- No category
Persons & Family Relations: Table of Contents
advertisement
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASE:Quismundov.WCC(1984)..................................................................................................26
TheFamilyasanInstitution....................................................................................................................5
CASE:Arroyo,Jr.v.CA,supra.........................................................................................................5
FamilyRelations..................................................................................................................................5
EarnestEffortsatCompromise..............................................................................................................6
CASE:Guerrerov.RTCofIlocosNorte(1994)...................................................................................6
CASE:Hontiverosv.RTC(1999)......................................................................................................7
CASE:Magbaletav.Gonong(1977).................................................................................................7
CASE:Manalov.CA(2001)............................................................................................................8
CASE:HeirsofDr.MarianoFavis,Sr.v.Gonzales(2015).....................................................................8
TheFamilyHome.....................................................................................................................................9
ConceptandApplicability......................................................................................................................9
CASE:Gomezv.Sta.Ines(2005)..................................................................................................10
CASE:Versolav.CA(2006)..........................................................................................................10
CASE:Patriciov.DarioIII(2006)..................................................................................................11
CASE:Ramosv.Pangilinan(2010).................................................................................................11
WhenDeemedConstituted,Requisites:................................................................................................12
CASE:Modequillov.Breva(1990)..................................................................................................12
CASE:SpousesOliva-DeMesav.SpousesAcero,Jr.(2012)...............................................................13
ApplicabilityoftheFamilyHome(NoretroactiveeffectforArt.153).........................................................13
CASE:Manacopv.CA(1997)........................................................................................................13
ValueCeilingforExemption.................................................................................................................14
DispositionandEncumbrance..............................................................................................................14
Afterthedeathofpersonswhoconstitutedthefamilyhome....................................................................14
PaternityandFiliation...........................................................................................................................14
LegitimateChildren............................................................................................................................15
PresumptionofLegitimacy..................................................................................................................15
CASE:Tanv.Trocio(1990)...........................................................................................................15
CASE:Arbolariov.CA(2003)........................................................................................................16
CASE:Cabataniav.CA(2004).......................................................................................................16
CASE:Concepcionv.CA(2005).....................................................................................................16
CASE:EstateofOngv.Diaz(2007)...............................................................................................17
ChildrenBornofArtificialInsemination.................................................................................................17
GroundsforImpugnationofLegitimacy................................................................................................18
WhoCanImpugnLegitimacy...............................................................................................................19
CASE:DeJesusv.EstateofDizon(2001).......................................................................................19
CASE:Liyaov.Tanhoti-Liyao(2002)...............................................................................................19
Periods(PrescriptiononImpugningLegitimacy).....................................................................................20
CASE:Babierav.Catotal(2000)....................................................................................................20
LegitimacyAssailableOnlyinDirectAction............................................................................................21
CASE:Tisonv.CA(1997).............................................................................................................21
CASE:DeJesusv.Dizon,supra.....................................................................................................21
CASE:Sps.Fidelv.CA(2008).......................................................................................................21
CASE:Brazav.CityCivilRegistrarofHimaymaylanCity(2009).........................................................22
ProofofFiliation....................................................................................................................................23
PrimaryProofsofFiliation...................................................................................................................23
SecondaryProofsofFiliation...............................................................................................................23
CASE:Peoplev.Tumimpad(1994).................................................................................................24
CASE:Mariateguiv.CA(1992)......................................................................................................25
CASE:RosalinaEcetav.Ma.TheresaEceta(2004)...........................................................................25
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |1
CASE:Constantinov.Mendez(1992).............................................................................................26
FiliationNotEstablished(CASES).........................................................................................................27
CASE:Labagalav.Santiago(2001)................................................................................................27
CASE:Fernandezv.Fernandez(2001)............................................................................................27
CASE:Solinapv.Locsin(2001).....................................................................................................28
CASE:Geronimov.Santos(2015).................................................................................................28
ImprescriptibilityofActiontoclaimLegitimacy......................................................................................29
CASE:DelaRosav.CA(1996).......................................................................................................29
RightsofLegitimateChildren...............................................................................................................29
CASE:Tolentinov.CA(1988)........................................................................................................30
IllegitimateChildren.............................................................................................................................30
HowFiliationEstablished....................................................................................................................30
CASE:Tayagv.CA(1992)............................................................................................................30
CASE:Uyguancov.CA(1989).......................................................................................................31
CASE:PeLimv.CA(1997)...........................................................................................................31
CASE:Baluyutv.Baluyut(1990)...................................................................................................32
CASE:Ilanov.CA(1994).............................................................................................................32
CASE:Trinidadv.CA,supra..........................................................................................................33
CASE:Potencianov.Reynoso(2003)..............................................................................................33
CASE:DeJesusvs.EstateofDizon,supra......................................................................................34
CASE:Solinapvs.Locsin,supra.....................................................................................................34
CASE:Arbolariov.CA,supra.........................................................................................................34
CASE:Cabataniav.CA,supra.......................................................................................................34
CASE:Aguilarv.Siasat(2015)......................................................................................................34
DNATesting......................................................................................................................................34
CASE:ArnelAgustinv.CA(2005)..................................................................................................34
CASE:RosendaHerrerav.Alba(2005)...........................................................................................35
CASE:EstateofOngvs.Diaz,supra...............................................................................................35
RightsofIllegitimateChildren.............................................................................................................35
CASE:Mossessgeldv.CA(1998)...................................................................................................36
CASE:Republicv.Abadilla(1998)..................................................................................................36
CASE:Leonardov.CA(2003)........................................................................................................37
ParentalAuthority/Custody.................................................................................................................37
CASE:GraceGrandev.PatricioAntonio(2014)................................................................................37
CASE:JulianLinWangvs.CebuCityCivilRegistrar(2005)...............................................................38
CASE:IntheMatteroftheAdoptionofStephanieNathyAstorgaGarcia,supra....................................38
CASE:Uyguangcovs.CA,supra....................................................................................................39
CASE:Bernabevs.Alejo,supra.....................................................................................................39
CASE:AlejandraAradoHeirsvs.Alcoran(2015)..............................................................................39
LegitimatedChildren(Arts.177-182)....................................................................................................40
Requisites.........................................................................................................................................40
RightsofLegitimatedChildren.............................................................................................................40
RetroactiveEffectofLegitimation.........................................................................................................40
DescendantsBenefitedbyLegitimation.................................................................................................40
WhocanImpugnLegitimation;Grounds;PrescriptivePeriod....................................................................40
CASE:DeSantosv.Hon.Angeles(1995)........................................................................................41
CASE:Abadillav.Tabiliran(1995)..................................................................................................41
CASE:“BBB”vs.“AAA”(2015).......................................................................................................41
Adoption................................................................................................................................................43
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |2
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
DomesticAdministrativeAdoptionandAlternativeChildCareAct(R.A.11642)....................................43
SubstituteandSpecialParentalAuthority..............................................................................................67
Whomayadopt.................................................................................................................................43
CASE:Amadorav.CA(1988)........................................................................................................67
ConsenttoAdoption...........................................................................................................................44
CASE:PSBAv.CA(1992).............................................................................................................68
CASE:Republicv.CA(1992).........................................................................................................45
EffectofParentalAuthorityUponthePersonsoftheChildren...................................................................68
CASE:Cangv.CA&Sps.Clavano(1998).......................................................................................45
CASE:Tamargov.CA,supra.........................................................................................................69
CASE:Landinginv.Republic(2006)...............................................................................................46
CASE:Libiv.IAC(1992)..............................................................................................................69
EffectsofAdoption.............................................................................................................................46
CASE:St.Mary’sAcademyv.Carpitanos(2002)..............................................................................70
CASE:Saysonv.CA(1992)..........................................................................................................47
EffectofparentalAuthorityUponthePropertyoftheChildren..................................................................70
CASE:Acainv.IAC(1987)............................................................................................................47
SuspensionorTerminationofParentalAuthority....................................................................................71
CASE:Tamargov.CA(1992)........................................................................................................47
CASE:Sombongv.CA,supra........................................................................................................72
CASE:IntheMatteroftheAdoptionofStephanieNathyAstorgaGarcia,supra....................................48
RepublicActNo.8972,“SoloParents’WelfareActof2000”..................................................................72
CASE:InRe:PetitionforAdoptionofMichelleP.Lim(2009)..............................................................48
GroundsforRescissionofAdoption......................................................................................................49
epublic Act No. 7610, “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
R
DiscriminationAct”...............................................................................................................................73
EffectsofRescissionofAdoption..........................................................................................................49
Funerals(Arts.305-310,NCC)..............................................................................................................74
RectificationofSimulatedBirths..........................................................................................................49
OrderofPreference:DutyandRighttoMakeFuneralArrangement...........................................................74
Inter-CountryAdoptionActof1995(RA8043).....................................................................................49
KindofFuneralArrangements.............................................................................................................74
WhoMayAdopt.................................................................................................................................50
Retention,Interment,DisposalorExhumationofDead...........................................................................74
CASE:Republicv.Tolendano(1994)...............................................................................................50
FuneralExpenses...............................................................................................................................74
WhoMayBeAdopted.........................................................................................................................51
CASE:Valinov.Adriano(2014).....................................................................................................74
WheretoFilePetition.........................................................................................................................51
UseofSurnames...................................................................................................................................75
SupervisionofTrialCustody;TimeWhentheDecreeforAdoptionCouldBeIssued.....................................51
SurnameofMarriedWomen................................................................................................................75
A.M.No.02-6-02-SC:RuleonAdoption(DomesticandInter-Country)......................................................51
CASE:Remov.SecretaryofForeignAffairs(2010)..........................................................................75
Support(Arts.194-208)........................................................................................................................52
LegallySeparatedWife.......................................................................................................................76
CASE:Lamv.Chua(2004)...........................................................................................................52
CASE:Laperalv.Republic(1962)...................................................................................................76
CASE:Lim-Luav.Lua(2013)........................................................................................................52
ChangeofName................................................................................................................................76
PersonsObligedtoSupportEachOther.................................................................................................53
CASE:Republicv.Vicencio(1998).................................................................................................77
CASE:Zaguirrev.Castillo(2005)..................................................................................................55
CASE:Yasinv.Shari’aDistrictCourt(1995)....................................................................................77
CASE:Mangononv.CA(2006)......................................................................................................55
CASE:Calderonv.Republic(1967)................................................................................................77
CASE:Lacsonv.Lacson(2006).....................................................................................................56
AliasNames......................................................................................................................................78
ParentalAuthority(Arts.209-233).......................................................................................................57
CASE:Ursuav.CA(1996)............................................................................................................78
JointExerciseofparentalAuthority......................................................................................................57
CivilRegister(Arts.407-413,NCC).....................................................................................................79
ParentalAuthoritywhenParentsareSeparated......................................................................................57
KindsofErrorsorMistakesSubjectofCorrection...................................................................................80
CASE:Lunav.IAC(1985).............................................................................................................58
CASE:JulianLinWangvs.CebuCityCivilRegistrar(2005)...............................................................80
CASE:UnsonIIIv.Navarro(1980)................................................................................................58
CASE:Ceruilav.Delantar(2005)...................................................................................................80
CASE:Cervantesv.Fajardo(1989)................................................................................................59
Rule108,RulesofCourt.....................................................................................................................80
CASE:Santos,Sr.v.CA(1995).....................................................................................................60
CASE:Republicv.Kho(2007).......................................................................................................81
CASE:Espirituv.CA(1995)..........................................................................................................60
epublic Act No. 9048 (An Act Authorizing The City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct
R
a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register
WithoutNeedofJudicialOrder)...........................................................................................................81
CASE:Sombongv.CA(1996).......................................................................................................61
CASE:Sagala-Eslaov.CA(1997)...................................................................................................61
CASE:Artadiv.Bondagjy(2001)...................................................................................................61
CASE:Laxamanav.Laxamana(2002)............................................................................................62
CASE:Gualbertov.Gualberto(2002).............................................................................................62
CASE:Hirschv.CA(2007)............................................................................................................63
CASE:Dacasinv.Del-MundoDacasin(2010)...................................................................................63
OnIllegitimateChildren......................................................................................................................64
CASE:Davidv.CA(1995).............................................................................................................64
CASE:Silvav.CA(1997)..............................................................................................................65
CASE:Tonogv.CA&Daguimol(2002)...........................................................................................65
CASE:Brionesv.Miguel(2004).....................................................................................................66
SubstituteParentalAuthoritybySurvivingGrandparent..........................................................................66
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |3
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |4
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
TITLE V – The Family
he Family as an Institution
T
Thefamily,beingthefoundationofthenation,isthebasicsocialinstitutionwhichpublicpolicycherishes
and protects.
rt. XV, 1987 Constitution
A
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
.A. 8369 (Creation of the Family Courts)
R
Family Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases:
1. Involving minors (ages 9-17) as either accused or victims in criminal cases;
2. Petitions for child guardianship, custody, and habeas corpus;
3. Adoption and its revocation;
4. Annulment and nullity of marriage;
5. Marital status issues, property relations, and the dissolution of conjugal partnerships;
6. Petitions for support and acknowledgment;
7. Summary proceedings under the Family Code;
8. Cases involving abandoned, dependent,orneglectedchildren,parentalauthoritymatters,andcases
related to child welfare laws;
9. Petitions for the constitution of family homes
10.Cases involving minors under the Dangerous Drugs Act;
11.Violations of the Special Protection of Children Act (RA 7610) are also under their purview, as are
domestic violence cases against women, involving physical, sexual, and psychological abuse, and
against children, including abuse, neglect, exploitation, and harmful conditions.
ote:
N
● Family Courts may use 10% of their income from filing and court fees for research, operating
expenses, and capital outlay. This benefit also applies to all courts of justice.
● Incasesofdomesticviolence,theFamilyCourtmayissuearestrainingorderuponrequestby
the victim. The court may also grant temporary custody of children and order interim
support, including salary deductions and use of the conjugalhome,incivilactionsforcustodyand
support.
CASE: Arroyo, Jr. v. CA,supra.
heCourtemphasizedthat,oncefiled,anadulterycomplaintiscontrolledbythepublicprosecutor,as
T
enforcing adultery laws supports public policy protecting marriage and family.
amily Relations
F
It is governed by law. No custom, practice, agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized.
Members of the Family/Family relations (Strictly Construed)
1. Husband and Wife
2. Parents and Children
3. Other ascendants and descendants
4. Siblings, full or half-blood
arnest Efforts at Compromise
E
Itisimportanttoidentifyfamilymembersbecausecertainlegalprovisionsapplyexclusivelytothem.For
instance,thelawstatesthat“Nosuitbetweenmembersofthesamefamilyshallprosperunlesstherewas
an earnest effort to settle the matter amicably.”
I n a complaint,itmustbestatedthatsincereattemptsweremadetoresolvetheissueamicablytohelp
preserve family unity.
ote: Failure to make an earnestefforttosettlethematteramicablyisgroundsforamotiontodismiss
N
under Rule 16. Among the ten grounds listed in Rule 16, the tenth is the failure to comply with a
condition precedentrequired before filing a claimor action in court.
Conditions Precedent for filing of action in court
1. Katarungan Pambarangay
You must gothroughtheLuponTaga-Pamayapa.Formembersofthesamebarangay,nocivilaction
can proceed without a Certificate to File Action issued by the Lupon.
2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
If the law provides for the exhaustion of admin remedies, must exhaust all, otherwise it will be
dismissed.
3. Earnest Efforts to settle the matter amicably under Article 151 of Family Code
Exceptions
1. Cases which cannot be compromised
There are non-compromisable cases. Hence, you need not allege in your complaint that earnest
efforts has been made to settle matters amicably, such as:
a. Involving the validity of the marriage
b. Annulment of marriage
c. Declaration of Nullity of marriage
d. Legal Separation
e. Action involving filiation
2. One of the defendants is not a member of the same family
If the suit involves a third party who is not a family member, therequirementforearnesteffortat
amicable settlement does not apply, as the interestsofthethirdpartymaydifferfromthoseofthe
family members.
Note: Read Hontiveros v. RTC below
3. Barangay Conciliation
eaning of “Suit”
M
The term "suit" between members of the same family refers to an adversarial or contentious case,
specificallyanordinarycivilaction.Itinvolvesonepersontakinglegalactionagainstanotherincourtto
seek a remedy for an injury or the enforcement of a right.
ASE: Guerrero v. RTC of Ilocos Norte (1994)
C
Brothers by affinity are not considered members of the same family and that the failure to allege
earnest efforts towards a compromise is a condition precedent
ote: It should be construed strictly. Those who are not included in the enumeration cannot be
N
considered as within the term “family relation.”
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |5
acts:
F
GaudencioGuerrerofiledanaccionpubliciana(plenaryactiontorecovertherightofpossession)against
his brother-in-law, Pedro G. Hernando, disputing ownership of a property. Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr.
presided over the case and instructed Guerrero to amend his complaint to include an assertion that
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |6
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
arnesteffortstowardacompromisehadbeenmadebutfailed,citingArticle151oftheFamilyCodeas
e
a jurisdictional requirement.
Guerrero argued that brothers-in-law were not legally considered family members and were thus
exempt from this requirement. After his motion for reconsideration was denied, Guerrero's failure to
amend led to the dismissal of the case, prompting him to appeal.
Ruling:
C ruled in favorofGuerrero,holdingthatbrothers-in-lawarenotclassifiedasfamilymembers
S
under Article 217 of the New Civil Code or Article 150 of the Family Code, which require
efforts toward a compromise.
acts:
F
ThecaseinvolvedalanddisputewhereprivaterespondentCatalinoMagbaleta,Rufino'sbrother,sought
tohaveaparceloflanddeclaredashisproperty,claimingthatSusanaG.Baldovihadattemptedtotake
possession after purchasing it from Rufino and Romana. The petitioners argued that the complaint
should be dismissed for failing to allege earnest efforts towards acompromise,asrequiredbyArticle
222 of the Civil Code and Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
owever,therespondentjudgedeniedthemotion,statingthatoneofthedefendants,Susana,wasnot
H
a family member, so the provisions for compromise did not apply.
egaldefinitionsof"familymembers"donotextendtorelationshipsbyaffinity,suchasbrothers-in-law.
L
Consequently, Guerrero was not bound by the compromise requirement. The Court also clarifiedthat
the lack of a compromise allegation did not justify the case's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. It
reversed the lower court's dismissal ordersand directedthe case's continuation.
uling:
R
SCruledthattherequirementforearnesteffortstowardsacompromisedoesnotapplywhena
stranger to the family is involved in the litigation. A non-family member, such as Susana, who
mayhaveacquiredaninterestinthepropertyingoodfaith,shouldnotbesubjectedtotheprocedural
delays and complexities typically associated with family disputes.
CASE: Hontiveros v. RTC (1999)
suitwasfiledagainstthepetitioner’sbrother,buthiswifewasalsoimpleaded.SCruledthatearnest
A
effort was not required, as the wife is not a member of the same family.
I t would beimpracticalandunfairtoimposethesamerequirementsonastranger,astheyshouldnot
have their rightsdeterminedbyinternalfamilyconflicts.Therefore,thepetitionwasdismissed,and
the restraining order issued in November 1976 was lifted, affirming therespondentjudge'srefusalto
dismiss the case.
Facts:
I nDecember1990,Sps.AugustoandMariaHontiverosfiledacomplaintfordamagesagainstGregorio
HontiverosandTeodoraAysonintheRTCofIloiloCity,claimingownershipofaparceloflandinCapiz.
They alleged that duetoalandregistrationcasefiledbyGregorioandthebadfaithpossessionofthe
property by the private respondents, they were deprived of income from the land.
he private respondents denied the allegations, assertingthatpossessionhadbeentransferredtothe
T
petitioners in 1985, and claimed the complaint lacked earnest efforts toward settlement, as required
under Article 151 of the Family Code, given that Augusto and Gregorio were brothers.
TC dismissed the case forlackofverification,concludingthatthepetitionersfailedtoshowtheyhad
R
attempted to resolve the matter amicably. When their motion for reconsideration was denied, the
petitioners filed a petition for review with SC.
Ruling:
C ruled that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint solely due to lack of verification. It
S
clarified that verification under Article151oftheFamilyCodeisaproceduralrequirementintendedto
confirm the truthfulnessoftheallegations,notajurisdictionalissue,andthecourtcouldhaveallowed
the petitioners to verify the complaint.
ASE: Manalo v. CA (2001)
C
Petition for estate settlement was a special proceeding, not an ordinary civil action, thereby excluding it
acts:
F
The centers on the judicial settlement of the estate of Troadio Manalo, who passed away intestate,
leavingbehindvariouspropertiesandabusiness.Hiswidow,PilarS.Manalo,andelevenchildrenwere
involved in a legal dispute initiated by eight of the siblings, who filed for theestate'ssettlementand
appointed Romeo Manalo as the administrator.
heoppositionledbyPilarandthreeotherchildrenarguedthatthepetitionshouldbedismissedfornot
T
showing that attempts for family compromise weremade,butthisargumentwasrejectedbytheRTC
and CA.
uling:
R
SCruledthatthepetitionforestatesettlementwasaspecialproceeding,notanordinarycivil
action, thereby excluding it from Article 222oftheCivilCode,whichmandatesfamilycompromise
efforts before initiating a suit.
dditionally, the Court found that the inclusion of Teodora Ayson as a defendant and Maria
A
HontiverosasaplaintifftookthecaseoutsidethescopeofArticle151,whichonlyappliesto
disputesbetweenfamilymembers.Thus,thetrialcourt'sdismissalwasdeemedincorrect.However,
theCourtupheldthetrialcourt'sdenialofthepetitioners'motionforjudgmentonthepleadings,asthe
private respondents’ answer raised factual issues regarding damages and possession, which required
further evidence. The case wasremanded to the RTCfor further proceedings.
rticle 222onlyappliestoordinarycivilactionsseekingredressorenforcementofrights,whereasthe
A
settlementpetitionaimedtoestablishlegalstatus,rights,orfactsrelatedtoTroadio'sestateandheirs.
The attempt bytheoppositorstoframethepetitionasanordinarycivilactionwasdeemedirrelevant,
asthejurisdictionandclassificationofacourtcasedependonthenatureofthecomplaintratherthan
the responses or defenses presented.
CASE: Magbaleta v. Gonong (1977)
ourt ruled that the requirement for earnest efforts towards a compromise does not apply when a
C
stranger to the family is involved
ASE: Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales (2015)
C
Requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code isnotjurisdictionalbutmerelyaproceduraldefect
that can be waived if not timely objected to.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |7
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |8
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
acts:
F
Dr.FaviswasinitiallymarriedtoCapitolinaAguilarandhadsevenchildren.AfterCapitolina’sdeath,he
entered a common-law relationship with Juana, with whom he had a son, MarianoG.Favis.Dr.Favis
and Juana later married, and he recognized Mariano as legitimate.
I n 1994, Dr. Favis, then 92 and reportedly in poor health, allegedly executed a Deed of Donation
transferringcertainpropertiestohisgrandchildrenbyJuana.Believingthisactprejudicedtheirrightful
inheritance,thepetitionerssoughttonullifythedonation.TheRTCruledintheirfavor,findingDr.Favis
lacked mental capacity due to age and illness, and declared Juana and Mariano as compulsory heirs.
nappeal,however,theCAdismissedthecomplaintforfailingtoallegeearnesteffortsatcompromise
O
as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
uling:
R
SC ruled that the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to exert earnesteffortmustberaised
before the filingofanAnswerintrialcourt.Otherwise,itisdeemedbarred.CAerredwhenit
motu propriodismissed the case on such ground.
TC’sfindingsonthementalincapacityofDr.FavisatthetimeofexecutingtheDeedofDonationwere
R
notcontestedbytherespondentsintheirappeal.ThetrialcourthadfoundthatDr.Favis,attheageof
92 and suffering from multiple illnesses, lacked the mental capacity to execute a valid Deed of
Donation. SC upheld these findings, affirming the nullification of the Deed of Donation and the
cancellation of the corresponding tax declarations.
he Family Home
T
Refers to the house and lot where the family resides. To be considered a family home, it must be owned
by the husband and the wife, the husband alone or the wife alone, or by an unmarried head of the family
AND must be devoted primarily for residential purposes.
Reason:When creditors seize the family house, theyvirtually shatter the family itself. Thus, Art. 153
grants the family home to be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment.
enefits of the Family Home
B
The family home is exempted from execution, forced sale, or attachment
Judicial Constitution
equires filing of a verified petition
R
before the courts and the registration
of the court order with the Registry
of Deeds of the area where the
property is located
Extra-Judicial Constitution
I nvolves execution of a public
instrument which must also be
registered with the Registry of
Property
ote:Obligations/DebtincurredpriortotheconstitutionoftheFamilyHomeisnotexempttheexecution
N
of the house.(see Gomez v. Sta. Ines & Mondequilov. Breva)
ASE: Gomez v. Sta. Ines (2005)
C
Not exempt from execution as a family home since it wasn’t before the liability arose
acts:
F
Gomez filed a complaintagainstMariettadelaCruzSta.Ines,allegingthatMariettamismanagedtheir
deceased mother’s rice land, refused to account for its produce, and withheld the property’s title.
Marietta was ordered by the RTC of Pasig to deliver the title and pay damages; when she failed to
comply, a writ of execution was issued. Thisresultedinthelevyandpublicauctionsaleofadifferent
property in Bayombong, registered in Marietta's name, which was purchased by Mary Josephine.
I n response, Family members of Marietta filed a complaint for annulment of the sale, claiming the
propertyastheirfamilyresidenceandthereforeexemptfromexecutionunderArticle155oftheFamily
Code.
uling:
R
SCruledthepropertywasn’tafamilyhomewhenMariettaincurreddebtsin1977;sheassumed
managementandsupervisionofherdeceasedmother’sricelandthen.Thecomplaintwasfiledin1986,
andthejudgmentorderedhertopaydamages.So,herliabilityarosebeforethepropertybecame
a family home in August 1988.
herefore, the property was not exempt from execution for debts incurred before that date and the
T
complaint for annulment of the sale was dismissed.
Exception
1. Non-payment of taxes;
2. Debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
3. Debts secured by a mortgage on the premises; and
4. Debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, etc. incurred in the construction of the family home.
Concept and Applicability
Under Civil Code
(FH constructed before Aug. 3, 1988)
uty of the Court
D
The Court should make earnest determination of the truth to one’s claim. If found to be a family home,
court should determine:
1. Whether the obligation falls under one of the exceptions (Art 155);
2. Whetherobligationsueduponwascontractedorincurredpriorto,oraftertheeffectivityofthe
Family Code;
3. Whether the spouse is still alive (as well as other beneficiaries);
4. Whether there is more than one residence (determine which is his family home);
5. Actual location and value (to apply Art 157 and 160);
Under Family Code
(present)
No need for further action, it
shall be automatically
considered as family home
the moment the family
resides therein
ASE: Versola v. CA (2006)
C
Right to exemption from execution under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege that
must be claimed and proved by the judgment debtor before the sale of the property
acts:
F
Here,Dr.VictoriaOnggranteda1MloantoDoloresLedesma,whopromisedtosecuretheloanwitha
real estate mortgage over her property. However, the mortgage wasnotexecuted,andLedesmasold
thepropertytoSps.Versolafor2.5M;theypaid1Mupfrontandplannedtopaytheremaining1.5Min
installments. To settle the balance, Sps.VersolaobtainedaloanfromAsiatrustBank;whereLedesma
executedadeedofsaleandforthemtomortgagethepropertyforsuchloan.However,anoticeoflevy
on execution was discovered on the title due to Ledesma's debt, leading the Bank torefusetheloan
release.
r.OngdemandedpaymentfromLedesmaandSps.Versola,butthechecksbounced;thusherfilinga
D
case where the RTC ultimately ruled in her favor. When the decision was final, Dr. Ong moved for
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |9
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |10
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
xecution where the property will be auctioned. However, Sps. Versola argued that the property was
e
their family home and exempt from execution.
1,661,490.30 in back wages and other benefits, and issued a writ of execution against Ramos'
P
property in Pandacan, Manila.
Ruling:
CruledthattherighttoexemptionfromexecutionunderArticle153oftheFamilyCodeisapersonal
S
privilege that judgment debtors must claim and prove before the sale of their property at
public auction. The Versolasfailedtoprovideevidencethatthepropertywastheirfamilyhomebefore
theauctionsale.Theirmotiontosuspendtheauctionsalewasdismissedbecausetheylackednoticeof
the hearing, and their objection to the sheriff was not supported by evidence.
amos and his company attempted to quash the writ, claiming the Pandacan property was a family
R
home and thus exempt from execution. The employees countered that the property served as the
company’s business address and was not Ramos' family home, notinghehadaseparateresidencein
Antipolo.
ourt said that litigation should end, and the winning party should notbedeprivedofthebenefitsof
C
theirverdictthroughdeception.TheVersolas’claimofexemptionwasconsideredalast-minuteattempt,
and their failure to timely and properly claim it barred them from asserting it later.
CASE: Patricio v. Dario III (2006)
C ruled in favor of the petitioner, partitioning a family home despite a minor beneficiary, as legal
S
support primarily falls on the parents, not the grandparents
Facts:
familypropertydisputearoseafterMarcelinoV.Dario’sdeathin1987,leavinghiswifePerlaandtheir
A
two sons, Marcelino Marc and Marcelino G. Dario III. The property, which included a residence and
pre-school in Quezon City, was initially settled extrajudicially among the heirs, with a new Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in their names.
ater, Perla and Marcelino Marc sought to partition the property, but Marcelino G. Dario III resisted,
L
leading to a court case. RTC ordered a publicauctionforpartition,whichwasinitiallyaffirmedbythe
CA. However, CA reversed its decision, ruling that the property, as a family home, could not be
partitioned while a minor beneficiary, the 12-year-old son of Marcelino G. Dario III, lived there.
Ruling:
C reversed theCA’sruling,allowingthepartitionofthefamilyhome.UnderArticle159oftheFamily
S
Code,afamilyhomeremainsassuchfor10yearsafterthedeathofthespouses,oraslongasaminor
beneficiary resides there.
owever, a minor beneficiary under Article 154 must be related to the decedent,resideinthefamily
H
home, and depend on the head of the family for support. Although the minor, Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV, met the first two conditions, he did not meet the third, as his legal support came
from his father rather than his grandmother, Perla. Thus, he could not be considered a minor
beneficiary under the Family Code, and the family home was not exempt from partition.
ourt remanded the case totheRTCforpartitionbycommissionerstoestablisheachheir’sshareand
C
facilitate property distribution or sale if needed.
CASE: Ramos v. Pangilinan (2010)
incethepetitionersclaimedthefamilyhomewasconstitutedin1944,theyneededtocomplywiththe
S
Civil Code's procedures, which they did not
Facts:
complaintforillegaldismissalwasfiledbyformeremployeesagainstE.M.RamosElectric,Inc.andits
A
owner, Ernesto M. Ramos. The Labor Arbiter ruled in the employees' favor, awarding them
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |11
uling:
R
SC ruled that the Pandacan property was not exempt from execution. Under the Civil Code, family
homesconstitutedbeforetheFamilyCode’seffectivityonAugust3,1988,musthavebeenjudiciallyor
extrajudiciallydeclaredandregisteredtoclaimexemptionfromexecution.Petitionersprovided
no evidence that these steps were followed for the Pandacan property, which they claimed was
constituted as a family home in 1944.
erely alleging a property as a family home is insufficient; formal requirements must be met.
M
Additionally, as the only remaining asset available forsatisfyingthejudgment,thePandacanproperty
was subject to execution, and the petitioners’ appeal was denied.
When Deemed Constituted, Requisites:
1. Both house and land are owned by husband and/or wife or by the unmarried head
Ifthelandismerelyleased,itcannotqualifyasafamilyhome.Thehousemustbeprimarilydevoted
to residential and not commercial purposes.
2. Occupancy must be actual
Residing in the family home is a real right. If only one living therein is the overseer, it cannot be
considered as a family home. Hence, not exempt from execution, forced sale and attachment.
3. It will remain to be such from the time of its constitution and so long as any of the
beneficiaries actually resides therein.
Beneficiaries (Article 154):
1. Primary - Persons who constituted the family home (husband and wife or the unmarried head).
2. Secondary - Parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers andsisters(legitimateorillegitimate)
who are living in the family home and depend on the head for support.
4. Family Home must be part of the properties of the Absolute community or the Conjugal
property, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter’s consent.(Art. 156)
Note: Land bought on installment and subject to a conditional sale (ownership is reserved to
guarantee payment of balance), still considered a family home.
ASE: Modequillo v. Breva (1990)
C
Sincethepetitionersclaimedthefamilyhomewasconstitutedin1944,theyneededtocomplywiththe
Civil Code's procedures, which they did not
acts:
F
Modequillo contested the execution of a judgment in favor of respondents, stemming from a 1976
vehicular accident for which Modequillo was held jointly and severally liable. A writ of execution was
issued against two of Modequillo’s properties—a residential lot in Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur,
claimed as his family home, and an agricultural lot he argued was still public land.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |12
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
odequillo sought to quash the levy onbothproperties,contendingthathisfamilyhomewasexempt
M
from execution under the Family Code, and the agricultural land was not fully his.
Ruling:
CheldthatthefamilyhomeexemptiondidnotapplysincethedebtpredatedtheFamilyCode,which
S
tookeffectonAugust3,1988.UnderArticle153oftheFamilyCode,afamilyhomeisgenerallyexempt
from execution except for debts incurred before its constitution. Since the debt originated froma
1976accidentandthefamilyhomehadnotyetattainedexemptstatusunderthelawinforce
at that time, the exemption claim was invalid.
Ontheagriculturalland,theCourtupheldthetrialcourt'sdecisiontoproceedwiththelevyonwhatever
rights Modequillo possessed, as his argument regarding the land’s public status was insufficient to
quash the levy. SC dismissed Modequillo's petition, affirming the trial court’s orders.
ASE: Spouses Oliva-De Mesa v. Spouses Acero, Jr. (2012)
C
Exemption must be claimed and proved to the Sheriff before the sale at public auction
acts:
F
ThecasecenteredonapropertyinBulacan,originallyownedbyAraceliOliva-DeMesaandmortgaged
to Claudio D. Acero, Jr.assecurityforaP100,000loan.Followingthedishonorofarepaymentcheck,
Claudiosecuredajudgmentfortheamountdueandacquiredthepropertyatapublicauction.Although
the petitioners leased the property post-auction, theydefaultedonrent,leadingtoanejectmentcase
that favored Claudio. The petitioners later sought to nullify Claudio's title (TCTNo.T-221755[M])by
claiming the property was exempt as a family home.
uling:
R
SCupheldthevalidityofClaudio'stitle,emphasizingthatwhilethepropertydidbecomeafamilyhome
by law upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August3,1988.However,thepetitionersfailedto
asserttheproperty’sexemptionfromexecutionatthetimeofthelevyorwithinareasonable
period thereafter.
he Court reiterated that the exemption mustbeclaimedandprovedtotheSheriffbeforethesaleat
T
public auction. The petitioners' failure to do so estopped them from later claiming the exemption.
pplicability of the Family Home (No retroactive effect for Art. 153)
A
A person can only have one family home or be a beneficiary of one, even if they own multiple residences;
only the home where they habitually reside qualifies as the family home. Residences established
before the Family Code’s effectivity on August 3, 1988, are automatically considered family homes under
the Family Code, provided they meet the residency requirement.
ASE: Manacop v. CA (1997)
C
Exemption must be claimed and proved to the Sheriff before the sale at public auction
Facts:
etitioner, Florante F. Manacop, contended that his residential property in Commonwealth Village,
P
Quezon City, acquired in 1972 and used as his family home, was exempt from execution under the
FamilyCode.ThiscameafterE&LMercantile,Inc.securedacompromisejudgmentforanoutstanding
debt against Manacop and his firm. When the sheriff levied the property following a motion for
execution,Manacopfiledamotiontoquash,arguingthatthepropertyshouldbeprotectedasafamily
home under the Family Code.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |13
uling:
R
SCruledthatthepropertywasnotexemptfromexecution.WhiletheFamilyCodedeemsafamilyhome
constituted upon actual occupancy, this provision cannot be applied retroactively to debts
incurred prior to its effectivity on August 3, 1988.
he property must be explicitly or legally recognized as a family home before the Family Code's
T
enactmenttobenefitfromsuchprotection.Manacopfailedtoprovetherequiredjudicialorextrajudicial
constitution of the home prior to that date. Additionally, the Court noted that actualoccupancymust
involve the owner or beneficiaries, not merely an overseer, to meet the legal criteria for exemption.
alue Ceiling for Exemption
V
Ceiling in the value of the family home for it to be exempted:
● For urban areas – Php 300,000.00
● For rural areas – Php 200,000.00
hevalueofafamilyhomeisdeterminedatthetimeitisconstituted,notatthetimeitislevied.
T
If its value exceeds the legal limit, an unpreferred creditor may request a levy on the property.
I n such cases, the creditor must provide the judgment debtor with the statutory exempt amount of
P300,000orP200,000,whichisintendedtoenablethedebtortoestablishanewhome.Anyamountfrom
the auction sale above this exemption will be applied to satisfy the outstanding debt. Additionally, the
sale of the family home must occur through a public auction.
isposition and Encumbrance
D
The family home cannot be sold, alienated, donated, assigned, or encumbered bytheowner(s)without
the written consent of certain individuals. Specifically, written consent must be obtained from: (1) the
personwhoconstitutedthefamilyhome,(2)theirspouse,and(3)themajorityofbeneficiaries
who are of legal age.
eneficiary
B
One who is dependent for support of the one who owns the house. There are 2 kinds of beneficiaries
under the Family Code:
1. Primary– owner (spouses or unmarried head of thefamily);
2. Secondary–childrenorthosepersonswhoarelivinginthefamilyhomedependentforsupportfrom
the owner (ex: parents of husband or wife, brother or sister of spouses)
fter the death of persons who constituted the family home
A
It shall continue to be a family home for a periodof10yearsfromdeathofitsownerorforaslongas
thereisstillaminorbeneficiarylivingtherein.Theheirscannotpartitionunlessthecourtfindscompelling
reasons in order to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head.
o preserve the family home as a physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing
T
restrictions on its partition:
1. Heirscannotextra-judiciallypartitionitforaperiodof10yearsfromthedeathoftheheadORfor
a longer period if there is still a minor beneficiary living.
2. Heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling
reasons.
aternity and Filiation
P
Refers to the bond or the ties that bind the parents and child.
● Paternity - Status of the father in relation to his child.
● Maternity - Status of the mother in relation to her child.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |14
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
iliation
F
Refers to the status of a child in relation to his parents. It could either be:
1. By nature - relationship by blood
2. By adoption - artificial filiation; created by law
ASE: Arbolario v. CA (2003)
C
Absence of valid marriage = cannot invoke presumption of legitimacy
acts:
F
Petitioners, claiming to be the legitimate children of Juan Arbolario, sought inheritance rights to
property owned by their allegedhalf-sister,PurificacionArbolario.Theyarguedthattheywereentitled
to a share of the estate and challenged an existing Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement
executed by the respondents, the Colinco family, who are descendants ofAguedaColinco,anoriginal
owner of the disputed land.
Natural Filiationis based on blood relationship.It may either be:
1. Legitimate – child born within lawful wedlock
2. Legitimated
3. Illegitimate – child is born outside lawful wedlock or void marriages
However, not all void marriages produce illegitimate children.
● Article 36 – Psychological incapacity
● Article 54 – Subsequent marriage (relate to Article 52 to 53).
efore the Family Code, there were different types of illegitimate. The rule is that the share in
B
inheritance is 10-5-4; 10 – for legitimate child, 5 – acknowledged natural child, 4 – spurious or
adulterous child.Under the New Family Code, no moredistinction of illegitimate child.
Legitimate Children
1. Child conceived or born during the marriage
2. Child conceived through artificial insemination of the wife with the husband or donor’s sperm
resumption of Legitimacy
P
As long as the child was born during wedlock, the child is considered legitimate even if the mother
declares otherwise or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
eneral Rule: Wife cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child
G
Exception: If the child did not come from her womb
CASE: Tan v. Trocio (1990)
ourt applied the presumption that a child born during wedlock is legitimate unless it canbeproven
C
that physical access between the couple was impossible
Facts:
elicidadBarinanTansoughtdisbarmentofAtty.Trocio,alleginghesexuallyassaultedherinApril1971,
F
resulting inthebirthofherson,JewelTan.Ittookher8yearstofileacomplaintbecauseshealleges
that Trocio threatened her with the deportation of her alien husband if she reported the incident.
Despite the alleged assault and threats, she continued to engage Trocio’s legal services for various
cases,includingarobberycaseandinsuranceclaims,whichcastdoubtonherclaims.Trociodeniedthe
allegations,arguingthatTan’scomplaintwasretaliatoryfollowingafeedisputeandherrequestforhim
to manipulate charges in an inheritance case.
uling:
R
SC dismissed the disbarment complaint, finding insufficient evidencetosubstantiateTan’sallegations.
The presented evidence with regards to Jewel Tan, including testimonies about physical resemblance
and emotional connections, is inadequate to prove Trocio’s paternity.
It upheld thepresumptionoflegitimacyforJewelTan’sbirthduringFelicidadBarinanTan's
marriage to her husband. The court applied the presumption that a child born during wedlock is
legitimate unless it can be proven that physical accessbetweenthecouplewasimpossible.Thecourt
concluded that this presumption had not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof, asJewel
wasregistered as the legitimate childof Felicidadand her husband, Tan Le Pok.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |15
uling:
R
SC said there’s nosufficientproofoftheirlegitimacyand,thus,theirrighttoinheritfromPurificacion.
Without evidence of a valid marriage between Juan Arbolario and their mother,FranciscaMalvas,the
petitionerscouldnotinvokethepresumptionoflegitimacyrequiredtoinheritundertheCivil
Code, which prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting from legitimate siblings. Thus,
petition was dismissed.
ASE: Cabatania v. CA (2004)
C
SC dismisses the case due to insufficient evidence of paternity and filiation
acts:
F
FlorenciaRegodosfiledapetitionseekingrecognitionandsupportforherminorson,CameloRegodos,
whom she claimed was fathered by Camelo Cabatania during her employment as his housemaid.
FlorenciaallegedtwoinstancesofsexualintercoursewithCabatania,afterwhichshebecamepregnant
and later gave birth to Camelo on September 9, 1982. She testified that Cabatania had promised to
support her if she conceived, but Cabatania denied paternity, asserting that Florencia was already
pregnant with her husband's child at the time of their encounters.
uling:
R
SCdismissedthepetitionforrecognitionandsupport.Itemphasizedtheneedforahighstandard
of proof in establishing paternity, which was not met by the evidence presented. The birth and
baptismalcertificatesidentifyingCabataniaasthefatherlackedprobativevalue,astheywereprepared
without his acknowledgment or involvement. These documents alone do not establish paternity,
particularly without corroborative evidence showing Cabatania’s role in their creation.
hepresumptionoflegitimacyforchildrenbornwithinanexistingmarriage,whichwasnotsufficiently
T
rebutted. Relying on physical resemblance alone was deemed inadequate in the absence of more
reliable genetic evidence.
ASE: Concepcion v. CA (2005)
C
Gerardo lacked legal standing, as only the husband or his heirs may challenge a child’s legitimacy
acts:
F
GerardoConcepcionsoughttoannulhismarriagetoMa.TheresaAlmonteafterdiscoveringshehadan
existingmarriagetoMarioGopiao,whichrenderedtheirunionvoidforbigamy.Ma.Theresaadmittedto
her marriage with Mario, explaining it as a sham without cohabitation.
he trial court annulled her marriage to Gerardo, deemingJoseGerardo,bornduringhermarriageto
T
Mario, illegitimate, and awarding custody to Ma. Theresa with visitation rights to Gerardo. When Ma.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |16
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
heresa contested Gerardo’s visitation rights and requested to changeherson’ssurnametoAlmonte,
T
CA reversed the trial court, declaring Jose Gerardo as Mario’s (first husband’s) legitimate child.
erardoappealedtoSC,challengingthisrulingandseekingtoretainvisitationrightsandhissurname
G
for the child.
Ruling:
C ruled that Jose Gerardo is Mario’s legitimate child, being born inside a valid marriage
S
between Almonte and Mario. It was also said that Gerardo lacked legal standing, as only the
husbandorhisheirsmaychallengeachild’slegitimacy,notthirdpartieslikeGerardo,whose
marriage to Ma. Theresa was void from inception.
ourtsaid,JoseGerardoshouldcarryhismother’ssurname,Almonte,asheisnotGerardo’slegitimate
C
child, and denied Gerardo’svisitationrights,stressingthechild’swelfareasparamountincustodyand
identity matters.
CASE: Estate of Ong v. Diaz (2007)
3. Thattheinstrumentcontainingtheagreementbetweenthepartiesmustbeexecutedbeforethebirth
of the child and shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.
I nartificialinsemination,thespermuseddoesnotneedtobefromthehusband.However,bothhusband
and wife must agree to the procedure in writing, and this agreement must be registered with the civil
registrar before the child’s birth. If the wife undergoes artificial insemination without the husband’s
knowledge,buthelaterlearnsofitanddoesnotobject,thechildisstillconsideredlegitimatesincethey
were born within the marriage.
I f the husband does not consent, the wife cannot be charged with adultery, as artificial insemination
involves no sexual intercourse—only the injection of sperm. In contrast, in vitro fertilization involves
harvesting both the man’s sperm and the woman’s egg, which are then fertilized and implanted in a
surrogate mother’s uterus.
I nanotableU.S.case(BabyM.case),asurrogatemotherwhorefusedtosurrenderthechildwasruleda
"carrier" only; the court determined the child legally belonged to the couple who provided the genetic
material.
Grounds for Impugnation of Legitimacy
acts:
F
JoanneRodjinDiaz,throughhermotherJinkyDiaz,soughtlegalrecognitionandfinancialsupportfrom
Rogelio G. Ong, claiming he was her father. Jinky and Rogelio had a relationshipfrom1994to1998,
during which Joanne was conceived and born. Although Rogelio initially provided support, he later
denied paternity and ceased support, leading to the lawsuit.
TCruledinJoanne’sfavor,orderingRogeliotorecognizeherashisdaughterandprovidesupport.After
R
hismotionsforanewtrialfailed,RogelioappealedtoCA,whichorderedDNAtestingtoclarifypaternity.
Rogelio’s estate continued the case after his death, challenging the order for DNA testing and
questioning Joanne’s paternity, particularly in light of Jinky's existing marriage to Hasegawa Katsuo,
which under law would typically presume Katsuo to be Joanne’s father.
Ruling:
C held here that although Joanne Rodjin Diaz was born during her mother Jinky's marriage to her
S
Japanese husband, Hasegawa Katsuo, no evidence showed that Katsuo had physical access to Jinky
duringtherelevantperiod,asheresidedabroadandreturnedonlyonceayear.Therefore,whilethe
presumption of legitimacy applied, it could be challenged, with the burden of proving
paternity resting on Rogelio Ong’s estate.
hus,SCaffirmedCA'sdecisiontoconductDNAtestingdespiteRogelio’sdeath,stressingthe
T
test's reliability and theneedforconclusiveevidenceofpaternity.Thisscientificmethodcould
rebutthepresumptionoflegitimacyifKatsuowasnotJoanne’sbiologicalfather.Courthereemphasized
thatestablishingpaternitywasessentialforJoanne’srighttosupport,aligningwithconstitutionalvalues
of justice and equality, and protecting the rights ofchildrentoclaimnecessarysupportthroughclear,
scientific evidence.
hildren Born of Artificial Insemination
C
Under the New FC, children born of Artificial Insemination are considered as legitimate children.
Elements
1. Both spouses have authorized in writing the performance of artificial insemination on the wife;
2. That if the husband had no knowledge, he ratified it upon knowledge;
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |17
1. Physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercoursewithhiswifewithinthe
first 120 days of the 300 days preceding the birth (period of conception).
Illustration: To determine the presumed period of conception, count 300 days backward from the
child’s birth date. For example, if a child is born on November 1, counting back 300 days
(approximately 10 months) gives a conceptiondatearoundJanuary1,markingthelongestpossible
gestational period. The presumed range of conception, from the longest period (10 months) tothe
shortest(6months),generallyspansthefirstfourmonthsafterJanuary1—inthiscase,fromJanuary
1 to May 1.
This timeframe serves as a basis for assessing whether sexual intercourse between spouses was
possible during conception. Even if the husband had intercourse outside this window, such as in
December or April, the child maynotbehis.WhilethislawpredatestheavailabilityofDNAtesting,
modern practice now incorporates DNA evidence for more accurate determination of paternity.
Must be due to any of the following:
1. Physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse
2. Impotence
3. Husband and wife living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible
4. Serious illness of the husband
Note:InAndalv.Macaraig(casenotincludedinsyllabus),ahusbandwhowasbedriddenwith
TB,unabletowalkduetoswollenlegs,hadawifewholaterbecamepregnant.Afterthehusband
passed away, his family contested the legitimacy of the child, questioning whether the couple
could have engaged in sexual intercourse underthesecircumstances.However,theCourtruled
the child legitimate, noting that it was not entirely impossible for the couple to have sexual
relations despite the husband’s condition. As long as intercourse is physically possible, the
presumption of legitimacy applies. Even in cases of significant health issues, factors such as
medical support (e.g. pampa-utog) could make sexual activity feasible, thus supporting the
child’s legitimacy.
2. Proved by biological or scientific reason that the child is not legitimate – DNA testing.
Jurisprudential Basis (some cases are not in the syllabus):
● InTijing v. CA, it recognized DNA as an effectivemethod.
● InAgustinv.CA,CompellingtheallegedfatherofachildtosubmithimselftoDNAtestingdoes
not violate his constitutional right against self incrimination.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |18
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
● I nHerrerav.Alba,DNAresultsshouldnotbeacceptedasabsolutetruthwithoutcarefulscrutiny.
The court must thoroughly examine whethertheDNAtestcomplieswithalllegalrequirements,
including ensuring thatthesampleswereproperlytaken,collected,andhandled.Onlyafterthis
examination can the court determine the probative value of the DNA evidence.
● InGotardov.DivinaBuling,theremustbeprimafacieevidencethatthewomanhadindeedhad
sexual relation with the putative father.
● In Lucas v. Lucas, it is incorrect to outright dismiss a request foraDNAtestwhenthereisno
prima facie case presented. Courts should not rely solely on the allegations in the complaint;
instead,theymustallowthepartyrequestingthetesttopresentevidence.Whileitiswithinthe
court'sdiscretiontoapproveordenytherequest,thecourtshouldsetahearingtoevaluatethe
motion and determine whether the DNA test is warranted.
3. Artificial insemination was obtained by vitiated consent.
○ Vitiation of Consent – caused by F, M, V, I, UI
acts:
F
WilliamLiyao,Jr.,representedbyhismotherCorazonGarcia,soughttoberecognizedastheillegitimate
sonofthelateWilliamLiyaotoclaiminheritancerights.AlthoughCorazonwaslegallymarriedtoRamon
Yulo,shehadlivedseparatelyfromhimforoveradecadeandcohabitedwithWilliamLiyaofrom1965
untilhisdeathin1975.RTCinitiallyruledinfavorofWilliamJr.,recognizinghimasanillegitimatechild
and a compulsory heir. However, CA reversed this decision, as he enjoys the legal presumption of
legitimacy for children born within a valid marriage.
uling:
R
SC upheld the CA’s ruling, denying William Jr.'s petition. A child born during a valid marriage is
presumedlegitimate,andonlythehusbandorhisheirscanchallengethispresumptionunder
specific conditions.
ho Can Impugn Legitimacy
W
Under Philippine law, only the husband or, in some cases, the husband's relatives, have the right to
questionorchallengethelegitimacyofachild.Themothercannotimpugnthelegitimacyofherownchild,
especially if she is the one who gave birth to the child.
herighttoimpugnlegitimacyisstrictlypersonaltothehusbandandcannotbeexercisedbythe
T
child.SinceRamonYulonevercontestedWilliamJr.'slegitimacy,theSCfoundtheclaimtobewithout
basis. The evidence presented (Birth and Baptismal Cert, Testimonies, Photographs, and Financial
Records) did not suffice to prove William Jr.'s filiation with William Liyao, reinforcing the strong
presumption of legitimacy in favor of children born within a marriage.
CASE: De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon (2001)
woillegitimatechildrenrecognizedbytheirdeceasedfatherinanotarizeddocumentcannothavetheir
T
statusadjudicatedwithoutfirstchallengingtheirlegitimacyinaseparateaction,duetothepresumption
of legitimacy for children born during marriage
hree Hundred Day Prohibition
T
Women are prohibited to remarry within 300 days of the termination of a previous marriage to avoid
doubtful paternity and filiation.
Facts:
etitioners, Jacqueline and Jinkie Christie de Jesus, represented by their mother,filedacomplaintfor
P
partition, inventory, and accounting of Juan G. Dizon’s estate, asserting their recognition as his
illegitimate children.
he respondents, including Dizon's surviving family and associated corporations, argued that the
T
petition essentially sought to change the petitioners’ status from legitimate children of Danilo and
Carolina deJesustoillegitimatechildrenofCarolinaandJuanDizon,whichtheRTCinitiallyallowedto
proceed. However, following motions and appeals, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause
andimpropriety,notingthatissuesofpaternityandfiliationcouldnotberesolvedwithinthecontextof
a partition case.
Ruling:
Cheldthatthelegitimacyofchildrenbornduringamarriageisconclusivelypresumedbylaw
S
andcannotbechallengedthroughacollateralactionlikeapartitioncase.Theacknowledgment
of the petitioners as illegitimate children in a notarized document by Juan G. Dizon was deemed
insufficient to alter their presumed legitimate status without a direct legal action impugning their
legitimacy.
uch challenges must be pursued through a specific action brought by the father or, in
S
exceptional cases, his heirs, to preserve the legal presumption of legitimacy. The ruling
affirmed that the petitioners needed to initiate a separate suit to address their status, upholding the
RTC’s dismissal of the partition complaint.
ASE: Liyao v. Tanhoti-Liyao (2002)
C
Right to impugn legitimacy is strictly personal to the husband and cannot be exercised by the child
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |19
hus, If a woman does contract a second marriage within300daysfromthedateofterminationofthe
T
previous marriage and a child is born within the first 180 days, the child is of the first husband.
rt.169.Thelegitimacyorillegitimacyofachildbornafterthreehundreddaysfollowingthetermination
A
of the marriage shall beproved by whoever allegessuch legitimacy or illegitimacy.
Periods (Prescription on Impugning Legitimacy)
1. 1 yearfrom knowledge of birth or recording in theLocal Civil Registrar – If the husband or his heirs
resides in the place where the birth was recorded.
2. 2 yearsfrom knowledge of birth or recording in theLocal Civil Registrar – If the husband or his heirs
resides not in the same city/place but in the Philippines.
3. 3 years- If the husband was living abroad.
4. If the birth of the child has beenconcealed fromor was unknownto the husband or his heirs, the
period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of
registration of said birth,whichever is earlier.
ASE: Babiera v. Catotal (2000)
C
Present action involved the cancellation of the birth certificate, not an impugnment of legitimacy.
acts:
F
Respondent, Presentacion B. Catotal, sought the cancellation of Teofista Babiera’s birth certificate,
claimingTeofistawasfalselyregisteredasthedaughterofPresentacion'sparents,EugenioBabieraand
Hermogena Carinosa, by Flora Guinto, Teofista’s biological mother and a former housemaid.
oththeRTCandtheCAruledinfavorofPresentacion,findingtheregistrationfraudulentandordering
B
the birth certificate’s cancellation. Teofista’s appeal to the SC contended that the action was
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |20
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
t ime-barred,citingArticle170oftheFamilyCode;wheresuchactionsmustbebroughtwithinoneyear
from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register.
Ruling:
Cruledherethatthisargumentwaswithoutmeritbecausethepresentactioninvolvedthecancellation
S
ofthebirthcertificate,notanimpugnmentoflegitimacy.TheprescriptiveperiodinArticle170did
not apply, as the action to nullify the birth certificate was based on it being voidabinitio,
meaning there was no time limit for challenging its validity.
egitimacy Assailable Only in Direct Action
L
Only the husband (or heirs) can directly attack the legitimacy of a child.
acts:
F
This involves a parcel of land, where the heirs of Primitivo Espineli filed for the annulmentofasale,
claimingthatVicenteEspineli'ssignatureonthedeedofsalewasforgedandthattheyweretherightful
heirs.
hile Sps. Fidel claims that they had legally purchased the property. They also argued that the
W
respondentsmustfirstestablishtheirfiliationfromVicenteEspinelitofileacomplaintforannulmentof
sale, as the baptismal certificate presented is not a public document, thus not sufficient evidence to
establish filiation.
RTC ruled in favor of the heirs, which was affirmed by the CA.
I nstances when the Heirs can impugn the filiation of the child
The heirs may represent the husband and file according to the prescriptive period if:
1. Husband dies before expiration of prescription
2. Husband dies after filing and did not desist
3. Child born after death of husband
ASE: Tison v. CA (1997)
C
Issue of legitimacy cannot be contested collaterally in an action for reconveyance
Facts:
etitionersCorazonDezollerTisonandReneR.Dezoller,claimingtobethenieceandnephewofTeodora
P
Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation through their father, Hermogenes Dezoller, sought
recognition as legitimate heirs of Teodora, who died intestate in 1983. They argued that Teodora's
property in Quezon City should be divided among them and Martin Guerrero, her surviving husband.
artinexecutedanAffidavitofExtrajudicialSettlement,claimingsoleownership,andsoldtheproperty
M
to Domingo in 1988. This prompted the petitioners to file for reconveyance.
owever, Domingo in this case impugned the filiation of the petitioners, Corazon Dezoller Tison and
H
ReneR.Dezoller,byarguingthattheyfailedtoprovetheirlegitimatefiliationwiththedeceasedTeodora
Dezoller Guerrero.
Ruling:
CsaidDomingodidnothavelocusstanditoimpugnthelegitimacyofCorazonDezollerTisonandRene
S
R. Dezoller. The issue of legitimacycannotbecontestedcollaterallyinanactionforreconveyanceand
that only the husband or his heirs can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
ourt ruled in favor of the petitioners, establishing their legitimacy as Hermogenes’ children and
C
upholding theirrighttoinheritbyrepresentation.Thus,petitionerswereentitledtoaone-fourthshare
as co-owners with the private respondent.
ASE: De Jesus v. Dizon,supra.
C
SC held that the legitimacy of children born during a marriage is conclusively presumed by law and
cannot be challenged through a collateral action like a partition case.
ASE: Sps. Fidel v. CA (2008)
C
Estopped from challenging RTC’s ruling even if filiation was not established in a direct action
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |21
uling:
R
SCruledthatwhilelegitimacyisgenerallyquestionedonlyinadirectaction,inthiscase,thepetitioners
raised the issue of the respondents' heirship during the annulment of sale proceedings. As a result,
petitioners were estopped from challenging the RTC's ruling on their status.
hus, respondents had locus standi to file the case and accepted Primitivo’s baptismal
T
certificate as valid evidence of his filiation to Vicente. Since Primitivo was born in 1895, birth
records at that time were only available in parochial records. The Court reaffirmed that entries in
parochial books, including certificates issued by parish priests, remain valid public documents for
proving acts referred to therein, as no law has abolished their official status. Parish priests, as legal
custodians of these records, may issue certified copies in the same manner as keepers of archives.
ourt also ruled that the first deed of sale, allegedly signedbyVicente,isvoidbecausehissignature
C
thereinisapatentforgery.Recordsshowhediedin1941,butthedeedofsalewasallegedlysignedon
October 7, 1994.
hus, the sale was annulled, and the property was ordered to be reconveyed to Vicente's estate for
T
proper distribution among his heirs.
ASE: Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himaymaylan City (2009)
C
Legitimacycanonlybecontestedthroughdirectactionbytheappropriateparty,notthroughcollateral
means or a special proceeding under Rule 108
acts:
F
Ma. Cristina Torres Braza and her children sought to correct the civil registry entries of Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza, who was introduced as the son of Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr., after Pablo's death. The
petitionersarguedthatPablo'ssupposedmarriagetoLucilleTitular,notedinPatrick'sbirthcertificateas
legitimating him, was bigamous. They aimed to amend Patrick’s birth record, remove Pablo's
acknowledgment, and requested a DNA test for paternity.
TCdismissedtheirpetition,statingitlackedtheauthoritytoannulmarriagesandchallengelegitimacy
R
withinaspecialproceedingforcorrectionofentries.ThedenialoftheirMR promptedthepetitionersto
seek review from the Supreme Court.
uling:
R
SC ruledthatunderRule108oftheRulesofCourt,onlyclericalandminorcorrectionstocivilregistry
entries are permissible. Substantial issues, such as nullifying a marriage or impugning legitimacy,
require adversarial proceedings in Family Court where due process and proper jurisdiction are observed.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |22
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
hus, legitimacy can only be contested through direct action by the appropriate party, not
T
throughcollateralmeansoraspecialproceedingunderRule108.TheCourtconcludedthatthe
petitioners' attempt to void Pablo's marriage and challenge Patrick’slegitimacyfelloutsidethecourt’s
jurisdiction in a non-adversarial proceeding, resulting in the denial of the petition.
roof of Filiation
P
Kinds of Evidence to Prove Filiation:
1. Primary proofs
Thesearethestrongestproofstoestablishfiliation.Infact,possessingthesedocumentsisequivalent
to a voluntary admission of paternity by your father. Even if your father is deceased, you can still
prove filiation with these evidences.(Art. 172 par.1)
2. Secondary proofs
Secondary proof of filiation is admissiblebutweakerevidencecomparedtoprimaryproof.(Art.172
par. 2)
Primary Proofs of Filiation
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment.
● PrimaryproofoffiliationincludesthebirthcertificateregisteredwiththeLCRorNSO,orafinal
court judgment that resolves the issue of filiation. If the court has ruled on your filiationina
case, that decision serves as a primary proof of your filiation.
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
● Public documents include notarized forms, such as an Affidavit of Recognition, where the
fatherexplicitlyacknowledgesthechildashisown,orgovernmentapplicationforms(likethose
for GSIS or SSS) where thefatherliststhechildasoneofhislegitimatechildren.Whenthese
documents are notarized, they are considered strong evidence of filiation, as they serve as a
formal, legally recognized acknowledgment.
● Privatehandwrittendocumentsarealsovalid,providedtheymeetcertaincriteria:theymust
bewritteninthefather'sownhandwriting,acknowledgethechildashis,andbesignedbyhim.
Ahandwrittendocumentthatisunsigned,evenifinthefather'shandwriting,doesnotqualifyas
primaryevidenceoffiliation.Thesetypesofdocuments,whetherpublicorprivate,arepowerful
proof of a father's recognition of his child and can be used to establish filiation in legal
proceedings.
. Admission by silence
e
f. Testimony of witness(Mendoza v. CA)
ASE: People v. Tumimpad (1994)
C
Blood test results show that Tumimpad could have been the father of the child
acts:
F
15yr.oldSandraSalcedoisclassifiedinthiscaseamongoloidchild,shewasraped,wheresheborea
child named Jacob Salcedo. During the investigation, it narrowed down to accused Ruel Prieto and
Moreno Tumimpad, where both of them were security men assigned to Col. Teofisto Salcedo, the
victim’s father.
The blood type results show that:
● Jacob Salcedo (child) had type O blood;
● Sandra Salcedo (victim) had type B;
● accused Ruel Prieto had type A; and
● accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad had type O
uling:
R
SCsaidherethatwhilethebloodtypeasevidencepresented,suggestsapossiblebiologicalconnection
betweenTumimpadandJacob.However,thecourtclarifiedthatbloodtypetestingcanonlyshowa
possibility of paternity and cannot conclusively establish it.
umimpadwasconvictedofrape,buttheprimarybasisfortheconvictionwasthetestimonialevidence
T
from the victim and her relatives, rather than the blood test results.
uelPrietowasacquittedbecausehavingType-Abloodcreatedreasonabledoubt,asJacobwas
● R
type O.
li Opinion: (in application of biology)
E
However, even if Ruel Prieto had Type Ablood,hecouldhaveaphenotypeofAO;whileSandracould
haveaphenotypeofBO;thusitispossibletohaveanoffspringofTypeO(25%).Itcannotbeusedas
conclusive evidence against Tumimpad, nor basis for his acquittal.
Illustration:
econdary Proofs of Filiation
S
Refers to all other evidence that could establish filiation but not falling under the first kind.
1. Open and Continuous possession of the Status of Legitimate Child
Notintermittent.Theremustbeapermanentintentionofthesupposedfathertoconsiderthechildas
his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal love.
Examples:
a. Pictures of you and your father
b. Letter of your father to your mother but it was not signed by him.
c. Yougrowingupwhereyourfatherpaidforyoureducationandyoucanprovethatbyreceiptsof
payment by your father
d. Monthly allowance from your father
e. Testimony of the friends of your father
2. Any other means allowed by Rules of Court (Rule 130 of the ROC) and Special laws
a. Baptismal certificate
b. Judicial admission
c. Family bible
d. Common reputation respecting pedigree
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |23
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |24
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
CASE: Mariategui v. CA (1992)
J acinto's birth certificateservedasarecordofbirth,whichisoneofthemeanstoestablishlegitimate
filiation under FC
ASE: Quismundo v. WCC (1984)
C
Continuous possession of status, does not substitute for formal acknowledgment
acts:
F
ThecasecentersonthepartitionoftheestateofLupoMariategui,whodiedintestatewithdescendants
from three marriages. After Lupo’s death, hischildrenfromhisfirstandsecondmarriagesexecuteda
deedofextrajudicialpartitionthatawardedthemexclusiveownershipofLotNo.163oftheMuntinlupa
Estate, which was registered under their names.
acts:
F
JovitaQuismundofiledapetitiononbehalfofherchildren,PacienciaandVirginiaVenta,seekingdeath
benefits after the death of Francisco Venta, an InstallationForemanwithAtlanticGulfandPacificCo.,
Inc., who passed away from chronic hemorrhagic ulcerative enteritis. While the company provided
P1,500.00inbenefitsthroughan"Extra-JudicialSettlementandRelease,"theWorkmen'sCompensation
Commission denied their claim for additional compensation.
ears later, Jacinto, Julian, and Paulina, his children from his third marriage to Felipa Velasco,fileda
Y
complaint challenging this partition andclaimingtheirrightfulinheritance.RTCinitiallydismissedtheir
claim, but the CA reversed this, recognizing them as legitimate heirs.
he denial was based on the fact that Francisco had not formally acknowledged the children as his,
T
while Jovita argued that the children were entitled to the benefits as Francisco's unrecognized yet
biological children.
Ruling:
CruledherethatthethirdmarriageofLupoenjoy’spresumptionofmarriage,evenintheabsenceofa
S
marriage certificate. This presumption was based on their conduct as husband and wife and their
acknowledgment in the community as such.
uling:
R
SC ruledthatPacienciaandVirginiadidnotmeettheformalrequirementsforacknowledgment;under
thelawacknowledgmentofachildrequiresdocumentation,suchasarecordofbirthorawill.Francisco
had provided no such acknowledgment of his relationship with the children, and thus they were not
entitled to claim benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.
dditionally,Jacinto'sbirthcertificateservedasarecordofbirth,whichisoneofthemeansto
A
establish legitimate filiation under the Family Code. The other two children, Julian andPaulina,
werealsoconsideredlegitimateastheycontinuouslyenjoyedthestatusofchildrenofLupoMariategui,
which was sufficient to affirm their rights as heirs.
Thus, being co-owners to the estate, they are allowed to demand their rightful share in the estate.
ASE: Rosalina Eceta v. Ma. Theresa Eceta (2004)
C
Father’s signature in birth cert, established filiation
acts:
F
The case centers on the ownership of a property in Quezon CitybetweenRosalinaP.Eceta,widowof
Isaac Eceta, and Maria Theresa VellLaguraEceta,theillegitimatedaughterofRosalina’sson,Vicente.
Following Vicente's death, Maria Theresa filed a case for "Partition and Accounting with Damages,"
claiming a share in the disputed property as Vicente’s heir.
TCruledthatMariaTheresawasentitledtoone-fourthoftheproperty,adecisionlatermodifiedbythe
R
CA to one-eighth. Rosalina then elevated the matter to the SC, challenging Maria Theresa's filiation
evidence and the legitimacy of her claim to a share of the property.
Ruling:
C affirmed Maria’s right to one-eighth of the property. ItheldthatthecertifiedxeroxcopyofMaria
S
Theresa’s birth certificate, signed by Vicente, was valid evidence of her filiation.
ndertheFamilyCode,filiationofillegitimatechildrencanbeestablishedbyrecordsinthecivilregister
U
oraprivateinstrumentsignedbytheparent,which,inthiscase,wassatisfiedbyVicente’ssignatureon
MariaTheresa’sbirthcertificate.Additionally,Rosalina’sacknowledgmentofMariaTheresaasher
granddaughter during thepre-trialfurthervalidatedherfiliation,eliminatinganyneedfora
separate recognition case.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |25
he Court noted that continuous possession of status, does not substitute for formal
T
acknowledgmentandcannotbeinvokedinadministrativeproceedingstocompelrecognition.
Therefore, without formal acknowledgment by Francisco, the petition for benefits was dismissed.
ASE: Constantino v. Mendez (1992)
C
Burden of proof was on Amelita to establish her claim, and in the absence of clear evidence, the
complaint was dismissed
acts:
F
Amelita Constantino and her son Michael sought acknowledgement, support, and damages fromIvan
Mendez, claiming that Ivan fathered Michael. Amelita alleged that she met Ivan in 1974, and he
pursued a romantic relationship with her, ultimatelypromisingmarriageandleadingtoherpregnancy
despite later learning he was already married.
I van denied any relationship with her, and though the RTC initially ruled in Amelita’s favor, the CA
reversed this decision, citing insufficient evidence of paternity.
uling:
R
SC affirmed CA’s decision, it found inconsistencies in Amelita’s testimony, becausesheclaimedthat
Ivan Mendez was her first and only boyfriend. But in one of her letters to Mendez, she
mentionedherattachmenttoIvanduetocertaintraitshepossessed,whichwerenotfound
in her previous boyfriend.
lso, she could not accurately determine their sexual contact in connection with the
A
conceptionofthechild.Thisinconsistencyunderminedhercredibility,andtheburdenofproofwason
Amelita to establish her claim, and in the absence of clear evidence, the complaint was dismissed.
n the topic of damages, it is not warranted simply because ofconsensualrelations,evenifinitiated
O
underapromiseofmarriage,especiallygivenAmelita'scontinuedinvolvementwithIvanafterlearning
of his marital status.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |26
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
Filiation Not Established (CASES)
ASE: Labagala v. Santiago (2001)
C
A baptismal certificate is not conclusive proof of parentageandthatthebirthcertificatepresentedby
the respondents showed that Ida was born to different parents
acts:
F
Petitioner Ida Labagala claimed inheritance rights over a one-third share of a property left by the
deceased Jose Santiago. Jose’s sisters, Nicolasa and Amanda Santiago, contended that Jose had
fraudulently registered the property solely in his name and, after his death, sought to recover their
shares.
henIdaassumedpossessionofthepropertyfollowingJose’sdeath,NicolasaandAmandachallenged
W
her claim, assertingthatthesupposedsaleofthepropertytoIdawasaforgeryandthatshewasnot
Jose's daughter. Ida argued that the sale was, in fact, a donation and that she was Jose’s daughter
presenting a baptismal certificate and Jose’s tax return listing her as a dependent as evidence.
Ruling:
CruledthatNicolasaandAmandawereco-ownersofJose’sone-thirdshare.Ida’sevidenceoffiliation
S
was insufficient to establish her as Jose's daughter.
baptismalcertificateandJose’staxreturnlistingherasadependentwereinsufficienttoestablishher
A
as Jose's daughter. Also, respondents were able to procure Labagala’s birth certificate which
indicated that the petitioner was the child ofdifferentparents(LeonLabagalaandCornelia
Cabrigas), not Jose and his wife.
I n another case, Jose had previously stated that he did not have any children. Asaresult,thecourt
determined that the petitioner was not entitled to inherit from Jose T. Santiago.
CASE: Fernandez v. Fernandez (2001)
ourt ruled that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition null concerning Rodolfo’s claimed share due to
C
insufficient evidence to establish filiation
acts:
F
Petitioners,RodolfoFernandezandhissonEddieFernandez,contestedapropertydisputeagainstother
heirs of the deceased Dr. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa A. de Venecia. Dr.Fernandezandhiswife
Generosa owned propertyinDagupanCity,whichwasallegedlytransferredtoRodolfothroughaDeed
of Extrajudicial Partition and a Deed of Absolute Sale executed after Dr. Fernandez’s death.
he respondents, Dr. Fernandez’s nephews and nieces, challenged these transactions, asserting that
T
Rodolfo was not a legitimate heir and that the deeds were fraudulent.
Ruling:
CsaidthattherewasinsufficientevidencetoestablishRodolfo’sfiliationduetotheabsenceofa
S
BirthCertificate,andDocumentaryEvidence,astherewerenorecordsofRodolfo'sbirthtothespouses.
A genealogy book also compiled by respected individuals showed that the deceased spouses were
childless, which undermined Rodolfo's claim.
hilehewasabletopresentaBaptismalCertificate,itwasalsoquestionableanddeemedfalsified,as
W
there were no available records of baptism for the relevant period as records show documents were
damaged during that time.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |27
hus,thecourtruledthattheDeedofExtra-JudicialPartitionnullconcerningRodolfo’sclaimed
T
sharebut upheld the Deed of Absolute Sale for Generosa'sthree-fourths interest in the property.
ASE: Solinap v. Locsin (2001)
C
Exhibit “8” was the real birth certificate, as there were notable discrepancies in Exhibit "D”
acts:
F
Petitioners contested the appointment of JuanC.Locsin,Jr.asadministratoroftheintestateestateof
JuanLocsin,Sr.,arguingthathewasnottheacknowledgednaturalchildofthedeceased.Locsin,Jr.had
filedapetitionin1991,claimingsoleheirshipandpresentingabirthcertificate(Exhibit"D") asproofof
his paternity.
hepetitionerschallengedhisclaims,assertingthathisbirthcertificatewasinvalid,andthatExhibit“8”
T
was the genuine birth certificate, which contained no signature or acknowledgment from the alleged
father. They also argue that his paternity claim was barred by prescription.
uling:
R
SC ruled here that Exhibit “8” was the real birth certificate, as there were notable
discrepancies in Exhibit "D," such as anachronistic formatting and suspicious alterations,
which indicated forgery.
For reference:
1. Therespondent'sCertificateofLiveBirthNo.477wasrecordedonaDecember1,1958revised
form, despite the birth occurring on October 22, 1956.
2. Exhibit "D" (the respondent's birth certificate) was typewritten, while other certificates in the
same bound volume were handwritten, making it stand out as suspicious.
3. Thecertificatelackedimportantparticularssuchastheallegedfather'sreligion,race,occupation,
address, and business. Additionally, the legitimacy of the child was left blank.
4. Thebackcoverofthe1957boundvolumewastorn,andExhibit"D"wasmerelypastedintothe
volume rather than sewn like other entries, which is unusual for official documents.
dditionally, Locsin, Jr.'s supporting evidence, including photographs purporting to show familial
A
recognition, was insufficient to establish his filiation with the deceased. Without legitimate
acknowledgment, the Court held that Locsin, Jr.wasnotaninterestedpartyeligibletoadministerthe
estate.
ASE: Geronimo v. Santos (2015)
C
Despite the procedural rule regarding the direct action for legitimacy, the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish her as a legitimate heir
acts:
F
Karen Santos claimed to be the only legitimate child and heir of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo. She sought to annul a document executed by Rufino’s brothers, Eugenio and
Emiliano, which declared them as the sole heirstoa6,542-squaremeterpropertyinBulacan.Santos
argued that the property should be inherited solely by her through intestate succession, as the
legitimate child of the Geronimos.
hedefendantscontendedthatSantoswasactuallythebiologicalchildofCaridad’ssister,takeninasa
T
ward, and asserted that her birth certificate was tampered with.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |28
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
TC ruled in favor of Santos, nullifying the defendants' claim to the property based on her birth
R
certificate and her long-standing recognition as the Geronimos’legitimatedaughter.Thisdecisionwas
upheld by the CA.
uling:
R
SC reversed the lower court’s rulings, dismissing Santos’ complaint. Although the Supreme Court
acknowledged that questions of legitimacy must be raised in a direct action, it ultimately ruled that
Karen Santos could not inherit due to the questionable nature of her birth certificate;
including tampered entries, casting doubt on her claim of filiation. Additionally, no evidence
suggested Caridad had ever been pregnant or took maternity leave, further weakening
Santos' claim. The Supreme Court ruled that the evidencepresented,includingsecondaryevidence,
was insufficient to prove that Santos was the legitimate child of the Geronimos.
ASE: Tolentino v. CA (1988)
C
Consuelo’scontinueduseofthesurname“Tolentino”didnotinfringeuponConstancia’srightsnordidit
constitute legal injury
acts:
F
The centers arose when Constancia C. Tolentino, the legal wifeofArturoTolentino,soughttoprevent
Arturo’s former wife, Consuelo David, from continuing to use the surname "Tolentino" after their
divorce. Arturo and Consuelo's marriage had ended with a decree of absolute divorcein1943dueto
Consuelo's abandonment. (Take note: Divorce was allowed herebecauseitwasduringtheJapanese
occupation)
espitethedivorce,Consuelocontinuedusing"Tolentino"ashersurname.Constanciafiledacomplaint
D
in the Court of First Instance to enjoin Consuelo from using the surname, and the court issued a
preliminary injunction in her favor.
Therefore, she was not entitled to inherit the property as their sole heir.
Imprescriptibility of Action to claim Legitimacy
● Thechildcan file such action anytime since thereisno prescription.
● Theheirsofthechildcanfiletheactiononbehalfofthechildwithin5yearsifthechildisdeador
insane.
ASE: Dela Rosa v. CA (1996)
C
Included in syllabus, but not related to PFR to be honest
Facts:
omulo Dela Rosa faced nine charges under B.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law, filed upon the
R
complaint of Benjamin Magtoto. Dela Rosa's arraignment was delayed initially due to his absence,
leading to an arrest warrant that was later lifted upon his request. He was eventually arraigned,
pleading not guilty. During the trial, multiple hearings were postponed at Dela Rosa’s request, as he
cited difficulties securing counsel. On November 17, 1992, the trial court dismissed all cases against
him, citing his right to a speedy trial due to the prosecution’s inability to proceed with witnesses.
Ruling:
C affirmed CA’s decision toreinstatethecases,clarifyingthatdismissalforviolationoftherighttoa
S
speedytrialdoesnotpreventfutureprosecutionifthedelayiscausedbythedefendant’sownactions.
Dela Rosa's frequent postponement requests effectively waived his right to a speedy trial.
heCourtalsosaidthatthedismissalwasarbitraryandfailedtomeettherequisitesofdoublejeopardy
T
since Dela Rosa’s requests contributed to the delay, thus negating any claim to a final acquittal or
dismissal that would bar retrial.
Rights of Legitimate Children
1. Bear surname of his father and mother;
2. Receive support from his parents, ascendants or brothers or sisters, and
3. To be entitled to the legitimate or successional rights.
ote:Anillegitimatechildhasnorighttoinheritabintestatefromthelegitimatechildrenandrelativesof
N
his father or mother. (Art. 992 CC).
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |29
uling:
R
SC ruled here that Consuelo had legitimate children who hadeveryrighttousethesurname
Tolentino,thus,compellinghertouseadifferentsurnamefromherchildrenwouldbeunjust,
especially since she had established legal relationships and contracts under the surname Tolentino.
ourt here recognized the potential prejudice to Consuelo, considering her children's rights and the
C
implicationsofchanginghersurnameatthatstageofherlife.Also,thepetitioner'scauseofaction
had prescribed.
llegitimate Children
I
This pertains to children born out of wedlock or void marriage.
ow Filiation Established
H
Illegitimacy is proven the same way legitimacy is proven.
Period when action to prove illegitimate filiation must be brought
1. PrimaryEvidence(Par.1,Art172)-Itcanbeprovedduringthelifetimeofthechildandshallbe
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during his minority or in a state of insanity.
● The heirs shall have a period of 5 years to institute the action. (Art. 173)
2. Secondary Evidence (Par. 2, Art 172) – Filiation can only be proved during the lifetime ofthe
alleged father.
● Exception:Illegitimate child born before the effectivityof the Family code
● Under the Civil Code, an illegitimate child can prove their filiation, even with secondary
evidence, even after the death of thefather,providedthatthefatherpassedawaywhile
thechildwasstillaminor.Thechildhasuptofouryearsfromreachingtheageofmajority
to establish their illegitimate filiation.
ASE: Tayag v. CA (1992)
C
Actionforrecognitioncouldstillproceedbecausetheminorchild’srighttofiletheactionwasvestedby
the filing of the complaint in court before the Family Code took effect
acts:
F
CoritoOcampoTayagsoughttooverturnthedecisionoftheCAthataffirmedthedenialofhermotionto
dismiss a "Claim for Inheritance" filed by Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan on behalf of her minor son, Chad
Cuyugan. Chad was alleged to be theillegitimatechildofAtty.RicardoOcampo,whodiedintestatein
1983. Emilie filed the complaint to establish Chad's filiation and claim his share in the estate.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |30
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
ayag's motion to dismiss argued that theclaimlackedacauseofactionastheFamilyCodeprovides
T
that filiation can only be proved during the lifetime of the alleged father.
Ruling:
Cruledthatthecomplaintadequatelystatedacauseofaction,asChadwasbornandthesuitwas
S
filed before the effectivity of the Family Code. The procedural rule under the Family Code
regarding filiation could not retroactively affect Chad's vested rights.
ndertheCivilCode,anillegitimatechildcanprovetheirfiliation,providedthatthefatherpassedaway
U
while the child was still a minor. It allows minors like Chad to file actions for recognition within four
years after reaching majority.
ASE: Uyguanco v. CA (1989)
C
Alleged father died, barring claims of filiation
Facts:
etitioners, the legitimate heirs of Apolinario Uyguangco, contested the claim of Graciano Bacjao
P
Uyguangco, who sought recognition as Apolinario's illegitimate son. Apolinario died intestatein1975,
and his heirs had already divided his estate through an extrajudicial settlement.
raciano, claiming he had been excluded despite living with Apolinario and working in the family
G
business,initiatedacomplaintforpartition.Althoughhelackedthedocumentaryevidencerequiredby
Article278oftheCivilCode,RTCallowedotherformsofevidencetoprovehisfiliation.TheCAupheld
this, prompting the legitimate heirs to seek relief from the SC.
uling:
R
SCruledinfavorofthepetitioners,dismissingGraciano'scase.ItemphasizedthatunderArticle175of
the Family Code, actions to prove filiation must be filed during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. As Apolinario had died in 1975, Graciano's action was barred bylaw,astheparent
could no longer acknowledge or contest the relationship.
henMaribelfiledforsupport,Raymonddeniedpaternity,allegingtheywereonlyfriendsandpointing
W
to Maribel’s work at a club. However, RTC ruled in favor of Maribel, a decision that the CA affirmed,
ordering Raymond to pay P10,000 monthly for child support and P7,500 for legal fees.
uling:
R
SC affirmed the lower court's findings, citing clear evidence such as Raymond’s handwritten love
letters,photographswithJoanna,andtheCertificateofLiveBirthnaminghimasthefather.
UnderArticles172and175oftheFamilyCode,illegitimatefiliationcanbeprovenbydocuments,
admissions, or open acknowledgment.
he Court found Raymond’s later denials, which coincided with his marriage to another woman,
T
unpersuasivecomparedtothesubstantialproofpresented.Additionally,hisclaimthatthesupportwas
beyond his means lacked evidence, leading the Court to affirm the monthly support amount as
reasonable. Thus, SC dismissed Raymond’s petition and confirmed the ruling in favor of Maribel and
Joanna.
ASE: Baluyut v. Baluyut (1990)
C
To inherit as illegitimate children, legal acknowledgment by the parent is essential
acts:
F
Three minors, Victoria, Ma. Theresa, and Ma. Flordeliza Baluyut, sought recognition as heirs of their
deceasedfather,EnriqueM.Baluyut,claimingtheywerehisillegitimatechildrenborntoNormaUrbano.
Theyarguedthattheywereconceivedandbornduringaperiodofcohabitationwiththedeceasedand
had consistently held the status of his children during his lifetime.
owever, Felicidad S. Baluyut, the deceased's widow and estate administrator, opposed the petition.
H
While the RTC initially ruled in favor of the minors, recognizing them as forced heirs and granting
monthly support, the CA reversed this decision, leading to the petition's dismissal.
uling:
R
SCaffirmedCA’sdecision,emphasizingthattoinheritasillegitimatechildren,legalacknowledgmentby
the parent is essential.
he Court acknowledged Graciano's claims of "open and continuouspossession"ofstatusbut
T
concluded that such proof was insufficient posthumously. While expressing sympathy for
Graciano’s position,theCourtmaintainedthattherule'sstrictapplicationwasnecessarytoupholdthe
law’s intent and finality, suggesting that a voluntary familial resolution would be the most equitable
solution.
he birth certificates presented, which bore Enrique's name, lacked his signature and were
T
insufficient evidence of acknowledgment. Additionally, there was no supporting document or
court-recorded statement demonstrating recognition by Enrique. Thus, petitioners' evidence did not
meet the stringent proof required for compulsory acknowledgment.
ASE: Pe Lim v. CA (1997)
C
Court ruled in her favor for support based on love letters, pictures, and the child's birth certificate
ASE: Ilano v. CA (1994)
C
Illegitimate children, including spurious ones, are entitled to support once paternity is established
Facts:
aribel Cruz filed a child support complaint for her daughter, Joanna Rose, againstRaymondPeLim,
M
whom she claimed was Joanna’s father. Their relationship began in 1978, involving cohabitation in
various locations and Raymond’s financial support, including covering rent and paying hospital bills
when Joanna was born in 1982. Despite initially registering as Joanna’sfatheronherbirthcertificate
and maintaining involvement, Raymond abandoned Maribel and Joanna in 1983.
acts:
F
Artemio G. Ilano contested a ruling involving the claim of Merceditas S. Ilano, represented by her
mother, Leoncia de los Santos, asserting that Merceditas was his illegitimate daughter. Leoncia, who
met Artemio while working for Atty. Virata, developed arelationshipwithhimthatledtocohabitation
and thebirthofMerceditasin1963,withArtemiolistedasthefatheronthebirthcertificate.Overthe
years, Artemio provided support through financial means and maintained a paternal relationship by
signing school documents and visiting.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |31
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |32
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
owever,Artemiolaterdeniedtherelationshipandhispaternity,leadingtoconflictingtestimonyinthe
H
RTC,whichdismissedthecase.CAreversedthis,recognizingMerceditasasArtemio’schildandgranting
her support and attorney’s fees.
Ruling:
CupheldCA’sruling,confirmingMerceditasasArtemio'sillegitimatedaughter.Itruledthatsufficient
S
evidence demonstrated her filiation through financial support, public acknowledgment,and
witness testimony, fulfilling requirements under the law as recognition of paternity could be
established through various means, including continuous possession of status and other evidence
allowed by the Rules of Court.
hus, Illegitimate children, including those born of adulterous relationships, are entitled to support if
T
paternity is established.
ASE: Trinidad v. CA,supra.
C
SC ruled in favor of Arturio,affirminghisfiliationandhisparents'marriagebasedoncrediblewitness
testimoniesandabaptismalcertificate,despitethelackofamarriagecontractorbirthcertificate.The
Court also rejected the defense of acquisitive prescription, noting that no prescription applies among
co-owners without clear repudiationofco-ownership,whichwasabsenthere.Consequently,theCourt
reinstated the trial court's decision, upholding Arturio's right to a share of the estate.
ASE: Potenciano v. Reynoso (2003)
C
Proof of filiation of illegitimate children can be through Joint Affidavit
Facts:
orgene Potenciano and spouses Manuel Jayme and Natividad Zafra-Jayme claimed ownership of a
N
parcel of land, asserting it was sold to them by Jayme’s father, Felipe Pareja, in 1979. However, the
respondents,includingallegedillegitimatechildrenofPareja,contestedthesale,arguingthatthedeed's
signature was forged.
etitioners contended that private respondents had not established their filiation to Pareja as their
P
fatherandarguedthatPareja'sunprobatedLastWillandTestamentcouldnotbeusedtoestablishthe
respondents' filiation. Thus, alleging that the illegitimate children of Pareja lackedlocus standi.
Ruling:
Cruledagainstthiscontention,statingthatthewaytoprovethefiliationofillegitimatechildren
S
is provided by the Family Code, which allows for such proof through various means.
ere,besidestheunprobatedLastWillandTestamentofFelipeB.Pareja,whichrecognizedtheprivate
H
respondents as his illegitimate children; A Joint Affidavit executed by Dwight Reynoso and
Manuel Jayme declared that they, along with other parties, wererecognizedasillegitimate
children of Pareja.Thisaffidavitservedasevidenceoftheirfiliation,preventingthepetitionersfrom
denying the private respondents' standing to sue.
ourt upheld findings of both the RTC and CA that the signaturesontheDeedofAbsoluteSalewere
C
forged, thereby renderingthesaleinvalid.ItwasdeterminedthatPotencianowasnotabuyeringood
faith due to his failure to conduct a proper investigation regarding the property's title and the
circumstances surrounding the sale.
ASE: De Jesus vs. Estate of Dizon,supra.
C
Twoillegitimatechildrenrecognizedbytheirdeceasedfatherinanotarizeddocumentcannothavetheir
statusadjudicatedwithoutfirstchallengingtheirlegitimacyinaseparateaction,duetothepresumption
of legitimacy for children born during marriage.
ASE: Solinap vs. Locsin,supra.
C
Exhibit “8” was the real birth certificate, as there were notable discrepancies in Exhibit "D”
ASE: Arbolario v. CA,supra.
C
Illegitimate children cannot inherit from legitimate siblings
ASE: Cabatania v. CA,supra.
C
Baptismal certificates, while public documents, only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament and not the veracity of the entries regarding paternity
ASE: Aguilar v. Siasat (2015)
C
aaa
acts:
F
Rodolfo S. Aguilar claimed to be the legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses Alfredo
AguilarandCandelariaSiasat-Aguilar,seekingthereturnoftitlestotwoparcelsofland.Rodolfoalleged
that these titles had been stolen by someone from the Siasat family and demanded their surrender
along with damages.
dnaG.Siasat,therespondent,arguedthatRodolfowasneitherbiologicallyrelatednorlegallyadopted,
E
claiming instead that she was entrusted with the titles by Candelaria for safekeeping. RTC dismissed
Rodolfo's complaint for lack of sufficient proof of filiation, a decision upheld by CA.
uling:
R
SCruledinfavorofRodolfo,reversingthelowercourts'decisions.ItfoundthatAlfredoAguilar’sSSS
Form E-1, a public document under oath listing Rodolfo as his son, provided sufficient
evidence of legitimate filiationin accordance withArticle 172 of the Family Code.
uchdocumentationisarecognizedadmissionoflegitimatestatus,especiallywhenprimaryrecordslike
S
abirthcertificatewereunavailableduetorecorddestruction.TherulingorderedEdnatosurrenderthe
titles, affirming Rodolfo’s right to inherit as the direct descendant and noting that Edna had no
inheritance rights to Candelaria’s estate.
NA Testing
D
Proof using biological and scientificevidencetoprovefiliation.Itisconsideredtobethemostreliablein
establishing paternity.
ASE: Arnel Agustin v. CA (2005)
C
Compelling the alleged father of a child to submit himself to DNA testing does not violate his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Facts:
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |33
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |34
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
rnel Agustin fathered a child with his girlfriend, Fe. However, after the child was born and their
A
relationshipdeteriorated,Arnelstoppedprovidingsupport.Inresponse,FefiledacasetocompelArnel
to acknowledge the child as his and provide support, seeking legal recognition of the child as his
illegitimate offspring. Arnel contested this claim, alleging that Fefalsifiedthebirthcertificateandhad
relationships with other men.
e then countered his denial by challenging him to undergo DNA testing, but in Arnel’s defense he
F
argues that it’s against his right to self-incrimination.
Ruling:
C denied his petition and ruled that DNA testing does not violate the right against
S
self-incrimination, as this right applies only to testimonial compulsion.
ourt even held that, in criminal cases, it has even required DNA testing for defendants accused of
C
seriouscrimeslikerapewithhomicide.Therefore,itreasoned,thereisnobasistoexemptapartyina
civil case from being similarly ordered to undergo DNA testing.
ASE: Rosenda Herrera v. Alba (2005)
C
Only DNA evidence that fully complies with legal standards should be considered reliable
acts:
F
The mother of 13-year old Rosendo Alba, sought recognitionandsupportfromRosendoHerrera,who
denied paternity and any physical contact with Armi Alba. So RTC ordered Herrera to undergo DNA
paternitytesting,butheobjectedsayingthatit’sagainsthisrighttoself-incriminationandarguedthat
DNA testing was not widely accepted as evidence.
Ruling:
C ruled that DNA testing does not violate the right against self-incrimination. However,
S
regardingtheprobativevalueofDNAresults,theCourtcautionedthattheyshouldnotbeacceptedas
absolute truth.
ourts must carefully examine whether the DNA testing process met all legal standards, including
C
whether the samples were properly taken, collected, and handled. Only DNA evidence that fully
complies with these requirements should be considered reliable.
Thus, Herrera’s petition was dismissed and he was ordered to undergo DNA testing.
CASE: Estate of Ong vs. Diaz, supra.
CaffirmedCA'sdecisiontoconductDNAtestingdespiteRogelio’sdeath,stressingthetest'sreliability
S
andtheneedforconclusiveevidenceofpaternity.Thisscientificmethodcouldrebutthepresumptionof
legitimacy if Katsuo was not Joanne’s biological father.
ights of Illegitimate Children
R
Theillegitimatechildhastherighttoget1/2ofthelegitimeofthelegitimatechild.Also,thefather
who recognized the child as his illegitimate child is bound to support the child.
R.A. 9255: Allowing illegitimate children to use the surname of their father, amending Art. 176
● Before the Family Code, the illegitimate child used the father’s surname if acknowledged and
allowed by him.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |35
● A
ftertheeffectivityoftheFamilycode,anillegitimatechildusedthemother’ssurnameevenif
allowed by the father to have his surname used by the illegitimate child.(Mossessgeld v. CA)
● After RA9255(July2,2003),anillegitimatechildwhoisrecognizedbyhisfatherandallowed
by his father to carry the surname may now use the surname of the father.
se of Surname by an Illegitimate Child is not Compulsory
U
An illegitimate child cannot be compelled to use the father's surname, even if paternity has been
acknowledged.RepublicAct9255usestheterm"may,"indicatingthattheuseofthefather'ssurnameis
optional, not mandatory.
ASE: Mossessgeld v. CA (1998)
C
Before RA 9255, illegitimate children exclusively use mother’s surname despite paternal
acknowledgement
acts:
F
Marissa Mossesgeld, an unmarried woman, gave birth to a son in 1989, with the presumed father,
Eleazar Calasan, acknowledging paternity and signing the child’s birth certificate under the name
Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan.
owever, the hospital and subsequently thelocalcivilregistrarrefusedtoregisterthechild’ssurname
H
as “Calasan,” citing Civil Registrar GeneralCircularNo.4,whichalignedwithArticle176oftheFamily
Code.ThislawmandatesthatillegitimatechildrenbornafterAugust3,1988,mustbeartheirmother’s
surname, regardless of paternal acknowledgment.
henCalasan’sattemptstoregisterthebirthcertificatewithhissurnamefailed,hefiledapetitionfor
W
mandamus to compel registration with the RTC. The RTC denied the petition, statingthatillegitimate
children must use their mother’s surname by law.
uling:
R
SCdeniedthepetition,upholdingthelowercourts'rulings.ItaffirmedthatunderArticle176ofthe
Family Code,illegitimatechildrenarerequiredtousetheirmother’ssurnameandareunder
her parental authority, even if the father admits paternity. The Family Code had repealed
provisions in the Civil Code allowing acknowledged natural children to take their father's surname.
urthermore, the Court noted thatmandamuscannotbeusedtocompelanofficialactthatthe
F
law prohibits.LCR’s refusal to register the birthcertificate under the father’s surname was lawful.
Cfurtherheldthatifthefatherwishedthechildtousehissurname,hecouldlegallyadoptthechild,
S
which would grant the child legitimate status and the right to use the father’s surname.
ASE: Republic v. Abadilla (1998)
C
Altering the children’s surname was necessary to comply with the legal requirement that illegitimate
children use their mother’s surname
acts:
F
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino, who were not married, cohabitated and had two children,
Emerson and Rafael, whose birth certificates initially bore the surname "Abadilla." However, the
certificates incorrectly listed Gerson’s name as "Herson" and contained a fictitious marriage date,
implyingtheparentsweremarried.Seekingtocorrecttheseerrors,thefamilyfiledapetitionwiththe
RTCtoremovethefictitiousmarriagedetails.WhiletheRTCgrantedtheremovalofthemarriageentry,
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |36
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
it did not change the children’s surname to "Celestino," prompting theOSGtoseekreview,asserting
that the children's surname should reflect their status as illegitimate.
Ruling:
CruledinfavoroftheSolicitorGeneral,orderingthatEmersonandRafael’ssurnamebechanged
S
to "Celestino," in accordance with Article 176 of the Family Code, which mandates that
illegitimate children carry their mother’s surname.
incetheparentswerenotlegallymarried,thechildren’sillegitimacywasundisputed,andremovingthe
S
fictitiousmarriageentryinthebirthcertificateclarifiedthisstatus.Thus,alteringthechildren’ssurname
was necessary to comply with the legal requirement that illegitimate children use their mother’s
surname, aligning with both legal standards and the children’s rights under the law.
uling:
R
SCruledhereR.A.9255,whichamendedArticle176oftheFamilyCode,isclearandunambiguous,and
must be followed as written. The use of the word "may" in the provision signifies that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is not obligated to use the surname of the father. Theterm
"may" is permissive, granting the child the discretion to decide whether or not to adopt the father's
surname.
Calsoruledherethatthemotherretainssoleparentalcustodyoverillegitimatechildrenunlessproven
S
unfit.
Illegitimate child has no middle name; exceptions
ASE: Leonardo v. CA (2003)
C
Just a reiteration of previous cases, but emphasizes on children born under FC and before RA 9255
ASE: Julian Lin Wang vs. Cebu City Civil Registrar (2005)
C
Convenience and potential discrimination were insufficient grounds for changing a child's name
Facts:
nn Brigitt Leonardo’s parents, common-law spouses EddieFernandezandGloriaLeonardo,soughtto
A
changehersurnamefrom"Leonardo"toherfather’ssurname,"Fernandez."DespiteEddieFernandez’s
writtenrequestandaffidavitsupportingthechange,theLocalCivilRegistrardeniedit,citingArticle176
of the Family Code, which mandates that illegitimate children use their mother’s surname.
acts:
F
Lisa Wang filed a petitiononbehalfofherminorson,Julian,seekingtochangehisnamebydropping
hismiddlename,"Carulasan."Julianwasbornin1998toAnnaLisaandSing-FoeWang,whowerenot
marriedatthetimeofhisbirthbutlaterwedandlegitimizedJulian,whichallowedhimtobearbothhis
mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname.
heparentsthenfiledaPetitionforReviewwiththeCA,arguingagainstthestrictapplicationofArticle
T
176 and the need for judicial intervention, but CA upheld the registrar's decision.
he family intended to relocate to Singapore, where middle names are uncommon, and they feared
T
potential discrimination or confusion due to the inclusion of Julian’s middle name. So, they filed a
petition to remove his middle name.
Ruling:
C denied the petition, like the cases discussed previously, under Article 176 of the Family Code,an
S
illegitimatechildbornafterAugust3,1988(institutionofFC),isrequiredtousethemother’s
surname regardless of paternal acknowledgment.
arental Authority/Custody
P
Foranillegitimatechild,parentalauthorityistypicallyexercisedsolelybythemother,assheisconsidered
the legal parent. However, if the alleged father has acknowledged the child and is cohabiting with the
mother and child, both parents share joint parental authority, as specified in Article 211.
otably, Article 211 does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children; it states thatifa
N
child lives with both parents, they jointly exercise parental authority.
ASE: Grace Grande v. Patricio Antonio (2014)
C
Theword"may"inRA9255signifiesthatanacknowledgedillegitimatechildisnotobligatedtousethe
surname of the father
Facts:
race M. Grande and Patricio T. Antonio lived together and had two sons, despite Antonio’s existing
G
marriagetoanotherwoman.Thechildren,AndreLewisandJerardPatrick,werebornwithoutAntonio’s
formal acknowledgment on their birth certificates. After the relationship ended, Grandemovedtothe
United States with the children.
ntonio later sought judicial recognition of his paternity, along with parental authority, custody, and
A
sought to compel his illegitimate children to use his surname “Antonio” under R.A. 9255.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |37
uling:
R
SC ruled here that convenience and potential discrimination were insufficient grounds for
changing a child's name. Aschanginganameisaprivilege,notaright,andmustbejustifiedbya
proper or reasonable cause. It stressed that middle names are important for identifying maternal
lineage and distinguishing individuals.
he petitioner's reasons were deemed too vague, and name changes are typically granted for more
T
compelling reasons, such as eliminating the stigma of illegitimacy or avoiding confusion. Court also
noted that as a minor, Julian was not in a position to fully appreciate the consequences of a name
change, and such decisions should be left to his discretion once he reaches legal age.
ASE: In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia,supra.
C
In this case, Catindig sought to adopt his illegitimate daughter, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia,and
requested that she be allowed to use her biological mother’s surname, Garcia, as her middle name.
Whilethelowercourtgrantedtheadoption,itdeniedtherequest,citingthelackoflegalprovisionsfor
an adopted child to use their biological mother's surname as a middle name.
C, however, ruled in favor of allowing the use of the surname, stating that while there is no law
S
explicitlypermittingit,thereisalsonolawprohibitingit.TheCourtemphasizedthatadoptionstatutes
should beliberallyconstruedtopromotethewelfareofthechildandrecognizedtheFilipinocustomof
using the mother's surname as a middle name, allowing it in this case for the best interest of the child.
Period to Prove Filiation
● Refer to page 28
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |38
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
ASE: Uyguangco vs. CA,supra.
C
ItemphasizedthatunderArticle175oftheFamilyCode,actionstoprovefiliationmustbefiledduring
thelifetimeoftheallegedparent.AsApolinariohaddiedin1975,Graciano'sactionwasbarredbylaw,
as the parent could no longer acknowledge or contest the relationship.
CASE: Bernabe vs. Alejo,supra.
drian Bernabe, born on September 18, 1981, was allegedly the illegitimate child of Fiscal Ernesto
A
Bernabe and his secretary, Carolina Alejo. After Bernabe's death onAugust13,1993,Carolinafileda
complaintin1994seekingrecognitionofAdrianashischildandinheritancefromhisestate,challenging
Ernestina Bernabe, the legitimate daughter of the deceased. However, the lower court dismissed the
complaint, citing the New Family Code, which requires that an action for recognition must be filed
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
C, however, ruled in favor of Adrian, stating that certain rights, once vested, are not affected by
S
subsequentlegislation.SinceAdrianwasbornbeforetheenactmentoftheNewFamilyCode,healready
had the right to seek recognition under the old Civil Code (Article 285), granting himtherighttobe
recognized as the illegitimate child of Fiscal Bernabe and claim a share of his estate.
CASE: Alejandra Arado Heirs vs. Alcoran (2015)
nacleto, acknowledged as Nicolas' illegitimate son, could inherit from Nicolas but was barred from
A
inheriting from Joaquina, as the law prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting from their parents'
legitimate relatives
Facts:
etitioners, descendants of JoaquinaAradoandRaymundoAlcoran,contestedtheinheritancerightsof
P
AnacletoAlcoran,whoclaimedtobetheillegitimatesonoftheirson,NicolasAlcoran.AfterRaymundo,
Nicolas, and Joaquina passed away over several decades, Anacleto, born from Nicolas' extramarital
relationship, claimed a share in the inheritance.
he petitioners filed a complaint seeking recovery of properties and damages, claiming that Anacleto
T
was not entitled to inherit as he was not a recognized illegitimate son of Nicolas.
Ruling:
CrecognizedAnacletoasNicolas'illegitimatesonbasedonthebirthcertificateregisteredby
S
Nicolas, satisfying the acknowledgment required for establishing filiation. Thus, he can
inherit from Nicolas.
owever, the Court ruled that illegitimate children do not have inheritance rights from their
H
parents'legitimaterelatives,preventingAnacletofrominheritingJoaquina’sproperties.Even
thoughJoaquinahadawill,whichmighthaveprovidedforAnacleto,itwasneverprobatedandthus
had no legal effect.
egitimated Children (Arts. 177-182)
L
One who was conceived AND born outside of wedlock to parents who, at the time of conceptionofthe
child, were not disqualified by any legal impediment to marry each other and parents subsequently
entered into a lawful marriage.
Note: Annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation (Art. 178, FC)
Requisites
1. The child was conceived and born outside of wedlock;
2. Theparentsdonotsufferanylegalimpedimentstomarryeachotheratthetimeoftheconceptionof
the child; and
3. The parents subsequently enter into a valid marriage.
Illustration (on first requisite):
● Conceived outside of wedlock + bornduringwedlock=Legitimate
● Conceived outside of wedlock + bornoutside ofwedlock+ parents marry later on =Legitimated
Note:NO LEGAL IMPEDIMENT during conception and birth.
egal Impediment
L
Iftheparents,oroneoftheparentshavelegalimpedimenttomarrytheother,thechildcanneverbe
legitimated. That is true even if the parents eventually get married, with the impediment already
removed, it will not legitimize the child.
ote:Itnowallowslegitimationforchildrenbornofparentswhoseonlyimpedimentisthateitherorboth
N
of them are still minors at the time the child was conceived and born (RA 9858)
I llustration:Ifachildwasborntoa17-year-oldmotherwho,uponreachingtheageofmajority,married
thefatherofthechild,thechildisconsideredlegitimated,providedthatthechildwasconceivedandborn
after the effectivity of the new law on December 20, 2009.
hislegitimationapplieseventhoughtherewasalegalimpediment(themother'sminority)preventingher
T
frommarryingatthetimeofthechild’sconceptionandbirth.Thelawrecognizesthesubsequentmarriage
of the parents as curing the defect, thereby conferring legitimacy on the child.
ights of Legitimated Children
R
Shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children (Art. 179, FC)
etroactive Effect of Legitimation
R
Legitimation retroacts to the timeofthechild’sbirth.Itwouldbeasifthechildhadbeenlegitimatethe
whole time.
escendants Benefited by Legitimation
D
Legitimationmaytakeplaceevenwhenthechilddies,alsocalledPosthumousLegitimation.Inthiscase,
the children of the legitimated child will enjoy the legitimation.
ho can Impugn Legitimation; Grounds; Prescriptive Period
W
Only those prejudiced of successional rights may impugn thelegitimation5yearsfromthedeathofthe
parents. Which are the following: (1) Legitimate Children of the Parents; and (2) Other illegitimate
Children
ote: The local civil registrarshallmaintainalegitimationregisterwherethelegitimationofachildmay
N
be recorded.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |39
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |40
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
CASE: De Santos v. Hon. Angeles (1995)
nlynaturalchildren—thoseborntoparentswithoutanymaritalimpedimentatconception—areeligible
O
for legitimation.
herewasaninvolvementofaPermanentProtectionOrder,duetotheirtumultuousrelationship,where
T
BBB heredeniedsupporttowardsCCCarguingthathe’snotthebiologicalfatherofthechild,implying
that CCC is not a legitimated child being contrary to Art. 177 of the Family Code.
Facts:
he case arose from a dispute over the inheritance rights to the estate of Dr. Antonio de Santos.
T
Antonio married SofiaBonain1941,anddespiteobtainingaNevadadivorcein1949(unrecognizedin
the Philippines), he entered into a second marriage with Conchita Talag in 1951, with whom he had
eleven children. After Sofia's death in 1967, Antonio remarried Conchita in the Philippines. Following
Antonio’s death in 1981, Conchita claimed her children were legitimate heirs, but Maria Rosario de
Santos, Antonio's daughter from his marriage to Sofia, contested this claim.
uling:
R
SC said here that yes, generally, under Art. 177 of FC, CCC cannot be legitimized under the
circumstances. However, BBB knowingly legitimized and misrepresented CCC ashisson;thus,
he cannot deny support for CCC as he was already estopped pursuant to Art. 1431 of the NCC.
Ruling:
C held that Antonio's marriage to Sofia was valid and subsisting at the time Conchita’s
S
children were conceived, rendering Antonio and Conchita disqualified to marry each other. Thus,
their children remained illegitimate and could not inherit as legitimated heirs.
hus, SC ruled that the principle of estoppel is applied in the instant case and it will bar BBB from
T
making a contrary assertion from his previous claims. He cannot be allowed to evade a
responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the
legitimation process.
CC will remaintobeBBBsson,andpursuanttoArticle179oftheFCwheretheformerisentitledto
C
the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his father’s support.
rovisions on legitimation are strictly construed to uphold the rightshierarchybasedonlegitimacy.It
P
rejectedtheconceptof"naturalchildrenbylegalfiction,"statingthisdoesnotapplytochildrenbornof
adulterousorbigamousrelationships.Thus,onlynaturalchildren—thoseborntoparentswithout
any marital impediment at conception—are eligible for legitimation.
CASE: Abadilla v. Tabiliran (1995)
abiliran falsely registered his illegitimate children with Baybayan as legitimate, despiteknowingthat
T
they could not be legitimated due to his existing marriage with Banzuela
Facts:
badilla, a clerk of court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran for gross immorality, deceitful
A
conduct, and corruption.
badilla alleged that Tabiliran scandalously cohabited with Priscilla Q. Baybayan while still married to
A
Teresita Banzuela, and even contracted a bigamous marriage with Baybayan in 1986. Also, Tabiliran
falsely registered his three illegitimate children with Baybayan as legitimate.
Ruling:
CruledthatJudgeTabiliranisguiltyofgrossimmoralityforopenlycohabitingwithPriscillaBaybayan
S
and having children with her while still married to Teresita Banzuela.
nd on the topic of legitimation and deceitful conduct, SC said Judge Tabiliran knowingly
A
registeredhisillegitimatechildrenwithBaybayanaslegitimateasheknewthattheycannot
be legitimated due to his existing marriage with Banzuela.
ASE:“BBB” vs. “AAA” (2015)
C
CCC remains legitimate due to estoppel by BBB
Facts:
ere, BBB and AAA had two biological children, DDD and EEE, and AAA’s son, CCC, from a previous
H
relationship. Whom BBB legitimated after their marriage in 2002, despite knowing such information.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |41
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |42
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
doption
A
Also known as “Artificial Filiation”, it is established through or by operation of law.
( 5) Foreign Nationals–Sec. 21(e)
If the adopter is an alien, they must possess the following:
1. Permanent or habitual residents of the Philippines forat least five (5) years;
2. Same qualifications as Filipino adopter prior to filingof the petition;
3. Their countrymust have diplomatic relations withthe Republic of the Philippines;
4. Theircountry’slawswillacknowledgetheCertificateofAdoptionasvalid,acknowledgethe
childasthelegalchildoftheadopters,andallowentryofthechildintosuchcountryasan
adoptee;
ur law on adoption is found in Article 183 to 193, of the Family Code but theseprovisionshavebeen
O
amendedorrepealedby(1)DomesticAdoptionActof1998-RA8552and(2)Inter-CountryAdoptionAct
of 1995 - RA 8043; and recently repealed and amended by Domestic Administrative Adoption and
Alternative Child Care Act (R.A. 11642).
omestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care Act (R.A. 11642)
D
It is an act strengthening alternative childcare by providing for an administrative process of domestic
adoption, reorganizing for the purpose the Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB) into the National
Authority forChildCare(NACC),amendingforthepurposeR.A.No.8043,R.A.No.11222,andR.A.No.
10165, repealing R.A. No. 8552, and R.A. No. 9523, and appropriating funds thereto.
nder the present law, adoption is no longer a judicial proceeding. Both domestic and inter-country
U
adoption is now purely an administrative proceeding.
J urisdiction
Jurisdiction over domestic adoption shall be with National Authority for Child Care (NACC), which is a
quasi-judicial agency attached to the DSWD.Thus,adoption proceedings are now administrative.
Who may adopt
1. Any Filipino citizen;
2. Legal Guardian with respect to the ward;
3. Legal guardians with respect to the foster child;
4. Philippine government officials and employees deployed or stationed abroad; and
5. Any Alien who arepermanentorhabitualresidentsofthePhilippinesforatleast5yearspossessing
the same qualifications for Filipino nationals.
( 1) Filipino Adopter– Sec. 21(a)
1. At least25 years of age;
2. Is in possession offull civil capacity and legalrights;
3. Hasnot been convicted of any crime involving moralturpitude;
4. Is ofgood moral characterand can model the same;
5. Isemotionally and psychologically capableof caringfor children;
6. At least16 years older than the adoptee; and
○ Note:Whentheadopteeisthebiologicalparentoftheadopteeoristhespouseoftheadoptee’s
parent, the 16-year difference requirement may be waived.
7. Who is inapositiontosupportandcareforadoptedchildreninkeepingwiththemeansofthe
family.
Note: The requirements on residency may bewaivedfor the following:
a. A formerFilipinocitizen,habituallyresidinginthePhilippines,whoseekstoadoptarelativewithin
4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity;
b. One who seeks to adopt legitimate child of the Filipino spouse; or
c. OnewhoismarriedtoaFilipinocitizenandseekstoadoptjointlywiththespousearelativewithin
the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse
J oint Adoption
General Rule:Spouses shall jointly adopt.
Exception:
1. If the adopterseeks to adopt the legitimate son ordaughter of the other spouse;
2. Iftheadopterseekstoadopthisorherownillegitimatechild.Provided,however,thattheother
spouse must have signified his/her consent;
3. If the spouses arelegally separatedfrom each other.
ersons Qualified to be Adopted–Sec. 22
P
1. A child who has been issued a Certificate Declaring a Child Legally Available for Adoption (CDCLAA);
2. The legitimate child of one spouse by the other spouse;
3. An illegitimate child by a qualified adopter to improve the status of legitimacy;
4. A Filipino of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and
treated by the adopters as their own child for a period of at least three (3) years;
5. A foster child;
6. A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded;
7. A child whose biological or adoptive parents have died;
○ Note: No proceedings shall be initiated within 6 monthsfrom the time of death of said parents.
8. A relative of the adopter.
onsent to Adoption
C
Afterbeingproperlycounseledandinformedoftherighttogiveorwithholdapprovaloftheadoption,the
written consent of the following to the adoption are hereby required: –Sec. 23
(3) Legal Guardian with Respect to the Foster Child–Sec. 21(c)
. Theadoptee, if 10 years of age or over;
1
2. The biological parentsofthechild,ifknown,orthelegalguardian,orthepropergovernment
instrumentality which has legal custody of thechild,exceptinthecaseofaFilipinooflegalageif,
prior totheadoption,saidpersonhasbeenconsistentlyconsideredandtreatedastheirownchildby
the adopters for at least 3 years;
3. Thelegitimate and adopted children, 10 years of ageor over, of the adopters, if any;
4. The illegitimate children,10yearsofageorover,oftheadopteriflivingwithsaidadopterorover
whom the adopter exercises parental authority and the latter’s spouse, if any; and
5. Thespouse, if any, of the person adopting or to beadopted.
( 4) Philippine government officials and employees deployed or stationed abroad–Sec. 21(d)
Provided,they are able to bring the child with them.
ote:Thatchildrenunder10yearsofageshallbecounseledandconsultedbutshallnotberequiredto
N
execute within consent.
ote: If a person is not in possession of full civil capacity and legalrights,asinthecaseofaninsane,
N
imbecile, deaf-mute, or a person suffering from civil interdiction, such person cannot adopt.
( 2) Legal Guardian with Respect to the Ward–Sec.21(b)
May only adopt the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial
accountabilities.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |43
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |44
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
ASE: Republic v. CA (1992)
C
Family Code could not be applied retroactively to the case, as Zenaida had a vested right to filethe
petition under the Child and Youth Welfare Code
Facts:
enaidaBobilesherefiledapetitionforadoptionfora6yearoldchild,JasonCondatalone,withouther
Z
husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, as a co-petitioner (in Feb 2, 1988 – before family code).
he RTC granted the adoption;however,thecasewasappealedonthegroundsthattheFamilyCode,
T
which requires joint adoption by spouses, should apply retroactively, potentially invalidating the petition.
Ruling:
C ruled here that the adoption is valid. It held that the Family Code could not be applied
S
retroactivelytothecase,asZenaidahadavestedrighttofilethepetitionundertheChildand
Youth Welfare Code, which allowed her to proceed without her husband’s participation.
slongasthepetitionforadoptionwassufficientinformandsubstanceinaccordancewiththelawin
A
governanceatthetimeitwasfiled,thecourtacquiresjurisdictionandretainsituntilitfullydisposesof
the case. It was further ruled that Dioscoro’s affidavit of consent was sufficient, fulfilling the legal
requirements for co-petitioners.
ASE: Cang v. CA & Sps. Clavano (1998)
C
Written consent of the parent of the adoptee is an indispensable requisite for adoption decree
Facts:
erbert Cang opposed the adoption of his three children—Keith, Charmaine, andJosephAnthony—by
H
Ronald and Maria ClaraClavano,thebrotherandsister-in-lawofhisformerwife,AnnaMarieClavano.
Theadoptionpetition,filedin1987,wassupportedbyAnnaMarie’sclaimthatHerberthadabandoned
his children (because he is living in the US).
espiteHerbert’sobjectionsandevidenceoffinancialsupport,theRTCgrantedtheadoption,citingthe
D
children’s strong bond with the Clavanos and Herbert’s alleged moral unfitness. CA affirmed the
decision, prompting Herbert to elevate the matter to the SC.
Ruling:
C said that physical estrangement alone,withoutfinancialandmoraldesertion,isnottantamountto
S
abandonment. In this case, Cang had not abandoned his children as evidenced by:
1. Regular Communication – through letters and phone calls
2. Financial Supports – by sending remittances and depositing money in bank accounts in the
children's names
3. EmotionalTies–Thelettersandtestimoniesindicatedthatheexpressedloveandconcernforhis
children
4. Testimonies – particularly Keith, who said he did not feel abandoned
hus,Cang’swrittenconsentisindispensableforthevalidityofanadoptiondecreebecausehedidnot
T
abandon his children.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |45
ASE: Landingin v. Republic (2006)
C
Written consent of the biological parent is a mandatory requirement
acts:
F
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a U.S. citizen of Filipino descent, sought to adopt her deceased brother’s
children, who were left orphaned after the deaths of their father and paternal grandmother.
hechildren’sbiologicalmother,AmeliaRamos,hadremarried,movedtoItaly,andceasedcontactwith
T
the family. While Landingin claimed she was financially supporting the children and had their written
consent for adoption, the OSGl opposed the petition, citing the lack of written consent from the
biologicalmother,non-compliancewithproceduralrequirements,anddoubtsaboutLandingin’sfinancial
capacity.
uling:
R
SC ruled that the written consent of the biological parent, in this case, Amelia Ramos, is a
mandatory requirement (cannot also be held under abandonment as Amelia provided financial
support of 10k-15k php while she’s in Italy).
he financial capability of Ladingin, based on part-time employment (as a restaurant server) and
T
reliance on her children and siblings, is insufficient to support the adoptees.
hus, Court held that the best interest of the child is theparamountconsiderationinadoptioncases,
T
and the legal requirements must be strictly followed to protect the natural rights of the parents and
ensure the welfare of the children.
Effects of Adoption
1. Legitimacy
2. Parental Authority
3. Succession
(1) Legitimacy
● Adoptee is considered as the legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes;
● Entitledtoalltherightsandobligationsprovidedbylawtolegitimatechildrenborntothemwithout
discrimination;
● Entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family;
● IMPORTANT:Thelegitimatefiliationthatiscreatedbetweentheadopterandtheadopteeshallbe
extendedto the adopter’s parents, adopter’s legitimatesiblings, and legitimate descendants.
(2) Parental Authority
● Adoptive parents have full parental authority over the child; except in cases where the biological
parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parentsandtheadoptee
shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopters.
● Note:Ifspousesjointlyadoptoronespouseadoptsthelegitimatechildoftheother,jointparental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
(3) Succession
● The adopters and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiations.
● However, if the adoptees and their biological parents have left a will, the law on testamentary
succession shall govern.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |46
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
CASE: Sayson v. CA (1992)
dopted children cannot inherit by right of representation from the grandparents of their adoptive
A
parents(but in new law, adopted children can nowinherit)
Facts:
or context, this is a case involving inheritance rights of the Parents of 3 children where one is
F
legitimate and the other 2 are adopted; such parents received a portion of the estate from their
ascendants. So to cut itshort,petitionersinthiscase,soughtpartitionandaccountingoftheestates,
challenging the status of Delia and Edmundo as adopted children, and Doribel as to her legitimacy.
Ruling:
CruledinthiscasethatDeliaandEdmundo'sdecreeofadoption,havingbeenfinalsince1967,could
S
nolongerbechallengedandthatDoribel’slegitimacycouldnotbequestionedinacollateralproceeding.
However,whileadoptedchildrenaredeemedlegitimateunderthelaw,theycannotinheritby
right of representation from the grandparents of their adoptive parents.
nly Doribel, as the legitimate descendant of Teodoro,wasentitledtorepresenthiminthe
O
distribution of the Parent's estate. Thus, succession by representation is limited to legitimate
descendants and excludes adopted children.
eanwhile, a petitionforAdelberto’sadoptionbySabasandFelisaRapisura,filednearlyayearbefore
M
theincident,wasgrantedaftertheshooting.TheBundocspousesarguedthattheRapisuraspouses,as
the adopting parents, were the indispensable parties since the adoption petition transferred parental
authority.
uling:
R
SCruledthatparentalauthoritycannotretroactivelyapplytotheRapisuraspouses,vicarious
liability appliesonlytothosewithactualcustody,asitwouldbeunjusttoholdadoptingparents
accountable for acts they could neither foresee nor control.
hus,theindispensablepartiesinthiscasearetheBundocspouses,asAdelberto’snaturalparentswith
T
actual custody at the time of the incident. Case was remanded.
ASE: In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia,supra.
C
In this case, Catindig sought to adopt his illegitimate daughter, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia,and
requested that she be allowed to use her biological mother’s surname, Garcia, as her middle name.
Whilethelowercourtgrantedtheadoption,itdeniedtherequest,citingthelackoflegalprovisionsfor
an adopted child to use their biological mother's surname as a middle name.
C, however, ruled in favor of allowing the use of the surname, stating that while there is no law
S
explicitlypermittingit,thereisalsonolawprohibitingit.TheCourtemphasizedthatadoptionstatutes
should beliberallyconstruedtopromotethewelfareofthechildandrecognizedtheFilipinocustomof
using the mother's surname as a middle name, allowing it in this case for the best interest of the child.
ASE: Acain v. IAC (1987)
C
Non-inclusion of adoptive child in will constitutes preterition
Facts:
here’s a petition here for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain, where ithadprovisions
T
regarding the share of properties. However, Virginia, who is Nemesio’s legally adopted daughter,was
not included in the will.
hus, she and Acain whoisthewidowfiledamotiontodismissthepetitionbasedonpreterition,was
T
they were omitted as heirs, being entitled to a legitime in the succession.
Ruling:
C ruled here that the will preterited the adopted daughter, Virginia as she was neither
S
mentioned or provided for in the will. Under the law, adopted children are treated as legitimate
children and enjoythesamerights,includinginheritancetotheiradoptiveparents.Thus,preterition
of a compulsory heir in the direct line annuls the institution of heirs, leading to intestate
succession.
owever,inthecaseofthewidow,itdidnotconstitutepreteritionevenifshewasacompulsoryheir,as
H
she was not in the direct line (ascendant or descendant).
ASE: Tamargo v. CA (1992)
C
Vicariousliabilityappliesonlytothosewithactualcustody,thusadoptiveparentsarenotliablefortorts
committed before adoption
acts:
F
Adelberto Bundoc (minor, age 10), accidentally shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle,
prompting the filing of a civil damages case against his natural parents, Victor and Clara Bundoc. A
criminal case against Adelberto was dismissed as he acted without discernment.
ASE: In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim (2009)
C
Joint adoption by spouses is mandatory
acts:
F
Monina P. Lim sought to adopt two children, Michelle and Michael, who were abandoned at birthand
raised as her own with her late husband, Primo Lim. After Primo's death in 1998, Monina remarried
Angel Olario, an American citizen, in 2000.
I n2002,MoninafiledseparatepetitionsforadoptionunderRepublicActNo.8552(RA8552)whenthe
childrenwerealreadyadultsandconsentedtotheadoption.However,RTCdismissedthepetition,ruling
that Monina should have filed jointly with her new husband as mandated byRA8552andtheFamily
Code.
onina argued that joint adoption was unnecessary since the children were emancipated, and her
M
husband was unqualified to adopt due to nationality and residency requirements.
uling:
R
SC ruled that joint adoption by spouses is mandatory, unless specific exceptions apply, none of
which Monina satisfied.
onina’sargumentregardingthechildren’semancipationwasrejected,asthelegaleffectsofadoption
M
extend beyond parental authority. Additionally, Olario’s lack of qualifications toadoptunderPhilippine
law, due to his citizenship and residency status, did not excuse compliance with the joint adoption
requirement.
SC held that legislative amendments, not judicial rulings, could address Monina’s concerns.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |47
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |48
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
rounds for Rescission of Adoption
G
The adoption may be rescinded only upon the petition of the adoptee with the NACC, or with the
assistanceoftheSWDOiftheadopteeisaminor,oriftheadopteeiseighteen(18)yearsofageorover
but who is incapacitated or by his or her guardian on any of the following grounds committed by the
adopter(s):
a. Repeated physical or verbal maltreatment by the adopter despite having undergone counseling;
b. Attempt on the life of the adoptee;
c. Abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
ote: Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
N
adopter. However, the adopter may disinherit the adopteefor causes provided in Art. 919 of the NCC.
ffects of Rescission of Adoption
E
If the NACC finds that the allegations of the petition for rescission are true, it shall render a decision
ordering the rescission of administrative adoption, with or without costs, as justice requires. The NACC
shall:
a. Orderthattheparentalauthorityofthebiologicalparentoftheadopteeberestored,upon
petitionofthebiologicalparentsandifinthebestinterestofthechild,iftheadopteeisstillaminor
or incapacitated, and declare that the reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter and the
adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
b. Ifthebiologicalparentoftheadopteehasnotfiledapetitionforrestorationofparentalauthority,or
isnotknown,orifrestoringtheparentalauthorityovertheadopteeisnotthelatter’sbestinterest,
theNACC shall take legal custody over the adopteeif still a child;
c. Declarethatsuccessionalrightsshallreverttoitsstatuspriortoadoption,asofthedateof
decision.
d. Vested rights acquired prior to administrative rescission shall be respected;
e. Order theadoptee to use the name stated in the originalbirth or foundling certificate; and
f. Order the Civil Registrar where the adoption order was registered to cancel the new birth
certificate of the adoptee and reinstate the original birth or foundling certificate.
ectification of Simulated Births
R
Simulation of birth record refers tothetamperingofthecivilregistrytomakeitappearintherecordof
birth that a child was born to apersonwhoisnotsuchchild'sbiologicalmother,causingthelossofthe
true identity and status of such child {R.A. No. 11222, Sec. 3(b)).
: Who may avail of administrative proceedings for the adoption and rectification of the
Q
simulated birth record of a child?
ANS:ApersonorpersonswhosimulatedthebirthofachildundertheconditionsprovidedunderSection4
ofthisActmayavailofadministrativeproceedingsfortheadoptionandrectificationofthesimulatedbirth
record of such child: Provided, Thatthechildhasbeenlivingwiththepersonforatleast3yearsbefore
the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further, That a Certificate Declaring the Child Legally Available for
Adoption is issued by the NACC in favorofsuchchild(R.A.No.11222,Sec.5,asamendedbyR.A.No.
11642).
nter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 (RA 8043)
I
It is a socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently
residing abroad where the petition isfiled,thesupervisedtrialcustodyisundertaken,andthedecreeof
adoption is issued outside the Philippines.
hen allowed
W
Nochildshallbematchedtoaforeignadoptivefamilyunlessitcanbesatisfactorilyshownthatthechild
cannot be adopted locally.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |49
ho May Adopt
W
An alien or Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad.
Qualifications
1. At least 27 years old and 16 years older than the child to be adopted at the time of the
application unless: (a) Parent by nature of the child to be adopted; or (b) spouse of such parent.
Note:Under RA 11642, the age requirement is 25 yearsold.
2. Hasundergone the appropriate Counselingfrom an accreditedcounselor in his or her country;
3. Adopter is the parent by natureof the child;
4. Adopter is the spouse of the parent by natureof thechild to be adopted;
5. If married, his/her spouse must Jointly filefor theadoption;
6. HasthecapacitytoActorassumeallrightsandresponsibilitiesofparentalauthorityunder
his national laws;
7. Not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
8. Eligible to adoptunder his national law;
9. Is in a position to give the necessary Moralvaluesandexampletoallhischildren,including
the child to be adopted;
10.Agrees to uphold the basic Rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N.
ConventionontheRightsoftheChild,andtoabidebytheRulesandregulationsissuedtoimplement
this Act;
11.Comes from a Country whose government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency;
12.Theadoption is Allowed under his or her nationallaws;and
13.Possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the law or other
applicable Philippine laws.
ASE: Republic v. Tolendano (1994)
C
Disqualified because alien, and they must jointly adopt
acts:
F
TheClousespouses,Alvin(anatural-bornU.S.citizen)andEvelyn(anaturalizedU.S.citizenofFilipino
origin), sought to adopt Evelyn's younger brother, Solomon Joseph Alcala, citing financial difficulties
faced by his natural family.
ince 1981, the couple intermittently cared for Solomon and provided continuous support from
S
November 1989. After afavorablesocialworker’srecommendationandconsentfromSolomonandhis
biological mother, the RTC granted the adoption, dissolving parental authority of Solomon’s natural
parents and recognizing him as the Clouse spouses' legitimate child.
However, the OSG appealed, asserting that the spouses were disqualified under Philippine law to adopt.
uling:
R
SCruledthattheClousespouseswereunqualifiedtoadoptunderArticles184and185oftheFC.
Article184(3)disallowsaliensfromadoptingexceptunderspecificconditions,noneofwhichappliedto
Alvin Clouse.
xceptions:
E
1. Being a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity.
2. Adopting the legitimate child of their Filipino spouse.
3. Being married to a Filipino citizen and seeking to adopt jointly with their spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.(Cannot apply becauseEvelyn is not a Filipino citizen anymore)
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |50
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
velyn, though a former Filipino citizen, could not adopt Solomon alone withoutviolatingArticle185,
E
whichmandatesjointadoptionbyspousesunlessadoptingone'sownillegitimatechildorthelegitimate
child of the other spouse.
Who May Be Adopted
1. Filipino children;(Sec. 3(a))
2. Below 15 years of age;(Sec. 3(b))and
3. Who are legally free, meaning children who have beenvoluntarilyorinvoluntarilycommittedtothe
DSWD.(Sec. 3(f) and Sec. 8)
Note: Any child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department as dependent,
abandoned, or neglected pursuant to the provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare Code may be the
subject of Inter-Country Adoption.(Sec. 26, IRR)
Where to File Petition
● Either with the Philippine RTC having jurisdiction over the child or with the Inter-Country Board
through an intermediate agency, in the country of the adoptive parents.(Sec. 10)
● ApplicationshallbefiledwiththeBoardortheCentralAuthorityortheForeignAdoptionAgencyinthe
countrywheretheapplicantresides.Incaseofforeignnationalswhofileapetitionforadoptionunder
RA R.A. 8552 or Domestic AdoptionLaw,theCourtafterfindingthepetitiontobesufficientinform
and substance and proper case for inter-countryadoptionshallimmediatelytransmitthepetitionto
the board for appropriate action.(Sec. 30, IRR)
Supervision of Trial Custody; Time When the Decree for Adoption Could Be Issued
● The government agencyorauthorizedagencyintheadoptiveparents'countryisresponsibleforthe
child's 6-month trial custody, care, family counseling, and related services.
● TheymustsubmitaprogressreporttotheagencyandtheBoard.Theagencywillmonitorthechild's
progressandpotentialrepatriation.Afinaladoptiondecree,afterthetrialperiod,willbeissuedbythe
adoptive country and sent to the Board.
A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC: Rule on Adoption (Domestic and Inter-Country)
● The National Authority for Child Care (NACC) now hasexclusivejurisdictionoverdomesticadoption
proceedings.
● Pending domestic adoption cases filed before January 28, 2022, may be withdrawn and processed
administratively through the NACC.
● The Rule on Adoption is rendered ineffective, except for pending cases that have not been withdrawn.
● Rescission of both judicial and administrative adoptions will now be handled by the NACC.
upport (Arts. 194-208)
S
It comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, and
transportation, in keeping with the financialcapacityofthefamily,includingtheeducationoftheperson
entitled to be supported until he completes his they complete their education or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.(Art. 194, FC)
upport is mandatory and cannot bewaived,renounced,transmittedorcompensated.Infact,a
S
compromise agreement regarding support isnull andvoid.
ASE: Lam v. Chua (2004)
C
The trial court must base support awards on evidence showing both parents’ capacity and monthly
expenses for the child’s sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical care, education, and transportation.
acts:
F
Adriana Chua filed a petition to annul her marriage to Jose Lam due to his alleged psychological
incapacity. To safeguard their properties, the couple dissolved their conjugal partnership through a
MakatiRTCruling,contributingP250,000eachtoacommonfundmanagedbyAdrianatosupporttheir
son, John Paul. Although Adriana’s initialpetitiondidnotclaimsupport,shetestifiedduringthePasay
RTC hearing about Jose’s irresponsibility, their arranged marriage,andhersoleresponsibilityfortheir
child’s needs. However, no evidence was presented regarding the required support amount or Jose’s
financial capacity.
driana later moved to reopen the case, submitting evidence ofJose’stwopriormarriages.Basedon
A
this,thePasayRTCdeclaredtheirmarriagevoidforbeingbigamous,awardingAdrianacustodyofJohn
Paul andorderingJosetopayP20,000monthlysupport.Josecontestedthisdecision,arguingthatthe
priorMakatiRTCrulinghadalreadyresolvedchildsupportthroughthecommonfundandthatthePasay
RTC lacked authoritytoimposeadditionalsupportwithoutsufficientevidenceorproperamendmentof
the pleadings.
uling:
R
SC ruled that Pasay RTC acted arbitrarily by awarding P20,000.00 monthly support without
evidence of Jose’s financialcapacityorJohnPaul’sspecificneeds,asrequiredbyArticles194,
201, and 202 of the Family Code.
he trial court must base support awards on evidence showing both parents’ capacity and
T
monthlyexpensesforthechild’ssustenance,dwelling,clothing,medicalcare,education,and
transportation.Inthiscase,thewife’stestimonyalonedoesn’tprovethechild’sneedsorthe
parents’ ability to provide.
herefore, the case was remanded to the Pasay RTC for further proceedings to determine the
T
appropriate amount of support for John Paul.
ASE: Lim-Lua v. Lua (2013)
C
Only expenses directly related to sustenance and household needs, suchasmedicalexpenses,dental
expenses, and purchases of groceries and dry goods, should be deducted
acts:
F
Susan Lim-Lua sought P500,000.00 in monthly support pendente lite forherselfandhertwochildren
during the proceedings for the declaration of nullityofhermarriagewithDaniloLua.TheRTCinitially
awarded P250,000.00, later adjusted by the Court of Appeals (CA) to P115,000.00 monthly,allowing
deductions for some expenses incurred by Danilo.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |51
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |52
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
anilo deferred some payments, arguing that his expenditures on his children’s education and other
D
needs were consistent with the family’s social status.
usanfiledforindirectcontempt,claimingDanilowillfullydisobeyedcourtorders.TheCAdismissedthe
S
contempt petition but allowed various deductions, including travel expenses and carcosts,prompting
Susan to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
CruledthatDanilowasnotguiltyofindirectcontempt,ashisactionswereneitherwillfuldisobedience
S
nor aimed at defying court orders. It acknowledged Danilo’s valid reasons and efforts to meet his
children’s essential needs.
owever, the Court modified the CA decision, allowing only deductions for expenses directly
H
relatedtothefamily’ssustenanceandhouseholdneeds,suchasmedicalbills,groceries,and
other essentials. Non-essential expenditures, including travel costs and car-related
expenses, were excluded.
upport must align with the giver’s resources and the recipient’s needs, directing the trial court to
S
reassess the support amount based on currentcircumstances.Danilowasorderedtoresumemonthly
payments of P115,000.00.
ersons Obliged to Support Each Other
P
Support is amutualandreciprocal obligationbetween:
1. Spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the children of the latter (legitimate or illegitimate);
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the children of the latter (legitimate or illegitimate);
5. Legitimate Siblings (full or half);
upport Between Spouses
S
The obligation of husband and wife to support each other persistsas long as the marriage is valid.
● If the husband questions the marriage’s validity, the marriage must be resolved.
● If a marriage isannulled,support ceases.
● If a legal separation is done, the court may order the guilty spouse to support the innocent
spouse, as marriage still exists.
● The wife guilty of adultery cannot get support(Quintanav. Lerma)
● Achildbornoutofadulterycannotdemandsupportbecausethechildisnotthatofthepersonfrom
whom support is demanded(Sanchez v. Zulueta)
upport between Parents (Grandparents) to Children
S
Parents and children, regardless of their relationship, must support each other.However,thissupportis
limited to grandparents and children. Children cannot demand support from their grandparents if their
parents can provide for them.
● A conceived child is entitled to support by virtue of Article 40 of the Civil Code.
rder of Obligation of Support
O
TheordermentionedinArticle195shouldbestrictlyadheredto.Theamountofsupportprovideddepends
on the resources available to the giver. It can never be a fixed amount; it can only be adjusted
proportionately.
upport from Absolute and Conjugal Properties
S
The support from these properties are for:
1. The spouses
2. The common children
3. The legitimate children from previous marriage, if any
upport from Own Separate Properties
S
The spouses’ own separate properties shall be for their:
1. Ascendants
2. Siblings
3. Respective Illegitimate children
ote:Supportforaspouse’sascendants,brother,sister,andillegitimatechildrenshallbechargedagainst
N
the spouse’s separate property, not the conjugal property. For instance, if Isupportmyparentsdespite
beingmarried,themoneyusedforthisshouldcomefrommyexclusivefunds,notconjugalfunds.Using
conjugal funds would be considered advances to theconjugalpartnershipordeductionsfrom
my share later.
rder of Preference to Demand Support–Art. 199
O
When a person needs support, he or she must ask support from the following persons in this specific
order:
(1) Spouse;
(2) Descendants in the nearest degree (children);
(3) Ascendants in the nearest degree (Parents); and
(4) Brothers and sisters
ote:Thisordermustbestrictlyfollowed.Ifmultiplepeopleaskforsupport,thepersonwillhelpthemin
N
the order listed. However, the child’s (if minor) needs come first between the child and the spouse.
ule when Obligation Falls on Two or More Persons of Different Category
R
The enumeration in 199 shall be followed. This enumeration also applies if the cases involve multiple
individualsseekingsupportfromasingleperson,andtheperson’sresourcesareinsufficienttomeettheir
needs.
bligation Falls on Several Persons belonging to the Same Category
O
The amount that each person will share isin proportionto their incomeand not equally.
ote: There are several individuals obligated to support you in the same category. For instance, if you
N
have five siblings, all five of you should contribute to your mother’s support, proportionally to your
income.
upport Between Siblings (Full or Half-Blood)
S
Siblings are obligated to support one another, as this is the only collateral filiation in which support is
legally mandated. Even illegitimate siblings are obligated to support each other, unlessthereisacause
that can be attributed to the claimant’s fault or negligence.
I n such a situation, when your mother is hospitalized, one of you can advance the charges for
hospitalization and then request reimbursement from your other siblings later on.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |53
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |54
mount of Support
A
Theamountofsupporttobegivenisproportionaltotheresourcesandthemeansofthesupporter
and the needs of the recipient.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
he court determines the amount of support,butit’sneverfinalandcanbemodified.Thecourtadjusts
T
the amount based on the recipient’s needs and the average amount of support.
ayment for Support
P
The obligation for support commences when an extra-judicial or judicial demand for support is
made, and it is not appealable. The law presumesthatsupportisnotnecessaryunlessitisdemanded.
However,onceademandandorderforsupportaremade,itmustbeprovidedwithinthefirstfivedaysof
each month.
mportant:Supportmustbedemanded,asitisonlyatthetimeofdemandthattheobligationtosupport
I
commences.
● Support shall cease when the recipient can support himself. However, if the support is still
needed, it will continue because the sufficiency of the income the recipient gets determines the
necessity of the support.
Options of the Person obliged to give Support
1. Give a monthly allowance (In cash);
2. Receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling of the recipient (Receive support and live with him)
○ Except:If there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
ASE: Zaguirre v. Castillo (2005)
C
Child support cannot be addressed in an administrative case
Facts:
omplainantinthiscaseaccusedAtty.Castilloofgrossimmoralconductduetohisaffairwithherwhile
C
he was married. This relationship resulted in a child, whom Castillo initially acknowledged through a
notarizedaffidavitbutlaterrefusedtorecognizeorsupport,soshealsosoughtforchildsupportinthe
instant complaint. SC initially imposed an indefinite suspension on Castillo for his actions.
I n his MR, Castillopresentedevidenceofrepentance,includingcertificatesattestingtohisgoodmoral
character and active community service, and expressed willingness to support the child.
a. Belen argued that the amount was insufficient and sought to hold Francisco, as the children’s
M
grandfather, responsible for support due to his substantial financial resources.
uling:
R
SC ruled that the grandfather, Francisco Delgado, was heldliabletoprovidesupportpendente
lite for his granddaughters, because both their parents, were found to be financially
incapable of providing the necessary support for their education.
nder Article 199 oftheFamilyCode,theobligationtoprovidesupportdevolvesuponrelatives
U
in order of closeness, and since the parents were unable to fulfill this obligation, the
responsibility fell upon the grandfather as the next immediate relative. The Supreme Court
foundthatFranciscohadthefinancialmeanstosupporthisgranddaughters,thusmakinghimliablefor
their educational expenses.
ASE: Lacson v. Lacson (2006)
C
Afathermustpayongoingsupporttohisabandonedfamilydespitehisfinancialdifficultiesandproperty
sale, as the court finds his neglectful behavior violates his duty to provide for his children’s basic needs.
acts:
F
Petitioner Edward V. Lacson was sued for support by his daughters, Maowee and Maonaa Lacson,
throughtheirmotherandguardian,LeaDabanLacson,followingyearsofabandonmentandinconsistent
financial assistance.
dward left the family home in 1975, forcing Lea and the children to live precariouslyfornearlytwo
E
decades,relyingonoccasionalsupportfromEdwardandhismother.In1995,Leafiledacomplaintfor
support on behalf of her daughters. RTC ordered Edward to pay P2,496,000.00 in arrears, less any
amounts previously given, along with attorney’s fees and costs.
The CA affirmed the RTC's decision, leading Edward to elevate the case to the SC, questioning the
arrears, advances made by thechildren’suncleNoelDaban,hisfinancialcapability,andhisclaimthat
support had been satisfied through proceeds from property he sold (for 5 million).
Ruling:
CreducedCastillo'sindefinitesuspensiontoadefiniteperiodoftwoyears;andstatedthatCarmelita
S
Zaguirre's claim for support should be addressedinapropercourtcase,indicatingthatthe
issue of child support needed to be resolved through appropriate legal channelsratherthan
through the administrative case against Atty. Castillo.
uling:
R
SCdeniedEdward’spetition,itruledthatEdward’sobligationtoprovidesupportbecamedemandableas
early as1975,whenLeamadeanextrajudicialdemandforassistance.Hisfailuretoconsistentlymeet
this obligation justified the award of support in arrears(unpaid or past-due child support).
ASE: Mangonon v. CA (2006)
C
Grandfather is responsible for providing financial support to his twin granddaughters' education after
their parents are found to be financially incapable
he Court also affirmed that advances made by Noel Daban to support the children must be
T
reimbursedunderArticle207oftheFamilyCode.RejectingEdward’sclaimoffinancialincapacity,
the Court highlighted that support was proportionately determined based on his financial
resources and the needs of his daughters.
Facts:
etitioner Ma. Belen Mangonon, on behalf of her twin daughters Rica and Rina Delgado, sought a
P
declarationoflegitimacyandfinancialsupportfromFedericoDelgadoandhisfather,FranciscoDelgado.
For context, Ma. Belen and Federico were briefly married in 1975, but their marriage was annulled
before the twins' birth.
llegingabandonment,Ma.Belenrequestedfinancialsupporttocoverherdaughters’collegeeducation
A
in the U.S., amounting to US$22,000 peryearperchild.RTCgrantedsupportpendenteliteofP5,000
per child per month, which was upheld by the CA.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |55
astly, the Court found no merit in Edward's argument regarding the proceeds from the sale of his
L
property,notinginsufficientproofthatthepropertywashisexclusiveassetorthatitssalebenefitedthe
respondents.
xemption from Attachment/Execution
E
Supportcannotbeenforcedunlesstheamountprovidedexceedsthelegalsupportrequired.A
judgment for support is immediately enforceable and cannot be appealed.
If the support iscontractual, creditors can onlylevy it upon attachment or execution.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |56
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
eimbursement to 3rd Party Supporter
R
If a third party provides support, the supposed supporter must be reimbursed unless the third party
offered the support out of charity or had no intention of being reimbursed.
arental Authority (Arts. 209-233)
P
The comprehensive set of rights that parents have over their unemancipated children (minor),
encompassingbothnaturallawandlegalprinciplessuchascommonlawandstatutes.Theserightsinclude
the duty and responsibility of parents to protect, care for, and provide for their children’s well-being,
ensuring their care, maintenance, and preservation.
urpose
P
Physicaldevelopmentcultivationofintelligence,anddevelopmentofintellectualandsensitivefacultiesare
all inalienable rights.
eneral Rule:Cannot be waived, transferred or renounced
G
Exception:
It can only be renounced, waived or abandoned in instances provided for by law:
1. Adoption
2. If the child is placed under guardianship
3. If child is surrendered to the care and custody of any child-caring institution
oint Exercise of parental Authority
J
Parental authority is exercised jointly by the mother and the father over theircommon children.
uty of the Children
D
Children are obliged to respect and obey their parents.
ote: Disobedienceanddisrespectcanbeconsideredcriminal.UndertheArticle223oftheFamilyCode,
N
the parents may even apply for an order to discipline their child.
In case of Death of a Parent
● When one parent dies, the surviving parent can still exercise parental authority.
● If the surviving parent remarries, the new spouse must adopt the child to exercise parental
authority.
● If the surviving spouse can’t be a parent, parental authority can be revoked.
arental Authority when Parents are Separated
P
In case of parental separation (legal or de facto), the designated parent by the Court shall exercise
parental authority.
he Courtconsidersallrelevantfactors,especiallythechild’spreferenceoversevenyearsofage,unless
T
the chosen parent is unfit.
Rule:
● Child below 7 – goes to mother (mandatory, unless there are compelling reasons to deprive the
mother of custody)
● Child over 7 – child’s preferred parent (but can be overruled if parent is deemed unfit)
ote: However, the award of custody to one parent does not mean authority of the other parent is
N
terminated unless it is so decreed.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |57
ompelling Reasons
C
There must be clear evidence of the mother’s unfitness, showing her morallapsesadverselyaffect
the child or distract her from proper care. The courts make this determination.
Illustration:
● Living with a brother-in-law with whom she has a child (immoral influence)
● Common-law relationship with a married man (unfavorable environment for growth)
Compelling reasons don’t include:
● Financial well-being of the father
● Lesbianism (unless shows that the wife carried same-sex relationship in the presence of child)
● Sexual preference or moral laxity (e.g., prostitution or unfaithfulness)
ote:Thecourt’sdecisionisneverfinalregardingthecustodyoverthechildasitmaychangeaccordingto
N
the best interest ofthechild.Thecourtmayevenawardthecustodytothegrandparentsorstrangersif
the parents are unfit, like in the case ofLuna v.IAC.
CASE: Luna v. IAC (1985)
acts:
F
When the child was born, the parents, unable to financially support him, gave custody to the
grandparents.However,whenthechildturnedsix,theparentsbecamefinanciallystableandsoughtto
regain custody. Despite the grandparents and the child’s refusal, the parents filed a custody case
against them. The grandparents lost in the RTC and appealed to the SC.
uring the enforcement of the SC’s judgment, the sheriff visited the grandparents’ house and
D
encountered a distraught child. The child threatened to commit suicide if taken away from the
grandparents. The sheriff reported this incident to the SC.
uling:
R
SCruledinfavorofthegrandparents,prioritizingShirley'swelfareoverproceduralrulesandthe
rights of her biological parents. It determined that her preference, emotional state, and the
stable, lovingenvironmentprovidedbyhergrandparentsoutweighedthebiologicalparents’
legal claim to custody.
hirley's expressed willingness to harm herself if removed, coupled with psychological findings about
S
herdistrustandestrangementfromherparents,constitutedasuperveningeventjustifyingthesetting
aside of the final judgment.
ASE: Unson III v. Navarro (1980)
C
Court has jurisdiction to decide the question of custody asanincidenttotheseparationofproperties
proceeding
acts:
F
ThecustodyofMariaTeresaUnsonbecamedisputedfollowingtheseparationofherparents,MiguelR.
UnsonIIIandEditaN.Araneta.Althoughthecouple’sagreementonpropertyseparationin1974didnot
explicitly address custody, Maria Teresa initiallystayedwithherfatheronschooldaysandhermother
on weekends.
iguel later restricted Edita’s access to Maria Teresa after learning that Edita was living with her
M
brother-in-law, Agustin F. Reyes,whohadahistoryofmanicdepressivedisorderandaninappropriate
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |58
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
r elationshipwithEdita.MiguelarguedthatthislivingarrangementendangeredMariaTeresa'smoraland
social development.
ASE: Santos, Sr. v. CA (1995)
C
Grandparents could only exercise substitute parental authority if the parent was proven unfit
dita contested Miguel’s actions and sought custody, leading to a December 26, 1979, order by the
E
respondent judge granting custody to Edita without a formal hearing. Miguel challenged this order,
asserting it violated due process under Section 6 of Rule 99.
acts:
F
A custody dispute arose between Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and his son’s maternal
grandparents,LeopoldoandOfeliaBedia,overLeouelSantos,Jr.’scustody.Afterhismotherleftforthe
US in 1988 and couldn’t be found, the boy was left with his grandparents due to financial constraints.
Ruling:
Csetasidetherespondentjudge'scustodyorderandgrantedEditaonlyvisitorialrights,emphasizing
S
Maria Teresa's welfare as paramount.ItfoundthatEdita'slivingarrangementposedamoraland
social risk to the child, particularly given Maria Teresa’s formative age.
I t also ruled that the issuance of the custody order without a hearing constituted a grave abuse of
discretion. However, the Court upheld the lower court's jurisdiction to decide custody as an
incident to the property separation proceedings, avoiding unnecessary multiplicity of cases.
CASE: Cervantes v. Fajardo (1989)
he court ultimately granting custody to the adoptive parents based on the child's welfare and the
T
stability and capability of the adoptive parents
Facts:
custody dispute arose over AngelieAnneCervantes,whosebiologicalparents,GinaCarreonFajardo
A
and Conrado Fajardo, had given her up for adoption shortly after her birth. The adoptive parents,
Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, took custody ofthechildattwoweeksold,withthebiologicalmother
signing an Affidavit of Consent.
headoptionwasfinalizedbytheRTC.However,thebiologicalparentslaterdemandedP150,000from
T
theadoptiveparents,threateningtotakethechildbackiftheamountwasnotpaid.Subsequently,the
biological mother took Angelie Anne from the adoptive parents’ home, claiming that the affidavit of
consent had not been fully explained to her.
social worker testified that Gina (the biological mother) had expressed her desire for the adoption
A
during the pre-adoption process, leading the adoptive parents to file a habeas corpus petition.
Ruling:
C ruled in favor of the adoptive parents, affirming the validity of GinaCarreon’saffidavitofconsent
S
and granting custody to Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes.
ourtreasonedthatthechild’swelfarewasparamount,findingthattheadoptiveparentsprovideda
C
stable, morally upright, and financially secure environment conducive to the child’s
development.
I n contrast, the respondents' circumstances, including Conrado Fajardo’s marriage to another woman
and Gina Carreon’s questionable relationships, posed risks to Angelie Anne’s moral upbringing.
Additionally,thefinaldecreeofadoptionhadalreadyseveredthebiologicalparents'legalauthorityover
the child, solidifying the adoptive parents' rights.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |59
antos, Sr., took his son to Negros Oriental in 1990, prompting the Bedia spouses to file a custody
S
petition,whichthetrialcourtgranted.CAupheldthedecision,citingthegrandparents’financialstability
and the father’s previous inattention. Santos, Sr., appealed to SC, arguing for his parental rights.
uling:
R
SC awarded custody to Santos, Sr. It held that parental authority is inalienable and cannot be
renounced or transferred except under exceptional circumstances authorized by law. The
CourtfoundnoevidenceprovingSantos,Sr.’sunfitnessorunsuitabilityasaparent,dismissing
the grandparents' claims about their financial superiority and the father’s soldier status.
aturalloveandauthorityofaparentoutweighssubstituteparentalcare,andthechild’swelfareisbest
N
served under the custody of a fit parent. The Court ruled that grandparents could only exercise
substitute parental authority if the parent was proven unfit, which was not the case here.
ASE: Espiritu v. CA (1995)
C
Courtfoundthatbothchildren,beingoversevenyearsold,werecapableofmakinganintelligentchoice
regarding their custodian.
acts:
F
A custody dispute arose between Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding over their two children,
RosalindThereseandReginaldVince.Thecouple'srelationshipdeterioratedin1990,andTeresitaleftfor
California,leavingthechildrenwithReynaldo,wholaterbroughtthemtothePhilippinesunderthecare
of his sister due to his work in Pittsburgh.
eresitafiledahabeascorpuspetitionin1992seekingcustody,whichthetrialcourtdismissed,granting
T
custody to Reynaldo and visitation rights to Teresita. However, CA reversed the decision, awarding
custody to Teresita relying on legal presumptions favoring maternal custody.
This prompted Reynaldo to seek SC for review.
uling:
R
SC awarded the custody towards Ronald Espiritu. It held that the CA erredbyoverlyrelyingonlegal
presumptionsfavoringmaternalcustodywithoutfullyconsideringthefacts.ItfoundthatRosalindand
Reginald, both over seven years old, had expressed a clear preference to stay with their
father.
xpert testimonies revealed negative perceptions of Teresita by the children, emotional disturbances
E
linked to her behavior, and her questionable morality and unstable home environment. Thus, Court
concluded that Reynaldo provided a more stable and supportive environment, making him the more
suitable custodian for the children.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |60
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
ASE: Sombong v. CA (1996)
C
Dismissed HB due to lack of evidence and in the best interest of the child
bdulaziz and Amouaje, initially lived with Fouzi’s family in the Philippines and Saudi Arabia before
A
staying with Sabrina’s mother in the Philippines.
Facts:
J ohannaSombongsoughtcustodyofherdaughter,Arabella,bornin1987.ArabellahadbeenleftatSir
John Clinic due to unpaid medical bills when she was six monthsold.Johannaclaimedtohavemade
partial payments but alleged that the clinicownersrefusedtoreturnthechild,whowassubsequently
placed with a third party, Marietta Neri Alviar.
ouzi alleged Sabrinaneglectedthechildren,baptizedthemasChristians,andviolatedIslamicnorms.
F
The Shari’a District Court ruled in his favor, finding Sabrina unfit, but Sabrina challenged the ruling,
arguing civil law should apply and the Shari’a court lacked jurisdiction due to her religious change.
years later, Johanna filed multiple habeas corpus petitions to reclaim her daughter, claiming that
5
CristinaGraceNeri,raisedbyAlviar,wasArabella.However,neitherJohannanortheclinicownerscould
conclusively identify Cristina as Arabella.
uling:
R
SC ruled that the evidencefailedtoestablishthatCristinawasArabella,makingthewritofhabeas
corpus an inappropriate remedy since it requires a clear identity and proof of illegal
detention.Inaddition,thecourtdeterminedthatJohannalackedfinancialstabilityandhadmadeplans
that would disrupt the child's care. In contrast, Cristina’s current caregivers provided a stable and
supportive environment.
ithoutproofofidentityorillegalrestraint,andgivenconcernsaboutJohanna'scapacitytoprovidefor
W
Cristina, the Court concluded that granting custody to Johanna would not serve the child's welfare.
ASE: Sagala-Eslao v. CA (1997)
C
Parental authority is a fundamental right that can’t be renounced or transferred
Facts:
aria Paz Cordero-Ouye sought custody of her daughter, Angelica Eslao, after her father’s death in
M
1990. She entrusted Angelica to her grandmother, Teresita Sagala-Eslao, temporarily to help her grieve.
fter remarrying and moving to the US, Maria Paz returned in 1993 to take Angelica, but Teresita
A
refused. Maria Paz filed a legal action, and the trial and appeals courts ruled in her favor. Teresita
appealed to the SC, claiming Maria Paz had abandoned Angelica and was unfit to regain custody.
uling:
R
SC ruled in favor of Sabrina, stating that the Shari’a court lacked jurisdiction as Presidential
Decree No. 1083 (Code of Muslim Personal Laws) applies only to Muslims, and Sabrina’s
reversion to Catholicism placed the case under civil law.
heCourtemphasizedthechildren'sbestinterestsastheparamountconsiderationincustodydisputes.
T
It found that Fouzi failed to present sufficient evidence of Sabrina’s unfitness, noting her
financial capability and stable environment for the children. Furthermore, Fouzi's frequent
work-relatedtraveldiminishedhisabilitytoprovideprimarycare.TheCourtawardedcustodyto
Sabrina, granting Fouzi visitorial rights to maintain his relationship with the children.
ASE: Laxamana v. Laxamana (2002)
C
Remanded to RTC because of failure to examine evidence
acts:
F
This case involves a custody battle over three minor children: twins Joseph and Vincent, and their
younger brother Michael. Reymond Laxamana, the father, struggled with drug dependencystartingin
1991 and underwent multiple treatments until he was declared drug-free in 1997. However,hiswife,
Lourdes, alleged that his issues persisted, leading to violent behavior.
heirmaritalproblemsculminatedinLourdesleavingReymondwiththechildrenin1999.Reymondfiled
T
apetitionforhabeascorpustogaincustody,whileLourdesfiledforannulment.RTCawardedcustodyto
Lourdesbasedonpsychiatricevaluations,grantingvisitationrightstoReymond.Dissatisfied,Reymond
appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to conduct a proper trial to evaluate the fitness of both
parents.
he CourtalsorecognizedMariaPaz’simprovedfinancialstatusandherhusband’swillingness
T
toadoptandsupportAngelica,concludingtherewasnocompellingreasontodenycustodyas
the child’s best interests were served by staying with a fit parent.
uling:
R
SC ruled that the case must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to
determine the fitness of both parents through a full trial. Custodydecisionsmustprioritizethe
best interests ofthechildrenandcriticizedthelowercourtforrelyingsolelyonpsychiatricevaluations
withoutthoroughexamination.TheCourtalsostressedtheimportanceofconsideringthechildren's
preferences, given their ages (14 and 15), as their input is vital in custody matters.
While Lourdes retainedcustodypendingthefinalresolution,thedecisionhighlightedtheconstitutional
mandate toprotectthewelfareofthechildrenandensurethatcustodyarrangementsaregroundedin
comprehensive and fair evidence evaluation.
ASE: Artadi v. Bondagjy (2001)
C
Shari’a court lacks jurisdiction as Sabrina reverted to catholicism, thus they are ruled under civil law
ASE: Gualberto v. Gualberto (2002)
C
Custody for children under seven should go to the mother
Facts:
abrinaArtadi-Bondagjy,aChristianwhoconvertedtoIslambeforehermarriagetoFouziAliBondagjy
S
in 1988 and later reverted to Catholicism, had custody disputes with her ex-husband. Theirchildren,
acts:
F
The case centers on a custody dispute between separated parents Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto and
Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V over their four-year-old son, Rafaello. Crisanto filed for nullity of
marriage in 2002, requesting temporary custody, which the RTC initially granted to him.
uling:
R
SCruledthatparentalauthorityisafundamentalrightthatcan’tberenouncedortransferred
except in exceptional circumstances. The Court found noevidenceofabandonmentbyMariaPaz,
noting her temporary decision to leave Angelica with Teresita didn’t relinquish her rights.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |61
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |62
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
owever, Joycelyn successfullymotionedtoreversethisorder,regainingcustody.Crisantoappealedto
H
theCA,whichdirectedthetrialcourttorevisitJoycelyn’smotion.Bothpartieseventuallyescalatedthe
matter to the SC, leading to a consolidated review of their cases.
he core issues involved the application of Articles 213 and 211 of the Family Code, which address
T
custody of children under seven, and whether ancillary remedies such as habeas corpus were
warranted.
Ruling:
CruledthatArt.213oftheFamilyCodeapplies,mandatingthatchildrenundersevenshouldnot
S
beseparatedfromtheirmotherunlesscompellingreasonsexist.TheCourtfoundnosufficient
evidence to disqualify Joycelyn from custody, dismissing Crisanto’s claims of immorality
based on her alleged lesbian relationships as irrelevant to her fitness as a parent.
heCourtemphasizedthatpersonalmoralissuesmusthaveadirectandadverseimpactonthechild's
T
welfaretobeconsideredincustodydecisions.Furthermore,itnotedthattemporarycustodyordersare
provisional and should prioritize the child’s best interests.
ASE: Hirsch v. CA (2007)
C
Joint custody when the parents are already separated is inimical to the interest of the child
Facts:
German citizen, married to a Filipina, resided in Boracay. However, they eventually separated. The
A
Filipina returned to Manila, accompanied by their sole child. Subsequently, the husband initiated a
custody case against the wife, where the RTC ruled in favor of joint custody for both parents.
Ruling:
he court should not grant joint custodyofachildwhentheparentsarealreadyseparated.
T
Granting joint custody of achildunder7yearsoldtoseparatedparentswithoutproofofthemother’s
unfitness is unjust and detrimental to the child’s well-being, as he may be confused about his residence.
Csaidonlyoneparentshouldhavecustody,withtheothergivenvisitationrights,andsincehe’sunder
S
7, the child should be with the mother.
ASE: Dacasin v. Del-Mundo Dacasin (2010)
C
Agreement is void, joint custody not possible for parents who are separated
Facts:
hecasecentersonacustodydisputeoverStephanie,thedaughterofpetitionerHeraldBlackDacasin,
T
an American, andrespondentSharonDelMundoDacasin,aFilipino.Sharonobtainedadivorcedecree
in Illinois in 1999, granting her sole custody of Stephanie.
espite this, the parties signed a joint custody agreement in the Philippines in 2002, designating
D
Philippinecourtsastheforumforresolvingdisputes.HeraldfiledasuitintheRTCofMakatiin2004to
enforce this agreement, claiming Sharon had violated it.
TCdismissedthecase,citingtheIllinoiscourt’sretainedjurisdictionandrulingthecustodyagreement
R
void under Philippine law. Herald appealed, asserting the divorce decree’s invalidity and seeking
enforcement of the agreement.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |63
uling:
R
SC ruled that RTC had jurisdiction to hear the casebutruledthejointcustodyagreementvoidunder
Article 213 of the Family Code, which prioritizes maternal custody for children under seven unless
compelling reasons dictate otherwise. At the time of the agreement, Stephanie was under seven,
and her parents were divorced, leaving no basis for joint custody.
urthermore, Sharon’s repudiation of the agreement rendered it unenforceable. Custody agreements
F
cannot override statutory rules prioritizing the child’s welfare, and while the Illinois divorce decree is
bindingonHeraldunderthenationalityprinciple,itdoesnotaffecttheRTC’sjurisdiction.Thecasewas
remanded to the RTC to determine a custodial arrangement in Stephanie’s best interest,
acknowledging her age (nearly 15 years) and the need for her voice to be considered.
n Illegitimate Children
O
When a child is born out of wedlock, themotherholdsthe parental authority.
owever, if the mother and father reside together with the illegitimate child, both parents share
H
joint parental authority. The term “common children” isusedin211torefertochildrenborntoboth
parents, regardless of their legitimacy.
Requisites for joint parental authority towards an illegitimate child
1. Paternity is certain
2. Father and mother of illegitimate child must be living together under one roof with the child
ote:Intheeventofaconflict,thefather’sdecisionwillprevail.Themother’sonlyrecourseistofile
N
alawsuitandchallengethedecision(thegroundsforthechallengemustbevalidandsubstantial).Onlya
judicial order can overturn the father’s decision.
ASE: David v. CA (1995)
C
Mother of an illegitimate child is entitled to sole parental authority and custody
acts:
F
The case centers on a custody dispute between Daisie T. David and Ramon R. Villar, who had an
extramarital affair resulting in three children. When their son, Christopher J.,wastakenbyRamonin
1991duringatriptoBoracayandenrolledinaschoolwithoutDaisie'sconsent,shefiledapetitionfor
habeas corpus to regain custody.
TCinitiallyruledinDaisie'sfavor,grantinghercustodyofChristopherandorderingRamontoprovide
R
temporary support. However, the CA reversed this decision, allowing Ramon to retain temporary
custody. Daisie appealed to SC.
uling:
R
SC ruled that a habeas corpus petition is valid fordeterminingcustodyoveranillegitimatechild.The
Courtaffirmedthatthemotherofanillegitimatechildisentitledtosoleparentalauthorityand
custody(Art.176,FC),andthefinancialstatusofthefathershouldnotinfluencethecustody
decision if the mother is fit and capable of providing for the child.
aisie, who could support her children and had no compelling reasons to separate Christopher, was
D
foundfittoretaincustody.TheCourtreversedtheCA’sdecision,orderedChristopher’sreturntoDaisie’s
custody, and mandated Ramon to provide temporary support for the children.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |64
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
ASE: Silva v. CA (1997)
C
Allegations of gambling and womanizing against Silva were insufficient to prove he was an unfit father
Facts:
he case involves a custodial dispute between Carlitos E. Silva, a businessman, and Suzanne T.
T
Gonzales, an actress, following their separationaftercohabitingandhavingtwochildren.Silvasought
weekend visitation rights after Gonzales refused to honor their previous arrangement.
onzales opposed the petition, accusing Silva of gambling and womanizing, claiming these behaviors
G
could negatively affect their children's moral development. In 1989, the RTC granted Silva limited
visitationrights,butGonzalesappealed.ShelatermovedtoHollandwiththechildrenaftermarryinga
Dutch national, and in 1993, the CA reversed the RTC's decision, denying Silva any visitation rights.
Silva then sought relief from SC.
Ruling:
C ruled that the allegations of gambling and womanizing against Silva were insufficient to
S
prove he was an unfit father and thus could not be used to deny him visitation rights.
I t reinstated the RTC's decision, granting Silva the right to visithischildrenonweekends,but
with the condition that he could not takethemoutwithoutGonzales'consent.Itisanatural
right of a parent to be involved in their children's lives, regardless of whether the relationship is
legitimate, and noted that Silva's alleged behavior had not been shown to harm the children.
CASE: Tonog v. CA & Daguimol (2002)
hilemotherretainsparentalcustodytoillegitimatechildren,inthiscase,removingthechildfromher
W
current environment would be detrimental to her well being
acts:
F
The case centers on a custody dispute over Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, an illegitimate child born to
Dinah B. Tonog and Edgar V. Daguimol.
inah,anursingstudent,leftfortheUnitedStatestoworkasaregisterednurse,leavingherdaughter
D
inthecareofEdgarandhisparents.In1992,Edgarfiledapetitionforguardianship,whichwasinitially
granted by RTC. However, Dinah, upon learning of this decision, contested it, seeking to regain custody.
TClaterallowedDinahtofileanoppositionandgrantedherrequesttohavecustodyremandedtoher.
R
Edgarappealed,andtheCAmodifiedthedecision,allowinghimtoretaintemporarycustody.Dinahthen
appealed to SC.
Ruling:
C ruled that the temporary custody of Gardin Faith should remain with her father, Edgar,
S
pending the final decision on the guardianship proceedings.
he welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in custody disputes and that the respective
T
resources and social situations of the parents should be evaluated. While recognizing that the
mother, Dinah, holds legal authority over her illegitimate child under the Family Code, the
Court noted that removing Gardin Faith from her current environment could harm her
well-being.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |65
ASE: Briones v. Miguel (2004)
C
Provision on children choosing which parenttobewithuponreachingacertainageisonlygrantedto
legitimate children and not illegitimate
acts:
F
ThecasecentersonacustodydisputeoverMichaelKevinPineda,anillegitimatechildborninJapanto
JoeyD.BrionesandLoretaP.Miguel.In2002,Joeyfiledapetitionforhabeascorpustogaincustodyof
Michael, claiming that Loreta’s relatives had takenthechildunderfalsepretensesandfailedtoreturn
him to Joey, who had been caring for him since 1998.
oreta,however,arguedthatshehadtakenthechildbacktothePhilippineswithJoey’sagreement,and
L
cited Joey's deportation and unemployment as factors in her decision. RTC initially issued a writ of
habeascorpus,butCAdismissedJoey'spetition,grantingcustodytoLoretabasedonArticle213ofthe
Family Code, which gives sole parental authority to themotherofanillegitimatechild,whilegranting
Joey visitorial rights.
uling:
R
SCaffirmedCA’sdecision,Loreta,asthemother,hadsoleparentalauthorityoverMichaelunder
the Family Code, and that there were no compelling reasons to deny her custody.
heCourtalsorecognizedJoey'svisitorialrights,acknowledgingthenaturalrightsofparentsovertheir
T
children. However, the Court corrected RTC’s ruling by removing a provision that would have
allowed Michael to choose which parent tolivewithuponreachingtenyearsofage,noting
thatthisprovisionappliedonlytomarriedparents.TheCourtclarifiedthatsinceJoeyandLoreta
were never married, the child’s preference could not be determinative in this case.
ubstitute Parental Authority by Surviving Grandparent
S
Parentalauthoritygiventothegrandparentsofthechildincaseofdeathofbothparentsorunfitness
of the parents to exercise parental authority.
ote: It is necessary that BOTH parents must have already been dead or unable to exercise parental
N
authorityIntheabsenceofgrandparents,theoldestbrotherorsisterwhoisoflegalageandfittoassume
parental authority.
I f both maternal and paternal grandparents are willing to assume parental authority, the court will
consider the child’s best interests and welfare.
etition for Habeas Corpus
P
The Grandparents may petition for habeas corpus for the recovery of the custody of the child. Writ of
habeascorpusextendstoallcaseswhereintheissueisdeterminedwhohastherightfulcustodyoverthe
child.Thus, a petition for Habeas Corpus carrieswith it action for custody of the child.
ilial Privilege Rule
F
GeneralRule:Thedescendantshavetherightnottobecompelledtotestifyinacriminalcaseagainst
their parents and grandparents.
Exception: When testimony is indispensable in a crimeagainstthedescendantorbyoneparentagainst
the other.
a. Does not extend to civil cases
b. Descendant can voluntarily testify
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |66
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
ubstitute and Special Parental Authority
S
Incasetheparentsorjudiciallyappointedguardianisnotavailable,thefollowingwillexercisesubstitute
parental authority:
1. Surviving grandparent (Art. 214)
2. Oldest brother or sister (over 21 yrs of age, unless unfit or disqualified)
3. Child’s actual custodian (over 21 yrs of age, unless unfit or disqualified)
Note:The court may prefer strangers over even theunfit parents.
I n cases of foundlings, abandoned, neglected, or abused children, or similarly situated children
Parental authority shall be entrusted to heads of accredited children’s homes, orphanages, or
similar institutionsby the proper government agencyin summary judicial proceedings.
pecial Parental Authority
S
Parentalauthorityexercisedbyschooladministrators,principals,teachers,orotherindividualsor
entitiesengagedinchildcarewhilesupervisingandinstructingaminorchild.Thus,onceaminor
student enters a school premises, they are considered under the special parental authority of the school.
ote: Authority andresponsibilityapplytoallauthorizedactivities,insideoroutsidetheschool,entity,
N
or premises.
iability under SPA
L
General Rule: School,itsadministratorsandteachersareprincipallyliableforthedamagecausedby
the child and their liability issolidary.
● While parents are only subsidiarilyliable,theyareonlyresponsibleiftheschoolanditsteachers
are unable to pay due to insolvency.
Exception:Diligence of a Good father of the Family.
ct causing damage is inside the classroom
A
The teacher-in-charge is principally liable. It is not a requirement that the teacher be physically
present at the time of the injury and in a position to prevent it.
ct causing damage is outside the classroom but within the campus
A
School and its administrator shall be principally liable.
Note: Arts. 218 and 219 of the FConly apply to minors.
● If the student causing the damage or injury is not a minor, then Art. 2180 of the NCC (Vicarious
Liability) will apply.
ASE: Amadora v. CA (1988)
C
2180appliestoallschools;Custodymeansbeingintheschool’svicinityforofficialpurposes,butcanbe
exempted from liability if due diligence is exercised.
Facts:
hecasestemsfromthetragicdeathofAlfredoAmadora,a17-year-oldstudentwhowasfatallyshotby
T
hisclassmate,PablitoDaffon,atColegiodeSanJose-Recoletos.Followingtheincident,Alfredo'sparents
filed a civil action for damages against the school and several individuals, including Daffon and the
school authorities.
he CourtofFirstInstanceinitiallyruledinfavorofthepetitioners,holdingthedefendantsliablefora
T
sum of P294,984. However, CA reversed the decision, stating that under the last paragraph of Art.
2180,onlyschoolsofartsandtrades(vocationalschools)areliable,notacademicschoolslikeColegio
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |67
eSanJoseRecoletos;andthestudentswerenotundertheschool'scustodyatthetimeoftheincident
d
(meaning staying on campus are boarders).
uling:
R
SC ruled that Art. 2180 applies to all schools, whether academic or non-academic, rejecting
the distinctionmadebytheCAbetweendifferenttypesofschools.Thecustodyrequirementin
Article 2180 depends on school authorities’ control and influence, not whether students board at the
school.TheCourtfoundAlfredostillunderschoolcustodysincehewasonthepremisesforalegitimate
purpose.
owever, the court found thattheschoolauthorities,includingtherector,principal,anddeanofboys,
H
weren’t directly responsible fortheincidentsincetheyweren’ttheteachersincharge.Thephysics
teacher,whowasn’tnegligent,wasalsoabsolvedofliability.Theschoolanditsauthoritiescouldn’t
be held liable under Article 2180 since they exercised due diligence to prevent the injury.
ASE: PSBA v. CA (1992)
C
Cannot be held liable under 2180 as assailants were not students
acts:
F
ThecasecentersaroundthetragicdeathofCarlitosBautista,athird-yearcommercestudentwhowas
fatally stabbed by outsiders on the premises of PSBA on August 30, 1985. Carlitos' parents filed a
lawsuit for damages against the school and its officers, alleging negligence in providing inadequate
security measures.
he school contended that it should not be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which
T
exempts schools from liability for theactsofnon-students.However,RTCandtheCAbothdeniedthe
motion to dismiss, leading the defendants to escalate the case to the Supreme Court.
uling:
R
SCruledthatthedoctrineofinlocoparentis,whichimposesliabilityonschoolsfortheactions
of students, was not applicablein this case sincethe assailants were not students.
owever, the school had a contractual obligation to ensure students’ safety and security,
H
stemming from the agreement to provide a safe learning environment when a student enrolls. A
breachofthisdutycouldleadtotortliabilityiftheschoolfailedtotakereasonablemeasures
to prevent harm.
he case was remanded for trial to determine whether PSBA had been negligent in its
T
security practices,withthepossibilityoftheschoolbeingheldliableifitwasfoundtohavefailedin
its duty.
ffect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of the Children
E
Parents are the natural guardians of their unemancipated children. In case of their absence, substitute
parental authority over the child will apply.
Parent’s Rights and Duties over Children
1. Keep them in their company
2. Love and affection
3. Moral and spiritual guidance
4. Protect physical and mental health
5. Educate them
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |68
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
. Represent them in matters of interest
6
7. Demand respect and obedience
8. Impose discipline
9. Other duties imposed by law
icarious Liability of Parents
V
Personisnotonlyliablefortortscommittedbyhimbutalsofortortscommittedbyotherswithwhomhe
has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible.
arents are principally and primarily liable for the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
P
childrenwhichresultedindamageorprejudiceofanother.Forthisliabilitytoattach,itisnecessary
that the unemancipated child must still belivingin their companyandunder their parental authority.
ote: Parents are presumednegligentunlesstheycanshowtheyexercisedallthediligenceofa
N
good father of a familyto prevent the damage.
Requisites for liability
1. Must still be living in their company
2. Under their parental authority
Reason: Failure to supervise them to prevent themfrom causing damage.
ppointment of Guardians
A
The court may appoint aguardian(eveniftheparentsarealive)ifthebestinterestsofthechildwillbe
preserved with such action. The welfare and best interest of the child are always the primary
consideration.
Considerations in appointing a guardian of the minor:
1. Financial capability;
2. Business acumen;
3. Physical condition;
4. Character;
5. Conduct;
6. Present and past history of the prospective appointee;
7. Probability to exercise the powers and duties of guardians for the full period during the guardianship.
iscipline of Children
D
Parents havetheprimaryresponsibilityofdiscipliningtheirchildren.Ifachildisincorrigibledespitetheir
efforts, parents can seek assistance from the court in disciplining the child.
● One way is to commit the child into a government-accredited agency for 30 days.
CASE: Tamargo v. CA,supra.
doptedparentsarenotheldliablefortheactionsoftheiradopteeduringthecourtproceedingrelated
A
to adoption, even if the adoption decree retroactively applies to the filing of the adoption petition.
ASE: Libi v. IAC (1992)
C
Parents are primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by minor
Facts:
endellLibishothisloverJulieAnnGiotong,bothminors,beforeheturnedthefirearmonhimself.Asa
W
result, the parents of Julie Ann filed against Wendell's parents to recover damages. RTC rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence, while CA reversed the decision.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |69
uling:
R
SC ruledthattheparentsofWendellareliable,underArt.2180oftheCivilCode,parentsare
primarilyresponsibleforthecivilliabilityarisingfromcriminalactscommittedbytheirminor
children,unlesstheycanprovetheyexercisedthediligenceofagoodfatherofafamilytopreventthe
harm.
I n this case, the Court found that the Libi parents had failed to secure the firearm properly,
which Wendell had access to, indicating negligence.
ASE: St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos (2002)
C
Thosewhoexercisespecialparentalauthorityoverminorsareliablefordamagescausedbytheminor's
actions, but only if negligence was the proximate cause of the injury
acts:
F
ThecasecentersonthetragicdeathofSherwinCarpitanos,astudentatSt.Mary'sAcademy,whowas
killed during an enrollment drive in 1995. Sherwin was riding in a jeep driven by James Daniel II, a
minorandfellowstudent,whenthevehicleflippedduetoamechanicalfailure—thedetachmentofthe
steering wheel guide. Sherwin's parents filed a lawsuit for damages against St. Mary's Academy, the
Daniel family, and Vivencio Villanueva, the jeep's owner.
uling:
R
SC ruled that St. Mary's Academy was not liable for Sherwin's death. Under the Family Code,
thosewhoexercisespecialparentalauthorityoverminorsareliablefordamagescausedbytheminor's
actions,butonlyifnegligencewastheproximatecauseoftheinjury.Inthiscase,theaccidentwas
caused by a mechanical defect, not the negligence of the school or the minor driver.
heCourtfoundnoevidencethattheschoolwasresponsiblefortheincidentorthatitsactionsdirectly
T
caused the harm. Consequently, the Court absolvedSt.Mary'sAcademyofliabilityforboththedeath
and the moral damages, remanding the case to determine the liability of other parties,
including Vivencio Villanueva, the jeep owner.
ffect of parental Authority Upon the Property of the Children
E
Parents of an unemancipated child automatically become the legal guardians of the child’s property. In
case of a disagreement, the father’s decision prevails.
imit of Guardianship
L
Parental authority over their children’s property only pertains to acts of administration or
management, not sale or encumbrance sincethesetypesofactionsneedauthorizationfromthecourt.
Thus,waiverofarightoranactenteringintoacompromiseagreementinvolvingthepropertyofthechild
cannot be done without authority of the court. These are deemed acts of alienation or of strict ownership.
ond
B
If the property of the child is more than50,000pesos,abondmustbeputuptoguaranteeobligations
prescribed for general guardians. Amount shall be decided by the court but not less than 10% of the
value. |Reason:Guarantee performance of the obligationsprescribed for general guardians.
ules on Guardianship
R
The rules on guardianship will be suppletory if parents are the guardians. However, the rules on
guardianshipwillprimarilyapplyundersubstituteparentalauthorityoriftheguardianisastrangersince
the same sense of devotion and loyalty cannot be expected.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |70
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
roperty acquired through Child’s Effort or Industry or Gratuitous Title
P
Propertyobtainedthroughtheeffortorbygratuitoustitlebelongstothechild.Itmustbeusedprimarily
forhisownwelfare,supportandeducation.However,thesepropertiesmaybeusedtosupportthefamily
since support must be mutual and if property is in excess.
pecial parental authority
S
This can never be exercised by one with special authority only. It is prohibited bytheFamilyCodeand
Manual of Regulations of Private Schools.
arents Hiring Child
P
If the parents hire their children in the management oradministrationoftheirproperties,theymustbe
compensatedlikeanyotherworker.Itmustnotbelessthanthatwhichtheparentswillpayforastranger.
Also, the compensation shouldnever be charged againstthe child’s legitime.
uspension or Termination of Parental Authority
S
Parental Authority TerminatesPermanentlyUpon
1. Death of parents
2. Death of child
3. Emancipation (at the age of 18)
ASE: Sombong v. CA,supra.
C
SC ruled that the evidence failed to establish that Cristina was Arabella, making the writ of habeas
corpus an inappropriate remedy since it requires a clear identity and proof of illegal detention. In
addition, the court determined that Johanna lacked financial stability and had madeplansthatwould
disrupt the child's care. In contrast, Cristina’s current caregivers provided a stable and supportive
environment.
epublic Act No. 8972, “Solo Parents’ Welfare Act of 2000”
R
The policy of the State is to promote the family as the foundation of the nation and ensure its total
development. The law aims to develop a comprehensive program ofservicesforsoloparentsandtheir
children, to be carried out by various government and non-government agencies.
Parental Authority TerminatesTemporarilyUpon
1. Adoption (when rescinded)
2. Appointment of general guardian
3. Judicial declaration of abandonment of the child
4. Final judgment divesting Parental Authority
5. Incapacity or absence of parent
olo parent
S
Referstoindividualswhofallundervariouscategories,includingthosewhohavegivenbirthasaresultof
rape,thosewhoareleftaloneduetodeath,detention,physicalormentalincapacityofthespouse,legal
separation, abandonment, or other circumstances.
ote:Itmustbeonlyonthebasisoflegalgroundsprovidedforbylaw.However,itmayberevivedbya
N
final judgment.
uspension of Parental Authority
S
Parental authority is automatically suspended upon the imposition of civil interdiction. However, the
parental authority is automatically restored once sentence is served or upon pardon or amnesty of the
offender, without need of court order. However, parental authority may be suspended upon filing of an
action based on the following grounds, such as when the parent exercises:
1. Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
2. Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
3. Compels the child to beg; or
4. Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness.
hildren
C
Referstothosewhoaredependentuponthesoloparentforsupportandareunmarried,unemployed,and
notmorethan18yearsold,orover18yearsoldbutincapableofself-supportduetomentalorphysical
disability.
arental responsibility
P
WithrespecttotheirminorchildrenshallrefertotherightsanddutiesoftheparentsasdefinedinArticle
220 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the “Family Code of the Philippines.”
arental leave
P
Refers to leave benefits granted to a soloparenttoperformparentaldutieswherephysicalpresenceis
required. (not more than seven (7) working days every year shall be granted to any solo parent
employee who has rendered service ofat least one(1) year)
rom Monteclar: The court cannot, on its own motion(motupropio),suspendparentalauthorityevenif
F
theparenthascommittedgroundsforsuspensionunderArticle231,unlessaspecificactionhasbeenfiled
to do so.
lexible work schedule
F
Refers to the right granted to a solo parent employee to vary their arrival anddeparturetimewithout
affecting the core work hours.
exual Abuse of Parent on Child
S
Sexual abuse is another instance of permanent deprivation of parental authority. It is one of the most
seriousactsofmoraldepravityandcorruption.Therefore,parentalauthoritycanneverberestored,even
if the parent becomes reformed.
Criteria for Support
● Solo parents whose income falls below the poverty threshold set by the National Economic and
DevelopmentAuthority(NEDA)andassessedbytheDepartmentofSocialWelfareandDevelopment
(DSWD) worker are eligible for assistance.
● Soloparentswhoseincomeisabovethepovertythresholdcanstillenjoycertainbenefitsmentioned
in the law.
orporal Punishment
C
Corporal punishment involves physical disciplinary measures for children or students, but it must be
reasonable to avoid excessive harshness or cruelty.
arents & those who has Substitute Parental Authority
P
Onlythoseexercisingtheparentalauthorityorsubstituteparentalauthoritycaninflictphysicaldisciplinary
measures.
omprehensive Package of Social Development and Welfare Services
C
The DSWD,DOH,DECS,CHED,TESDA,DOLE,NHA,andDILGwilldevelopacomprehensivepackageof
social development and welfare services for solo parents and their families. The package includes
livelihood development services, counseling services, parent effectiveness services, critical incidence
stress debriefing, and special projects for individuals in need of protection.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |71
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |72
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
epublic Act No. 7610, “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
R
Discrimination Act”
Instituted by President Corazon Aquino toprovidespecialprotectiontochildrenfromallformsofabuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation, and discrimination.
unerals (Arts. 305-310, NCC)
F
A funeral is a ritualized ceremony following a death to honor, memorialize, and celebrate an individual.
hild abuse, under RA 7610
C
"Child abuse" referstothemaltreatment,whetherhabitualornot,ofthechildwhichincludesanyofthe
following:
1. Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
2. Anyactbydeedsorwordswhichdebases,degradesordemeanstheintrinsicworthanddignityofa
child as a human being;
3. Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
4. Failure to immediatelygivemedicaltreatmenttoaninjuredchildresultinginseriousimpairmentof
his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
ircumstances which gravely threaten or endanger the survival and normal development of children
C
Include, but are not limited to, the following;
1. Being in a community where there is armed conflict or being affected by armed conflict-related
activities;
2. Working under conditions hazardous to life, safety and normal which unduly interfere with their
normal development;
3. Livinginorfendingforthemselvesinthestreetsofurbanorruralareaswithoutthecareofparents
or a guardian or basic services needed for a good quality of life;
4. Being a member of a indigenous cultural community and/or living under conditions of extreme
poverty or in an area which is underdeveloped and/or lacks or has inadequate access to basic
services needed for a good quality of life;
5. Being a victim of a man-made or natural disaster or calamity; or
6. Circumstances analogous to those above stated which endanger the life, safety or normal
development of children.
rder of Preference: Duty and Right to Make Funeral Arrangement
O
In accordance with Art. 294:
1. Spouse;
2. Descendants in the nearest degree;
3. Ascendants on the nearest degree;
4. Brothers and Sister
I n case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothersandsisters,theoldestshallbepreferred.In
case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
Note: Every funeral shall be inkeeping with the socialpositionof the deceased.
Kind of Funeral Arrangements
● The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressedwishes of the deceased.
● In the absence of such expression,hisreligiousbeliefsoraffiliationshalldeterminethefuneral
rites.
● In caseofdoubt,theformofthefuneralshallbedecideduponbythepersonobligedtomake
arrangementsfor the same, after consulting the othermembers of the family.
etention, Interment, Disposal or Exhumation of Dead
R
No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the
persons mentioned in articles 294 and 305.(referto order of preference)
● R
etention–actofholdingorstoringhumanremainsbeforetheyareburied,cremated,orotherwise
disposed of;
● Interment–formalactofplacingabodyorcrematedremainsinagrave,tomb,crypt,orotherburial
site;
● Disposal–broadertermforhandlinghumanremainsafterdeath,encompassingburial,cremation,or
other methods;
● Exhumation– act of digging up and removing a bodyor cremated remains from its burial site.
omprehensive program against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination
C
Refers to the coordinated program of services and facilities to protected children against:
1. Child Prostitution and other sexual abuse;
2. Child trafficking;
3. Obscene publications and indecent shows;
4. Other acts of abuses; and
5. Circumstances which threaten or endanger the survival and normal development of children.
isrespect to the dead
D
Any person who showsdisrespecttothedead,orwrongfullyinterfereswithafuneralshallbeliableto
the family of the deceased for damages, material andmoral.
emedial Procedures
R
Complaints of child abuse can be filed by various parties,andthevictim’sidentityisprotecteduntilthe
case is resolved. Juvenile and Domestic Courts prioritize cases involving child abuse.
uneral Expenses
F
Theconstructionofatombstoneormausoleumshallbedeemedapartofthefuneralexpenses,andshall
bechargeable to the conjugal partnership property,if the deceased is one of the spouses.
Common Penal Provisions
● Penalties for violations of this Act may be increasedforrepeatoffenders,corporations,responsible
officers or employees, ascendants, parents, guardians, and public officers or employees.
● Foreign offenders will be deported after serving their sentence.
● Fines imposed will be used for the rehabilitation of child victims or their immediate family members.
n “Parental authority”
O
Should theperpetratorbeanascendant,stepparentorguardianoftheminor,thepenaltytobeimposed
shallbeprisionmayorinitsmaximumperiod,afineofnotlessthanFiftythousandpesos(P50,000),and
theloss of parental authority over the minor.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |73
ASE: Valino v. Adriano (2014)
C
Wife has exclusive legal authority to make funeral arrangements, even if separated de facto
acts:
F
ThiscaseinvolvesthedisputeovertheburialofAtty.Adriano,alawyerwhopassedawayinthecareof
his mistress after being separated from his legal wife, whoresidedintheUnitedStates.Accordingto
themistress,Atty.Adrianoexpressedhiswishtobeburiedinherfamily’smausoleum.Uponlearningof
hisdeath,thelegalwifeimmediatelyinstructedthemistressnottoproceedwiththeburial,statingshe
wouldreturntothePhilippineswiththeirchildren.However,bythetimeshearrived,Atty.Adrianohad
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |74
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
lready been interred in the mistress’ family mausoleum, prompting the wife to file a legal case to
a
recover the remains of her husband.
Ruling:
Cruledthatthelegalwife,asthelegitimatefamilymember,hastheexclusiverightanddutytomake
S
funeral arrangements under the law, regardless of her physical separation from her husband or her
location abroad at the timeofhisdeath.Themistress’claimthatAtty.Adrianowishedtobeburiedin
herfamily’smausoleumwasdeemedirrelevant,asthelawdoesnotgrantsuchrightstoacommon-law
partner. Consequently, the legal wife’s authority over her husband’s burial arrangements prevails.
se of Surnames
U
The purpose of surnames is to provide a family or ancestral identity, distinguishing individuals within a
larger community by linking them to a specific lineage or group.
hildren
C
Surname of a person:
1. Legitimate – Father’s (“principally”; seeAlanis v.CA)
2. Legitimated – Father’s
3. Illegitimate – Mother’s (Subject toRA 9255)
4. Adopted - Adopter
5. If father is unknown or not acknowledged – Known parent’s surname
6. Children conceived before annulment of a voidable marriage – Father’s
2. If wife is innocent, may have the option to use husband’s surname UNLESS the court decrees
otherwise or the wife or husband remarries
egally Separated Wife
L
When legal separationhasbeengranted,thewifeshallcontinueusinghernameandsurnameemployed
before the legal separation.
ASE: Laperal v. Republic (1962)
C
SC ruled Art. 372 explicitly requires a wife to retain her married name even after legal separation
acts:
F
Elisea Laperal sought to resume using her maiden name after obtaining a legal separation from her
husband, Enrique B.Santamaria,usingRule103(changeofname);arguingthatcontinueduseofher
married name could lead to financial confusion and complications in the liquidation of conjugal assets.
uling:
R
SCdeniedLaperal'spetition,itheldthatRule103cannotbeusedtocircumventArticle372which
explicitly requires a wife to retain her married name even after legal separation, as the
marital bond remains intact.
I theldthatreasonscitedforpotentialfinancialconfusionandtheneedforliquidationofconjugalassets
were unfounded since the conjugal partnership had already been dissolved.
ote:InAlanisv.CA,SCheldthattheword“principally”inArticle364doesnotmean"exclusively,"thus
N
permitting a legitimate child to use the mother's surname.(case not in syllabus)
urname of Married Women
S
A married woman may use:
1. Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
2. Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
3. Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as “Mrs.”
ASE: Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs (2010)
C
Once a married woman adopts her husband's surname in her passport, she may not revert to her
maiden name unless in specific cases provided by the Philippine Passport Act
acts:
F
Remo,amarriedFilipina,appliedtorenewherpassportandrequestedtoreplacehermarriedsurname
"Rallonza" with her maiden name "Remo." However, DFA denied her request.
She argues that Art. 370 of the Civil Code allows a married woman the option to use her maiden name.
uling:
R
SCheldthatifsheusedhermaidennameinthefirstplaceuponapplicationitwouldhavebeenvalid.
However, since she has consciously adopted to use her husband's surname in her passport,
she cannot change it back to her maiden name unless one of the conditions under the
Philippine Passport actismet,suchasdivorce,annulment,orthedeathofahusband.Thus,
SC denied her petition.
In case of annulment
1. If wife isguilty, she shalluse her maiden surname;
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |75
idow
W
A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with
Article 370.
ven if the marriage ties are dissolved, a widow can still use the surname of her deceased husband.
E
However,ifshedoesnotwantto,sheisallowedtousehermaidensurname.Noticetheuseoftheword
“may” by the provision.
dditional Names and Surnames, when required
A
Incaseofidentityofnamesandsurnames,theyoungerpersonshallbeobligedtousesuchadditional
name or surname as willavoid confusion.
I dentity of Names & Surnames between Ascendants and Descendants
In case of identity ofnamesandsurnamesbetweenascendantsanddescendants,theword"Junior"can
beused only by a son. Grandsons and other directmale descendantsshall either:
1. Add a middle nameor themother's surname, or
2. Add the Roman NumeralsII, III, and so on.
hange of Name
C
No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. Thus, a person can be
authorized to change his name by showing proper or reasonable cause which may justify such change.
Justifiable causes include the following:
1. If the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
2. When the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, as when a natural child is
acknowledged or legitimated;
3. When the change is necessary to avoid confusion;
4. A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino Name to erase signs of a former alien nationality.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |76
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
CASE: Republic v. Vicencio (1998)
llowing the change without adoption could create confusion about paternity, legitimate status, and
A
inheritance rights
Facts:
ynthia, born to Pablo Vicencio and Fe Esperanza Leabres, had been raised by her mother and
C
stepfather, Ernesto Yu, after her father abandoned the family. Despite the dissolution of her parents’
conjugalpartnershipandFeEsperanza’sremarriagetoYu,Cynthiaremainedlegallyobligatedtouseher
biological father’s surname.
ynthia Vicencio sought to change her surname to Yu,herstepfather’ssurname,citingconfusionand
C
embarrassment from the discrepancy in surnames.
Ruling:
Cruledthatachangeofnameisaprivilegerequiringaproperandreasonablecause.Asalegitimate
S
child,Cynthiawaslegallyboundtouseherbiologicalfather’ssurnameunlesslegallyadopted
by her stepfather, which was not the case.
llowing the change without adoption could create confusion about paternity, legitimate
A
status, and inheritance rights. While Cynthia’s personal reasons for the change were
understandable, they did not outweigh the legal principles safeguarding the use of surnames.
ASE: Yasin v. Shari’a District Court (1995)
C
Judicial confirmation is unnecessary for a divorced woman to revert to her maiden name
Facts:
atimaYasin,aMuslimFilipinowoman,soughttoresumeusinghermaidenname,HatimaCentiySaul,
H
after her divorce from Hadji Idris Yasin in 1984, which was granted underIslamicLaw.Followingthe
divorce,Hadjiremarried,promptingHatimatofileapetitionintheShari'aDistrictCourtofZamboanga
City on May 5, 1990, to revert to her maiden name.
owever, the Shari’a Court denied her petition, requiring compliance with Rule 103 of the Rules of
H
Court, which governs changes of name. Hatima argued thatherpetitionwasnotarequesttochange
her name but to resume her maiden name following the dissolution of her marriage.
uling:
R
SCgrantedherpetitiontoresumehermaidennameandoverturnedtheordersoftheShari’acourt.It
held that resuming the use of a maiden name after a divorce is not equivalent to a formal
name changeunder Rule 103.
married woman’s use of her husband’s surname isoptionalandceasestoapplywhenthemarriage
A
bond is dissolved. Judicial confirmation is unnecessary for a divorced woman toreverttohermaiden
name, as this is a right conferred by law.
ASE: Calderon v. Republic (1967)
C
Stigma of illegitimacy constituted a valid and reasonable ground for the name change
Facts:
minor,GertrudesJosefinadelPrado,soughttochangehersurnamefromherbiologicalfather’stoher
A
foster father’s. The petition, filed by her mother and natural guardian Corazon Adolfo Calderon,
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |77
temmed from concerns that the surname "Del Prado" carried a stigma of illegitimacy due to the
s
bigamous marriage of her biological parents. After the annulment of her parents’ marriage and her
mother’s subsequent remarriage to Engineer Romeo C. Calderon, Gertrudes had been livingwithand
supported by the Calderon family.
uling:
R
SCheldthatthestigmaofillegitimacyconstitutedavalidandreasonablegroundforthenamechange.
Petitions foraminor’snamechangeshouldprioritizethechild’swelfareandsocialwell-being.Itnoted
thatGertrudes’fosterfatherandmotherbelievedthechangewouldpromoteherdignityandprotecther
from social prejudice.
ejecting the Solicitor General’s claim that the name change soughttoconcealillegitimacy,theCourt
R
ruled that individuals have the right to improve their social standing through justifiable
means,provideditdoesnotharmthestateorothers.TheCourtclarifiedthatwhileanaturalchild
isexpectedtousethefather’ssurname,exceptionsarepermissiblewhenjustifiedandwithproper
consent.
surpation of Name
U
It is the unauthorized use of another person’s name, typically to deceive, cause harm, or gainbenefits
unlawfully. It may be thesubject of an action fordamages and other relief.
I llustration:
If someone uses “Eliakim” tocommitfraud,therealEliakimcanfileacaseunderthisprovisiontoclaim
damages and stop the misuse of her name.
nauthorized Use of Surname
U
The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the latter.
Note: Allows right of action, but only if the useisunauthorizedorunlawful.
en Name or Stage Name
P
Theemploymentofpennamesorstagenamesispermitted,provideditisdoneingoodfaithandthere
isno injury to third persons. Pen names and stagenames cannot be usurped.
I f done in good faith and there is no injury to third persons, no need for judicial approval.
●
● “Cannot be usurped” – should not be usurped, otherwise liability for damages may lie.
Alias Names
ASE: Ursua v. CA (1996)
C
Notliableforanti-aliaslawnoevidencethatUrsuahabituallyused“OscarPerez”orintendedtoadoptit
as a secondary identity
acts:
F
Petitioner Cesario Ursua, a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer, faced charges of
violatingtheanti-aliaslawafterregisteringas"OscarPerez"inthevisitors'logbookattheOfficeofthe
Ombudsman. Ursua used the name "Oscar Perez" to acknowledgereceiptofacomplaintagainsthim,
following the suggestion of a law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, who was unavailable to make the
request.However,Ursua'strueidentitywasrevealed,leadingtohisconvictionbytheRTCforviolating
Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act No. 6085.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |78
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
rsuaappealedtotheSupremeCourt,arguingthathisuseof"OscarPerez"wasasingleinstanceand
U
did not violate the anti-alias law, which penalizes the habitual use of aliases.
Ruling:
Cruledthathissingle,isolateduseof“OscarPerez”didnotconstituteaviolationoftheanti-aliaslaw.
S
Commonwealth Act No. 142 regulates the habitual use of aliases to prevent confusion and fraud,
requiring that an alias be used publiclyandrepeatedlyalongsideone'srealname.Inthiscase,there
was no evidence that Ursua habitually used “Oscar Perez” or intended to adopt it as a
secondary identity.
dditionally,theprosecutionfailedtoestablishthat"OscarPerez"wasdifferentfromUrsua'sregistered
A
name in the local civil registry. Thus, SC acquitted Ursua as penal laws must bestrictlyconstruedin
favor of the accused.
ivil Register (Arts. 407 - 413, NCC)
C
The Civil Register (or Registry) has for its object the recording of acts, events, and judicial decrees
concerningcivil status.
cts, Events and Matters to be Registered
A
Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recordedinthecivil
register.
ote: Although the Civil Registry is an official record, stilltheentriesmadethereinareonlyprimafacie
N
evidenceofthefactsstated.Consequently,thecorrectionandcancellationthereof,inpropercasesandby
judicial order, is allowed. Thus, testimonial evidence may be given to prevail over an entry (as in the
surname of a child) if the facts so warrant after a case has been tried. (Malicdem v. Republic)
The followingshall be enteredin the civil register:
● Births;
● marriages;
● deaths;
● legal separations;
● annulments of marriage;
● judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
● legitimations;
● adoptions;
● acknowledgments of natural children;
● naturalization;
● loss; or
● recovery of citizenship;
● civil interdiction;
● judicial determination of filiation;
● voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
● changes of name.
I llustration: In a case of adoption, ifthecourtissuesadecreefinalizingtheprocessbutithasnotbeen
registered,theclerkofthecourtmustensurethedecreeisforwardedtothelocalcivilregistryforproper
documentation.
ooks of Civil Register are Public Documents
B
The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public
documentsand shallbe prima facie evidence of thefacts therein contained.
ote:Allrecordsopentothepublicexceptbirthcertificate,thelatteravailableonlytointerestedpersons.
N
None of the documents can be removed unless by order of the court. (Amended by RA 9048)
inds of Errors or Mistakes Subject of Correction
K
General Rule: No entry in a civil register can be changed or corrected without a judicial order. (For
substantial changes)
Exception: RA 9048 as amended by RA 10172 forclericalortypographical errors.
ASE: Julian Lin Wang vs. Cebu City Civil Registrar (2005)
C
SC ruled here that convenience and potential discrimination were insufficient grounds for changing a
child's name. As changing a name is a privilege, not a right, and must be justified by a proper or
reasonable cause. It stressed that middle names are important for identifying maternal lineage and
distinguishing individuals.
ASE: Ceruila v. Delantar (2005)
C
Petition denied for lack of due process or failure to include Rosilyn in the proceedings
acts:
F
Petitioners sought to annul and cancel the birth certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Rosilyn),
alleging it was falsified. RTC granted the Ceruilas' petition, declaring the birth certificate null and void.
owever, CA annulled the RTC’s decision, ruling that the proceedings violated Rosilyn’s right to due
H
process because she and her guardian, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
were not notified or included in the case.
uling:
R
SC upheld the CA’s decision, ruling that the RTC judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction and due
process. Petitions to cancel or correct entries intheCivilRegistry,likethisone,aregovernedbyRule
108 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that all interestedparties,includingRosilynandher
guardian, must be notified and included in the proceedings.TheRTCfailedtocomplywiththis
requirement, as the mere publication of the hearing notice could not substitute for personal
service of summons.
ule 108, Rules of Court
R
Rule 108oftheRulesofCourtprovidestheprocedureforcancellationorcorrectionofentriesinthecivil
registry. The proceedings may either be:(1)Summary;or(2)Adversarial
uty of Clerks of Court
D
Incasesoflegalseparation,adoption,naturalizationandotherjudicialordersmentionedinthepreceding
article, it shall be the dutyoftheclerkofthecourtwhichissuedthedecreetoascertainwhetherthe
same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy ofsaiddecreetothe
civil registryof the city or municipality where thecourt is functioning.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |79
lerical or Typographical Errors (Summary)
C
If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary.
ote: However, withtheenactmentofRA9048,suchcorrectionscannowbemadeadministratively,
N
rendering the summary proceedings under Rule 108obsoletefor these types of errors.
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |80
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS|DEAN BATHAN-LASCO
. In the LCR of the place where the petitioner is already residing
2
3. If residing abroad, in the nearest consulate
ubstantial Changes (Adversarial)
S
But If the rectification affects the:
1. Civil status,
2. Citizenship, or
3. Nationality of a party
Grounds for Changing Name or Nickname under RA 9048
1. Name is ridiculous, tainted, or hard to pronounce.
2. New name is habitually and continuously used and the person is publicly known as such.
3. Change will avoid confusion.
nder the Civil Code, Rule108originallyappliedonlytoclericalandtypographicalerrorsincivilregistry
U
entries. However, following the 1986 ruling inRepublicv. Valencia, SC expanded the scope of Rule 108.
I t consistentlyheldthatevensubstantialerrorsinLCRentriesmaybecorrectedthroughapetitionfiled
underRule108,providedthatthetruefactsareestablishedandthepartiesaffectedbytheerrorengage
in the appropriate adversarial proceeding.
ASE: Republic v. Kho (2007)
C
Petition denied for lack of due process or failure to include Rosilyn in the proceedings
acts:
F
CarlitoI.KhoandhissiblingspetitionedtheRTCtocorrectentriesintheirbirthcertificatesandthoseof
Carlito’s minor children. The requested changes included amending their mother’s citizenship from
"Chinese" to "Filipino," removing the marital status of their parents as “married,” correcting Carlito’s
wife’s name from "Maribel" to "Marivel," and updating their marriage date.
hiletheRTCandtheCAgrantedthepetition,theRepublic,throughtheOSG,challengedthedecision,
W
arguing that these substantial corrections required an adversarial proceeding and that indispensable
parties were not properly impleaded.
Steps in Changing Name
1. Petition to be filed in the LCR and done in an affidavit form and sworn to with oath.
2. If change is for the first name, such change will be published at least once every week for two
consecutive weeks.
3. It will also be posted in a conspicuous place for 10 days.
4. After posting, the LCR shall render a decision not later than 5 days.
5. The Civil Registrar General may reverse the decision within 10 days from receipt.
Entries that cannot be correctedwithoutjudicialorder under 9048:
1. Nationality
2. Age
3. Status
4. Sex
5. Surname
A 10172,on date of birth and Sex(not in syllabus)
R
The rule on date of birth (age) and sex was later amended by RA 10172, allowing for changes or
correctionstothesedetailsinthecivilregistry.Aslongasthechangeisbasedonatypographicalerror,it
can now be corrected administratively.
Ruling:
C held that substantial corrections in civil registry entries canbeallowedunderRule108aslongas
S
due process requirements—such as notice, publication, and opportunity to oppose—are met. It ruled
thatfailuretoimpleadindispensableparties,suchasCarlito’swifeandparents,wascuredby
compliance with publication requirements, as the casewas an action in rem, binding upon all.
he corrections were supported by sufficient evidence, including marriage and birth certificates, and
T
upheld the trial court's role in determining the true facts. Clerical errors, such as the misspelling of
names,weredeemedinnocuousandnon-controversial.Thus,thecorrectionswerevalidlygranted,
reinforcing the principle that substantive errors may be corrected through appropriate adversarial
proceedings under Rule 108.
epublic Act No. 9048 (An Act Authorizing The City or Municipal CivilRegistrarortheConsul
R
GeneraltoCorrectaClericalorTypographicalErrorinanEntryand/orChangeofFirstNameor
Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of Judicial Order)
I nthepast,judicialauthorizationwasrequiredtocorrecterrorsinaname.However,withtheenactment
of RA 9048, individuals can now change their name administratively through the Local Civil
Registrar. This procedure allows for the correction of clerical or typographical errors in birth
certificates.
Note: However, only the first name or nickname canbe altered through this administrative process.
Where to file the Petition
1. In the office of the LCR where the birth record is kept
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |81
SNMC LAW— INSONG, ELIAKIM III |82
0
advertisement
Download
advertisement
Add this document to collection(s)
You can add this document to your study collection(s)
Sign in Available only to authorized usersAdd this document to saved
You can add this document to your saved list
Sign in Available only to authorized users