Daisy Mendoza
Judges Questions
Petitioner Issue 1:
1. How do you di2erentiate Mr. DeNolf’s remarks from speech that directly incites
violence or illegal action?
2. In what way do you believe Mr. DeNolf’s speech does not meet the “imminent
lawless action” standard set in Brandenburg v. Ohio?
3. Given the repeated nature of Mr. DeNolf’s remarks, do you believe this could have
created a pattern of coercion? If so, why would that still be protected under the First
Amendment?
4. If Mr. DeNolf’s remarks caused emotional distress, should the intent or impact of his
speech on Ms. Bronner be considered when assessing its protection?
5. Can you explain why you believe Mr. DeNolf’s speech is comparable to hyperbolic
speech, as protected in Watts v United States?
6. What responsibility, if any, does Mr. DeNolf have for the foreseeable impact of his
speech, even if it wasn’t intended as direct command?
7. How does the Waller v Osbourne precedent apply to speech that could be seen as
encouraging self-harm? Could repeated messages be considered more than just
encouragement?
8. At what point do you believe speech crosses the line from protected expression to
assisting or promoting illegal acts like suicide?
9. Do you believe the government’s interest in protecting life can ever justify restricting
speech that, while harmful, is not directly violent or threatening?
10. How do you address the argument that even non-imminent encouragement, when
directed toward a vulnerable person, may lead to significant harm, thus justifying
limits on free speech?
Respondent Issue 2:
1. In what specific ways did Mr. DeNolf’s remarks incite imminent illegal action under
the Brandenburg v Ohio standard, given that Ms. Bronner’s death was not
immediate?
2. Could the long-term emotional impact of Mr. DeNolf’s remarks be considered
imminent lawless action, or is the time lapse between the remarks and Ms.
Bronner’s suicide significant?
3. How do you classify Mr. DeNolf’s repeated messages as a “true threat” under Watts
v United States, rather than harmful but non-threatening speech?
4. How do you define Mr. DeNolf’s intent in this case? Is there su2icient evidence to
prove his intent to cause harm or suicide, or could his speech be interpreted as
reckless but criminal?
5. Given the precedent set in State v Melchert-Dinkel, what separates Mr. DeNolf’s
speech from mere encouragement, which could still be protected, and actionable
assistance in a crime?
6. How do you address the argument that Mr. DeNolf did not provide any specific
instructions or direct aid in Ms. Bronner’s suicide, and thus did not assist in the
illegal act?
7. Do you believe that restricting Mr. DeNolf’s speech in this case would set a
precedent for limiting free speech whenever it has harmful emotional
consequences, and if so, how would just justify that limitation?
8. Could you elaborate on how Mr. DeNolf’s speech constitutes active participation in
the suicide, and not just an expression of opinion or hyperbolic speech?
9. In your view, how does the state’s interest in protecting life override the general First
Amendment protections for free speech in this case?
10. How would you apply the ruling in Rice v Paladin Press to this case, given that Mr.
DeNolf’s remarks did not explicitly provide a method or plan for suicide but still
contributed to the tragic outcome?