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The Theory of Interpersonal
Knowledge
Interaction Requirements to Develop
Dyad-Specific Familiarity
Joseph B. Walther
Among the best known and most influential bodies of research in interpersonal communication are theories that concern how we seek information
and form distinctive impressions about other people through uncertainty
reduction processes. Works in this area have had a monumental impact in
conceptualizing and conducting research about forming relationships in
their earliest stages. Included in this body of work is the notion that we form
impressions of another person at three successive levels of knowledge about
others: cultural, sociological, and psychological levels (Miller & Steinberg,
1975). How we acquire these levels of knowledge through communication
is the focus of Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) uncertainty reduction theory
(URT). Extensions of URT have included a description of different observational and communication strategies by which people reduce uncertainty
(or learn) about others: passive, active, and interactive uncertainty-reduction
strategies (Berger et al., 1976). This typology has become more or less
canonical within the field of communication. Its breadth of application is so
great that it even applies to social media, a form of potentially interpersonal
communication unimagined by these theories’ originators.
Yet the conceptualization of psychological-level knowledge about another
person falls short of distinguishing what is psychological from what is interpersonal, both in terms of levels of knowledge about others and the kinds
of communication that are necessary to acquire such knowledge. Recent
work (Walther, 2019) explores these theoretical shortcomings and articulates
an alternative set of definitions that distinguish between psychological (or
personal-level) knowledge, and interpersonal-level knowledge about others. The approach carries implications for how various information-seeking
strategies can or cannot reduce uncertainty beyond the personal and into the
interpersonal dimension. In an application to contemporary social media,
this new framework offers some explanatory implications for the oftenfound preference people have for using visually augmented interaction
media (e.g., videoconferencing), despite ample evidence that such media
are not particularly advantageous in the ways most people imagine. The
DOI: 10.4324/9781003195511-34
Joseph B. WaltherThe Theory of Interpersonal Knowledge
392 Joseph B. Walther
theoretical extension also has implications for the development of trust and
affection directed toward artificially intelligent agents that may easily appear
to know us better than many humans we encounter in similar settings.
Intellectual Tradition of the Theory of
Interpersonal Knowledge
To some extent, the theory of interpersonal knowledge is rooted in the postpositivist tradition. The original work in Miller and Steinberg’s (1975) typology of cultural, sociological, and psychological-level knowledge included
propositions predicting what nature of persuasive message one individual
selects to influence another person. These predictions were derived from the
level of knowledge a persuader held about the other person, ranging from
arguments based on broad cultural norms, to individually based appeals, and,
most specifically, appeals based on relational obligations. Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) work was more formally axiomatic. They articulated formal
construct definitions, and axioms and propositions relating the constructs of
uncertainty and uncertainty reduction to the degree of liking one individual
develops toward another. They theorized two general classes of behavior
(verbal and nonverbal affiliative messages), the positive association between
uncertainty and information seeking, and the positive relationship between
uncertainty reduction and the degree to which one likes another person.
This tradition also led to the articulation of more particular uncertaintyreduction (i.e., information seeking) strategies, with further derived propositions concerning the utility (efficiency and face-threatening value) of each
type. Additional work by Berger and numerous colleagues generated a considerably rich legacy of hypothetico-deductive studies.
The current development of this new theory of interpersonal knowledge
revisits the typological roots of research on uncertainty and social knowledge. It identifies a potential gap in the original view of types of knowledge
one can develop about another, and how it can be acquired. As such, this
work is definitional, as many theories begin. From some novel definitions,
some derived implications and propositions follow, although future research
is needed to articulate fully a comprehensive and potentially integrated theoretical framework and all that it can provide, and subject it to empirical
verification, following in the post-positivist tradition it addresses.
Main Goals and Features of the Theory of
Interpersonal Knowledge
There is a considerable difference, this theory argues, between knowing
someone else versus knowing that someone else knows us. Yet research in
interpersonal communication has not been explicit about this difference or
how communication intersects with it. The goal of this theory is to distinguish between various forms of knowledge about other people at relatively
The Theory of Interpersonal Knowledge 393
particular levels, specifically, a difference between personal knowledge and
interpersonal knowledge. The theory specifies the form of communication
that is necessary to move from personal to interpersonal knowledge, in
terms of interactivity and references to relational history. It predicts subtle
relational outcomes that may result from these differences and changes in
language codes that accompany them.
A variety of perspectives suggest that, as we get to know someone, we
learn their idiosyncrasies. Social penetration theory (Altman & Taylor,
1973), for instance, predicts that the exchange of self-disclosure allows interactants to learn about each other. We progress from the most superficial
inferences about someone, to moderately-, to deeply intimate knowledge
about someone’s core personality. Miller and Steinberg (1975) argued that
when we know someone’s personality, we tailor messages and influence
attempts to comport with, and take strategic advantage of, that knowledge.
Of course, disclosure is not the only means by which we form impressions,
and knowing someone’s personality is not the only thing to know. Here we
need to review in more detail what prior research provides in terms of the
three levels of knowledge and the strategies by which we acquire them.
Miller and Steinberg (1975) asserted that we make cultural-level assumptions very quickly when we encounter someone. Their general body shape,
dress, or manner lead to stereotypical impressions about their cultural origins. Sociological-level knowledge moves a level deeper and can be acquired
by additional observation of someone. Sociological knowledge describes
our impressions of someone’s social categories. Significantly greater observation can reveal psychological-level knowledge, that is, inferences about
the target’s relatively unique personality. Miller and Steinberg asserted that
communication messages based on this most individual level constitute
interpersonal communication.
An example helps to illustrate the forms of knowledge and how one
acquires them. Imagine you (and a number of other students) are taking
a class from a professor. You infer at the moment you see him that the
professor is an Asian male, and as soon as he speaks, you presume he was
probably raised in America, on account of his accent. In your experience,
Asian professors are pretty smart. You have made cultural-level inferences
through observation, as we all do more or less automatically. He looks relatively young as professors go, which may mean he is pretty approachable.
Unless his age means he has something to prove, in which case maybe he’ll
be aloof, as some professors are. These are sociological-level inferences or
impressions based on assumptions you may hold about age, status, profession, and stereotypes that you associate with these various social categories.
But given you will be in his class for weeks, and he will evaluate you and
your work, maybe you want to know more about what he is “really like.”
What will tell you that?
You can make observations about what the professor does and how he
does it. As the first couple of weeks go by, you might see that his explanations
394 Joseph B. Walther
are really thorough, though sometimes a little dense. He is a serious thinker.
At the same time, he makes a joke now and then. Some of the jokes are
actually quite humorous. Some are puns that are real groaners. Some of his
jokes are self-deprecating. Okay, so he is funny, and does not take himself
too seriously. You could probably have a pretty relaxing conversation with
the guy. Both you and another student in class raise your hand at the same
time to ask a question; he calls on the other student first, who says, “This
may be a dumb question, but based on what you just said, wouldn’t that
theory be obsolete nowadays?” and he says, “You’re absolutely right. That
is a dumb question. If you’d done the reading for today, you’d know better.”
Ouch! He is a serious thinker, and funny, but vicious. Or maybe he’s vicious
if one is unprepared (which you are not). It may be hard to know whether
he’d humiliate you too, or engage you. Just the same, you put your hand
back down for now.
This last group of inferences, based on his behavior, lead you to make
judgments about his personality and what he is like idiosyncratically. This
level of knowledge is more particular than cultural or sociological knowledge, and this is what theorists refer to as psychological-level knowledge.
Previous thinking in communication asserts that this level of knowledge is
what we rely on to strategize and generate interpersonal communication
messages. This is the theoretical point at which the present theory parts
company from the previous work on uncertainty reduction.
The new theory of interpersonal knowledge differs from previous
approaches with respect to what role psychological level knowledge plays
in interpersonal communication, and even what “interpersonal” communication means. It defines a fourth level of knowledge that is more particular than psychological knowledge. It defines interpersonal knowledge as
the knowledge one develops about how a particular other person interacts
with one’s self. It is dyadic, as it regards the potentially unique interaction
patterns between a particular individual and another individual. Psychological knowledge may help one make probabilistic predictions of how an
individual is likely to communicate to one’s own self, based on the other’s
cultural, sociological, and psychological factors, as well as inferences about
how a specific individual tends to communicate with most or all other people. Nevertheless, that prediction is imperfect and tentative if it does not
include experientially acquired knowledge about the unique dyadic relationship between one’s self and the other.
Why might we expect a person to behave differently toward one’s self
than toward (every) other person we have observed? There is reason to
believe that we often consider ourselves to be unique, and more competent
or efficacious than most other people. Research in other domains indicates
that, in many cases, each of us tends to think that we have unique abilities
in terms of our ability to influence people or resist influence ourselves,
often referred to as an “egocentric bias” or “comparative optimism” (see
Christen & Gunther, 2003; Metzger & Suh, 2017); that we are somehow
The Theory of Interpersonal Knowledge 395
different, and potentially more competent, than others in the same communication environment. Therefore, even if we observe how a new person
responds to others with disfavor, each of us might approach that person with
a (biased) tentative sense that we can coax a more favorable response from
that person than most other people have. That is, until we interact with
that person ourselves and find out for sure, we may be cautiously optimistic
about our own individual ability to engender from the other a relatively
unique, positive interpersonal reaction.
Therefore, to acquire interpersonal knowledge and know how another
person would respond to one’s self in a way that may be distinct from that
person’s responses to most others, one must interact with the target. One
must provide the target an opportunity to respond to one’s self distinctively,
for better or worse.
This is not to say that we always communicate with someone to see how
they respond to us, however. The theory acknowledges that we watch how
a target person interacts with others to make those probabilistic predictions
of what direct, interpersonal communication might be like if we attempt
it ourselves. This notion is consistent with past research on uncertainty
reduction processes (Berger & Douglas, 1981), yet the present theory takes
the notion a step further. It suggests that the inferential value of watching
another person interact with a target increases the more that the other person resembles one’s self in important ways. The more one identifies with
another person, the greater that person’s value becomes as a surrogate for
one’s self. That is, the more we rely on the observation of the target individual and the person like us to make predictions about how the target would
behave if it was one’s self with whom the target was interacting (Dai &
Walther, 2018).
How Communication Is Conceptualized in the Theory
of Interpersonal Knowledge
The theory places a critical emphasis on interactive communication and
distinguishes interpersonal interactivity from other forms of communication
and from other forms of inference by observation. The term, interactivity,
has been used in a variety of ways in different research contexts. It sometimes simply refers to incurring a response from another entity, whether the
entity is another person or a computer program, but the process does not
transcend those two instances of action/reaction, or in the case of verbal
utterances, an “adjacency pair” like question/answer (Schegloff & Sacks,
1973) that ends after the second part of the pair.
In the present framework, interactivity in communication describes a
sequence of exchanges in which the meaning of subsequent messages is
contingent upon content referents in prior messages (see Burgoon et al.,
2002). That is, when one communicator says something to which another
responds, and so on, the meaning of the responses depends in particular on
396 Joseph B. Walther
the content that was introduced in prior responses. Interactivity, or contingency, does not depend on face-to-face exchanges. Rather, interactivity is
a function of the interrelatedness of messages, no matter what medium or
how proximally in time they occur (Rafaeli, 1988). For instance, consider
the following email exchanges between Person A and Person B, as if they
were separated by a day’s interval, each:
A1:
A2:
B1:
A3:
B2:
A4:
B3:
Why did the firefighter wear red suspenders?
To keep his pants up!
Ha ha
You thought it was funny?
Kinda, for a dad joke.
I was afraid you thought it was stupid.
It was both.
In these exchanges, messages B2, A4, and B3 do not make any sense on
their own, nor do they make much sense if you consider each one only in
the context of the immediately prior statement. They garner meaning only
through their implicit incorporation of further previous statements. This
quality exemplifies contingency and interactivity, regardless of whether the
conversation occurs online or in a physical encounter.
In order for an individual to ascertain that another person has responded
to that individual uniquely, interactivity must occur. Otherwise, the target
person could be responding to someone else or to no one else in particular.
Memories in Messages
An additional quality of communication that should be visible, and important in knowing that another person is aware of and responsive to one’s self,
would be the presence of allusions to things remembered about the particular other from previous interactions. In other words, messages should reflect
memory about the person, ideally in reference to unique qualities, episodes,
or events. Messages expressing a particularity about another person demonstrate communicatively that the speaker has distinguished that person from
all others. Transmission of that memory in a message conveys interpersonal
communication, in that it is a response to a unique, interacting individual.
Distinction Between Intergroup and Interpersonal Messages
Another definitional difference between interpersonal knowledge and its
accompanying message characteristics appears if we compare it to social
knowledge and communication that is based on group identification. Group
identification, or social identification, comes from social identity theory
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). From this perspective, when something about a
situation or conversation makes it salient, we relate to others not on an
The Theory of Interpersonal Knowledge 397
interpersonal or even a psychological basis. Rather, we size up other people
on the basis of the social groups to which we consider ourselves, and them,
to belong. This perspective, at its root, predicts differences in our attitudes
toward and messages concerning ingroup members, who we favor, versus
outgroup members, who we disfavor. Within an ingroup, we should expect
to see the expression of common idioms that have meaning within a group
but which may be obscure or have different, broader meanings, in general
society. That is, there are code words and phrases that are not only commonly understood by members of an ingroup, but the very use of those
words and phrases reinforces the shared identity those groups members share
and value. Therefore, we should expect messages expressed in situations
where group identification prevails to exhibit phrases that have particular
meanings within the group, or are associated with the group, or refer to
groups rather than implicate distinctive individuals.
We should expect a shift in referents when messages implicate interpersonal knowledge than when they are based on other knowledge sources.
Specifically, we should expect messages to reflect knowledge about the person rather than knowledge that is less individually differentiated, such as to
a reference group. Note the difference in the following two feedback comments that a student might receive on an assignment:
1. Your most recent paper for the course was not as well-written as we
expect for students at this level.
2. Your most recent paper for the course was not as well-written as your
previous paper.
The former message makes a comparison of a student to a large, amorphous group. The latter message demonstrates memory of that person’s prior
communication specifically, therefore, knowledge of the unique individual.
Thus, the incorporation of interpersonal memory becomes a long-term
feature of messages that are exchanged within interpersonal relationships.
Messages should be expected to reference personal rather than amorphous
social comparisons.
Additionally, the notion that idiomatic messages define and reinforce
group identification is a notion that can be transplanted into the realm of
interpersonal knowledge and communication as well. The implication that
phrases, symbols, and other message elements have shared meanings among
certain people, but not other people, translates very well into ideas about
interpersonal knowledge and interpersonal communication as they are
defined in the present theoretical work. However, rather than the meaning
for certain phrases being held among members who identify within a certain
group, we should expect, over time, to see certain phrases and symbols that
have private meaning among two specific people, or, for instance, between
close family members. The notion of “code change” is well-known in the
literature on developing relationships: People “evolve specialized ways of
398 Joseph B. Walther
communicating, such as personal idioms, that allow them to express themselves in more efficient ways and that reinforce their relational identity”
(Parks & Floyd, 1996, p. 8).
In the current context, code change requires that interactants have had
interpersonal exchanges and that the messages they come to exchange exhibit
memory of one another’s conversations and interaction episodes. The sharing of those phrases and the idiosyncratic meanings they evoke are not just a
reflection of interpersonal knowledge; just as the exchange of group-based
idioms reinforces group membership, the exchange of relationship-specific
idioms should reinforce the existence and importance of the unique interpersonal knowledge and interpersonal relationship between individuals.
Thus, as interpersonal relationships develop, it should be observable that,
within the messages exchanged between relational partners, idiosyncratic
phrases become more prevalent. Dialogues should become less decipherable
to those outside the relationship.
Research and Practical Applications of the Theory
of Interpersonal Knowledge
As a new theory, there is much to discover about its potential implications, predictions, and outcomes. Research can begin by testing some of
the assertions enumerated previously, with respect to empirically observable
differences in message qualities that are expected to be revealed in communicators’ expressions as individuals move from impersonal to personal to
interpersonal levels of knowledge.
Research can also examine various relational outcomes and their correspondence with predicted shifts in communication reflecting the acquisition
of interpersonal knowledge. The theory suggests that, provided an interaction is not interpersonally negative or harmful, or remains impersonal,
a shift in interpersonal and relational attributions and predictions should
follow. Interpersonal knowledge of how someone interacts with one’s self
may change one’s orientation from perceiving that someone is potentially
attractive to experiencing interpersonal attraction.
Another change should be in greater trust toward an individual with
whom we have interacted, who responds to us with interpersonal regard
and respect. Although several theories about the accrual of trust discuss the
development of interpersonal relations as a means to displace an impersonal,
rational assessment of someone’s dependability—that is, to replace “calculative trust” with “relational trust” (see Lewicki et al., 2006)—they define
interpersonal knowledge as what we know about a person. The current theory suggests that interpersonal trust derives from trustworthy transactions or
interactions, which bestow greater confidence than tentative trust predictions
we might make of someone based on their apparent psychological makeup.
One of the most unusual claims emanating from this theory pertains to
the role of electronic communication media in the process of impression
The Theory of Interpersonal Knowledge 399
formation. There is abundant research on the use of computer-mediated
communication and its effects on how well people form impressions of
others in various contexts. A fair assessment of that research indicates that
people perceive face-to-face communication as most effective, followed by
various media in the order of their resemblance to face-to-face interaction.
People’s preferences follow along the lines of the number of nonverbal cue
systems that various media offer. So, following face-to-face interaction, people rate videoconferencing as most effective for getting to know someone,
followed in turn by audio or voice-based communication systems. Last on
the list is most often email or texting or some other form of typed messaging that features only written language and no nonverbal cues (see Walther
et al., 2015). However, what people perceive and advocate as most effective
is, frequently, inconsistent with empirical studies that measure effectiveness
in different ways. In controlled experiments, people often get to know one
another using text-based computer-mediated messages as well as they do
face to face, although it takes more time and message exchanges to do so.
People get to know each other more intensely via text-based messaging
than they do face to face (e.g., Hancock & Dunham, 2001). One recent
experiment found that speed dating via computer led to more attraction
than speed dating face to face (Antheunis et al., 2020). Why the disparity
between perception and behavior?
A previous articulation of this theory (Walther, 2019) argued that we
are conditioned to favor face-to-face communication, even if face-toface interaction does not provide the information we need to reduce
interpersonal uncertainty. Since birth, whenever we enter a room, when
we are in the presence of another person with whom we will soon interact, we first observe their nonverbal physical appearance and movement,
and their facial expression if they see us. We next receive their vocal
cues, and on top of vocal cues, we exchange verbal, linguistic messages.
Because the nonverbal cues precede the verbal content, and the content is informative, we form a classical association between the observation of nonverbal features and the interpersonal uncertainty-reducing
interaction we have with another person. This is not to discount the
informativeness of nonverbal communication, by any means. However,
it does stress that we form interpersonal impressions from the exchange
of interpersonally-idiosyncratic reactions, and that language, whether
spoken or written, is sufficiently capable of performing that function.
Social interaction, this theory argues, is the requisite for interpersonal
uncertainty reduction.
Evaluation of the Theory of Interpersonal Knowledge
The theory of interpersonal knowledge is very new. As such, it is difficult
to pinpoint where its limitations will be in terms of both its testability and
its applicability. Nevertheless, certain assessments can be made tentatively.
400 Joseph B. Walther
The scope of the theory is, in a sense, quite broad. Like its intellectual
predecessors in URT and others, its focus is on a commonplace activity
since we form impressions and begin relationships with other people quite
often. The scope includes both mediated and face-to-face interaction. At
the same time, not all relationships are in their nascent stages, and not all
encounters with people progress into interaction or repeated interaction, in
a sense limiting the scope of the theory.
The testability of the theory is a challenge. This is not because the theory
makes unfalsifiable claims. Rather, the research is difficult because people are
not easily able to report, casually, the strength of their predictions about how
another person is likely to behave toward them. The current theory argues
that pre-interaction predictions about someone’s future behavior toward
themselves should be weaker or different than post-interaction predictions
about future encounters. The development of measures sensitive enough to
distinguish the two states is a needed step. Research must also be designed
carefully enough to assess whether outcomes such as code change are due to
interpersonal uncertainty reduction and not due to other processes that are
already associated with relational development.
The theory, such as it is, is parsimonious. Although its description in a
chapter like this involves a considerable review of various models and constructs from previous theories and research, the theory essentially defines
two states of knowledge (interpersonal and noninterpersonal) and two kinds
of communication (interactive and noninteractive). To the extent that parsimony pertains to the number of newly defined terms at the core of a theory,
this is very economical.
The theory’s utility and heuristic value are aspects that remain to be seen.
If applications of the theory to face-to-face interactions are successful and
introduce nuances to the theory’s formulation, its utility may be great. The
theory’s potential heuristic value will probably become evident, soonest,
in its application to the process of interpersonal uncertainty reduction in
comparative media contexts. There are many contradictions in the empirical
literature on getting acquainted online, and there has not been a new theoretical approach in some time with the potential to sort out why perceptual
and behavioral studies of online impression formation seem to reach opposite conclusions. Hopefully, the present work can help explain the apparent
contradictions.
Continuing the Conversation
Future research is already venturing somewhat far afield from the theory’s
original scope, (mediated) interactions between humans. New research is
applying the theory to artificial intelligence systems that seem to “know”
a human user. Consider seeing a medical AI system for a review of your
medical lab tests. A computer system should have no trouble comparing
current results to your medical history; computers are good at remembering
The Theory of Interpersonal Knowledge 401
details about us. It would know, for instance, if your glucose has been high
every winter but only temporarily. An AI system might make diagnoses
taking these historical data into explicit account. (Consider how certain
music apps “remember” us, recommending songs like those we’ve selected
before.) In contrast, a new, human doctor does not know you, aside from
current labs or X-rays, and does not remember anything about you. Who
knows you better, the AI or the human? Whose message is more likely to
reflect historical, personal knowledge about you and your responses to its
last recommendation? Which is more trustworthy? Although there are many
more questions to be asked in a context like this, preliminary investigations
are underway.
In a more familiar domain, we have all been participating in a wild field
experiment on getting acquainted with others using different media. Questions about how different media facilitate or impede getting interpersonally
acquainted have occupied communication research for decades. These issues
have never been as critical, or so prescient, as during the recent period in
which so many of us worked and studied from home due to the COVID19 pandemic. We met new people, at least each academic term, but almost
never face to face. Students appeared to their professors as a black box with
a name, in Zoom meetings, with their cameras off and microphones muted.
Students got to know each other during my lectures using the text-chat
within Zoom, or external texting systems like GroupMe. I got to know students through email—tons of it—or when I read and commented on their
written work, or answered questions on discussion boards. This was how we
got to know each other in 2020. Was it as good as our traditional classroom?
We are tempted to say not. Then we remember how few students we get to
know interpersonally in a face-to-face class of considerable size and decide
that the jury is out on the comparison. It is safe to say that we got to know
each other, to the extent that we did, through reciprocal interactions. The
students who I have come to like, and those who still send their regards long
after the course ended, got to know each other in silence, through words
going back and forth. That is the essence of the theory of interpersonal
knowledge. Who knew how large a field experiment it would see?
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31
Truth-Default Theory
Changing Our Understanding
of Human Deception
Timothy R. Levine
Welcome to Truth-Default Theory (TDT hereafter). My name is Tim Levine and TDT is my creation. TDT is a new theory of interpersonal communication that focuses on deception.
TDT makes several claims that distinguish it from other theories of human
deception. As its name implies, TDT says that people generally communicate from within a default mindset where other’s communication is passively
and uncritically accepted as honest. Suspicion requires a “trigger,” and even
then, people are still truth biased. According to TDT, this is a good thing
because it allows for efficient and effective communication.
TDT rejects the idea that deception can be detected in real time based on
verbal and nonverbal cues. Cues and demeanor (impressions that are conveyed) affect who is believed, but lack diagnostic value in deception detection because some people are “mismatched senders” who come off opposite
of how they really are. According to TDT, deception is more accurately
detected through communication content, evidence, and persuading people
to be honest. Deception is also usually detected after the fact. TDT makes
further predictions about how often people lie and when and why people
lie. I will expand on TDT’s claims throughout this chapter. The full explication of the theory is in my book Duped (Levine, 2020) where entire chapters
are devoted to issues that are only briefly mentioned here.
TDT has become known outside academic circles thanks to the bestselling author Malcolm Gladwell. TDT inspired Gladwell’s (2019) book Talking
to Strangers. Because of Malcolm, Oprah actually voiced the words “. . . now
going to become a cultural phrase, and everyone is going to be talking about
the truth default” (Winfrey, 2019, 17:09). Although surely Oprah exaggerates, it is nice to hear Oprah and Malcolm engaging in communication
theory. Here, I will do my best to engage you in TDT. Let us talk theory.
Intellectual Tradition of Truth-Default Theory
Although many people may consider TDT a post-positivist theory, it is
not a label that I endorse. Along with Meehl (1989, 1990b) and Campbell
(1990), I think that logical positivism has been misunderstood in the social
DOI: 10.4324/9781003195511-35
Timothy R. LevineTruth-Default Theory