Damien Moore
Rebecca Evans
POL-242-A
10 December 2024
The Role of Ruling Parties in Sustaining Competitive Authoritarianism
In “The New Competitive Authoritarianism,” Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way explore
the persistence of competitive authoritarian regimes, focusing on the international and
institutional factors that contribute to their continued existence. However, while their analysis is
extensive, they fail to fully consider how the internal dynamics of political institutions within
these regimes—specifically the structure of the ruling party—can significantly influence the
longevity and stability of competitive authoritarianism. The authors focus heavily on external
factors like the waning power of Western liberalism and the influence of regional powers like
Russia and China. While these factors are undeniably important, they do not adequately address
how the internal structures of competitive authoritarian regimes, particularly the consolidation of
power within ruling parties, can either solidify or undermine the grip of authoritarian leaders. By
looking closer at how ruling parties in these regimes manage internal conflict, control political
elites, and maintain cohesion, we can see how these internal dynamics are just as crucial in
sustaining competitive authoritarianism.
Levitsky and Way argue that “competitive authoritarianism was a post-Cold War
phenomenon—a product of an international environment that was uniquely hostile to full-scale
dictatorship” (Levitsky & Way, 52). This argument focuses on how the external international
environment forced elites to adopt hybrid political structures. While they acknowledge the
importance of domestic political conditions, they primarily attribute the persistence of
competitive authoritarianism to external pressure—or the lack thereof. As the authors note,
“Western linkage and leverage had lost much of their force,” leading to a “diminished interest in
democracy promotion” (Levitsky & Way, 53). This argument is certainly valid when analyzing
the role of external forces like the European Union and the United States in promoting
democracy. However, it fails to account for how the internal dynamics of ruling parties
themselves play a critical role in either reinforcing or destabilizing competitive authoritarian
regimes.
One of the most significant internal dynamics is the capacity of ruling parties to manage
factionalism and prevent elite fragmentation. In many competitive authoritarian regimes, the
ruling party plays a central role in maintaining control over the state. Leaders who consolidate
power within a cohesive, loyal party can more effectively suppress opposition and create the
appearance of democratic processes, such as elections, that are not competitive in substance. The
ability to prevent splits within the ruling party ensures that the leader can rely on a loyal base of
support that provides both political stability and the suppression of dissenting voices within the
government.
Levitsky and Way mention how ruling elites are often “compelled to permit a degree of
pluralism and electoral competition” under pressure from external forces (Levitsky & Way, 52).
However, they do not delve into how ruling parties manage the internal dynamics that allow
them to navigate this pluralism. In regimes like Venezuela under Hugo Chávez or Russia under
Vladimir Putin, the internal cohesion of the ruling party has been essential in maintaining the
facade of democracy. In Venezuela, for example, Chávez's United Socialist Party of
Venezuela (PSUV) effectively consolidated power by co-opting opposition parties,
managing internal dissent, and ensuring that key institutions—such as the military and
judiciary—remained loyal to the party. This internal unity allowed Chávez to present his regime
as a competitive authoritarian system, with elections that were widely criticized but still
technically held. The authors’ focus on external pressures misses the critical role that party
cohesion plays in maintaining control within these regimes.
Furthermore, the authors’ analysis does not consider how competitive authoritarian
regimes adapt to internal challenges, especially when factionalism arises within the ruling party.
In some cases, the fragmentation of the ruling party can destabilize a regime. This is evident in
the collapse of competitive authoritarianism in countries like Peru and Taiwan, where ruling
parties failed to maintain internal cohesion, leading to democratic transitions. As Levitsky and
Way note, “some competitive authoritarian regimes democratized,” but they do not explore in
depth how the inability of ruling parties to manage internal divisions led to these transitions
(Levitsky & Way, 51). In contrast, regimes like Belarus and Zimbabwe have managed to avoid
democratization by maintaining unity within their ruling parties, despite significant external and
internal challenges.
A key example of the role of party cohesion in competitive authoritarianism is found in
Hungary under Viktor Orbán. The authors highlight Orbán’s manipulation of parliamentary
power, but they do not explore the role of his party, Fidesz, in cementing his hold on power.
Orbán’s ability to centralize authority within Fidesz allowed him to control the political agenda,
suppress opposition, and subvert democratic institutions. The ruling party’s unity enabled Orbán
to effectively shut down dissent within Hungary’s political system, making it more difficult for
competitive authoritarianism to transition into full authoritarianism or democracy. Levitsky and
Way’s failure to address this aspect of internal dynamics in competitive authoritarian regimes
overlooks a critical element in understanding their persistence.
Additionally, the role of the ruling party in creating a “party-state” structure—where the
state apparatus is co-opted by the party—also plays a significant role in sustaining competitive
authoritarian regimes. The authors briefly mention how regimes in competitive authoritarian
systems have “hardened” into full-blown authoritarianism, but they do not fully explain how
ruling parties often contribute to this hardening process by gradually eroding the independence
of key institutions. In Russia, for instance, the consolidation of power within the United Russia
party has been accompanied by the gradual dismantling of independent media, courts, and
opposition parties. The control over state resources and the patronage system, which are
distributed through the ruling party, help maintain a firm grip on power. This internal
consolidation of power, however, is rarely discussed in the authors’ analysis, which focuses more
on the impact of external pressures on these regimes.
In conclusion, while Levitsky and Way provide an insightful analysis of the role of
external factors in shaping competitive authoritarianism, their argument would be more robust if
it considered the internal dynamics of ruling parties in these regimes. The ability of ruling parties
to maintain cohesion, manage factionalism, and control key state institutions is essential to
understanding why some competitive authoritarian regimes persist while others transition toward
democracy or full authoritarianism. The internal consolidation of power within ruling parties, as
seen in cases like Venezuela, Russia, and Hungary, is a critical factor that sustains competitive
authoritarianism, even in the face of diminished external pressures. By overlooking these internal
factors, Levitsky and Way miss a crucial piece of the puzzle in explaining the persistence of
competitive authoritarian regimes.