University of St. Gallen
Exploring
Russia’s
Vote for
Trump
Analysis of the motive behind Russia's alleged
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election
Reimann, Tiago Philip
Brühlbleichestrasse 7
9000 St. Gallen
+41 78 422 55 21
Tiagophilip.reimann@student.unisg.ch
Matriculation number: 22-610-059
Academic Term Paper
Economics
Media bias: Does media affect the voting behavior in the U.S.?
Dr. Davia Kündig
17 April 2023
Abstract
This study investigates the potential motivations behind Russia's involvement in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, emphasizing the role of media manipulation. It highlights the significant
influence that media can exert on public opinion and voter behavior, noting that while information
manipulation is not a novel phenomenon, the advent of social media has markedly enhanced and
facilitated the dissemination of biased information. The evolution of digital platforms allows various
actors to shape public perception more effectively, making it easier to spread tailored narratives to
large audiences.
The analysis then shifts to examine the economic and geopolitical contexts of the Russian crisis and
the potential impacts of the policies of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton on Moscow's economic
interests. While Clinton's energy policies might have seemed advantageous to Russia initially, her
administration's adversarial rhetoric towards Moscow could have led Russia to explore other avenues
for exerting influence. Conversely, Trump's more accommodating stance on U.S.-Russia relations and
the prospect of eased sanctions align more closely with Russia’s geopolitical and economic objectives.
Given Russia's capability for media manipulation and the strategic advantages of influencing U.S.
policy through a more amenable administration, the potential benefits of Trump's policy proposals
could have served as a significant motivation for Russia to interfere in the election. This analysis seeks
to underscore the strategic considerations and motivations that may have guided Russia's actions in
this complex geopolitical context.
II
Table of Contents
1.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 1
2.
THE IMPACT OF MEDIA ON PUBLIC BEHAVIOR ................................................................................ 2
3.
RUSSIA AND THE WORLD ............................................................................................................... 4
3.1.
3.2.
4.
ECONOMICAL & GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT .........................................................................................................4
THE RUSSIAN CRISIS .....................................................................................................................................6
TRUMP: RUSSIA’S SAVIOR? .......................................................................................................... 10
4.1.
WASHINGTON, MOSCOW AND THE MIDDLE EAST ...........................................................................................11
4.2. WESTERN SANCTIONS AND THE IMPACT ON RUSSIA'S TRADE AND ECONOMY ..............................................................13
4.3.
ENERGY POLICIES.......................................................................................................................................16
4.4.
GAME THEORY ..........................................................................................................................................20
5.
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 22
DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP..................................................................................................................................29
DIRECTORY OF AUXILIARY AIDS...................................................................................................................................30
III
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Evolution of Russia's Trade Partners ........................................................................................6
Figure 2, Evolution of Russia's Trade Balance .........................................................................................7
Figure 3, Evolution of Russian Fuel Export ............................................................................................16
Figure 4, Evolution of Oil Production in major oil producing countries ................................................17
IV
1. Introduction
In 2016, under the eyes of the entire world, Hillary Clinton and Donald J. Trump competed in the U.S.
presidential elections. However, for the vast majority of American newspapers, the outcome seemed
clear: On Tuesday, November the 8th, 2016, the United States of America was expected to elect
Clinton as president, making her the first woman in American history to hold this position. On election
day, the New York Times, based on 376 polls conducted by organizations across the political spectrum,
estimated the likelihood of the Democratic candidate's election at 86%. Moreover, only 6% of the polls
taken into account by the New York newspaper predicted a Trump victory (Andrews et al., 2016).
Against all media expectations, it was indeed the Republican candidate who won the election. Shortly
thereafter, Hillary Clinton's camp accused the Russian Federation of attempting to manipulate the
election and Donald Trump of having pro-Russian rhetoric throughout his campaign. Consequently, an
investigation was launched by the U.S. Department of Justice, which later announced the discovery of
organizations close to Russian power that, through social media and hacking, allegedly attempted to
influence the 2016 election (Mueller, 2019, p. 4). On their part, Donald Trump and the Russian
Federation denied any involvement of its government in this matter (Paris, 2018).
In an era marked by multiple crises, international tensions and ideological divergences intensify,
raising fears of potential conflicts. However, new technologies have changed the dynamics of conflicts
and indirectly led to the emergence of a new type of conflict, such as information warfare and
cyberwarfare (Baptiste et al., 2018). Given the proven ability of media to influence public opinion, as
explained later in this work, numerous cases have shown that entities have attempted to use media
to manipulate the populations of rival regions. The reasons motivating such acts are multiple, and it is
likely that undiscovered cases also exist. Moreover, the effectiveness of such methods requiring a
great deal of discretion, even in the assumption of Russian use of such processes, it is difficult to
guarantee access to the necessary information enabling the establishment of Moscow's involvement
with certainty. Thus, this work does not aim to establish potential Russian culpability, but rather to
analyze if, in the context preceding the 2016 American election, Russia could have hoped to
economically benefit from the election of Donald Trump. (Baptiste et al., 2018).
Therefore, by basing this work on data from the World Bank, archives, and media coverage of both
candidates' campaigns, this study will first address the power of media over public opinion and their
use for manipulation purposes. It will then analyze the Russian economic and geopolitical context, to
assess the impact on Russia of various measures and campaign promises of Trump, compared to those
of Clinton. This structure aims to answer the following research question: To what extent could the
impact of Donald Trump's campaign promises on Moscow have motivated Russia to resort to media
manipulation?
1
2. The Impact of Media on Public Behavior
Encompassing, among others, TV channels, social media and newspapers, the different forms of media
differ in a wide range of aspects. However, they all have at least two points in common. Firstly, they
collectively constitute the main source for delivering information to the masses. Secondly, and above
all, none of them can claim absolute neutrality.
It is essential to understand this last point because, whether intentional or not, the way in which
information is presented, such as the details highlighted and the context provided, can strongly alter
the public's understanding of events. Furthermore, as the primary source of information for most
people, media can significantly influence how the population perceives reality, thus, indirectly
affecting their political behaviors. (Reimann, 2022, pp. 2-6)
This influence can be shown by the joint research from ETH Zurich and George Washington University,
which examined Fox News Channel's (FNC) entry into the American information market and its effect
on American political orientation. Their study, "The Effect of Fox News Channel on U.S. Elections:
2000-2020," indicates that over two decades, the conservative television channel Fox News Channel
increased the percentage of votes for the Republican party by a percentage point ranging from 0.5 to
1.5. The study attributes this shift to the media's editorial choices, which, through biased media
coverage, lead viewers to internalize a set of facts oriented towards major political issues, thereby
potentially swaying their attitudes and ideologies towards conservative views. Additionally, the
research suggests that exposure to one-sided information could prompt FNC viewers to develop more
conservative positions on various topics. (Ash et al., 2021, pp. 9-11)
The case of Fox News Channel (FNC) exemplifies how television networks can influence audience
behavior. Moreover, as highlighted in a report by the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs,
other media types, particularly social networks, are also capable of producing similar effects (Baptiste
et al., 2018).
Importantly, the report by Baptiste et al. (2018) notes that social media has accelerated the
manipulation of information. Indeed, given the prevalence of these platforms, with 62% of American
adults using them, coupled with the ability to target specific population segments directly and the low
dissemination cost, the emergence of social media has significantly increased the potential for
misinformation (Baptiste et al., 2018).
However, it is crucial to recognize that for Baptiste et al. (2018), "misinformation" can be
unintentional, whereas "information manipulation" is always intentional.
2
Furthermore, the manipulation described by Baptiste et al. (2018) is defined by its strategic planning
and harmful purpose in spreading content, demonstrating a conscious shift from merely presenting
information with a biased perspective.
The spectrum of entities capable of disseminating manipulated information is as varied as their
motivations. It is essential to realize that media manipulation is not a phenomenon invented in the
21st century. In fact, historical precedents such as the media propaganda of Nazi Germany and the
ideological campaigns of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda illustrate the long-standing use of
the media for manipulation. In the case of Russia, media manipulation did not begin in 2016. There
are numerous confirmed cases involving the Kremlin throughout history, targeting both the Russian
population and foreign countries, including European nations and the United States (Baptiste et al.,
2018).
While information manipulation is not a new phenomenon, its use, impact, and accessibility have been
significantly amplified by new technologies, particularly due to the near-absence of borders on the
internet (Baptiste et al., 2018). The reasons that can motivate such actions are endless, ranging from
religious to ideological to economic, and they depend heavily on the context and objectives of the
various actors (Baptiste et al., 2018).
In this study, to determine the motivations for potential Russian interference in elections, the next
chapter will examine the context and situation in which Russia found itself.
3
3. Russia and the World
Standing at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Russia occupies a strategic position on the world stage.
With a population of 146 million, as the world's largest country, it benefits from a unique position on
the borders of major economic powers such as Europe to the west, China to the south, and the United
States and Canada to the east (Statista, 2022b, p. 7). Historically recognised for its role in major events
such as the World Wars and the Cold War, Russia is now recognised as a geopolitical power. Moreover,
its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and its formidable military capabilities
reinforce the country's status(Statista, 2022a, p. 21).
3.1. Economical & Geopolitical Context
In 2016, Russia's economy was prominently positioned on the global stage, boasting a Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of $1.276 trillion and ranking as the 12th largest worldwide (World Bank, 2018). That
year, Russia also stood as the 14th largest exporter globally, highlighting its pivotal role in international
trade. This economic strength is evidenced by a significant trade surplus, with exports valued at
approximately $301 billion, which was 45% higher than its imports, reflecting an export-driven
strategy (World Bank, 2017).
Examining Russia's trade relationships reveals that the Netherlands, China, and Germany are key
export destinations, underscoring Russia's strategic economic interactions. The European Union (EU)
is Russia’s largest trading partner, accounting for 45% of its exports and 37% of its imports, which
signifies deep economic interconnections (World Bank, 2017). Additionally, the BRICS countries
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) play a substantial role in Russia's trade, comprising 13%
of its exports and 25% of its imports (World Bank, 2017).
China, Germany, and the United States are principal suppliers for Russia, especially in sectors crucial
for its hydrocarbon extraction and processing. Notably, the United States, although it ranks ninth
among export destinations, is strategically important, accounting for 3% of Russian exports and 6% of
its imports (World Bank, 2017). This relationship is critical, particularly given Russia's reliance on
hydrocarbon exports and the dynamics of the global energy market.
Russia's dominance in the hydrocarbon sector, especially as Europe's main gas supplier, provides both
economic benefits and geopolitical leverage. This dependency, however, also exposes Russia to
vulnerabilities associated with global price fluctuations of hydrocarbons (World Bank, 2021). The
dependency on fossil fuels, which nearly half of its export revenue relies on, underscores the economic
risks from price volatility.
4
Russia also maintains a significant presence in the international arms market, being the second-largest
supplier after the USA, with arms exports totaling $11.38 billion in 2016. This sector, though only
representing 4% of total exports, indirectly supports the nation's economy and confirms its strategic
significance on the global stage (Cooper, 2021, p. 306; Connoly & Sendstad, 2017, p. 22). Major clients
such as India, Algeria, and Vietnam highlight Russia's key position in arms trade dynamics (Cooper,
2021, p. 307).The relationship between Russia and the United States in the arms trade is marked by
both competition and occasional cooperation, reflecting broader geopolitical tensions and alignments.
This complex interaction is evident in various regional conflicts and global security issues where the
two countries frequently find themselves on opposing sides. For instance, in the Middle East and North
Africa, Russia and the United States have supported different factions, reflecting their strategic
interests and foreign policy goals
Despite these rivalries, there are instances of cooperation or mutual tolerance where broader
strategic interests, such as combating terrorism, align. In Syria, for example, while the United States
has supported opposition groups and prioritized the fight against ISIS, Russia has bolstered the Assad
regime, also under the banner of fighting terrorism. This scenario illustrates how both nations
maneuver within a shared conflict zone, pursuing distinct objectives while occasionally intersecting in
their broader security aims (Trenin, 2016, pp. 1-4).
5
3.2. The Russian Crisis
Nevertheless, beneath the appearance of economic robustness masks a declining economy. Three
years earlier, Russia's economic indicators were significantly better, with gross domestic product
(GDP) approaching $2.3 trillion, exports exceeding $520 billion and a rising inflow of foreign
investment (World Bank, 2021). Over this period, Russia's position in world trade has changed
significantly, dropping from 8th place in 2013 to 14th place in 2016. Interestingly, the arms export
sector was less affected during this period (Cooper, 2021, p. 306). This sudden transition reveals both
the volatility of Russia's export performance and its impact on the country's economic positioning. The
following chapters will look at the origins of this economic fall, in order to clarify the multitude of
factors that have shaped Russia's economic landscape before the elections.
Figure 1: Evolution of Russia's Trade Partners, Created by T. Reimann based on (World Bank, 2017)
As detailed in the previously, 2016 marked a precarious economic stance for the Russian Federation,
primarily due to the events of the 2014 Russian crisis. It is crucial to understand that the economic
structure prior to the crisis significantly differed from the situation presented for 2016.
The above figure illustrates the evolution of Russia's international trade between 2013 and 2016, and
reveals four key elements. Firstly, Russia's total trade (Exports + Imports) dropped steeply from USD
848 billion to USD 509 billion. Secondly, the graph illustrates a marked decrease in Russia's trade
6
volume with most countries from 2013 to 2016, with the notable exception of the Middle East, where
trade levels remained stable. Despite this constancy, the third element is that the distribution of
Russia's trade partners shifted significantly. The European Union's (EU) share of Russian trade saw a
decline, while the shares of other partners rose sharply: BRICS countries' share grew by 42%, the
United States by 32%, and the Middle East saw the most substantial increase at 66%—evidencing a
doubling from 2% to 4% of the total trade share.
Figure 2, Evolution of Russia's Trade Balance, Created by T. Reimann based on (World Bank, 2017)
Furthermore, the export structure underwent a transformation, with fuel exports decreasing from
70% of total exports in 2013 to just 48% in 2016 (World Bank, 2017; World Bank, 2021).
This Russian crisis' inception can be attributed to three pivotal events: the dramatic fall in hydrocarbon
prices, Western sanctions following the annexation of Crimea, and a significantly destabilized Russian
financial market leading to the depreciation of the rouble. These factors, while individually impactful,
created an unprecedented economic challenge for Russia when combined, as observed by the Centre
of Eastern Studies (OSW) (Karpia, 2015, p. 10).
Turning our attention to what might be considered the less catastrophic yet significant event for
Russia: the remarkable depreciation of the ruble. Throughout 2014, the exchange rate plummeted
from approximately 32.8 rubles to 1 USD in January to nearly 66.9 rubles by the end of December,
signifying a 51% devaluation of the Russian currency. This downward trend persisted, with the dollar
7
reaching around 73 RUB in early 2016 (Bank of Russia, 2022).
Currency depreciation is not inherently detrimental to a country's economy. Particularly for exportreliant nations, depreciation usually positively affecting trade balances. Blanchard (2021) explains this
by noting that real depreciation makes foreign goods relatively more expensive, which in turn
decreases imports, which which is coherent with Russia's reduced import levels. Nevertheless,
according to Blanchard, relatively more expensive foreign goods imply an increase of the
competitiveness from domestic goods, which in turn are perceived as less expensive, thereby,
theoretically increasing domestic exports. However, this is not consistent with the situation
experienced by Russia in 2014, which saw its exports fall (Blanchard, 2021, pp. 403-404).
An explanation for this anomaly is partially provided by the OSW, which suggests that the reduction
in imports and exports was not a direct result of the devaluation of the rouble. But that all three events
stem largely from the same sources, which are the collapse in oil prices and the repercussions of the
Western sanctions that followed the annexation of Crimea (Karpia, 2015, p. 6). These two factors being
described as the main drivers of Russia's precarious situation.
The drop in world oil prices, combined with Western sanctions, left the Russian economy severely
exposed. Firstly, the fall in oil prices was not an isolated market trend but was shaped by the
slowdown of the global economy, notably China’s reduced growth rate, and increased production
from oil-rich regions such as Libya, the United States, and Iraq. Caused by the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the decision to sustain production levels despite these
circumstances further aggravated the oversupply, causing oil prices to fall more than 50%, going from
US$ 115 in June to US$ 56 by late December 2014. This price-level severely impacted Russia, given its
heavy reliance on hydrocarbon exports for both export revenues and government budget (Karpia,
2015, p. 14).
The sanctions imposed by the West, particularly in response to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, were
carefully targeted to circumvent exacerbating the Western economies' dependency on Russian
Secondly, the sanctions imposed by the West in response to the annexation of Crimea in February
2014 were targeted to minimise the impact on European economies. As a result, the EU has refused
to impose sanctions on oil and gas, due to their potentially significant impact on its member states.
Furthermore, sanctioning Russian gas could unintentionally lead to a reduction in supply which could
raise oil prices, thereby unintentionally benefiting the Kremlin through increased revenues from
hydrocarbon sales.
For this reason, Western sanctions focused mainly on Russia's biggest import: the financial sector,
targeting state banks and Russian companies by banning lending and financing operations.
The energy industry, crucial to Russia's economy, faced not immediate challenges to its current oil
8
production but rather potential obstacles to its future projects. Due to Western sanctions that banned
exports of vital oil extraction equipment, the industry didn't see an instant drop in oil output. However,
these sanctions likely set the stage for risks to the industry's long-term growth. In addition, Western
countries halted the shipment of military equipment to Russia. As a countermeasure, Russia scaled
back its food exports to Europe and the United States. Significantly, the impact of Western financial
sanctions was magnified because even Russia's allies, such as China, adhered to them and refrained
from lending money to Russia, likely to avoid sanctions themselves. This widespread compliance
played a crucial role in the sharp decline of Russia's trade with other countries (Korhonen, 2019, pp.
19-22).
Simultaneously, the value of the ruble plummeted, driven down by both the sanctions and the falling
oil prices, compounding Russia’s economic challenges. This confluence of factors—the weakening
ruble, the sanctions, and the decline in oil prices—interwove to precipitate a complex financial crisis.
The sanctions undermined confidence in Russia's economy, leading to capital flight and a downturn in
the stock market. As the ruble's value decreased, Russia's financial leverage diminished, compelling
the government to intervene swiftly to bolster the banking sector, which is crucial for the nation's
economic stability. These measures underscored Russia's economic vulnerabilities, particularly its
dependence on the export of natural resources. The sanctions intensified these vulnerabilities as oil
prices continued to drop. (Karpia, 2015, pp. 6, 8, 10-14).
9
4. Trump: Russia’s Savior?
Let's now consider whether, in the context of the Russian crisis, the campaign of the Republican
presidential candidate, as criticized by the Democratic camp, promised benefits for Russia compared
to Hillary Clinton's campaign. The issue of Russia was a recurring topic during the presidential election,
with both camps making numerous statements about how they envisioned the future of relations with
Russia. Specifically, we will compare their declared positions and other planned measures that could
impact the Kremlin. This analysis will focus on the potential evolution of three key areas: (1) the future
of U.S.-Russian relations in general, including the candidates' rhetoric toward the Russian Federation
and their relations in the Middle East, (2) the anticipated evolution of sanctions, and (3) American
energy policy.
10
4.1. Washington, Moscow and the Middle East
Throughout his campaign, Donald J. Trump consistently held a discourse that was both respectful and
promising towards Moscow and Vladimir Putin. Notably, during a press conference in Miami, he
declared, “President Trump would be much better for U.S.-Russian relations,” emphasizing that the
United States gains nothing from opposing Russia. He pledged that, if elected, he would foster a
cooperative and friendly relationship with countries like Russia and China, reducing American
presence in the Middle East and focusing on combating terrorism. Furthermore, in a foreign policy
conference in Washington D.C., Trump suggested that despite considerable differences, Russia and
China are not destined to remain adversaries and that he wishes to seek common ground based on
shared interests to ensure peace and build friendly relations (Trump, 2016a; Trump, 2016b).
In stark contrast, Hillary Clinton’s stance was diametrically opposed. In a Washington D.C. interview,
she criticized Putin and voiced reservations about his leadership in Russia. Clinton argued that
cooperating with Russia in the Middle East was unlikely, labeling Putin as one of the main long-term
security challenges faced by the United States, Europe, and NATO. She even suggested that Moscow
supported Assad's government in Syria knowing that it would contribute to terrorism, suggesting that
Russia's alliances with countries like Syria and Iran were aimed at destabilising the West. Clinton thus
advocated swift action to "raise the costs" for Russia and Iran, suggesting a continuation of a
confrontational posture (Clinton, 2015a).
These statements alone could demonstrate the media's ability to influence the masses, particularly in
the portrayal of Russia during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. When viewed from the Republican
perspective, Russia was often depicted as a potential ally, with Trump advocating for strategic
collaborations that would benefit the U.S. by enhancing its relations with key international actors,
such as China. Conversely, if one were to rely solely on the Democrats' narrative, then Russia was likely
to be perceived as a threat, as it was portrayed as a long-term adversary, who intended to destabilize
Western democracies.
However, the Slavic Review's article published by Cambridge University presented a contrasting
perspective to Clinton's approach. It suggested that although one of Russia's objectives in the Middle
East was to demonstrate its global influence, its primary goal was to re-establish its partnership with
the United States, particularly through collaborative efforts against terrorism. In this context, Trump's
11
election appeared to be a timely opportunity for the Kremlin. Moreover, the article affirms that
Russian officials were aware that a Clinton presidency would likely obstruct any potential
collaboration, given the previously strained relations. This tension was particularly intensified by
suspicions during Obama's administration that Clinton had sought to leverage the Bolotnaia protests
to instigate regime change in Moscow (Rutland, 2017, pp. S44–S45).
Furthermore, as the Middle East situation outlined in chapter 3.1 was complex, the policy changes
proposed by Trump seemed to align with Russian interests. In particular his support for finding
common ground and his plan to construct peaceful relations, could facilitate cooperation on shared
objectives, not only fulfilling one of Russia's key goals but potentially easing bilateral tensions
significantly.
Moreover, the potential benefits of Trump’s presidency for Russia extend beyond the Middle East.
Western foreign policy prior to 2016 was largely antagonistic towards Russia, deterring even allied
nations from investing in the country. Clinton’s continuation of this hostile policy could have
exacerbated Russia's isolation. In contrast, Trump's willingness to engage with Russia and China could
lessen these deterrents, especially as the Middle East's share in Russian trade had substantially
increased between 2013 and 2016. Thus, the mitigation of regional tensions under Trump's
administration could further benefit Russia by strengthening its commercial relationships and
enhancing its strategic position globally.
As explored in Chapter 3.1, the complexities inherent in the Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape
render Donald Trump's policy proposals especially significant.
Consequently, Trump’s election could result in an increased inflow of foreign capital into Russia,
enhancing the ruble's value through heightened demand. Moreover, Trump's presidency could boost
foreign investor confidence in the Russian economy, fostering a more stable and conducive business
environment and thereby attracting additional investments.
However, it is crucial to recognize that despite Trump's policies seemingly aligning with Russian
interests, his "America First" campaign rhetoric emphasized prioritizing American interests,
potentially at the expense of international alliances and agreements. This approach could result in less
cooperative international relations, including with Russia, particularly if conflicting interests arise from
unilateral American actions.
12
4.2. Western Sanctions and the Impact on Russia's Trade and Economy
Having explored the broader implications of the U.S. presidency on Russia in areas indirectly related
to the root causes of the crisis, we now shift our focus to the direct influences of the candidates'
policies on this crisis. This chapter examines the anticipated approaches of both candidates towards
Western sanctions on Russia, providing a precursor to the subsequent chapter’s analysis of their
energy policies.
Western sanctions, introduced in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, aimed to limit
Russia's strategic gains—militarily by expanding its regional control and economically through access
to new hydrocarbon reserves and gas export routes. These sanctions not only stunted the Russian
economy but also significantly restricted Russia's ability to capitalize on the annexed region by
blocking external investments and the import of necessary resource exploitation technology (Biersack
& O’Lear, 2014, pp. 256-258).
Western sanctions, imposed in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, were designed to
curtail Russia's strategic advantages. The annexation provided Russia with military benefits by
expanding its regional control in the Black Sea and economic benefits through access to new
hydrocarbon reserves and potential gas export routes to Europe. However, these sanctions have
significantly hindered the Russian economy and restricted its ability to fully benefit from the annexed
region by blocking external investments and the import of essential resource exploitation technology
(Biersack & O’Lear, 2014, pp. 256-258). Despite the economic implications, the impact of these
sanctions was most pronounced in the financial sector due to Europe's dependency on Russian gas.
This reliance meant that while the EU imposed sanctions, they were cautious not to jeopardize their
energy supplies, thereby focusing the punitive measures more heavily on the financial sector.
The effectiveness of these financial sanctions was intensified by the global dominance of the U.S.
dollar. As the principal currency for international transactions, access to the American financial system
is crucial for global economic activities. The U.S. controls this system and can exclude certain countries
or entities, effectively isolating them from the international financial network. This control has
deterred even non-sanctioning countries from investing in Russia, fearing potential repercussions
from the U.S. This resulted in a decrease in net foreign capital inflows of more than USD 28 million
between 2013 and 2016. (Zoffer, 2019, p. 153-154; Korhonen, 2019, pp. 21-22; World Bank, 2021)
Despite the extent of these sanctions, Hillary Clinton claimed that the measures implemented by the
Obama administration and the EU were minimal compared to the economic impact of the fall in oil
prices, suggesting the need for more robust sanctions to effectively impact Russia (Clinton, 2015a).
13
In this context, the rhetoric of the two candidates diverges significantly. Hillary Clinton emphasized
the need to increase pressure on Russia to achieve more substantial economic effects. In an interview
in Washington, she expressed her intent to collaborate with the EU to devise strategies to pressure
Moscow, indicating a pessimistic outlook for the easing of Russo-American tensions. However, other
measures proposed by Clinton could further deteriorate Russia’s relations with the West. Specifically,
in her Washington interview, Clinton stated, “I’ll enforce and strengthen if necessary our restrictions
on sending arms to Iran and from Iran, to bad actors like Syria. And I’ll impose these sanctions on
everyone involved in these activities, whether they’re in Iran or overseas.” These actions could
exacerbate tensions as, in 2016 alone, Russia exported over one billion dollars' worth of arms to Iran
and more than 40 million dollars to Syria (Clinton, 2015a; Cooper, 2021, p. 307).
In stark contrast, Donald Trump's rhetoric suggested a potential thaw in relations. His comments
highlighted the unintended diplomatic consequences of previous policies: "one thing that I've always
heard is you never want to do anything to unite Russia and China. Well, they're united now, in a true
sense. They've never been closer. They are selling oil to China. We forced them into this position"
(Trump, 2016b). This acknowledgment suggests an awareness of the geopolitical shifts caused by
stringent policies and presents a case for re-evaluating them. Trump emphasized the possibility of a
beneficial relationship with Russia, advocating for collaboration against common threats like Islamic
terrorism and seeking an end to the "cycle of hostility," while highlighting the need for a position of
strength (Trump, 2016a).
The uncertainty of Trump's intentions regarding sanctions led to a significant legislative change.
Concerns that Trump might unilaterally lift sanctions prompted Congress to codify them into law
through the Combating America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), ensuring that any
modification would require legislative approval (Aslund, 2019, p. 15). This act is representative of how
Trump could have benefited Russia, as even the U.S. government had to take preventive measures.
However, it is crucial to understand that Donald Trump’s foreign policy was likely not designed
specifically to benefit Russia; rather, his proposed measures were intended to serve American
interests but coincidentally could also benefit Russia. Trump’s potential to ease sanctions, articulated
by Rutland (2017), could have facilitated a more favorable environment for Russian trade and
economic recovery, enhancing investor confidence and stabilizing the ruble. Even with the congress’
restrictions, Trump was likely to still pursue improved relations with Russia, actions that could benefit
both countries by potentially stabilizing regions critical to U.S. interests and opening channels for
economic exchange (Rutland, 2017, pp. S44–S45).
In summary, the contrasting approaches of Clinton and Trump toward sanctions not only reflect their
14
distinct foreign policy strategies but also highlight the broader implications for Russia's economic and
geopolitical landscape. While Clinton's policies might have perpetuated Russia's economic challenges,
Trump offered a potential for easing tensions, albeit with complexities introduced by congressional
oversight and his own "America First" rhetoric.
15
4.3. Energy Policies
In Chapter 3.2, we noted that despite Europe's reliance on Russian energy, the proportion of fuels in
Russian exports diminished from 70% in 2013 to 48% in 2016. It is crucial to emphasize that this
reduction in the share of hydrocarbons does not signify a decrease in the exported quantity. According
to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the quantity of Russian exports actually increased slightly,
from 649 megatonnes (Mt) in 2013 to 665 Mt in 2016. If fuel prices had remained stable, hydrocarbons
would have constituted 77% of Russia's international trade in 2016. Moreover, if prices had stayed
constant between 2013 and 2016, Russia's exports would have totaled $1.48 trillion, in contrast to the
actual $1 trillion exported. This discrepancy indicates a potential revenue loss of over $406 billion over
four years, despite a 16 Mt increase in exported quantity (World Bank, 2021; IEA, 2023). Additionally,
had fuel prices not fluctuated, Russia's export levels might have nearly matched previous highs.
Figure 3, Evolution of Russian Fuel Export, Created by T. Reimann, based on (IEA, 2023 ; World Bank, 2017)
The decline in fuel prices affected not only Russia; the United States, though less reliant on fuel
exports, also experienced a reduction in export value from $148 billion to $94 billion during the same
period, despite increasing their exports. This drop was attributed to an oversupply in the U.S. market
(Mead & Stiger, 2015, p. 4). The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that this surge
in oil production was strategically implemented to reduce American dependence on imported oil for
domestic activities, which shielded the U.S. from the volatility of international oil prices.
This increase in production is attributed to innovations that led to lower marginal costs and substantial
16
tax subsidies to oil-producing companies, making American oil relatively more competitive (EIA, 2024).
As depicted in the following figure, among the main oil-exporting countries, the United States (shown
in blue) significantly increased its production.
Figure 4, Evolution of Oil Production in major oil producing countries, Created by T. Reimann based on (IEA, 2023)
The figure illustrates that while most countries maintained stable production levels since 2010, the
United States notably stood out by accounting for 51% of the additional global production in 2014
alone (Energy Institute, 2023). However, the EIA notes that this increased production predominantly
catered to domestic demand, with U.S. production satisfying 75% of the national consumption in 2016,
up from only 52% in 2010, a substantial portion of the U.S. oil imports being resold in the international
market (EIA, 2024). Consequently, as the United States is also a significant oil exporter, decisions made
within the U.S. regarding this sector can greatly impact Russia indirectly, given its heavy reliance on
these exports. This impact is particularly profound as the fall in oil prices was the most significant
event affecting Russia during the crisis, exacerbating the economic challenges it faced during this
period.
In this context, it may appear that Clinton's planned measures could inadvertently benefit Russia. The
Democratic candidate frequently expressed her commitment to making the United States a leader in
combating climate change. Following the U.S. ratification of the Paris Agreement, she stated, “The
next decade of action is critical—because if we do not press forward with driving clean energy growth
and cutting carbon pollution across the economy, we will not be able to avoid catastrophic
consequences. […] We cannot afford to be slowed by the climate skeptics or deterred by the defeatists
17
who doubt America's ability to meet this challenge. That's why as President, I will make combating
climate change a top priority from day one, and secure America's future as the clean energy
superpower of the 21st century” (Clinton, 2015b).
Clinton's ambition to position the United States as a major player in the energy transition could
paradoxically shift the supply curve for traditional energy sources down, thereby creating
opportunities for the Russian economy. If victorious in the elections, she promised drastic actions,
including a transition to renewable energy production sufficient to power every American household,
which would decrease the elasticity of demand for fossil fuels. Additionally, she pledged to eliminate
tax subsidies for oil and gas producers at the start of her term (Clinton, 2024). The removal of these
subsidies would likely increase the costs of American oil production, reducing its competitiveness and
leading to higher global oil prices if U.S. supply diminished.
The measures proposed by Clinton could also reduce the international supply of fuels. By significantly
decreasing American dependency on fossil fuels, global prices might shift upwards due to reduced
supply, assuming demand remains relatively stable or does not decrease at the same pace. Achieving
the goal of powering households with renewable energy would long-term affect fuel prices by
decreasing supply, theoretically benefiting countries like Russia that would continue to supply oil and
gas at higher prices.
While Clinton's measures could inadvertently raise global oil prices, benefiting Russia, it is likely that
her administration would seek alternative methods to ensure that these benefits do not undermine
her broader geopolitical strategy of applying pressure on Russia. Theoretically, Clinton could attempt
to flood the market with American oil at very low prices to reduce benefits to Russia, thereby
depressing global oil prices. However, such a move would conflict with her environmental goals and
negatively impact American oil-exporting allies by increasing the total quantity of fossil fuels
consumed. Therefore, although possible in theory, it is unlikely that she would pursue this strategy.
Instead, given her stated intent to raise costs on Russia, Clinton would probably explore other avenues
to increase pressure on Russia without contradicting her domestic and international policy objectives.
In contrast, Trump's energy policies appeared less advantageous for Russia. Throughout his campaign,
he expressed disagreement with the American ratification of the Paris Agreement, even promising to
increase domestic oil production to achieve energy independence if elected (CFR, 2023). Furthermore,
Trump aimed to make the United States a significant player in the international energy market. In an
interview with the Financial Times, Harold Hamm, Trump's main energy adviser, suggested that the
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U.S. should collaborate with Russia to increase oil prices (Hume & Sheppard, 2016). However, this
intention to raise oil prices followed a massive increase in American production, making it unlikely
that prices would return to pre-crisis levels.
In summary, the nuanced impact of Trump's policies on fuel prices and the broader implications for
Russia offer a stark contrast to Clinton's potentially more favorable yet complex measures. If Clinton
does not implement additional strategies to escalate pressure on Russia, her policies could
inadvertently result in the most positive impact on the Russian economy due to potential increases in
global oil prices driven by reduced U.S. competitiveness in fossil fuel production. However, considering
her consistently hostile stance towards Moscow, it is likely that Clinton would seek alternative
methods to intensify pressure on Russia, thereby neutralizing the positive repercussions of her
environmental strategies on Russia's economic interests.
Given this likelihood, while Clinton's measures could initially seem advantageous for Russia, the
probable escalation of political and economic pressures could offset these benefits. Therefore,
Trump's policies, though ostensibly less attractive, might ultimately present a more favorable option
for Russia. His administration could potentially facilitate collaboration with the U.S. and other oilexporting nations to elevate oil prices, aligning more closely with Russia's economic interests. This
strategic alignment under Trump's less aggressive stance towards Russian economic activities could
make his policy framework the better option for Russia in the long term.
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4.4. Game Theory
Assuming Russia had the ability to influence the outcomes of the U.S. elections and that Trump’s
victory was contingent upon this interference, a game theory analysis provides crucial strategic
insights. It is important to note, however, that the divergent portrayals of Russia by the candidates
could significantly influence public perception and could subtly influence the Russian government's
decision-making processes, as the public speeches might mask deeper strategic intentions.
Initially, this scenario resembles a sequential game in which Russia knows it is a participant and must
choose between manipulating the election to ensure Trump's victory or abstaining, allowing Clinton
to win. Once the election is decided, the game transitions into a normal-form game, where the
strategies involve the newly elected candidate deciding whether to implement their stated policies,
and Russia choosing between cooperation and non-cooperation.
Within this framework, Russia's optimal strategy consistently favors facilitating Trump's victory. This
preference stems from the assessment that Clinton's energy policies, while theoretically beneficial,
carry a high risk of being offset by stringent sanctions. Any scenario involving Clinton would thus likely
have adverse consequences for Russia and is best avoided. Conversely, Trump's approach to
improving Russian-American relations could inherently provide benefits, thereby enhancing the value
of his presidency for Russia. After the election, with Clinton out of the equation, Russia must then
choose between collaboration with the United States or opting for non-cooperation.
Choosing non-cooperation after facilitating Trump's victory could lead to severe repercussions, such
as U.S. sanctions or other punitive measures, worsening bilateral relations and detrimentally
impacting both nations economically and diplomatically. Since Trump has not advocated for any
punitive measures targeting Russia, it is likely that even if Trump does not fully enact his policies, the
situation for Russia would not deteriorate further. Hence, Russia gains no advantage from choosing
not to cooperate.
This decision-making process differs because the players can communicate. After negotiations, given
the mutual benefits of conciliatory measures—improving relations with Russia and its allies being
advantageous for the U.S.—Trump would likely enforce these measures unless prevented by external
factors. In this setup, Russia stands to benefit significantly. Thus, a Nash equilibrium occurs when the
20
U.S. enacts the measures and Russia cooperates. Russia's best strategy, therefore, is to ensure Trump’s
win and cooperate, as other strategies would likely result in less favorable outcomes.
This analysis, while simplified, underscores the potential strategic motivations influencing Russia's
decision-making in this hypothetical scenario. It highlights how external factors such as international
alliances, public opinion, and other geopolitical dynamics could influence outcomes, though these are
not fully accounted for in this simplified model. This framework effectively illustrates the strategic
considerations and incentives that could drive Russia's actions in this context.
21
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, this study has delved into the potential motivations underlying Russia's possible
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, examining the economic and geopolitical context
surrounding the Russian crisis and analyzing how the campaign promises and policies of the two
candidates, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, could have impacted Moscow's strategic
considerations. The analysis reveals a complex and nuanced picture. While Trump's proposed energy
policies were less favorable for Russia compared to Clinton's, his other measures and positions, such
as his rhetoric towards improving U.S-Russia relations and his potential to ease sanctions, appeared
more advantageous for the Kremlin. In contrast, Clinton's consistently hostile stance towards Russia
would likely have led her administration to seek alternative methods to intensify pressure on Moscow,
potentially offsetting any positive economic repercussions from her energy policies. Furthermore, the
game theory analysis suggests that from a strategic perspective, facilitating Trump's victory may have
been the optimal choice for Russia, as it could have led to a more cooperative relationship and reduced
the risk of punitive measures compared to a Clinton presidency.
This research has critically assessed the ways in which Russia's strategic interests in the economic and
geopolitical spheres may have motivated its alleged involvement in media manipulation to influence
the 2016 U.S. presidential election. From an economic standpoint, the potential easing of sanctions
under a Trump administration presented a significant opportunity for Russia to stabilize its economy,
which had been heavily impacted by international sanctions and a global decline in oil prices.
Geopolitically, improving U.S.-Russia relations under Trump's proposed foreign policy was viewed as
an opportunity to shift the international balance of power in favor of Moscow, counteracting the
adversarial approach taken by previous U.S. administrations. This strategic calculus suggests that
Russia's potential engagement in media manipulation was not merely a function of opportunity but
also a potentially deliberate attempt to tilt the election in favor of a candidate whose policies might
align more closely with its national interests. Therefore, the election of Donald Trump could have been
perceived as a means to achieve a more favorable geopolitical alignment and economic relief, making
it a calculated move within Russia's broader international strategy.
However, it is crucial to recognize that this simplified model does not account for the full complexity
of geopolitical dynamics and international alliances, which could have significantly influenced the
outcomes. It is important to note that while this paper covered numerous measures and factors that
could have impacted Russia, there are likely many other variables that could alter the findings of this
research. Additionally, Russia's potential ability to manipulate social media was not unique, as many
22
actors have the technological means to do so. However, Russia may have had the necessary
knowledge and capacity to employ media manipulation more efficiently on a larger scale. Presidential
elections are highly mediatized, and there was likely biased information disseminated by various
actors on both sides. This paper did not aim to determine Russia's innocence or culpability, but rather
to analyze whether Russia could have benefited from Trump's election. As Malcolm X famously said,
"The media's the most powerful entity on earth. They have the power to make the innocent guilty and
to make the guilty innocent, and that's power. Because they control the minds of the masses."
Numerous motives and actors could have been involved in the 2016 election, and further research
would be needed to unravel the complexities of this intriguing and highly consequential issue.
23
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Appendix
Declaration of Authorship
I hereby declare,
- that I have written this term paper independently;
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graphics, or that these materials were created by me;
- that the topic, the paper or parts of it have not already been the object of any work or examination
of another course, unless this has been expressly agreed with the faculty member in advance and is
stated as such in the paper;
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entire paper and that I comply with them accordingly;
- that I am aware that my term paper can be electronically checked for plagiarism and for third-party
authorship of human or technical origin and that I hereby grant the University of St.Gallen the
copyright according to the Examination Regulations as far as it is necessary for administrative
actions;
- that I am aware that the University will prosecute a violation of this Declaration of Authorship and
that disciplinary as well as criminal consequences may result, which may lead to expulsion from the
University or to the withdrawal of my title or degree.
By submitting this term paper, I confirm through my conclusive action that I am submitting the
Declaration of Authorship, that I have read and understood it, and that it is true.
Neuchâtel, April 17th 2024
Tiago Philip Reimann
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