear the propagation of this
doctrine; but the reason why they cannot, viz. its being preventive of their pernicious designs, is an
undeniable argument of its being the more necessary.
As for good rulers, they are not affected by the propagation of it, but may promote it themselves
consistently with their own particular interest; for it is the chief interest of princes to reign in the
affections of their subjects, free from all suspicion and jealousy of evil design. Nothing can give a nation
greater satisfaction that their supreme magistrate sincerely endeavors to promote their interest, or gain
him more hearty love and esteem, than the admission of this doctrine; it looks open, and removed from
base and unworthy purposes; but a zeal for the opposite doctrine, tends, in its nature, and has been
seen, in experience, to create jealousies in the minds of subjects, to take off their affections from a
prince, and to lay the foundation of their withdrawing their allegiance from him.
But supposing it to be universally received, that it is the duty of the people patiently to submit, and not
oppose their rulers, tho’ manifestly carrying forward the ruin of the public, nothing can be imagined to
follow, but what is of the worst consequence to human society, unless we suppose rulers as angels of
God, or rather, as God himself, incapable of being mistaken themselves, or misled by others. This
supposition leaves no restraint on such rulers as have designs of their own, distinct from the public
good: Public misery and slavery will therefore ensue; and this is a state of things infinitely worse than
that of public disturbance, supposing such sometimes to take place in consequence of resistance. The
inconveniences of the latter will soon be felt and rectified by the people themselves; but the former, on
the principle of non-resistance, is absolutely without a remedy.
When people feel the influence and blessing of a good administration, they are not, in general,
disposed to complain and find fault with their rulers; it is inconsistent with their own interest, and that
f their families to do so. If we will be determined on a point of such delicacy by a ruler himself, who, as
absolute as he was, had wisdom and public virtue to give judgment conformable to the nature and
truth of things, we shall see that it is under the influence of an evil administration the people are
discontented and mourn; and that under the influence of a good, one they rejoice.
All lawful rulers are the servants of the public, exalted above their brethren not for their own sakes, but
the benefit of the people; and submission is yielded, not on the account of their persons considered
exclusively of the authority they are clothed with, but of those laws, which in the exercise of this
authority are made by them, conformably to the laws of nature and equity.
This position is so far from being unacceptable to good rulers, or thought to be derogatory of their
dignity, that they esteem it as implying the highest human character, and an official resemblance of the
great Savior of mankind, who came not to be ministered unto, but to minister; and accordingly went
about doing good.
The assertion that rulers are constituted by the people for the common happiness, is no denial of St
Paul’s doctrine, who, speaking of magistracy, hath said- There is no power but of God; the powers that
be are ordained of God:- any more than it is a denial of the blessings of husbandry, merchandize, and
the mechanic arts, or, indeed any thing beneficial to society, being from God, to say, that men have
52
invented them- They are all from God, from whom cometh down every good and perfect gift; and
much in the same sense, as it is his will that men should be employed in them for their own advantage:
But men by their reason, which is also the gift of God, are the immediate discoverers of their utility. It
is, however, necessary to observe, that as civil governments holds a distinguished place among the gifts
of God; and, considering the human make, the blessings of it are productive of a greater aggregate of
happiness, both in a natural and moral view, than most others: Much has been said in revelation about
it- the divine approbation manifested- and the qualification of rulers exactly stated.
Although government is not explicitly instituted by God, it is, nevertheless, from him; as, by the human
constitution, and the circumstances men are placed in, He has signified it to be his will, that, as a
security of property and liberty, and as necessary to greater improvements in virtue and happiness
than could be attained in a state of nature, there should be government among them. But it is from
man, as for the same end- the procuring a greater good to each individual, on the whole, than could be
had without it; they have, in conformity to their make and circumstances, and the dictates of reason,
voluntarily instituted it. And thus government is the ordinance both of God and man. And so the newtestament writers consider it, and speak of its design as being the same in both, viz. The public
happiness.
This is a striking indication to rulers, not only as to their aims in accepting any public office in a
community, but as to the obligations they are under to discharge the duties of it with fidelity. They are
the trustees of God, vested with authority by him, in the benevolent designs of his providence, to be
employed in guarding and defending the just Rights and Liberties of mankind; and as far as they can,
advancing the common welfare.
And as they are responsible to him who is no respecter of persons; they are not to expect their public
conduct is to be exempted from his most strict and impartial scrutiny.
They are also the trustees of society, as their authority, under God, is derived from the people,
delegated to them with design it should be exercised for, and to no other purpose than, the common
benefit; and this renders them justly accountable to their human constituents, whose tribunal, however
some have affected to despise it, is full of dignity and majesty- Kings and emperors have trembled
before it!
While merely to possess places of dignity and eminence is sufficiently gratifying to some minds, the
chief joy of rulers, mindful of the importance of their station, arises from a consciousness of such
behaviour, in their public capacity, as will be approved of God, and accepted of men. For this great and
valuable purpose, they will be careful to deserve the character first mentioned in the text- be just and
impartial in every part of administration; and with their integrity, endeavor to join those other
accomplishments which are requisite to the honorable discharge of their respective trusts.
***
The present situation of our public affairs requires good degrees of knowledge, firmness of spirit,
patriotism, and the fear of God, in those who stand at helm and guide the state- they should be men
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able to investigate the source of our evils, point out adequate remedies, and that have resolution and
public spirit to apply them.
Our danger is not visionary, but real- Our contention is not about trifles, but about liberty and property
and not ours only, but those of posterity, to the latest generations. And every lover of mankind will
allow that these are important objects, too inestimably precious and valuable enjoyments to be treated
with neglect, and tamely surrendered:- For however some few, I speak it with regret and astonishment,
even from among ourselves, appear sufficiently disposed to ridicule the rights of America, and the
liberties of subjects; ’tis plain St. Paul, who was a good judge, had a very different sense of them- “He
was on all occasions for standing fast, not only in the liberties with which Christ had made him free,
from the Jewish law of ceremonies, but also in that liberty, with which the laws of nature, and the
Roman state, had made him free from oppression and tyranny.”
If I am mistaken in supposing plans are formed, and executing, subversive of our natural, and charter
rights, and privileges, and incompatible with every idea of liberty, all America is mistaken with me.
Our continued complaints- Our repeated, humble, but fruitless, unregarded petitions remonstrancesand if I may be allowed the sacred allusion, our groaning, which cannot be uttered, are at once
indications of our sufferings, and the feeling sense we have of them.
We think we are injured- We believe we are denied some of those privileges, enjoyed by our fellow
subjects in Great-Britain, which have not only been insured to us by Royal Charter, but which we have a
natural independent right to.
And it bears the harder on our spirits, when we recollect the deep inwrought affection we have always
had for the parent state- our well known loyalty to our Sovereign, and our remitting attachment to his
illustrious house, as well as the ineffable toils, hardships and dangers which our Fathers endured,
unassisted, but by Heaven, in planting this American wilderness, and turning it into a fruitful field!
But in such circumstances, we place great confidence in the wisdom and patriotism of our civil rulersOur eyes are fixed on them, and under the smiles of Heaven we expect a redress of our grievances by
their instrumentality. Or, at least, that they will not be wanting, in any thing in their power, consistent
with the duties of their station, to effect it.
We sincerely hope, and trust, the elections of this day will turn on men, who shall be disposed in their
proper department to restore and establish our rights- Men acquainted with the several powers vested
in the honorable board, and determined, with persevering spirit, to assert and uphold them- Men, in
every view, friendly to the constitution of government in this province, and resolved to maintain it,
undiminished, and entire.
You will please to remember, Gentlemen, that in this weighty affair, you do not act merely for
yourselves- you act for the whole community- every member has an interest in the transaction.
But above all, suffer me to remind you, that you act for God, and under his inspection, by whose
providence, this trust is committed to you- and that you must one day give an account to Him whose
eyes are as a flame of fire, of the motives of your conduct.
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The Right of Revolution
The Farmer Refuted
Alexander Hamilton
I shall, for the present, pass over to that part of your pamphlet, in which you endeavour to establish the
supremacy of the British Parliament over America. After a proper eclaircissement of this point, I shall
draw such inferences, as will sap the foundation of every thing you have offered.
The first thing that presents itself is a wish, that "I had, explicitly, declared to the public my ideas of
the natural rights of mankind. Man, in a state of nature (you say) may be considered, as perfectly free
from all restraints of law and government, and, then, the weak must submit to the strong."
I shall, henceforth, begin to make some allowance for that enmity, you have discovered to the natural
rights of mankind. For, though ignorance of them in this enlightened age cannot be admitted, as a
sufficient excuse for you; yet, it ought, in some measure, to extenuate your guilt. If you will follow my
advice, there still may be hopes of your reformation. Apply yourself, without delay, to the study of the
law of nature. I would recommend to your perusal, Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, and
Burlemaqui. I might mention other excellent writers on this subject; but if you attend, diligently, to
these, you will not require any others.
There is so strong a similitude between your political principles and those maintained by Mr. Hobb[e]s,
that, in judging from them, a person might very easily mistake you for a disciple of his. His opinion was,
exactly, coincident with yours, relative to man in a state of nature. He held, as you do, that he was,
then, perfectly free from all restraint of law and government. Moral obligation, according to him, is
derived from the introduction of civil society; and there is no virtue, but what is purely artificial, the
mere contrivance of politicians, for the maintenance of social intercourse. But the reason he run into
this absurd and impious doctrine, was, that he disbelieved the existence of an intelligent
superintending principle, who is the governor, and will be the final judge of the universe.
As you, sometimes, swear by him that made you, I conclude, your sentiment does not correspond with
his, in that which is the basis of the doctrine, you both agree in; and this makes it impossible to imagine
whence this congruity between you arises. To grant, that there is a supreme intelligence, who rules the
world, and has established laws to regulate the actions of his creatures; and, still, to assert, that man, in
a state of nature, may be considered as perfectly free from all restraints of law and government, appear
to a common understanding, altogether irreconcileable.
Good and wise men, in all ages, have embraced a very dissimilar theory. They have supposed, that the
deity, from the relations, we stand in, to himself and to each other, has constituted an eternal and
immutable law, which is, indispensibly, obligatory upon all mankind, prior to any human institution
whatever.
This is what is called the law of nature, "which, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God
himself, is, of course, superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries,
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and at all times. No human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid,
derive all their authority, mediately, or immediately, from this original." Blackstone.
Upon this law, depend the natural rights of mankind, the supreme being gave existence to man,
together with the means of preserving and beatifying that existence. He endowed him with rational
faculties, by the help of which, to discern and pursue such things, as were consistent with his duty and
interest, and invested him with an inviolable right to personal liberty, and personal safety.
Hence, in a state of nature, no man had any moral power to deprive another of his life, limbs, property
or liberty; nor the least authority to command, or exact obedience from him; except that which arose
from the ties of consanguinity.
Hence also, the origin of all civil government, justly established, must be a voluntary compact, between
the rulers and the ruled; and must be liable to such limitations, as are necessary for the security of
the absolute rights of the latter; for what original title can any man or set of men have, to govern others,
except their own consent? To usurp dominion over a people, in their own despite, or to grasp at a more
extensive power than they are willing to entrust, is to violate that law of nature, which gives every man
a right to his personal liberty; and can, therefore, confer no obligation to obedience.
"The principal aim of society is to protect individuals, in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which
were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preserved, in peace,
without that mutual assistance, and intercourse, which is gained by the institution of friendly and
social communities. Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws, is to maintain and
regulate these absolute rights of individuals." Blackstone.
If we examine the pretensions of parliament, by this criterion, which is evidently, a good one, we shall,
presently detect their injustice. First, they are subversive of our natural liberty, because an authority is
assumed over us, which we by no means assent to. And secondly, they divest us of that moral security,
for our lives and properties, which we are intitled to, and which it is the primary end of society to
bestow. For such security can never exist, while we have no part in making the laws, that are to bind
us; and while it may be the interest of our uncontroled legislators to oppress us as much as possible.
To deny these principles will be not less absurd, than to deny the plainest axioms: I shall not, therefore,
attempt any further illustration of them.
.....
Thus Sir, I have taken a pretty general survey of the American Charters; and proved to the satisfaction
of every unbiassed person, that they are intirely, discordant with that sovereignty of parliament, for
which you are an advocate. The disingenuity of your extracts (to give it no harsher name) merits the
severest censure; and will no doubt serve to discredit all your former, as well as future labours, in your
favourite cause of despotism.
It is true, that New-York has no Charter. But, if it could support its claim to liberty in no other way, it
might, with justice, plead the common principles of colonization: for, it would be unreasonable, to
seclude one colony, from the enjoyment of the most important privileges of the rest. There is no need,
however, of this plea: The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among old
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parchments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sun beam, in the whole volume of human
nature, by the hand of the divinity itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.
The nations of Turkey, Russia, France, Spain, and all other despotic kingdoms, in the world, have an
inherent right, when ever they please, to shake off the yoke of servitude, (though sanctified by the
immemorial usage of their ancestors;) and to model their government, upon the principles of civil
liberty.
.....
Had the rest of America passively looked on, while a sister colony was subjugated, the same fate would
gradually have overtaken all. The safety of the whole depends upon the mutual protection of every
part. If the sword of oppression be permitted to lop off one limb without opposition, reiterated strokes
will soon dismember the whole body. Hence it was the duty and interest of all the colonies to succour
and support the one which was suffering. It is sometimes sagaciously urged, that we ought to
commisserate the distresses of the people of Massachusetts; but not intermeddle in their affairs, so far,
as perhaps to bring ourselves into like circumstances with them. This might be good reasoning, if our
neutrality would not be more dangerous, than our participation: But I am unable to conceive how the
colonies in general would have any security against oppression, if they were once to content
themselves, with barely pitying each other, while parliament was prosecuting and enforcing its
demands. Unless they continually protect and assist each other, they must all inevitably fall a prey to
their enemies.
Extraordinary emergencies, require extraordinary expedients. The best mode of opposition was that in
which there might be an union of councils. This was necessary to ascertain the boundaries of our rights;
and to give weight and dignity to our measures, both in Britain and America. A Congress was
accordingly proposed, and universally agreed to.
You, Sir, triumph in the supposed illegality of this body; but, granting your supposition were true, it
would be a matter of no real importance. When the first principles of civil society are violated, and the
rights of a whole people are invaded, the common forms of municipal law are not to be regarded. Men
may then betake themselves to the law of nature; and, if they but conform their actions, to that
standard, all cavils against them, betray either ignorance or dishonesty. There are some events in
society, to which human laws cannot extend; but when applied to them lose all their force and efficacy.
In short, when human laws contradict or discountenance the means, which are necessary to preserve
the essential rights of any society, they defeat the proper end of all laws, and so become null and void.
Romans 13: 1-14
New American Standard Bible (NASB)
Be Subject to Government
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13 Every person is to be in subjection to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from
God, and those which exist are established by God. 2 Therefore whoever resists authority has opposed
the ordinance of God; and they who have opposed will receive condemnation upon themselves. 3 For
rulers are not a cause of fear for good behavior, but for evil. Do you want to have no fear of authority?
Do what is good and you will have praise from the same; 4 for it is a minister of God to you for good.
But if you do what is evil, be afraid; for it does not bear the sword for nothing; for it is a minister of
God, an avenger who brings wrath on the one who practices evil. 5 Therefore it is necessary to be in
subjection, not only because of wrath, but also for conscience’ sake. 6 For because of this you also pay
taxes, for rulers are servants of God, devoting themselves to this very thing. 7 Render to all what is due
them: tax to whom tax is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor.
8 Owe nothing to anyone except to love one another; for he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the
law. 9 For this, “You shall not commit adultery, You shall not murder, You shall not steal, You shall not
covet,” and if there is any other commandment, it is summed up in this saying, “You shall love your
neighbor as yourself.” 10 Love does no wrong to a neighbor; therefore love is the fulfillment of the law.
11 Do this, knowing the time, that it is already the hour for you to awaken from sleep; for now
salvation is nearer to us than when we believed. 12 The night is almost gone, and the day is near.
Therefore let us lay aside the deeds of darkness and put on the armor of light. 13 Let us behave
properly as in the day, not in carousing and drunkenness, not in sexual promiscuity and sensuality, not
in strife and jealousy. 14 But put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh in regard
to its lusts.
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“TO REDUCE THEM UNDER ABSOLUTE DESPOTISM…”
Aristotle’s Politics Book V, Chapter 11
As to (2) tyrannies, they are preserved in two most opposite ways. One of them is the old traditional
method in which most tyrants administer their government. Of such arts Periander of Corinth is said to
have been the great master, and many similar devices may be gathered from the Persians in the
administration of their government. There are firstly the prescriptions mentioned some distance back,
for the preservation of a tyranny, in so far as this is possible; viz., that the tyrant should lop off those
who are too high; he must put to death men of spirit; he must not allow common meals, clubs,
education, and the like; he must be upon his guard against anything which is likely to inspire either
courage or confidence among his subjects; he must prohibit literary assemblies or other meetings for
discussion, and he must take every means to prevent people from knowing one another (for
acquaintance begets mutual confidence). Further, he must compel all persons staying in the city to
appear in public and live at his gates; then he will know what they are doing: if they are always kept
under, they will learn to be humble. In short, he should practice these and the like Persian and barbaric
arts, which all have the same object. A tyrant should also endeavor to know what each of his subjects
says or does, and should employ spies, like the 'female detectives' at Syracuse, and the eavesdroppers
whom Hiero was in the habit of sending to any place of resort or meeting; for the fear of informers
prevents people from speaking their minds, and if they do, they are more easily found out. Another art
of the tyrant is to sow quarrels among the citizens; friends should be embroiled with friends, the people
with the notables, and the rich with one another. Also he should impoverish his subjects; he thus
provides against the maintenance of a guard by the citizen and the people, having to keep hard at
work, are prevented from conspiring. The Pyramids of Egypt afford an example of this policy; also the
offerings of the family of Cypselus, and the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the
Peisistratidae, and the great Polycratean monuments at Samos; all these works were alike intended to
occupy the people and keep them poor. Another practice of tyrants is to multiply taxes, after the
manner of Dionysius at Syracuse, who contrived that within five years his subjects should bring into
the treasury their whole property. The tyrant is also fond of making war in order that his subjects may
have something to do and be always in want of a leader. And whereas the power of a king is preserved
by his friends, the characteristic of a tyrant is to distrust his friends, because he knows that all men
want to overthrow him, and they above all have the power.
Again, the evil practices of the last and worst form of democracy are all found in tyrannies. Such are
the power given to women in their families in the hope that they will inform against their husbands,
and the license which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray their masters; for slaves and
women do not conspire against tyrants; and they are of course friendly to tyrannies and also to
democracies, since under them they have a good time. For the people too would fain be a monarch, and
therefore by them, as well as by the tyrant, the flatterer is held in honor; in democracies he is the
demagogue; and the tyrant also has those who associate with him in a humble spirit, which is a work of
flattery.
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Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because they love to be flattered, but no man who has the
spirit of a freeman in him will lower himself by flattery; good men love others, or at any rate do not
flatter them. Moreover, the bad are useful for bad purposes; 'nail knocks out nail,' as the proverb says.
It is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike every one who has dignity or independence; he wants to be
alone in his glory, but any one who claims a like dignity or asserts his independence encroaches upon
his prerogative, and is hated by him as an enemy to his power. Another mark of a tyrant is that he likes
foreigners better than citizens, and lives with them and invites them to his table; for the one are
enemies, but the Others enter into no rivalry with him.
Such are the notes of the tyrant and the arts by which he preserves his power; there is no wickedness
too great for him. All that we have said may be summed up under three heads, which answer to the
three aims of the tyrant. These are, (1) the humiliation of his subjects; he knows that a mean-spirited
man will not conspire against anybody; (2) the creation of mistrust among them; for a tyrant is not
overthrown until men begin to have confidence in one another; and this is the reason why tyrants are at
war with the good; they are under the idea that their power is endangered by them, not only because
they would not be ruled despotically but also because they are loyal to one another, and to other men,
and do not inform against one another or against other men; (3) the tyrant desires that his subjects shall
be incapable of action, for no one attempts what is impossible, and they will not attempt to overthrow a
tyranny, if they are powerless. Under these three heads the whole policy of a tyrant may be summed
up, and to one or other of them all his ideas may be referred: (1) he sows distrust among his subjects;
(2) he takes away their power; (3) he humbles them.
… But enough of these details; what should be the general policy of the tyrant is obvious. He ought to
show himself to his subjects in the light, not of a tyrant, but of a steward and a king. He should not
appropriate what is theirs, but should be their guardian; he should be moderate, not extravagant in his
way of life; he should win the notables by companionship, and the multitude by flattery. For then his
rule will of necessity be nobler and happier, because he will rule over better men whose spirits are not
crushed, over men to whom he himself is not an object of hatred, and of whom he is not afraid. His
power too will be more lasting. His disposition will be virtuous, or at least half virtuous; and he will
not be wicked, but half wicked only.
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“…TO INSTITUTE NEW GOVERNMENT, LAYING ITS
FOUNDATION ON SUCH PRINCIPLES AND
ORGANIZING ITS POWERS IN SUCH FORM, AS TO THEM
SHALL SEEM MOSTLY LIKELY TO AFFECT THEIR SAFETY
AND HAPPINESS.”
The Second Treatise of Civil Government, Chapter 9: John Locke
Of the Ends of Political Society and Government.
Sec. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own
person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his
freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any
other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right,
yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being
kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice,
the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing
to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without
reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a
mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general
name, property.
Sec. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting
themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature
there are many things wanting.
First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be
the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them:
for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by
their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to
them in the application of it to their particular cases.
Sec. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to
determine all differences according to the established law: for every one in that state being both judge
and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt
to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and
unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.
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Sec. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when
right, and to give it due execution, They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are
able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment
dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
Sec. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being but in an ill
condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we
seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are
therein exposed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the
transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and
therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his
single power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and
by such rules as the community, or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in
this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the
governments and societies themselves.
Sec. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two
powers.
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and others within the
permission of the law of nature: by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are
one community, make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the
corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no necessity that
men should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive agreements combine into
smaller and divided associations.
The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the crimes committed against
that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular politic
society, and incorporates into any common-wealth, separate from the rest of mankind.
Sec. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the preservation of himself, and the
rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the
preservation of himself, and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many
things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.
Sec. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, (which
he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he
thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now
in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniences, from the labour, assistance, and society of
others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as
much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society
shall require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the society do the like.
Sec. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive
power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the
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legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the
better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change
his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them,
can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's
property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so
unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-wealth, is
bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by
extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws;
and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to
prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this
to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.
Second Treatise of Civil Government, Chapter 11: John Locke
“Of the Extent of the Legislative Power”
Sec. 134. THE great end of men's entering into society, being the enjoyment of their properties in peace
and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society; the
first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power; as
the first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation
of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative is
not only the supreme power of the common-wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the
community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body else, in what form soever conceived, or
by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its sanction from
that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without this the law could not have
that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a law,* the consent of the society, over whom no body
can have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received from them; and
therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately
terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts: nor can any oaths to
any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the
society from his obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any
obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine
one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society, which is not the supreme.
(* The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men, belonging so properly
unto the same intire societies, that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to
exercise the same of himself, and not by express commission immediately and personally received
from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose
laws, it is no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not
made so. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10. Of this point therefore we are to note, that sith men naturally
have no full and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without
our consent, we could in such sort be at no man's commandment living. And to be commanded we do
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consent, when that society, whereof we be a part, hath at any time before consented, without revoking
the same after by the like universal agreement.
Laws therefore human, of what kind so ever, are available by consent. Ibid.)
Sec. 135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being, or only
by intervals, though it be the supreme power in every common-wealth; yet,
First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it
being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is
legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society,
and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself;
and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or
take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the
arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or
possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself,
and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the common-wealth, and by it to the
legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds
of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power, that hath no other end but preservation,
and therefore can never* have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects. The
obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have
by human laws known penalties annexed to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the law of nature
stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other
men's actions, must, as well as their own and other men's actions, be conformable to the law of nature,
i.e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the
preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against it.
(* Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one a natural inclination, whereby all
men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other an order, expresly or secretly agreed upon, touching
the manner of their union in living together: the latter is that which we call the law of a commonweal,
the very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and set on work
in such actions as the common good requireth. Laws politic, ordained for external order and regiment
amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly
obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless
presuming man to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than a wild beast, they do
accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto
the common good, for which societies are instituted. Unless they do this, they are not perfect. Hooker's
Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
Sec. 136. Secondly,* The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to its self a power to rule by
extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by
promulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges: for the law of nature being unwritten, and
so no where to be found but in the minds of men, they who through passion or interest shall miscite, or
misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge: and so
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it serves not, as it ought, to determine the rights, and fence the properties of those that live under it,
especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own case: and
he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to
defend himself from injuries, or to punish delinquents. To avoid these inconveniences, which disorder
men's propperties in the state of nature, men unite into societies, that they may have the united
strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to
bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up all their natural
power to the society which they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into such
hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace,
quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the state of nature.
(* Human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must direct, howbeit such measures
they are as have also their higher rules to be measured by, which rules are two, the law of God, and the
law of nature; so that laws human must be made according to the general laws of nature, and without
contradiction to any positive law of scripture, otherwise they are ill made. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. iii. sect.
9.
To constrain men to any thing inconvenient doth seem unreasonable. Ibid. l. i. sect. 10.)
Sec. 137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither of them
consist with the ends of society and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of
nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and fortunes, and
by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they
should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over
their persons and estates, and put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will
arbitrarily upon them. This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of nature,
wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal
terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man, or many in combination. Whereas by
supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator, they
have disarmed themselves, and armed him, to make a prey of them when he pleases; he being in a
much worse condition, who is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of
100,000, than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 single men; no body being secure, that
his will, who has such a command, is better than that of other men, though his force be 100,000 times
stronger. And therefore, whatever form the common-wealth is under, the ruling power ought to
govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions:
for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature, if they shall have armed
one, or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant
and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment unknown wills,
without having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions: for all the power the
government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure,
so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their
duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds,
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and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to such purposes, and by such
measures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly.
Sec. 138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his
own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men
enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should have property, without
which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering into society, which was the end for which they
entered into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men therefore in society having property,
they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are their's, that no body hath a
right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent: without this they
have no property at all; for I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me,
when he pleases, against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative
power of any commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily,
or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative
consists, wholly or in part, in assemblies which are variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of
the assembly, are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the rest. But in
governments, where the legislative is in one lasting assembly always in being, or in one man, as in
absolute monarchies, there is danger still, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest
from the rest of the community; and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power, by taking
what they think fit from the people: for a man's property is not at all secure, tho' there be good and
equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands those
subjects have power to take from any private man, what part he pleases of his property, and use and
dispose of it as he thinks good.
Sec. 139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as I have before shewed, intrusted
with this condition, and for this end, that men might have and secure their properties; the prince, or
senate, however it may have power to make laws, for the regulating of property between the subjects
one amongst another, yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or any part of the
subjects property, without their own consent: for this would be in effect to leave them no property at
all. And to let us see, that even absolute power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute,
but is still limited by that reason, and confined to those ends, which required it in some cases to be
absolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of martial discipline: for the preservation
of the army, and in it of the whole common-wealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of
every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable
of them; but yet we see, that neither the serjeant, that could command a soldier to march up to the
mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach, where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to
give him one penny of his money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death for deserting his
post, or for not obeying the most desperate orders, can yet, with all his absolute power of life and
death, dispose of one farthing of that soldier's estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can
command any thing, and hang for the least disobedience; because such a blind obedience is necessary
to that end, for which the commander has his power, viz. the preservation of the rest; but the disposing
of his goods has nothing to do with it.
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Sec. 140. It is true, governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one who
enjoys his share of the protection, should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it.
But still it must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves,
or their representatives chosen by them: for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the
people, by his own authority, and without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the
fundamental law of property, and subverts the end of government: for what property have I in that,
which another may by right take, when he pleases, to himself?
Sec. 141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands: for it
being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The
people alone can appoint the form of the common-wealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and
appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said, We will submit to rules, and
be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall make
laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those whom they
have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them. The power of the legislative, being derived from
the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no
power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in other hands.
Sec. 142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the society, and the law of God
and nature, have set to the legislative power of every common-wealth, in all forms of government.
First, They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to
have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough.
Secondly, These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately, but the good of the people.
Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of the people,
given by themselves, or their deputies. And this properly concerns only such governments where the
legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative
to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.
Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body else, or
place it any where, but where the people have.
Articles of Confederation
To all to whom these Presents shall come, we the undersigned Delegates of the States affixed to our
Names send greeting.
Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the states of New Hampshire, Massachusettsbay Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.
I.
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The Stile of this Confederacy shall be: "The United States of America".
II.
Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right,
which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.
III.
The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their
common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding
themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them,
on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.
IV.
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the
different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and
fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several States; and the people of each State shall free ingress and regress to and from any other State,
and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties,
impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions
shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State,
of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid
by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them.
If any person guilty of, or charged with, treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any State, shall
flee from justice, and be found in any of the United States, he shall, upon demand of the Governor or
executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having
jurisdiction of his offense.
Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings
of the courts and magistrates of every other State.
V.
For the most convenient management of the general interests of the United States, delegates shall be
annually appointed in such manner as the legislatures of each State shall direct, to meet in Congress on
the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each State to recall its delegates,
or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the
year.
No State shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor more than seven members; and no
person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor shall
any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the United States, for which he, or
another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees or emolument of any kind.
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Each State shall maintain its own delegates in a meeting of the States, and while they act as members of
the committee of the States.
In determining questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each State shall have one vote.
Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place
out of Congress, and the members of Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests or
imprisonments, during the time of their going to and from, and attendence on Congress, except for
treason, felony, or breach of the peace.
VI.
No State, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or
receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any King,
Prince or State; nor shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any
of them, accept any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever from any King, Prince or
foreign State; nor shall the United States in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of
nobility.
No two or more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them,
without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for
which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue.
No State shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties, entered
into by the United States in Congress assembled, with any King, Prince or State, in pursuance of any
treaties already proposed by Congress, to the courts of France and Spain.
No vessel of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any State, except such number only, as shall be
deemed necessary by the United States in Congress assembled, for the defense of such State, or its
trade; nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any State in time of peace, except such number only,
as in the judgement of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison
the forts necessary for the defense of such State; but every State shall always keep up a well-regulated
and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered, and shall provide and constantly have ready
for use, in public stores, a due number of filed pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms,
ammunition and camp equipage.
No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled,
unless such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a resolution
being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not to
admit of a delay till the United States in Congress assembled can be consulted; nor shall any State grant
commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it be after a
declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled, and then only against the Kingdom or
State and the subjects thereof, against which war has been so declared, and under such regulations as
shall be established by the United States in Congress assembled, unless such State be infested by
pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger
shall continue, or until the United States in Congress assembled shall determine otherwise.
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VII.
When land forces are raised by any State for the common defense, all officers of or under the rank of
colonel, shall be appointed by the legislature of each State respectively, by whom such forces shall be
raised, or in such manner as such State shall direct, and all vacancies shall be filled up by the State
which first made the appointment.
VIII.
All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general
welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common
treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States in proportion to the value of all land within each
State, granted or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon
shall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled, shall from time
to time direct and appoint.
The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the
legislatures of the several States within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress
assembled.
IX.
The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of
determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth article -- of sending and
receiving ambassadors -- entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall
be made whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such
imposts and duties on foreigners, as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the
exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever -- of establishing rules
for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken
by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated -- of granting
letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace -- appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies
commited on the high seas and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all
cases of captures, provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any of the said
courts.
The United States in Congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and
differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or more States concerning
boundary, jurisdiction or any other causes whatever; which authority shall always be exercised in the
manner following. Whenever the legislative or executive authority or lawful agent of any State in
controversy with another shall present a petition to Congress stating the matter in question and
praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of Congress to the legislative or executive
authority of the other State in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties by their
lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint by joint consent, commissioners or judges to
constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question: but if they cannot agree,
Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list of such persons
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each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall be reduced
to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven, nor more than nine names as Congress shall
direct, shall in the presence of Congress be drawn out by lot, and the persons whose names shall be so
drawn or any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges, to hear and finally determine the
controversy, so always as a major part of the judges who shall hear the cause shall agree in the
determination: and if either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed, without showing
reasons, which Congress shall judge sufficient, or being present shall refuse to strike, the Congress shall
proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and the secretary of Congress shall strike in behalf
of such party absent or refusing; and the judgement and sentence of the court to be appointed, in the
manner before prescribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any of the parties shall refuse to submit
to the authority of such court, or to appear or defend their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless
proceed to pronounce sentence, or judgement, which shall in like manner be final and decisive, the
judgement or sentence and other proceedings being in either case transmitted to Congress, and lodged
among the acts of Congress for the security of the parties concerned: provided that every
commissioner, before he sits in judgement, shall take an oath to be administered by one of the judges of
the supreme or superior court of the State, where the cause shall be tried, 'well and truly to hear and
determine the matter in question, according to the best of his judgement, without favor, affection or
hope of reward': provided also, that no State shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United
States.
All controversies concerning the private right of soil claimed under different grants of two or more
States, whose jurisdictions as they may respect such lands, and the States which passed such grants are
adjusted, the said grants or either of them being at the same time claimed to have originated antecedent
to such settlement of jurisdiction, shall on the petition of either party to the Congress of the United
States, be finally determined as near as may be in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding
disputes respecting territorial jurisdiction between different States.
The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of
regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective States - fixing the standards of weights and measures throughout the United States -- regulating the trade and
managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the legislative
right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated -- establishing or regulating post
offices from one State to another, throughout all the United States, and exacting such postage on the
papers passing through the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the said office -appointing all officers of the land forces, in the service of the United States, excepting regimental
officers -- appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all officers whatever in the
service of the United States -- making rules for the government and regulation of the said land and
naval forces, and directing their operations.
The United States in Congress assembled shall have authority to appoint a committee, to sit in the
recess of Congress, to be denominated 'A Committee of the States', and to consist of one delegate from
each State; and to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing
the general affairs of the United States under their direction -- to appoint one of their members to
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preside, provided that no person be allowed to serve in the office of president more than one year in
any term of three years; to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the service of the
United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying the public expenses -- to borrow
money, or emit bills on the credit of the United States, transmitting every half-year to the respective
States an account of the sums of money so borrowed or emitted -- to build and equip a navy -- to agree
upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in proportion to
the number of white inhabitants in such State; which requisition shall be binding, and thereupon the
legislature of each State shall appoint the regimental officers, raise the men and cloath, arm and equip
them in a solid-like manner, at the expense of the United States; and the officers and men so cloathed,
armed and equipped shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United
States in Congress assembled. But if the United States in Congress assembled shall, on consideration of
circumstances judge proper that any State should not raise men, or should raise a smaller number of
men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, officered, cloathed, armed and equipped
in the same manner as the quota of each State, unless the legislature of such State shall judge that such
extra number cannot be safely spread out in the same, in which case they shall raise, officer, cloath, arm
and equip as many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared. And the officers and men
so cloathed, armed, and equipped, shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on
by the United States in Congress assembled.
The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque or
reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value
thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense and welfare of the United States,
or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate
money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war, to be built or purchased, or the number of land or
sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander in chief of the army or navy, unless nine States assent
to the same: nor shall a question on any other point, except for adjourning from day to day be
determined, unless by the votes of the majority of the United States in Congress assembled.
The Congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to any time within the year, and to any
place within the United States, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer duration than the space
of six months, and shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof
relating to treaties, alliances or military operations, as in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas
and nays of the delegates of each State on any question shall be entered on the journal, when it is
desired by any delegates of a State, or any of them, at his or their request shall be furnished with a
transcript of the said journal, except such parts as are above excepted, to lay before the legislatures of
the several States.
X.
The Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall be authorized to execute, in the recess of
Congress, such of the powers of Congress as the United States in Congress assembled, by the consent of
the nine States, shall from time to time think expedient to vest them with; provided that no power be
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delegated to the said Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of Confederation, the voice
of nine States in the Congress of the United States assembled be requisite.
XI.
Canada acceding to this confederation, and adjoining in the measures of the United States, shall be
admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be admitted
into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States.
XII.
All bills of credit emitted, monies borrowed, and debts contracted by, or under the authority of
Congress, before the assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present confederation, shall
be deemed and considered as a charge against the United States, for payment and satisfaction whereof
the said United States, and the public faith are hereby solemnly pleged.
XIII.
Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all
questions which by this confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation
shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at
any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the
United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.
And Whereas it hath pleased the Great Governor of the World to incline the hearts of the legislatures
we respectively represent in Congress, to approve of, and to authorize us to ratify the said Articles of
Confederation and perpetual Union. Know Ye that we the undersigned delegates, by virtue of the
power and authority to us given for that purpose, do by these presents, in the name and in behalf of
our respective constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and every of the said Articles of
Confederation and perpetual Union, and all and singular the matters and things therein contained:
And we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective constituents, that they shall
abide by the determinations of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions, which by the
said Confederation are submitted to them. And that the Articles thereof shall be inviolably observed by
the States we respectively represent, and that the Union shall be perpetual.
In Witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands in Congress. Done at Philadelphia in the State of
Pennsylvania the ninth day of July in the Year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and SeventyEight, and in the Third Year of the independence of America.
Agreed to by Congress 15 November 1777 In force after ratification by Maryland, 1 March 1781
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Vices of the Political System of the United States
James Madison | April 1787
1. FAILURE OF THE STATES TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUISITIONS.1
This evil has been so fully experienced both during the war and since the peace, results so naturally
from the number and independent authority of the States, and has been so uniformly exemplified in
every similar Confederacy, that it may be considered as not less radically and permanently inherent in,
than it is fatal to the object of, the present System.
2. ENCROACHMENTS BY THE STATES ON THE FEDERAL AUTHORITY.
Examples of this are numerous and repetitions may be foreseen in almost every case where any
favorite object of a State shall present a temptation. Among these examples are the wars and Treaties of
Georgia with the Indians, the unlicensed compacts between Virginia and Maryland, and between
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the troops raised and to be kept up by Massachusetts.
3. VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS AND OF TREATIES.
From the number of Legislatures, the sphere of life from which most of their members are taken, and
the circumstances under which their legislative business is carried on, irregularities of this kind must
frequently happen. Accordingly, not a year has passed without instances of them in some one or other
of the States. The Treaty of peace, the treaty with France, the treaty with Holland, have each been
violated.2 The causes of these irregularities must necessarily produce frequent violations of the law of
nations in other respects.
As yet foreign powers have not been rigorous in animadverting3 on us. This moderation, however,
cannot be mistaken for a permanent partiality to our faults, or a permanent security against those
disputes with other nations, which, being among the greatest of public calamities, it ought to be least in
the power of any part of the community to bring on the whole.
4. TRESPASSES OF THE STATES ON THE RIGHTS OF EACH OTHER.
These are alarming symptoms, and may be daily apprehended, as we are admonished by daily
experience. See the law of Virginia restricting foreign vessels to certain ports; of Maryland in favor of
vessels belonging to her own citizens; of New York in favor of the same.
Paper money, instalments of debts, occlusion of courts,4 making property a legal tender, may likewise
be deemed aggressions on the rights of other States. As the citizens of every State, aggregately taken,
stand more or less in the relation of creditors or debtors to the citizens of every other State, acts of the
debtor State in favor of debtors affect the creditor State in the same manner, as they do its own citizens,
who are, relatively, creditors towards other citizens. This remark may be extended to foreign nations. If
the exclusive regulation of the value and alloy of coin was properly delegated to the federal authority,
the policy of it equally requires a control on the States in the cases above mentioned. It must have been
meant — 1. To preserve uniformity in the circulating medium throughout the nation. 2. To prevent
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those frauds on the citizens of other States, and the subjects of foreign powers, which might disturb the
tranquility at home, or involve the Union in foreign contests.
The practice of many States in restricting the commercial intercourse with other States, and putting
their productions and manufactures on the same footing with those of foreign nations, though not
contrary to the federal articles, is certainly adverse to the spirit of the Union, and tends to beget
retaliating regulations, not less expensive and vexatious in themselves than they are destructive of the
general harmony.
5. WANT OF CONCERT IN MATTERS WHERE COMMON INTEREST REQUIRES IT.
This defect is strongly illustrated in the state of our commercial affairs. How much has the national
dignity, interest, and revenue, suffered from this cause? Instances of inferior moments are the want of
uniformity in the laws concerning naturalization and literary property; of provision for national
seminaries;5 for grants of incorporation for national purposes, for canals and other works of general
utility; which may at present be defeated by the perverseness of particular States whose concurrence is
necessary.
6. WANT OF GUARANTY TO THE STATES OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS
AGAINST INTERNAL VIOLENCE.
The Confederation is silent on this point, and therefore by the second article the hands of the federal
authority are tied. According to Republican Theory, Right and power being both vested in the majority,
are held to be synonymous. According to fact and experience, a minority may, in an appeal to force, be
an overmatch for the majority. 1. If the minority happen to include all such as possess the skill and
habits of military life, and such as possess the great pecuniary resources, one third only may conquer
the remaining two thirds. 2. One third of those who participate in the choice of the rulers, may be
rendered a majority by the accession6 of those whose poverty excludes them from a right of suffrage,
and who for obvious reasons will be more likely to join the standard of sedition than that of the
established Government. 3. Where slavery exists, the republican Theory becomes still more fallacious.
7. WANT OF SANCTION TO THE LAWS, AND OF COERCION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE CONFEDERACY.
A sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of Government. The federal system being
destitute of both, wants the great vital principles of a Political Constitution. Under the form of such a
Constitution, it is in fact nothing more than a treaty of amity, of commerce, and of alliance, between
independent and Sovereign States. From what cause could so fatal an omission have happened in the
articles of Confederation? From a mistaken confidence that the justice, the good faith, the honor, the
sound policy of the several legislative assemblies would render superfluous any appeal to the ordinary
motives by which the laws secure the obedience of individuals; a confidence which does honor to the
enthusiastic virtue of the compilers, as much as the inexperience of the crisis apologizes for their errors.
The time which has since elapsed has had the double effect of increasing the light and tempering the
warmth with which the arduous work may be revised. It is no longer doubted that a unanimous and
punctual obedience of 13 independent bodies to the acts of the federal Government ought not to be
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calculated on. Even during the war, when external danger supplied in some degree the defect of legal
and coercive sanctions, how imperfectly did the States fulfill their obligations to the Union? In time of
peace we see already what is to be expected. How, indeed, could it be otherwise? In the first place,
every general act of the Union must necessarily bear unequally hard on some particular member or
members of it; secondly, the partiality of the members to their own interests and rights, a partiality
which will be fostered by the courtiers of popularity, will naturally exaggerate the inequality where it
exists, and even suspect it where it has no existence; thirdly, a distrust of the voluntary compliance of
each other may prevent the compliance of any, although it should be the latent disposition of all. Here
are causes and pretexts which will never fail to render federal measures abortive. If the laws of the
States were merely recommendatory to their citizens, or if they were to be rejudged by county
authorities, what security, what probability would exist that they would be carried into execution? Is
the security or probability greater in favor of the acts of Congress, which, depending for their execution
on the will of the State legislatures, which are tho’ nominally authoritative, in fact recommendatory
only?
8. WANT OF RATIFICATION BY THE PEOPLE OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION.
In some of the States the Confederation is recognized by and forms a part of the Constitution. In others,
however, it has received no other sanction than that of the Legislative authority. From this defect two
evils result: 1. Whenever a law of a State happens to be repugnant to an act of Congress, particularly
when the latter is of posterior date to the former, it will be at least questionable whether the latter must
not prevail; and as the question must be decided by the Tribunals of the State, they will be most likely
to lean on the side of the State. 2. As far as the Union of the States is to be regarded as a league of
sovereign powers, and not as a political Constitution, by virtue of which they are become one sovereign
power, so far it seems to follow from the doctrine of compacts, that a breach of any of the articles of the
confederation by any of the parties to it absolves the other parties from their respective obligations, and
gives them a right if they choose to exert it, of dissolving the Union altogether.
9. MULTIPLICITY OF LAWS IN THE SEVERAL STATES.
In developing the evils which viciate the political system of the United States, it is proper to include
those which are found within the States individually, as well as those which directly affect the States
collectively, since the former class have an indirect influence on the general malady, and must not be
overlooked in forming a complete remedy. Among the evils, then, of our situation, may well be ranked
the multiplicity of laws, from which no State is exempt. As far as laws are necessary to mark with
precision the duties of those who are to obey them, and to take from those who are to administer them
a discretion which might be abused, their number is the price of liberty. As far as the laws exceed this
limit they are a nuisance; a nuisance of the most pestilent kind. Try the Codes of the several States by
this test, and what a luxuriancy7 of legislation do they present. The short period of independency has
filled as many pages as the century which preceded it. Every year, almost every session, adds a new
volume. This may be the effect in part, but it can only be in part, of the situation in which the
revolution has placed us. A review of the several Codes will show that every necessary and useful part
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of the least voluminous of them might be compressed into one tenth of the compass, and at the same
time be rendered tenfold as perspicuous.8
10. MUTABILITY OF THE LAWS OF THE STATES.
This evil is intimately connected with the former, yet deserves a distinct notice, as it emphatically
denotes a vicious legislation. We daily see laws repealed or superseded before any trial can have been
made of their merit, and even before a knowledge of them can have reached the remoter districts
within which they were to operate. In the regulations of trade this instability becomes a snare not only
to our citizens but to foreigners also.
11. INJUSTICE OF THE LAWS OF STATES.
If the multiplicity and mutability of laws prove a want of wisdom, their injustice betrays a defect still
more alarming; more alarming, not merely because it is a greater evil in itself, but because it brings
more into question the fundamental principle of republican Government, that the majority who rule in
such Governments are the safest guardians both of public good and of private rights. To what causes is
this evil to be ascribed?
These causes lie —1. in the Representative bodies. 2. in the people themselves.
1. Representative appointments are sought from 3 motives: 1. Ambition 2. Personal interest. 3.
Public good.
Unhappily, the two first are proved by experience to be most prevalent. Hence, the candidates who feel
them, particularly, the second, are most industrious, and most successful in pursuing their object; and
forming often a majority in the legislative Councils, with interested views, contrary to the interest and
views of their constituents, join in a perfidious sacrifice of the latter to the former. A succeeding
election, it might be supposed, would displace the offenders, and repair the mischief. But how easily
are base and selfish measures masked by pretexts of public good and apparent expediency? How
frequently will a repetition of the same arts and industry which succeeded in the first instance again
prevail on the unwary to misplace their confidence?
How frequently, too, will the honest but unenlightened representative be the dupe of a favorite leader,
veiling his selfish views under the professions of public good, and varnishing his sophistical arguments
with the glowing colors of popular eloquence?
2. A still more fatal, if not more frequent cause, lies among the people themselves. All civilized
societies are divided into different interests and factions, as they happen to be creditors or
debtors, rich or poor, husbandmen, merchants, or manufacturers, members of different
religious sects, followers of different political leaders, inhabitants of different districts, owners
of different kinds of property and &c, &c. In republican Government, the majority, however
composed, ultimately give the law. Whenever, therefore, an apparent interest or common
passion unites a majority, what is to restrain them from unjust violations of the rights and
interests of the minority, or of individuals? Three motives only: 1. A prudent regard to their
own good, as involved in the general and permanent good of the community. This
consideration, although of decisive weight in itself, is found by experience to be too often
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unheeded. It is too often forgotten, by nations as well as by individuals, that honesty is the best
policy. 2dly. Respect for character. However strong this motive may be in individuals, it is
considered as very insufficient to restrain them from injustice. In a multitude its efficacy is
diminished in proportion to the number which is to share the praise or the blame. Besides, as it
has reference to public opinion, which within a particular society, is the opinion of the majority,
the standard is fixed by those whose conduct is to be measured by it. The public opinion
without the society will be little respected by the people at large of any Country. Individuals of
extended views and of national pride may bring the public proceedings to this standard, but the
example will never be followed by the multitude. Is it to be imagined that an ordinary citizen or
even an Assemblyman of R[hode] Island, in estimating the policy of paper money, ever
considered or cared in what light the measure would be viewed in France or Holland; or even
in Massachusetts or Connecticut? It was a sufficient temptation to both that it was for their
interest; it was a sufficient sanction to the latter that it was popular in the State; to the former
that it was so in the neighborhood. 3dly. Will Religion, the only remaining motive be a sufficient
restraint? It is not pretended to be such, on men individually considered. Will its effect be
greater on them considered in an aggregate view? Quite the reverse. The conduct of every
popular assembly acting on oath, the strongest of religious ties, proves that individuals join
without remorse in acts against which their consciences would revolt if proposed to them under
the like sanction, separately, in their closets. When, indeed, Religion is kindled into enthusiasm,
its force, like that of other passions, is increased by the sympathy of a multitude. But
enthusiasm is only a temporary state of religion, and, while it lasts, will hardly be seen with
pleasure at the helm of Government. Besides, as religion in its coolest state, is not infallible, it
may become a motive to oppression as well as a restraint from injustice. Place three individuals
in a situation wherein the interest of each depends on the voice of the others, and give to two of
them an interest opposed to the rights of the third: Will the latter be secure? The prudence of
every man would shun the danger. The rules and forms of justice suppose and guard against it.
Will two thousand in a like situation be less likely to encroach on the rights of one thousand?
The contrary is witnessed by the notorious factions and oppressions which take place in
corporate towns, limited as the opportunities are, and in little republics, when uncontrolled by
apprehensions of external danger. If an enlargement of the sphere is found to lessen the
insecurity of private rights, it is not because the impulse of a common interest or passion is less
predominant in this case with the majority; but because a common interest or passion is less apt
to be felt, and the requisite combinations less easy to be formed, by a great than by a small
number. The society becomes broken into a greater variety of interests and pursuits of passions,
which check each other, whilst those who may feel a common sentiment have less opportunity
of communication and concert. It may be inferred that the inconveniences of popular States
contrary to the prevailing Theory, are in proportion not to the extent, but to the narrowness of
their limits.
The great desideratum9 in Government is such a modification of the sovereignty as will render it
sufficiently neutral between the different interests and factions to control one part of the Society from
invading the rights of another, and, at the same time, sufficiently controlled itself from setting up an
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interest adverse to that of the whole society. In absolute Monarchies the prince is sufficiently neutral
towards his subjects, but frequently sacrifices their happiness to his ambition or his avarice. In small
Republics, the sovereign will is sufficiently controlled from such a Sacrifice of the entire Society, but is
not sufficiently neutral towards the parts composing it. As a limited monarchy tempers the evils of an
absolute one, so an extensive Republic meliorates the administration of a small Republic.
An auxiliary desideratum for the melioration of the Republican form is such a process of elections as
will most certainly extract from the mass of the society the purest and noblest characters which it
contains; such as will at once feel most strongly the proper motives to pursue the end of their
appointment, and be most capable to devise the proper means of attaining it.
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Part II – Principles of American Government:
The Constitution of 1787
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787
PREAMBLE
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.
ARTICLE I
SECTION. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
SECTION. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year
by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite
for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and
been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of
that State in which he shall be chosen.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included
within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.The actual Enumeration shall be made within three
Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of
ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.The number of Representatives shall not exceed
one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such
enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts
eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four,
Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five,
and Georgia three.
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall
issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.
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The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers;and shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment.
SECTION. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen
by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as
equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the
Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third
Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year;and if
Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the
Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which
shall then fill such Vacancies.
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for
which he shall be chosen.
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless
they be equally divided.
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice
President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall
be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall
preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the
Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment,
according to Law.
SECTION. 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday
in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.
SECTION. 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members,and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may
adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such
Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour,
and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.
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Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting
such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either
House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for
more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
SECTION. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be
ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States.They shall in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or
Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil
Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments
whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
SECTION. 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the
Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become
a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two
thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the
other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it
shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and
Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of
each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a
Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives
may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the
United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by
him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules
and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
SECTION. 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
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To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and
Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law
of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term
than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and
repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as
may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles
square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the
Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings;-And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof.
SECTION. 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred
and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person.
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The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration
herein before directed to be taken.
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over
those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties
in another.
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and
a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be
published from time to time.
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit
or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument,
Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
SECTION. 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,
except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all
Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of
War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay.
ARTICLE II
SECTION. 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He
shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for
the same Term, be elected, as follows:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors,
equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the
United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
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The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at
least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the
Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and
transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the
Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,
open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number
of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors
appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes,
then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if
no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner
chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation
from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members
from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every
Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors
shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate
shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give
their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption
of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to
that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a
Resident within the United States.
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to
discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and
the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall
act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be
increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not
receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:--"I do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and
will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."
SECTION. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may
require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
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He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the
Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.
SECTION. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and
recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may,
on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement
between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he
shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.
SECTION. 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.
ARTICLE III
SECTION. 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.
SECTION. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to
Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between
Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in
the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State,
the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
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SECTION. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason
unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall
work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.
ARTICLE IV
SECTION. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
SECTION. 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States.
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be
found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be
delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall,
in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall
be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
SECTION. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be
formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of
two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as
well as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be
so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
SECTION. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or
of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
ARTICLE V
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of
the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
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ARTICLE VI
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be
as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures,
and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required
as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.
ARTICLE VII
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this
Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.
AMENDMENT I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
AMENDMENT II
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
AMENDMENT III
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
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against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.
AMENDMENT IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.
AMENDMENT X
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENT XI
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.
AMENDMENT XII
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President,
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as VicePresident, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons
voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and
certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the
President of the Senate; -- The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; -- The
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such
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number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such
majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of
those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot,
the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the
representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a
member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be
necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President
whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next
following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in case of the death or other
constitutional disability of the President.-- The person having the greatest number of votes as
Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number
of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on
the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of
two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall
be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.
AMENDMENT XIII
SECTION. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.
SECTION. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XIV
SECTION. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
SECTION. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of
the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
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SECTION. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and
Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who,
having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
SECTION. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion,
shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or
obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss
or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
SECTION. 5. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.
AMENDMENT XV
SECTION. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
SECTION. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XVI
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.
AMENDMENT XVII
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the
people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have
the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such
State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may
empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by
election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before
it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.
AMENDMENT XVIII
SECTION. 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation
of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United
States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
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SECTION. 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
SECTION. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the
Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven
years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.
AMENDMENT XIX
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XX
SECTION. 1. The terms of the President and the Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of
January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years
in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their
successors shall then begin.
SECTION. 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at
noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.
SECTION. 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall
have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen
before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify,
then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the
Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President shall
have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall
be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have
qualified.
SECTION. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from
whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have
devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may
choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.
SECTION. 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of
this article.
SECTION. 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the
Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date
of its submission.
AMENDMENT XXI
SECTION. 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby
repealed.
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SECTION. 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or Possession of the United
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited.
SECTION. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the
Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years
from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.
AMENDMENT XXII
SECTION. 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person
who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which
some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of President more than once. But
this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this Article was
proposed by Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or
acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the
office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.
SECTION. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the
Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date
of its submission to the States by the Congress.
AMENDMENT XXIII
SECTION. 1. The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such
manner as Congress may direct:
A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and
Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event
more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they
shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors
appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the
twelfth article of amendment.
SECTION. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XXIV
SECTION. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for
President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative
in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to
pay poll tax or other tax.
SECTION. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XXV
SECTION. 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice
President shall become President.
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SECTION. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall
nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of
Congress.
SECTION. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
SECTION. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the
executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers
and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the
executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four
days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not
in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if
Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
AMENDMENT XXVI
SECTION. 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.
SECTION. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XXVII
No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect,
until an election of representatives shall have intervened.
94
The Federalist No. 1
[Alexander Hamilton]
AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government, you are called
upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own
importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the
safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most
interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the
people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether
societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice,
or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If
there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as
the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this
view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.
This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude
which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be
directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not
connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be
expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon
too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and
of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.
~
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars: -- The utility of the
UNION to your political prosperity -- The insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve that
Union -- The necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the
attainment of this object -- The conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true principles of
republican government -- Its analogy to your own state constitution -- and lastly, The additional
security which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of government, to liberty, and
to property.
In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections
which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.
PUBLIUS
1 - The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late
publications against the new Constitution.
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The Federalist No. 10
The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (continued)
[James Madison]
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more
accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of
popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he
contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on
any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it.
The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the
mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be
the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious
declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models,
both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable
partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and
expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally
the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too
unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too
often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior
force of an interested and overbearing majority.
~
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to
the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by
controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty
which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same
passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is
to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly
to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to
wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive
agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man
continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the
connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a
96
reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach
themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less
an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of
government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the
possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of
these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into
different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought
into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for
different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of
speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence
and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human
passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and
rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common
good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial
occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their
unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of
factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are
without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who
are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile
interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and
divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these
various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit
of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his
judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of
men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important
acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single
persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of
legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine?
~
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render
them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in
many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote
considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in
disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is
only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.
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If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables
the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse
the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution.
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it
to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To
secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to
preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries
are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be
rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem
and adoption of mankind.
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same
passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such
coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert
and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide,
we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They
are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in
proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society
consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can
admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case,
be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government
itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious
individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention;
have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in
general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who
have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a
perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and
assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a
different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which
it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy
which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the
government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater
number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing
them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice,
98
pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if
pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be
inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by
corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people.
The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of
proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious
considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must
be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it
may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a
multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the
two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the
proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a
greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than
in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the
vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free,
will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and
established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which
inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the
representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by
reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and
pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect;
the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State
legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be
brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance
principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The
smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer
the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and
the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which
they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the
sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to
act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a
consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in
proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
99
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in
controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic, -- is enjoyed by the Union
over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose
enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of
injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these
requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties,
against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree
does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine,
consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an
unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable
advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to
spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political
faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must
secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an
abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will
be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same
proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the
diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride
we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character
of Federalists.
PUBLIUS
The Federalist No. 39
Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
[James Madison]
~
The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly
republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of
America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination
which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of
mankind for self-government.
~
What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form?
~
100
If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are
established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which
derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by
persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It
is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising
their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for
their government the honorable title of republic. It is sufficient for such a government that the persons
administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their
appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every government in the United States,
as well as every other popular government that has been or can be well organized or well executed,
would be degraded from the republican character.
~
On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the standard here fixed, we perceive at
once that it is, in the most rigid sense, conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of one
branch at least of all the State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people. The
Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from
the people. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the example
in most of the States. Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States,
be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves, the duration of the appointments is
equally conformable to the republican standard, and to the model of State constitutions The House of
Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the
State of South Carolina. The Senate is elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year more
than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and
Virginia. The President is to continue in office for the period of four years; as in New York and
Delaware, the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In the
other States the election is annual. In several of the States, however, no constitutional provision is made
for the impeachment of the chief magistrate. And in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till
out of office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in
office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that
of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal regulation,
conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the State constitutions.
~
"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, "for the convention to
adhere to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the federal form, which
regards the Union as a Confederacy of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed
a national government, which regards the Union as a consolidation of the States." And it is asked by what
authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The handle which has been made of this
objection requires that it should be examined with some precision.
101
~
First. In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in relation to the
foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be
drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future
changes in the government are to be introduced.
On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the
assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but,
on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing
one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively
belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in
each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will
not be a national, but a federal act.
That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors; the act of
the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious
from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a majority of the people of
the Union, nor from that of a majority of the States. It must result from the unanimous assent of the
several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being
expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people
regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the
United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the
minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual
votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the
people of the United States. Neither of these rules have been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the
Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its
own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a federal, and not a
national constitution.
The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived.
The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be
represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a
particular State. So far the government is national, not federal. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive
its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the
principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government
is federal, not national. The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The
immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes
allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies,
partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that
branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they
are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies
102
politic. From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as
many federal as national features.
The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the operation of the
government, is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies
composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens
composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls
under the national, not the federal character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood.
In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must
be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the national
countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this
blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the government on the people, in
their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate
it, in this relation, a national government.
But if the government be national with regard to the operation of its powers, it changes its aspect again
when we contemplate it in relation to the extent of its powers. The idea of a national government
involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all
persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into
one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united
for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the
former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or
abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and
independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general
authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the
proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain
enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over
all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions,
the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this
does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules
of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this
impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution
of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local
governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a
position not likely to be combated.
If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we
find it neither wholly national nor wholly federal. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate
authority would reside in the majority of the people of the Union; and this authority would be
competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established
government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union
would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of
the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and
103
particularly in computing the proportion by States, not by citizens, it departs from the national and
advances towards the federal character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of
States sufficient, it loses again the federal and partakes of the national character.
The proposed Constitution, therefore, [even when tested by the rules laid down by its antagonists,][1] is,
in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it
is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it
is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the
extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing
amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.
PUBLIUS
1. This phrase appears in the Rossiter edition, but not the Cooke edition.
The Federalist No. 43
Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
[James Madison]
HAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or
improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to
the portion of authority left in the several States.
The adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of considering in the first place what degree of
power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the federal government, have exhausted
themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power to
the governments of the particular States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be essential to the
security of the people of America against foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against
contentions and wars among the different States; if it be essential to guard them against those violent
and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of liberty, and against those military
establishments which must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word, the Union be essential to
the happiness of the people of America, is it not preposterous, to urge as an objection to a government,
without which the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a government may derogate from
the importance of the governments of the individual States? Was, then, the American Revolution
effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the
hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty,
and safety, but that the government of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments,
might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of
sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for
kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape that the
solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form?
It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the
104
great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government
whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were the plan of
the convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, Reject the plan. Were the Union
itself inconsistent with the public happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as
the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every
good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is necessary, has
been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue will be endangered, is the question before us.
Several important considerations have been touched in the course of these papers, which
discountenance the supposition that the operation of the federal government will by degrees prove
fatal to the State governments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am persuaded that the
balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale.
We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies, the strongest tendency
continually betraying itself in the members, to despoil the general government of its authorities, with a
very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroachments. Although, in most of
these examples, the system has been so dissimilar from that under consideration as greatly to weaken
any inference concerning the latter from the fate of the former, yet, as the States will retain, under the
proposed Constitution, a very extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be
wholly disregarded. In the Achaean league it is probable that the federal head had a degree and species
of power, which gave it a considerable likeness to the government framed by the convention. The
Lycian Confederacy, as far as its principles and form are transmitted, must have borne a still greater
analogy to it. Yet history does not inform us that either of them ever degenerated, or tended to
degenerate, into one consolidated government. On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of them
proceeded from the incapacity of the federal authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally the
disunion, of the subordinate authorities. These cases are the more worthy of our attention, as the
external causes by which the component parts were pressed together were much more numerous and
powerful than in our case; and consequently less powerful ligaments within would be sufficient to bind
the members to the head, and to each other.
In the feudal system, we have seen a similar propensity exemplified. Notwithstanding the want of
proper sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns and the people, and the sympathy in
some instances between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that the local
sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments. Had no external dangers enforced internal
harmony and subordination, and particularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the
people, the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of as many independent princes as
there were formerly feudatory barons.
The State governments will have the advantage of the Federal government, whether we compare them
in respect to the immediate dependence of the one on the other; to the weight of personal influence
which each side will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them; to the predilection and
probable support of the people; to the disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures
of each other.
105
The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal government;
whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation or organization of the former. Without the
intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They
must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves
determine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures. Even the
House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will be chosen very much
under the influence of that class of men, whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an
election into the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the federal government will
owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently feel a
dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing
towards them. On the other side, the component parts of the State governments will in no instance be
indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the federal government, and very little, if at all,
to the local influence of its members.
The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much smaller
than the number employed under the particular States. There will consequently be less of personal
influence on the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative, executive, and
judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial
officers of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town officers, for three millions and more of
people, intermixed, and having particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people, must
exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description who will be
employed in the administration of the federal system. Compare the members of the three great
departments of the thirteen States, excluding from the judiciary department the justices of peace, with
the members of the corresponding departments of the single government of the Union; compare the
militia officers of three millions of people with the military and marine officers of any establishment
which is within the compass of probability, or, I may add, of possibility, and in this view alone, we may
pronounce the advantage of the States to be decisive. If the federal government is to have collectors of
revenue, the State governments will have theirs also. And as those of the former will be principally on
the seacoast, and not very numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over the face of the
country, and will be very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the same side. It is true,
that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external
taxes throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for
supplemental purposes of revenue; that an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas
by previous collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of
the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several
States. Indeed it is extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the organization of the
judicial power, the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union.
Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue should be appointed under the
federal government, the influence of the whole number would not bear a comparison with that of the
multitude of State officers in the opposite scale. Within every district to which a federal collector would
be allotted, there would not be less than thirty or forty, or even more, officers of different descriptions,
and many of them persons of character and weight, whose influence would lie on the side of the State.
106
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be
exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which
last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and
danger; those of the State governments, in times of peace and security. As the former periods will
probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy another advantage
over the federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the
national defense, the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy
over the governments of the particular States.
If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the change which
it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration
of its ORIGINAL POWERS. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be
an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained. The powers relating
to war and peace, armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other more considerable powers, are
all vested in the existing Congress by the articles of Confederation. The proposed change does not
enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them. The change
relating to taxation may be regarded as the most important; and yet the present Congress have as
complete authority to REQUIRE of the States indefinite supplies of money for the common defense and
general welfare, as the future Congress will have to require them of individual citizens; and the latter
will be no more bound than the States themselves have been, to pay the quotas respectively taxed on
them. Had the States complied punctually with the articles of Confederation, or could their compliance
have been enforced by as peaceable means as may be used with success towards single persons, our
past experience is very far from countenancing an opinion, that the State governments would have lost
their constitutional powers, and have gradually undergone an entire consolidation. To maintain that
such an event would have ensued, would be to say at once, that the existence of the State governments
is incompatible with any system whatever that accomplishes the essental purposes of the Union.
PUBLIUS
The Federalist No. 45
The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered Madison for
the Independent Journal.
To the People of the State of New York:
107
HAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or
improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to
the portion of authority left in the several States.
~
We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for kings, not
kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape that the solid
happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is
too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great
body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has
any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were the plan of the
convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, Reject the plan. Were the Union itself
inconsistent with the public happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the
sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good
citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter.
~
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be
exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which
last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State. The
operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger;
those of the State governments, in times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably bear
a small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the
federal government.
The Federalist No. 46
The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
Madison From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 29, 1788.
To the People of the State of New York:
RESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether the federal government or the
State governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people.
~
Were it admitted, however, that the Federal government may feel an equal disposition with the State
governments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the
means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the
108
national government, be generally popular in that State and should not too grossly violate the oaths of
the State officers, it is executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the
State alone. The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would but
inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if
at all, without the employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and
difficulty.
On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in
particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which
may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of
the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the
frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices,
which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be
despised; would form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several
adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal government
would hardly be willing to encounter.
But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the authority of the State governments,
would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of
general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be
opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The
same combinations, in short, would result from an apprehension of the federal, as was produced by the
dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the
same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the other. But what
degree of madness could ever drive the federal government to such an extremity.
~
But what would be the contest in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few
representatives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves; or rather one set of
representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body of
their common constituents on the side of the latter. The only refuge left for those who prophesy the
downfall of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government may
previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. The reasonings contained in these
papers must have been employed to little purpose indeed, if it could be necessary now to disprove the
reality of this danger.
The Federalist No. 47
The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different
Parts
[James Madison]
109
HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed government and the general mass of power
allotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular structure of this government, and the distribution of
this mass of power among its constituent parts.
One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution, is its
supposed violation of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments
ought to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the federal government, no regard, it is said, seems
to have been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty. The several departments of power are
distributed and blended in such a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of form, and
to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the
disproportionate weight of other parts.
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more
enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded. The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or
with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments
would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself, however, that it
will be made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on which
it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to form correct ideas on this important
subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the
three great departments of power should be separate and distinct.
The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not
the author of this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and
recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind. Let us endeavor, in the first place, to
ascertain his meaning on this point.
The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic
poetry.
~
On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that the legislative, executive, and
judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each other. The executive
magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has the prerogative of making
treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain limitations, the force of
legislative acts. All the members of the judiciary department are appointed by him, can be removed by
him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament, and form, when he pleases to consult them, one of
his constitutional councils. One branch of the legislative department forms also a great constitutional
council to the executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial power in cases of
impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges,
again, are so far connected with the legislative department as often to attend and participate in its
deliberations, though not admitted to a legislative vote.
110
From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be inferred that, in saying "There
can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of
magistrates," or, "if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers,"
he did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of
each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the
example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one department is
exercised by the same hands which possess thewhole power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constitution are subverted. This would have been the case in the constitution
examined by him, if the king, who is the sole executive magistrate, had possessed also the complete
legislative power, or the supreme administration of justice; or if the entire legislative body had
possessed the supreme judiciary, or the supreme executive authority. This, however, is not among the
vices of that constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself
make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in person, though he has
the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no executive prerogative,
though they are shoots from the executive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be
advised with by the legislative councils. The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act, though by
the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices, and though one of its
branches is possessed of the judicial power in the last resort. The entire legislature, again, can exercise
no executive prerogative, though one of its branches constitutes the supreme executive magistracy, and
another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the
executive department.
The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning.
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body," says he, "there can
be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical
laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner." Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would
then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence
of an oppressor." Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as
they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of
this celebrated author.
If we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find that, notwithstanding the emphatical and,
in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a single
instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct.
PUBLIUS
The Federalist No. 48
These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each
Other
111
[James Madison]
IT WAS shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall
undertake, in the next place, to show that unless these departments be so far connected and blended as
to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim
requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.
It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be
directly and completely administered by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that
none of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the
administration of their respective powers. It will not be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature,
and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it. After discriminating,
therefore, in theory, the several classes of power, as they may in their nature be legislative, executive, or
judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security for each, against the
invasion of the others. What this security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved.
Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments, in the constitution of
the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? This
is the security which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the
American constitutions. But experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly
overrated; and that some more adequate defense is indispensably necessary for the more feeble, against
the more powerful, members of the government. The legislative department is everywhere extending
the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.
The founders of our republics have so much merit for the wisdom which they have displayed, that no
task can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into which they have fallen. A respect for
truth, however, obliges us to remark, that they seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from
the danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate,
supported and fortified by an hereditary branch of the legislative authority. They seem never to have
recollected the danger from legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands,
must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations.
In a government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary
monarch, the executive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger, and watched with
all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a multitude of people
exercise in person the legislative functions, and are continually exposed, by their incapacity for regular
deliberation and concerted measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their executive magistrates, tyranny
may well be apprehended, on some favorable emergency, to start up in the same quarter. But in a
representative republic, where the executive magistracy is carefully limited; both in the extent and the
duration of its power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired,
by a supposed influence over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is
sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be
incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is against the
112
enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust
all their precautions.
The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other circumstances. Its
constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with
the greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes
on the co-ordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies,
whether the operation of a particular measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere.
On the other side, the executive power being restrained within a narrower compass, and being more
simple in its nature, and the judiciary being described by landmarks still less uncertain, projects of
usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this
all: as the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people, and has in some
constitutions full discretion, and in all a prevailing influence, over the pecuniary rewards of those who
fill the other departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter, which gives still greater facility to
encroachments of the former.
I have appealed to our own experience for the truth of what I advance on this subject. Were it necessary
to verify this experience by particular proofs, they might be multiplied without end. I might find a
witness in every citizen who has shared in, or been attentive to, the course of public administrations. I
might collect vouchers in abundance from the records and archives of every State in the Union.
~
The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these observations is, that a mere demarcation
on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a sufficient guard against
those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the
same hands.
PUBLIUS
The Federalist No. 49
Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing
to the People Through a Convention
[James Madison]
THE author of the Notes on the State of Virginia, quoted in the last paper, has subjoined to that valuable
work the draught of a constitution, which had been prepared in order to be laid before a convention,
expected to be called in 1783, by the legislature, for the establishment of a constitution for that
commonwealth. The plan, like every thing from the same pen, marks a turn of thinking, original,
comprehensive, and accurate; and is the more worthy of attention as it equally displays a fervent
attachment to republican government and an enlightened view of the dangerous propensities against
which it ought to be guarded.
113
~
His proposition is, "that whenever any two of the three branches of government shall concur in
opinion, each by the voices of two thirds of their whole number, that a convention is necessary for
altering the constitution, or correcting breaches of it, a convention shall be called for the purpose."
As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional
charter, under which the several branches of government hold their power, is derived, it seems strictly
consonant to the republican theory, to recur to the same original authority, not only whenever it may
be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the powers of the government, but also whenever any
one of the departments may commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others.
~
There is certainly great force in this reasoning, and it must be allowed to prove that a constitutional
road to the decision of the people ought to be marked out and kept open, for certain great and
extraordinary occasions. But there appear to be insuperable objections against the proposed recurrence
to the people, as a provision in all cases for keeping the several departments of power within their
constitutional limits.
In the first place, the provision does not reach the case of a combination of two of the departments
against the third. If the legislative authority, which possesses so many means of operating on the
motives of the other departments, should be able to gain to its interest either of the others, or even one
third of its members, the remaining department could derive no advantage from its remedial provision.
~
In the next place, it may be considered as an objection inherent in the principle, that as every appeal to
the people would carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in a
great measure, deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on every thing, and
without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability. If it
be true that all governments rest on opinion, it is no less true that the strength of opinion in each
individual, and its practical influence on his conduct, depend much on the number which he supposes
to have entertained the same opinion. The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when
left alone, and acquires firmness and confidence in proportion to the number with which it is
associated. When the examples which fortify opinion are ancient as well as numerous, they are known to
have a double effect. In a nation of philosophers, this consideration ought to be disregarded. A
reverence for the laws would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a
nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato.
And in every other nation, the most rational government will not find it a superfluous advantage to
have the prejudices of the community on its side.
The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public passions, is a still
more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the
whole society. Notwithstanding the success which has attended the revisions of our established forms
of government, and which does so much honor to the virtue and intelligence of the people of America,
114
it must be confessed that the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied. We
are to recollect that all the existing constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger which repressed
the passions most unfriendly to order and concord; of an enthusiastic confidence of the people in their
patriotic leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national questions; of a
universal ardor for new and opposite forms, produced by a universal resentment and indignation
against the ancient government; and whilst no spirit of party connected with the changes to be made,
or the abuses to be reformed, could mingle its leaven in the operation. The future situations in which
we must expect to be usually placed, do not present any equivalent security against the danger which
is apprehended.
But the greatest objection of all is, that the decisions which would probably result from such appeals
would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the government. We
have seen that the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the
expense of the other departments. The appeals to the people, therefore, would usually be made by the
executive and judiciary departments. But whether made by one side or the other, would each side
enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us view their different situations. The members of the
executive and judiciary departments are few in number, and can be personally known to a small part
only of the people. The latter, by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and
permanency of it, are too far removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions. The
former are generally the objects of jealousy, and their administration is always liable to be discolored
and rendered unpopular. The members of the legislative department, on the other hand, are
numberous. They are distributed and dwell among the people at large. Their connections of blood, of
friendship, and of acquaintance embrace a great proportion of the most influential part of the society.
The nature of their public trust implies a personal influence among the people, and that they are more
immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the people. With these advantages,
it can hardly be supposed that the adverse party would have an equal chance for a favorable issue.
But the legislative party would not only be able to plead their cause most successfully with the people.
They would probably be constituted themselves the judges. The same influence which had gained
them an election into the legislature, would gain them a seat in the convention. If this should not be the
case with all, it would probably be the case with many, and pretty certainly with those leading
characters, on whom every thing depends in such bodies. The convention, in short, would be
composed chiefly of men who had been, who actually were, or who expected to be, members of the
department whose conduct was arraigned. They would consequently be parties to the very question to
be decided by them.
It might, however, sometimes happen, that appeals would be made under circumstances less adverse
to the executive and judiciary departments. The usurpations of the legislature might be so flagrant and
so sudden, as to admit of no specious coloring. A strong party among themselves might take side with
the other branches. The executive power might be in the hands of a peculiar favorite of the people. In
such a posture of things, the public decision might be less swayed by prepossessions in favor of the
legislative party. But still it could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the question. It would
inevitably be connected with the spirit of pre-existing parties, or of parties springing out of the question
115
itself. It would be connected with persons of distinguished character and extensive influence in the
community. It would be pronounced by the very men who had been agents in, or opponents of, the
measures to which the decision would relate. The PASSIONS, therefore, not the REASON, of the public
would sit in judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the
government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government.
We found in the last paper, that mere declarations in the written constitution are not sufficient to
restrain the several departments within their legal rights. It appears in this, that occasional appeals to
the people would be neither a proper nor an effectual provision for that purpose.
PUBLIUS
The Federalist No. 51
The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different
Departments
[James Madison]
TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of
power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be
given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by
so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their
mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to
undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which
may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles
and structure of the government planned by the convention.
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of
government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of
liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so
constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the
members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the
appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from
the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with
one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in
practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense
would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In
the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on
the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary
consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications;
secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must
soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.
116
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on
those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the
judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would
be merely nominal.
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department,
consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all
other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may
be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of
government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of
auxiliary precautions.
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced
through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed
in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the
several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -- that the private interest of
every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less
requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican
government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is
to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and
different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common
functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard
against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority
requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand,
that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the
natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither
altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite
firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an
absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the
weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional
rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department?
If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and
they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be
117
found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to
bear such a test.
There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America,
which place that system in a very interesting point of view.
First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of
a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into
distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by
the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each
subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of
the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be
controlled by itself.
Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its
rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests
necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights
of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by
creating a will in the community independent of the majority -- that is, of the society itself; the other, by
comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust
combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails
in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a
precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views
of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both
parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all
authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into
so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be
in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil
rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of
interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend
on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and
number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must
particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican
government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into
more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated:
the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be
diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the
only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of
civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the
pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not
secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are
prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the
118
weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be
gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker
as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated
from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government
within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that
some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very
factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States,
and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority
of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the
general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must
be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will
not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less
certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that
the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of selfgovernment. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great
extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle.
PUBLIUS
The Federalist No. 55
The Total Number of the House of Representatives
[James Madison]
THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms another and a very interesting
point of view, under which this branch of the federal legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any
article, indeed, in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight
of character and the apparent force of argument with which it has been assailed. The charges exhibited
against it are, first, that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public
interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their
numerous constituents; thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citizens which will sympathize
least with the feelings of the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of
the few on the depression of the many; fourthly, that defective as the number will be in the first
instance, it will be more and more disproportionate, by the increase of the people, and the obstacles
which will prevent a correspondent increase of the representatives.
In general it may be remarked on this subject, that no political problem is less susceptible of a precise
solution than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative legislature; nor is
there any point on which the policy of the several States is more at variance, whether we compare their
legislative assemblies directly with each other, or consider the proportions which they respectively bear
to the number of their constituents.
~
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Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio between the representatives and the people ought
not to be the same where the latter are very numerous as where they are very few.
~
The truth is, that in all cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of
free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes;
as, on the other hand, the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the
confusion and intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character
composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a
Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.
It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were applied to the case of biennial
elections. For the same reason that the limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State
legislatures, justify less frequent elections than the public safely might otherwise require, the members
of the Congress need be less numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation, and were
under no other than the ordinary restraints of other legislative bodies.
With these general ideas in our mind, let us weigh the objections which have been stated against the
number of members proposed for the House of Representatives. It is said, in the first place, that so
small a number cannot be safely trusted with so much power.
The number of which this branch of the legislature is to consist, at the outset of the government, will be
sixty-five. Within three years a census is to be taken, when the number may be augmented to one for
every thirty thousand inhabitants; and within every successive period of ten years the census is to be
renewed, and augmentations may continue to be made under the above limitation. It will not be
thought an extravagant conjecture that the first census will, at the rate of one for every thirty thousand,
raise the number of representatives to at least one hundred. Estimating the negroes in the proportion of
three fifths, it can scarcely be doubted that the population of the United States will by that time, if it
does not already, amount to three millions. At the expiration of twenty-five years, according to the
computed rate of increase, the number of representatives will amount to two hundred, and of fifty
years, to four hundred. This is a number which, I presume, will put an end to all fears arising from the
smallness of the body
~
The true question to be decided then is, whether the smallness of the number, as a temporary
regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty? Whether sixty-five members for a few years, and a
hundred or two hundred for a few more, be a safe depositary for a limited and well-guarded power of
legislating for the United States? I must own that I could not give a negative answer to this question,
without first obliterating every impression which I have received with regard to the present genius of
the people of America, the spirit which actuates the State legislatures, and the principles which are
incorporated with the political character of every class of citizens I am unable to conceive that the
people of America, in their present temper, or under any circumstances which can speedily happen,
will choose, and every second year repeat the choice of, sixty-five or a hundred men who would be
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disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. I am unable to conceive that the State
legislatures, which must feel so many motives to watch, and which possess so many means of
counteracting, the federal legislature, would fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the latter
against the liberties of their common constituents. I am equally unable to conceive that there are at this
time, or can be in any short time, in the United States, any sixty-five or a hundred men capable of
recommending themselves to the choice of the people at large, who would either desire or dare, within
the short space of two years, to betray the solemn trust committed to them.
~
From what quarter can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign gold? If foreign gold could so
easily corrupt our federal rulers and enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it
happened that we are at this time a free and independent nation? The Congress which conducted us
through the Revolution was a less numerous body than their successors will be; they were not chosen
by, nor responsible to, their fellow citizens at large; though appointed from year to year, and recallable
at pleasure, they were generally continued for three years, and prior to the ratification of the federal
articles, for a still longer term.
~
Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the federal government? But where are the
means to be found by the President, or the Senate, or both? Their emoluments of office, it is to be
presumed, will not, and without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives cannot, more
than suffice for very different purposes; their private fortunes, as they must all be American citizens,
cannot possibly be sources of danger. The only means, then, which they can possess, will be in the
dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests her charge?
~
But, fortunately, the Constitution has provided a still further safeguard. The members of the Congress
are rendered ineligible to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may be
increased, during the term of their election. No offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing
members but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties: and to suppose that these would be
sufficient to purchase the guardians of the people, selected by the people themselves, is to renounce
every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded
jealousy, with which all reasoning must be vain.
PUBLIUS
The Federalist No. 57
The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in
Connection with Representation
[James Madison]
121
THE third charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens
which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious
sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few.
Of all the objections which have been framed against the federal Constitution, this is perhaps the most
extraordinary. Whilst the objection itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy, the principle of it
strikes at the very root of republican government.
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place,
to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their
public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government.
The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are numerous and
various. The most effectual one, is such a limitation of the term of appointments as will maintain a
proper responsibility to the people.
Let me now ask what circumstance there is in the constitution of the House of Representatives that
violates the principles of republican government, or favors the elevation of the few on the ruins of the
many? Let me ask whether every circumstance is not, on the contrary, strictly conformable to these
principles, and scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of every class and description of
citizens?
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the
learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble
sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the
United States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every State of electing the
corresponding branch of the legislature of the State.
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the
esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil
profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.
If we consider the situation of the men on whom the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens may confer
the representative trust, we shall find it involving every security which can be devised or desired for
their fidelity to their constituents.
In the first place, as they will have been distinguished by the preference of their fellow-citizens, we are
to presume that in general they will be somewhat distinguished also by those qualities which entitle
them to it, and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to the nature of their engagements.
In the second place, they will enter into the public service under circumstances which cannot fail to
produce a temporary affection at least to their constituents. There is in every breast a sensibility to
marks of honor, of favor, of esteem, and of confidence, which, apart from all considerations of interest,
is some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns. Ingratitude is a common topic of declamation
against human nature; and it must be confessed that instances of it are but too frequent and flagrant,
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both in public and in private life. But the universal and extreme indignation which it inspires is itself a
proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment.
In the third place, those ties which bind the representative to his constituents are strengthened by
motives of a more selfish nature. His pride and vanity attach him to a form of government which
favors his pretensions and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions.
~
All these securities, however, would be found very insufficient without the restraint of frequent
elections. Hence, in the fourth place, the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the
members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed
on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be
compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be
reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised; there forever to
remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.
I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of Representatives, restraining them
from oppressive measures, that they can make no law which will not have its full operation on
themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society. This has always been deemed
one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and the people together. It
creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments, of which few
governments have furnished examples; but without which every government degenerates into tyranny.
If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives from making legal discriminations in
favor of themselves and a particular class of the society? I answer: the genius of the whole system; the
nature of just and constitutional laws; and above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the
people of America -- a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is nourished by it.
If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the legislature, as well as
on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate any thing but liberty.
Such will be the relation between the House of Representatives and their constituents. Duty, gratitude,
interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the
great mass of the people. It is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the caprice and
wickedness of man. But are they not all that government will admit, and that human prudence can
devise? Are they not the genuine and the characteristic means by which republican government
provides for the liberty and happiness of the people? Are they not the identical means on which every
State government in the Union relies for the attainment of these important ends? What then are we to
understand by the objection which this paper has combated? What are we to say to the men who
profess the most flaming zeal for republican government, yet boldly impeach the fundamental
principle of it; who pretend to be champions for the right and the capacity of the people to choose their
own rulers, yet maintain that they will prefer those only who will immediately and infallibly betray the
trust committed to them?
PUBLIUS
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The Federalist No. 58
Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the
Progress of Population Demands Considered
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on a
supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of
population may demand. It has been admitted, that this objection, if well supported, would have great
weight. The following observations will show that, like most other objections against the Constitution,
it can only proceed from a partial view of the subject, or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures
every object which is beheld.
1. Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that the federal Constitution will not
suffer by a comparison with the State constitutions, in the security provided for a gradual
augmentation of the number of representatives. The number which is to prevail in the first
instance is declared to be temporary. Its duration is limited to the short term of three years.
Within every successive term of ten years a census of inhabitants is to be repeated. The
unequivocal objects of these regulations are, first, to readjust, from time to time, the
apportionment of representatives to the number of inhabitants, under the single exception that
each State shall have one representative at least; secondly, to augment the number of
representatives at the same periods, under the sole limitation that the whole number shall not
exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. If we review the constitutions of the several
States, we shall find that some of them contain no determinate regulations on this subject, that
others correspond pretty much on this point with the federal Constitution, and that the most
effectual security in any of them is resolvable into a mere directory provision.
2. As far as experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual increase of representatives under
the State constitutions has at least kept pace with that of the constituents, and it appears that the
former have been as ready to concur in such measures as the latter have been to call for them.
3. There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution which insures a watchful attention in a
majority both of the people and of their representatives to a constitutional augmentation of the
latter. The peculiarity lies in this, that one branch of the legislature is a representation of
citizens, the other of the States: in the former, consequently, the larger States will have most
weight; in the latter, the advantage will be in favor of the smaller States. From this circumstance
it may with certainty be inferred that the larger States will be strenuous advocates for increasing
the number and weight of that part of the legislature in which their influence predominates.
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And it so happens that four only of the largest will have a majority of the whole votes in the
House of Representatives.
Should the representatives or people, therefore, of the smaller States oppose at any time a reasonable
addition of members, a coalition of a very few States will be sufficient to overrule the opposition; a
coalition which, notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary
occasions, would not fail to take place, when not merely prompted by common interest, but justified by
equity and the principles of the Constitution. It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would be
prompted by like motives to an adverse coalition; and as their concurrence would be indispensable, the
just and constitutional views of the other branch might be defeated. This is the difficulty which has
probably created the most serious apprehensions in the jealous friends of a numerous representation.
Fortunately it is among the difficulties which, existing only in appearance, vanish on a close and
accurate inspection. The following reflections will, if I mistake not, be admitted to be conclusive and
satisfactory on this point. Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two
houses on all legislative subjects, except the originating of money bills, it cannot be doubted that the
House, composed of the greater number of members, when supported by the more powerful States,
and speaking the known and determined sense of a majority of the people, will have no small
advantage in a question depending on the comparative firmness of the two houses.
This advantage must be increased by the consciousness, felt by the same side of being supported in its
demands by right, by reason, and by the Constitution; and the consciousness, on the opposite side, of
contending against the force of all these solemn considerations. It is farther to be considered, that in the
gradation between the smallest and largest States, there are several, which, though most likely in
general to arrange themselves among the former are too little removed in extent and population from
the latter, to second an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence it is by no means
certain that a majority of votes, even in the Senate, would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the
number of representatives. It will not be looking too far to add, that the senators from all the new States
may be gained over to the just views of the House of Representatives, by an expedient too obvious to
be overlooked. As these States will, for a great length of time, advance in population with peculiar
rapidity, they will be interested in frequent reapportionments of the representatives to the number of
inhabitants. The large States, therefore, who will prevail in the House of Representatives, will have
nothing to do but to make reapportionments and augmentations mutually conditions of each other;
and the senators from all the most growing States will be bound to contend for the latter, by the interest
which their States will feel in the former. These considerations seem to afford ample security on this
subject, and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been indulged with regard to it.
Admitting, however, that they should all be insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller
States, or their predominant influence in the councils of the Senate, a constitutional and infallible
resource still remains with the larger States, by which they will be able at all times to accomplish their
just purposes.
The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose, the supplies requisite for
the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse that powerful instrument by which we
behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people
125
gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to
have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This power over
the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any
constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every
grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure. But will not the House of
Representatives be as much interested as the Senate in maintaining the government in its proper
functions, and will they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation on the pliancy
of the Senate? Or, if such a trial of firmness between the two branches were hazarded, would not the
one be as likely first to yield as the other? These questions will create no difficulty with those who
reflect that in all cases the smaller the number, and the more permanent and conspicuous the station, of
men in power, the stronger must be the interest which they will individually feel in whatever concerns
the government.
Those who represent the dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations, will be particularly
sensible to every prospect of public danger, or of dishonorable stagnation in public affairs. To those
causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the British House of Commons over the other
branches of the government, whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed. An absolute
inflexibility on the side of the latter, although it could not have failed to involve every department of
the state in the general confusion, has neither been apprehended nor experienced. The utmost degree of
firmness that can be displayed by the federal Senate or President, will not be more than equal to a
resistance in which they will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles. In this review of
the Constitution of the House of Representatives, I have passed over the circumstances of economy,
which, in the present state of affairs, might have had some effect in lessening the temporary number of
representatives, and a disregard of which would probably have been as rich a theme of declamation
against the Constitution as has been shown by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any
remarks on the difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances, in engaging in the
federal service a large number of such characters as the people will probably elect.
One observation, however, I must be permitted to add on this subject as claiming, in my judgment, a
very serious attention. It is, that in all legislative assemblies the greater the number composing them
may be, the fewer will be the men who will in fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more
numerous an assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the greater is known to be the
ascendency of passion over reason. In the next place, the larger the number, the greater will be the
proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities. Now, it is precisely on characters
of this description that the eloquence and address of the few are known to act with all their force. In the
ancient republics, where the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single orator, or an artful
statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as if a sceptre had been placed in his
single hand.
On the same principle, the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered, the more it
will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe
of cunning, and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than in
supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier
126
against the government of a few. Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, AFTER
SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR THE PURPOSES OF SAFETY, OF LOCAL
INFORMATION, AND OF DIFFUSIVE SYMPATHY WITH THE WHOLE SOCIETY, they will
counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the
government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The
machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its
motions are directed. As connected with the objection against the number of representatives, may
properly be here noticed, that which has been suggested against the number made competent for
legislative business. It has been said that more than a majority ought to have been required for a
quorum; and in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That
some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an
additional shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial
measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale.
In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures
to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would be no longer
the majority that would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive
privilege limited to particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen
themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort
unreasonable indulgences. Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of secessions; a
practice which has shown itself even in States where a majority only is required; a practice subversive
of all the principles of order and regular government; a practice which leads more directly to public
convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than any other which has yet been displayed among
us.
PUBLIUS.
The Federalist No. 62
The Senate
[James Madison]
HAVING examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and answered such of the
objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the Senate. The heads
into which this member of the government may be considered are: I. The qualification of senators; II.
The appointment of them by the State legislatures; III. The equality of representation in the Senate; IV.
The number of senators, and the term for which they are to be elected; V. The powers vested in the
Senate.
I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of representatives, consist in a
more advanced age and a longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as
a representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven
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years are required for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the
senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires at the
same time that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages;
and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by
none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and
education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of
adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the public confidence, and an
indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the
national councils.
II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by the State legislatures. Among
the various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the government, that
which has been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It
is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State
governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority
of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems.
III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of
compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much
discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every
district ought to have a proportional share in the government, and that among independent and
sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to
have an equal share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that in a
compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal character, the government ought to be
founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous
to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the
result, not of theory, but "of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the
peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable." A common government, with powers
equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political situation, of America.
A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to
be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the former, lies between the proposed
government and a government still more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence
must be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible
mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify
the sacrifice.
In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional
recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for
preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large
than to the small States; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against
an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic.
128
Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional
impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed
without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must
be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well
as beneficial; and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be
more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other States, would
otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their power
over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the
facility and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it
is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears
to many in contemplation.
IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their appointment, come next to be considered. In
order to form an accurate judgment on both of these points, it will be proper to inquire into the
purposes which are to be answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain these, it will be necessary to
review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an institution.
First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other
governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove
unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative
assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on
the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct
bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise
be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the
United States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the
improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two
bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will consist
with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican government.
Second. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous
assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious
leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without
number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of other nations.
But a position that will not be contradicted, need not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a
body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less
numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority
by a tenure of considerable duration.
Third. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and
principles of legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from
pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent
motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the
comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of
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important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that
no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our
governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather than the hearts of most of the
authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and
disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments
exhibited by each succeeding against each preceding session; so many admonitions to the people, of the
value of those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted senate?
A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the
happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained.
Some governments are deficient in both these qualities; most governments are deficient in the first. I
scruple not to assert, that in American governments too little attention has been paid to the last. The
federal Constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a
mode which increases the security for the first.
Fourth. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members, however
qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in
the government. Every new election in the States is found to change one half of the representatives.
From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change
of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence
and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just, as well as
more important, in national transactions.
To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume. I will hint a few only,
each of which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others.
In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, and all the advantages
connected with national character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or
perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all prudent people, as a
speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity him, but all will
decline to connect their fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the opportunity of making their
fortunes out of his. One nation is to another what one individual is to another; with this melancholy
distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under
fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretions of each other. Every nation,
consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which
can be sustained from the more systematic policy of their wiser neighbors. But the best instruction on
this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she
is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to
every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs.
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself.
It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be
so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be
repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who
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knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of
action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?
Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the
enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious and uniformed mass of the people. Every new
regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way affecting the value of the different species
of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a
harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens.
This is a state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the few, not for
the many.
In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable government. The want of confidence in
the public councils damps every useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend on a
continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new
branch of commerce when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can
be executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any
particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and
advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement
or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of national policy.
But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into
the hearts of the people, towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and
disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government, any more than an individual, will long
be respected without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a certain
portion of order and stability.
PUBLIUS
The Federalist No. 63
The Senate (continued)
[James Madison]
A fifth desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character.
Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be
forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but
the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not
less necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain, its respect and confidence.
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: the
one is, that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various
accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the
second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some
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strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be
the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign
nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of
her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would probably
appear to the unbiased part of mankind?
Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently
possessed by a numerous and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small that a
sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual; or in
an assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its members may
be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community. The half-yearly
representatives of Rhode Island would probably have been little affected in their deliberations on the
iniquitous measures of that State, by arguments drawn from the light in which such measures would
be viewed by foreign nations, or even by the sister States; whilst it can scarcely be doubted that if the
concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary, a regard to national character alone would
have prevented the calamities under which that misguided people is now laboring.
I add, as a sixth defect the want, in some important cases, of a due responsibility in the government to
the people, arising from that frequency of elections which in other cases produces this responsibility.
This remark will, perhaps, appear not only new, but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be
acknowledged, when explained, to be as undeniable as it is important.
Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible
party, and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper
judgment can be formed by the constituents. The objects of government may be divided into two
general classes: the one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and sensible
operation; the other depending on a succession of well-chosen and well-connected measures, which
have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. The importance of the latter description to the
collective and permanent welfare of every country, needs no explanation. And yet it is evident that an
assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of
measures, on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the
final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could be justly made to answer
for places or improvements which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years. Nor is it
possible for the people to estimate the share of influence which their annual assemblies may
respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently
difficult to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a numerous body, for such acts of the
body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its constituents.
The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the legislative department, which,
having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a train
of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the attainment of those objects.
Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a well-constructed Senate
only as they relate to the representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by prejudice or
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corrupted by flattery as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may
be sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions.
As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all
free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in
public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or
misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they
themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how
salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check
the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until
reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would
not the people of Athens have often escaped if their government had contained so provident a
safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the
indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next.
It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive region cannot, like the crowded inhabitants
of a small district, be subject to the infection of violent passions, or to the danger of combining in
pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I
have, on the contrary, endeavored in a former paper to show, that it is one of the principal
recommendations of a confederated republic. At the same time, this advantage ought not to be
considered as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. It may even be remarked, that the same
extended situation, which will exempt the people of America from some of the dangers incident to
lesser republics, will expose them to the inconveniency of remaining for a longer time under the
influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested men may succeed in
distributing among them.
It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to recollect that history informs us of no long-lived
republic which had not a senate. Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact, the only states to whom that
character can be applied. In each of the two first there was a senate for life. The constitution of the
senate in the last is less known. Circumstantial evidence makes it probable that it was not different in
this particular from the two others. It is at least certain, that it had some quality or other which
rendered it an anchor against popular fluctuations; and that a smaller council, drawn out of the senate,
was appointed not only for life, but filled up vacancies itself. These examples, though as unfit for the
imitation, as they are repugnant to the genius, of America, are, notwithstanding, when compared with
the fugitive and turbulent existence of other ancient republics, very instructive proofs of the necessity
of some institution that will blend stability with liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which
distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well ancient as modern; and which
render extreme circumspection necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the other. But after
allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained, that there are many points of
similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention. Many of the defects, as we have
seen, which can only be supplied by a senatorial institution, are common to a numerous assembly
frequently elected by the people, and to the people themselves. There are others peculiar to the former,
which require the control of such an institution. The people can never wilfully betray their own
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interests; but they may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people; and the danger will
be evidently greater where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than
where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every public act.
The difference most relied on, between the American and other republics, consists in the principle of
representation; which is the pivot on which the former move, and which is supposed to have been
unknown to the latter, or at least to the ancient part of them. The use which has been made of this
difference, in reasonings contained in former papers, will have shown that I am disposed neither to
deny its existence nor to undervalue its importance. I feel the less restraint, therefore, in observing, that
the position concerning the ignorance of the ancient governments on the subject of representation, is by
no means precisely true in the latitude commonly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition
which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts, in support of what I advance.
In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive functions were performed, not by the
people themselves, but by officers elected by the people, and representing the people in
their executive capacity.
Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine Archons, annually elected by the people at
large. The degree of power delegated to them seems to be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to that
period, we find an assembly, first of four, and afterwards of six hundred members, annually elected by
the people; and partially representing them in their legislative capacity, since they were not only
associated with the people in the function of making laws, but had the exclusive right of originating
legislative propositions to the people. The senate of Carthage, also, whatever might be its power, or the
duration of its appointment, appears to have been elective by the suffrages of the people. Similar
instances might be traced in most, if not all the popular governments of antiquity.
Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in
numbers, but annually elected by the whole body of the people, and considered as the representatives of the
people, almost in their plenipotentiary capacity. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually elected by the
people, and have been considered by some authors as an institution analogous to those of Sparta and
Rome, with this difference only, that in the election of that representative body the right of suffrage was
communicated to a part only of the people.
From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that the principle of representation
was neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions. The true
distinction between these and the American governments, lies in the total exclusion of the people, in their
collective capacity, from any share in the latter, and not in the total exclusion of the representatives of the
people from the administration of the former. The distinction, however, thus qualified, must be
admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority in favor of the United States. But to insure to this
advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantage, of an extensive
territory. For it cannot be believed, that any form of representative government could have succeeded
within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.
In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illustrated by examples, and enforced by our
own experience, the jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably content himself with repeating,
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that a senate appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of six years, must gradually
acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical
aristocracy.
To this general answer, the general reply ought to be sufficient, that liberty may be endangered by the
abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses of power; that there are numerous instances of the former as
well as of the latter; and that the former, rather than the latter, are apparently most to be apprehended
by the United States. But a more particular reply may be given.
Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt
itself; must next corrupt the State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and
must finally corrupt the people at large. It is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted before it
can attempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the State legislatures, it cannot prosecute
the attempt, because the periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole body.
Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success on the House of Representatives, the
opposition of that coequal branch of the government would inevitably defeat the attempt; and without
corrupting the people themselves, a succession of new representatives would speedily restore all things
to their pristine order. Is there any man who can seriously persuade himself that the proposed Senate
can, by any possible means within the compass of human address, arrive at the object of a lawless
ambition, through all these obstructions?
~
Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of facts, that the federal Senate will
never be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body, we
are warranted in believing, that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the
foresight of man cannot guard against, the House of Representatives, with the people on their side, will
at all times be able to bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles. Against the force
of the immediate representatives of the people, nothing will be able to maintain even the constitutional
authority of the Senate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as
will divide with that branch of the legislature the affections and support of the entire body of the
people themselves.
PUBLIUS
The Federalist No. 69
The Real Character of the Executive
[Alexander Hamilton]
I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the
plan of the convention. This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations
which have been made in regard to it.
135
The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be
vested in a single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any
comparison can be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be a resemblance to the king of Great
Britain, there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the khan of Tartary, to the Man of the
Seven Mountains, or to the governor of New York.
That magistrate is to be elected for four years; and is to be re-eligible as often as the people of the United
States shall think him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude
between him and a king of Great Britain, who is an hereditary monarch, possessing the crown as a
patrimony descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy between him and a governor of
New York, who is elected for three years, and is re-eligible without limitation or intermission. If we
consider how much less time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single
State, than for establishing a like influence throughout the United States, we must conclude that a
duration of four years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to be
dreaded in that office, than a duration of three years for a corresponding office in a single State.
The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of
treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be
liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the king of Great
Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no
punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this
delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America
would stand upon no better ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the
governors of Maryland and Delaware.
The President of the United States is to have power to return a bill, which shall have passed the two
branches of the legislature, for reconsideration; and the bill so returned is to become a law, if, upon that
reconsideration, it be approved by two thirds of both houses.
~
The qualified negative of the President differs widely from this absolute negative of the British
sovereign; and tallies exactly with the revisionary authority of the council of revision of this State, of
which the governor is a constituent part. In this respect the power of the President would exceed that of
the governor of New York, because the former would possess, singly, what the latter shares with the
chancellor and judges; but it would be precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachusetts,
whose constitution, as to this article, seems to have been the original from which the convention have
copied.
The President is to be the "commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the
militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. He is to have
power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of
impeachment; to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient; to convene, on extraordinary occasions, both houses of the legislature, or either of them,
and, in case of disagreement between them with respect to the time of adjournment, to adjourn them to
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such time as he shall think proper; to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and to commission
all officers of the United States." In most of these particulars, the power of the President will resemble
equally that of the king of Great Britain and of the governor of New York
~
The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided
two thirds of the senators present concur. The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute
representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. He can of his own accord make treaties of peace,
commerce, alliance, and of every other description.
~
In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the
actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the
concurrence of a branch of the legislature. It must be admitted, that, in this instance, the power of the
federal Executive would exceed that of any State Executive. But this arises naturally from the sovereign
power which relates to treaties. If the Confederacy were to be dissolved, it would become a question,
whether the Executives of the several States were not solely invested with that delicate and important
prerogative.
The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and other public ministers. This, though
it has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a
circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of the government; and it was
far more convenient that it should be arranged in this manner, than that there should be a necessity of
convening the legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though it
were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor.
The President is to nominate, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors and
other public ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the United States
established by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution. The
king of Great Britain is emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He not only appoints to all
offices, but can create offices. He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure; and has the disposal of an
immense number of church preferments. There is evidently a great inferiority in the power of the
President, in this particular, to that of the British king; nor is it equal to that of the governor of New
York, if we are to interpret the meaning of the constitution of the State by the practice which has
obtained under it. The power of appointment is with us lodged in a council, composed of the governor
and four members of the Senate, chosen by the Assembly. The governor claims, and has
frequently exercised, the right of nomination, and is entitled to a casting vote in the appointment.
~
Hence it appears that, except as to the concurrent authority of the President in the article of treaties, it
would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess more or less
power than the Governor of New York. And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no
pretense for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain. But to
137
render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal
circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group.
The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for four years; the king of
Great Britain is a perpetual and hereditary prince. The one would be amenable to personal punishment
and disgrace; the person of the other is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a qualified negative
upon the acts of the legislative body; the other has an absolute negative. The one would have a right to
command the military and naval forces of the nation; the other, in addition to this right, possesses that
of declaring war, and of raising and regulating fleets and armies by his own authority. The one would
have a concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in the formation of treaties; the other is
the sole possessor of the power of making treaties. The one would have a like concurrent authority in
appointing to offices; the other is the sole author of all appointments. The one can confer no privileges
whatever; the other can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with
all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or
currency of the nation; the other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can
establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time,
can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. The one has no particle of
spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the supreme head and governor of the national church! What answer
shall we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other? The same that
ought to be given to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of which would be in the
hands of the elective and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a
despotism.
PUBLIUS
1. A writer in a Pennsylvania paper, under the signature of TAMONY, has asserted that the king of
Great Britain owes his prerogative as commander-in-chief to an annual mutiny bill. The truth is, on the
contrary, that his prerogative, in this respect, is immenmorial, and was only disputed, "contrary to all
reason and precedent," as Blackstone vol. i., page 262, expresses it, by the Long Parliament of Charles I.
but by the statute the 13th of Charles II., chap. 6, it was declared to be in the king alone, for that the sole
supreme government and command of the militia within his Majesty's realms and dominions, and of
all forces by sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength, EVER WAS AND IS the undoubted
right of his Majesty and his royal predecessors, kings and queens of England, and that both or either
house of Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same.
2. Vide Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol I., p. 257.
3. Candor, however, demands an acknowledgment that I do not think the claim of the governor to a
right of nomination well founded. Yet it is always justifiable to reason from the practice of a
government, till its propriety has been constitutionally questioned. And independent of this claim,
when we take into view the other considerations, and pursue them through all their consequences, we
shall be inclined to draw much the same conclusion.
138
The Federalist No. 70
The Executive Department Further Considered
[Alexander Hamilton]
THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the
genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at
least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without
at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a
leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the
community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the
protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes
interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of
ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often
that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable
title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and
the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all
government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of
Rome.
There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive
implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad
execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad
government.
Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic
Executive, it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How
far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense?
And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention?
The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an
adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.
The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are, first, a due dependence on the
people, secondly, a due responsibility.
Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their
principles and for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a
numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary
qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while
they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and
best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.
139
That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will
generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the
proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will
be diminished.
This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of
equal dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the
control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of the first, the two Consuls of
Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the
States. New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the
executive authority wholly to single men.1 Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive
have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both
liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.
The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches
any thing, it teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive.
~
But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and
good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the
Executive, under any modification whatever.
Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always
danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal
dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either,
and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these
happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of
those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a
country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important
measures of the government, in the most critical emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they
might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the
different individuals who composed the magistracy.
Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may
have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to
disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem
to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the
success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent
tempers have too many opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this
disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the
vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their
passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the public may, in
its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable
vice, in the human character.
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Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must
necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore
unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too that they may be most
pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences
of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may
sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to
check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end.
That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate or
atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure and
unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the
execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it.
They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in
its composition -- vigor and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of
war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, every thing would be
to be apprehended from its plurality.
It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed -that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the advocates for which
are not likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable
weight to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the
operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to
enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views
and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of
habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.
[But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the
last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two
kinds -- to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an
elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy
of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But
the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes
impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a
pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to
another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in
suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or
misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had
different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been
mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have
been incurred is truly chargeable.]
[But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the
last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.
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Responsibility is of two kinds -- to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the
two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to
render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to
legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either
case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the
punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted
from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public
opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national
miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who
may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that
there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil
which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.]
"I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to
obtain any better resolution on the point." These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether
true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict scrutiny
into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake
the unpromising task, if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how easy it is to
clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise
conduct of any of those parties?
In the single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled with a council -- that is, in the
appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration.
Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed, have been so
flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made,
the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on their part, have
charged it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose
influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In
tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.
It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of
the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the
restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure
attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall;
and, second, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons
they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which
admit of it.
In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the
pub lic peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing,
therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be
responsible to the nation for the advice they give.
~
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But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office
the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply,
but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the
prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the
national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would
greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.
The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has
been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a
number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I
should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages
on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur
in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid,
and ingenious," that "the executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE";[2] that it is far more
safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that
all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.
PUBLIUS
1. New York has no council except for the single purpose of appointing to offices; New Jersey has a
council whom the governor may consult. But I think, from the terms of the constitution, their
resolutions do not bind him.
2. De Lolme.
3. Ten
The Federalist No. 71
The Duration in Office of the Executive
[Alexander Hamilton]
DURATION in office has been mentioned as the second requisite to the energy of the Executive
authority. This has relation to two objects: to the personal firmness of the executive magistrate, in the
employment of his constitutional powers; and to the stability of the system of administration which
may have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to the first, it must be evident, that the longer
the duration in office, the greater will be the probability of obtaining so important an advantage. It is a
general principle of human nature, that a man will be interested in whatever he possesses, in
proportion to the firmness or precariousness of the tenure by which he holds it; will be less attached to
what he holds by a momentary or uncertain title, than to what he enjoys by a durable or certain title;
and, of course, will be willing to risk more for the sake of the one, than for the sake of the other. This
remark is not less applicable to a political privilege, or honor, or trust, than to any article of ordinary
property. The inference from it is, that a man acting in the capacity of chief magistrate, under a
consciousness that in a very short time he must lay down his office, will be apt to feel himself too little
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interested in it to hazard any material censure or perplexity, from the independent exertion of his
powers, or from encountering the ill-humors, however transient, which may happen to prevail, either
in a considerable part of the society itself, or even in a predominant faction in the legislative body. If
the case should only be, that he might lay it down, unless continued by a new choice, and if he should
be desirous of being continued, his wishes, conspiring with his fears, would tend still more powerfully
to corrupt his integrity, or debase his fortitude. In either case, feebleness and irresolution must be the
characteristics of the station.
There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing
current, either in the community or in the legislature, as its best recommendation. But such men
entertain very crude notions, as well of the purposes for which government was instituted, as of the
true means by which the public happiness may be promoted. The republican principle demands that
the deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the
management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden
breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men,
who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests. It is a just observation, that the people
commonly intend the PUBLIC GOOD. This often applies to their very errors. But their good sense
would despise the adulator who should pretend that they always reason right about the means of
promoting it. They know from experience that they sometimes err; and the wonder is that they so
seldom err as they do, beset, as they continually are, by the wiles of parasites and sycophants, by the
snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate, by the artifices of men who possess their
confidence more than they deserve it, and of those who seek to possess rather than to deserve it. When
occasions present themselves, in which the interests of the people are at variance with their
inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those
interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more
cool and sedate reflection. Instances might be cited in which a conduct of this kind has saved the
people from very fatal consequences of their own mistakes, and has procured lasting monuments of
their gratitude to the men who had courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril of their
displeasure.
But however inclined we might be to insist upon an unbounded complaisance in the Executive to the
inclinations of the people, we can with no propriety contend for a like complaisance to the humors of
the legislature. The latter may sometimes stand in opposition to the former, and at other times the
people may be entirely neutral. In either supposition, it is certainly desirable that the Executive should
be in a situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor and decision.
The same rule which teaches the propriety of a partition between the various branches of power,
teaches us likewise that this partition ought to be so contrived as to render the one independent of the
other. To what purpose separate the executive or the judiciary from the legislative, if both the executive
and the judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute devotion of the legislative? Such a
separation must be merely nominal, and incapable of producing the ends for which it was established.
It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on the legislative body. The
first comports with, the last violates, the fundamental principles of good government; and, whatever
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may be the forms of the Constitution, unites all power in the same hands. The tendency of the
legislative authority to absorb every other, has been fully displayed and illustrated by examples in
some preceding numbers. In governments purely republican, this tendency is almost irresistible. The
representatives of the people, in a popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that they are the people
themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience and disgust at the least sign of opposition from
any other quarter; as if the exercise of its rights, by either the executive or judiciary, were a breach of
their privilege and an outrage to their dignity. They often appear disposed to exert an imperious
control over the other departments; and as they commonly have the people on their side, they always
act with such momentum as to make it very difficult for the other members of the government to
maintain the balance of the Constitution.
It may perhaps be asked, how the shortness of the duration in office can affect the independence of the
Executive on the legislature, unless the one were possessed of the power of appointing or displacing
the other. One answer to this inquiry may be drawn from the principle already remarked -- that is,
from the slender interest a man is apt to take in a short-lived advantage, and the little inducement it
affords him to expose himself, on account of it, to any considerable inconvenience or hazard. Another
answer, perhaps more obvious, though not more conclusive, will result from the consideration of the
influence of the legislative body over the people; which might be employed to prevent the re-election of
a man who, by an upright resistance to any sinister project of that body, should have made himself
obnoxious to its resentment.
It may be asked also, whether a duration of four years would answer the end proposed; and if it would
not, whether a less period, which would at least be recommended by greater security against ambitious
designs, would not, for that reason, be preferable to a longer period, which was, at the same time, too
short for the purpose of inspiring the desired firmness and independence of the magistrate.
It cannot be affirmed, that a duration of four years, or any other limited duration, would completely
answer the end proposed; but it would contribute towards it in a degree which would have a material
influence upon the spirit and character of the government. Between the commencement and
termination of such a period, there would always be a considerable interval, in which the prospect of
annihilation would be sufficiently remote, not to have an improper effect upon the conduct of a man
indued with a tolerable portion of fortitude; and in which he might reasonably promise himself, that
there would be time enough before it arrived, to make the community sensible of the propriety of the
measures he might incline to pursue. Though it be probable that, as he approached the moment when
the public were, by a new election, to signify their sense of his conduct, his confidence, and with it his
firmness, would decline; yet both the one and the other would derive support from the opportunities
which his previous continuance in the station had afforded him, of establishing himself in the esteem
and good-will of his constituents. He might, then, hazard with safety, in proportion to the proofs he
had given of his wisdom and integrity, and to the title he had acquired to the respect and attachment of
his fellow-citizens. As, on the one hand, a duration of four years will contribute to the firmness of the
Executive in a sufficient degree to render it a very valuable ingredient in the composition; so, on the
other, it is not enough to justify any alarm for the public liberty. If a British House of Commons, from
the most feeble beginnings, from the mere power of assenting or disagreeing to the imposition of a new tax,
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have, by rapid strides, reduced the prerogatives of the crown and the privileges of the nobility within
the limits they conceived to be compatible with the principles of a free government, while they raised
themselves to the rank and consequence of a coequal branch of the legislature; if they have been able, in
one instance, to abolish both the royalty and the aristocracy, and to overturn all the ancient
establishments, as well in the Church as State; if they have been able, on a recent occasion, to make the
monarch tremble at the prospect of an innovation1 attempted by them, what would be to be feared
from an elective magistrate of four years' duration, with the confined authorities of a President of the
United States? What, but that he might be unequal to the task which the Constitution assigns him? I
shall only add, that if his duration be such as to leave a doubt of his firmness, that doubt is inconsistent
with a jealousy of his encroachments.
PUBLIUS
1. This was the case with respect to Mr. Fox's India bill, which was carried in the House of Commons,
and rejected in the House of Lords, to the entire satisfaction, as it is said, of the people.
The Federalist No. 72
The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
[Alexander Hamilton]
THE administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body
politic, whether legislative, executive, or judiciary; but in its most usual, and perhaps its most precise
signification. it is limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive
department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans of finance, the
application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the
legislature, the arrangement of the army and navy, the directions of the operations of war -- these, and
other matters of a like nature, constitute what seems to be most properly understood by the
administration of government. The persons, therefore, to whose immediate management these
different matters are committed, ought to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the chief
magistrate, and on this account, they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least from
his nomination, and ought to be subject to his superintendence. This view of the subject will at once
suggest to us the intimate connection between the duration of the executive magistrate in office and the
stability of the system of administration. To reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor, is
very often considered by a successor as the best proof he can give of his own capacity and desert; and
in addition to this propensity, where the alteration has been the result of public choice, the person
substituted is warranted in supposing that the dismission of his predecessor has proceeded from a
dislike to his measures; and that the less he resembles him, the more he will recommend himself to the
favor of his constituents. These considerations, and the influence of personal confidences and
attachments, would be likely to induce every new President to promote a change of men to fill the
subordinate stations; and these causes together could not fail to occasion a disgraceful and ruinous
mutability in the administration of the government.
146
With a positive duration of considerable extent, I connect the circumstance of re-eligibility. The first is
necessary to give to the officer himself the inclination and the resolution to act his part well, and to the
community time and leisure to observe the tendency of his measures, and thence to form an
experimental estimate of their merits. The last is necessary to enable the people, when they see reason
to approve of his conduct, to continue him in his station, in order to prolong the utility of his talents
and virtues, and to secure to the government the advantage of permanency in a wise system of
administration.
Nothing appears more plausible at first sight, nor more ill-founded upon close inspection, than a
scheme which in relation to the present point has had some respectable advocates -- I mean that of
continuing the chief magistrate in office for a certain time, and then excluding him from it, either for a
limited period or forever after. This exclusion, whether temporary or perpetual, would have nearly the
same effects, and these effects would be for the most part rather pernicious than salutary.
One ill effect of the exclusion would be a diminution of the inducements to good behavior. There are
few men who would not feel much less zeal in the discharge of a duty when they were conscious that
the advantages of the station with which it was connected must be relinquished at a determinate
period, than when they were permitted to entertain a hope of obtaining, by meriting, a continuance of
them. This position will not be disputed so long as it is admitted that the desire of reward is one of the
strongest incentives of human conduct; or that the best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make
their interests coincide with their duty. Even the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest minds,
which would prompt a man to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public
benefit, requiring considerable time to mature and perfect them, if he could flatter himself with the
prospect of being allowed to finish what he had begun, would, on the contrary, deter him from the
undertaking, when he foresaw that he must quit the scene before he could accomplish the work, and
must commit that, together with his own reputation, to hands which might be unequal or unfriendly to
the task. The most to be expected from the generality of men, in such a situation, is the negative merit
of not doing harm, instead of the positive merit of doing good.
Another ill effect of the exclusion would be the temptation to sordid views, to peculation, and, in some
instances, to usurpation. An avaricious man, who might happen to fill the office, looking forward to a
time when he must at all events yield up the emoluments he enjoyed, would feel a propensity, not easy
to be resisted by such a man, to make the best use of the opportunity he enjoyed while it lasted, and
might not scruple to have recourse to the most corrupt expedients to make the harvest as abundant as it
was transitory; though the same man, probably, with a different prospect before him, might content
himself with the regular perquisites of his situation, and might even be unwilling to risk the
consequences of an abuse of his opportunities. His avarice might be a guard upon his avarice. Add to
this that the same man might be vain or ambitious, as well as avaricious. And if he could expect to
prolong his honors by his good conduct, he might hesitate to sacrifice his appetite for them to his
appetite for gain. But with the prospect before him of approaching an inevitable annihilation, his
avarice would be likely to get the victory over his caution, his vanity, or his ambition.
147
An ambitious man, too, when he found himself seated on the summit of his country's honors, when he
looked forward to the time at which he must descend from the exalted eminence for ever, and reflected
that no exertion of merit on his part could save him from the unwelcome reverse; such a man, in such a
situation, would be much more violently tempted to embrace a favorable conjuncture for attempting
the prolongation of his power, at every personal hazard, than if he had the probability of answering the
same end by doing his duty.
Would it promote the peace of the community, or the stability of the government to have half a dozen
men who had had credit enough to be raised to the seat of the supreme magistracy, wandering among
the people like discontented ghosts, and sighing for a place which they were destined never more to
possess?
A third ill effect of the exclusion would be, the depriving the community of the advantage of the
experience gained by the chief magistrate in the exercise of his office. That experience is the parent of
wisdom, is an adage the truth of which is recognized by the wisest as well as the simplest of mankind.
What more desirable or more essential than this quality in the governors of nations? Where more
desirable or more essential than in the first magistrate of a nation? Can it be wise to put this desirable
and essential quality under the ban of the Constitution, and to declare that the moment it is acquired,
its possessor shall be compelled to abandon the station in which it was acquired, and to which it is
adapted? This, nevertheless, is the precise import of all those regulations which exclude men from
serving their country, by the choice of their fellow citizens, after they have by a course of service fitted
themselves for doing it with a greater degree of utility.
A fourth ill effect of the exclusion would be the banishing men from stations in which, in certain
emergencies of the state, their presence might be of the greatest moment to the public interest or safety.
There is no nation which has not, at one period or another, experienced an absolute necessity of the
services of particular men in particular situations; perhaps it would not be too strong to say, to the
preservation of its political existence. How unwise, therefore, must be every such self-denying
ordinance as serves to prohibit a nation from making use of its own citizens in the manner best suited
to its exigencies and circumstances! Without supposing the personal essentiality of the man, it is
evident that a change of the chief magistrate, at the breaking out of a war, or at any similar crisis, for
another, even of equal merit, would at all times be detrimental to the community, inasmuch as it would
substitute inexperience to experience, and would tend to unhinge and set afloat the already settled
train of the administration.
A fifth ill effect of the exclusion would be, that it would operate as a constitutional interdiction of
stability in the administration. By necessitating a change of men, in the first office of the nation, it would
necessitate a mutability of measures. It is not generally to be expected, that men will vary and measures
remain uniform. The contrary is the usual course of things. And we need not be apprehensive that
there will be too much stability, while there is even the option of changing; nor need we desire to
prohibit the people from continuing their confidence where they think it may be safely placed, and
where, by constancy on their part, they may obviate the fatal inconveniences of fluctuating councils
and a variable policy.
148
These are some of the disadvantages which would flow from the principle of exclusion. They apply
most forcibly to the scheme of a perpetual exclusion; but when we consider that even a partial
exclusion would always render the readmission of the person a remote and precarious object, the
observations which have been made will apply nearly as fully to one case as to the other.
What are the advantages promised to counterbalance these disadvantages? They are represented to be:
1st, greater independence in the magistrate; 2d, greater security to the people. Unless the exclusion be
perpetual, there will be no pretense to infer the first advantage. But even in that case, may he have no
object beyond his present station, to which he may sacrifice his independence? May he have no
connections, no friends, for whom he may sacrifice it? May he not be less willing by a firm conduct, to
make personal enemies, when he acts under the impression that a time is fast approaching, on the
arrival of which he not only MAY, but MUST, be exposed to their resentments, upon an equal, perhaps
upon an inferior, footing? It is not an easy point to determine whether his independence would be most
promoted or impaired by such an arrangement.
As to the second supposed advantage, there is still greater reason to entertain doubts concerning it. If
the exclusion were to be perpetual, a man of irregular ambition, of whom alone there could be reason
in any case to entertain apprehension, would, with infinite reluctance, yield to the necessity of taking
his leave forever of a post in which his passion for power and pre-eminence had acquired the force of
habit. And if he had been fortunate or adroit enough to conciliate the good-will of the people, he might
induce them to consider as a very odious and unjustifiable restraint upon themselves, a provision
which was calculated to debar them of the right of giving a fresh proof of their attachment to a favorite.
There may be conceived circumstances in which this disgust of the people, seconding the thwarted
ambition of such a favorite, might occasion greater danger to liberty, than could ever reasonably be
dreaded from the possibility of a perpetuation in office, by the voluntary suffrages of the community,
exercising a constitutional privilege.
There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the people to continue in office men who had
entitled themselves, in their opinion, to approbation and confidence; the advantages of which are at
best speculative and equivocal, and are overbalanced by disadvantages far more certain and decisive.
PUBLIUS
The Federalist No. 78
The Judiciary Department
[Alexander Hamilton]
WE PROCEED now to an examination of the judiciary department of the proposed government.
In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the utility and necessity of a federal judicature
have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged, as
the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which have been
149
raised being relative to the manner of constituting it, and to its extent. To these points, therefore, our
observations shall be confined.
The manner of constituting it seems to embrace these several objects: 1st. The mode of appointing the
judges. 2d. The tenure by which they are to hold their places. 3d. The partition of the judiciary
authority between different courts, and their relations to each other.
First. As to the mode of appointing the judges; this is the same with that of appointing the officers of
the Union in general, and has been so fully discussed in the two last numbers, that nothing can be said
here which would not be useless repetition.
Second. As to the tenure by which the judges are to hold their places; this chiefly concerns their
duration in office; the provisions for their support; the precautions for their responsibility.
According to the plan of the convention, all judges who may be appointed by the United States are to
hold their offices during good behavior; which is conformable to the most approved of the State
constitutions and among the rest, to that of this State. Its propriety having been drawn into question by
the adversaries of that plan, is no light symptom of the rage for objection, which disorders their
imaginations and judgments. The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial
magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of
government. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a
no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the
best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
administration of the laws.
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government
in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to
annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the
community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties
and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over
either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can
take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments.
This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences. It proves incontestably, that
the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power1; that it can never
attack with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend
itself against their attacks. It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then
proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that
quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the
Executive. For I agree, that "there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers."2 And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to
fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union with either of the other
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departments; that as all the effects of such a union must ensue from a dependence of the former on the
latter, notwithstanding a nominal and apparent separation; that as, from the natural feebleness of the
judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate
branches; and that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence as permanency
in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution,
and, in a great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public security.
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a
limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative
authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like.
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts
of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution
void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce legislative acts void, because contrary
to the Constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the
judiciary to the legislative power. It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of another
void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. As this doctrine is of
great importance in all the American constitutions, a brief discussion of the ground on which it rests
cannot be unacceptable.
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority,
contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act,
therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is
greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are
superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their
powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and
that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be
answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any
particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could
intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It
is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the
people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to
their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs
to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the
legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which
has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the
Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their
agents.
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Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It
only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the
legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the
Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to
regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental.
This exercise of judicial discretion, in determining between two contradictory laws, is exemplified in a
familiar instance. It not uncommonly happens, that there are two statutes existing at one time, clashing
in whole or in part with each other, and neither of them containing any repealing clause or expression.
In such a case, it is the province of the courts to liquidate and fix their meaning and operation. So far as
they can, by any fair construction, be reconciled to each other, reason and law conspire to dictate that
this should be done; where this is impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect to one, in
exclusion of the other. The rule which has obtained in the courts for determining their relative validity
is, that the last in order of time shall be preferred to the first. But this is a mere rule of construction, not
derived from any positive law, but from the nature and reason of the thing. It is a rule not enjoined
upon the courts by legislative provision, but adopted by themselves, as consonant to truth and
propriety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the law. They thought it reasonable, that
between the interfering acts of an EQUAL authority, that which was the last indication of its will
should have the preference.
But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate authority, of an original and
derivative power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate the converse of that rule as proper to be
followed. They teach us that the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an
inferior and subordinate authority; and that accordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the
Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former.
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may substitute their own
pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen in the case of two
contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. The
courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead
of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the
legislative body. The observation, if it prove any thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges
distinct from that body.
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against
legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of
judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges
which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of
individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of
particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they
speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the
meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor
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party in the community. Though I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur with
its enemies,3 in questioning that fundamental principle of republican government, which admits the
right of the people to alter or abolish the established Constitution, whenever they find it inconsistent
with their happiness, yet it is not to be inferred from this principle, that the representatives of the
people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents,
incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a
violation of those provisions; or that the courts would be under a greater obligation to connive at
infractions in this shape, than when they had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative
body. Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the
established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no
presumption, or even knowledge, of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure
from it, prior to such an act. But it is easy to see, that it would require an uncommon portion of
fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative
invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community.
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that the independence of the judges
may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society. These
sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by
unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in
mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the
immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the
legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of iniquitous intention
are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled, by the very motives of
the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts. This is a circumstance calculated to have more
influence upon the character of our governments, than but few may be aware of. The benefits of the
integrity and moderation of the judiciary have already been felt in more States than one; and though
they may have displeased those whose sinister expectations they may have disappointed, they must
have commanded the esteem and applause of all the virtuous and disinterested. Considerate men, of
every description, ought to prize whatever will tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts: as no
man can be sure that he may not be to-morrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a
gainer to-day. And every man must now feel, that the inevitable tendency of such a spirit is to sap the
foundations of public and private confidence, and to introduce in its stead universal distrust and
distress.
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, which we
perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who hold
their offices by a temporary commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by
whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary independence. If the power
of making them was committed either to the Executive or legislature, there would be danger of an
improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to
hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people, or to persons chosen by them for the special purpose,
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there would be too great a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be
consulted but the Constitution and the laws.
There is yet a further and a weightier reason for the permanency of the judicial offices, which is
deducible from the nature of the qualifications they require. It has been frequently remarked, with
great propriety, that a voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with
the advantages of a free government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable
that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out
their duty in every particular case that comes before them; and it will readily be conceived from the
variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the records of
those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and
laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them. Hence it is, that there can be but few men
in the society who will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges. And
making the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still
smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge. These considerations
apprise us, that the government can have no great option between fit character; and that a temporary
duration in office, which would naturally discourage such characters from quitting a lucrative line of
practice to accept a seat on the bench, would have a tendency to throw the administration of justice into
hands less able, and less well qualified, to conduct it with utility and dignity. In the present
circumstances of this country, and in those in which it is likely to be for a long time to come, the
disadvantages on this score would be greater than they may at first sight appear; but it must be
confessed, that they are far inferior to those which present themselves under the other aspects of the
subject.
Upon the whole, there can be no room to doubt that the convention acted wisely in copying from the
models of those constitutions which have established good behavior as the tenure of their judicial offices,
in point of duration; and that so far from being blamable on this account, their plan would have been
inexcusably defective, if it had wanted this important feature of good government. The experience of
Great Britain affords an illustrious comment on the excellence of the institution.
PUBLIUS
1. The celebrated Montesquieu, speaking of them, says: "Of the three powers above mentioned, the
judiciary is next to nothing." -- Spirit of Laws. Vol. I, page 186.
2. Idem, page 181.
3. Vide Protest of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania, Martin's Speech, etc.
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The Federalist No. 79
The Judiciary Continued
[Alexander Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York:
NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a
fixed provision for their support. The remark made in relation to the President is equally applicable
here. In the general course of human nature, A POWER OVER A MAN's SUBSISTENCE AMOUNTS
TO A POWER OVER HIS WILL. And we can never hope to see realized in practice, the complete
separation of the judicial from the legislative power, in any system which leaves the former dependent
for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the latter. The enlightened friends to good
government in every State, have seen cause to lament the want of precise and explicit precautions in
the State constitutions on this head. Some of these indeed have declared that PERMANENT1 salaries
should be established for the judges; but the experiment has in some instances shown that such
expressions are not sufficiently definite to preclude legislative evasions. Something still more positive
and unequivocal has been evinced to be requisite. The plan of the convention accordingly has provided
that the judges of the United States "shall at STATED TIMES receive for their services a compensation
which shall not be DIMINISHED during their continuance in office.''
This, all circumstances considered, is the most eligible provision that could have been devised. It will
readily be understood that the fluctuations in the value of money and in the state of society rendered a
fixed rate of compensation in the Constitution inadmissible. What might be extravagant to-day, might
in half a century become penurious and inadequate. It was therefore necessary to leave it to the
discretion of the legislature to vary its provisions in conformity to the variations in circumstances, yet
under such restrictions as to put it out of the power of that body to change the condition of the
individual for the worse. A man may then be sure of the ground upon which he stands, and can never
be deterred from his duty by the apprehension of being placed in a less eligible situation. The clause
which has been quoted combines both advantages. The salaries of judicial officers may from time to
time be altered, as occasion shall require, yet so as never to lessen the allowance with which any
particular judge comes into office, in respect to him. It will be observed that a difference has been made
by the convention between the compensation of the President and of the judges, That of the former can
neither be increased nor diminished; that of the latter can only not be diminished. This probably arose
from the difference in the duration of the respective offices. As the President is to be elected for no
more than four years, it can rarely happen that an adequate salary, fixed at the commencement of that
period, will not continue to be such to its end. But with regard to the judges, who, if they behave
properly, will be secured in their places for life, it may well happen, especially in the early stages of the
government, that a stipend, which would be very sufficient at their first appointment, would become
too small in the progress of their service.
This provision for the support of the judges bears every mark of prudence and efficacy; and it may be
safely affirmed that, together with the permanent tenure of their offices, it affords a better prospect of
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their independence than is discoverable in the constitutions of any of the States in regard to their own
judges.
The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the article respecting impeachments. They are
liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House of Representatives, and tried by the Senate; and, if
convicted, may be dismissed from office, and disqualified for holding any other. This is the only
provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character,
and is the only one which we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own judges.
The want of a provision for removing the judges on account of inability has been a subject of complaint.
But all considerate men will be sensible that such a provision would either not be practiced upon or
would be more liable to abuse than calculated to answer any good purpose. The mensuration of the
faculties of the mind has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of known arts. An attempt to fix the
boundary between the regions of ability and inability, would much oftener give scope to personal and
party attachments and enmities than advance the interests of justice or the public good. The result,
except in the case of insanity, must for the most part be arbitrary; and insanity, without any formal or
express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualification.
The constitution of New York, to avoid investigations that must forever be vague and dangerous, has
taken a particular age as the criterion of inability. No man can be a judge beyond sixty. I believe there
are few at present who do not disapprove of this provision. There is no station, in relation to which it is
less proper than to that of a judge. The deliberating and comparing faculties generally preserve their
strength much beyond that period in men who survive it; and when, in addition to this circumstance,
we consider how few there are who outlive the season of intellectual vigor, and how improbable it is
that any considerable portion of the bench, whether more or less numerous, should be in such a
situation at the same time, we shall be ready to conclude that limitations of this sort have little to
recommend them. In a republic, where fortunes are not affluent, and pensions not expedient, the
dismission of men from stations in which they have served their country long and usefully, on which
they depend for subsistence, and from which it will be too late to resort to any other occupation for a
livelihood, ought to have some better apology to humanity than is to be found in the imaginary danger
of a superannuated bench.
PUBLIUS.
1 Vide "Constitution of Massachusetts,'' chapter 2, section I, article 13.
The Federalist No. 80
The Powers of the Judiciary
[Alexander Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York:
To JUDGE with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal judicature, it will be necessary to consider,
in the first place, what are its proper objects.
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It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the judicary authority of the Union ought to extend to
these several descriptions of cases: 1st, to all those which arise out of the laws of the United States,
passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of legislation; 2d, to all those which concern
the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles of Union; 3d, to all those in which the
United States are a party; 4th, to all those which involve the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether
they relate to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, or to that between the
States themselves; 5th, to all those which originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction; and, lastly, to all those in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and
unbiased.
The first point depends upon this obvious consideration, that there ought always to be a constitutional
method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions. What, for instance, would avail restrictions on
the authority of the State legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of
them? The States, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited from doing a variety of things, some of
which are incompatible with the interests of the Union, and others with the principles of good
government. The imposition of duties on imported articles, and the emission of paper money, are
specimens of each kind. No man of sense will believe, that such prohibitions would be scrupulously
regarded, without some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions of
them. This power must either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an authority in the federal
courts to overrule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles of Union. There is no third
course that I can imagine. The latter appears to have been thought by the convention preferable to the
former, and, I presume, will be most agreeable to the States.
As to the second point, it is impossible, by any argument or comment, to make it clearer than it is in
itself. If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a government
being coextensive with its legislative, may be ranked among the number. The mere necessity of
uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws, decides the question. Thirteen independent courts
of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from
which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.
Still less need be said in regard to the third point. Controversies between the nation and its members or
citizens, can only be properly referred to the national tribunals. Any other plan would be contrary to
reason, to precedent, and to decorum.
The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the
disposal of a PART. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its
members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of
preventing it. As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other
manner, is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary
ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned. This is not
less essential to the preservation of the public faith, than to the security of the public tranquillity. A
distinction may perhaps be imagined between cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations and
those which may stand merely on the footing of the municipal law. The former kind may be supposed
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proper for the federal jurisdiction, the latter for that of the States. But it is at least problematical,
whether an unjust sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of controversy was wholly relative to
the lex loci, would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one which
violated the stipulations of a treaty or the general law of nations. And a still greater objection to the
distinction would result from the immense difficulty, if not impossibility, of a practical discrimination
between the cases of one complexion and those of the other. So great a proportion of the cases in which
foreigners are parties, involve national questions, that it is by far most safe and most expedient to refer
all those in which they are concerned to the national tribunals.
The power of determining causes between two States, between one State and the citizens of another,
and between the citizens of different States, is perhaps not less essential to the peace of the Union than
that which has been just examined. History gives us a horrid picture of the dissensions and private
wars which distracted and desolated Germany prior to the institution of the Imperial Chamber by
Maximilian, towards the close of the fifteenth century; and informs us, at the same time, of the vast
influence of that institution in appeasing the disorders and establishing the tranquillity of the empire.
This was a court invested with authority to decide finally all differences among the members of the
Germanic body.
A method of terminating territorial disputes between the States, under the authority of the federal
head, was not unattended to, even in the imperfect system by which they have been hitherto held
together. But there are many other sources, besides interfering claims of boundary, from which
bickerings and animosities may spring up among the members of the Union. To some of these we have
been witnesses in the course of our past experience. It will readily be conjectured that I allude to the
fraudulent laws which have been passed in too many of the States. And though the proposed
Constitution establishes particular guards against the repetition of those instances which have
heretofore made their appearance, yet it is warrantable to apprehend that the spirit which produced
them will assume new shapes, that could not be foreseen nor specifically provided against. Whatever
practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States, are proper objects of federal
superintendence and control.
It may be esteemed the basis of the Union, that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.'' And if it be a just principle that every
government OUGHT TO POSSESS THE MEANS OF EXECUTING ITS OWN PROVISIONS BY ITS
OWN AUTHORITY, it will follow, that in order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of
privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national judiciary
ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another State or its
citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and subterfuge, it is
necessary that its construction should be committed to that tribunal which, having no local
attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the different States and their citizens, and which,
owing its official existence to the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the
principles on which it is founded.
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The fifth point will demand little animadversion. The most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not
thus far shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizances of maritime causes. These
so generally depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they
fall within the considerations which are relative to the public peace. The most important part of them
are, by the present Confederation, submitted to federal jurisdiction.
The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases in which the State tribunals cannot be
supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in
any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias. This principle has no inconsiderable
weight in designating the federal courts as the proper tribunals for the determination of controversies
between different States and their citizens. And it ought to have the same operation in regard to some
cases between citizens of the same State. Claims to land under grants of different States, founded upon
adverse pretensions of boundary, are of this description. The courts of neither of the granting States
could be expected to be unbiased. The laws may have even prejudged the question, and tied the courts
down to decisions in favor of the grants of the State to which they belonged. And even where this had
not been done, it would be natural that the judges, as men, should feel a strong predilection to the
claims of their own government.
Having thus laid down and discussed the principles which ought to regulate the constitution of the
federal judiciary, we will proceed to test, by these principles, the particular powers of which, according
to the plan of the convention, it is to be composed. It is to comprehend "all cases in law and equity
arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a
party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State;
between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands and grants of
different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, and subjects.''
This constitutes the entire mass of the judicial authority of the Union. Let us now review it in detail. It
is, then, to extend:
First. To all cases in law and equity, ARISING UNDER THE CONSTITUTION and THE LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES. This corresponds with the two first classes of causes, which have been enumerated,
as proper for the jurisdiction of the United States. It has been asked, what is meant by "cases arising
under the Constitution,'' in contradiction from those "arising under the laws of the United States''? The
difference has been already explained. All the restrictions upon the authority of the State legislatures
furnish examples of it. They are not, for instance, to emit paper money; but the interdiction results from
the Constitution, and will have no connection with any law of the United States. Should paper money,
notwithstanding, be emited, the controversies concerning it would be cases arising under the
Constitution and not the laws of the United States, in the ordinary signification of the terms. This may
serve as a sample of the whole.
It has also been asked, what need of the word "equity What equitable causes can grow out of the
Constitution and laws of the United States? There is hardly a subject of litigation between individuals,
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which may not involve those ingredients of FRAUD, ACCIDENT, TRUST, or HARDSHIP, which
would render the matter an object of equitable rather than of legal jurisdiction, as the distinction is
known and established in several of the States. It is the peculiar province, for instance, of a court of
equity to relieve against what are called hard bargains: these are contracts in which, though there may
have been no direct fraud or deceit, sufficient to invalidate them in a court of law, yet there may have
been some undue and unconscionable advantage taken of the necessities or misfortunes of one of the
parties, which a court of equity would not tolerate. In such cases, where foreigners were concerned on
either side, it would be impossible for the federal judicatories to do justice without an equitable as well
as a legal jurisdiction. Agreements to convey lands claimed under the grants of different States, may
afford another example of the necessity of an equitable jurisdiction in the federal courts. This reasoning
may not be so palpable in those States where the formal and technical distinction between LAW and
EQUITY is not maintained, as in this State, where it is exemplified by every day's practice.
The judiciary authority of the Union is to extend:
Second. To treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, and to all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. These belong to the fourth class of the
enumerated cases, as they have an evident connection with the preservation of the national peace.
Third. To cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. These form, altogether, the fifth of the
enumerated classes of causes proper for the cognizance of the national courts.
Fourth. To controversies to which the United States shall be a party. These constitute the third of those
classes.
Fifth. To controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State;
between citizens of different States. These belong to the fourth of those classes, and partake, in some
measure, of the nature of the last.
Sixth. To cases between the citizens of the same State, CLAIMING LANDS UNDER GRANTS OF
DIFFERENT STATES. These fall within the last class, and ARE THE ONLY INSTANCES IN WHICH
THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION DIRECTLY CONTEMPLATES THE COGNIZANCE OF DISPUTES
BETWEEN THE CITIZENS OF THE SAME STATE.
Seventh. To cases between a State and the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects.
These have been already explained to belong to the fourth of the enumerated classes, and have been
shown to be, in a peculiar manner, the proper subjects of the national judicature.
From this review of the particular powers of the federal judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution, it
appears that they are all conformable to the principles which ought to have governed the structure of
that department, and which were necessary to the perfection of the system. If some partial inconviences
should appear to be connected with the incorporation of any of them into the plan, it ought to be
recollected that the national legislature will have ample authority to make such EXCEPTIONS, and to
prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or remove these inconveniences. The
possibility of particular mischiefs can never be viewed, by a wellinformed mind, as a solid objection to
a general principle, which is calculated to avoid general mischiefs and to obtain general advantages.
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PUBLIUS.
The Federalist No. 84
Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered
[Alexander Hamilton]
IN THE course of the foregoing review of the Constitution, I have taken notice of, and endeavored to
answer most of the objections which have appeared against it. There, however, remain a few which
either did not fall naturally under any particular head or were forgotten in their proper places. These
shall now be discussed; but as the subject has been drawn into great length, I shall so far consult
brevity as to comprise all my observations on these miscellaneous points in a single paper.
The most considerable of the remaining objections is that the plan of the convention contains no bill of
rights. Among other answers given to this, it has been upon different occasions remarked that the
constitutions of several of the States are in a similar predicament. I add that New York is of the number.
And yet the opposers of the new system, in this State, who profess an unlimited admiration for its
constitution, are among the most intemperate partisans of a bill of rights. To justify their zeal in this
matter, they allege two things: one is that, though the constitution of New York has no bill of rights
prefixed to it, yet it contains, in the body of it, various provisions in favor of particular privileges and
rights, which, in substance amount to the same thing; the other is, that the Constitution adopts, in their
full extent, the common and statute law of Great Britain, by which many other rights, not expressed in
it, are equally secured.
To the first I answer, that the Constitution proposed by the convention contains, as well as the
constitution of this State, a number of such provisions.
Independent of those which relate to the structure of the government, we find the following: Article 1,
section 3, clause 7 -- "Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from
office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United
States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment,
and punishment according to law." Section 9, of the same article, clause 2 -- "The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety
may require it." Clause 3 -- "No bill of attainder or ex-post-facto law shall be passed." Clause 7 -- "No
title of nobility shall be granted by the United States; and no person holding any office of profit or trust
under them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or
title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state." Article 3, section 2, clause 3 -- "The
trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the
State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the
trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed." Section 3, of the same
article -- "Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in
adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless
on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court." And clause 3,
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of the same section -- "The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason; but no
attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person
attainted."
It may well be a question, whether these are not, upon the whole, of equal importance with any which
are to be found in the constitution of this State. The establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the
prohibition of ex post facto laws, and of TITLES OF NOBILITY, to which we have no corresponding provision
in our Constitution, are perhaps greater securities to liberty and republicanism than any it contains. The
creation of crimes after the commission of the fact, or, in other words, the subjecting of men to
punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law, and the practice of
arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of
tyranny. The observations of the judicious Blackstone,1 in reference to the latter, are well worthy of
recital: "To bereave a man of life, [says he] or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or
trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny
throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his
sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous
engine of arbitrary government." And as a remedy for this fatal evil he is everywhere peculiarly
emphatical in his encomiums on the habeas corpus act, which in one place he calls "the BULWARK of the
British Constitution."2
Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly
be denominated the corner-stone of republican government; for so long as they are excluded, there can
never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the people.
To the second that is, to the pretended establishment of the common and state law by the Constitution,
I answer, that they are expressly made subject "to such alterations and provisions as the legislature
shall from time to time make concerning the same." They are therefore at any moment liable to repeal
by the ordinary legislative power, and of course have no constitutional sanction. The only use of the
declaration was to recognize the ancient law and to remove doubts which might have been occasioned
by the Revolution. This consequently can be considered as no part of a declaration of rights, which
under our constitutions must be intended as limitations of the power of the government itself.
It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations between
kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not
surrendered to the prince. Such was MAGNA CHARTA, obtained by the barons, sword in hand, from
King John. Such were the subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding princes. Such was
the Petition of Right assented to by Charles I., in the beginning of his reign. Such, also, was the
Declaration of Right presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, and
afterwards thrown into the form of an act of parliament called the Bill of Rights. It is evident, therefore,
that, according to their primitive signification, they have no application to constitutions professedly
founded upon the power of the people, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants.
Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain every thing they have no need of
particular reservations. "WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to
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ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
Here is a better recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which make the
principal figure in several of our State bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise
of ethics than in a constitution of government.
But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a Constitution like that under
consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the general political interests of the nation, than to
a constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal and private concerns. If, therefore,
the loud clamors against the plan of the convention, on this score, are well founded, no epithets of
reprobation will be too strong for the constitution of this State. But the truth is, that both of them
contain all which, in relation to their objects, is reasonably to be desired.
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are contended
for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would
contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable
pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is
no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained,
when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision
would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a
plausible pretense for claiming that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the
Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority
which was not given, and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear
implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the
national government. This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which would be given to
the doctrine of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of rights.
On the subject of the liberty of the press, as much as has been said, I cannot forbear adding a remark or
two: in the first place, I observe, that there is not a syllable concerning it in the constitution of this State;
in the next, I contend, that whatever has been said about it in that of any other State, amounts to
nothing. What signifies a declaration, that "the liberty of the press shall be inviolably preserved"? What
is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for
evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations
may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the
general spirit of the people and of the government.3 And here, after all, as is intimated upon another
occasion, must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights.
There remains but one other view of this matter to conclude the point. The truth is, after all the
declamations we have heard, that the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful
purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS. The several bills of rights in Great Britain form its Constitution, and
conversely the constitution of each State is its bill of rights. And the proposed Constitution, if adopted,
will be the bill of rights of the Union. Is it one object of a bill of rights to declare and specify the political
privileges of the citizens in the structure and administration of the government? This is done in the
most ample and precise manner in the plan of the convention; comprehending various precautions for
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the public security, which are not to be found in any of the State constitutions. Is another object of a bill
of rights to define certain immunities and modes of proceeding, which are relative to personal and
private concerns? This we have seen has also been attended to, in a variety of cases, in the same plan.
Adverting therefore to the substantial meaning of a bill of rights, it is absurd to allege that it is not to be
found in the work of the convention. It may be said that it does not go far enough, though it will not be
easy to make this appear; but it can with no propriety be contended that there is no such thing. It
certainly must be immaterial what mode is observed as to the order of declaring the rights of the
citizens, if they are to be found in any part of the instrument which establishes the government. And
hence it must be apparent, that much of what has been said on this subject rests merely on verbal and
nominal distinctions, entirely foreign from the substance of the thing.
Another objection which has been made, and which, from the frequency of its repetition, it is to be
presumed is relied on, is of this nature: "It is improper [say the objectors] to confer such large powers,
as are proposed, upon the national government, because the seat of that government must of necessity
be too remote from many of the States to admit of a proper knowledge on the part of the constituent, of
the conduct of the representative body." This argument, if it proves any thing, proves that there ought
to be no general government whatever. For the powers which, it seems to be agreed on all hands, ought
to be vested in the Union, cannot be safely intrusted to a body which is not under every requisite
control. But there are satisfactory reasons to show that the objection is in reality not well founded.
There is in most of the arguments which relate to distance a palpable illusion of the imagination. What
are the sources of information by which the people in Montgomery County must regulate their
judgment of the conduct of their representatives in the State legislature? Of personal observation they
can have no benefit. This is confined to the citizens on the spot. They must therefore depend on the
information of intelligent men, in whom they confide; and how must these men obtain their
information? Evidently from the complexion of public measures, from the public prints, from
correspondences with their representatives, and with other persons who reside at the place of their
deliberations. This does not apply to Montgomery County only, but to all the counties at any
considerable distance from the seat of government.
It is equally evident that the same sources of information would be open to the people in relation to the
conduct of their representatives in the general government, and the impediments to a prompt
communication which distance may be supposed to create, will be overbalanced by the effects of the
vigilance of the State governments. The executive and legislative bodies of each State will be so many
sentinels over the persons employed in every department of the national administration; and as it will
be in their power to adopt and pursue a regular and effectual system of intelligence, they can never be
at a loss to know the behavior of those who represent their constituents in the national councils, and
can readily communicate the same knowledge to the people. Their disposition to apprise the
community of whatever may prejudice its interests from another quarter, may be relied upon, if it were
only from the rivalship of power. And we may conclude with the fullest assurance that the people,
through that channel, will be better informed of the conduct of their national representatives, than they
can be by any means they now possess of that of their State representatives.
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It ought also to be remembered that the citizens who inhabit the country at and near the seat of
government will, in all questions that affect the general liberty and prosperity, have the same interest
with those who are at a distance, and that they will stand ready to sound the alarm when necessary,
and to point out the actors in any pernicious project. The public papers will be expeditious messengers
of intelligence to the most remote inhabitants of the Union.
Among the many curious objections which have appeared against the proposed Constitution, the most
extraordinary and the least colorable is derived from the want of some provision respecting the debts
due to the United States. This has been represented as a tacit relinquishment of those debts, and as a
wicked contrivance to screen public defaulters. The newspapers have teemed with the most
inflammatory railings on this head; yet there is nothing clearer than that the suggestion is entirely void
of foundation, the offspring of extreme ignorance or extreme dishonesty. In addition to the remarks I
have made upon the subject in another place, I shall only observe that as it is a plain dictate of
common-sense, so it is also an established doctrine of political law, that "States neither lose any of their
rights, nor are discharged from any of their obligations, by a change in the form of their civil government."4
The last objection of any consequence, which I at present recollect, turns upon the article of expense. If
it were even true, that the adoption of the proposed government would occasion a considerable
increase of expense, it would be an objection that ought to have no weight against the plan.
The great bulk of the citizens of America are with reason convinced, that Union is the basis of their
political happiness. Men of sense of all parties now, with few exceptions, agree that it cannot be
preserved under the present system, nor without radical alterations; that new and extensive powers
ought to be granted to the national head, and that these require a different organization of the federal
government -- a single body being an unsafe depositary of such ample authorities. In conceding all this,
the question of expense must be given up; for it is impossible, with any degree of safety, to narrow the
foundation upon which the system is to stand. The two branches of the legislature are, in the first
instance, to consist of only sixty-five persons, which is the same number of which Congress, under the
existing Confederation, may be composed. It is true that this number is intended to be increased; but
this is to keep pace with the progress of the population and resources of the country. It is evident that a
less number would, even in the first instance, have been unsafe, and that a continuance of the present
number would, in a more advanced stage of population, be a very inadequate representation of the
people.
Whence is the dreaded augmentation of expense to spring? One source indicated, is the multiplication
of offices under the new government. Let us examine this a little.
It is evident that the principal departments of the administration under the present government, are the
same which will be required under the new. There are now a Secretary of War, a Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, a Secretary for Domestic Affairs, a Board of Treasury, consisting of three persons, a Treasurer,
assistants, clerks, etc. These officers are indispensable under any system, and will suffice under the new
as well as the old. As to ambassadors and other ministers and agents in foreign countries, the proposed
Constitution can make no other difference than to render their characters, where they reside, more
respectable, and their services more useful. As to persons to be employed in the collection of the
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revenues, it is unquestionably true that these will form a very considerable addition to the number of
federal officers; but it will not follow that this will occasion an increase of public expense. It will be in
most cases nothing more than an exchange of State for national officers. In the collection of all duties,
for instance, the persons employed will be wholly of the latter description. The States individually will
stand in no need of any for this purpose. What difference can it make in point of expense to pay officers
of the customs appointed by the State or by the United States? There is no good reason to suppose that
either the number or the salaries of the latter will be greater than those of the former.
Where then are we to seek for those additional articles of expense which are to swell the account to the
enormous size that has been represented to us? The chief item which occurs to me respects the support
of the judges of the United States. I do not add the President, because there is now a president of
Congress, whose expenses may not be far, if any thing, short of those which will be incurred on
account of the President of the United States. The support of the judges will clearly be an extra expense,
but to what extent will depend on the particular plan which may be adopted in regard to this matter.
But upon no reasonable plan can it amount to a sum which will be an object of material consequence.
Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any extra expense that may attend the establishment of
the proposed government. The first thing which presents itself is that a great part of the business which
now keeps Congress sitting through the year will be transacted by the President. Even the management
of foreign negotiations will naturally devolve upon him, according to general principles concerted with
the Senate, and subject to their final concurrence. Hence it is evident that a portion of the year will
suffice for the session of both the Senate and the House of Representatives; we may suppose about a
fourth for the latter and a third, or perhaps half, for the former. The extra business of treaties and
appointments may give this extra occupation to the Senate. From this circumstance we may infer that,
until the House of Representatives shall be increased greatly beyond its present number, there will be a
considerable saving of expense from the difference between the constant session of the present and the
temporary session of the future Congress.
But there is another circumstance of great importance in the view of economy. The business of the
United States has hitherto occupied the State legislatures, as well as Congress. The latter has made
requisitions which the former have had to provide for. Hence it has happened that the sessions of the
State legislatures have been protracted greatly beyond what was necessary for the execution of the
mere local business of the States. More than half their time has been frequently employed in matters
which related to the United States. Now the members who compose the legislatures of the several
States amount to two thousand and upwards, which number has hitherto performed what under the
new system will be done in the first instance by sixty-five persons, and probably at no future period by
above a fourth or fifth of that number. The Congress under the proposed government will do all the
business of the United States themselves, without the intervention of the State legislatures, who
thenceforth will have only to attend to the affairs of their particular States, and will not have to sit in
any proportion as long as they have heretofore done. This difference in the time of the sessions of the
State legislatures will be clear gain, and will alone form an article of saving, which may be regarded as
an equivalent for any additional objects of expense that may be occasioned by the adoption of the new
system.
166
The result from these observations is that the sources of additional expense from the establishment of
the proposed Constitution are much fewer than may have been imagined; that they are
counterbalanced by considerable objects of saving; and that while it is questionable on which side the
scale will preponderate, it is certain that a government less expensive would be incompetent to the
purposes of the Union.
PUBLIUS
1. Vide Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 1, p. 136.
2. Idem, Vol. 4, p. 438.
3. To show that there is a power in the Constitution by which the liberty of the press may be affected,
recourse has been had to the power of taxation. It is said that duties may be laid upon the publications
so high as to amount to a prohibition. I know not by what logic it could be maintained, that the
declarations in the State constitutions, in favor of the freedom of the press, would be a constitutional
impediment to the imposition of duties upon publications by the State legislatures. It cannot certainly
be pretended that any degree of duties, however low, would be an abridgment of the liberty of the
press. We know that newspapers are taxed in Great Britain, and yet it is notorious that the press
nowhere enjoys greater liberty than in that country. And if duties of any kind may be laid without a
violation of that liberty, it is evident that the extent must depend on legislative discretion, respecting
the liberty of the press, will give it no greater security than it will have without them. The same
invasions of it may be effected under the State constitutions which contain those declarations through
the means of taxation, as under the proposed Constitution, which has nothing of the kind. It would be
quite as significant to declare that government ought to be free, that taxes ought not to be excessive,
etc., as that the liberty of the press ought not to be restrained.
4. Vide Rutherford's Institutes, Vol. 2, Book II, Chapter X, Sections XIV and XV. Vide also Grotius, Book
II, Chapter IX, Sections VIII and IX.
Brutus No. 1
When the public is called to investigate and decide upon a question in which not only the present
members of the community are deeply interested, but upon which the happiness and misery of
generations yet unborn is in great measure suspended, the benevolent mind cannot help feeling itself
peculiarly interested in the result.
***
With these few introductory remarks, I shall proceed to a consideration of this constitution:
The first question that presents itself on the subject is, whether a confederated government be the best
for the United States or not? Or in other words, whether the thirteen United States should be reduced
to one great republic, governed by one legislature, and under the direction of one executive and
judicial; or whether they should continue thirteen confederated republics, under the direction and
controul of a supreme federal head for certain defined national purposes only?
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This enquiry is important, because, although the government reported by the convention does not go to
a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed, certainly and
infallibly terminate in it.
This government is to possess absolute and uncontroulable power, legislative, executive and judicial,
with respect to every object to which it extends, for by the last clause of section 8th, article 1st, it is
declared "that the Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution, in the
government of the United States; or in any department or office thereof." And by the 6th article, it is
declared "that this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance
thereof, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the
constitution, or law of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." It appears from these articles that
there is no need of any intervention of the state governments, between the Congress and the people, to
execute any one power vested in the general government, and that the constitution and laws of every
state are nullified and declared void, so far as they are or shall be inconsistent with this constitution, or
the laws made in pursuance of it, or with treaties made under the authority of the United States. — The
government then, so far as it extends, is a complete one, and not a confederation. It is as much one
complete government as that of New-York or Massachusetts, has as absolute and perfect powers to
make and execute all laws, to appoint officers, institute courts, declare offences, and annex penalties,
with respect to every object to which it extends, as any other in the world. So far therefore as its powers
reach, all ideas of confederation are given up and lost.
***
How far the clause in the 8th section of the 1st article may operate to do away all idea of confederated
states, and to effect an entire consolidation of the whole into one general government, it is impossible to
say. The powers given by this article are very general and comprehensive, and it may receive a
construction to justify the passing almost any law. A power to make all laws, which shall be necessary
and proper, for carrying into execution, all powers vested by the constitution in the government of the
United States, or any department or officer thereof, is a power very comprehensive and definite
[indefinite?], and may, for ought I know, be exercised in a such manner as entirely to abolish the state
legislatures.
***
It is not meant, by stating this case, to insinuate that the constitution would warrant a law of this kind;
or unnecessarily to alarm the fears of the people, by suggesting, that the federal legislature would be
more likely to pass the limits assigned them by the constitution, than that of an individual state, further
than they are less responsible to the people. But what is meant is, that the legislature of the United
States are vested with the great and uncontroulable powers, of laying and collecting taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises; of regulating trade, raising and supporting armies, organizing, arming, and
disciplining the militia, instituting courts, and other general powers. And are by this clause invested
with the power of making all laws, proper and necessary, for carrying all these into execution; and they
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may so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate all the state governments, and reduce this country
to one single government. And if they may do it, it is pretty certain they will; for it will be found that
the power retained by individual states, small as it is, will be a clog upon the wheels of the government
of the United States; the latter therefore will be naturally inclined to remove it out of the way. Besides,
it is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that every man, and every body of men,
invested with power, are ever disposed to increase it, and to acquire a superiority over every thing that
stands in their way. This disposition, which is implanted in human nature, will operate in the federal
legislature to lessen and ultimately to subvert the state authority, and having such advantages, will
most certainly succeed, if the federal government succeeds at all. It must be very evident then, that
what this constitution wants of being a complete consolidation of the several parts of the union into one
complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and executive powers, to all intents and
purposes, it will necessarily acquire in its exercise and operation.
Let us now proceed to enquire, as I at first proposed, whether it be best the thirteen United States
should be reduced to one great republic, or not? It is here taken for granted, that all agree in this, that
whatever government we adopt, it ought to be a free one; that it should be so framed as to secure the
liberty of the citizens of America, and such an one as to admit of a full, fair, and equal representation of
the people. The question then will be, whether a government thus constituted, and founded on such
principles, is practicable, and can be exercised over the whole United States, reduced into one state?
If respect is to be paid to the opinion of the greatest and wisest men who have ever thought or wrote on
the science of government, we shall be constrained to conclude, that a free republic cannot succeed over
a country of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants, and these encreasing in
such rapid progression as that of the whole United States. Among the many illustrious authorities
which might be produced to this point, I shall content myself with quoting only two. The one is the
baron de Montesquieu, spirit of laws, chap. xvi. vol. I [book VIII]. "It is natural to a republic to have
only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. In a large republic there are men of large
fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single
subject; he has interest of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and glorious, by
oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In
a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and
depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood,
and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course are less protected."
Of the same opinion is the marquis Beccarari.
History furnishes no example of a free republic, any thing like the extent of the United States. The
Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was that of the Romans. Both of these, it is true, in
process of time, extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the consequence was,
that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that
ever existed in the world.
Brutus
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Brutus No. 4
There can be no free government where the people are not possessed of the power of making the laws
by which they are governed, either in their own persons, or by others substituted in their stead.
Experience has taught mankind, that legislation by representatives is the most eligible, and the only
practicable mode in which the people of any country can exercise this right, either prudently or
beneficially. But then, it is a matter of the highest importance, in forming this representation, that it be
so constituted as to be capable of understanding the true interests of the society for which it acts, and so
disposed as to pursue the good and happiness of the people as its ultimate end. The object of every free
government is the public good, and all lesser interests yield to it. That of every tyrannical government,
is the happiness and aggrandisement of one, or a few, and to this the public felicity, and every other
interest must submit. — The reason of this difference in these governments is obvious. The first is so
constituted as to collect the views and wishes of the whole people in that of their rulers, while the latter
is so framed as to separate the interests of the governors from that of the governed. The principle of self
love, therefore, that will influence the one to promote the good of the whole, will prompt the other to
follow its own private advantage. The great art, therefore, in forming a good constitution, appears to be
this, so to frame it, as that those to whom the power is committed shall be subject to the same feelings,
and aim at the same objects as the people do, who transfer to them their authority. There is no possible
way to effect this but by an equal, full and fair representation; this, therefore, is the great desideratum
in politics. However fair an appearance any government may make, though it may possess a thousand
plausible articles and be decorated with ever so many ornaments, yet if it is deficient in this essential
principle of a full and just representation of the people, it will be only like a painted sepulcher — For,
without this it cannot be a free government; let the administration of it be good or ill, it still will be a
government, not according to the will of the people, but according to the will of a few.
To test this new constitution then, by this principle, is of the last importance — It is to bring it to the
touch-stone of national liberty, and I hope I shall be excused, if, in this paper. I pursue the subject
commenced in my last number, to wit, the necessity of an equal and full representation in the
legislature. — In that, I showed that it was not equal, because the smallest states are to send the same
number of members to the senate as the largest, and, because the slaves, who afford neither aid or
defence to the government, are to encrease the proportion of members. To prove that it was not a just
or adequate representation, it was urged, that so small a number could not resemble the people, or
possess their sentiments and dispositions. That the choice of members would commonly fall upon the
rich and great, while the middling class of the community would be excluded. That in so small a
representation there was no security against bribery and corruption.
The small number which is to compose this legislature, will not only expose it to the danger of that
kind of corruption, and undue influence. which will arise from the gift of places of honor and
emolument, or the more direct one of bribery, but it will also subject it to another kind of influence no
less fatal to the liberties of the people, though it be not so flagrantly repugnant to the principles of
rectitude. It is not to be expected that a legislature will be found in any country that will not have some
of its members, who will pursue their private ends. and for which they will sacrifice the public good.
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Men of this character are, generally, artful and designing, and frequently possess brilliant talents and
abilities; they commonly act in concert, and agree to share the spoils of their country among them; they
will keep their object ever in view, and follow it with constancy. To effect their purpose, they will
assume any shape, and, Proteus like. mould themselves into any form — where they find members
proof against direct bribery or gifts of offices, they will endeavor to mislead their minds by specious
and false reasoning, to impose upon their unsuspecting honesty by an affectation of zeal for the public
good; they will form juntos, and hold out-door meetings; they will operate upon the good nature of
their opponents, by a thousand little attentions, and teize them into compliance by the earnestness of
solicitation. Those who are acquainted with the manner of conducting business in public assemblies,
know how prevalent art and address are in carrying a measure, even over men of the best intentions,
and of good understanding. The firmest security against this kind of improper and dangerous
influence, as well as all other, is a strong and numerous representation: in such a house of assembly, so
great a number must be gained over, before the private views of individuals could be gratified that
there could be scarce a hope of success. But in the foederal assembly, seventeen men are all that is
necessary to pass a law. It is probable, it will seldom happen that more than twenty-five will be
requisite to form a majority, when it is considered what a number of places of honor and emolument
will be in the gift of the executive, the powerful influence that great and designing men have over the
honest and unsuspecting, by their art and address, their soothing manners and civilities, and their
cringing flattery, joined with their affected patriotism; when these different species of influence are
combined, it is scarcely to be hoped that a legislature, composed of so small a number, as the one
proposed by the new constitution, will long resist their force.
A farther objection against the feebleness of the representation is. that it will not possess the confidence
of the people. The execution of the laws in a free government must rest on this confidence, and this
must be founded on the good opinion they entertain of the framers of the laws. Every government
must be supported, either by the people having such an attachment to it, as to be ready, when called
upon, to support it, or by a force at the command of the government, to compel obedience. The latter
mode destroys every idea of a free government; for the same force that may be employed to compel
obedience to good laws, might, and probably would be used to wrest from the people their
constitutional liberties. — Whether it is practicable to have a representation for the whole union
sufficiently numerous to obtain that confidence which is necessary for the purpose of internal taxation,
and other powers to which this proposed government extends, is an important question. I am clearly of
opinion, it is not, and therefore I have stated this in my first number, as one of the reasons against
going into an entire consolidation of the states — one of the most capital errors in the system, is that of
extending the powers of the foederal government to objects to which it is not adequate, which it cannot
exercise without endangering public liberty, and which it is not necessary they should possess, in order
to preserve the union and manage our national concerns; of this, however, I shall treat more fully in
some future paper — But, however this may be. certain it is, that the representation in the legislature is
not so formed as to give reasonable ground for public trust.
In order for the people safely to repose themselves on their rulers, they should not only be of their own
choice. But it is requisite they should be acquainted with their abilities to manage the public concerns
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with wisdom. They should be satisfied that those who represent them are men of integrity, who will
pursue the good of the community with fidelity; and will not be turned aside from their duty by
private interest, or corrupted by undue influence; and that they will have such a zeal for the good of
those whom they represent, as to excite them to be diligent in their service; but it is impossible the
people of the United States should have sufficient knowledge of their representatives, when the
numbers are so few, to acquire any rational satisfaction on either of these points. The people of this
state will have very little acquaintance with those who may be chosen to represent them; a great part of
them will, probably, not know the characters of their own members, much less that of a majority of
those who will compose the foederal assembly; they will consist of men, whose names they have never
heard, and whose talents and regard for the public good, they are total strangers to; and they will have
no persons so immediately of their choice so near them, of their neighbours and of their own rank in
life, that they can feel themselves secure in trusting their interests in their hands. The representatives of
the people cannot, as they now do, after they have passed laws, mix with the people, and explain to
them the motives which induced the adoption of any measure, point out its utility, and remove
objections or silence unreasonable clamours against it. — The number will be so small that but a very
few of the most sensible and respectable yeomanry of the country can ever have any knowledge of
them: being so far removed from the people, their station will be elevated and important, and they will
be considered as ambitious and designing. They will not be viewed by the people as part of themselves,
but as a body distinct from them, and having separate interests to pursue; the consequence will be, that
a perpetual jealousy will exist in the minds of the people against them; their conduct will be narrowly
watched; their measures scrutinized; and their laws opposed, evaded, or reluctantly obeyed. This is
natural, and exactly corresponds with the conduct of individuals towards those in whose hands they
intrust important concerns. If the person confided in, be a neighbour with whom his employer is
intimately acquainted, whose talents, he knows, are sufficient to manage the business with which he is
charged, his honesty and fidelity unsuspected, and his friendship and zeal for the service of this
principal unquestionable, he will commit his affairs into his hands with unreserved confidence, and
feel himself secure; all the transactions of the agent will meet with the most favorable construction, and
the measures he takes will give satisfaction. But, if the person employed be a stranger, whom he has
never seen, and whose character for ability or fidelity he cannot fully learn — If he is constrained to
choose him, because it was not in his power to procure one more agreeable to his wishes, he will trust
him with caution, and be suspicious of all his conduct.
If then this government should not derive support from the good will of the people, it must be
executed by force, or not executed at all; either case would lead to the total destruction of liberty.
~
Wise and good men will exercise power so as to promote the public happiness under any form of
government. If we are to take it for granted, that those who administer the government under this
system, will always pay proper attention to the rights and interests of the people, nothing more was
necessary than to say who should be invested with the powers of government, and leave them to
exercise it at will and pleasure. Men are apt to be deceived both with respect to their own dispositions
and those of others. Though this truth is proved by almost every page of the history of nations, to wit,
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that power, lodged in the hands of rulers to be used at discretion, is almost always exercised to the
oppression of the people, and the aggrandizement of themselves; yet most men think if it was lodged
in their hands they would not employ it in this manner. — Thus when the prophet Elisha told Hazael, "I
know the evil that thou wilt do unto the children of Israel; their strong holds wilt thou set on fire, and
their young men, wilt thou slay with the sword, and wilt dash their children, and rip up their women
with child." Hazael had no idea that he ever should be guilty of such horrid cruelty, and said to the
prophet, "Is thy servant a dog that he should do this great thing." Elisha answered, "The Lord hath
shewed me that thou shalt be king of Syria." The event proved, that Hazael only wanted an
opportunity to perpetrate these enormities without restraint, and he had a disposition to do them,
though he himself knew it not.
Brutus.
Brutus No. 11
The nature and extent of the judicial power of the United States, proposed to be granted by this
constitution, claims our particular attention.
Much has been said and written upon the subject of this new system on both sides, but I have not met
with any writer, who has discussed the judicial powers with any degree of accuracy. And yet it is
obvious, that we can form but very imperfect ideas of the manner in which this government will work,
or the effect it will have in changing the internal police and mode of distributing justice at present
subsisting in the respective states, without a thorough investigation of the powers of the judiciary and
of the manner in which they will operate. This government is a complete system, not only for making,
but for executing laws. And the courts of law, which will be constituted by it, are not only to decide
upon the constitution and the laws made in pursuance of it, but by officers subordinate to them to
execute all their decisions. The real effect of this system of government, will therefore be brought home
to the feelings of the people, through the medium of the judicial power. It is, moreover, of great
importance, to examine with care the nature and extent of the judicial power, because those who are to
be vested with it, are to be placed in a situation altogether unprecedented in a free country. They are to
be rendered totally independent, both of the people and the legislature, both with respect to their
offices and salaries. No errors they may commit can be corrected by any power above them, if any such
power there be, nor can they be removed from office for making ever so many erroneous adjudications.
The only causes for which they can be displaced, is, conviction of treason, bribery, and high crimes and
misdemeanors.
This part of the plan is so modelled, as to authorise the courts, not only to carry into execution the
powers expressly given, but where these are wanting or ambiguously expressed, to supply what is
wanting by their own decisions.
That we may be enabled to form a just opinion on this subject, I shall, in considering it,
1st. Examine the nature and extent of the judicial powers — and
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2d. Enquire, whether the courts who are to exercise them, are so constituted as to afford reasonable
ground of confidence, that they will exercise them for the general good.
~
Though I am not competent to give a perfect explanation of the powers granted to this department of
the government, I shall yet attempt to trace some of the leading features of it, from which I presume it
will appear, that they will operate to a total subversion of the state judiciaries, if not, to the legislative
authority of the states.
In article 3d, sect. 2d, it is said, "The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising
under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority, &c."
The first article to which this power extends, is, all cases in law and equity arising under this
constitution.
What latitude of construction this clause should receive, it is not easy to say. At first view, one would
suppose, that it meant no more than this, that the courts under the general government should exercise,
not only the powers of courts of law, but also that of courts of equity, in the manner in which those
powers are usually exercised in the different states. But this cannot be the meaning, because the next
clause authorises the courts to take cognizance of all cases in law and equity arising under the laws of
the United States; this last article, I conceive, conveys as much power to the general judicial as any of
the state courts possess.
The cases arising under the constitution must be different from those arising under the laws, or else the
two clauses mean exactly the same thing.
The cases arising under the constitution must include such, as bring into question its meaning, and will
require an explanation of the nature and extent of the powers of the different departments under it.
This article, therefore, vests the judicial with a power to resolve all questions that may arise on any case
on the construction of the constitution, either in law or in equity.
1st. They are authorised to determine all questions that may arise upon the meaning of the constitution
in law. This article vests the courts with authority to give the constitution a legal construction, or to
explain it according to the rules laid down for construing a law. — These rules give a certain degree of
latitude of explanation. According to this mode of construction, the courts are to give such meaning to
the constitution as comports best with the common, and generally received acceptation of the words in
which it is expressed, regarding their ordinary and popular use, rather than their grammatical
propriety. Where words are dubious, they will be explained by the context. The end of the clause will
be attended to, and the words will be understood, as having a view to it; and the words will not be so
understood as to bear no meaning or a very absurd one.
2d. The judicial are not only to decide questions arising upon the meaning of the constitution in law,
but also in equity.
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By this they are empowered, to explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it, without
being confined to the words or letter.
"From this method of interpreting laws (says Blackstone) by the reason of them, arises what we call
equity;" which is thus defined by Grotius, "the correction of that, wherein the law, by reason of its
universality, is deficient["]; for since in laws all cases cannot be foreseen, or expressed, it is necessary,
that when the decrees of the law cannot be applied to particular cases, there should some where be a
power vested of defining those circumstances, which had they been foreseen the legislator would have
expressed; and these are the cases, which according to Grotius, ["]lex non exacte definit, sed arbitrio
boni viri permittet."
The same learned author observes, "That equity, thus depending essentially upon each individual case,
there can be no established rules and fixed principles of equity laid down, without destroying its very
essence, and reducing it to a positive law."
From these remarks, the authority and business of the courts of law, under this clause, may be
understood.
They will give the sense of every article of the constitution, that may from time to time come before
them. And in their decisions they will not confine themselves to any fixed or established rules, but will
determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and spirit of the constitution. The opinions of
the supreme court, whatever they may be, will have the force of law; because there is no power
provided in the constitution, that can correct their errors, or controul their adjudications. From this
court there is no appeal. And I conceive the legislature themselves, cannot set aside a judgment of this
court, because they are authorised by the constitution to decide in the last resort. The legislature must
be controuled by the constitution, and not the constitution by them. They have therefore no more right
to set aside any judgment pronounced upon the construction of the constitution, than they have to take
from the president, the chief command of the army and navy, and commit it to some other person. The
reason is plain; the judicial and executive derive their authority from the same source, that the
legislature do theirs; and therefore in all cases, where the constitution does not make the one
responsible to, or controulable by the other, they are altogether independent of each other.
The judicial power will operate to effect, in the most certain, but yet silent and imperceptible manner,
what is evidently the tendency of the constitution: — I mean, an entire subversion of the legislative,
executive and judicial powers of the individual states. Every adjudication of the supreme court, on any
question that may arise upon the nature and extent of the general government, will affect the limits of
the state jurisdiction. In proportion as the former enlarge the exercise of their powers, will that of the
latter be restricted.
That the judicial power of the United States, will lean strongly in favour of the general government,
and will give such an explanation to the constitution, as will favour an extension of its jurisdiction, is
very evident from a variety of considerations.
1st. The constitution itself strongly countenances such a mode of construction. Most of the articles in
this system, which convey powers of any considerable importance, are conceived in general and
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indefinite terms, which are either equivocal, ambiguous, or which require long definitions to unfold the
extent of their meaning. The two most important powers committed to any government, those of
raising money, and of raising and keeping up troops, have already been considered, and shewn to be
unlimitted by any thing but the discretion of the legislature. The clause which vests the power to pass
all laws which are proper and necessary, to carry the powers given into execution, it has been shewn,
leaves the legislature at liberty, to do every thing, which in their judgment is best. It is said, I know, that
this clause confers no power on the legislature, which they would not have had without it — though I
believe this is not the fact, yet, admitting it to be, it implies that the constitution is not to receive an
explanation strictly, according to its letter; but more power is implied than is expressed. And this
clause, if it is to be considered, as explanatory of the extent of the powers given, rather than giving a
new power, is to be understood as declaring, that in construing any of the articles conveying power,
the spirit, intent and design of the clause, should be attended to, as well as the words in their common
acceptation.
This constitution gives sufficient colour for adopting an equitable construction, if we consider the great
end and design it professedly has in view — these appear from its preamble to be, "to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote
the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity." The design of this
system is here expressed, and it is proper to give such a meaning to the various parts, as will best
promote the accomplishment of the end; this idea suggests itself naturally upon reading the preamble,
and will countenance the court in giving the several articles such a sense, as will the most effectually
promote the ends the constitution had in view — how this manner of explaining the constitution will
operate in practice, shall be the subject of future enquiry.
2d. Not only will the constitution justify the courts in inclining to this mode of explaining it, but they
will be interested in using this latitude of interpretation. Every body of men invested with office are
tenacious of power; they feel interested, and hence it has become a kind of maxim, to hand down their
offices, with all its rights and privileges, unimpared to their successors; the same principle will
influence them to extend their power, and increase their rights; this of itself will operate strongly upon
the courts to give such a meaning to the constitution in all cases where it can possibly be done, as will
enlarge the sphere of their own authority. Every extension of the power of the general legislature, as
well as of the judicial powers, will increase the powers of the courts; and the dignity and importance of
the judges, will be in proportion to the extent and magnitude of the powers they exercise. I add, it is
highly probable the emolument of the judges will be increased, with the increase of the business they
will have to transact and its importance. From these considerations the judges will be interested to
extend the powers of the courts, and to construe the constitution as much as possible, in such a way as
to favour it; and that they will do it, appears probable.
3d. Because they will have precedent to plead, to justify them in it. It is well known, that the courts in
England, have by their own authority, extended their jurisdiction far beyond the limits set them in their
original institution, and by the laws of the land.
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The court of exchequer is a remarkable instance of this. It was originally intended principally to recover
the king's debts, and to order the revenues of the crown. It had a common law jurisdiction, which was
established merely for the benefit of the king's accomptants. We learn from Blackstone, that the
proceedings in this court are grounded on a writ called quo minus, in which the plaintiff suggests, that
he is the king's farmer or debtor, and that the defendant hath done him the damage complained of, by
which he is less able to pay the king. These suits, by the statute of Rutland, are expressly directed to be
confined to such matters as specially concern the king, or his ministers in the exchequer. And by the
articuli super cartas, it is enacted, that no common pleas be thenceforth held in the exchequer contrary
to the form of the great charter: but now any person may sue in the exchequer. The surmise of being
debtor to the king being matter of form, and mere words of course; and the court is open to all the
nation.
When the courts will have a precedent before them of a court which extended its jurisdiction in
opposition to an act of the legislature, is it not to be expected that they will extend theirs, especially
when there is nothing in the constitution expressly against it? and they are authorised to construe its
meaning, and are not under any controul?
This power in the judicial, will enable them to mould the government, into almost any shape they
please. — The manner in which this may be effected we will hereafter examine.
Brutus.
Brutus No. 12
In my last, I shewed, that the judicial power of the United States under the first clause of the second
section of article eight, would be authorized to explain the constitution, not only according to its letter,
but according to its spirit and intention; and having this power, they would strongly incline to give it
such a construction as to extend the powers of the general government, as much as possible, to the
diminution, and finally to the destruction, of that of the respective states.
I shall now proceed to shew how this power will operate in its exercise to effect these purposes. In
order to perceive the extent of its influence, I shall consider,
First. How it will tend to extend the legislative authority.
Second. In what manner it will increase the jurisdiction of the courts, and
Third. The way in which it will diminish, and destroy, both the legislative and judicial authority of the
United States.
First. Let us enquire how the judicial power will effect an extension of the legislative authority.
Perhaps the judicial power will not be able, by direct and positive decrees, ever to direct the legislature,
because it is not easy to conceive how a question can be brought before them in a course of legal
discussion, in which they can give a decision, declaring, that the legislature have certain powers which
they have not exercised, and which, in consequence of the determination of the judges, they will be
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bound to exercise. But it is easy to see, that in their adjudications they may establish certain principles,
which being received by the legislature, will enlarge the sphere of their power beyond all bounds.
It is to be observed, that the supreme court has the power, in the last resort, to determine all questions
that may arise in the course of legal discussion, on the meaning and construction of the constitution.
This power they will hold under the constitution, and independent of the legislature. The latter can no
more deprive the former of this right, than either of them, or both of them together, can take from the
president, with the advice of the senate, the power of making treaties, or appointing ambassadors.
In determining these questions, the court must and will assume certain principles, from which they will
reason, in forming their decisions. These principles, whatever they may be, when they become fixed, by
a course of decisions, will be adopted by the legislature, and will be the rule by which they will explain
their own powers. This appears evident from this consideration, that if the legislature pass laws, which,
in the judgment of the court, they are not authorised to do by the constitution, the court will not take
notice of them; for it will not be denied, that the constitution is the highest or supreme law. And the
courts are vested with the supreme and uncontroulable power, to determine, in all cases that come
before them, what the constitution means; they cannot, therefore, execute a law, which, in their
judgment, opposes the constitution, unless we can suppose they can make a superior law give way to
an inferior. The legislature, therefore, will not go over the limits by which the courts may adjudge they
are confined. And there is little room to doubt but that they will come up to those bounds, as often as
occasion and opportunity may offer, and they may judge it proper to do it. For as on the one hand, they
will not readily pass laws which they know the courts will not execute, so on the other, we may be sure
they will not scruple to pass such as they know they will give effect, as often as they may judge it
proper.
From these observations it appears, that the judgment of the judicial, on the constitution, will become
the rule to guide the legislature in their construction of their powers.
What the principles are, which the courts will adopt, it is impossible for us to say; but taking up the
powers as I have explained them in my last number, which they will possess under this clause, it is not
difficult to see, that they may, and probably will, be very liberal ones.
We have seen, that they will be authorized to give the constitution a construction according to its spirit
and reason, and not to confine themselves to its letter.
To discover the spirit of the constitution, it is of the first importance to attend to the principal ends and
designs it has in view. These are expressed in the preamble, in the following words, viz. "We, the
people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution," &c. If the end of the
government is to be learned from these words, which are clearly designed to declare it, it is obvious it
has in view every object which is embraced by any government. The preservation of internal peace —
the due administration of justice — and to provide for the defence of the community, seems to include
all the objects of government; but if they do not, they are certainly comprehended in the words, "to
provide for the general welfare." If it be further considered, that this constitution, if it is ratified, will
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not be a compact entered into by states, in their corporate capacities, but an agreement of the people of
the United States, as one great body politic, no doubt can remain, but that the great end of the
constitution, if it is to be collected from the preamble, in which its end is declared, is to constitute a
government which is to extend to every case for which any government is instituted, whether external
or internal. The courts, therefore, will establish this as a principle in expounding the constitution, and
will give every part of it such an explanation, as will give latitude to every department under it, to take
cognizance of every matter, not only that affects the general and national concerns of the union, but
also of such as relate to the administration of private justice, and to regulating the internal and local
affairs of the different parts.
Such a rule of exposition is not only consistent with the general spirit of the preamble, but it will stand
confirmed by considering more minutely the different clauses of it.
The first object declared to be in view is, "To form a perfect union." It is to be observed, it is not an
union of states or bodies corporate; had this been the case the existence of the state governments, might
have been secured. But it is a union of the people of the United States considered as one body, who are
to ratify this constitution, if it is adopted. Now to make a union of this kind perfect, it is necessary to
abolish all inferior governments, and to give the general one compleat legislative, executive and
judicial powers to every purpose. The courts therefore will establish it as a rule in explaining the
constitution to give it such a construction as will best tend to perfect the union or take from the state
governments every power of either making or executing laws. The second object is "to establish justice."
This must include not only the idea of instituting the rule of justice, or of making laws which shall be
the measure or rule of right, but also of providing for the application of this rule or of administering
justice under it. And under this the courts will in their decisions extend the power of the government to
all cases they possibly can, or otherwise they will be restricted in doing what appears to be the intent of
the constitution they should do, to wit, pass laws and provide for the execution of them, for the general
distribution of justice between man and man. Another end declared is "to insure domestic tranquility."
This comprehends a provision against all private breaches of the peace, as well as against all public
commotions or general insurrections; and to attain the object of this clause fully, the government must
exercise the power of passing laws on these subjects, as well as of appointing magistrates with
authority to execute them. And the courts will adopt these ideas in their expositions. I might proceed to
the other clause, in the preamble, and it would appear by a consideration of all of them separately, as it
does by taking them together, that if the spirit of this system is to be known from its declared end and
design in the preamble, its spirit is to subvert and abolish all the powers of the state government, and
to embrace every object to which any government extends.
As it sets out in the preamble with this declared intention, so it proceeds in the different parts with the
same idea. Any person, who will peruse the 8th section with attention, in which most of the powers are
enumerated, will perceive that they either expressly or by implication extend to almost every thing
about which any legislative power can be employed. But if this equitable mode of construction is
applied to this part of the constitution; nothing can stand before it.
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This will certainly give the first clause in that article a construction which I confess I think the most
natural and grammatical one, to authorise the Congress to do any thing which in their judgment will
tend to provide for the general welfare, and this amounts to the same thing as general and unlimited
powers of legislation in all cases.
(Part II)
This same manner of explaining the constitution, will fix a meaning, and a very important one too, to
the 12th [18th?] clause of the same section, which authorises the Congress to make all laws which shall
be proper and necessary for carrying into effect the foregoing powers, &c. A voluminous writer in
favor of this system, has taken great pains to convince the public, that this clause means nothing: for
that the same powers expressed in this, are implied in other parts of the constitution. Perhaps it is so,
but still this will undoubtedly be an excellent auxilliary to assist the courts to discover the spirit and
reason of the constitution, and when applied to any and every of the other clauses granting power, will
operate powerfully in extracting the spirit from them.
I might instance a number of clauses in the constitution, which, if explained in an equitable manner,
would extend the powers of the government to every case, and reduce the state legislatures to nothing;
but, I should draw out my remarks to an undue length, and I presume enough has been said to shew,
that the courts have sufficient ground in the exercise of this power, to determine, that the legislature
have no bounds set to them by this constitution, by any supposed right the legislatures of the
respective states may have, to regulate any of their local concerns.
I proceed, 2d, To inquire, in what manner this power will increase the jurisdiction of the courts.
I would here observe, that the judicial power extends, expressly, to all civil cases that may arise save
such as arise between citizens of the same state, with this exception to those of that description, that the
judicial of the United States have cognizance of cases between citizens of the same state, claiming lands
under grants of different states. Nothing more, therefore, is necessary to give the courts of law, under
this constitution, complete jurisdiction of all civil causes, but to comprehend cases between citizens of
the same state not included in the foregoing exception.
I presume there will be no difficulty in accomplishing this. Nothing more is necessary than to set forth,
in the process, that the party who brings the suit is a citizen of a different state from the one against
whom the suit is brought, and there can be little doubt but that the court will take cognizance of the
matter, and if they do, who is to restrain them?" Indeed, I will freely confess, that it is my decided
opinion, that the courts ought to take cognizance of such causes, under the powers of the constitution.
For one of the great ends of the constitution is, "to establish justice." This supposes that this cannot be
done under the existing governments of the states; and there is certainly as good reason why
individuals, living in the same state, should have justice, as those who live in different states.
Moreover, the constitution expressly declares, that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." It will therefore be no fiction, for a citizen of
one state to set forth, in a suit, that he is a citizen of another; for he that is entitled to all the privileges
and immunities of a country, is a citizen of that country. And in truth, the citizen of one state will,
under this constitution, be a citizen of every state.
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But supposing that the party, who alledges that he is a citizen of another state, has recourse to fiction in
bringing in his suit, it is well known, that the courts have high authority to plead, to justify them in
suffering actions to be brought before them by such fictions. In my last number I stated, that the court
of exchequer tried all causes in virtue of such a fiction. The court of king's bench, in England, extended
their jurisdiction in the same way. Originally, this court held pleas, in civil cases, only of trespasses and
other injuries alledged to be committed vi et armis. They might likewise, says Blackstone, upon the
division of the aula regia, have originally held pleas of any other civil action whatsoever (except in real
actions which are now very seldom in use) provided the defendant was an officer of the court, or in the
custody of the marshall or prison-keeper of this court, for breach of the peace, &c. In process of time, by
a fiction, this court began to hold pleas of any personal action whatsoever; it being surmised, that the
defendant has been arrested for a supposed trespass that "he has never committed, and being thus in
the custody of the marshall of the court, the plaintiff is at liberty to proceed against him, for any other
personal injury: which surmise of being in the marshall's custody, the defendant is not at liberty to
dispute." By a much less fiction, may the pleas of the courts of the United States extend to cases
between citizens of the same state. I shall add no more on this head, but proceed briefly to remark, in
what way this power will diminish and destroy both the legislative and judicial authority of the states.
It is obvious that these courts will have authority to decide upon the validity of the laws of any of the
states, in all cases where they come in question before them. Where the constitution gives the general
government exclusive jurisdiction, they will adjudge all laws made by the states, in such cases, void ab
initio. Where the constitution gives them concurrent jurisdiction, the laws of the United States must
prevail, because they are the supreme law. In such cases, therefore, the laws of the state legislatures
must be repealed, restricted, or so construed, as to give full effect to the laws of the union on the same
subject. From these remarks it is easy to see, that in proportion as the general government acquires
power and jurisdiction, by the liberal construction which the judges may give the constitution, will
those of the states lose its rights, until they become so trifling and unimportant, as not to be worth
having. I am much mistaken, if this system will not operate to effect this with as much celerity, as those
who have the administration of it will think prudent to suffer it. The remaining objections to the
judicial power shall be considered in a future paper.
Brutus.
Brutus No. 15
I said in my last number, that the supreme court under this constitution would be exalted above all
other power in the government, and subject to no controul. The business of this paper will be to
illustrate this, and to shew the danger that will result from it. I question whether the world ever saw, in
any period of it, a court of justice invested with such immense powers, and yet placed in a situation so
little responsible. Certain it is, that in England, and in the several states, where we have been taught to
believe, the courts of law are put upon the most prudent establishment, they are on a very different
footing.
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The judges in England, it is true, hold their offices during their good behaviour, but then their
determinations are subject to correction by the house of lords; and their power is by no means so
extensive as that of the proposed supreme court of the union. — I believe they in no instance assume
the authority to set aside an act of parliament under the idea that it is inconsistent with their
constitution. They consider themselves bound to decide according to the existing laws of the land, and
never undertake to controul them by adjudging that they are inconsistent with the constitution —
much less are they vested with the power of giving an equitableconstruction to the constitution.
The judges in England are under the controul of the legislature, for they are bound to determine
according to the laws passed by them. But the judges under this constitution will controul the
legislature, for the supreme court are authorised in the last resort, to determine what is the extent of the
powers of the Congress; they are to give the constitution an explanation, and there is no power above
them to set aside their judgment. The framers of this constitution appear to have followed that of the
British, in rendering the judges independent, by granting them their offices during good behaviour,
without following the constitution of England, in instituting a tribunal in which their errors may be
corrected; and without adverting to this, that the judicial under this system have a power which is
above the legislative, and which indeed transcends any power before given to a judicial by any free
government under heaven.
I do not object to the judges holding their commissions during good behaviour. I suppose it a proper
provision provided they were made properly responsible. But I say, this system has followed the
English government in this, while it has departed from almost every other principle of their
jurisprudence, under the idea, of rendering the judges independent; which, in the British constitution,
means no more than that they hold their places during good behaviour, and have fixed salaries, they
have made the judges independent, in the fullest sense of the word. There is no power above them, to
controul any of their decisions. There is no authority that can remove them, and they cannot be
controuled by the laws of the legislature. In short, they are independent of the people, of the legislature,
and of every power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves
independent of heaven itself. Before I proceed to illustrate the truth of these assertions, I beg liberty to
make one remark — Though in my opinion the judges ought to hold their offices during good
behaviour, yet I think it is clear, that the reasons in favour of this establishment of the judges in
England, do by no means apply to this country.
The great reason assigned, why the judges in Britain ought to be commissioned during good
behaviour, is this, that they may be placed in a situation, not to be influenced by the crown, to give
such decisions, as would tend to increase its powers and prerogatives. While the judges held their
places at the will and pleasure of the king, on whom they depended not only for their offices, but also
for their salaries, they were subject to every undue influence. If the crown wished to carry a favorite
point, to accomplish which the aid of the courts of law was necessary, the pleasure of the king would
be signified to the judges. And it required the spirit of a martyr, for the judges to determine contrary to
the king's will. — They were absolutely dependent upon him both for their offices and livings. The
king, holding his office during life, and transmitting it to his posterity as an inheritance, has much
stronger inducements to increase the prerogatives of his office than those who hold their offices for
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stated periods, or even for life. Hence the English nation gained a great point, in favour of liberty.
When they obtained the appointment of the judges, during good behaviour, they got from the crown a
concession, which deprived it of one of the most powerful engines with which it might enlarge the
boundaries of the royal prerogative and encroach on the liberties of the people. But these reasons do
not apply to this country, we have no hereditary monarch; those who appoint the judges do not hold
their offices for life, nor do they descend to their children. The same arguments, therefore, which will
conclude in favor of the tenor of the judge's offices for good behaviour, lose a considerable part of their
weight when applied to the state and condition of America. But much less can it be shewn, that the
nature of our government requires that the courts should be placed beyond all account more
independent, so much so as to be above controul.
I have said that the judges under this system will be independent in the strict sense of the word: To
prove this I will shew — That there is no power above them that can controul their decisions, or correct
their errors. There is no authority that can remove them from office for any errors or want of capacity,
or lower their salaries, and in many cases their power is superior to that of the legislature.
1st. There is no power above them that can correct their errors or controul their decisions — The
adjudications of this court are final and irreversible, for there is no court above them to which appeals
can lie, either in error or on the merits. — In this respect it differs from the courts in England, for there
the house of lords is the highest court, to whom appeals, in error, are carried from the highest of the
courts of law.
2d. They cannot be removed from office or suffer a dimunition of their salaries, for any error in
judgement or want of capacity.
It is expressly declared by the constitution, — "That they shall at stated times receive a compensation
for their services which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."
The only clause in the constitution which provides for the removal of the judges from office, is that
which declares, that "the president, vice-president, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors." By this paragraph, civil officers, in which the judges are included, are removable only
for crimes. Treason and bribery are named, and the rest are included under the general terms of high
crimes and misdemeanors. — Errors in judgement, or want of capacity to discharge the duties of the
office, can never be supposed to be included in these words, high crimes and misdemeanors. A man may
mistake a case in giving judgment, or manifest that he is incompetent to the discharge of the duties of a
judge, and yet give no evidence of corruption or want of integrity. To support the charge, it will be
necessary to give in evidence some facts that will shew, that the judges commited the error from
wicked and corrupt motives.
3d. The power of this court is in many cases superior to that of the legislature. I have shewed, in a
former paper, that this court will be authorised to decide upon the meaning of the constitution, and
that, not only according to the natural and ob[vious] meaning of the words, but also according to the
spirit and intention of it. In the exercise of this power they will not be subordinate to, but above the
legislature. For all the departments of this government will receive their powers, so far as they are
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expressed in the constitution, from the people immediately, who are the source of power. The
legislature can only exercise such powers as are given them by the constitution, they cannot assume
any of the rights annexed to the judicial, for this plain reason, that the same authority which vested the
legislature with their powers, vested the judicial with theirs — both are derived from the same source,
both therefore are equally valid, and the judicial hold their powers independently of the legislature, as
the legislature do of the judicial. — The supreme court then have a right, independent of the
legislature, to give a construction to the constitution and every part of it, and there is no power
provided in this system to correct their construction or do it away. If, therefore, the legislature pass any
laws, inconsistent with the sense the judges put upon the constitution, they will declare it void; and
therefore in this respect their power is superior to that of the legislature. In England the judges are not
only subject to have their decisions set aside by the house of lords, for error, but in cases where they
give an explanation to the laws or constitution of the country, contrary to the sense of the parliament,
though the parliament will not set aside the judgement of the court, yet, they have authority, by a new
law, to explain a former one, and by this means to prevent a reception of such decisions. But no such
power is in the legislature. The judges are supreme — and no law, explanatory of the constitution, will
be binding on them.
From the preceding remarks, which have been made on the judicial powers proposed in this system,
the policy of it may be fully developed.
I have, in the course of my observation on this constitution, affirmed and endeavored to shew, that it
was calculated to abolish entirely the state governments, and to melt down the states into one entire
government, for every purpose as well internal and local, as external and national. In this opinion the
opposers of the system have generally agreed — and this has been uniformly denied by its advocates in
public. Some individuals, indeed, among them, will confess, that it has this tendency, and scruple not
to say, it is what they wish; and I will venture to predict, without the spirit of prophecy, that if it is
adopted without amendments, or some such precautions as will ensure amendments immediately after
its adoption, that the same gentlemen who have employed their talents and abilities with such success
to influence the public mind to adopt this plan, will employ the same to persuade the people, that it
will be for their good to abolish the state governments as useless and burdensome.
Perhaps nothing could have been better conceived to facilitate the abolition of the state governments
than the constitution of the judicial. They will be able to extend the limits of the general government
gradually, and by insensible degrees, and to accomodate themselves to the temper of the people. Their
decisions on the meaning of the constitution will commonly take place in cases which arise between
individuals, with which the public will not be generally acquainted; one adjudication will form a
precedent to the next, and this to a following one. These cases will immediately affect individuals only;
so that a series of determinations will probably take place before even the people will be informed of
them. In the mean time all the art and address of those who wish for the change will be employed to
make converts to their opinion. The people will be told, that their state officers, and state legislatures
are a burden and expence without affording any solid advantage, for that all the laws passed by them,
might be equally well made by the general legislature. If to those who will be interested in the change,
be added, those who will be under their influence, and such who will submit to almost any change of
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government, which they can be persuaded to believe will ease them of taxes, it is easy to see, the party
who will favor the abolition of the state governments would be far from being inconsiderable. — In this
situation, the general legislature, might pass one law after another, extending the general and
abridging the state jurisdictions, and to sanction their proceedings would have a course of decisions of
the judicial to whom the constitution has committed the power of explaining the constitution. — If the
states remonstrated, the constitutional mode of deciding upon the validity of the law, is with the
supreme court, and neither people, nor state legislatures, nor the general legislature can remove them
or reverse their decrees.
Had the construction of the constitution been left with the legislature, they would have explained it at
their peril; if they exceed their powers, or sought to find, in the spirit of the constitution, more than was
expressed in the letter, the people from whom they derived their power could remove them, and do
themselves right; and indeed I can see no other remedy that the people can have against their rulers for
encroachments of this nature. A constitution is a compact of a people with their rulers; if the rulers
break the compact, the people have a right and ought to remove them and do themselves justice; but in
order to enable them to do this with the greater facility, those whom the people chuse at stated periods,
should have the power in the last resort to determine the sense of the compact; if they determine
contrary to the understanding of the people, an appeal will lie to the people at the period when the
rulers are to be elected, and they will have it in their power to remedy the evil; but when this power is
lodged in the hands of men independent of the people, and of their representatives, and who are not,
constitutionally, accountable for their opinions, no way is left to controul them but with a high hand and
an outstretched arm.
Brutus.
Brutus No. 16
When great and extraordinary powers are vested in any man, or body of men, which in their exercise,
may operate to the oppression of the people, it is of high importance that powerful checks should be
formed to prevent the abuse of it.
Perhaps no restraints are more forcible, than such as arise from responsibility to some superior power.
— Hence it is that the true policy of a republican government is, to frame it in such manner, that all
persons who are concerned in the government, are made accountable to some superior for their
conduct in office. — This responsibility should ultimately rest with the People. To have a government
well administered in all its parts, it is requisite the different departments of it should be separated and
lodged as much as may be in different hands. The legislative power should be in one body, the
executive in another, and the judicial in one different from either — But still each of these bodies
should be accountable for their conduct. Hence it is impracticable, perhaps, to maintain a perfect
distinction between these several departments — For it is difficult, if not impossible, to call to account
the several officers in government, without in some degree mixing the legislative and judicial. The
legislature in a free republic are chosen by the people at stated periods, and their responsibility
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consists, in their being amenable to the people. When the term, for which they are chosen, shall expire,
who will then have opportunity to displace them if they disapprove of their conduct — but it would be
improper that the judicial should be elective, because their business requires that they should possess a
degree of law knowledge, which is acquired only by a regular education, and besides it is fit that they
should be placed, in a certain degree in an independent situation, that they may maintain firmness and
steadiness in their decisions. As the people therefore ought not to elect the judges, they cannot be
amenable to them immediately, some other mode of amenability must therefore be devised for these, as
well as for all other officers which do not spring from the immediate choice of the people: this is to be
effected by making one court subordinate to another, and by giving them cognizance of the behaviour
of all officers; but on this plan we at last arrive at some supreme, over whom there is no power to
controul but the people themselves. This supreme controling power should be in the choice of the
people, or else you establish an authority independent, and not amenable at all, which is repugnant to
the principles of a free government. Agreeable to these principles I suppose the supreme judicial ought
to be liable to be called to account, for any misconduct, by some body of men, who depend upon the
people for their places; and so also should all other great officers in the State, who are not made
amenable to some superior officers. This policy seems in some measure to have been in view of the
framers of the new system, and to have given rise to the institution of a court of impeachments — How
far this Court will be properly qualified to execute the trust which will be reposed in them, will be the
business of a future paper to investigate. To prepare the way to do this, it shall be the business of this,
to make some remarks upon the constitution and powers of the Senate, with whom the power of trying
impeachments is lodged.
The following things may be observed with respect to the constitution of the Senate.
1st. They are to be elected by the legislatures of the States and not by the people, and each State is to be
represented by an equal number.
2d. They are to serve for six years, except that one third of those first chosen are to go out of office at
the expiration of two years, one third at the expiration of four years, and one third at the expiration of
six years, after which this rotation is to be preserved, but still every member will serve for the term of
six years.
3d. If vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any State, the
executive is authorised to make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature.
4. No person can be a senator who has not arrived to the age of thirty years, been nine years a citizen of
the United States, and who is not at the time he is elected an inhabitant of the State for which he is
elected.
The apportionment of members of Senate among the States is not according to numbers, or the
importance of the States; but is equal. This, on the plan of a consolidated government, is unequal and
improper; but is proper on the system of confederation — on this principle I approve of it. It is indeed
the only feature of any importance in the constitution of a confederated government. It was obtained
after a vigorous struggle of that part of the Convention who were in favor of preserving the state
governments. It is to be regretted, that they were not able to have infused other principles into the plan,
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to have secured the government of the respective states, and to have marked with sufficient precision
the line between them and the general government.
The term for which the senate are to be chosen, is in my judgment too long, and no provision being
made for a rotation will, I conceive, be of dangerous consequence.
It is difficult to fix the precise period for which the senate should be chosen. It is a matter of opinion,
and our sentiments on the matter must be formed, by attending to certain principles. Some of the duties
which are to be performed by the senate, seem evidently to point out the propriety of their term of
service being extended beyond the period of that of the assembly. Besides as they are designed to
represent the aristocracy of the country, it seems fit they should possess more stability, and so continue
a longer period than that branch who represent the democracy. The business of making treaties and
some other which it will be proper to commit to the senate, requires that they should have experience,
and therefore that they should remain some time in office to acquire it. — But still it is of equal
importance that they should not be so long in office as to be likely to forget the hand that formed them,
or be insensible of their interests. Men long in office are very apt to feel themselves independent [and]
to form and pursue interests separate from those who appointed them. And this is more likely to be the
case with the senate, as they will for the most part of the time be absent from the state they represent,
and associate with such company as will possess very little of the feelings of the middling class of
people. For it is to be remembered that there is to be a federal city, and the inhabitants of it will be the
great and the mighty of the earth. For these reasons I would shorten the term of their service to four
years. Six years is a long period for a man to be absent from his home, it would have a tendency to
wean him from his constituents.
A rotation in the senate, would also in my opinion be of great use. It is probable that senators once
chosen for a state will, as the system now stands, continue in office for life. The office will be honorable
if not lucrative. The persons who occupy it will probably wish to continue in it, and therefore use all
their influence and that of their friends to continue in office. — Their friends will be numerous and
powerful, for they will have it in their power to confer great favors; besides it will before long be
considered as disgraceful not to be re-elected. It will therefore be considered as a matter of delicacy to
the character of the senator not to return him again. — Every body acquainted with public affairs
knows how difficult it is to remove from office a person who is [has?] long been in it. It is seldom done
except in cases of gross misconduct. It is rare that want of competent ability procures it. To prevent this
inconvenience I conceive it would be wise to determine, that a senator should not be eligible after he
had served for the period assigned by the constitution for a certain number of years; perhaps three
would be sufficient. A farther benefit would be derived from such an arrangement; it would give
opportunity to bring forward a greater number of men to serve their country, and would return those,
who had served, to their state, and afford them the advantage of becoming better acquainted with the
condition and politics of their constituents. It farther appears to me proper, that the legislatures should
retain the right which they now hold under the confederation, of recalling their members. It seems an
evident dictate of reason, that when a person authorises another to do a piece of business for him, he
should retain the power to displace him, when he does not conduct according to his pleasure. This
power in the state legislatures, under confederation, has not been exercised to the injury of the
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government, nor do I see any danger of its being so exercised under the new system. It may operate
much to the public benefit.
These brief remarks are all I shall make on the organization of the senate. The powers with which they
are invested will require a more minute investigation.
This body will possess a strange mixture of legislative, executive and judicial powers, which in my
opinion will in some cases clash with each other.
1. They are one branch of the legislature, and in this respect will possess equal powers in all cases with
the house of representatives; for I consider the clause which gives the house of representatives the right
of originating bills for raising a revenue as merely nominal, seeing the senate be authorised to propose
or concur with amendments.
2. They are a branch of the executive in the appointment of ambassadors and public ministers, and in
the appointment of all other officers, not otherwise provided for; whether the forming of treaties, in
which they are joined with the president, appertains to the legislative or the executive part of the
government, or to neither, is not material.
3. They are part of the judicial, for they form the court of impeachments. It has been a long established
maxim, that the legislative, executive and judicial departments in government should be kept distinct.
It is said, I know, that this cannot be done. And therefore that this maxim is not just, or at least that it
should only extend to certain leading features in a government. I admit that this distinction cannot be
perfectly preserved. In a due ballanced government, it is perhaps absolutely necessary to give the
executive qualified legislative powers, and the legislative or a branch of them judicial powers in the last
resort. It may possibly also, in some special cases, be adviseable to associate the legislature, or a branch
of it, with the executive, in the exercise of acts of great national importance. But still the maxim is a
good one, and a separation of these powers should be sought as far as is practicable. I can scarcely
imagine that any of the advocates of the system will pretend, that it was necessary to accumulate all
these powers in the senate.
There is a propriety in the senate's possessing legislative powers; this is the principal end which should
be held in view in their appointment. I need not here repeat what has so often and ably been advanced
on the subject of a division of the legislative power into two branches — The arguments in favor of it I
think conclusive. But I think it equally evident, that a branch of the legislature should not be invested
with the power of appointing officers. This power in the senate is very improperly lodged for a number
of reasons — These shall be detailed in a future number.
Brutus.
Centinel No. 1
Friends, Countrymen and Fellow Citizens,
Permit one of yourselves to put you in mind of certain liberties and privileges secured to you by the
constitution of this commonwealth, and to beg your serious attention to his uninterested opinion upon
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the plan of federal government submitted to your consideration, before you surrender these great and
valuable privileges up forever. Your present frame of government, secures to you a right to hold
yourselves, houses, papers and possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants
granted without oaths or affirmations first made, affording sufficient foundation for them, whereby
any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search your houses or seize your persons
or property, not particularly described in such warrant, shall not be granted. Your constitution further
provides "that in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the parties
have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held sacred." It also provides and declares. "that the people
have a right of FREEDOM OF SPEECH, and of WRITING and PUBLISHING their sentiments, therefore THE
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS OUGHT NOT TO BE RESTRAINED. " The constitution of Pennsylvania
is yet in existence, as yet you have the right to freedom of speech, and of publishing your sentiments. How
long those rights will appertain to you, you yourselves are called upon to say, whether
your houses shall continue to be your castles; whether your papers, your persons and your property, are to
be held sacred and free from general warrants, you are now to determine. Whether the trial by jury is to
continue as your birth-right, the freemen of Pennsylvania, nay, of all America, are now called upon to
declare.
***
The late convention have submitted to your consideration a plan of a new federal government — The
subject is highly interesting to your future welfare — Whether it be calculated to promote the great
ends of civil society, viz. the happiness and prosperity of the community; it behoves you well to
consider, uninfluenced by the authority of names…. — All the blessings of liberty and the dearest
privileges of freemen, are now at stake and dependent on your present conduct.
***
Having premised this much, I shall now proceed to the examination of the proposed plan of
government, and I trust, shall make it appear to the meanest capacity, that it has none of the essential
requisites of a free government…
***
It will not be controverted that the legislative is the highest delegated power in government, and that
all others are subordinate to it. The celebrated Montesquieu establishes it as a maxim, that legislation
necessarily follows the power of taxation. By sect. 8, of the first article of the proposed plan of
government, "the Congress are to have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to
pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States, but all
duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States." Now what can be more
comprehensive than these words; not content by other sections of this plan, to grant all the great
executive powers of a confederation, and a STANDING ARMY IN TIME OF PEACE, that grand engine
of oppression, and moreover the absolute control over the commerce of the United States and all
external objects of revenue, such as unlimited imposts upon imports, etc. — they are to be vested with
every species of internal taxation; — whatever taxes, duties and excises that they may deem requisite
for the general welfare, may be imposed on the citizens of these states, levied by the officers of Congress,
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distributed through every district in America; and the collection would be enforced by the standing
army, however grievous or improper they may be. The Congress may construe every purpose for
which the state legislatures now lay taxes, to be for the general welfare, and thereby seize upon every
object of revenue.
The judicial power by 1st sect. of article 3 "shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their
authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of
admirality and maritime jurisdiction, to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, to
controversies between two or more states, between a state and citizens of another state, between
citizens of different states, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different
states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects."
***
To put the omnipotency of Congress over the state government and judicatories out of all doubt, the
6th article ordains that "this constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United
States, shall be thesupreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any
thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
***
If the foregoing be a just comment — if the United States are to be melted down into one empire, it
becomes you to consider, whether such a government, however constructed, would be eligible in so
extended a territory; and whether it would be practicable, consistent with freedom? It is the opinion of
the greatest writers, that a very extensive country cannot be governed on democratical principles, on
any other plan, than a confederation of a number of small republics, possessing all the powers of
internal government, but united in the management of their foreign and general concerns.
***
From this investigation into the organization of this government, it appears that it is devoid of all
responsibility or accountability to the great body of the people, and that so far from being a regular
balanced government, it would be in practice a permanent ARISTOCRACY.
The framers of it, actuated by the true spirit of such a government, which ever abominates and
suppresses all free enquiry and discussion, have made no provision for the liberty of the press that
grand palladium of freedom, and scourge of tyrants, but observed a total silence on that head. It is the
opinion of some great writers, that if the liberty of the press, by an institution of religion, or otherwise,
could be rendered sacred, even in Turkey, that despotism would fly before it. And it is worthy of
remark, that there is no declaration of personal rights, premised in most free constitutions; and that
trial by jury in civil cases is taken away;
***
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But our situation is represented to be so critically dreadful that, however reprehensible and
exceptionable the proposed plan of government may be, there is no alternative, between the adoption
of it and absolute ruin. — My fellow citizens, things are not at that crisis, it is the argument of tyrants;
the present distracted state of Europe secures us from injury on that quarter, and as to domestic
dissensions, we have not so much to fear from them, as to precipitate us into this form of government,
without it is a safe and a proper one. For remember, of all possible evils that of despotism is the worst and
the most to be dreaded.
***
Who's here so base, that would a bondsman be?
If any, speak; for him have I offended.
Who's here so vile, that will not love his country?
If any, speak; for him have I offended.
[Julius Caesar, Act 3, Scene 2 ]
Centinel.
Cato No. 5
Thomas Gordon
In my last number I endeavored to prove that the language of the article relative to the establishment of
the executive of this new government was vague and inexplicit, that the great powers of the President,
connected with his duration in office would lead to oppression and ruin. That he would be governed
by favorites and flatterers, or that a dangerous council would be collected from the great officers of
state, -- that the ten miles square, if the remarks of one of the wisest men, drawn from the experience of
mankind, may be credited, would be the asylum of the base, idle, avaricious and ambitious, and that
the court would possess a language and manners different from yours; that a vice president is as
unnecessary, as he is dangerous in his influence -- that the president cannot represent you because he is
not of your own immediate choice, that if you adopt this government, you will incline to an arbitrary
and odious aristocracy or monarchy the that the president possessed of the power, given him by this
frame of government differs but very immaterially from the establishment of monarchy in Great
Britain, and I warned you to beware of the fallacious resemblance that is held out to you by the
advocates of this new system between it and your own state governments.
And here I cannot help remarking, that inexplicitness seems to pervade this whole political fabric:
certainty in political compacts, which Mr. Coke calls the mother and nurse of repose and quietness, the want
of which induced men to engage in political society, has ever been held by a wise and free people as
essential to their security; as, on the one hand it fixes barriers which the ambitious and tyrannically
disposed magistrate dare not overleap, and on the other, becomes a wall of safety to the community -otherwise stipulations between the governors and governed are nugatory; and you might as well
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deposit the important powers of legislation and execution in one or a few and permit them to govern
according to their disposition and will; but the world is too full of examples, which prove that to live by
one man's will became the cause of all men's misery. Before the existence of express political compacts it
was reasonably implied that the magistrate should govern with wisdom and Justice, but mere
implication was too feeble to restrain the unbridled ambition of a bad man, or afford security against
negligence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind. It is alledged that the opinions and manners of the
people of America, are capable to resist and prevent an extension of prerogative or oppression; but you
must recollect that opinion and manners are mutable, and may not always be a permanent obstruction
against the encroachments of government; that the progress of a commercial society begets luxury, the
parent of inequality, the foe to virtue, and the enemy to restraint; and that ambition and
voluptuousness aided by flattery, will teach magistrates, where limits are not explicitly fixed to have
separate and distinct interests from the people, besides it will not be denied that government
assimilates the manners and opinions of the community to it. Therefore, a general presumption that
rulers will govern well is not a sufficient security. -- You are then under a sacred obligation to provide
for the safety of your posterity, and would you now basely desert their interests, when by a small share
of prudence you may transmit to them a beautiful political patrimony, that will prevent the necessity of
their travelling through seas of blood to obtain that, which your wisdom might have secured: -- It is a
duty you owe likewise to your own reputation, for you have a great name to lose; you are characterised
as cautious, prudent and jealous in politics; whence is it therefore, that you are about to precipitate
yourselves into a sea of uncertainty, and adopt a system so vague, and which has discarded so many of
your valuable rights. -- Is it because you do not believe that an American can be a tyrant? If this be the
case you rest on a weak basis; Americans are like other men in similar situations, when the manners
and opinions of the community are changed by the causes I mentioned before, and your political
compact inexplicit, your posterity will find that great power connected with ambition, luxury, and
flattery, will as readily produce a Caesar, Caligula, Nero, and Domitian in America, as the same causes
did in the Roman empire.
But the next thing to be considered in conformity to my plan, is the first article of this new government,
which comprises the erection of the house of representatives and senate, and prescribes their various
powers and objects of legislation. The most general objections to the first article, are that biennial
elections for representatives are a departure from the safe democratical principles- of annual ones -that the number of representatives are too few; that the apportionment and principles of increase are
unjust; that no attention has been paid to either the numbers or property in each state in forming the
senate; that the mode in which they are appointed and their duration, will lead to the establishment of
an aristocracy; that the senate and president are improperly connected, both as to appointments, and
the making of treaties, which are to become the supreme law of the land; that the judicial in some
measure, to-wit, as to the trial of impeachments, is placed in the senate, a branch of the legislative, and
some times a branch of the executive: that Congress have the improper power of making or altering the
regulations prescribed by the different legislatures, respecting the time, place, and manner of holding
elections for representatives, and the time and manner of choosing senators; that standing armies may
be established, and appropriation of money made for their support for two years; that the militia of the
most remote state may be marched into those states situated at the opposite extreme of this continent;
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that the slave trade is, to all intents and purposes permanently established; and a slavish capitation, or
poll-tax, may at any time be levied -- these are some of the many evils that will attend the adoption of
this government.
But with respect to the first objection, it may be remarked that a well digested democracy has this
advantage over all others, to wit, that it affords to many the opportunity to be advanced to the supreme
command, and the honors they thereby enjoy fill them with a desire of rendering themselves worthy of
them; hence this desire becomes part of their education, is matured m manhood, and produces an
ardent affection for their country, and it is the opinion of the great Sidney, and Montesquieu that this is
in a great measure produced by annual election of magistrates.
If annual elections were to exist in this government, and learning and information to become more
prevalent, you never will want men to execute whatever you could design -- Sidney observes "that a
well governed state is as fruitful to all good purposes as the seven headed serpent is said to have been
in evil; when one head is cut off, many rise up in the place of it." He remarks further, that "it was also
thought, that free cities by frequent elections of magistrates became nurseries of great and able men,
every man endeavoring to excel others, that he might be advanced to the honor he had no other title to,
than what might arise from his merit, or reputation," but the framers of this perfect government, as it is
called, have departed from this democratical principle, and established bi-ennial elections for the house
of representatives, who are to be chosen by the people, and sextennial for the senate, who are to be
chosen by the legislatures of the different states, and have given to the executive the unprecedented
power of making temporary senators, in case of vacancies, by resignation or otherwise, and so far forth
establishing a precedent for virtual representation (though in fact their original appointment is virtual)
thereby influencing the choice of the legislatures, or if they should not be so complaisant as to conform
to his appointment -- offence will be given to the executive and the temporary members will appear
ridiculous by rejection; this temporary member, during his time of appointment, will of course act by a
power derived from the executive, and for, and under his immediate influence.
It is a very important objection to this government, that the representation consists of so few; too few to
resist the influence of corruption, and the temptation to treachery, against which all governments ought
to take precautions -- how guarded you have been on this head, in your own state constitution, and yet
the number of senators and representatives proposed for this vast continent, does not equal those of
your own state; how great the disparity, if you compare them with the aggregate numbers in the
United States. The history of representation in England, from which we have taken our model of
legislation, is briefly this: before the institution of legislating by deputies, the whole free part of the
community usually met for that purpose; when this became impossible by the increase of numbers the
community was divided into districts, from each of which was sent such a number of deputies as was a
complete representation of the various numbers and orders of citizens within them; but can it be
asserted with truth, that six men can be a complete and full representation of the numbers and various
orders of the people in this state? Another thing [that] may be suggested against the small number of
representatives is, that but few of you will have the chance of sharing even in this branch of the
legislature; and that the choice will be confined to a very few; the more complete it is, the better will
your interests be preserved, and the greater the opportunity you will have to participate in
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government, one of the principal securities of a free people; but this subject has been so ably and fully
treated by a writer under the signature of Brutus, that I shall content myself with referring you to him
thereon, reserving further observations on the other objections I have mentioned, for my future
numbers.
Cato.
CATO No. 45
Men are naturally equal, and none ever rose above the rest but by Force or Consent: No Man was ever
born above all the rest, nor below them all; and therefore there never was any Man in the World so
good or so bad, so high or so low, but he had his Fellow. Nature is a kind and benevolent Parent; she
constitutes no particular Favourites with Endowments and Privileges above the rest; but for the most
part sends all her Offspring into the World furnished with the Elements of Understanding and
Strength, to provide for themselves: She gives them Heads to consult their own Security, and Hands to
execute their own Counsels; and according to the Use that they make of their Faculties, and of the
Opportunities that they find, Degrees of Power and Names of Distinction grow amongst them, and
their natural Equality is lost.
Thus Nature, who is their Parent, deals with Men: But Fortune, who is their Nurse, is not so benevolent
and impartial; she acts wantonly and capriciously, often cruelly; and counterplotting Justice as well as
Nature, frequently sets the Fool above the wise Man, and the Best below the Worst.
And from hence it is, that the most Part of the World, attending much more to the noisy Conduct and
glaring Effects of Fortune, than to the quiet and regular Proceedings of Nature, are misled in their
Judgment upon this Subject: They confound Fortune with Nature, and too often ascribe to natural
Merit and Excellency the Works of Contrivance or Chance. This however, shews that Reason and
Equity run in our Heads, while we endeavour to find a just Cause for Things that are not just; and this
is the Source of the Reverence which we pay to Men whom Fortune sometimes lifts on high, though
Nature had placed them below. The Populace rarely see any Creature rise, but they find a Reason for it
in his Parts; when probably the true one will be found in his own Baseness, or another Man's Folly.
From the same Reasoning may be seen why it is, that, let who will be at the Head of a Party, he is
always extolled by his Party as superior to the rest of Mankind; and let who will be the first Man of his
Country, he will never fail being complimented by many as the first of his Species. But the Issue and
their own Behaviour constantly shew, that the highest are upon a Level with the rest, and often with
the lowest. Men that are high are almost ever seen in a false Light; the most Part see them at a great
Distance, and through a magnifying Medium; some are dazzled with their Splendor, many are awed by
their Power. Whatever appears shining or terrible, appears great, and is magnified by the Eye and the
Imagination.
That Nature has made Men equal, we know and feel; and when People come to think otherwise, there
is no Excess of Folly and Superstition which they may not be brought to practise. Thus they have made
Gods of dead Men, and paid divine Honours to many while they were yet living: They saw them to be
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but Men, yet they worshipped them as Gods. And even they who have not gone quite so far, have yet,
by their wild Notions of Inequality, done as much Mischief; they have made Men, and often wicked
Men, to be Vice-Gods; and then made God's Power (falsly so called) as irresistible in the Hands of Men
as in his own, and much more frightful.
It is evident to common Sense, that there ought to be no Inequality in Society, but for the Sake of
Society; but these Men have made one Man's Power and Will the Cause of all Men's Misery. They gave
him as far as they could the Power of God, without obliging him to practise the Mercy and Goodness of
God.
Those that think themselves furthest above the rest, are generally by their Education below them all.
They are debased by a Conceit of their Greatness: They trust to their Blood; which, speaking naturally,
gives them no Advantage; and neglect their Mind, which alone, by proper Improvements, sets one Man
above another. It is not Blood or Nature, but Art or Accident, which makes one Man excel
others. Aristotle, therefore, must either have been in Jest, when he said, that he, who naturally excelled
all others, ought to govern all; or said it to flatter his Pupil and Prince, Alexander the Great. It is certain,
that such a Man never yet was found in the World, and never will be found till the End of
it. Alexander himself, notwithstanding the Greatness of his Spirit, and his Conquests, had in his own
Army, and perhaps among the common Soldiers, Men naturally as great and brave as himself, and
many more wise.
Whoever pretends to be naturally superior to other Men, claims from Nature what she never gave to
any Man. He sets up for being more than a Man; a Character with which Nature has nothing to do. She
has thrown her Gifts in common amongst us; and as the highest Offices of Nature fall to the Share of
the Mean as well as of the Great, her vilest Offices are performed by the Great as well as by the Mean:
Death and Diseases are the Portion of Kings as well as of Clowns; and the Corpse of a Monarch is no
more exempted from Stench and Putrefaction, than the Corpse of a Slave.
Mors aequo pulsat pede.
[Pale Death with foot impartial knocks at poor men's hovels and princes' citadels.]
All the Arts and Endowments of Men to acquire Preeminence and Advantages over one another, are so
many Proofs and Confessions that they have not such Pre-eminence and Advantages from Nature; and
all their Pomp, Titles, and Wealth, are Means and Devices to make the World think that they who
possess them are superior in Merit to those that want them. But it is not much to the Glory of the upper
Part of Mankind, that their boasted and superior Merit is often the Work of Heralds, Artificers, and
Money; and that many derive their whole Stock of Fame from Ancestors, who lived an Age or many
Ages ago.
The first Founders of great Families were not always Men of Virtue or Parts; and where they were so,
those that came after them did frequently, and almost generally, by trusting to their Blood, disgrace
their Name. Such is the Folly of the World, and the Inconvenience of Society, to allow Men to be great
by Proxy! An Evil that can scarce ever be cured. The Race of French Kings, called by their Historians in
Contempt, Les Rois faineants and the Succession of the Roman Caesars, (in both which, for one good
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Prince they had ten that were intolerable, either for Folly, or Cruelty, and often for both) might be
mentioned as known Proofs of the above Truth; and every Reader will find in his own Memory many
more.
I have been told of a Prince, who, while yet under Age, being reproved by his Governor for doing
Things ill or indecent, used to answer, Je suis Roy; I am King; as if his Quality had altered the Nature of
Things, and he himself had been better than other Men, while he acted worse. But he spoke from that
Spirit which had been instilled into him from his Cradle. I am King! What then, Sir? The Office of a King
is not to do Evil, but to prevent it. You have Royal Blood in your Veins: But the Blood of your Page is,
without being Royal, as good as yours; or, if you doubt, try the Difference in a Couple of Porringers
next Time you are ill; and learn from this Consideration and Experiment, that by Nature you are no
better than your People, though subject from your Fortune to be worse, as many of your Ancestors
have been.
If my Father got an Estate and Title by Law or the Sword, I may by Virtue of his Will or his Patent enjoy
his Acquisition; but if I understand neither Law nor the Sword, I can derive Honour from neither: My
Honour therefore is, in the Reason of Things purely nominal; and I am still by Nature a Plebeian, as all
Men are.
There is nothing moral in Blood, or in Title, or in Place: Actions only, and the Causes that produce
them, are moral. He therefore is best that does best. Noble Blood prevents neither Folly, nor Lunacy,
nor Crimes: but frequently begets or promotes them: And Noblemen, who act infamously, derive no
Honour from virtuous Ancestors, whom they dishonour. A Man who does base Things, is not noble;
nor great, if he do little Things: A sober Villager is a better Man than a debauched Lord; an honest
Mechanick than a Knavish Courtier.
. . . Nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prima mihi debes animi bona; sanctus haberi
Justitiacque tenax factis, dictisque mereris?
Juv. Sat. 8.
[Virtue is the only and sole real nobility. . . . You owe first the virtues of the mind-do you deserve to be accounted honest, and tenacious of justice, in word and deed?]
We cannot bring more natural Advantages into the World than other Men do; but we can acquire more
Virtue in it than we generally acquire. To be great is not in every Man's Power; but to be good is in the
Power of all: Thus far every Man may be [u]pon a Level with another, the Lowest with the Highest:
and Men might thus come to be morally as well as naturally equal.
Old Whig No. 5
November 1, 1787
MR. PRINTER, In order that people may be sufficiently impressed, with the necessity of establishing a
BILL OF RIGHTS in the forming of a new constitution, it is very proper to take a short view of some of
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those liberties, which it is of the greatest importance for Freemen to retain to themselves, when they
surrender up a part of their natural rights for the good of society.
The first of these, which it is of the utmost importance for the people to retain to themselves, which
indeed they have not even the right to surrender, and which at the same time it is of no kind of
advantages to government to strip them of, is the LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE. I know that a ready
answer is at hand, to any objections upon this head. We shall be told that in this enlightened age, the
rights of conscience are perfectly secure: There is no necessity of guarding them; for no man has the
remotest thoughts of invading them. If this be the case, I beg leave to reply that now is the very time to
secure them.—Wise and prudent men always take care to guard against danger beforehand, and to
make themselves safe whilst it is yet in their power to do it without inconvenience or risk.—who shall
answer for the ebbings and flowings of opinion, or be able to say what will be the fashionable frenzy of
the next generation? It would have been treated as a very ridiculous supposition, a year ago, that the
charge of witchcraft would cost a person her life in the city of Philadelphia; yet the fate of the unhappy
old woman called Corbmaker, who was beaten—repeatedly wounded with knives—mangled and at last
killed in our streets, in obedience to the commandment which requires “that we shall not suffer a witch
to live,” without a possibility of punishing or even of detecting the authors of this inhuman folly,
should be an example to warn us how little we ought to trust to the unrestrained discretion of human
nature.
Uniformity of opinion in science, morality, politics or religion, is undoubtedly a very great happiness to
mankind; and there have not been wanting zealous champions in every age, to promote the means of
securing so invaluable a blessing. If in America we have not lighted up fires to consume Heretics in
religion, if we have not persecuted unbelievers to promote the unity of the faith, in matters which
pertain to our final salvation in a future world, I think we have all of us been witness to something very
like the same spirit, in matters which are supposed to regard our political salvation in this world. In
Boston it seems at this very moment, that no man is permitted to publish a doubt of the infallibility of
the late convention, without giving up his name to the people, that he may be delivered over to speedy
destruction; and it is but a short time since the case was little better in this city. Now this is a portion of
the very same spirit, which has so often kindled the fires of the inquisition: and the same Zealot who
would hunt a man down for a difference of opinion upon a political question which is the subject of
public enquiry, if he should happen to be fired with zeal for a particular species of religion, would be
equally intolerant. The fact is, that human nature is still the same that ever it was: the fashion indeed
changes; but the seeds of superstition, bigotry and enthusiasm, are too deeply implanted in our minds,
ever to be eradicated; and fifty years hence, the French may renew the persecution of the Huguenots,
whilst the Spaniards in their turn may become indifferent to their forms of religion. They are idiots
who trust their future security to the whim of the present hour. One extreme is always apt to produce
the contrary, and those countries, which are now the most lax in their religious notions, may in a few
years become the most rigid, just as the people of this country from not being able to bear any
continental government at all, are now flying into the opposite extreme of surrendering up all the
powers of the different states, to one continental government.
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The more I reflect upon the history of mankind, the more I am disposed to think that it is our duty to
secure the essential rights of the people, by every precaution; for not an avenue has been left
unguarded, through which oppression could possibly enter in any government; without some enemy
of the public peace and happiness improving the opportunity to break in upon the liberties of the
people; and none have been more frequently successful in the attempt, than those who have covered
their ambitious designs under the garb of a fiery zeal for religious orthodoxy. What has happened in
other countries and in other ages, may very possibly happen again in our own country, and for aught
we know, before the present generation quits the stage of life. We ought therefore in a bill of rights to
secure, in the first place, by the most express stipulations, the sacred rights of conscience. Has this been
done in the constitution, which is now proposed for the consideration of the people of this country?—
Not a word on this subject has been mentioned in any part of it; but we are left in this important article,
as well as many others, entirely to the mercy of our future rulers.
But supposing our future rulers to be wicked enough to attempt to invade the rights of conscience; I
may be asked how will they be able to effect so horrible a design? I will tell you my friends—
The unlimited power of taxation will give them the command of all the treasures of the continent; a
standing army will be wholly at their devotion, and the authority which is given them over
the militia, by virtue of which they may, if they please, change all the officers of the militia on the
continent in one day, and put in new officers whom they can better trust; by which they can subject all
the militia to strict military laws, and punish the disobedient with death, or otherwise, as they shall
think right: by which they can march the militia back and forward from one end of the continent to the
other, at their discretion; these powers, if they should ever fall into bad hands, may be abused to the
worst of purposes. Let us instance one thing arising from this right of organizing and governing the
militia. Suppose a man alledges that he is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing Arms.—By the bill of
rights of Pennsylvania he is bound only to pay an equivalent for his personal service.—What is there in
the new proposed constitution to prevent his being dragged like a Prussian soldier to the camp and
there compelled to bear arms?—This will depend wholly upon the wisdom and discretion of the future
legislature of the continent in the framing their militia laws; and I have lived long enough to hear the
practice of commuting personal service for a paltry fine in time of war and foreign invasion most severely
reprobated by some persons who ought to have judged more rightly on the subject—Such flagrant
oppressions as these I dare say will not happen at the beginning of the new government; probably not
till the powers of government shall be firmly fixed; but it is a duty we owe to ourselves and our
posterity if possible to prevent their ever happening. I hope and trust that there are few persons at
present hardy enough to entertain thoughts of creating any religious establishment for this country;
although I have lately read a piece in the newspaper, which speaks of religious as well as civil and
military offices, as being hereafter to be disposed of by the new government; but if a majority of the
continental legislature should at any time think fit to establish a form of religion, for the good people of
this continent, with all the pains and penalties which in other countries are annexed to the
establishment of a national church, what is there in the proposed constitution to hinder their doing so?
Nothing; for we have no bill of rights, and every thing therefore is in their power and at their
discretion. And at whose discretion? We know not any more than we know the fates of those
generations which are yet unborn.
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It is needless to repeat the necessity of securing other personal rights in the forming a new government.
The same argument which proves the necessity of securing one of them shews also the necessity of
securing others. Without a bill of rights we are totally insecure in all of them; and no man can promise
himself with any degree of certainty that his posterity will enjoy the inestimable blessings of liberty of
conscience, of freedom of speech and of writing and publishing their thoughts on public matters, of
trial by jury, of holding themselves, their houses and papers free from seizure and search upon general
suspicion or general warrants; or in short that they will be secured in the enjoyment of life, liberty and
property without depending on the will and pleasure of their rulers.
If we pass over the consideration of this subject so essential to the preservation of our liberties, and turn
our eyes to the formof the government which the Convention have proposed to us, I apprehend that
changing the prospect will not wholly alleviate our fears.—A few words on this head, will close the
present letter. In the first place the office of President of the United States appears to me to be clothed
with such powers as are dangerous. To be the fountain of all honors in the United States, commander
in chief of the army, navy and militia, with the power of making treaties and of granting pardons, and
to be vested with an authority to put a negative upon all laws, unless two thirds of both houses shall
persist in enacting it, and put their names down upon calling the yeas and nays for that purpose, is in
reality to be a KING as much a King as the King of Great Britain, and a King too of the worst kind;—an
elective King.—If such powers as these are to be trusted in the hands of any man, they ought for the
sake of preserving the peace of the community at once to be made hereditary.—Much as I abhor kingly
government, yet I venture to pronounce where kings are admitted to rule they should most certainly be
vested with hereditary power. The election of a King whether it be in America or Poland, will be a
scene of horror and confusion; and I am perfectly serious when I declare that, as a friend to my country,
I shall despair of any happiness in the United States until this office is either reduced to a lower pitch of
power or made perpetual and hereditary.—When I say that our future President will be as much a king
as the king of Great-Britain, I only ask of my readers to look into the constitution of that country, and
then tell me what important prerogative the King of Great-Britain is entitled to, which does not also
belong to the President during his continuance in office.—The King of Great-Britain it is true can create
nobility which our President cannot; but our President will have the power of making all the great men,
which comes to the same thing.—All the difference is that we shall be embroiled in contention about
the choice of the man, whilst they are at peace under the security of an hereditary succession.—To be
tumbled headlong from the pinnacle of greatness and be reduced to a shadow of departed royalty is a
shock almost too great for human nature to endure. It will cost a man many struggles to resign such
eminent powers, and ere long, we shall find, some one who will be very unwilling to part with them.—
Let us suppose this man to be a favorite with his army, and that they are unwilling to part with their
beloved commander in chief; or to make the thing familiar, let us suppose, a future President and
commander in chief adored by his army and the militia to as great a degree as our late illustrious
commander in chief; and we have only to suppose one thing more, that this man is without the virtue,
the moderation and love of liberty which possessed the mind of our late general, and this country will
be involved at once in war and tyranny. So far is it from its being improbable that the man who shall
hereafter be in a situation to make the attempt to perpetuate his own power, should want the virtues of
General Washington; that it is perhaps a chance of one hundred millions to one that the next age will
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not furnish an example of so disinterested a use of great power. We may also suppose, without
trespassing upon the bounds of probability, that this man may not have the means of supporting in
private life the dignity of his former station; that like Caesar, he may be at once ambitious and poor,
and deeply involved in debt.—Such a man would die a thousand deaths rather than sink from the
heights of splendor and power into obscurity and wretchedness. We are certainly about giving our
president too much or too little; and in the course of less than twenty years we shall find that we have
given him enough to enable him to take all. It would be infinitely more prudent to give him at once as
much as would content him, so that we might be able to retain the rest in peace; for if once power is
seized by violence not the least fragment of liberty will survive the shock. I would therefore advise my
country-men seriously to ask themselves this question;—Whether they are prepared TO RECEIVE A
KING? If they are to say at once, and make the kingly office hereditary; to frame a constitution that
should set bounds to his power, and, as far as possible secure the liberty of the subject. If we are not
prepared to receive a king, let us call another convention to revise the proposed constitution, and form it
anew on the principles of a confederacy of free republics; but by no means, under pretence of a
republic, to lay the foundation for a military government, which is the worst of all tyrannies.
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Part III – The History of American Politics:
Revolutions and returns
Washington’s First Inaugural Address
George Washington
April 30, 1789
Fellow Citizens of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Among the vicissitudes incident to life, no event could have filled me with greater anxieties than that of
which the notification was transmitted by your order, and received on the fourteenth day of the present
month. On the one hand, I was summoned by my Country, whose voice I can never hear but with
veneration and love, from a retreat which I had chosen with the fondest predilection, and, in my
flattering hopes, with an immutable decision, as the asylum of my declining years: a retreat which was
rendered every day more necessary as well as more dear to me, by the addition of habit to inclination,
and of frequent interruptions in my health to the gradual waste committed on it by time. On the other
hand, the magnitude and difficulty of the trust to which the voice of my Country called me, being
sufficient to awaken in the wisest and most experienced of her citizens, a distrustful scrutiny into his
qualifications, could not but overwhelm with dispondence, one, who, inheriting inferior endowments
from nature and unpractised in the duties of civil administration, ought to be peculiarly conscious of
his own deficiencies. In this conflict of emotions, all I dare aver, is, that it has been my faithful study to
collect my duty from a just appreciation of every circumstance, by which it might be affected. All I dare
hope, is, that, if in executing this task I have been too much swayed by a grateful remembrance of
former instances, or by an affectionate sensibility to this transcendent proof, of the confidence of my
fellow-citizens; and have thence too little consulted my incapacity as well as disinclination for the
weighty and untried cares before me; my error will be palliated by the motives which misled me, and
its consequences be judged by my Country, with some share of the partiality in which they originated.
Such being the impressions under which I have, in obedience to the public summons, repaired to the
present station; it would be peculiarly improper to omit in this first official Act, my fervent
supplications to that Almighty Being who rules over the Universe, who presides in the Councils of
Nations, and whose providential aids can supply every human defect, that his benediction may
consecrate to the liberties and happiness of the People of the United States, a Government instituted by
themselves for these essential purposes: and may enable every instrument employed in its
administration to execute with success, the functions allotted to his charge. In tendering this homage to
the Great Author of every public and private good I assure myself that it expresses your sentiments not
less than my own; nor those of my fellow-citizens at large, less than either. No People can be bound to
acknowledge and adore the invisible hand, which conducts the Affairs of men more than the People of
the United States. Every step, by which they have advanced to the character of an independent nation,
seems to have been distinguished by some token of providential agency. And in the important
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revolution just accomplished in the system of their United Government, the tranquil deliberations and
voluntary consent of so many distinct communities, from which the event has resulted, cannot be
compared with the means by which most Governments have been established, without some return of
pious gratitude along with an humble anticipation of the future blessings which the past seem to
presage. These reflections, arising out of the present crisis, have forced themselves too strongly on my
mind to be suppressed. You will join with me I trust in thinking, that there are none under the
influence of which, the proceedings of a new and free Government can more auspiciously commence.
By the article establishing the Executive Department, it is made the duty of the President "to
recommend to your consideration, such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." The
circumstances under which I now meet you, will acquit me from entering into that subject, farther than
to refer to the Great Constitutional Charter under which you are assembled; and which, in defining
your powers, designates the objects to which your attention is to be given. It will be more consistent
with those circumstances, and far more congenial with the feelings which actuate me, to substitute, in
place of a recommendation of particular measures, the tribute that is due to the talents, the rectitude,
and the patriotism which adorn the characters selected to devise and adopt them. In these honorable
qualifications, I behold the surest pledges, that as on one side, no local prejudices, or attachments; no
seperate views, nor party animosities, will misdirect the comprehensive and equal eye which ought to
watch over this great assemblage of communities and interests: so, on another, that the foundations of
our National policy will be laid in the pure and immutable principles of private morality; and the preeminence of a free Government, be exemplified by all the attributes which can win the affections of its
Citizens, and command the respect of the world.
I dwell on this prospect with every satisfaction which an ardent love for my Country can inspire: since
there is no truth more thoroughly established, than that there exists in the economy and course of
nature, an indissoluble union between virtue and happiness, between duty and advantage, between the
genuine maxims of an honest and magnanimous policy, and the solid rewards of public prosperity and
felicity: Since we ought to be no less persuaded that the propitious smiles of Heaven, can never be
expected on a nation that disregards the eternal rules of order and right, which Heaven itself has
ordained: And since the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty, and the destiny of the Republican
model of Government, are justly considered as deeply, perhaps as finally staked, on the experiment
entrusted to the hands of the American people.
Besides the ordinary objects submitted to your care, it will remain with your judgment to decide, how
far an exercise of the occasional power delegated by the Fifth article of the Constitution is rendered
expedient at the present juncture by the nature of objections which have been urged against the
System, or by the degree of inquietude which has given birth to them. Instead of undertaking particular
recommendations on this subject, in which I could be guided by no lights derived from official
opportunities, I shall again give way to my entire confidence in your discernment and pursuit of the
public good: For I assure myself that whilst you carefully avoid every alteration which might endanger
the benefits of an United and effective Government, or wh ich ought to await the future lessons of
experience; a reverence for the characteristic rights of freemen, and a regard for the public harmony,
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will sufficiently influence your deliberations on the question how far the former can be more
impregnably fortified, or the latter be safely and advantageously promoted.
To the preceeding observations I have one to add, which will be most properly addressed to the House
of Representatives. It concerns myself, and will therefore be as brief as possible. When I was first
honoured with a call into the Service of my Country, then on the eve of an arduous struggle for its
liberties, the light in which I contemplated my duty required that I should renounce every pecuniary
compensation. From this resolution I have in no instance departed. And being still under the
impressions which produced it, I must decline as inapplicable to myself, any share in the personal
emoluments, which may be indispensably included in a permanent provision for the Executive
Department; and must accordingly pray that the pecuniary estimates for the Station in which I am
placed, may, during my continuance in it, be limited to such actual expenditures as the public good
may be thought to require.
Having thus imported to you my sentiments, as they have been awakened by the occasion which
brings us together, I shall take my present leave; but not without resorting once more to the benign
parent of the human race, in humble supplication that since he has been pleased to favour the
American people, with opportunities for deliberating in perfect tranquility, and dispositions for
deciding with unparellelled unanimity on a form of Government, for the security of their Union, and
the advancement of their happiness; so his divine blessing may be equally conspicuous in the enlarged
views, the temperate consultations, and the wise measures on which the success of this Government
must depend.
Letter to the Hebrew Congregation at Newport
George Washington
1790
Gentlemen:
While I received with much satisfaction your address replete with expressions of esteem, I rejoice in the
opportunity of assuring you that I shall always retain grateful remembrance of the cordial welcome I
experienced on my visit to Newport from all classes of citizens.
The reflection on the days of difficulty and danger which are past is rendered the more sweet from a
consciousness that they are succeeded by days of uncommon prosperity and security.
If we have wisdom to make the best use of the advantages with which we are now favored, we cannot
fail, under the just administration of a good government, to become a great and happy people.
The citizens of the United States of America have a right to applaud themselves for having given to
mankind examples of an enlarged and liberal policy — a policy worthy of imitation. All possess alike
liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship.
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It is now no more that toleration is spoken of as if it were the indulgence of one class of people that
another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights, for, happily, the Government of the United
States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live
under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens in giving it on all occasions their
effectual support.
It would be inconsistent with the frankness of my character not to avow that I am pleased with your
favorable opinion of my administration and fervent wishes for my felicity.
May the children of the stock of Abraham who dwell in this land continue to merit and enjoy the good
will of the other inhabitants — while every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and fig tree and
there shall be none to make him afraid.
May the father of all mercies scatter light, and not darkness, upon our paths, and make us all in our
several vocations useful here, and in His own due time and way everlastingly happy.
G. Washington
Washington’s Farewell Address
George Washington
1796
Friends and Citizens:
The period for a new election of a citizen to administer the executive government of the United States
being not far distant, and the time actually arrived when your thoughts must be employed in
designating the person who is to be clothed with that important trust, it appears to me proper,
especially as it may conduce to a more distinct expression of the public voice, that I should now apprise
you of the resolution I have formed, to decline being considered among the number of those out of
whom a choice is to be made.
I beg you, at the same time, to do me the justice to be assured that this resolution has not been taken
without a strict regard to all the considerations appertaining to the relation which binds a dutiful
citizen to his country; and that in withdrawing the tender of service, which silence in my situation
might imply, I am influenced by no diminution of zeal for your future interest, no deficiency of grateful
respect for your past kindness, but am supported by a full conviction that the step is compatible with
both.
The acceptance of, and continuance hitherto in, the office to which your suffrages have twice called me
have been a uniform sacrifice of inclination to the opinion of duty and to a deference for what appeared
to be your desire. I constantly hoped that it would have been much earlier in my power, consistently
with motives which I was not at liberty to disregard, to return to that retirement from which I had been
reluctantly drawn. The strength of my inclination to do this, previous to the last election, had even led
to the preparation of an address to declare it to you; but mature reflection on the then perplexed and
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critical posture of our affairs with foreign nations, and the unanimous advice of persons entitled to my
confidence, impelled me to abandon the idea.
I rejoice that the state of your concerns, external as well as internal, no longer renders the pursuit of
inclination incompatible with the sentiment of duty or propriety, and am persuaded, whatever
partiality may be retained for my services, that, in the present circumstances of our country, you will
not disapprove my determination to retire.
The impressions with which I first undertook the arduous trust were explained on the proper occasion.
In the discharge of this trust, I will only say that I have, with good intentions, contributed towards the
organization and administration of the government the best exertions of which a very fallible judgment
was capable. Not unconscious in the outset of the inferiority of my qualifications, experience in my
own eyes, perhaps still more in the eyes of others, has strengthened the motives to diffidence of myself;
and every day the increasing weight of years admonishes me more and more that the shade of
retirement is as necessary to me as it will be welcome. Satisfied that if any circumstances have given
peculiar value to my services, they were temporary, I have the consolation to believe that, while choice
and prudence invite me to quit the political scene, patriotism does not forbid it.
In looking forward to the moment which is intended to terminate the career of my public life, my
feelings do not permit me to suspend the deep acknowledgment of that debt of gratitude which I owe
to my beloved country for the many honors it has conferred upon me; still more for the steadfast
confidence with which it has supported me; and for the opportunities I have thence enjoyed of
manifesting my inviolable attachment, by services faithful and persevering, though in usefulness
unequal to my zeal. If benefits have resulted to our country from these services, let it always be
remembered to your praise, and as an instructive example in our annals, that under circumstances in
which the passions, agitated in every direction, were liable to mislead, amidst appearances sometimes
dubious, vicissitudes of fortune often discouraging, in situations in which not unfrequently want of
success has countenanced the spirit of criticism, the constancy of your support was the essential prop of
the efforts, and a guarantee of the plans by which they were effected. Profoundly penetrated with this
idea, I shall carry it with me to my grave, as a strong incitement to unceasing vows that heaven may
continue to you the choicest tokens of its beneficence; that your union and brotherly affection may be
perpetual; that the free Constitution, which is the work of your hands, may be sacredly maintained;
that its administration in every department may be stamped with wisdom and virtue; that, in fine, the
happiness of the people of these States, under the auspices of liberty, may be made complete by so
careful a preservation and so prudent a use of this blessing as will acquire to them the glory of
recommending it to the applause, the affection, and adoption of every nation which is yet a stranger to
it.
Here, perhaps, I ought to stop. But a solicitude for your welfare, which cannot end but with my life,
and the apprehension of danger, natural to that solicitude, urge me, on an occasion like the present, to
offer to your solemn contemplation, and to recommend to your frequent review, some sentiments
which are the result of much reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which appear to me allimportant to the permanency of your felicity as a people. These will be offered to you with the more
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freedom, as you can only see in them the disinterested warnings of a parting friend, who can possibly
have no personal motive to bias his counsel. Nor can I forget, as an encouragement to it, your indulgent
reception of my sentiments on a former and not dissimilar occasion.
Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your hearts, no recommendation of mine is
necessary to fortify or confirm the attachment.
The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to you. It is justly so, for it
is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquility at home, your
peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so highly prize. But as it
is easy to foresee that, from different causes and from different quarters, much pains will be taken,
many artifices employed to weaken in your minds the conviction of this truth; as this is the point in
your political fortress against which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most
constantly and actively (though often covertly and insidiously) directed, it is of infinite moment that
you should properly estimate the immense value of your national union to your collective and
individual happiness; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attachment to it;
accustoming yourselves to think and speak of it as of the palladium of your political safety and
prosperity; watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety; discountenancing whatever may suggest
even a suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned; and indignantly frowning upon the first
dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred
ties which now link together the various parts.
For this you have every inducement of sympathy and interest. Citizens, by birth or choice, of a
common country, that country has a right to concentrate your affections. The name of American, which
belongs to you in your national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of patriotism more than any
appellation derived from local discriminations. With slight shades of difference, you have the same
religion, manners, habits, and political principles. You have in a common cause fought and triumphed
together; the independence and liberty you possess are the work of joint counsels, and joint efforts of
common dangers, sufferings, and successes.
But these considerations, however powerfully they address themselves to your sensibility, are greatly
outweighed by those which apply more immediately to your interest. Here every portion of our
country finds the most commanding motives for carefully guarding and preserving the union of the
whole.
The North, in an unrestrained intercourse with the South, protected by the equal laws of a common
government, finds in the productions of the latter great additional resources of maritime and
commercial enterprise and precious materials of manufacturing industry. The South, in the same
intercourse, benefiting by the agency of the North, sees its agriculture grow and its commerce expand.
Turning partly into its own channels the seamen of the North, it finds its particular navigation
invigorated; and, while it contributes, in different ways, to nourish and increase the general mass of the
national navigation, it looks forward to the protection of a maritime strength, to which itself is
unequally adapted. The East, in a like intercourse with the West, already finds, and in the progressive
improvement of interior communications by land and water, will more and more find a valuable vent
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for the commodities which it brings from abroad, or manufactures at home. The West derives from the
East supplies requisite to its growth and comfort, and, what is perhaps of still greater consequence, it
must of necessity owe the secure enjoyment of indispensable outlets for its own productions to the
weight, influence, and the future maritime strength of the Atlantic side of the Union, directed by an
indissoluble community of interest as one nation. Any other tenure by which the West can hold this
essential advantage, whether derived from its own separate strength, or from an apostate and
unnatural connection with any foreign power, must be intrinsically precarious.
While, then, every part of our country thus feels an immediate and particular interest in union, all the
parts combined cannot fail to find in the united mass of means and efforts greater strength, greater
resource, proportionably greater security from external danger, a less frequent interruption of their
peace by foreign nations; and, what is of inestimable value, they must derive from union an exemption
from those broils and wars between themselves, which so frequently afflict neighboring countries not
tied together by the same governments, which their own rival ships alone would be sufficient to
produce, but which opposite foreign alliances, attachments, and intrigues would stimulate and
embitter. Hence, likewise, they will avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments
which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as
particularly hostile to republican liberty. In this sense it is that your union ought to be considered as a
main prop of your liberty, and that the love of the one ought to endear to you the preservation of the
other.
These considerations speak a persuasive language to every reflecting and virtuous mind, and exhibit
the continuance of the Union as a primary object of patriotic desire. Is there a doubt whether a common
government can embrace so large a sphere? Let experience solve it. To listen to mere speculation in
such a case were criminal. We are authorized to hope that a proper organization of the whole with the
auxiliary agency of governments for the respective subdivisions, will afford a happy issue to the
experiment. It is well worth a fair and full experiment. With such powerful and obvious motives to
union, affecting all parts of our country, while experience shall not have demonstrated its
impracticability, there will always be reason to distrust the patriotism of those who in any quarter may
endeavor to weaken its bands.
In contemplating the causes which may disturb our Union, it occurs as matter of serious concern that
any ground should have been furnished for characterizing parties by geographical discriminations,
Northern and Southern, Atlantic and Western; whence designing men may endeavor to excite a belief
that there is a real difference of local interests and views. One of the expedients of party to acquire
influence within particular districts is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other districts. You
cannot shield yourselves too much against the jealousies and heartburnings which spring from these
misrepresentations; they tend to render alien to each other those who ought to be bound together by
fraternal affection. The inhabitants of our Western country have lately had a useful lesson on this head;
they have seen, in the negotiation by the Executive, and in the unanimous ratification by the Senate, of
the treaty with Spain, and in the universal satisfaction at that event, throughout the United States, a
decisive proof how unfounded were the suspicions propagated among them of a policy in the General
Government and in the Atlantic States unfriendly to their interests in regard to the Mississippi; they
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have been witnesses to the formation of two treaties, that with Great Britain, and that with Spain,
which secure to them everything they could desire, in respect to our foreign relations, towards
confirming their prosperity. Will it not be their wisdom to rely for the preservation of these advantages
on the Union by which they were procured? Will they not henceforth be deaf to those advisers, if such
there are, who would sever them from their brethren and connect them with aliens?
To the efficacy and permanency of your Union, a government for the whole is indispensable. No
alliance, however strict, between the parts can be an adequate substitute; they must inevitably
experience the infractions and interruptions which all alliances in all times have experienced. Sensible
of this momentous truth, you have improved upon your first essay, by the adoption of a constitution of
government better calculated than your former for an intimate union, and for the efficacious
management of your common concerns. This government, the offspring of our own choice,
uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full investigation and mature deliberation, completely free in
its principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security with energy, and containing within
itself a provision for its own amendment, has a just claim to your confidence and your support. Respect
for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in its measures, are duties enjoined by the
fundamental maxims of true liberty. The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make
and to alter their constitutions of government. But the Constitution which at any time exists, till
changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very
idea of the power and the right of the people to establish government presupposes the duty of every
individual to obey the established government.
All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations, under whatever
plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation
and action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle, and of fatal
tendency. They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force; to put, in the
place of the delegated will of the nation the will of a party, often a small but artful and enterprising
minority of the community; and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the
public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than
the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by common counsels and modified by mutual
interests.
However combinations or associations of the above description may now and then answer popular
ends, they are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning,
ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp for
themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to
unjust dominion.
Towards the preservation of your government, and the permanency of your present happy state, it is
requisite, not only that you steadily discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged
authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however
specious the pretexts. One method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the Constitution,
alterations which will impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly
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overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at least
as necessary to fix the true character of governments as of other human institutions; that experience is
the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country; that
facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change, from
the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and remember, especially, that for the efficient
management of your common interests, in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much
vigor as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable. Liberty itself will find in such
a government, with powers properly distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is, indeed, little
else than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction, to confine
each member of the society within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure
and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property.
I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the State, with particular reference to the
founding of them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and
warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally.
This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the
human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or
repressed; but, in those of the popular form, it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst
enemy.
The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to
party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is
itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The
disorders and miseries which result gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in
the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able
or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on
the ruins of public liberty.
Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out
of sight), the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest
and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.
It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the
community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against
another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and
corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party
passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.
There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the
government and serve to keep alive the spirit of liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and
in governments of a monarchical cast, patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the
spirit of party. But in those of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to
be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for
every salutary purpose. And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be by force of
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public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to
prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume.
It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in those
entrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres,
avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit of
encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create,
whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power, and
proneness to abuse it, which predominates in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of
this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and
distributing it into different depositaries, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal against
invasions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; some of them in our
country and under our own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in the
opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular
wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there
be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the
customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly
overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit, which the use can at any time yield.
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are
indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should labor to
subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens.
The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could
not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked: Where is the
security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which
are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice ? And let us with caution indulge the
supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the
influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to
expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.
It is substantially true that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule,
indeed, extends with more or less force to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere
friend to it can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric?
Promote then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge.
In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public
opinion should be enlightened.
As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public credit. One method of preserving it
is to use it as sparingly as possible, avoiding occasions of expense by cultivating peace, but
remembering also that timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater
disbursements to repel it, avoiding likewise the accumulation of debt, not only by shunning occasions
of expense, but by vigorous exertion in time of peace to discharge the debts which unavoidable wars
may have occasioned, not ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burden which we ourselves
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ought to bear. The execution of these maxims belongs to your representatives, but it is necessary that
public opinion should co-operate. To facilitate to them the performance of their duty, it is essential that
you should practically bear in mind that towards the payment of debts there must be revenue; that to
have revenue there must be taxes; that no taxes can be devised which are not more or less inconvenient
and unpleasant; that the intrinsic embarrassment, inseparable from the selection of the proper objects
(which is always a choice of difficulties), ought to be a decisive motive for a candid construction of the
conduct of the government in making it, and for a spirit of acquiescence in the measures for obtaining
revenue, which the public exigencies may at any time dictate.
Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and
morality enjoin this conduct; and can it be, that good policy does not equally enjoin it - It will be
worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the
magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.
Who can doubt that, in the course of time and things, the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any
temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it? Can it be that Providence has
not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue? The experiment, at least, is
recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its
vices?
In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies
against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that, in place
of them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges
towards another a habitual hatred or a habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its
animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.
Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay
hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling
occasions of dispute occur. Hence, frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. The
nation, prompted by ill-will and resentment, sometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the
best calculations of policy. The government sometimes participates in the national propensity, and
adopts through passion what reason would reject; at other times it makes the animosity of the nation
subservient to projects of hostility instigated by pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious
motives. The peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty, of nations, has been the victim.
So likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for
the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real
common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a
participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification. It
leads also to concessions to the favorite nation of privileges denied to others which is apt doubly to
injure the nation making the concessions; by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been
retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill-will, and a disposition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal
privileges are withheld. And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote
themselves to the favorite nation), facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country,
without odium, sometimes even with popularity; gilding, with the appearances of a virtuous sense of
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obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base or
foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.
As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments are particularly alarming to the
truly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with
domestic factions, to practice the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the
public councils. Such an attachment of a small or weak towards a great and powerful nation dooms the
former to be the satellite of the latter.
Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the
jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign
influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But that jealousy to be useful must
be impartial; else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense
against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike of another cause those whom
they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on
the other. Real patriots who may resist the intrigues of the favorite are liable to become suspected and
odious, while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their
interests.
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to
have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed
engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary
interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent
controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be
unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the
ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.
Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain
one people under an efficient government. the period is not far off when we may defy material injury
from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at
any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility
of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may
choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.
Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign
ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and
prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I
mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity
to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that
honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their
genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.
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Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we
may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.
Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But
even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting
exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by
gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing (with powers so disposed, in
order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the government
to support them) conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual
opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied, as
experience and circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to
look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for
whatever it may accept under that character; that, by such acceptance, it may place itself in the
condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude
for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from
nation to nation. It is an illusion, which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard.
In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare not hope
they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish; that they will control the usual current
of the passions, or prevent our nation from running the course which has hitherto marked the destiny
of nations. But, if I may even flatter myself that they may be productive of some partial benefit, some
occasional good; that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against
the mischiefs of foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism; this hope
will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare, by which they have been dictated.
How far in the discharge of my official duties I have been guided by the principles which have been
delineated, the public records and other evidences of my conduct must witness to you and to the
world. To myself, the assurance of my own conscience is, that I have at least believed myself to be
guided by them.
In relation to the still subsisting war in Europe, my proclamation of the twenty-second of April, I793, is
the index of my plan. Sanctioned by your approving voice, and by that of your representatives in both
houses of Congress, the spirit of that measure has continually governed me, uninfluenced by any
attempts to deter or divert me from it.
After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could obtain, I was well satisfied that our
country, under all the circumstances of the case, had a right to take, and was bound in duty and
interest to take, a neutral position. Having taken it, I determined, as far as should depend upon me, to
maintain it, with moderation, perseverance, and firmness.
The considerations which respect the right to hold this conduct, it is not necessary on this occasion to
detail. I will only observe that, according to my understanding of the matter, that right, so far from
being denied by any of the belligerent powers, has been virtually admitted by all.
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The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without anything more, from the obligation
which justice and humanity impose on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain
inviolate the relations of peace and amity towards other nations.
The inducements of interest for observing that conduct will best be referred to your own reflections and
experience. With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle
and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength
and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.
Though, in reviewing the incidents of my administration, I am unconscious of intentional error, I am
nevertheless too sensible of my defects not to think it probable that I may have committed many errors.
Whatever they may be, I fervently beseech the Almighty to avert or mitigate the evils to which they
may tend. I shall also carry with me the hope that my country will never cease to view them with
indulgence; and that, after forty five years of my life dedicated to its service with an upright zeal, the
faults of incompetent abilities will be consigned to oblivion, as myself must soon be to the mansions of
rest.
Relying on its kindness in this as in other things, and actuated by that fervent love towards it, which is
so natural to a man who views in it the native soil of himself and his progenitors for several
generations, I anticipate with pleasing expectation that retreat in which I promise myself to realize,
without alloy, the sweet enjoyment of partaking, in the midst of my fellow-citizens, the benign
influence of good laws under a free government, the ever-favorite object of my heart, and the happy
reward, as I trust, of our mutual cares, labors, and dangers.
Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address
Thomas Jefferson
March 4, 1801
FRIENDS AND FELLOW-CITIZENS,
Called upon to undertake the duties of the first executive office of our country, I avail myself of the
presence of that portion of my fellow-citizens which is here assembled to express my grateful thanks
for the favor with which they have been pleased to look toward me, to declare a sincere consciousness
that the task is above my talents, and that I approach it with those anxious and awful presentiments
which the greatness of the charge and the weakness of my powers so justly inspire. A rising nation,
spread over a wide and fruitful land, traversing all the seas with the rich productions of their industry,
engaged in commerce with nations who feel power and forget right, advancing rapidly to destinies
beyond the reach of mortal eye -- when I contemplate these transcendent objects, and see the honor, the
happiness, and the hopes of this beloved country committed to the issue and the auspices of this day, I
shrink from the contemplation, and humble myself before the magnitude of the undertaking. Utterly,
indeed, should I despair did not the presence of many whom I here see remind me that in the other
high authorities provided by our Constitution I shall find resources of wisdom, of virtue, and of zeal on
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which to rely under all difficulties. To you, then, gentlemen, who are charged with the sovereign
functions of legislation, and to those associated with you, I look with encouragement for that guidance
and support which may enable us to steer with safety the vessel in which we are all embarked amidst
the conflicting elements of a troubled world.
During the contest of opinion through which we have passed the animation of discussions and of
exertions has sometimes worn an aspect which might impose on strangers unused to think freely and
to speak and to write what they think; but this being now decided by the voice of the nation,
announced according to the rules of the Constitution, all will, of course, arrange themselves under the
will of the law, and unite in common efforts for the common good. All, too, will bear in mind this
sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful
must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to
violate would be oppression. Let us, then, fellow-citizens, unite with one heart and one mind. Let us
restore to social intercourse that harmony and affection without which liberty and even life itself are
but dreary things. And let us reflect that, having banished from our land that religious intolerance
under which mankind so long bled and suffered, we have yet gained little if we countenance a political
intolerance as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecutions. During the throes
and convulsions of the ancient world, during the agonizing spasms of infuriated man, seeking through
blood and slaughter his long-lost liberty, it was not wonderful that the agitation of the billows should
reach even this distant and peaceful shore; that this should be more felt and feared by some and less by
others, and should divide opinions as to measures of safety. But every difference of opinion is not a
difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all
Republicans, we are all Federalists. If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or
to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error
of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. I know, indeed, that some honest
men fear that a republican government can not be strong, that this Government is not strong enough;
but would the honest patriot, in the full tide of successful experiment, abandon a government which
has so far kept us free and firm on the theoretic and visionary fear that this Government, the world's
best hope, may by possibility want energy to preserve itself? I trust not. I believe this, on the contrary,
the strongest Government on earth. I believe it the only one where every man, at the call of the law,
would fly to the standard of the law, and would meet invasions of the public order as his own personal
concern. Sometimes it is said that man can not be trusted with the government of himself. Can he, then,
be trusted with the government of others? Or have we found angels in the forms of kings to govern
him? Let history answer this question.
Let us, then, with courage and confidence pursue our own Federal and Republican principles, our
attachment to union and representative government. Kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean
from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe; too high-minded to endure the degradations
of the others; possessing a chosen country, with room enough for our descendants to the thousandth
and thousandth generation; entertaining a due sense of our equal right to the use of our own faculties,
to the acquisitions of our own industry, to honor and confidence from our fellow-citizens, resulting not
from birth, but from our actions and their sense of them; enlightened by a benign religion, professed,
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indeed, and practiced in various forms, yet all of them inculcating honesty, truth, temperance,
gratitude, and the love of man; acknowledging and adoring an overruling Providence, which by all its
dispensations proves that it delights in the happiness of man here and his greater happiness hereafter -with all these blessings, what more is necessary to make us a happy and a prosperous people? Still one
thing more, fellow-citizens -- a wise and frugal Government, which shall restrain men from injuring
one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and
improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of
good government, and this is necessary to close the circle of our felicities.
About to enter, fellow-citizens, on the exercise of duties which comprehend everything dear and
valuable to you, it is proper you should understand what I deem the essential principles of our
Government, and consequently those which ought to shape its Administration. I will compress them
within the narrowest compass they will bear, stating the general principle, but not all its limitations.
Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace,
commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none; the support of the
State governments in all their rights, as the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns
and the surest bulwarks against antirepublican tendencies; the preservation of the General Government
in its whole constitutional vigor, as the sheet anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad; a jealous
care of the right of election by the people -- a mild and safe corrective of abuses which are lopped by
the sword of revolution where peaceable remedies are unprovided; absolute acquiescence in the
decisions of the majority, the vital principle of republics, from which is no appeal but to force, the vital
principle and immediate parent of despotism; a well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace and
for the first moments of war till regulars may relieve them; the supremacy of the civil over the military
authority; economy in the public expense, that labor may be lightly burthened; the honest payment of
our debts and sacred preservation of the public faith; encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce
as its handmaid; the diffusion of information and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of the public
reason; freedom of religion; freedom of the press, and freedom of person under the protection of the
habeas corpus, and trial by juries impartially selected. These principles form the bright constellation
which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation. The
wisdom of our sages and blood of our heroes have been devoted to their attainment. They should be
the creed of our political faith, the text of civic instruction, the touchstone by which to try the services
of those we trust; and should we wander from them in moments of error or of alarm, let us hasten to
retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety.
I repair, then, fellow-citizens, to the post you have assigned me. With experience enough in
subordinate offices to have seen the difficulties of this the greatest of all, I have learnt to expect that it
will rarely fall to the lot of imperfect man to retire from this station with the reputation and the favor
which bring him into it. Without pretensions to that high confidence you reposed in our first and
greatest revolutionary character, whose preeminent services had entitled him to the first place in his
country's love and destined for him the fairest page in the volume of faithful history, I ask so much
confidence only as may give firmness and effect to the legal administration of your affairs. I shall often
go wrong through defect of judgment. When right, I shall often be thought wrong by those whose
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positions will not command a view of the whole ground. I ask your indulgence for my own errors,
which will never be intentional, and your support against the errors of others, who may condemn what
they would not if seen in all its parts. The approbation implied by your suffrage is a great consolation
to me for the past, and my future solicitude will be to retain the good opinion of those who have
bestowed it in advance, to conciliate that of others by doing them all the good in my power, and to be
instrumental to the happiness and freedom of all.
Relying, then, on the patronage of your good will, I advance with obedience to the work, ready to retire
from it whenever you become sensible how much better choice it is in your power to make. And may
that Infinite Power which rules the destinies of the universe lead our councils to what is best, and give
them a favorable issue for your peace and prosperity.
Northwest Ordinance
1787
An Ordinance for the government of the Territory of the United States northwest of the River Ohio.
Section 1. Be it ordained by the United States in Congress assembled, That the said territory, for the
purposes of temporary government, be one district, subject, however, to be divided into two districts,
as future circumstances may, in the opinion of Congress, make it expedient.
Sec 2. Be it ordained by the authority aforesaid, That the estates, both of resident and nonresident
proprietors in the said territory, dying intestate, shall descent to, and be distributed among their
children, and the descendants of a deceased child, in equal parts; the descendants of a deceased child or
grandchild to take the share of their deceased parent in equal parts among them: And where there shall
be no children or descendants, then in equal parts to the next of kin in equal degree; and among
collaterals, the children of a deceased brother or sister of the intestate shall have, in equal parts among
them, their deceased parents' share; and there shall in no case be a distinction between kindred of the
whole and half blood; saving, in all cases, to the widow of the intestate her third part of the real estate
for life, and one third part of the personal estate; and this law relative to descents and dower, shall
remain in full force until altered by the legislature of the district. And until the governor and judges
shall adopt laws as hereinafter mentioned, estates in the said territory may be devised or bequeathed
by wills in writing, signed and sealed by him or her in whom the estate may be (being of full age), and
attested by three witnesses; and real estates may be conveyed by lease and release, or bargain and sale,
signed, sealed and delivered by the person being of full age, in whom the estate may be, and attested
by two witnesses, provided such wills be duly proved, and such conveyances be acknowledged, or the
execution thereof duly proved, and be recorded within one year after proper magistrates, courts, and
registers shall be appointed for that purpose; and personal property may be transferred by delivery;
saving, however to the French and Canadian inhabitants, and other settlers of the Kaskaskies, St.
Vincents and the neighboring villages who have heretofore professed themselves citizens of Virginia,
their laws and customs now in force among them, relative to the descent and conveyance, of property.
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Sec. 3. Be it ordained by the authority aforesaid, That there shall be appointed from time to time by
Congress, a governor, whose commission shall continue in force for the term of three years, unless
sooner revoked by Congress; he shall reside in the district, and have a freehold estate therein in 1,000
acres of land, while in the exercise of his office.
Sec. 4. There shall be appointed from time to time by Congress, a secretary, whose commission shall
continue in force for four years unless sooner revoked; he shall reside in the district, and have a
freehold estate therein in 500 acres of land, while in the exercise of his office. It shall be his duty to keep
and preserve the acts and laws passed by the legislature, and the public records of the district, and the
proceedings of the governor in his executive department, and transmit authentic copies of such acts
and proceedings, every six months, to the Secretary of Congress: There shall also be appointed a court
to consist of three judges, any two of whom to form a court, who shall have a common law jurisdiction,
and reside in the district, and have each therein a freehold estate in 500 acres of land while in the
exercise of their offices; and their commissions shall continue in force during good behavior.
Sec. 5. The governor and judges, or a majority of them, shall adopt and publish in the district such laws
of the original States, criminal and civil, as may be necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the
district, and report them to Congress from time to time: which laws shall be in force in the district until
the organization of the General Assembly therein, unless disapproved of by Congress; but afterwards
the Legislature shall have authority to alter them as they shall think fit.
Sec. 6. The governor, for the time being, shall be commander in chief of the militia, appoint and
commission all officers in the same below the rank of general officers; all general officers shall be
appointed and commissioned by Congress.
Sec. 7. Previous to the organization of the general assembly, the governor shall appoint such
magistrates and other civil officers in each county or township, as he shall find necessary for the
preservation of the peace and good order in the same: After the general assembly shall be organized,
the powers and duties of the magistrates and other civil officers shall be regulated and defined by the
said assembly; but all magistrates and other civil officers not herein otherwise directed, shall during the
continuance of this temporary government, be appointed by the governor.
Sec. 8. For the prevention of crimes and injuries, the laws to be adopted or made shall have force in all
parts of the district, and for the execution of process, criminal and civil, the governor shall make proper
divisions thereof; and he shall proceed from time to time as circumstances may require, to lay out the
parts of the district in which the Indian titles shall have been extinguished, into counties and
townships, subject, however, to such alterations as may thereafter be made by the legislature.
Sec. 9. So soon as there shall be five thousand free male inhabitants of full age in the district, upon
giving proof thereof to the governor, they shall receive authority, with time and place, to elect a
representative from their counties or townships to represent them in the general assembly: Provided,
That, for every five hundred free male inhabitants, there shall be one representative, and so on
progressively with the number of free male inhabitants shall the right of representation increase, until
the number of representatives shall amount to twenty five; after which, the number and proportion of
representatives shall be regulated by the legislature: Provided, That no person be eligible or qualified to
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act as a representative unless he shall have been a citizen of one of the United States three years, and be
a resident in the district, or unless he shall have resided in the district three years; and, in either case,
shall likewise hold in his own right, in fee simple, two hundred acres of land within the same;
Provided, also, That a freehold in fifty acres of land in the district, having been a citizen of one of the
states, and being resident in the district, or the like freehold and two years residence in the district,
shall be necessary to qualify a man as an elector of a representative.
Sec. 10. The representatives thus elected, shall serve for the term of two years; and, in case of the death
of a representative, or removal from office, the governor shall issue a writ to the county or township for
which he was a member, to elect another in his stead, to serve for the residue of the term.
Sec. 11. The general assembly or legislature shall consist of the governor, legislative council, and a
house of representatives. The Legislative Council shall consist of five members, to continue in office
five years, unless sooner removed by Congress; any three of whom to be a quorum: and the members
of the Council shall be nominated and appointed in the following manner, to wit: As soon as
representatives shall be elected, the Governor shall appoint a time and place for them to meet together;
and, when met, they shall nominate ten persons, residents in the district, and each possessed of a
freehold in five hundred acres of land, and return their names to Congress; five of whom Congress
shall appoint and commission to serve as aforesaid; and, whenever a vacancy shall happen in the
council, by death or removal from office, the house of representatives shall nominate two persons,
qualified as aforesaid, for each vacancy, and return their names to Congress; one of whom congress
shall appoint and commission for the residue of the term. And every five years, four months at least
before the expiration of the time of service of the members of council, the said house shall nominate ten
persons, qualified as aforesaid, and return their names to Congress; five of whom Congress shall
appoint and commission to serve as members of the council five years, unless sooner removed. And the
governor, legislative council, and house of representatives, shall have authority to make laws in all
cases, for the good government of the district, not repugnant to the principles and articles in this
ordinance established and declared. And all bills, having passed by a majority in the house, and by a
majority in the council, shall be referred to the governor for his assent; but no bill, or legislative act
whatever, shall be of any force without his assent. The governor shall have power to convene,
prorogue, and dissolve the general assembly, when, in his opinion, it shall be expedient.
Sec. 12. The governor, judges, legislative council, secretary, and such other officers as Congress shall
appoint in the district, shall take an oath or affirmation of fidelity and of office; the governor before the
president of congress, and all other officers before the Governor. As soon as a legislature shall be
formed in the district, the council and house assembled in one room, shall have authority, by joint
ballot, to elect a delegate to Congress, who shall have a seat in Congress, with a right of debating but
not voting during this temporary government.
Sec. 13. And, for extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, which form the
basis whereon these republics, their laws and constitutions are erected; to fix and establish those
principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions, and governments, which forever hereafter shall be
formed in the said territory: to provide also for the establishment of States, and permanent government
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therein, and for their admission to a share in the federal councils on an equal footing with the original
States, at as early periods as may be consistent with the general interest:
Sec. 14. It is hereby ordained and declared by the authority aforesaid, That the following articles shall
be considered as articles of compact between the original States and the people and States in the said
territory and forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent, to wit:
Art. 1. No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on
account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments, in the said territory.
Art. 2. The inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to the benefits of the writ of habeas
corpus, and of the trial by jury; of a proportionate representation of the people in the legislature; and of
judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law. All persons shall be bailable, unless
for capital offenses, where the proof shall be evident or the presumption great. All fines shall be
moderate; and no cruel or unusual punishments shall be inflicted. No man shall be deprived of his
liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land; and, should the public
exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person's property, or to
demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same. And, in the just
preservation of rights and property, it is understood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made,
or have force in the said territory, that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private
contracts or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud, previously formed.
Art. 3. Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged. The utmost good faith shall
always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them
without their consent; and, in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or
disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and
humanity, shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for
preserving peace and friendship with them.
Art. 4. The said territory, and the States which may be formed therein, shall forever remain a part of
this Confederacy of the United States of America, subject to the Articles of Confederation, and to such
alterations therein as shall be constitutionally made; and to all the acts and ordinances of the United
States in Congress assembled, conformable thereto. The inhabitants and settlers in the said territory
shall be subject to pay a part of the federal debts contracted or to be contracted, and a proportional part
of the expenses of government, to be apportioned on them by Congress according to the same common
rule and measure by which apportionments thereof shall be made on the other States; and the taxes for
paying their proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the
district or districts, or new States, as in the original States, within the time agreed upon by the United
States in Congress assembled. The legislatures of those districts or new States, shall never interfere with
the primary disposal of the soil by the United States in Congress assembled, nor with any regulations
Congress may find necessary for securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers. No tax shall
be imposed on lands the property of the United States; and, in no case, shall nonresident proprietors be
taxed higher than residents. The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and
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the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways and forever free, as well to the
inhabitants of the said territory as to the citizens of the United States, and those of any other States that
may be admitted into the confederacy, without any tax, impost, or duty therefor.
Art. 5. There shall be formed in the said territory, not less than three nor more than five States; and the
boundaries of the States, as soon as Virginia shall alter her act of cession, and consent to the same, shall
become fixed and established as follows, to wit: The western State in the said territory, shall be
bounded by the Mississippi, the Ohio, and Wabash Rivers; a direct line drawn from the Wabash and
Post Vincents, due North, to the territorial line between the United States and Canada; and, by the said
territorial line, to the Lake of the Woods and Mississippi. The middle State shall be bounded by the said
direct line, the Wabash from Post Vincents to the Ohio, by the Ohio, by a direct line, drawn due north
from the mouth of the Great Miami, to the said territorial line, and by the said territorial line. The
eastern State shall be bounded by the last mentioned direct line, the Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the said
territorial line: Provided, however, and it is further understood and declared, that the boundaries of these
three States shall be subject so far to be altered, that, if Congress shall hereafter find it expedient, they
shall have authority to form one or two States in that part of the said territory which lies north of an
east and west line drawn through the southerly bend or extreme of Lake Michigan. And, whenever any
of the said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted, by its
delegates, into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States in all
respects whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitution and State
government: Provided, the constitution and government so to be formed, shall be republican, and in
conformity to the principles contained in these articles; and, so far as it can be consistent with the
general interest of the confederacy, such admission shall be allowed at an earlier period, and when
there may be a less number of free inhabitants in the State than sixty thousand.
Art. 6. There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in
the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted: Provided, always, That any
person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the
original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the person claiming his or her
labor or service as aforesaid.
Be it ordained by the authority aforesaid, That the resolutions of the 23rd of April, 1784, relative to the
subject of this ordinance, be, and the same are hereby repealed and declared null and void.
Done by the United States, in Congress assembled, the 13th day of July, in the year of our Lord 1787,
and of their soveriegnty and independence the twelfth.
“Socialism and Democracy”
Woodrow Wilson
Unpublished essay
1887
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Is it possible that in practical America we are becoming sentimentalists? To judge by much of our
periodical literature, one would think so. All resolution about great affairs seems now “sicklied o’er
with a pale cast of thought.” Our magazine writers smile sadly at the old-time optimism of their
country; are themselves full of forebodings; expend much force and enthusiasm and strong (as well as
weak) English style in disclosing social evils and economics bugbears; are moved by a fine sympathy
for the unfortunate and a fine anger against those who bring wrong upon their fellows: but where
amidst all these themes for the conscience is there a theme for the courage of the reader? Where are the
brave plans of reform which should follow such prologues?
No man with a heart can withhold sympathy from the laborer whose strength is wasted and whose
hope is thwarted in the service of the heartless and closefisted; but, then, no man with a head ought to
speak that sympathy in the public prints unless he have some manly, thought-out ways of betterment
to propose. One wearies easily, it must be confessed, of woful-warnings; one sighs often for a little tonic
of actual thinking grounded in sane, clear-sighted perception of what is possible to be done. Sentiment
is not despicable—it may be elevating and noble, it may be inspiring, and in some mental fields it is
self-sufficing—but when uttered concerning great social and political questions, it needs the addition of
practical initiative sense to keep it sweet and to prevent its becoming insipid.
I point these remarks particularly at current discussions of socialism, and principally of ‘state
socialism,’ which is almost the only form of socialism seriously discussed among us, outside the AntiPoverty Society. Is there not a plentiful lack of nerve and purpose in what we read and hear nowadays
on this momentous topic? One might be excused for taking and keeping the impression that there can
be no great need for the haste in the settlement of the questions mooted in connexion with it, inasmuch
as the debating of them has not yet passed beyond its rhetorical and pulpit stage. It is easy to make
socialism, as theoretically developed by the greater and saner socialistic writers, intelligible not only,
but even attractive, as a conception; it is easy also to render it a thing of fear to timorous minds, and to
make many signs of the times bear menace of it; the only hard task is to give it validity and strength as
a program in practical politics. Yet the whole interest of socialism for those whose thinking extends
beyond the covers of books and the paragraphs of periodicals lies in what it will mean in practice. It is a
question of practical politics, or else it is only a thesis for engaging discourse.
Even mere discourses, one would think, would be attracted to treat of the practical means of realizing
for society the principles of socialism, for much the most interesting and striking features of it emerge
only when its actual applications to concrete affairs are examined. These actual applications of it are the
part of it which is much the most worth talking about—even for those whose only object is to talk
effectively.
Roundly described, socialism is a proposition that every community, by means of whatever forms of
organization may be most effective for the purpose, see to it for itself that each one of its members finds
the employment for which he is best suited and is rewarded according to his diligence and merit, all
proper surroundings of moral influence being secured to him by the public authority. ‘State socialism’
is willing to act through state authority as it is at present organized. It proposes that all idea of a
limitation of public authority by individual rights be put out of view, and that the State consider itself
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bound to stop only at what is unwise or futile in its universal superintendence alike of individual and
of public interests. The thesis of the state socialist is, that no line can be drawn between private and
public affairs which the State may not cross at will; that omnipotence of legislation is the first postulate
of all just political theory.
Applied in a democratic state, such doctrine sounds radical, but not revolutionary. It is only an
acceptance of the extremest logical conclusions deducible from democratic principles long ago received
as respectable. For it is very clear that, in fundamental theory, socialism and democracy are almost, if
not quite, one and the same. They both rest at bottom upon the absolute right of the community to
determine its own destiny and that of its members. Men as communities are supreme over men as
individuals. Limits of wisdom and convenience to the public control there may be: limits of principle
there are, upon strict analysis, none.
It is of capital importance to note this substantial correspondence of fundamental conception as
between socialism and democracy: a whole system of practical politics may be erected upon it without
further foundation. The germinal conceptions of democracy are as free from all thought of a limitation
of the public authority as are the corresponding conceptions of socialism; the individual rights which
the democracy of our own century has actually observed, were suggested to it by a political Philosophy
radically individualistic, but not necessarily democratic. Democracy is bound by no principle of its own
nature to say itself nay as to the exercise of any power. Here, then, lies the point. The difference
between democracy and socialism is not an essential difference, but only a practical difference—is a
difference of organization and policy, not a difference of primary motive. Democracy has not
undertaken the tasks which socialists clamour to have undertaken; but it refrains from them, not for
lack of adequate principles or suitable motives, but for lack of adequate organization and suitable
hardihood: because it cannot see its way clear to accomplishing them with credit. Moreover it may be
said that democrats of today hold off from such undertakings because they are of today, and not of the
days, which history very well remembers, when government had the temerity to try everything. The
best thought of modern time having recognized a difference between social and political questions,
democratic government, like all other governments, seeks to confine itself to those political concerns
which have, in the eyes of the judicious, approved themselves appropriate to the sphere and capacity of
public authority.
The socialist does not disregard the obvious lessons of history concerning overwrought government: at
least he thinks he does not. He denies that he is urging the resumption of tasks which have been
repeatedly shown to be impossible. He points to the incontrovertible fact that the economic and social
conditions of life in our century are not only superficially but radically different from those of any
other time whatever. Many affairs of life which were once easily to be handled by individuals have
now become so entangled amongst the complexities of international trade relations, so confused by the
multiplicity of news-voices, or so hoisted into the winds of speculation that only powerful
combinations of wealth and influence can compass them. Corporations grow on every hand, and on
every hand not only swallow and overawe individuals but also compete with governments. The
contest is no longer between government and individuals; it is now between government and
dangerous combinations and individuals. Here is a monstrously changed aspect of the social world. In
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face of such circumstances, must not government lay aside all timid scruple and boldly make itself an
agency for social reform as well as for political control?
‘Yes,’ says the democrat, ‘perhaps it must. You know it is my principle, no less than yours, that every
man shall have an equal chance with every other man: if I saw my way to it as a practical politician, I
should be willing to go farther and superintend every man’s use of his chance. But the means? The
question with me is not whether the community has power to act as it may please in these matters, but
how it can act with practical advantage—a question of policy.’
A question of policy primarily, but also a question of organization, that is to say of administration.
“The Study of Administration”
Woodrow Wilson
Political Science Quarterly
July 1887
It is the object of administrative study to discover, first, what government can properly and
successfully do, and, secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency
and at the least possible cost either of money or of energy. On both these points there is obviously
much need of light among us; and only careful study can supply that light.
~
There is scarcely a single duty of government which was once simple which is not now complex;
government once had but a few masters; it now has scores of masters. Majorities formerly only
underwent government; they now conduct government. Where government once might follow the
whims of a court, it must now follow the views of a nation.
And those views are steadily widening to new conceptions of state duty; so that, at the same time that
the functions of government are everyday becoming more complex and difficult, they are also vastly
multiplying in number. Administration is everywhere putting its hands to new undertakings. The
utility, cheapness, and success of the government’s postal service, for instance, point towards the early
establishment of governmental control of the telegraph system. Or, even if our government is not to
follow the lead of the governments of Europe in buying or building both telegraph and railroad lines,
no one can doubt that in some way it must make itself master of masterful corporations. The creation of
national commissioners of railroads, in addition to the older state commissions, involves a very
important and delicate extension of administrative functions. Whatever hold of authority state or
federal governments are to take upon corporations, there must follow cares and responsibilities which
will require not a little wisdom, knowledge, and experience. Such things must be studied in order to be
well done. And these, as I have said, are only a few of the doors which are being opened to offices of
government.
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~
This is why there should be a science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of
government, to make its business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen and purify its organization, and to
crown its duties with dutifulness. This is one reason why there is such a science.
But where has this science grown up? Surely not on this side the sea. Not much impartial scientific
method is to be discerned in our administrative practices. The poisonous atmosphere of city
government, the crooked secrets of state administration, the confusion, sinecurism, and corruption ever
and again discovered in the bureaux at Washington forbid us to believe that any clear conceptions of
what constitutes good administration are as yet very widely current in the United States. No; American
writers have hitherto taken no very important part in the advancement of this science. It has found its
doctors in Europe. It is not of our making; it is a foreign science, speaking very little of the language of
English or American principle. It employs only foreign tongues; it utters none but what are to our
minds alien ideas. Its aims, its examples, its conditions, are almost exclusively grounded in the histories
of foreign races, in the precedents of foreign systems, in the lessons of foreign revolutions. It has been
developed by French and German professors, and is consequently in all parts adapted to the needs of a
compact state, and made to fit highly centralized forms of government; whereas, to answer our
purposes, it must be adapted, not to a simple and compact, but to a complex and multiform state, and
made to fit highly decentralized forms of government. If we would employ it, we must Americanize it,
and that not formally, in language merely, but radically, in thought, principle, and aim as well. It must
learn our constitutions by heart; must get the bureaucratic fever out of its veins; must inhale much free
American air.
If an explanation be sought why a science manifestly so susceptible of being made useful to all
governments alike should have received attention first in Europe, where government has long been a
monopoly, rather than in England or the United States, where government has long been a common
franchise, the reason will doubtless be found to be twofold: first, that in Europe, just because
government was independent of popular assent, there was more governing to be done; and, second,
that the desire to keep government a monopoly made the monopolists interested in discovering the
least irritating means of governing. They were, besides, few enough to adopt means promptly.
~
On this side the sea we, the while, had known no great difficulties of government. With a new country
in which there was room and remunerative employment for everybody, with liberal principles of
government and unlimited skill in practical politics, we were long exempted from the need of being
anxiously careful about plans and methods of administration. We have naturally been slow to see the
use or significance of those many volumes of learned research and painstaking examination into the
ways and means of conducting government which the presses of Europe have been sending to our
libraries. Like a lusty child, government with us has expanded in nature and grown great in stature,
but has also become awkward in movement. The vigor and increase of its life has been altogether out of
proportion to its skill in living. It has gained strength, but it has not acquired deportment. Great,
therefore, as has been our advantage over the countries of Europe in point of ease and health of
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constitutional development, now that the time for more careful administrative adjustments and larger
administrative knowledge has come to us, we are at a signal disadvantage as compared with the
transatlantic nations; and this for reasons which I shall try to make clear.
Judging by the constitutional histories of the chief nations of the modern world, there may be said to be
three periods of growth through which government has passed in all the most highly developed of
existing systems, and through which it promises to pass in all the rest. The first of these periods is that
of absolute rulers, and of an administrative system adapted to absolute rule; the second is that in which
constitutions are framed to do away with absolute rulers and substitute popular control, and in which
administration is neglected for these higher concerns; and the third is that in which the sovereign
people undertake to develop administration under this new constitution which has brought them into
power.
~
The English race… has long and successfully studied the art of curbing executive power to the constant
neglect of the art of perfecting executive methods. It has exercised itself much more in controlling than
in energizing government. It has been more concerned to render government just and moderate than to
make it facile, well-ordered, and effective. English and American political history has been a history,
not of administrative development, but of legislative oversight,—not of progress in governmental
organization, but of advance in law-making and political criticism. Consequently, we have reached a
time when administrative study and creation are imperatively necessary to the well-being of our
governments saddled with the habits of a long period of constitution-making. That period has
practically closed, so far as the establishment of essential principles is concerned, but we cannot shake
off its atmosphere. We go on criticizing when we ought to be creating. We have reached the third of the
periods I have mentioned,—the period, namely, when the people have to develop administration in
accordance with the constitutions they won for themselves in a previous period of struggle with
absolute power; but we are not prepared for the tasks of the new period.
~
In government, as in virtue, the hardest of things is to make progress. Formerly the reason for this was
that the single person who was sovereign was generally either selfish, ignorant, timid, or a fool,—albeit
there was now and again one who was wise. Nowadays the reason is that the many, the people, who
are sovereign have no single ear which one can approach, and are selfish, ignorant, timid, stubborn, or
foolish with the selfishness, the ignorances, the stubbornnesses, the timidities, or the follies of several
thousand persons,—albeit there are hundreds who are wise. Once the advantage of the reformer was
that the sovereign’s mind had a definite locality, that it was contained in one man’s head, and that
consequently it could be gotten at; though it was his disadvantage that the mind learned only
reluctantly or only in small quantities, or was under the influence of some one who let it learn only the
wrong things. Now, on the contrary, the reformer is bewildered by the fact that the sovereign’s mind
has no definite locality, but is contained in a voting majority of several million heads; and embarrassed
by the fact that the mind of this sovereign also is under the influence of favorites, who are none the less
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favorites in a good old-fashioned sense of the word because they are not persons by preconceived
opinions; i.e., prejudices which are not to be reasoned with because they are not the children of reason.
Wherever regard for public opinion is a first principle of government, practical reform must be slow
and all reform must be full of compromises. For wherever public opinion exists it must rule. This is
now an axiom half the world over, and will presently come to be believed even in Russia. Whoever
would effect a change in a modern constitutional government must first educate his fellow-citizens to
want some change. That done, he must persuade them to want the particular change he wants. He must
first make public opinion willing to listen and then see to it that it listen to the right things. He must stir
it up to search for an opinion, and then manage to put the right opinion in its way.
~
The object of administrative study is to rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of
empirical experiment and set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principle.
It is for this reason that we must regard civil-service reform in its present stages as but a prelude to a
fuller administrative reform. We are now rectifying methods of appointment; we must go on to adjust
executive functions more fitly and to prescribe better methods of executive organization and action.
Civil-service reform is thus but a moral preparation for what is to follow. It is clearing the moral
atmosphere of official life by establishing the sanctity of public office as a public trust, and, by making
service unpartisan, it is opening the way for making it businesslike. By sweetening its motives it is
rendering it capable of improving its methods of work.
~
And let me say that large powers and unhampered discretion seem to me the indispensable conditions
of responsibility. Public attention must be easily directed, in each case of good or bad administration, to
just the man deserving of praise or blame. There is no danger in power, if only it be not irresponsible. If
it be divided, dealt out in shares to many, it is obscured; and if it be obscured, it is made irresponsible.
But if it be centered in heads of the service and in heads of branches of the service, it is easily watched
and brought to book. If to keep his office a man must achieve open and honest success, and if at the
same time he feels himself entrusted with large freedom of discretion, the greater his power the less
likely is he to abuse it, the more is he nerved and sobered and elevated by it. The less his power, the
more safely obscure and unnoticed does he feel his position to be, and the more readily does he relapse
into remissness.
~
I know that a corps of civil servants prepared by a special schooling and drilled, after appointment,
into a perfected organization, with appropriate hierarchy and characteristic discipline, seems to a great
many very thoughtful persons to contain elements which might combine to make an offensive official
class,—a distinct, semi-corporate body with sympathies divorced from those of a progressive, freespirited people, and with hearts narrowed to the meanness of a bigoted officialism. Certainly such a
class would be altogether hateful and harmful in the United States. Any measure calculated to produce
it would for us be measures of reaction and of folly.
227
But to fear the creation of a domineering, illiberal officialism as a result of the studies I am here
proposing is to miss altogether the principle upon which I wish most to insist. That principle is, that
administration in the United States must be at all points sensitive to public opinion. A body of
thoroughly trained officials serving during good behavior we must have in any case: that is a plain
business necessity. But the apprehension that such a body will be anything un-American clears away
the moment it is asked. What is to constitute good behavior? For that question obviously carries its own
answer on its face. Steady, hearty allegiance to the policy of the government they serve will constitute
good behavior. That policy will have no taint of officialism about it. It will not be the creation of
permanent officials, but of statesmen whose responsibility to public opinion will be direct and
inevitable. Bureaucracy can exist only where the whole service of the state is removed from the
common political life of the people, its chiefs as well as its rank and file. Its motives, its objects, its
policy, its standards, must be bureaucratic. It would be difficult to point out any examples of impudent
exclusiveness and arbitrariness on the part of officials doing service under a chief of department who
really served the people, as all our chiefs of departments must be made to do. It would be easy, on the
other hand, to adduce other instances like that of the influence of Stein in Prussia, where the leadership
of one statesman imbued with true public spirit transformed arrogant and perfunctory bureaux into
public-spirited instruments of just government.
The ideal for us is a civil service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, and yet
so intimately connected with the popular thought, by means of elections and constant public counsel,
as to find arbitrariness of class spirit quite out of the question.
~
We can borrow the science of administration with safety and profit if only we read all fundamental
differences of condition into its essential tenets. We have only to filter it through our constitutions, only
to put it over a slow fire of criticism and distil away its foreign gases.
I know that there is a sneaking fear in some conscientiously patriotic minds that studies of European
systems might signalize some foreign methods as better than some American methods; and the fear is
easily to be understood. But it would scarcely be avowed in just any company.
It is the more necessary to insist upon thus putting away all prejudices against looking anywhere in the
world but at home for suggestions in this study, because nowhere else in the whole field of politics, it
would seem, can we make use of the historical, comparative method more safely than in this province
of administration.
~
Let it be noted that it is the distinction, already drawn, between administration and politics which
makes the comparative method so safe in the field of administration. When we study the
administrative systems of France and Germany, knowing that we are not in search
of political principles, we need not care a peppercorn for the constitutional or political reasons which
Frenchmen or Germans give for their practices when explaining them to us. If I see a murderous fellow
sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his
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probable intention to commit murder with it; and so, if I see a monarchist dyed in the wool managing a
public bureau well, I can learn his business methods without changing one of my republican spots. He
may serve his king; I will continue to serve the people; but I should like to serve my sovereign as well
as he serves his. By keeping this distinction in view,—that is, by studying administration as a means of
putting our own politics into convenient practice, as a means of making what is democratically politic
towards all administratively possible towards each,—we are on perfectly safe ground, and can learn
without error what foreign systems have to teach us. We thus devise an adjusting weight for our
comparative method of study. We can thus scrutinize the anatomy of foreign governments without fear
of getting any of their diseases into our veins; dissect alien systems without apprehension of bloodpoisoning.
“The Future of Liberalism”
John Dewey
Originally delivered as an address to the 24th annual meeting of the American Philosophical
Association on December 28, 1934 and then published in the journal School and Society on January 19,
1935
The emphasis of earlier liberalism upon individuality and liberty defines the focal points of discussion
of the philosophy of liberalism today. This earlier liberalism was itself an outgrowth, in the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of an earlier revolt against oligarchical government, one which
came to its culmination in the “glorious revolution” of 1688. The latter was fundamentally a demand
for freedom of the taxpayer from governmental arbitrary action, in connection with a demand for
confessional freedom in religion by the Protestant churches. In the new liberalism expressly so named,
demand for individual freedom of action came primarily from the rising industrial and trading class,
and was directed against restrictions placed by government, in legislation, common law and judicial
action (and other institutions having connection with the political state) upon freedom of economic
enterprise. In both cases, governmental action and the desired freedom were placed in antithesis to
each other. This way of conceiving liberty has persisted; it was strengthened in this country by the
revolt of the colonies and by pioneer conditions.
Nineteenth-century philosophic liberalism added, more or less because of its dominant economic
interest, the conception of natural laws to that of natural rights in the earlier Whig movement. There
are natural laws, it held, in social matters as well as in physical, and these natural laws are economic in
character. Political laws, on the other hand, are man-made and in that sense artificial. Governmental
intervention in industry and exchange was thus regarded as a violation not only of inherent individual
liberty but also of natural laws—of which supply and demand is a sample. The proper sphere of
governmental action was simply to prevent and to secure redress for infringement by one, in the
exercise of his liberty, of like and equal liberty of action by others.
229
Nevertheless, demand for freedom in initiation and conduct of business enterprise did not exhaust the
content of the earlier liberalism. In the minds of its chief promulgators there was included an equally
strenuous demand for liberty of mind: freedom of thought and its expression in speech, writing, print
and assemblage. The earlier interest in confessional freedom was generalized, and thereby deepened as
well as broadened. This demand was a product of the rational enlightenment of the eighteenth century
and of the growing importance of science. The great tide of reaction that set in after the defeat of
Napoleon, the demand for order and discipline, gave the agitation for freedom of thought and its
expression plenty of cause and plenty of opportunity.
The earlier liberal philosophy rendered valiant service. It finally succeeded in sweeping away,
especially in its home, Great Britain, an innumerable number of abuses and restrictions. The history of
social reforms in the nineteenth century is almost one with the history of liberal social thought. It is not,
then, from ingratitude that I shall emphasize its defects, for recognition of them is essential to an
intelligent statement of the elements of liberal philosophy for the present and any nearby future. The
fundamental defect was its lack of perception of historic relativity. This lack is expressed in the
conception of the individual as something given, complete in itself, and of liberty as a ready-made
possession of the individual, only needing the removal of external restrictions in order to manifest
itself. The individual of earlier liberalism was a Newtonian atom having only external time and space
relations to other individuals, save in that each social atom was equipped with inherent freedom. These
ideas might not have been especially harmful if they had been merely a rallying cry for practical
movements. But they formed part of a philosophy, and of a philosophy in which the particular ideas of
individuality and freedom were asserted to be absolute and eternal truths; good for all times and all
places.
This absolutism, this ignoring and denial of temporal relativity, is one great reason why the earlier
liberalism degenerated so easily into pseudo-liberalism. For the sake of saving time, I shall identify
what I mean by this spurious liberalism, the kind of social ideas represented by the “Liberty League”
and ex-President Hoover. I call it a pseudo-liberalism because it ossified and narrowed generous ideas
and aspirations. Even when words remain the same, they mean something very different when they
are uttered by a minority struggling against repressive measures, and when expressed by a group that
has attained power and then uses ideas that were once weapons of emancipation as instruments for
keeping the power and wealth they have obtained. Ideas that at one time are means of producing social
change have not the same meaning when they are used as means of preventing social change. This fact
is itself an illustration of historic relativity, and an evidence of the evil that lay in the assertion by
earlier liberalism of the immutable and eternal character of their ideas. Because of this latter fact,
the laissez fairedoctrine was held by the degenerate school of liberals to express the very order of nature
itself. The outcome was the degradation of the idea of individuality until in the minds of many who are
themselves struggling for a wider and fuller development of individuality, individualism has become a
term of hissing and reproach, while many can see no remedy for the evils that have come from the use
of socially unrestrained liberty in business enterprise, save change produced by violence. The historic
tendency to conceive the whole question of liberty as a matter in which individual and government are
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opposed parties has borne bitter fruit. Born of despotic government, it has continued to influence
thinking and action after government had become popular and in theory the servant of the people.
I pass now to what the philosophy of liberalism would be were its inheritance of absolutism
eliminated. In the first place, such liberalism knows that an individual is nothing fixed, given readymade. It is something achieved, and achieved not in isolation but with the aid and support of
conditions, cultural and physical: including in “cultural,” economic, legal and political institutions as
well as science and art. Liberalism knows that social conditions may restrict, distort and almost prevent
the development of individuality. It therefore takes an active interest in the working of social
institutions that have a bearing, positive or negative, upon the growth of individuals who shall be
rugged in fact and not merely in abstract theory. It is as much interested in the positive construction of
favorable institutions, legal, political and economic as it is in removing abuses and overt oppressions.
In the second place, liberalism is committed to the idea of historic relativity. It knows that the content
of the individual and freedom change with time; that this is as true of social change as it is of individual
development from infancy to maturity. The positive counterpart of opposition to doctrinal absolutism
is experimentalism. The connection between historic relativity and experimental method is intrinsic.
Time signifies change. The significance of individuality with respect to social policies alters with
change of the conditions in which individuals live. The earlier liberalism in being absolute was also
unhistoric. Underlying it there was a philosophy of history which assumed that history, like time in the
Newtonian scheme, means only modification of external relations; that it is quantitative not qualitative
and internal. The same thing is true of any theory that assumes, like the one usually attributed to Marx,
that temporal changes in society are inevitable—that is to say, are governed by a law that is not itself
historical. The fact is that the historicism and the evolutionism of nineteenth century doctrine were only
halfway doctrines. They assumed that historical and developmental processes were subject to some law
or formula outside temporal processes.
The commitment of liberalism to experimental procedure carries with it the idea of continuous
reconstruction of the ideas of individuality and of liberty, in their intimate connection with changes in
social relations. It is enough to refer to the changes in productivity and distribution since the time when
the earlier liberalism was formulated, and the effect of these transformations, due to science and
technology, upon the terms on which men associate together. An experimental method is the
recognition of this temporal change in ideas and policies so that the latter may coordinate with the
facts, instead of being opposed to them. Any other view maintains a rigid conceptualism, and implies
that facts should conform to concepts that are framed independently of temporal or historical change.
The two things essential, then, to thoroughgoing social liberalism are, first, realistic study of existing
conditions in their movement, and, secondly, leading ideas, in the form of policies, for dealing with
these conditions in the interest of increased individuality and liberty. The first requirement is so
obviously implied that I shall not elaborate it. The second point needs some amplification.
Experimental method is not just messing around nor doing a little of this and a little of that in the hope
that things will improve. Just as in the physical sciences, it implies a coherent body of ideas, a theory,
that gives direction to effort. What is implied, in contrast to every form of absolutism is that the ideas
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and theory be taken as methods of action tested and continuously revised by the consequences they
produce in actual social conditions. Since they are operational in nature, they modify conditions, while
the first requirement, that of basing policies upon realistic study of actual conditions, brings about their
continuous reconstruction.
It follows finally that there is no opposition in principle between liberalism as social philosophy and
radicalism in action, if by radicalism is signified the adoption of policies that bring about drastic,
instead of piecemeal, social change. It is all a question of what kind of procedures an intelligent study
of changing conditions discloses. These changes have been so tremendous in the last century, yes, in
the last forty years, that it looks to me as if radical methods were now necessary. But all that the
argument here requires is recognition of the fact that there is nothing in the nature of liberalism that
makes it a milk-water doctrine, committed to compromise and minor “reforms.” It is worth noting that
the earlier liberals were regarded in their day as subversive radicals.
What has been said should make it clear that the question of method in formation and execution of
policies is the central thing in liberalism. The method indicated is that of maximum reliance upon
intelligence. This fact determines its opposition to those forms of radicalism that place chief
dependence upon violent overthrow of existing institutions as the method of effecting desired social
change. A genuine liberal will emphasize as crucial the complete correlation between the means used
and the consequences that follow. The same principle which makes him aware that the means
employed by pseudo-liberalism only perpetuate and multiply the evils of existing conditions makes
him also aware that dependence upon sheer massed force, as the means of social change decides the
kind of consequences that actually result. Doctrines, whether proceeding from Mussolini or from Marx,
which assume that because certain ends are desirable therefore those ends and nothing else will result
from the use of force to attain them, is but another example of the limitations put upon intelligence by
any absolute theory. In the degree in which mere force is resorted to, actual consequences are
themselves so compromised that the ends originally in view have in fact to be worked out afterwards
by the method of experimental intelligence.
In saying this, I do not wish to be understood as meaning that radicals of the type mentioned have any
monopoly of the use of force. The contrary is the case. The reactionaries are in possession of force, in
not only the army and police, but in the press and the schools. The only reason they do not advocate
the use of force is the fact that they are already in possession of it, so that their policy is to cover up its
existence with idealistic phrases—of which their present use of the ideas of individual initiative and
liberty is a striking example.
These facts exemplify the essential evil of reliance upon sheer force. Action and reaction are physically
equal and in opposite direction and force as such is always physical. Dependence upon it on one side
always sooner or later calls out force on the other side. The whole problem of the intelligent use of force
is one too large to go into here. I can only say that when the forces in possession are so blind and
stubborn as to resist by force the free use of intelligence in effecting social change, they not only
encourage dependence upon the method of force in those who see the need of social change but they
give the latter its maximum of justification. The emphasis of liberalism upon liberty of inquiry,
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communication and organization does not commit it to unqualified pacifism but to the unremitting use
of every method of intelligence that conditions permit—and to search for all that are possible.
In conclusion, I wish to emphasize a point implied in the earlier discussion. The question of the
practical significance of liberty is much wider than that of the relation of government to the individual,
to say nothing of the monstrosity of the doctrine that assumes that under all conditions governmental
action and individual liberty are found in separate and independent spheres. Government is one factor
and an important one. But it comes into the picture only in relation to other matters. At present, these
other matters are economic and cultural. With respect to the first point, it is absurd to conceive liberty
as that of the business entrepreneur and ignore the immense regimentation to which workers are
subjected, intellectual as well as manual workers. As to the second point, the full freedom of the human
spirit and of individuality can be achieved only as there is effective opportunity to share in the cultural
resources of civilization. No economic state of affairs is merely economic. It has a profound effect upon
the presence or absence of cultural freedom. Any liberalism that does not make full cultural freedom
supreme and that does not see the relation between it and genuine industrial freedom as a way of life is
a degenerate and delusive liberalism.
Commonwealth Club Address
Franklin Delano Roosevelt
1932
I count it a privilege to be invited to address the Commonwealth Club. It has stood in the life of this
city and state, and it is perhaps accurate to add, the nation, as a group of citizen leaders interested in
fundamental problems of government, and chiefly concerned with achievement of progress in
government through non-partisan means. The privilege of addressing you, therefore, in the heat of a
political campaign, is great. I want to respond to your courtesy in terms consistent with your policy.
I want to speak not of politics but of government. I want to speak not of parties, but of universal
principles. They are not political, except in that larger sense in which a great American once expressed
a definition of politics, that nothing in all of human life is foreign to the science of politics...
The issue of government has always been whether individual men and women will have to serve some
system of government of economics, or whether a system of government and economics exists to serve
individual men and women. This question has persistently dominated the discussion of government
for many generations. On questions relating to these things men have differed, and for time
immemorial it is probable that honest men will continue to differ.
The final word belongs to no man; yet we can still believe in change and in progress. Democracy, as a
dear old friend of mine in Indian, Meredith Nicholson, has called it, is a quest, a never-ending seeking
for better things, and in the seeking for these things and the striving for better things, and in the
seeking for these things and the striving for them, there are many roads to follow. But, if we map the
course of these roads, we find that there are only two general directions.
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When we look about us, we are likely to forget how hard people have worked to win the privilege of
government. The growth of the national governments of Europe was a struggle for the development of
a centralized force in the nation, strong enough to impose peace upon ruling barons. In many instances
the victory of the central government, the creation of a strong central government, was a haven of
refuge to the individual. The people preferred the master far away to the exploitation and cruelty of the
smaller master near at hand.
But the creators of national government were perforce ruthless men. They were often cruel in their
methods, but they did strive steadily toward something that society needed and very much wanted, a
strong central state, able to keep the peace, to stamp out civil war, to put the unruly nobleman in his
place, and to permit the bulk of individuals to live safely. The man of ruthless force had his place in
developing a pioneer country, just as he did in fixing the power of the central government in the
development of nations. Society paid him well for his services and its development. When the
development among the nations of Europe, however, has been completed, ambition, and ruthlessness,
having served its term tended to overstep its mark.
There came a growing feeling that government was conducted for the benefit of a few who thrived
unduly at the expense of all. The people sought a balancing- a limiting force. There came gradually,
through town councils, trade guilds, national parliaments, by constitution and by popular participation
and control, limitations on arbitrary power.
Another factor that tended to limit the power of those who ruled, was the rise of the ethical conception
that a ruler bore a responsibility for the welfare of his subjects.
The American colonies were born in this struggle. The American Revolution was a turning point in it.
After the revolution the struggle continued and shaped itself in the public life of the country. There
were those who because they had seen the confusion which attended the years of war for American
independence surrendered to the belief that popular government was essentially dangerous and
essentially unworkable. They were honest people, my friends, and we cannot deny that their
experience had warranted some measure of fear. The most brilliant, honest and able exponent of this
point of view was Hamilton. He was too impatient of slow moving methods. Fundamentally he
believed that the safety of the republic lay in the autocratic strength of its government, that the destiny
of individuals was to serve that government, and that fundamentally a great and strong group of
central institutions, guided by a small group of able and public spirited citizens could best direct all
government.
But Mr. Jefferson, in the summer of 1776, after drafting the Declaration of Independence turned his
mind to the same problem and took a different view. He did not deceive himself with outward forms.
Government to him was a means to an end, not an end in itself; it might be either a refuge and a help or
a threat and a danger, depending on the circumstances. We find him carefully analyzing the society for
which he was to organize a government. “We have no paupers. The great mass of our population is of
laborers, our rich who cannot live without labor, either manual or professional, being few and of
moderate wealth. Most of the laboring class possess property, cultivate their own lands, have families
and from the demand for their labor, are enabled to exact from the rich and the competent such prices
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as enable them to feed abundantly, clothe above mere decency, to labor moderately and raise their
families.”
These people, he considered, had two sets of rights, those of “personal competency” and those
involved in acquiring and possessing property. By “personal competency” he meant the right of free
thinking, freedom of forming and expressing opinions, and freedom of personal living each man
according to his own lights. To insure the first set of rights, a government must so order its functions as
not to interfere with the individual. But even Jefferson realized that the exercise of the property rights
might so interfere with the rights of the individual that the government, without whose assistance the
property rights could not exist, must intervene, not to destroy individualism but to protect it.
You are familiar with the great political duel which followed, and how Hamilton, and his friends,
building towards a dominant centralized power were at length defeated in the great election of 1800,
by Mr. Jefferson’s party. Out of that duel came the two parties, Republican and Democratic, as we
know them today.
So began, in American political life, the new day, the day of the individual against the system, the day
in which individualism was made the great watchword of American life. The happiest of economic
conditions made that day long and splendid. On the Western frontier, land was substantially free. No
one, who did not shirk the task of earning a living, was entirely without opportunity to do so.
Depressions could, and did, come and go; but they could not alter the fundamental fact that most of the
people lived partly by selling their labor and partly by extracting their livelihood from the soil, so that
starvation and dislocation were practically impossible. At the very worst there was always the
possibility of climbing into a covered wagon and moving west where the untilled prairies afforded a
haven for men to whom the East did not provide a place. So great were our natural resources that we
could offer this relief not only to our own people, but to the distressed of all the world; we could invite
immigration from Europe, and welcome it with open arms. Traditionally, when a depression came, a
new section of land was opened in the West; and even our temporary misfortune served our manifest
destiny.
It was the middle of the 19th century that a new force was released and a new dream created. The force
was what is called the industrial revolution, the advance of steam and machinery and the rise of the
forerunners of the modern industrial plant. The dream was the dream of an economic machine, able to
raise the standard of living for everyone; to bring luxury within the reach of the humblest; to annihilate
distance by steam power and later by electricity, and to release everyone from the drudgery of the
heaviest manual toil. It was to be expected that this would necessarily affect government. Heretofore,
government had merely been called upon to produce conditions within which people could live
happily, labor peacefully, and rest secure. Now it was called upon to aid in the consummation of this
new dream. There was, however, a shadow over the dream. To be made real, it required use of the
talents of men of tremendous will, and tremendous ambition, since by no other force could the
problems of financing and engineering and new developments be brought to a consummation.
So manifest were the advantages of the machine age, however, that the United States fearlessly,
cheerfully, and, I think, rightly, accepted the bitter with the sweet. It was thought that no price was too
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high to pay for the advantages which we could draw from a finished industrial system. The history of
the last half century is accordingly in large measure a history of a group of financial Titans, whose
methods were not scrutinized with too much care, and who were honored in proportion as they
produced the results, irrespective of the means they used. The financiers who pushed the railroads to
the Pacific were always ruthless, we have them today. It has been estimated that the American investor
paid for the American railway system more than three times over in the process; but despite that fact
the net advantage was to the United States. As long as we had free land; as long as population was
growing by leaps and bounds; as long as our industrial plants were insufficient to supply our needs,
society chose to give the ambitious man free play and unlimited reward provided only that he
produced the economic plant so much desired.
During this period of expansion, there was equal opportunity for all and the business of government
was not to interfere but to assist in the development of industry. This was done at the request of
businessmen themselves. The tariff was originally imposed for the purpose of “fostering our infant
industry”, a phrase I think the older among you will remember as a political issue not so long ago. The
railroads were subsidized, sometimes by grants of money, oftener by grants of land; some of the most
valuable oil lands in the United States were granted to assist the financing of the railroad which pushed
through the Southwest. A nascent merchant marine was assisted by grants of money, or by mail
subsidies, so that our steam shipping might ply the seven seas. Some of my friends tell me that they do
not want the Government in business. With this I agree; but I wonder whether they realize the
implications of the past. For while it has been American doctrine that the government must not go into
business in competition with private enterprises, still it has been traditional particularly in Republican
administrations for business urgently to ask the government to put at private disposal all kinds of
government assistance.
The same man who tells you that he does not want to see the government interfere in business-and he
means it, and has plenty of good reasons for saying so-is the first to go to Washington and ask the
government for a prohibitory tariff on his product. When things get just bad enough-as they did two
years ago-he will go with equal speed to the United States government and ask for a loan; and the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation is the outcome of it. Each group has sought protection from the
government for its own special interest, without realizing that the function of government must be to
favor no small group at the expense of its duty to protect the rights of personal freedom and of private
property of all its citizens.
In retrospect we can now see that the turn of the tide came with the turn of the century. We were
reaching our last frontier; there was no more free land and our industrial combinations had become
great uncontrolled and irresponsible units of power within the state. Clear-sighted men saw with fear
the danger that opportunity would no longer be equal; that the growing corporation, like the feudal
baron of old, might threaten the economic freedom of individuals to earn a living. In that hour, our
antitrust laws were born. The cry was raised against the great corporations. Theodore Roosevelt, the
first great Republican progressive, fought a Presidential campaign on the issue of “trust busting” and
talked freely about malefactors of great wealth. If the government had a policy it was rather to turn the
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clock back, to destroy the large combinations and to return to the time when every man owned his
individual small business.
This was impossible; Theodore Roosevelt, abandoning the idea of “trust busting“, was forced to work
out a difference between “good” trusts and “bad” trusts. The Supreme Court set forth the famous “rule
of reason” by which it seems to have meant that a concentration of industrial power was permissible if
the method by which it got its power, and the use it made of that power, was reasonable.
Woodrow Wilson, elected in 1912, saw the situation more clearly. Where Jefferson had feared the
encroachment of political power on the lives of individuals, Wilson knew that the new power was
financial. He say, in the highly centralized economic system, the depot of the twentieth century, on
whom great masses of individuals relied for their safety and their livelihood, and whose
irresponsibility and greed ( if it were not controlled) would reduce them to starvation and penury. The
concentration of financial power had not proceeded so far in 1912 as it has today; but it had grown far
enough for Mr. Wilson to realize fully its implications. It is interesting, now, to read his speeches.
What is called “radical” today (and I have reason to know whereof I speak) is mild compared to the
campaign of Mr. Wilson. “No man can deny,” he said, “that the lines of endeavor have more and more
narrowed and stiffened; no man who knows anything about the development of industry in this
country can have failed to observe that the larger kinds of credit are more and more difficult to obtain
unless you obtain them upon terms of uniting your efforts with those who already control the industry
of the country, and nobody can fail to observe that every man who tries to set himself up in
competition with any process of manufacture which has taken place under the control of large
combinations of capital will presently find himself either squeezed out or obliged to sell and allow
himself to be absorbed.”
Had there been no World War -- had Mr. Wilson been able to devote eight years to domestic instead of
to international affairs- we might have had a wholly different situation at the present time. However,
the then distant roar of European cannon, growing ever louder, forced him to abandon the study of this
issue. The problem he saw so clearly is left with us as a legacy; and no one of us on either side of the
political controversy can deny that it is a matter of grave concern to the government.
A glance at the situation today only too clearly indicates that equality of opportunity as we have know
it no longer exists. Our industrial plant is built; the problem just now is whether under existing
conditions it is not overbuilt. Our last frontier has long since been reached, and there is practically no
more free land. More than half of our people do not live on the farms or on lands and cannot derive a
living by cultivating their own property. There is no safety valve in the form of a Western prairie to
which those thrown out of work by the Eastern economic machines can go for a new start. We are not
able to invite the immigration from Europe to share our endless plenty. We are now providing a drab
living for our own people.
Our system of constantly rising tariffs has at last reacted against us to the point of closing our Canadian
frontier on the north, our European markets on the east, many of our Latin American markets to the
south, and a goodly proportion of our Pacific markets on the west, through the retaliatory tariffs of
those countries. It has forced many of our great industrial institutions who exported their surplus
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production to such countries, to establish plants in such countries within the tariff walls. This has
resulted in the reduction of the operation of their American plants, and opportunity for employment.
Just as freedom to farm has ceased, so also the opportunity in business has narrowed. It still is true that
men can start small enterprises, trusting to native shrewdness and ability to keep abreast of
competitors; but area after area has been preempted altogether by the great corporations, and even in
the fields which still have no great concerns, the small man starts with a handicap. The unfeeling
statistics of the past three decades show that the independent business man is running a losing race.
Perhaps he is forced to the wall; perhaps he cannot command credit; perhaps he is “squeezed out,” in
Mr. Wilson’s words, by highly organized corporate competitors, as your corner grocery man can tell
you.
Recently a careful study was made of the concentration of business in the United States. It showed that
our economic life was dominated by some six hundred odd corporations who controlled two-thirds of
American industry. Ten million small business men divided the other third. More striking still, it
appeared that if the process of concentration goes on at the same rate, at the end of another century we
shall have all American industry controlled by a dozen corporations, and run by perhaps a hundred
men. Put plainly, we are steering a steady course toward economic oligarchy, if we are not there
already.
Clearly, all this calls for a re-appraisal of values. A mere builder of more industrial plants, a creator of
more railroad systems, and organizer of more corporations, is as likely to be a danger as a help. The
day of the great promoter or the financial Titan, to whom we granted anything if only he would build,
or develop, is over. Our task now is not discovery or exploitation of natural resources, or necessarily
producing more goods. It is the soberer, less dramatic business of administering resources and plants
already in hand, of seeking to reestablish foreign markets for our surplus production, of meeting the
problem of under consumption, of adjusting production to consumption, of distributing wealth and
products more equitably, of adapting existing economic organizations to the service of the people. The
day of enlightened administration has come.
Just as in older times the central government was first a haven of refuge, and then a threat, so now in a
closer economic system the central and ambitious financial unit is no longer a servant of national
desire, but a danger. I would draw the parallel one step farther. We did not think because national
government had become a threat in the 18th century that therefore we should abandon the principle of
national government. Nor today should we abandon the principle of strong economic units called
corporations, merely because their power is susceptible of easy abuse. In other times we dealt with the
problem of an unduly ambitious central government by modifying it gradually into a constitutional
democratic government. So today we are modifying and controlling our economic units.
As I see it, the task of government in its relation to business is to assist the development of an economic
declaration of rights, an economic constitutional order. This is the common task of statesman and
business man. It is the minimum requirement of a more permanently safe order of things.
Every man has a right to life; and this means that he has also a right to make a comfortable living. He
may by sloth or crime decline to exercise that right; but it may not be denied him. We have no actual
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famine or death; our industrial and agricultural mechanism can produce enough and to spare. Our
government formal and informal, political and economic, owes to every one an avenue to possess
himself of a portion of that plenty sufficient for his needs, through his own work.
Every man has a right to his own property; which means a right to be assured, to the fullest extent
attainable, in the safety of his savings. By no other means can men carry the burdens of those parts of
life which, in the nature of things afford no chance of labor; childhood, sickness, old age. In all thought
of property, this right is paramount; all other property rights must yield to it. If, in accord with this
principle, we must restrict the operations of the speculator, the manipulator, even the financier, I
believe we must accept the restriction as needful, not to hamper individualism but to protect it.
These two requirements must be satisfied, in the main, by the individuals who claim and hold control
of the great industrial and financial combinations which dominate so large a pert of our industrial life.
They have undertaken to be, not business men, but princes-princes of property. I am not prepared to
say that the system which produces them is wrong. I am very clear that they must fearlessly and
competently assume the responsibility which goes with the power. So many enlightened business men
know this that the statement would be little more that a platitude, were it not for an added implication.
This implication is, briefly, that the responsible heads of finance and industry instead of acting each for
himself, must work together to achieve the common end. They must, where necessary, sacrifice this or
that private advantage; and in reciprocal self-denial must seek a general advantage. It is here that
formal government-political government, if you choose, comes in. Whenever in the pursuit of this
objective the lone wolf, the unethical competitor, the reckless promoter, the Ishmael or Insull whose
hand is against every man’s, declines to join in achieving and end recognized as being for the public
welfare, and threatens to drag the industry back to a state of anarchy, the government may properly be
asked to apply restraint. Likewise, should the group ever use its collective power contrary to public
welfare, the government must be swift to enter and protect the public interest.
The government should assume the function of economic regulation only as a last resort, to be tried
only when private initiative, inspired by high responsibility, with such assistance and balance as
government can give, has finally failed. As yet there has been no final failure, because there has been
no attempt, and I decline to assume that this nation is unable to meet the situation.
The final term of the high contract was for liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We have learnt a great
deal of both in the past century. We know that individual liberty and individual happiness mean
nothing unless both are ordered in the sense that one man’s meat is not another man’s poison. We
know that the old “rights of personal competency”-the right to read, to think, to speak to choose and
live a mode of life, must be respected at all hazards. We know that liberty to do anything which
deprives others of those elemental rights is outside the protection of any compact; and that government
in this regard is the maintenance of a balance, within which every individual may have a place if he
will take it; in which every individual may find safety if he wishes it; in which every individual may
attain such power as his ability permits, consistent with his assuming the accompanying
responsibility...
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Faith in America, faith in our tradition of personal responsibility, faith in our institutions, faith in
ourselves demands that we recognize the new terms of the old social contract. We shall fulfill them, as
we fulfilled the obligation of the apparent Utopia which Jefferson imagined for us in 1776, and which
Jefferson, Roosevelt and Wilson sought to bring to realization. We must do so, lest a rising tide of
misery engendered by our common failure, engulf us all. But failure is not an American habit; and in
the strength of great hope we must all shoulder our common load.
“Commencement Address at the University of Michigan”
Lyndon B. Johnson
May 22, 1964
President Hatcher, Governor Romney, Senators McNamara and Hart, Congressmen Meader and
Staebler, and other members of the fine Michigan delegation, members of the graduating class, my
fellow Americans:
It is a great pleasure to be here today. This university has been coeducational since 1870, but I do not
believe it was on the basis of your accomplishments that a Detroit high school girl said, “In choosing a
college, you first have to decide whether you want a coeducational school or an educational school.”
Well, we can find both here at Michigan, although perhaps at different hours.
I came out here today very anxious to meet the Michigan student whose father told a friend of mine
that his son’s education had been a real value. It stopped his mother from bragging about him.
I have come today from the turmoil of your Capital to the tranquility of your campus to speak about
the future of your country.
The purpose of protecting the life of our Nation and preserving the liberty of our citizens is to pursue
the happiness of our people. Our success in that pursuit is the test of our success as a Nation.
For a century we labored to settle and to subdue a continent. For half a century we called upon
unbounded invention and untiring industry to create an order of plenty for all of our people.
The challenge of the next half century is whether we have the wisdom to use that wealth to enrich and
elevate our national life, and to advance the quality of our American civilization.
Your imagination, your initiative, and your indignation will determine whether we build a society
where progress is the servant of our needs, or a society where old values and new visions are buried
under unbridled growth. For in your time we have the opportunity to move not only toward the rich
society and the powerful society, but upward to the Great Society.
The Great Society rests on abundance and liberty for all. It demands an end to poverty and racial
injustice, to which we are totally committed in our time. But that is just the beginning.
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The Great Society is a place where every child can find knowledge to enrich his mind and to enlarge his
talents. It is a place where leisure is a welcome chance to build and reflect, not a feared cause of
boredom and restlessness. It is a place where the city of man serves not only the needs of the body and
the demands of commerce but the desire for beauty and the hunger for community.
It is a place where man can renew contact with nature. It is a place which honors creation for its own
sake and for what it adds to the understanding of the race. It is a place where men are more concerned
with the quality of their goals than the quantity of their goods.
But most of all, the Great Society is not a safe harbor, a resting place, a final objective, a finished work.
It is a challenge constantly renewed, beckoning us toward a destiny where the meaning of our lives
matches the marvelous products of our labor.
So I want to talk to you today about three places where we begin to build the Great Society—in our
cities, in our countryside, and in our classrooms.
Many of you will live to see the day, perhaps 50 years from now, when there will be 400 million
Americans—four-fifths of them in urban areas. In the remainder of this century urban population will
double, city land will double, and we will have to build homes, highways, and facilities equal to all
those built since this country was first settled. So in the next 40 years we must rebuild the entire urban
United States.
Aristotle said: “Men come together in cities in order to live, but they remain together in order to live
the good life.” It is harder and harder to live the good life in American cities today.
The catalog of ills is long: there is the decay of the centers and the despoiling of the suburbs. There is
not enough housing for our people or transportation for our traffic. Open land is vanishing and old
landmarks are violated.
Worst of all expansion is eroding the precious and time honored values of community with neighbors
and communion with nature. The loss of these values breeds loneliness and boredom and indifference.
Our society will never be great until our cities are great. Today the frontier of imagination and
innovation is inside those cities and not beyond their borders.
New experiments are already going on. It will be the task of your generation to make the American city
a place where future generations will come, not only to live but to live the good life.
I understand that if I stayed here tonight I would see that Michigan students are really doing their best
to live the good life.
This is the place where the Peace Corps was started. It is inspiring to see how all of you, while you are
in this country, are trying so hard to live at the level of the people.
A second place where we begin to build the Great Society is in our countryside. We have always prided
ourselves on being not only America the strong and America the free, but America the beautiful. Today
that beauty is in danger. The water we drink, the food we eat, the very air that we breathe, are
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threatened with pollution. Our parks are overcrowded, our seashores overburdened. Green fields and
dense forests are disappearing.
A few years ago we were greatly concerned about the “Ugly American.” Today we must act to prevent
an ugly America.
For once the battle is lost, once our natural splendor is destroyed, it can never be recaptured. And once
man can no longer walk with beauty or wonder at nature his spirit will wither and his sustenance be
wasted.
A third place to build the Great Society is in the classrooms of America. There your children’s lives will
be shaped. Our society will not be great until every young mind is set free to scan the farthest reaches
of thought and imagination. We are still far from that goal.
Today, 8 million adult Americans, more than the entire population of Michigan, have not finished 5
years of school. Nearly 20 million have not finished 8 years of school. Nearly 54 million—more than
one-quarter of all America—have not even finished high school.
Each year more than 100,000 high school graduates, with proved ability, do not enter college because
they cannot afford it. And if we cannot educate today’s youth, what will we do in 1970 when
elementary school enrollment will be 5 million greater than 1960? And high school enrollment will rise
by 5 million. College enrollment will increase by more than 3 million.
In many places, classrooms are overcrowded and curricula are outdated. Most of our qualified teachers
are underpaid, and many of our paid teachers are unqualified. So we must give every child a place to
sit and a teacher to learn from. Poverty must not be a bar to learning, and learning must offer an escape
from poverty.
But more classrooms and more teachers are not enough. We must seek an educational system which
grows in excellence as it grows in size. This means better training for our teachers. It means preparing
youth to enjoy their hours of leisure as well as their hours of labor. It means exploring new techniques
of teaching, to find new ways to stimulate the love of learning and the capacity for creation.
These are three of the central issues of the Great Society. While our Government has many programs
directed at those issues, I do not pretend that we have the full answer to those problems.
But I do promise this: We are going to assemble the best thought and the broadest knowledge from all
over the world to find those answers for America. I intend to establish working groups to prepare a
series of White House conferences and meetings—on the cities, on natural beauty, on the quality of
education, and on other emerging challenges. And from these meetings and from this inspiration and
from these studies we will begin to set our course toward the Great Society.
The solution to these problems does not rest on a massive program in Washington, nor can it rely solely
on the strained resources of local authority. They require us to create new concepts of cooperation, a
creative federalism, between the National Capital and the leaders of local communities.
Woodrow Wilson once wrote: “Every man sent out from his university should be a man of his Nation
as well as a man of his time.”
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Within your lifetime powerful forces, already loosed, will take us toward a way of life beyond the
realm of our experience, almost beyond the bounds of our imagination.
For better or for worse, your generation has been appointed by history to deal with those problems and
to lead America toward a new age. You have the chance never before afforded to any people in any
age. You can help build a society where the demands of morality, and the needs of the spirit, can be
realized in the life of the Nation.
So, will you join in the battle to give every citizen the full equality which God enjoins and the law
requires, whatever his belief, or race, or the color of his skin?
Will you join in the battle to give every citizen an escape from the crushing weight of poverty?
Will you join in the battle to make it possible for all nations to live in enduring peace—as neighbors
and not as mortal enemies?
Will you join in the battle to build the Great Society, to prove that our material progress is only the
foundation on which we will build a richer life of mind and spirit?
There are those timid souls who say this battle cannot be won; that we are condemned to a soulless
wealth. I do not agree. We have the power to shape the civilization that we want. But we need your
will, your labor, your hearts, if we are to build that kind of society.
Those who came to this land sought to build more than just a new country. They sought a new world.
So I have come here today to your campus to say that you can make their vision our reality. So let us
from this moment begin our work so that in the future men will look back and say: It was then, after a
long and weary way, that man turned the exploits of his genius to the full enrichment of his life.
Thank you. Goodbye.
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