CASE DIGEST
Police Power
1. Lucena Grand Central Terminal vs. JAC Liner
2. Aquino vs. Municipality of Malay Aklan
3. Social Justice Society vs. Atienza
4. Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap vs. Robredo
5. Rural Bank of Makati vs. Municipality of Makati
6. Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers
7. White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila
8. Acebedo Optical vs. Court of Appeals
Page 1 of 13
Lucena Grand Central Terminal vs JAC Liner
FACTS:
● The Petitioner in this case is Lucena Grand Central Terminal, while the
respondents is JAC Liner, Inc.
● The respondent assailed Ordinance 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional
on the ground that the same constituted an invalid exercise of police
power, an undue taking of private property and a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against monopolies.This ordinance affected the
operation of bus, mini-bus, and jeepney terminals in Lucena City.
● Ordinance 163, grants an exclusive 25-year (renewable for another 25
years) franchise to Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. for constructing,
financing, establishing, operating, and maintaining a common busjeepney terminal facility in Lucena City. It imposes an obligation on the
City Government not to grant third parties privileges or concessions to
operate additional terminals.
● While, Ordinance 1778, it regulates the entry of all buses, mini-buses, and
out-of-town jeepneys into Lucena City by prohibiting them from using
temporary or other existing terminals. It mandates that carriers must use
the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal located in Brgy.
Ilayang Dupay. It invalidated all other temporary terminals in Lucena City.
The RTC, Upheld the validity of City Ordinance No. 1631 but invalidated Section
4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 to the effect that the City Government shall not grant
any third party any privileged and or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and
jeepney terminal as illegal and ultra vires because it contravenes the R.A 7160.
Also, the RTC declared Ordinance No. 1778 null and void for being also an ultra
vires act arising from an invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the
police power, more specifically, declaring illegal sections 1(b), 3(c) and 3(e)];
(b) All temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting
from the effectivity of this ordinance.
c) Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other
municipalities and/or local government units shall utilize the facilities of the Lucena Grand
Central Terminal at Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, this City, and no other terminals
shall be situated inside or within the City of Lucena;
e) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the permanent common terminal as this is the entity
which was given the exclusive franchise by the Sangguniang Panglungsod under
Ordinance No. 1631; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power in enacting
Ordinances Nos. 1631 and 1778.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of respondent, JAC Liner, finding that while
the ordinances had a public purposes of addressing traffic congestion, the means
employed were not reasonably necessary and were unduly oppressive thus failing
to meet the requirements for a valid exercise of police power.
As with the State, the local government may be considered as having
properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met under
the general welfare clause (Sec 16, LGC):
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class,require the interference of the State, and (equal protection clause,
lawful subject,reasonable purpose)
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of
the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. (Due process clause, lawful means/method) - missingIn other words,
there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
1. LAWFUL SUBJECT REQUIREMENT:The questioned ordinances having
been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City
of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the
State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus
present, but the second is not.An ordinance aimed at relieving traffic
congestion meets the first standard which is also known as the
"reasonable purpose requirement."
2. LAWFUL METHOD REQUIREMENT: Declaring bus terminals as
nuisances per se and ordering their closure or relocation contravenes the
standard on reasonableness. (G.R. No. 148339. February 23,
2005). Nuisances per se are those which affect the immediate safety of
Page 2 of 13
persons and property and may be abated/prohibited by an ordinance
under the undefined law of necessity(Monteverde v. Generoso).
In other words, there are ways of easing traffic problems, which is a good goal,
but declaring bus terminals as nuisance per se is not a reasonable way of dealing
with said problems. How the outright prohibition against the existence of all
terminals, apart from that franchised to Lucena, can be considered as
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, the Court has not been
enlightened
DOCTRINE:
Objectives Behind the Ordinances
The ordinances were purportedly enacted to alleviate traffic congestion caused
by the dispersion of multiple terminals within the city proper.
Measures employed (i.e., granting an exclusive franchise and prohibiting
all other terminal operations)
Page 3 of 13
Aquino v. Municipality of Alay Aklan
1. Judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the
respondent mayor could order the demolition of the company's
establishment.
FACTS:
● The Petitioner in this case is Crisostomo Aquino, the president and
chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management
Philippines, Inc. While, the respondents are the Municipality of Malay,
Aklan, its Mayor and others.
●
In 2010, the company applied for zoning compliance. While the
company was already operating a resort in the area, the application
sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a
three-story hotel over a parcel of land which is covered by a Forest
Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by DENR
in favor of Boracay West Cove.
●
The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on
the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build
zone” demarcated in a Municipal Ordinance.
●
●
●
●
●
A Notice of Assessment was sent to petitioner asking for the settlement
of the company’s unpaid taxes and other liabilities under pain of a
recommendation for closure in view of its continuous commercial
operation since 2009 sans the necessary zoning clearance, building
permit, and business and mayor’s permit.
In reply, petitioner expressed willingness to settle the company’s
obligations, but the municipal treasurer refused to accept the tendered
payment. Meanwhile, petitioner continued with the construction,
expansion, and operation of the resort hotel.
Subsequently, a Cease and Desist Order and the Office of the Mayor
of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and
demolition of the hotel.
Said EO was implemented and as such, the respondents demolished
the improvements introduced by the hotel.
As such, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with CA on the following
arguments:
2. The Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by the DENR,
which bestowed the company the right to construct permanent
improvements on the area in question.
3. Since the area is a forestland, it is the DENR — and not the
municipality of Malay, or any other local government unit for
that matter — that has primary jurisdiction over the area, and
that the Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region 6 had
officially issued an opinion regarding the legal issues involved
in the present case; that the Ordinance admits of exceptions.
4. It is the mayor who should be blamed for not issuing the
necessary clearances in the company’s favor.
Respondents argued the following:
1. The FLAgT does not excuse the company from complying with
the Ordinance and PD 1096 (National Building Code of the
Philippines).
2. The demolition needed no court order because the municipal
mayor has the express power under the Local Government
Code to order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground. .
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON the mayor could validly order the demolition of the hotel without first
conducting judicial proceedings, thereby violating the petitioner’s right to due
process.
HELD:
YES. Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a
nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotel’s
classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the Court still finds in this
case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This
Page 4 of 13
is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause,
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the
government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
In the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights
of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government. The government may enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to
promote the general welfare.
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition
orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only
relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also been
endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals
and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.
Other Notes:
Requirements for the exercise of the power are present:
Illegality of structures – Petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary
permits, clearances, and exemptions before the construction, expansion, and
operation of the hotel. To recall, petitioner declared that the application for
zoning compliance was still pending with the office of the mayor even though
construction and operation were already ongoing at the same time. As such, it
could no longer be denied that the petitioner openly violated Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131.
Observance of procedural due process rights
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties. The burden is on the petitioner herein to prove that Boracay West Cove
was deprived of the opportunity to be heard before EO 10 was issued.
Regrettably, copies of the Cease and Desist Order issued by the LGU and of
the assailed EO 10 itself were never attached to the petition before this Court,
which documents could have readily shed light on whether or not petitioner has
been accorded the 10-day grace period provided in Section 10 of the
Ordinance. In view of this fact, the presumption of regularity must be sustained.
EO 10 states that petitioner received notices from the municipality government
on March 7 and 28, 2011, requiring Boracay West Cove to comply with the
zoning ordinance and yet it failed to do so. If such was the case, the grace
period can be deemed observed and the establishment was already ripe for
closure and demolition by the time EO 10 was issued in June.
The observance of the 10-day allowance for the owner to demolish the hotel
was never questioned by the petitioner so there is no need to discuss the same.
Page 5 of 13
Social Justice Society v. Atienza
FACTS:
● The Petitioner in this case is Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique and
Bonifacio. While the respondents is Mayor Jose Atienza.
●
The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 which
reclassified the Pandacan Area from industrial to commercial, and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the
reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within
six months from the effective date of the ordinance.
●
Most affected are the oil companies composed of Shell, Chevron (Caltex)
and Petron whose oil depots are located therein.
●
Despite the ordinance, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13
extending the agreement of scaling down of the Pandacan depots up to
April 2003 and authorized the mayor of Manila to issue special business
permits to the oil companies. Nevertheless, the petitioners filed a petition
for mandamus, sought to compel the Mayor to enforce Ordinance No.
8027.
●
The oil companies questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance.
condemned under the exercise of police power is not compensable. The
restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a
taking.
DOCTRINE:
Constitutionality and Validity of Ordinance No. 8027
● The Court affirmed that Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted within the police
power of the local government to promote public safety and welfare.
● The ordinance was found to be constitutional, not unfair or oppressive,
and did not violate any existing laws.
● The Court ruled that the right to life and public safety takes precedence
over property rights, justifying the ordinance's enactment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and valid.
HELD:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. In the present case, Ordinance No.
8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring
health, public safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila.
The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect its residents from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan depots.
Further, the zoning ordinance which reclassified the area is reasonable and not
arbitrary enactment to the oil companies because they were not prevented nor
prohibited from doing business in the city other than the now reclassified location
of the depot where such operations are no longer permitted. The power to
establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the
police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents.
Averring that they shall not be compensated, the Court ruled that property
Page 6 of 13
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap vs. Robredo
FACTS:
The in this case are Members of Kalipunan ng Damaging Mahihirap and Corazon
de Jesus Homeowners’ Association. They occupied certain parcels of land in San
Juan, Navotas, and QC, which were owned by their respective city LGUs.
The LGUs sent the petitioners notices of evictions and demolition pursuant to Sec
28 (a) & (b) of RA 7279 to give way to the implementation and construction of
infrastructure projects (city hall, roads, public school) in the areas.
a. Sec 28 (a) & (b) of RA 7279 authorise evictions and demolitions without
any court order when: (1) persons or entities occupy danger areas such
as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places and (2) persons or entities occupy
areas where govt infrastructure projects with available funding are about
to be implemented.
On Mar 23, 2012, petitioners directly filed petition for prohibition and mandamus
to compel the public respondents to first secure an eviction and/or demolition
order from the court prior to implementing RA 7279. They justified their direct
recourse to the SC by averring that:
1. a. they had no plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law;
2. b. the respondents committed GAD in implementing RA 7279;
3. c. they stand to be directly injured by the threats of eviction/demolition
and in the alternative, the transcendental importance of the issues clothed
them with standing.
They also argue that Sec 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are violative of: Art. 13, Sec
10 because the previously conducted evictions/demolitions were conducted in a
violent manner.
Respondents’ positions are as follows:
a. Navotas Mayor - Art. 13, Sec. 10 allows evictions/demolitions without court
order provided that they are done in accordance with the law and in a just and
humane manner. RA 7279 is precisely the law referred to and was faithfully
implemented by the LGU by giving a 30-day notice and holding consultations.
San Juan Mayor - Sec 28 (a) & (b) already lay down the procedure for evicting
informal settlers in a just and humane manner.
DILG Secretary and NHA GM - Sec. 28 of RA 7279 provides sufficient safeguards
in ensuring that evictions and demolitions are carried out in a just and humane
manner.
ISSUE:
W/N Sec. 28 (a) & (b) of RA 7279 are violative of Art. 3, Sec. 1 and 6 of the
1987 Constitution.
HELD:
No. There is no need to examine the constitutionality of Sec 28 (a) and (b) of RA
7279 in light of Art. 3, Sec. 1 & 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In an earlier case Magkalas v. NHA, the Court has already ruled on the validity of
evictions/demolitions without any court order. In that case, the court affirmed the
validity of Sec. 2 of PD 1472 and held that Caridad Magkalas’ illegal possession
of the property should not hinder NHA’s development of Bagong Barrio Urban
Bliss Project.
Furthermore, the Court stated that demolitions/evictions may be validly carried out
even without judicial order in the following instances:
1. when the property involved is an expropriated property xxx pursuant to
Sec. 1 of PD 1315;
2. when there are squatters on government resettlement projects and illegal
occupants in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned or
administered by the NHA pursuant to Sec. 2 of PD 1472;
3. when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad
tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other
public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds, pursuant
to Sec. 28 (a) of RA 7279;
4. when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about
to be implemented pursuant to Sec. 28 (b) of RA 7279.
The court noted that Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that
urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished,
except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. Paragraph 1,
Section 28 of RA 7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases where
persons or entities occupy danger areas and when persons or entities occupy
areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are about
to be implemented.
Page 7 of 13
To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane
manner, paragraph 2, Section 28 of RA 7279.
This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council carry out the provision.
In short, stare decisis on the case at bar provides that Section 28 (a) and (b) of
RA 7279 are constitutional; eviction and demolition are exercise of their
constitutional rights provided that it is conducted in a just and humane manner
‘
Page 8 of 13
Rural Bank of Makati vs City of Makati
FACTS:
In August 1990, Atty. Victor A.L. Valero, the municipal attorney of Makati,
investigated the Rural Bank of Makati’s tax payments at the request of the
municipal treasurer. The bank's corporate secretary, Magdalena V. Landicho,
claimed the bank was exempt from taxes under Republic Act No. 720. On
November 19, 1990, the municipality lodged a complaint against Landicho and
the bank's president, Esteban S. Silva, for violating the Metropolitan Tax Code by
failing to pay required taxes and fees.
In April 1991, criminal cases were filed against them for non-payment of the
mayor’s permit fee and the annual business tax. While these cases were pending,
the municipality ordered the closure of the bank, prompting the bank to pay
P82,408.66 in taxes and fees under protest. In response, the bank filed a civil
case with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, alleging that the tax collection
was illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive. They also argued that Atty. Valero had no
authority to enforce the laws and claimed lost earnings due to the closure.
The RTC dismissed the bank's complaint, ruling that rural banks were no longer
exempt from paying taxes following the enactment of Executive Order No. 936
and the Rural Bank Act of 1992. The court found that the municipality had the
legal right to impose taxes and fees under its police power and that the bank had
no valid claim of exemption. It also rejected the bank’s assertion that the municipal
ordinances were invalid due to lack of publication, citing insufficient evidence.
Furthermore, the RTC ruled that Atty. Valero had been wrongfully included in the
case and awarded him P200,000 in moral damages and P50,000 in attorney’s
fees.
The bank’s motion for reconsideration was denied. The case was then elevated
to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the RTC’s decision in its entirety. The
appellate court affirmed the legality of the bank’s closure, stating that the bank
was operating without the necessary permits and had failed to pay the required
taxes. It emphasized that the municipality's actions were a valid exercise of police
power under the general welfare clause, which allows local governments to
regulate businesses for the good of the municipality and its residents.
The appellate court also dismissed the bank’s argument that the general welfare
clause only applied to legislative action, reinforcing that local governments have
the authority to enact and enforce regulations to promote public welfare. The
bank's final attempt to have the decision reconsidered was denied in November
2001.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the closure of petitioner banks is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD:
Yes. The closure of the bank is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
the general welfare clause contained in and restated by B.P. Blg. 337.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the closure was valid under the old
Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337), which also contained a
general welfare clause in Section 7. Municipal corporations, as agents of the state,
have long been endowed with police powers to promote local self-governance, as
established since the Administrative Code of 1917. The power of the local
government to enforce laws for the welfare of the public remains a consistent
authority across various legislative enactments. Therefore, the closure was
considered a valid exercise of police power under BP Blg. 337.
The general welfare clause includes two branches:
1. General Legislative Power: Grants the municipal council the authority to
enact ordinances necessary for public welfare.
2. Police Power Proper: Authorizes the municipality to create regulations for
the health, safety, and prosperity of the public.
In this case, the municipal ordinances that imposed business licenses and taxes
were deemed valid under the general welfare clause and the municipality’s power
of taxation. The mayor, as the municipality's chief executive, was tasked with
enforcing these ordinances and had the authority to establish a Special Task
Force to carry out this enforcement.
However, the court found that the closure of the bank was unjustified, as the bank
was not engaged in any illegal or immoral activities. The Local Tax Code provided
remedies for delinquent tax payments, such as distraint of property or legal action,
but closure was not one of these remedies. Moreover, the closure order violated
the bank’s right to due process, as the bank had acted in good faith and believed
it had a valid justification for not paying the required taxes. The municipal mayor
had no authority to resort to extrajudicial remedies like closure without due
process. Therefore, while the enforcement of tax ordinances was lawful, the
outright closure of the bank was improper
Page 9 of 13
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers
FACTS:
On Jan 23, 2007, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao City enacted
Ordinance No. 0309 which bans aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all
agricultural activities within Davao City. Feb 9 2007. City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte
approved the ordinance and the ordinance took effect on March 23, 2007 after its
publication in Mindanao Pioneer.
The ordinance defined aerial spraying as the application of substances through
the use of aircraft that dispenses the substances in the air. Said ordinance also
requires agricultural entities to provide a 30-meter buffer zone within their
agricultural farms/plantations. In addition, provided for in the said ordinance that
the ban against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced three months thereafter.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two
of its members filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of
the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs through a temporary
restraining order (TRO). They alleged that the ordinance was an unreasonable
exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to· the
confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication
pursuant to Section 5116 of Republic Act No. 7160.
ISSUE:
Whether the Davao City Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid exercise of police
power.
HELD:
NO. The Court ruled that be considered as a valid police power measure, an
ordinance must pass a two-pronged test: (1) formal test and (2) substantive test.
The former refers to whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers
of the local government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law (Sec. 53&54 of LGC). While, substantive test
involves inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes
The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations in order to promote the general welfare. This
authorizes the LGU to make ordinances necessary and proper for the health and
safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
local government unit and its constituents, and for the protection of their property.
On the other hand, in order for an ordinance to be a valid piece of local legislation,
it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not
oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) it must not be unreasonable.
Accordingly, a local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its
police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State (equal protection clause) and; the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive (due process clause).
In the case at bar, the Court held that the questioned ordinance was violative of
the required due process clause as it requires the respondents and other affected
individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month
period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of
business permits. This is definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police
power.
In addition, the said ordinance also violates the equal protection clause. The
constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things
without distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which
it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.
According to the Court, to determine the propriety of the classification, courts
resort to three levels of scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny
and strict scrutiny. The rational scrutiny demands that the classification
reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. In addition, the intermediate scrutiny
refers to when the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage.
The strict scrutiny, on the other hand, applies when a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to
the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class.
In the case at bar, it is the rational basis approach which was applied by the Court.
Applying the test, the established classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 is
to be viewed in relation to the group of individuals similarly situated with respect
to the avowed purpose. To this end, Davao City justifies the prohibition against
Page 10 of 13
aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and
harm to the residents and degrades the environment. However, the Court agreed
with the Court of Appeals in saying that the imposition of the ban is too broad
because the ordinance applies irrespective of the substance to be aerially applied
and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted.
The exercise of police power by the local government must conform to the
limitations prescribed by the Constitution and existing statutes.
The Court affirms that local government units have the authority to enact
ordinances for the general welfare, but such ordinances must not be
unreasonable or oppressive.
Page 11 of 13
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila
FACTS:
The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7774 which prohibits short time
admission, or checking in for less than twelve hours, in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the city, and provided that
violators shall punished by imprisonment and fine. The Petitioners questioned the
ordinance before the Regional Trial Court arguing that it is unconstitutional for
violating right to privacy, and infringing their property right thus affecting their
business interests as operators of drive-in hotels and motels in the city.
The RTC ruled in their favor and strike down the ordinance as unconstitutional for
infringing personal liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution such as the right to
operate economic enterprises. Further, the illicit relationships the ordinance
sought to dissuade could be performed still by paying the 12-hour stay. However,
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC stating that (1) it did not
violate right to privacy and freedom of movement as it only penalizes owners or
operators of establishments that admit individual for short time says, and (2) it is
a valid exercise of police power.
intrusive measures of curtailing immorality in the city such as curbing the
proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work, or the strict
enforcement of existing laws penalizing prostitution and drug use. These
measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners who
may offer short time rates for families who pass by only for a few hours while there
is a black out, or a traveler who washes up for a few hours before continuing his
travel. Further, the ordinance can be circumvented by merely paying the whole
day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the CA is REVERSED. Decision of the RTC is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power under the
general welfare clause.
HELD:
The Court ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The Court ruled that in order for an
ordinance to be valid, it must also conform to the substantive requirements:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
must not be unfair or oppressive;
must not be partial or discriminatory;
must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
must be general and consistent with public policy; and
must not be unreasonable.
In using this test, the Court is constrained to struck down the Ordinance for
arbitrarily intruding into private rights. It must appear that the interests of the public
generally require an interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights.
In the present case, the Ordinance could have been valid if it employed less
Page 12 of 13
ACEBEDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
The Petitioner in this case is Acebedo Optical Company. Acebedo Optical
Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City.
After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted
the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made
Acebedo dependent upon prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local
optometrists. Acebedo basically is not allowed to practice optometry within the city
(but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions
and operated under the permit.
Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was
subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the
validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is
estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and
that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police power;
that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence
the permit is actually a contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City Mayor special conditions in the grant of business permit
is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD:
No, the special conditions in the grant of business permit is not a valid exercise of
police power. The Petitioner was applying for a business permit to operate its
business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction of
the Professional Regulation Commission Board of Optometry). The conditions
attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application
therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power.
Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he
must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra
vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege –
estoppel does not apply.
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety
and general welfare of the people. The State, through the legislature, has
delegated the exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of
the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of
their creation. The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive
as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order,
morals, comfort and convenience of the community. Police power is essentially
regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if
exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of
this power.
In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by the respondent
City Mayor to the petitioner was burdened with several conditions. The objective
of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner’s business permit could be
attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner’s employ to produce a valid
certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in
Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of
business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate
the practice of a profession, like that of optometry.
The primary purpose of the statute regulating the practice of optometry is to insure
that optometrical services are to be rendered by competent and licensed persons
in order to protect the health and physical welfare of the people from the dangers
engendered by unlicensed practice. Such purpose may be fully accomplished
although the person rendering the service is employed by a corporation. Hence,
the special conditions in business permit is not a valid exercise of police power.
Under the Local Government Code, The authority to issue or grant such licenses
or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the
contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.
Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe
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