Nonconformity Report instructions 1. PURPOSE The purpose of this document is to outline the steps and measures necessary to effectively document and establish non-conformities. 2. PROCEDURE The person responsible for opening the nonconformance report should provide details of the issue that caused the nonconformance, including the “who, what, when, and where” of detecting the nonconformance. This description needs to be clear and understandable, so the nonconformance can be investigated correctly if needed. This section provides a clear and thorough explanation of the nonconformity. It serves to identify what went wrong and is crucial for understanding the scope of the problem. Here’s how you can structure it: a. What is the issue? Start by defining the issue in simple, precise terms. It should directly describe the nonconformity or the deviation from the standard. The goal here is to leave no ambiguity about what exactly is wrong. You can break it down into a few aspects: • Specific issue or defect: Is it a quality issue, a missed requirement, a process deviation, or an error in materials? • Example: "The colour of the finished product does not match the approved sample." • Example: "The weld strength of the joint is lower than the minimum required by the engineering specification." b. Where does it occur? This is the part where you identify the specific location, department, or part of the process where the nonconformity is occurring. This helps to narrow down the scope and locate the root cause. • Location: This could be a physical place (e.g., in the warehouse, on the production line), a specific process (e.g., during packaging or assembly), or even a software system (if the nonconformity is in software development or IT processes). • Example: "The issue occurs during the final inspection of the product in the quality control area." • Example: "The problem is occurring in the assembly line where components are being joined." c. When was it identified? Indicate the date and time (if possible) when the nonconformity was first identified. This helps create a timeline and allows stakeholders to track when the issue arose. • Example: "The nonconformity was identified on January 15, 2025, during the routine quality check." • Example: "It was discovered on January 29, 2025, following a customer complaint about defective parts." d. How was it identified? Here, you explain how the nonconformity was detected. This could include inspections, audits, tests, feedback, or even a third-party review. You can also mention the process or tools used to detect the issue. • Method of detection: Did it come to light through a routine inspection? Was it flagged by an internal audit, customer feedback, or even a statistical process control (SPC) chart showing an anomaly? • Example: "The issue was identified during the final inspection when a visual check revealed colour mismatches in the batch." • Example: "The nonconformity was detected through customer complaints, who reported receiving products that did not meet the agreed specifications." Types of evidence The types of evidence that a compliance monitoring auditor may utilize: Observations Interviews/Feedback/ complaint … Documented Information (e.g., ERP entries, photographs, scanned documents, etc.) Since including attachments may not always be feasible, auditors may also refer to direct links to access the relevant information. e. Putting it All Together: A strong, clear nonconformity description is one that provides enough context for someone unfamiliar with the situation to understand the full extent of the issue Include a brief but comprehensive description of the occurrence, state how and when the arising was identified. When appropriate, the reference numbers of any originator’s documentation relating to the occurrence should be entered, including cross reference to previous NCR when change of area of responsibility has been authorized. If possible, identify the perceived cause and effect of the quality issue. Avoid using personnel names; however, positions may be stated e.g. the maintenance controller. Note: adverse comments on the performance of other organizations or functional areas are not to be made. 3. Common Examples of Nonconformities To properly address the nonconformity, the primary focus should be placed on the statement in black, which represents the core of the issue. However, it is strongly recommended to include the supplementary information highlighted in yellow. This additional data will serve to further illustrate and emphasize the risks associated with the identified nonconformities, offering a clearer understanding of the potential impacts. While the black statement identifies the central problem, the yellowhighlighted details provide context and depth to the risk analysis, helping to communicate the severity and implications of the nonconformities more effectively. The following are examples of nonconformities, along with explanations of how the additional information (highlighted in yellow) can help to clarify the associated risks: a. During the February 2025 audit of maintenance operations in H2 Line 3 engines the mechanics were not using the most current data, it was found that B1/B2 and authorized inspection personnel did not ensure mechanics were using the most current maintenance data, as required by MOE Part 2.13.1.4 and MOE Part 2.13.1.2. See copy of evidence attached. This failure to provide updated information increases the risk of using outdated data, which could potentially compromise the safety and airworthiness of the aircraft. b. During the February 2025 audit in H1 interiors shop, which focused on maintenance documentation and task progression, it was found that the crew leader/lead engineer, along with mechanical and inspection staff, did not review the documentation for tasks progressed during shifts, as required by MOE Part 2.13.1.4. The audit revealed that maintenance sign-off were incomplete, and the required stage inspections were not properly documented. See copy of evidence attached. This oversight increases the risk of incomplete maintenance records, potentially compromising aircraft safety and airworthiness. c. During the February 2025 audit conducted at Hangar 1 and Maintenance line 3, focused on task allocation and supervision procedures, it was found that crew leaders/lead engineers did not consistently assign tasks according to an individual’s competence, as required by MOE Part 2.13.1.11. The audit team reviewed work allocation sheets and interviewed crew members, revealing instances where personnel were assigned tasks outside their scope without proper supervision by an authorized inspector or a competent mechanic. This non-compliance increases the risk of improper task execution, potentially compromising the quality and safety of the maintenance work. 1. The February 2025 audit conducted at Hangar 1 and Maintenance Line 3, focusing on task allocation and supervision procedures, revealed non-compliance with MOE Part 2.13.1.11. Crew leaders and lead engineers did not consistently assign tasks based on individual competence. A review of work allocation sheets and interviews with crew members highlighted instances where personnel were tasked beyond their qualifications without adequate supervision by an authorized inspector or competent mechanic. This deficiency poses a significant risk of improper task execution, potentially compromising maintenance quality and safety. 2. The February 2025 audit at Hangar 1 and Maintenance Line 3 revealed noncompliance with MOE Part 2.13.1.11, as crew leaders did not consistently assign tasks based on individual competence. Review of work allocation sheets and crew interviews showed personnel were assigned tasks beyond their qualifications without proper supervision, increasing the risk of maintenance errors and safety issues. d. During the February 2025 audit at the main maintenance control office, focused on maintenance and certification processes, it was found that the certificate of release to service was issued without proper confirmation that the task had been performed by an authorized person and without a satisfactory re-inspection, as required by MOE Part 2.23.7.2. The audit team reviewed completed work orders and certification records, identifying cases where the certification process lacked proper documentation and inspection evidence. This non-compliance increases the risk of undetected errors in maintenance tasks, potentially compromising the safety and airworthiness of the aircraft. 1. The February 2025 audit of the main maintenance control office, focusing on maintenance and certification processes, identified non-compliance with MOE Part 2.23.7.2. Certificates of release to service were issued without confirming task execution by authorized personnel or conducting satisfactory re-inspections. A review of work orders and certification records revealed insufficient documentation and inspection evidence. This oversight increases the risk of undetected maintenance errors, potentially compromising aircraft safety and airworthiness. e. During the February 2025 inspection at Hangar 2, focusing on release procedures, it was found that the release personnel failed to verify that all tooling issued had been accounted for prior to returning the aircraft to service, in violation of MOE Part L2.4.3. Evidence included discrepancies in tool accountability logs and interviews with maintenance personnel. This oversight increases the risk of missing tools or components, potentially compromising the safety and airworthiness of the aircraft. 1. Hangar 2 Release Procedures Audit - February 2025 The February 2025 inspection at Hangar 2 revealed non-compliance with MOE Part L2.4.3, as release personnel failed to verify the accountability of all issued tooling before returning aircraft to service. Discrepancies in tool accountability logs and maintenance personnel interviews provided supporting evidence. This oversight increases the risk of missing tools or components, potentially compromising aircraft safety and airworthiness. f. During the February 2025 audit at the calibration and tool storage area, which reviewed tooling and equipment usage in the maintenance department, it was found that the department did not consistently use calibrated tooling and equipment as recommended by the manufacturer, in violation of MOE Part L2.4.3. Calibration records and maintenance task reports were examined, revealing instances of expired calibration certifications. This non-compliance increases the risk of inaccurate maintenance work, potentially compromising the safety and airworthiness of the aircraft. 1. Calibration and Tooling Audit - February 2025 The February 2025 audit of the calibration and tool storage area identified violations of MOE Part L2.4.3, as the maintenance department did not consistently use calibrated tooling and equipment per manufacturer recommendations. A review of calibration records and maintenance task reports revealed instances of expired calibration certifications. This deficiency increases the risk of inaccurate maintenance work, potentially compromising aircraft safety and airworthiness. g. During the February 2025 inspection at Hangar 1, which focused on maintenance procedures and work area safety, it was found that a general verification inspection was not performed in the work areas or areas where panel removal had been completed to ensure the aircraft was clear of all tools, equipment, and any other extraneous materials, as required by MOE Part L2.4.3. Observations and photographic evidence highlighted instances of unsecured tools and equipment. This oversight increases the risk of foreign object damage (FOD), which could compromise the safety and airworthiness of the aircraft 1. Hangar 1 Work Area Safety Inspection - February 2025 The February 2025 inspection at Hangar 1 identified non-compliance with MOE Part L2.4.3. A general verification inspection was not conducted in work areas or panel removal zones to ensure the aircraft was clear of tools, equipment, and other extraneous materials. Observations and photographic evidence highlighted unsecured tools and equipment, increasing the risk of foreign object damage (FOD) that could compromise aircraft safety and airworthiness. h. During the February 2025 inspection at the Maintenance Hangar 2, which focused on maintenance procedures, it was found that the Maintenance organization failed to confirm that all access panels removed during maintenance had been refitted and secured, as required by MOE Part L2.4.3. The inspection team reviewed task completion checklists and observed maintenance activities, noting multiple instances where access panels were not properly secured. This oversight increases the risk of unsealed access panels, potentially compromising the aircraft's airworthiness and safety. 1. Maintenance Hangar 2 Inspection - February 2025 The February 2025 inspection at Maintenance Hangar 2 revealed non-compliance with MOE Part L2.4.3, as the maintenance organization failed to confirm that all access panels removed during maintenance were refitted and properly secured. A review of task completion checklists and observation of maintenance activities identified multiple instances of unsecured access panels. This oversight increases the risk of unsealed panels, potentially compromising the aircraft's airworthiness and safety. i. During the February 2025 audit at the planning office, which focused on maintenance documentation practices, it was found that the Designated Planner did not ensure that aircraft technical log write-ups and deferred defect items were accurately transcribed into the maintenance documentation, as required by MOE Part 2.10.3. The audit team reviewed maintenance logs and planning records, identifying transcription errors and omissions. This failure increases the risk of inaccurate maintenance records, which could lead to incorrect maintenance actions and compromise aircraft safety. 1.Planning Office Audit - February 2025 The February 2025 audit at the planning office found that the Designated Planner did not ensure accurate transcription of aircraft technical log write-ups and deferred defect items into the maintenance documentation, as required by MOE Part 2.10.3. The audit team reviewed maintenance logs and planning records, identifying errors and omissions in the transcription process. This failure increases the risk of inaccurate maintenance records, which could lead to incorrect maintenance actions and compromise aircraft safety. j. During the January 2025 inspection at the Tool Crib counter, which focused on tool control procedures, it was found that the movement of tools and equipment outside of duty hours was not recorded in the Tool Control Book located at the Tool Crib counter, as required by MOE Part 2.6.1.5. Evidence included a review of the tool control book and interviews with tool crib personnel. This oversight compromises the tool control system, increasing the risk of tools being misplaced or unaccounted for, which could lead to inaccuracies in maintenance and potentially affect aircraft safety. 1.Tool Crib Counter Inspection - January 2025 The January 2025 inspection at the Tool Crib counter revealed non-compliance with MOE Part 2.6.1.5, as the movement of tools and equipment outside of duty hours was not recorded in the Tool Control Book. A review of the tool control book and interviews with tool crib personnel confirmed this oversight. This deficiency compromises the tool control system, increasing the risk of misplaced or unaccounted tools, which could lead to inaccuracies in maintenance and impact aircraft safety. k. During the February 2025 audit at the tool inventory management office, which focused on tool inventory management, it was found that the Tool Crib Supervisor did not update the information on the ERP system as required by MOE Part 2.6.1.5. Evidence included system audit logs and tool inventory reports showing discrepancies between physical inventory and system records. This failure to properly update tool inventory data increases the risk of discrepancies in tool tracking, which could lead to inaccuracies in maintenance and compromise aircraft safety. 1.Tool Inventory Management Office Audit - February 2025 The February 2025 audit at the tool inventory management office found that the Tool Crib Supervisor failed to update the ERP system as required by MOE Part 2.6.1.5. System audit logs and tool inventory reports revealed discrepancies between physical inventory and system records. This failure to update tool inventory data increases the risk of discrepancies in tool tracking, potentially leading to inaccuracies in maintenance and compromising aircraft safety. l. During the January 2025 inspection at hangar 1, which focused on tool management practices, it was found that the Team Leaders did not consistently monitor the Tools Issued Report, as required by MOE Part 2.6.1.7. Evidence included a review of issued tool reports and interviews with team leaders, revealing gaps in monitoring practices. This failure to ensure proper monitoring of tool issuance increases the risk of unaccounted tools or equipment, which could lead to inaccuracies in maintenance and potentially compromise aircraft safety. 1. Hangar 1 Tool Management Inspection - January 2025 The January 2025 inspection at Hangar 1 revealed non-compliance with MOE Part 2.6.1.7, as Team Leaders did not consistently monitor the Tools Issued Report. A review of issued tool reports and interviews with team leaders highlighted gaps in monitoring practices. This oversight increases the risk of unaccounted tools or equipment, which could lead to inaccuracies in maintenance and potentially compromise aircraft safety. m. During the February 2025 audit at Hangar 1, which focused on tool control and inventory management, it was found that maintenance personnel failed to mark all personal tools retained in their toolboxes with an identifying initial, as required by MOE Part 2.6.1.8. The audit team conducted toolbox inspections and found numerous unmarked personal tools. This non-compliance increases the risk of tool misplacement or incorrect tool use, potentially compromising the accuracy and safety of maintenance activities 1. Hangar 1 Tool Control and Inventory Audit - February 2025 The February 2025 audit at Hangar 1 found that maintenance personnel did not mark all personal tools retained in their toolboxes with an identifying initial, as required by MOE Part 2.6.1.8. Toolbox inspections revealed numerous unmarked personal tools. This non-compliance increases the risk of tool misplacement or incorrect tool use, potentially compromising the accuracy and safety of maintenance activities.
