The Ethics of Marketing to Vulnerable Populations
Author(s): David Palmer and Trevor Hedberg
Source: Journal of Business Ethics , August 2013, Vol. 116, No. 2 (August 2013), pp. 403413
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42001929
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Business Ethics
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J Bus Ethics (2013) 116:403-413
DOI 1 0. 1 007/s 1 055 1-012-1 476-2
The Ethics of Marketing to Vulnerable Populations
David Palmer • Trevor Hedberg
Received: 11 May 2012/ Accepted: 24 August 2012 /Published online: 6 September 2012
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
Abstract An orthodox view in marketing ethics is that it
Keywords Ethics • Marketing • Vulnerability • Market
is morally impermissible to market goods to specially
clients • Exploitation • Consumer interests
vulnerable populations in ways that take advantage of their
vulnerabilities. In his signature article "Marketing and the
Vulnerable," Brenkert (Bus Ethics Q Ruffin Ser 1:7-20,
Is it morally permissible to market goods to vulnerable
1998) provided the first substantive defense of this position, one which has become a well-established view in
populations - the elderly, the young, the poor, and so on?
Almost anyone will agree that a view of marketing ethics
marketing ethics. In what follows, we throw new light onthat eliminates all marketing to these groups would be too
marketing to the vulnerable by critically evaluating key restrictive, but most believe that there is at least one
components of Brenkerťs general arguments. Specifically, method of marketing to these groups that is morally
we contend that Brenkert has failed to offer us any per- impermissible. As Klein (2007) observes, "the ethics and
suasive reasons to think that it is immoral to market to the
social responsibility communities seem to agree that tar-
vulnerable in ways that take advantage of their vulnera-
geting vulnerable groups with marketing campaigns that
bility. Although Brenkert does highlight the fact that the
take advantage of their vulnerability is unjust" (p. 40;
specially vulnerable are at greater risk of being harmed by emphasis added). But is this consensus well-founded? And
already immoral marketing practices (e.g., deception, if so, what is it about taking advantage of a vulnerable
manipulation), he fails to establish that the specially vul-
person's vulnerability that makes such a marketing practice
nerable are a unique moral category of market clients or
immoral or unjust? Brenkert (1998) was perhaps the first to
that there are special moral standards that apply to them. provide a substantive defense of this position, one which
Moreover, even if Brenkert' s position were theoretically has become a well-established view in marketing ethics. In
defensible, the practical implications of his position are far his signature article "Marketing and the Vulnerable,"
less tenable than he suggests. If our criticisms are sound, Brenkert argues that it is morally wrong to market goods to
then Brenkert and others who endorse his position are these people in ways that take advantage of their vulnerseriously mistaken regarding how one can permissibly ability, although Brenkert leaves it open that it can be
market products to vulnerable populations, and, in addition, morally permissible to market goods to vulnerable poputhey have improperly categorized certain morally permis- lations if the marketing is not done in these ways.
sible marketing practices as being immoral.
Brenkert' s study has proven influential for two reasons: it
provides a concise, illuminating categorization of vulnerable
people, and it advances arguments that morally criticize the
practice of marketing to vulnerable groups. However, while
D. Palmer (El) • T. Hedberg
Department of Philosophy, University of Tennessee,
Knoxville, TN 37996-0480, USA
his categorization of vulnerable people has received signif-
icant discussion and expansion,1 his arguments against
e-mail: dpalmer6@utk.edu
T. Hedberg
e-mail: thedberg@utk.edu
1 For some examples, see Baker et al. (2005), Walsh and Mitchell
(2005), and Mansfield and Pinto (2008).
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404
D-
Palmer,
marketing
(3)
These vulnerabilities
make them more susceptible to
the
vulnerable
to
marketing
contend
to
hav
arti
to
the
vulnerable
b
With this categorization in hand, Brenkert argues that
of
Brenkerťs
gen
there are three significant upshots concerning the ethics of
components
reasons
Hedberg
harm by others than they
do to normal
adults.
scrutiny.2
In
this
critical
we
T.
that
Brenkert
has
that
immo
marketing to specially vulnerable populations (pp. 14-15).
think
it
is
fa
First , the specially vulnerable are significantly less able
take
advantage
of
than ordinary market clients - individuals who participate
Brenkert
does
highlight
the
fac
in the market as consumers - to protect (and in some cases
are
at
greater
risk
for
being
identify ) their own interests. Second , to market goods to the
marketing
practices
(e.g.,
dece
specially vulnerable in ways that take advantage of their
to
establish
that
the
specially
vulnerability is to treat them unfairly, and it is morally
category
of
market
clients
or
wrong for precisely this reason. Third, marketers can target
standards
that
apply
to
them.
the specially vulnerable but not in ways that take advantage
position
were
theoretically
de
of their vulnerability. In the next sections, we challenge
cations
of
his Brenkert'
position
are
far
le
s second and third claims.
our
criticisms
are
sound,
then
in
ways
that
endorse
one
his
can
tions
and,
certain
immoral.
position
permissibly
II
in
are
seriou
market
addition,
they
morally
permissible
According to Brenkert, marketing goods to the specially
vulnerable in ways that take advantage of their vulnerability is unfair. Moreover, this unfairness is the reason why
marketing goods to these people in this way is morally
I
wrong. But why is it unfair to market goods to the specially
Brenkert defines a vulnerable population as one that is
susceptible to harm by others. Of course, as he points out,
we are all susceptible to harm by others in one degree or
another, but surely we are not all vulnerable in the sense
that is relevant to the ethics of marketing. With this in
vulnerable in these ways? What reason is there to think that
such marketing is unfair? Brenkert does not directly
address these questions. The nearest he comes to answering
them is in the following passage:
...to market to [the specially vulnerable] in ways
mind, Brenkert isolates the "specially vulnerable" as the
which take advantage of their vulnerabilities, i.e., to
relevant population. According to Brenkert, the specially
vulnerable are characterized by the following three con-
seek to engage them in competitive effort to sell them
ditions (pp. 13-14):
vulnerabilities, is to treat them unfairly. Regardless of
(1) They suffer from at least one of the following
vulnerabilities, which separates them from the normal
adult population:
(a) physical vulnerabilities (e.g., allergies, sensitivity to chemicals),
(b) cognitive vulnerabilities (e.g., cognitive immaturity, senility),
(c) motivational vulnerabilities (e.g., grave illness,
grief), or
(d) social vulnerabilities (e.g., poverty).
(2) These vulnerabilities are due to factors largely
beyond their control, and
goods through the weaknesses characterizing their
whether they are actually harmed, they are being
taken advantage of. They have little or no control
over these features of their behavior (p. 14).
It appears that Brenkert is arguing as follows:
(1) To market goods to the specially vulnerable in ways
that take advantage of their vulnerability is to take
advantage of some fact about them - their vulnerability - over which they have little or no control.
(2) It is unfair to take advantage of a fact about someone
over which she has little or no control.
(3) Therefore, it is unfair to market goods to the specially
vulnerable in ways that take advantage of their
vulnerability.
This argument, however, is unsound. Premise (2) is
2 Gaski (2001) is a notable exception. Smith (2001) bases some of his
arguments on Brenkert' s ideas and analysis. Gaski raises criticisms
against Smith (pp. 29-30) that he believes could likewise be lodged
against Brenkert.
false. Sometimes it can be fair to take advantage of a fact
about someone over which she has little or no control. At
first glance, the following example would seem to show
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pr
h
m
Marketing
to
Vulnerable
Populations
405
that (2) is false. Imagine
aexample
boxer
who
takes
sense!" Again, this
shows that premise
(2) is
opponent's bad chin
by
him to t
false. Sometimes
it can punching
be fair to take advantage of a fact
about someonehas
over which little
that individual has
little orno
no
him out. The opponent
or
cont
his
control.
strength of his chin.
It is something determi
biology. But we do not
therefore
think
that it
To clarify,
our aim in offering this
further counterex-
the
boxer
chin
in
to
appropriate
that
it
was
hi
way.
it
weak,
the
him
was
weak,
You
need
for
tage
of
a
or
no
him plausibility
to do
derives so.
from the Moreover,
fact that it occurs in a sportingwe
boxer
out.
but
a
fact
w
if,
knowing
thatbetween
his
oppone
context
(where there's a tacit agreement
compet-
did itors
not
target
his
chin
as a
that it is
morally okay to take
advantage
of facts about
("Wait,"
we
say,
people over which
theywould
have little or no control)
rather"you
than
you
new
contrary
little
In
think
makefact,
to our originalwe
counterexample
- namely, that
that its
strange
knock
that,
target, ample
and
of,
to (2) istake
to sidestep anadvantage
objection that Brenkert might
this
didn't
try
punch
in a marketing
context to
(where there's
presumablyhim
no such
w
k
ther
coach!")
So,
this
example
agreement between
marketers
and consumers).
Our "big
se
to
premise
(2),avoids
itthis
can
fair to
and tall" store example
problem be
since, unlike
about someone
over
which
that i
the boxer case, it does occur in the context of marketing.
control.
Clarifying this aim of the "big and tall" store case helps
Counterexamples similar
our
case
us to see why a possibleto
objection
to this case
would not of th
are fairly common:
minimally,
similar
cas
succeed.
Brenkert might respond to it by
drawing on his
constructed
might
to
their
athletic
as
to
this
context.
rexamples
long
involving
any
competitive
sport.
distinction
between
disadvantaged groups and specially
object
is
B
strain
counterexamples
vulnerable groups,of
and arguing
that since tall people are
Perhaps
theand
plausibility
merely disadvantaged
not specially vulnerable, the of
t
derivedexample
from
anthat
assumed
agreem
does not show
(2) is false in the pertinent
competitors context,
- namely,
parties
since what's at issue inboth
the present argument
is the
they
do
not
ag
violate
the
competition's
unfairness of marketing
to specially
vulnerable populations
e
rules, they can do and
anything
toto win,
includ
not the unfairness of marketing
(merely) disadvanadvantage of their opponents'
weaknesses
(e
taged groups.3 In reply, though,
given that our aim in
weaknesses
trol).
This
particular
between
do
not
exist
forpositing
reasons
beyond
this new counterexample
to (2) is the
simply tooppon
tacit
agreement
renders
premise
(2)
respond to the possible
objection that Brenkert
might make
context, but
since
no
similar
agreem
of our original boxer counterexample, we do not need a
marketers
show
that
marketing.
and
consumers,
case in which
the group being marketedthese
to is specially coun
the
argument
fails
the
vulnerable
and not simply disadvantaged.
To show thatin
(2)
is false in a way that sidesteps Brenkert's possible objec-
We respond to this objection by proposing a second
tion to the boxer case, we only need to provide a case
counterexample, one that occurs in the context of market-
where (2) is false in the context of marketing. We think that
ing and thereby eludes the objector's concerns. Consider
the owner of a "big and tall" store, a shop that sells clothes
the "big and tall" store case does just this. Whether the
people being marketed to are specially vulnerable or
to individuals who are bigger and taller than normal. We do
(merely) disadvantaged is irrelevant here.4
not typically think that a person's height is something over
In reply, Brenkert might concede the point but offer a
which he has any control. Like the boxer's chin, a person's
further argument for the claim that it is unfair to market
height is determined largely (if not wholly) by his genes,
but we do not therefore conclude that it is unfair for the
take advantage of their vulnerability, one that does not turn
store owner to target especially tall individuals in mar-
on the claim that marketing goods to these people in this
keting campaigns. That is, we do not tend to think that it is
unfair for the owner to take advantage of the fact that these
way would be taking advantage of something over which
they have little or no control. To this end, consider the
individuals are unusually tall in deciding what groups in
following later passage from his article:
goods to specially vulnerable individuals in ways which
the community she should market to. In fact, we do not just
take it to be permissible for the store owner to determine
3 On pp. 8-9, Brenkert distinguishes between disadvantaged groups
her marketing strategy in this way - we think that it's the
and specially vulnerable groups. The difference, roughly, is that while
right thing for her to do. To motivate this intuition, imagine
the disadvantaged are (merely) impaired or unequal in some way with
respect to others in their attempt to obtain various good and services,
the specially vulnerable are (in addition) open to suffering harm from
those who market goods to them.
how we would react if we found out that the owner was
marketing to persons of all shapes and sizes, including very
short and very skinny people. "What are you doing?" we
would say. "That marketing strategy doesn't make any
4 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising a concern that led to
this paragraph.
Ö Springer
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406
In
D.
Palmer,
T.
Hedberg
short,
unfair
if
a advantage
group
is
specially
v
of someone's vulnerability
entails treating him
as a mere means to one's
own ends. This claim seems
false.
techniques
which
would
n
them
harm
isConsider
still
the
of
te
again the case
of the owneruse
of the "big and
tall"
individuals
unfairly
throug
store. In marketing
to individuals who are unusually
tall,
through
theirthe vulnerabilities
store owner does seem to be taking advantage of the (p.
such
These
remarks
different
goods
to
fact that these individuals are unusually tall. But - here's
suggest
that
Brenk
the crucial question - in taking advantage of the unusual
argument
for
the
claim
height of these individuals, is the store owner treating these
specially
vulnerable
ind
individuals as a mere means to her own end? We doubt it.
advantage
of
their
vulnerabilit
While it is true that she is using these individuals as a
makes
it
unfair
to
market
goods
ways
is
harm,
that
means to her own end (i.e., as a means to the end of making
the
marketing,
even
a profit), it does not seem she is treating them as merely a
manipulates
them,
and
means to this end. After all (and assuming that she's an
about
being
This
appeal
t
subject
to
this
sort
o
otherwise moral store owner), the owner treats these indito
the
unfairness
of
viduals with respect when they come into her shop. She
Kantian roots. Let's recall Kant's second formulation of the
does not coerce or compel them to enter her store, nor does
Categorical Imperative: "Act in such a way that you treat
she coerce or compel them into buying anything. She gives
humanity, whether in your own person or in any other
them the best advice that she can about which clothes best
person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as
fit them (in her honest opinion) and which clothes look
a means."5 With this idea in mind, one might read Brenkert
good. She would seem to be treating these individuals with
as claiming that to manipulate someone in this way is to
respect - and, hence, not treating them as a mere means to
treat her as a "mere means" to one's own ends rather than
her own end. (Of course, if she were to lie to these inditreating the person as an end in herself. Brenkert suggests
viduals or to coerce them into purchasing goods, then she
this line of reasoning in his explicit rejection of a conseno doubt would be treating them as a mere means to her
quentialist approach to marketing to vulnerable populations
own end. But this, of course, is a different matter.) So, the
(pp. 10-1 1). He argues that even if such marketing were to
mere fact that the store owner is taking advantage of the
maximize total utilities and the customers were not dis-
height and size of these individuals in her marketing does
satisfied, this type of marketing would be unacceptable
not entail that she is treating these individuals as a mere
because of considerations that a purely consequentialist
means to her own end. Hence, premise (1') in this revised
approach overlooks. Specifically, the vulnerable groups
argument is false. To market goods to the specially vulbeing targeted "are not competent to evaluate the product
nerable in ways that take advantage of their vulnerability
marketed to them," and thus, a consequentialist justificadoes not entail treating them as mere means to a marketer's
tion of this marketing practice "permits treating some
own ends.
individuals merely as means to the ends of others" (p. 10).
What if Brenkert were to press the objection again that
Such an action is wrong because it fails to treat the spetall people are not specially vulnerable - they're simply
cially vulnerable with moral respect.
disadavantaged? In reply, we offer a further counterexWith these ideas established, Brenkert could deploy the
ample to (1;), one that all sides would agree involves a
following argument:
specially vulnerable group. Take, for example, a marketer
(1') To market goods to the specially vulnerable in ways
who markets healthy food to young children as part of a
that take advantage of their vulnerability is to treat
government-sponsored marketing campaign to improve
them as a mere means to one's own ends.
children's health. Suppose the marketing is done entirely
(2') It is unfair to treat someone as a mere means to one's
altruistically: the marketer's sole motive for the campaign
own ends.
is to benefit the children; the company's financial consid-
(3') Therefore, it is unfair to market goods to the
erations are not relevant. Given that the marketer is acting
specially vulnerable in ways that take advantage ofsolely in the children's own interests, it seems a stretch to
their vulnerability.
say that she is treating them merely as a means to her own
end even if she does market to them in a way that takes
Is this any better than the first argument? We do not
advantage of their (say, cognitive and motivational) vul-
think so. For the sake of argument, we will grant that
nerabilities. After all, given that she's acting solely in their
premise (2') is true. The key claim here, we think, concerns
own interests when marketing to them, for their own benthe claim expressed in premise (1') - the claim that taking
efit, it seems that she is according them the proper moral
respect. After all, a parent who acts in these ways to
5 Kant (2002, p. 230).
encourage healthy habits in her children is not condemned
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Marketing
for
somehow
ends,
in
to
even
lower
if
then
this
while
407
flos
for
If
our
reasoning
But her.
as clear as the
verdict
in Quicksand
might seem,
here
of
using
marketing
campaign
almost no actual cases of exploitation
are this extreme or show
clear-cut. Other factors
often render it more
difficult to
clearly
specially
vulnerable
a
that,
to
example)
their
stances (i.e., extreme
duress) are notincreased
legally enforceable.
bills
type
conclude
special
Populations
treating
them
as amade
mere
means
might
explain why contracts
under such circum(for
dental
false
we
Vulnerable
contrary
(1'),
marketing
discern whether to
an action
is properly
classified as
vulnerable
g
in
ways
that
exploitative.
To illustrate
this point,take
consider some advanta
exam-
vulnerability does not
ples entail
from Altman andtreating
Wellman (2009):
them as a
to one's own ends.6
[I]magine a number of scenarios in which a taxicab
Nevertheless, there may be another way that m
company might offer to give people rides from Jerito the vulnerable fails to show the targeted gr
cho to Jerusalem. In the first instance, imagine that
priate moral respect. Perhaps Brenkert views m
masses of people walk the road from Jericho to
these groups as a type of exploitation - the a
Jerusalem, and that many of them get so tired by the
another's disadvantaged bargaining position
midway point that they would gladly pay handsomely
disproportionate benefit for oneself. On thi
to be driven the rest of the way. There is no objection
vulnerable are exploited because marketers use
to a taxi company capitalizing on this fact, even if it
vantaged bargaining position caused by their v
ties
to
secure
higher
Admittedly,
charged very high rates for its service. The morality
profits than they otherwis
of these prices would be very different, however, if
exploitative
actions
can
genera
the desire for rides sprang from a different source.
feelings of moral unease in us. Consider the foll
Imagine that the owner of the company set up a taxi
which we call Quicksand :
stand halfway between Jericho and Jerusalem only
One day, while trekking
through
the
jungle, A
because she knew
that there was a gang
of hoodlums
encounters a man trapped
in quicksand.
who routinely attacked
and broke the legs of people The si
man begs for Allan's onhelp,
but
Allan
is berelucta
that road. Under
these circumstances,
it would
offer
pull
in
it.
the
He
lacks
man
himself.
out
the impermissibly
proper
equipment
exploitative
for the taxi company to and
without
a little
charge the at
victimsleast
of the gang exorbitant
prices for risk
its
After
cou
of
f
some
however,
services. deliberation,
The central idea here is that it is wrong
to
offers
to help the sinking
man
on
condition
t
gain from charging
prices
which the
others accept
only
Allan helps him escape
quicksand,
becausethe
they are the
victims of injustice (p. 155).the man
become Allan's servant for the remainder of hi
One of the most basic observations to make from these
As he sinks deeper, the man reluctantly agrees
cases is that the cause of a person's disadvantageous
saves him and then demands that the rescued man
bargaining position plays a crucial role in whether someone
adhere to their agreement.
else taking advantage of this person's bargaining position
Allan's behavior is morally condemnable: he has taken qualifies as exploitation. There are limits to the influence of
advantage of someone else's unfair bargaining position to
secure a benefit for himself that he would otherwise have
these factors, of course. Suppose in Quicksand that the pit
was surrounded by signs reading "TURN BACK! QUICK-
never been able to obtain. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any SAND AHEAD!" Even if the jungle explorer became
scenario beyond impending death where someone would trapped because he was too hasty (or irrational) to properly
forego all his other commitments to become someone heed these warnings, Allan still seems despicable for trying
else's servant. Our moral repulsion to these kinds of actions to take advantage of the explorer's pending death to acquire
a servant. Nevertheless, a more general point still holds:
when one enters a disadvantaged bargaining position as a
6 What if Brenkert was to respond here by arguing that we're
appealing to a utilitarian justification of the permissibility of result of one's voluntary actions, this can make an otherwise
marketing to young children in this way, a justification that he wants exploitative act morally permissible. Thus, exploitation is
to reject? In reply, Brenkert seems to imply that a justification of
most likely to occur when one's being in a disadvantaged
marketing based on maximizing "total utilities" is wrong because this
bargaining
position is the result of the unjust actions of
sort of justification "permits treating some individuals merely as a
means to the ends of others" (p. 10). But as our example of the others or other factors which are beyond one's control.7
government-sponsored healthy eating campaign to young children
shows, the mere fact that a justification for marketing is based on 7 Admittedly, whether a particular situation is exploitative may hinge
maximizing total utilities does not entail that the people being significantly on what theory of exploitation one endorses. For
marketed to are being treated merely as a means to one's own ends. instance, while some may think benefiting from another's disadvan(We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the example of a taged bargaining position is sufficient for the action to be exploitative,
government-sponsored campaign to young children.)
others may claim that excessively benefiting from other's bargaining
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408
D.
Palmer,
T.
Hedberg
Here,
Brenkerťs
gains
some
necessary forview
their proprietors to make
a profit and stay in
business.8
he
establishes
that
the
vulnerabil
specially
beyond
vulnerable
largely
Now, as a point ofare
clarification, there
is no doubt that the
their
observations
(1*)
control.
Thus,
owner of a "big and tall" store could engage
in exploitative
about
practices. If exploitation
she discovered that she owned the only store
acqu
Bren
to
selling certain sizes of clothes with a 100-mile radius and
Marketing
to
the
pr
specially
v
started charging $300 for T-shirts in those sizes, we could
disadvantaged
bargaining
position
very well accuse her of exploiting her customers. We might
profits
than
the
marketers
could
o
also accuse her of exploitation if her marketing campaigns
(2*)
The
specially
vulnerable
ar
contained misleading information or she tried to swindle
bargaining
beyond
(3*)
It
is
their
position
largely
her customers after they entered her store. But these
control.
practices of price gouging, deception, and manipulation are
unfair
use
a
person's
bec
disa
wrong regardless of what the targeted population is: their
to
secure
additional
be
wrongness does not give us any reason to think that the
when
the
other
party's
bargaining
ethics of marketing to the specially vulnerable is any diflargely
from
factors
beyond
her
co
ing
position
ferent from the ethics of marketing to the general
(4*)
Therefore,
it
is
unfair
to
ma
population.
vulnerable
in
ways
that
take
ad
Brenkert might mention here that the specially vulner-
vulnerability.
While this argument is formidable, we argue that it should
be rejected because (3*) is false.
Let's return a final time to the owner of the "big and
tall" store. It is surely true that the store owner secures
greater profits by marketing to unusually large and tall
customers than she would if he did not target these individuals in his marketing campaigns. These individuals find
themselves in a disadvantaged bargaining position with
regard to these products because of factors largely beyond
their control: being unusually large or tall, their clothing
options are more limited than typical consumers, so a
specialty store of this nature will appeal to them. However,
despite these considerations, there does not appear to be
anything wrong with the store owner marketing to these
individuals. It even seems permissible for her to charge
more for these clothes than the prices of similar products at
more common retail stores. After all, it is common practice
to charge a higher price for specialty products which are of
a higher quality than those one could find at more general
stores, and since these stores are catering to a smaller
population of consumers, these higher prices are often
able are at greater risk of being exploited than the general
population because they have more weaknesses for marketers to take advantage of. For various reasons, the spe-
cially vulnerable are not as able to recognize or resist
marketing campaigns that are deceptive or manipulative.
This point seems correct, but it is not enough to ground
Brenkert' s position. At most, these observations might
justify being more cautious about what kinds of marketing
to the specially vulnerable we permit, but they do not
suggest that there is anything uniquely unfair either with
marketing to the specially vulnerable or with marketing to
them in ways that take advantage of their vulnerabilities.
The specially vulnerable are not a unique moral category of
market clients: the factors that make marketing to the
specially vulnerable wrong are the same factors that will
make any marketing wrong. If such marketing practices are
more wrong when they target the specially vulnerable, then
while the degree of wrongness may be higher (because the
specially vulnerable are less able to resist these immoral
marketing tactics than ordinary market clients), the kind of
wrongness is nevertheless the same. Therefore, if the
standards for marketing to the specially vulnerable are no
different than the standards for marketing to ordinary
market clients, then concerns about exploitation do not
seem sufficient to ground an argument establishing that
marketing to the specially vulnerable is unfair, even if it is
Footnote 7 continued
position is necessary for the act to be exploitative. We do not intend
8 Note that the claim that tall persons are (merely) disadvantaged
here to commit either ourselves or Brenkert to any particular theory rather
of
than specially vulnerable would not help Brenkert here. All
exploitation. The prior discussion serves only to highlight some
we're trying to do is show that (3*) is false. In order to do this, we
general features that should be common to all theories of exploitation
need to come up with a situation in which it can be fair to use a
(e.g., inequalities between the bargaining positions of the transacting
person's disadvantageous bargaining position to secure additional
parties, the stronger party taking advantage of the weaker party), benefits
and
for oneself when the other party's bargaining position results
our refutation of this strand of argument does not hinge on endorsing
from factors largely beyond her control. Plausibly, the marketing
a particular definition of what constitutes exploitation.
strategy of the "big and tall" store owner fits this bill.
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Marketing
done
in
group
At
Vulnerable
ways
to
this
the
to
that
generate
point.
It's
degree
of
409
use
of th
tothe
thevulnerabilities
specially vulnerabl
increased
profit.
their vulnerability.
At
m
Brenkert
might argue
that may
we h
marketing
practices
point,
not
disadvantaged
Populations
just
thatseverely
the specially
vulne
more
or more
bargaining
position
also that
would
wrongbut
normal
pop
incompetence
as market
clients hints
that t
However,
Brenkert
is
aware
of.
is
crucial,
This
he
degree
of incompetence
as m
unfair
to take advantage
o
suggest,
because
it makes
able than
ordinary
markett
might
vulnerable significantly
less
able than
ests. He
suggests
that ordin
peopl
clients to protect their
own
interests.
With
protect
their
own interests
mind,
Brenkert
market
to
could
argue
that
pass
a certain
what makes
threshold
for
specially fulfillment
vulnerableof
people
wa
these in
condit
advantage
of their vulnerability
that market
treated as a is
market
client
people in these ways
takes advantage
of
ind
morally
be treated as
other
are significantly lessstatement
able than can
normal
market
be interpre
protect
their
marketing
own
interests
and
that
this is what
neither
one
establishes
that
practices
unfair.
In other
words, it
(or otherwise
immoral)
ab
market to specially vulnerable
vulnerable
in wa
in people
ways that
tak
advantage of their vulnerability
because
in
Suppose Brenkert
means
take advantage of people
who are
significan
significantly
less
able to p
than
ordinary
However,
see
why
be
unfair
less
not
able
Brenkertspecially
suggests
two responses
vulnerable
are no
it
for
his needs.
According
t
activity
of marketing
can
unfair We
to take
advantage
of peo
consider
this conclusi
less able
than it
ordinary
market
cl
First,
directly
contradic
is
significantly
their
liability
earlier
to
own
be
(or
interests
because
such"III")
people
ha
lyze
in section
that
to
be swayed,
to target
the s
directions they
which
benefit
domay
not do
so in other
ways
harm their interests"
(p. 14).
However,
to
nerability.
Second,
if it tur
enticed
may
advantage
of people
who
are s
would not
even be
possibl
ordinary
market
clients
prote
clients
at all
under to
this
inte
sufficient
response,
tect
not conclusion
find this argument
conv
is not that
ma
take
than
is
do
consider morally
the following
w
wrongquestion:
but rathe
to
interests?
which
market
clients
their o
they
are to
no protect
longer market
we
in
point,
swayed
their
susceptibility)...
marketers
own
uniquely
the
or
mere
fact that
such people
ar
specially
vulnerable
at all,
moved
in ways that
benefit oth
implausible
implications.
A
interests
wrong
does
not entail
that
the article,
there
are
or
the take
marketers'.
We have
to
that
advantage
of the
vulnerable
in
bility.
what
it shows
is that or
such
pe
nerable
somehow,
else
a
ordinary
market
b
help them
will clients
remain of
utte
immoral marketing
practices,
Brenkert is
sensitive prac
to t
At
greater
by
most,
risk
already
misleading
ways
there
strong
unfair
in marketing
to
marketing
to the vulnerabl
than
deceptive
marketing
that are
mo
specially
vulnerable,
and
for all market clients,
whether
specially vulne
remarks
contradicts
one o
Hence, the most we that
can conclude
from the de
ob
this interpretation
that
the
or
vulnerable
significantly
There is, are
however,
a secon
interests
(and with
thereby
more
consistent
Brenkert
swayed or moved in ways
benefit others
bu
that that
the specially
vulnerabl
own interests) is that are
we a
need
to be
even more
special
category
of
protect
specially
their
own
marketing to them to
be sure
that we're
not
moral
standards
apply.9
Th
generally immoral marketing
practices:
decep
own interests generates sp
gouging, and so on. But this conclusion does n
claim that Brenkert seeks to defend: it does no
there's
anything
9 We thank an anonymous
uniquely
wrong
or unfair
abou
Brenkert's
statement
in greate
Springer
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410
D.
present
may
Palmer,
be
marketing
ordinary
What are the implications of . .to
. [my] analysis?
A first
possible
to
market
to the
interpretation might be that marketers may not mar-
Intuitively,
the
that
preceding
this
Hedberg
when
still
population
the
T.
specially
vulnerable
ket to the specially vulnerable at
all. This is mistaken.
raises
special
moral
There are obviously
cases in which those
who are
sentiment
rests
on
a
specially vulnerable, e.g.,
the elderly or the
grieving,
population
benefit from learning about them. The preceding
negligent marketing that are not raised by the presence of
argument contends that any marketing to the vul-
ordinary market clients. Marketing practices that are ordi-
nerable cannot morally be undertaken in a way which
narily permissible may prove deceptive or manipulative when
trades upon their vulnerabilities (p. 15).
aimed at the specially vulnerable. Deception, manipulation,
To be clear, we take the issue here to be whether it is ever
coercion, and other similar practices are always wrong,
morally permissible for marketers to target the specially
however, so we once again reach the following conclusion:
vulnerable as a single group. The issue is not whether
while the specially vulnerable are at greater risk for being
marketers may target them as part of the larger target
harmed through immoral marketing practices, there is no
population. To see what we mean, distinguish between goods
unique class of moral concerns that applies to them. Accordwhose intended audience is the general population (a popuingly, there is nothing uniquely unfair about marketing to
lation which would include the specially vulnerable) - goods
them in ways that take advantage of their vulnerability: such
such as apples, lawnmowers, and washing machines come to
practices will sometimes be wrong, but they will be wrong for
mind - and goods whose intended audience is solely the
reasons that apply to all market clients. If, for example, marspecially vulnerable. An example of the latter kind of good is
keting to them in this way manipulates them into purchasing a
panic buttons designed for the elderly to be able to call for help
product, then this act would be wrong for the same reason it
in cases of emergency. Panic buttons are not intended for any
would be wrong to manipulate an ordinary market client into
other group besides the specially vulnerable.
purchasing a product - because (at least prima facie ) manipWith this in mind, Brenkert wants to allow that it can be
ulating anyone is wrong. Consequently, it is inappropriate to
morally permissible for marketers to market panic buttons to
classify the specially vulnerable as a distinct moral group,
the elderly, so long as they do not do so in ways that take
although marketing to them will often demand that we be
advantage of their vulnerability. In response, we ask whether
more cautious than we would be toward other populations.
such marketing is even possible : is it even possible for panic
Recall that this fourth argument rests on the following
buttons to be marketed to the elderly without at least some
claim: marketing to the specially vulnerable is wrong
advantage being taken of their vulnerability (e.g., their frailty,
because it is unfair to take advantage of those who are less
their increased likelihood of falling down and being without
able than ordinary market clients to protect their own
immediate help)? We do not see how this can be done.
interests. Since we have been unable to find adequate sup-
Moreover, if it is impossible for marketers to market goods to
port for this claim, we conclude that this fourth argument
the specially vulnerable without taking advantage of their
does not show that marketing to the specially vulnerable in
vulnerabilities, then surely it is a moot point for Brenkert to
ways that take advantage of their vulnerability is unfair.
Having now refuted the four different arguments that we
claim that it is morally permissible for marketers to market to
these individuals so long as they do not take advantage of their
vulnerability. His claim about when it is moral permissible for
Brenkert has failed to establish the claim that marketing
marketers to target the specially vulnerable would have no
goods to the specially vulnerable in ways that take advanpractical import whatsoever.10
tage of their vulnerability is unfair. Moreover, since he
claims that this unfairness is what makes the activity mor-
ally wrong, then for all Brenkert has shown, it is morally
10 Perhaps Brenkert might argue that the properties we've chosen to
permissible to market goods to specially vulnerable popu- highlight the elderly' s vulnerability - their fragility, increased likelilations in ways that take advantage of their vulnerability. hood of falling down, and so on - are not the relevant kinds of
properties. He might argue that he can allow that it is perfectly
permissible - and, indeed, possible - to market to the elderly by
pointing out this sort of information, but it would be a different matter
Ill
if the marketers targeted the cognitive difficulties such a population
faces, seeking to confuse and instill fear in them. In reply, we wonder
We now turn to Brenkert' s claim that it can be morally whether a marketer could "point out" this sort of information without
instilling, and thereby trading on, the elderly's fear of falling down or
permissible for marketers to target the specially vulnerable
their fear of being fragile, If not, then our point that it becomes (on
so long as they do not do so in ways that take advantage of
Brenkert' s analysis) impossible to market to the specially vulnerable
their vulnerability. Brenkert writes:
mis
unique.
The
specially
require various products
and services
and would
because their existence raises concerns about reckless and
can extract from Brenkerťs article, we conclude that
d
co
still stands.
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Marketing
to
Vulnerable
Populations
41
1
In reply, suppose the
target
audience
for
m
marketing
is so often examined
with regard to how
it
panic buttons was not
increases the
profits, it elderly
can be easy to forget themselve
that it has more
families
goods
instead.
for
intended
take
not
the
Would
thisSpecifically,
be an
example
holistic benefits.
it raises
consumers' aware- of
specially
ness of available
vulnerable
products and services and causes
(since
them to
of
the
panic
in ifways
seriously
consider
whether buttons)
their lives would be better
recipients
advantage
among
of
the
m
th
their
vulnerabilities
they were
to purchase a particular product or(since
service. In
the
target
of
the
this audience
way, marketing can be both
informative
andmarketin
helpful for
not think so. Imagine
themaking
following
advertisem
consumers,
it potentially beneficial
for all parties
"What if your elderly
mother
falls
down
the s
involved. Although Brenkert may be right to resist a purely
she's alone? How would
she
While
consequentialist
analysisget
because ofhelp?"
the morally relevant
grant that this does
notit omits,
take
direct
advant
considerations
he appears
to have overlooked
the
elderly's
ence
of
their
vulnerability
(since
they're
the
ta
salience
of the negative
social consequencesnot
entailed by
his
position. it surely takes indirect
marketing),
the
vulnerability.
It Second,
does
this
by
taking
there is sometimes
nothing
objectionable
about
advan
vulnerability
of
the
on
their
of
losing
mother,
bilitiestheir
as a means of making
a product appealing toseeing
them.
so
on.
the
fear
But
it
is
elderly's
taking
vulnerable
view,
as
There
resist
that
it
is,
buttons
panic
be
in
fact,
the
of
just
as
wrong,
person even cites
some morally
statistics to support her claims
and
them
directly
to
then stresses how
panic buttons assure that
their the
buyers
a
m
t
on
elderly
however, have
another
some guaranteed assistanceway
should any suchthat
situation
analysis
to
Brenk
inarise.
this
section:
perhaps
he w
Is there really
anything wrong with this
activity?
morally
impermissible
to m
Clearly, the salesperson
is highlighting the customer's
elderly
precisely
because
special vulnerability
to try to sell the product,
but empha-
marke
buttons
cannot
be
done
without
takin
sizing this
information
seems perfectly
appropriate. In the
advantage of
the
elderly's
vulnerabilit
absence
of any manipulation
or statistical inaccuracies,
indirect)
lier
panic these
buttons
to families
situations can often be life-threatening.
The sales-
would
is,
to
indirect
Supposesee
someone how
tries to sell antaking
elderly woman a panic
advantage
of
risk of personal
injurytheir
than other people vulnerability.
and suggests that
of
marketing
our
her
vulnerability
could
be
any
button by mentioning
that her old age
puts her
at greater better
direct
marketing
hard
family
members
themselve
using facts about a potential
customer's special vulnera-
mentioned
risk
of
that
this
being
that
the
specially
vulnerable
see
there is nothing
that makes this marketing
technique any
manipulated
and
by adver
morally different from
trying to misled
sell Gatorade to an athlete
might
justify
a its
cautionary
approach
by describing
active ingredients and how it helps
one's
to
to these populations.
Perhaps
Brenkert
could
body recover
from rigorous exercise.
Now if the elderly
womanpanic
were senile and therefore
unable to make a rational
because the appeal of
buttons
relies exc
the
vulnerabilities
this
product
ert's
in
a
awareness
nerable
would
can
be
resist,
able
to
any
case,
First,
him
that
to
some
marketing
the spe
However, it would
be impermissible to market to
to her not
their
is su
because benefit,
it is wrong to marketthis
to her in a move
way takes
but
it may
be but
the
only
mane
advantage of also
her vulnerability
because she
is not an
wishes
to
his
position
con
individual who
can keep
properly participate
in the
market at all.
find this As
position
indefensible
for
Brenkert mentions, morally
justifiable market trans-
if
we
of decision
the
is no wa
evenelderly,
after being presentedthere
with all the relevant
morally
Giv
facts, it wouldpermissible
be ethically dubious to market way.
to her.
he
Brenkert's actions
position
actually
entails th
require that market
clients have certain competenkinds of products cannot
be
marketed
at all, th
cies, including the ability to make rational choices after
social consequences will
be
severe.
Panic
button
considering the characteristics of various products which
be
the
we
only
market
groups
why
are
if
that
would
these
the
same
we
cannot
market.
After
all,
they
can buy.11 Brenkert
specifically identifies
"the
insurance
effectively
withou
severely mentally ill,
incompetent elderly and young chil-
are
we
precisely
whether
to
items
life
they
more
likely
to
die
than
others
dren"
as those who clearly
cannot
be market
clients. Thus,
consider
those
gr
it might not
appear thattargeting
Brenkert's position regarding
the
the
people
that
need
to careful
cognitively vulnerable
is correct,
but this appearance
is
have
adequate
insurance.
misleading for two life
reasons. First,
the reason why it is in Thus,
individuals seems quite appropriate. W
observation
about
marketing
panic
but
11 Brenkert also identifies several other competencies that market
elderly: these individuals
like
precisely
clients must have (p. seem
12), such as awareness
of legal rights
and the
who have a reasonable need for this service. Because
ability to shop at more than one place.
â Springer
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412
D.
fact
Palmer,
T.
Hedberg
impermissible
to
market
marketing
tactic
people
in
ways
that
take
adva
or
otherwise
mis
has
nothing
to
with
how
Todo
clarify,
Bren
to notion
these
groups
is
that
the
are
not
market
people
clients
that
mark
they
one
can
market
or
sell
produc
special
kind
of
m
the
cognitively
vulnerable
we
think
that
hi
education
andpractices
shopping
- sophis
those
more
is
said)
on
these
areindividu
wrong
r
deficient
that
they
not
that
theare
speciall
harmed
byin
these
capable
of
participating
the
vulnerable
will
of
though
they
will
be
unlikely
keener,
more manipulative
sophisticated
or
sh
d
while
it
may
be
one
impermissible
of
degree
ra
clients
will
also
cognitively
vulnerable
(i.e.,
th
ents),
there
remain
(although
morally
genera
pe
to
others
who We
are argued
specially
again
vu
marketing
ther
First,
marketing
the
the
that
IV
we
question
takes
advan
specially
do
vul
not
(at
vulnerability.
there
We
have
namely,
ways
W
clear
target
the
marketing
specia
goods
abilities
to
take
advantage
mak
of
th
ways
which
are
because
it
treats
them
target
advantage
claim
no
on
our
earlier
ar
critiqued
two
of
Br
that
that
wrong
can
is
by
the
of
u
The
upshot
of
specially
vulnera
accepted
Brenke
their
vulnerabilit
nerable
populatio
examining
Brenkert
pathizers
must
different
arguments
that p
of
them
failed,
and
we
ther
us
to
conclude
th
four
All
that
use
th
given ways
us
convincing
re
has
not
the
specially
vulnerability
is
any
morally
d
vulnerable
in
way
population
in
as
any
morally
wa
dif
bilities
to While
increas
general
population.12
most
noteworthy
specially
vulnerable
may
be
the
ma
manipulative keeping
or
misleading
m
techniques
tion
the
the
not
they
specially
vulnerable
are
th
article,
wh
Acknowledgments
general
population:
portra
ymous
reviewers
fo
omit
relevant
information
consumer,
to
manipulative
as
are
impermissible
ethical
marke
Thus,
the
basic
all
target.
the
of
specially
victimized
this
and
version.
so
on.
by
vulnerable
immoral
References
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a
not
to
can
permissibly
instead
to
Ultimate
is
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mora
market
to
Altman, A., & Wellman, C. H. (2009). A liberal theory of
improve
our
means
international justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13 Sher (2011) proposes a framework for identifying marketing
12 In sect. "Ill", we noted a probable exception to this with regard to
tactics that are immorally manipulative that serves as a helpful and
marketing to those with cognitive vulnerabilities that prevent rational
choice.
recent example of how we might approach this task.
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All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
t
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t
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Gentry,
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