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Political Communications, French Style: An Analysis

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A (very long) essay on political
communications, French style
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Post
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19 October 2011
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Posted by Alastair Campbell
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10
The post has just arrived and in it a very nice surprise, the discovery that Jacques
Seguela, one-time adviser to President Mitterrand, now close confidant of President and
Madame Sarkozy (indeed he intoduced them), and something of a legend in French
political communications, has dedicated his latest book to little old moi. With apologies
for the missing accents here and in the French bits of the long posting which follows the dedication to 'Le Pouvoir dans la Peau' (Power in the skin) reads 'A Alastair
Campbell, mon spin doctor prefere' (three missing accents in one word - mes excuses
sinceres). So what did I do for this honour, you are asking? Well, perhaps the fact that
he asked me to read his book, and write a 'postface' assessment both of his writing and
of the issues he covers, and the fact that I said yes, has something to do with it. He
says some blushmakingly kind things in his 'preface to the postface', which I will have to
leave to French readers of the whole thing (published by Plon). But for the largely
Anglophone visitors of this blog, I thought some of you might like to read the said
'postface' in English (apart from the bits where I quote direct from his book). I hope all
those students who write asking for help with dissertations will find something quotable
in it. Meanwhile I am off to Norway for a conference and a meeting with the Norwegian
Labour Party. I'm looking forward to being in the country with the highest 'human
development index' in the world, and which showed such a mature response to the
recent massacre of Oslo and Utoya. Here is the postface to Le Pouvoir dans la Peau
Jacques Seguela writes about political campaigns and communications not merely as
an expert analyst, but as an experienced practitioner. Hence his latest book contains
both insights worth heeding, but also enlivening tales of his own experience. He is
observer and participant; outsider looking in, and insider looking out. There is much to
look at, not least in France with a Presidential election looming, and the outcome far
from easy to predict. We live in a world defined by the pace of change, and whilst the
velocity of that change has not always impacted upon our political institutions, many of
which would remain recognisable to figures of history, it most certainly has impacted
upon political communications. As Seguela writes: ‘En 5 ans le monde de la
communication a plus evolue que dans les cents dernieres annees. ' Google, Youtube,
Twitter, Facebook have quickly entered our language and changed the way we
communicate, live our private lives, do business, do politics. People do not believe
politicians as much as they once did. Nor do they believe the media. So who do we
believe? We believe each other. The power and the political potential of social networks
flows from that reality. Though fiercely modern in their application, social networks in
some ways take us back to the politics of the village square. They are an electronic
word of mouth on a sometimes global scale. This has changed the way people interact
with each other and with their politicians. My first campaign as spokesman and
strategist for Tony Blair was in 1997, three years in the planning after he had become
leader of the Opposition Labour Party. Some of the principles of strategy we applied
back then would certainly apply to a modern day election. But their tactical execution
almost certainly would not. Politicians and their strategists have to adapt to change as
well as lead it. Seguela gives some interesting insights into those who have adapted
well, and those who have done less well. He clearly adores former President Lula of
Brazil and you can feel his yearning for a French leader who can somehow combine
hard-headed strategy with human empathy in the same way as a man who left office
with satisfaction ratings of 87percent. Seguela probably remains best known in political
circles for his role advising Francois Mitterrand. Yet wheras I am 'tribal Labour', and
could not imagine supporting a Conservative Party candidate in the UK, Seguela came
out as a major supporter of Nicolas Sarkozy. I wonder if one of the reasons was not a
frustration that large parts of the left in France remain eternally suspicious of modern
communications techniques and styles which, frankly, no modern leader in a modern
democracy can ignore. How he or she adapts to, or uses, them is up to them. But you
cannot stand aside and imagine the world has not changed. If Lula is a star of this book,
so too is Barack Obama. American elections are of enormous interest to all political
campaign junkies, a category in which both Seguela and I would almost certainly
qualify. Much is made of Obama's use of the internet, a relatively new phenomenon in
historical terms and one the young Senator used brilliantly in his quest to become
President. Yet though it was an accurate expression of his modernity, underpinning its
use were some very old-fashioned campaign principles. He used it to turn supporters
into activists who both gave funds and also took his campaign materials and ideas and
ran their own campaigns for him. Somehow he managed to make one of the most
professional, most disciplined and best funded campaigns in history look like an
enormous act of democratic participation. It was less command and control - the model
we certainly adopted in 1997 and 2001, Labour's two landslide victories, easing off a
little for our third win in 2005 - than 'inspire and empower.' 'Yes we can' not 'yes I can'.
His supporters were more than supporters. They were an active part of the campaign,
and of the message. The key to this was something that had nothing to do with
politicians and everything to do with science, technology and the internet. Ask me who
has had the most influence on campaigns in recent times and I might be tempted to
reply Tim Berners-Lee, the man credited with gifting the web to the world. Its
implications have been far reaching in virtually all aspects of our lives, politics and
political campaigns foremost. The new household brand names of the cyber era have
not replaced good policy work, messaging and organisation. But they have become
essential components of the execution of them in the campaign. Mainstream
conventional media remains important and influential, not least because, bizarrely, in
most democracies the broadcasters continue to let the press set their agenda for them.
But a candidate who tries to stand against the tide of new media will be making a big
mistake, and missing big opportunities. If it has changed so much in the last five years,
how much more will it change in the next five years? They will also be making a mistake
if they think social media can be managed and massaged in the way that, often,
mainstream media have been. The key - on this I agree totally with Seguela - is
authenticity. And that should be good news for authentic political leaders and an
authenticity hungry public alike. The public tend to get to the point of an election.
Seguela has an interesting account of the last UK election and in particular the first ever
televised Leaders' Debates. Though I had worked on three campaigns for Tony Blair, I
am sufficiently tribally Labour to have answered a call from his successor, Gordon
Brown, to go back to help him for his first election campaign as leader in 2011. One of
the roles I ended up playing was that of David Cameron in Brown's preparatory
sessions for the TV debates. These debates mattered, that much was sure. Election
planning for Blair, I had always been doubtful about the benefit of such debates in a
Parliamentary democracy where our leaders meet each other week in week out in the
crucible of the House of Commons. I was worried the media would make them all about
themselves, and that the policy issues would be drowned out. So it proved. Yet in a way
the public did get to the point they wanted to. They did not particularly want Labour back
after 13 years in power. They did not particularly yearn for David Cameron and a
Conservative Party unsure about its direction. So the third party leader emerged
through the middle. Nick Clegg was judged the clear winner by the instant reactions of
public and media alike. For a few days he seemed impregnable. Yet come the vote, he
did not make a huge breakthrough. It was only because neither Labour nor the Tories
could get over the line that Clegg ended up as deputy Prime Minister in a coalition
government. The country had not been able to make its mind up, delivered a muddled
result and asked the leaders to sort it out. The leader who came first and the leader who
came third did a deal to do so. I think Seguela is too kind to Cameron. Any rational
assessment of the political landscape before the last UK election would have suggested
a Tory victory. Labour in power a long time; the economic crash; a Parliament
dominated by a scandal involving MPs' expenses; Iraq back in the news because of the
official Inquiry; Afghanistan not going well; the press even more strongly in favour of a
Tory win than they had been for a Labour win in 1997, and vicious about Brown. Also
the Tories had big money to spend on the campaign and Labour did not. Yet Cameron
could not secure a majority. Why not? There is no simple answer. The wonder of
democracy lies in millions of people having their own experiences, impressions and
judgements before deciding how to cast their vote. But the strategist in me says the
simple answer is that Cameron lacked real strategic clarity. I think Sequela would agree
that for all the changes that technological and mediatic change has forced upon political
campaigns, strategy remains the key. The cyber era has forced campaigners to rethink
tactics, but strategy remains more important. He and I are clearly in agreement that
John McCain's appointment of Sarah Palin as running mate, for example, was a tactical
masterstroke, but a strategic catastrophe. Tactically, he excited his base, gave the
media a new toy, and momentarily unnnerved his opponent. Strategically he blew a hole
through the two central planks of his campaign - experience, and being different from
George Bush. In putting tactics before strategy, he broke one of the golden rules of
campaigning. Strategists like rules. We like points of principle to act as anchors. I like
the rules in Seguela's Chapter 5. On vote pour une idee. Pas pour une ideologie. On
vote pour soi. Pas pour son candidat. On vote pour un homme. Pas pour un parti. On
vote pour le professionalisme. Pas pour l'amateurisme. On vote pour un projet pas pour
le rejet. On vote pour le coeur. Pas pour le rancoeur. On vote pour le futur. Pas pour le
passe. On vote pour le bcbg. Pas pour le bling bling. It is charmingly French that he
illuminates the rule about voting for le couer pas pour le rancour to a tale of love and
sex. 'Si votre femme vous trompe, ce n'est pas en couvrant d'insulte son amant que
vous le reconquerez. Mais en lui redonnant envie de vous. La mecanique electorale est
le meme, se faire elire c'est se faire preferer.' That may seem glib. But politics is a
human business. It is about feelings as well as policies, emotion as well as reason.
People often talk about their political leaders as though in a relationship with them. 'He's
not listening ... Why on earth did he do that? ... I've gone off him ... Oh, I still like him
deep down.' Political leaders sometimes talk of the people in the same way. How many
times did I sit in the back of a car with Tony Blair, or fly over Britain in a ‘plane and he
would look down and say 'God, I wish I knew what they were thinking ... Do they still like
us?' Back at the time of our first landslide, talk of the country 'falling in love' with Blair
was widespread. Today, the biggest accusations of betrayal against Blair will often come
from those who 'fell in love' most deeply at the outset of his leadership. Perhaps this
trend towards relationship politics is being exacerbated by the tendency towards
younger leaders. Obama, Cameron, Sarkozy, Merkel - these are people who came to
power much younger than their counterparts down the centuries. Seguela, a man of a
certain age, remains fascinated by youth and its impact. The brand manager in him can
barely disguise his glee that Coca Cola, the drink of the young trendy, is 130 years old.
You can sense the excitement he felt on meeting the young Americans - not born when
Seguela was advising Mitterrand - who had developed Obama's digital strategy and so
helped deliver a mailing list of 13m people. The focus on youth also dominates his
analysis of the political consequences of the economic crash whose impact runs
through these pages, and offers some fascinating factoids - half of all Europeans are
over 50, whilst three quarters of Algerians are under 25. There are as many people
under 30 in China as in Russia, the US and Australia combined, and in India twice as
many as in China. That too is a powerful force of global change, and will have its impact
on Western politics of the future. As to what it all means for the next French elections, I
don't know. But this book provides part of the backdrop, economic and political. It should
make interesting reading for anyone involved in that campaign. Whilst clearly still of the
view Sarkozy was and is the right choice for France, (though the polls at the time of
writing indicate he is in a minority) he throws out ideas and challenges for right and left
alike. As traditional lines are drawn, careful reading might provoke candidates and
parties to see that they should always be looking to the next new ideas, not merely
repackaging the last new, let alone the old. I was in Paris recently as a guest of the left
think tank, Terra Nova, and met politicians, advisors, militants, experts, journalists and
bloggers. I came away with some strong impressions. Firstly, virtually everyone told me
that President Sarkozy was hugely unpopular, and his ratings as low as it was possible
to go. Yet many of the same people told me he could still win. They know he relishes a
campaign. They suspect he may have learned from some mistakes. Incumbency is a
powerful weapon. A comeback is a powerful narrative. And they worried that with the
President so unpopular, the economy sluggish, social issues raw, and the left in power
in many parts of France, the PS should have been doing far better in the polls (to which,
incidentally, French politicians and media pay far too much attention.) Of course this
was pre selection of a PS candidate. Many of the Socialists agreed with my analysis
that once they had chosen the candidate, they needed to unite behind that candidate,
resist their historic predilection for factionalism, run a campaign that was fresh,
energetic and based upon a programme totally focused on the future and one which
addressed people's concerns. They agreed too that the PS could no longer look down
its nose at communication, but had to see it not just as an essential element of
campaigning, but a democratic duty at a time when people have so many pressures on
their lives and living standards, and concerns about the world around them. But though
they agreed with the analysis, some worried about the Party’s capacity to deliver upon
it. The fear of another defeat ought to be enough, surely, to deliver on the first and
essential part: unity. As someone on the progressive side of the political divide, I
continue to think the French left's over intellectualisation of politics, its focus on
never-ending debate instead of agreement around big points and unity behind one
accepted leader remains a problem. I added that I felt the way was wide open for
someone to come along and set out, with total honesty and clarity, the challenges
ahead, the limitations of what one leader or one country can do, but explain the world
and begin to shape direction. In other words, what I sensed behind the seeming
confusion and rather disgruntled nature of French opinion was a real desire for
leadership of a strategic rather than a tactical nature. There too, there were concerns,
not least because of memories of the negative impact on Lionel Jospin’s campaign
when he stated – truthfully – that the State could not do everything. I heard a lot about
Marine Le Pen and certainly the polls tell a good story for the leader of the Front
National. She has certainly shown she can mount a campaign and get the media to
accept a sense of change. When even her enemies refer to as Marine, rather than the
more toxic Le Pen, that is something of a success. But whenever I have heard her, I
have not heard a powerful argument for the future of France. So France enters a
fascinating period, where not one single person I met predicted the outcome of either
first or second round without at least some doubt in their eyes. When things are so tight,
communications can make the difference. It is not a dirty word. I don't agree with all of
Seguela’s analysis. I don't accept that only four US presidents radically changed the
country. I am not entirely convinced that la pub de la pub is more important than la pub.
I am not sure that David Cameron's loss of a child had the political impact Seguela
thinks it did. I think Brits will be also be surprised at the dominant role he gives in the
Tory campaign to his colleague David Jones. I think he overstates how Sarkozy is seen
in the world. I agree with him that we need to be cautious about the potential abuse of
the internet which has no global governance or regulation to match, but I'm not sure I
agree this risks being 'en bras arme de l'anarchie'. But it is a book full of understanding
of some of the big themes and the small details required for a successful campaigning
mindset. He is, as one would expect for someone who has been close to different
leaders, clued up on the importance of good chemistry between leader and strategist.
He understands the importance of body language as well as language. He knows the
importance of emotion as well as reason. He understands how the web is changing
politics. One of my favourite phrases is that 'life is on the record'. He has a different way
of putting it. 'Le "off" n'existe plus desormais. Tout ce que vous direz pourra se retourner
contre vous.' It is why the whole 'droit d'etre oublie' is emerging as a debate. How many
of the young men and women today filling the web with pictures and confessions from
their private lives may end up running for office one day, and regretting their openness?
On verra. Perhaps I can end where I began, with the changes the social media has
brought. At the last election Labour did not do poster campaigns. This was a shame. In
previous campaigns we had had some brilliant posters. But under Gordon Brown, we
had very little money for the campaign. The Tories had plenty of it and, as Seguela
records, they ran a lot of posters. One of their most expensive billboard campaigns was
of a giant photo of Cameron with an anti-Labour slogan 'we can't go on like this.'
Someone noticed that the Tory leader's face had been airbrushed. This fact became the
source of thousands of tweets. Then someone set up a website mydavidcameron.com
where people could send their own, largely anti-Tory, versions of this poster. These
were sent in in their thousands, and many were much better, wittier and more politically
devastating than the original. I'll tell you when I knew they had wasted their money when the newspapers carried photos of one giant poster site which had been defaced ...
Cameron's hair had been replaced with a painted version of Elvis Presley's hair, and to
the slogan 'we can't go on like this' had been added the words of one of Elvis' most
famous songs ... 'with suspicious minds'. The combination of the internet and wit had
reduced the political impact of a hugely expensive campaign to zero. That is my final
thought as you begin to read Jacques Seguela’s account. It is a quote from a former
colleague, Labour MP Hazel Blears ... 'Campaigning is like sex. If you're not enjoying it,
you're not doing it properly.'
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