국제관계원론 9/10 [Principles of International Relations]
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destruction as a direct threat to its interests.
WHY ARE THERE WARS?
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e.g., Iraq War: U.S. saw Iraq's potential weapons of mass
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Most countries are at peace most of the time.
U.S. launched missiles against Syria in 2017 in response to
the alleged use of chemical weapons on civilians
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Relative Power Concerns: Major powers often engage in
conflicts to prevent shifts in the balance of power.
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e.g., during the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union
intervened in smaller countries to maintain global
influence.
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Britain and France opposed Germany’s victory over Poland
in WWII due to concerns about a stronger Germany
dominating Europe.
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War: at least 1000 battle deaths
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Interstate War: Involves organized conflict between states.
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Civil War: Occurs within a state, involving actors such as the
communism, which could tilt regional power towards the
government and a rebel group.
Soviet Union.)
Rarity of War: War is uncommon; most countries are at peace most
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Conflicts Over Regime Type: The desire to change or
influence another country's government.
of the time. war is not the norm.
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It’s not natural and can be predicted
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Territorial Conflicts: Territory is frequently a source of conflict.
"What are these parties fighting over?" : This question
Historical data shows that over half of the 155 wars studied
addresses the interests at stake
involved territorial disputes. Territory may be valuable for
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e.g., territory, resources, policies, or ideologies)
various reasons, such as:
"Why are they fighting?" : This looks into the motivations and
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minerals (e.g., Iran-Iraq War over oil fields); they enhance
conflict
state power and economic stability
Security Dilemma: This occurs when one state’s efforts to
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Cultural/Historical Significance: territories with cultural or
historical importance (e.g., conflicts involving Israel and its
fear, which can ultimately escalate to war (preventive motive)
neighbors).
Bargaining Model: bargaining model views war as a process to
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Pakistan is driven by historical and religious claims. 인도와 파키스탄
force but emphasizes the costs of war.
이 독립할 당시, 힌두교 통치자가 있던 카슈미르 지역을 인도가 병합하
States often use the threat of force to get better deals,
려 했지만, 파키스탄은 이 지역의 주로 이슬람교도 인구를 근거로 카슈
but they are usually better off avoiding actual conflict.
미르에 대한 권리를 주장했습니다. 이 분쟁은 티베트 인근 지역에 대한
The model suggests that states prefer bargaining and
중국의 주장으로 인해 더욱 복잡해졌음
& negotiating > war)
Misperceptions and Mistakes: wars may result from inaccurate
judgments. Leaders may overestimate their chances of success
or underestimate the costs of war.
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Kashmir Conflict: The dispute over Kashmir between India and
This model shares realism's view on the use of military
only go to war when peaceful resolution fails. (bargaining
e.g., during World War I, European leaders underestimated
the length and impact of the conflict)
Strategic Interactions: Conflicts arise due to unresolved issues over
strategic interests. Since the international system lacks a central
authority (like courts or legislatures), states often resolve conflicts
through bargaining. However, when bargaining fails, conflicts may
escalate to war.
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Realism is one of the main theories discussed, viewing war as
Interests and Influence of Groups: wars might occur not only
a result of the lack of international authority. This perspective
due to state interests but also because they benefit influential
suggests that in an anarchic international system, states are
groups within states (e.g., corporations, arms merchants,
left to resolve disputes on their own, often resulting in war.
military) . These groups may push for war since the costs do
not directly impact them.
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also increase their defenses, leading to an arms race driven by
obtain valuable resources or strategic assets.
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Strategic Value: Certain locations hold military
importance (e.g., Golan Heights in Israel).
neighboring states to feel threatened. These states may then
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Economic Resources: valuable resources like oil or
strategic interactions that can escalate disputes into armed
increase its security (e.g., building up its military) cause
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During the Cold War, U.S. and the Soviet Union supported
opposing governments to align with their interests)
two questions:
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e.g., in Ukraine, Russia sought to pressure the Ukrainian
government to make reforms favoring ethnic Russians.
Reasons for War: To understand why wars happen, it’s crucial to ask
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U.S. actions in Vietnam aimed to prevent the spread of
Avoiding War: Understanding why wars occur involves examining
Conflicts over Policies: States may use force to compel policy
the factors that prevent peaceful resolutions.
changes, particularly if they perceive the policies of another
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Wars are very costly
state as harmful.
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To generalize: States have conflicting interests over the
distribution of XXX
EMPLOYING THE THREE IS FRAMEWORK
Actors with Varying Interests:
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States
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Domestic Actors (leaders of the country)
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Inter/trans-national
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Strategic Interactions:
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The bargaining range is a fixed sum, but it’s still better than
one state losing everything
How do purposive actors interact with one another?
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HOWEVER, would A accept the proposal?
Institutions:
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COERCIVE BARGAINING
Rules that constrain strategic interactions
RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR
1 Interests: What are they fighting over? What does each side
want?
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Territory in Ukraine that Russia believes to be theirs
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NATO & EU: expanding European influence
2 Interactions: Identify causes of bargaining failure. (cooperation vs.
Coercive Bargaining: seeking to influence the bargaining outcome
by threatening to use force
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If you don’t accept our new boarder proposal, we are going to
attack state A (“do this, or else..”)
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This approach can escalate to war if the threatened state does
not comply.
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AKA: crisis bargaining, coercive diplomacy, compellence
bargaining)
3 Institutions: Which institutions might facilitate bargaining?
II. HOW DO STATES INTERACT TO ACHIEVE WHAT
THEY WANT?
Strategic Interaction: Bargaining
Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein: Leave the country or face military
action (form of an explicit ultimatum)
President Bush’s ultimatum to the Taliban: hand over al-Qaeda
leaders, demanding compliance without negotiation
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They both claim the ownership of the fertile farmland
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Currently A has more land than B
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B is unhappy with the status quo, Should B start a war?
Ultimatum to Hassan Rouhani: You will suffer consequences if you
threaten the US
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But war is costly
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Cost of fighting should be applied to both A and B
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If bargaining succeed -> no war, peaceful distribution
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all-or-nothing positions: choosing war over an unfavorable
settlement if the terms do not meet their minimum
expectations.
TWO KEY STRATEGIES IN BARGAINING
Compellence:
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An effort to change the status quo through the threat of force
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The goal is to coerce another state into making a concession
Bargaining range: a set of outcomes that both sides prefer over
or changing its behavior.
going to war (the empty area; cost of war = barganing range)
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E.g., U.S. demand that Afghanistan hand over Osama bin
Laden after 9/11
Bargaining involves negotiations where states discuss dividing
disputed resources or territories to reach a mutual
Deterrence:
agreement.
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force
It can also involve bargaining over policies, where states
attempt to modify or eliminate objectionable policies of
other states.
An effort to preserve the status quo through the threat of
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This strategy includes general deterrence, where a state warns
against attacks on itself (e.g., “Don’t attack me, or I’ll retaliate”),
and extended deterrence, where a state threatens retaliation if
for war or resolve, such as military strength and economic
an ally is attacked (e.g., “Don’t attack my ally, or else”).
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E.g., Israel’s stance on Iran’s nuclear program, where it
threatened military action to prevent Iran from developing
nuclear weapons.
Combining Deterrence and Compellence:
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In a crisis, both compellence and deterrence can be used, with
each side making threats and counterthreats to strengthen its
resources
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Failure to convey one’s capacity and resolve
Private Information in Russo-Japanese War, 1905
러시아는 일본의 군사력이 상대적으로 약하기 때문에 일본이 더 적은
조건에 만족할 것이라고 믿었다. BUT 이견은 일본의 군사 능력에 대한
비공개 정보로부터 비롯되었다. 일본 지도자들은 비교적 시험되지 않은
position. This back-and-forth creates a dynamic negotiation
일본군의 전투 능력과 지난 10년간의 개혁, 훈련, 자본 개발의 효과에
process, where each state tries to reinforce its stance.
대해 훨씬 더 잘 알고 있었음…
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Private info -> failure to know one’s capacity
Iraq and Kuwait (1990)
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이란-이라크 전쟁 후, Iraq 의 경제는 어려움을 겪고 있었음
Saddam Hussein 은 Kuwait 의 석유 생산과 그 행동들이 Iraq 의
회복을 방해한다고 여겼다
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Kuwait 는 이전에 합의된 양보다 더 많은 석유를 생산하여 세계
유가를 낮췄고, 이는 Iraq 의 석유 수익에 타격을 주었다. 또한
Kuwait 가 두 나라의 국경에 있는 유전에서 석유를 훔쳤다고 비난
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Kuwait 가 Iraq 의 석유 생산 감소 요구, 전쟁 배상, 그리고 전쟁 빚
탕감 요구를 거부하자, Iraq 는 군대를 동원하며 상황을 악화시켰음
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처음에 Kuwait 와 미국 관리들은 Iraq 가 실제로 침공할 것이라고
믿지 않았고, Hussein 의 군대 집결을 단순한 협박으로 봄. BUT
그러나 Hussein 의 행동은 단순한 위협이 아니었고, Kuwait 가
WAR AS AN OUTCOME OF FAILED BARGAINING
Why Bargaining Failure?
저항하자 Iraq 는 곧바로 침공함
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underestimate of threat
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Incomplete Information
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Commitment Problem
Resolve:
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Indivisible Good (in reality, less common)
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INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
a state's willingness to endure costs to achieve its objectives in
war. (목표를 달성하기 위해 비용을 감수하려는 의지)
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This includes how many lives a country is willing to lose, the
financial burden it can bear, and its willingness to make policy
changes or territorial concessions.
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Because resolve is influenced by physical, economic, political,
and psychological factors, it is difficult to measure accurately,
often leading to uncertainty in conflict situations.
Risk-Return Trade-Off:
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When states lack information about each other’s resolve or
capabilities, they face a risk-return trade-off.
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there is a trade-off between trying to get a good deal &
trying to minimize the possibility of war
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They must balance the potential benefits of pushing for
favorable terms against the risk that the opponent will stand
firm, leading to war.
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A will resist to believe, and think that B is bluffing
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For example, A state might push for concessions, expecting the
other side to give in, but this approach can lead to conflict if
the opponent refuses to back down.
Problem of credibility
Credibility in Threats:
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A threat is credible if the target believes it will happen
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Credible threats are essential in crisis bargaining: If a threat is
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Private information: the secret weapon
seen as a bluff, the target may ignore it, which can lead to
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Bluffing
conflict.
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Lack of credibility
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states cannot fully observe or measure each other’s potential
Challenges in Establishing Credibility:
Send costly signals (paying for power)
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High costs: A state might threaten action but hesitate to
follow through if the costs are too high.
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signals that it has prepared for action, which can force the
E.g., the U.S. and the Soviet Union both had nuclear
arsenals, but neither wanted to risk total annihilation
Mobilizing troops (show-off): By mobilizing forces, a state
opponent to take the threat more seriously.
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during the Cold War, leading to questions about the
Military drills (showing the militarial capability)
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credibility of their threats.
back to the 38th parallel. When the U.S. considered
advancing further, China warned it would intervene if the
Bluffing and Misperception: sometimes, a state really plans to act,
U.S. crossed the line.
but the target thinks it’s bluffing, like when Saddam Hussein
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threatened Kuwait. Other times, a state bluffs, hoping the target will
E.g., The Rhineland Crisis (1936): Germany sent troops
into the Rhineland, challenging a treaty that required the
seem less serious
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harder to dismiss as a bluff.
Britain chose not to confront Germany, allowing Hitler to
Political Purpose of Military Actions:
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For threats to be credible, they must be costly or involve
public commitments that are difficult to retract, making them
area to stay demilitarized. Though concerned, France and
remilitarize the region without opposition
Tie your hands
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A state can make its threats more believable by publicly
moving troops or holding military drills are ways for states to
committing to action, which makes it difficult to back down.
show they’re serious.
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Historical Example:
putting his reputation on the line.
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False Threats can generate audience costs (the domestic price
a leader would pay for making foreign threats and then
During the Cold War, the U.S. needed to convince the Soviet
backing down; looking weak & unreliable)
Union that it would defend Western Europe. The potential
Audience costs can come from:
costs of a nuclear war created doubts about whether the U.S.
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would actually follow through, influencing the credibility of its
bargaining power.
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Hiding Information:
Domestic Audience: Citizens and political opponents may
view a retreat as a sign of weakness, affecting the leader’s
In a bargaining situation, each side wants the best deal, which
reputation and chances in future elections.
can lead them to hide their true capabilities.
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International Audience: Other countries may doubt the
leader’s resolve if they back down, weakening their future
commitments.
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E.g., when Iraq invaded Kuwait, George Bush made it clear
that he would use military force if Iraq did not withdraw,
These moves help make threats more believable by showing a
willingness to back them up with force.
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The U.S. saw China’s warning as a possible bluff because it
was cheap to issue and lacked concrete actions, making it
believe the threat, even though it doesn’t intend to act.
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During the Korean War, U.S. pushed North Korean forces
E.g., after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the U.S. massed forces in
COMMITMENT PROBLEM AND BARGAINING
Saudi Arabia and hinted at a direct attack, but secretly
FAILURE
planned a surprise move to avoid high casualties.
Mitigating incomplete information problem
Promote transparency and communication:
Brinkmanship:
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when states take actions that bring them closer to conflict,
Can you trust your adversary to honor a deal?
Commitment Problems:
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to keep the deal.
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The “Slippery Slope”: The idea is that small, risky steps can
off later.
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sides want peace. (prisoner’s dilemma)
scale conflict. As tensions rise, the chance of unintended
escalation grows.
During the Cold War, nuclear threats couldn’t be fully
Without a reliable enforcement mechanism (like a global
authority), this distrust can lead to conflict, even when both
lead both sides closer to war, even if neither side wants a full-
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If one state worries that the other might break the deal in the
future, it may prefer to fight now rather than risk being worse
hoping the other side will back down first, but this increases
the risk of accidental war.
Even if states agree to avoid war, they may not trust each other
Commitment is less credible when:
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bargaining over goods that are source of future bargaining
credible since no one wanted mutual destruction. However,
power (land, nuclear power..)
both the U.S. and the Soviet Union used brinkmanship to
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If a state fears that its opponent will use control over
signal resolve without actually intending to start a nuclear
strategic goods to become more powerful later, it may
war
choose to fight now rather than allow the opponent to
gain an advantage.
E.g., The U.S. withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal partly
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INDIVISIBLE GOODS
due to concerns that Iran might become stronger in the
Indivisible Goods: something that cannot be split without losing its
future
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there has been an on-going change in relative power (→
value.
preventive war)
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preventive war: a war fought with the intention of
cultural significance, making them indivisible in the eyes of
preventing an adversary from becoming stronger in the
those who value them.
future
a state may prefer a current fight over a future one when
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certain territories, like Jerusalem, hold unique religious or
the opponent is stronger.
All-or-Nothing Bargaining: When a good is indivisible, neither side
can accept a partial solution, which can lead to an all-or-nothing
conflict.
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For instance, Jerusalem is seen as indivisible by Jews,
Christians, and Muslims due to its religious importance, fueling
ongoing disputes.
Symbolic Value: Indivisible goods often have deep symbolic or
cultural meaning, and compromise can feel impossible. This makes
finding peaceful solutions challenging, as both sides may refuse to
concede any part of the good.
Alternative Solutions:
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Shared Control: States can jointly manage indivisible goods,
like proposed arrangements for Jerusalem's holy sites, allowing
access to all without dividing sovereignty.
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when a first strike advantage exists in face of an imminent
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threat (→ preemptive war)
exchange for control. For example, if one side values a good
preemptive wars happen when states fear losing the upper
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highly, it might pay the other to let go of their claim.
hand by waiting, prompting them to attack before their
War Has Become Obsolete
opponent does
This advantage may come from superior technology,
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strategies, or geography.
⋆ d<pc: the retaliatory damage following my own firststrike (d) is smaller than the probability of the enemy’s
first strike (p) times its costs on me (c)
내가 먼저 공격해서 받는 피해가 상대방이 먼저 공격했을 때
의 위험보다 덜하다고 판단될 때
Compensation: Another approach is to offer compensation in
Decline in Interstate War: Since the Korean War in 1953, major
wars between great powers have become rare. This has led some to
question if war is becoming a thing of the past.
Factors Behind the Decline:
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Changing Interests: Modern states may value territory less due
to technological advances and globalization. Instead of
Breakdown of Bargaining:
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expanding through war, states can gain resources through
If both sides believe that striking first offers a major advantage,
they may rush to attack, as waiting could put them at a
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trade and investment.
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Increased Costs of War: The destructive power of modern
disadvantage.
weapons and economic interdependence make war more
This fear makes it harder to reach peaceful agreements, as
costly, deterring states from choosing conflict.
each side feels pressured to act quickly.
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International Institutions: Organizations like the United
Nations promote transparency, peaceful solutions, and help
resolve disputes, reducing the need for war.
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Democracy: The spread of democratic governments is linked
to fewer wars between democratic states. Democracies tend to
resolve disputes through negotiation rather than conflict.
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