Applying European Ideas on Federalism and Doing It Better? The Government of
Canada's Homelessness Policy Experiment
Author(s): Carey Doberstein
Source: Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques , September/septembre 2012, Vol.
38, No. 3 (September/septembre 2012), pp. 395-410
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Applying European Ideas on
Federalism and Doing It Better?
The Government of Canada's
Homelessness Policy Experiment
Carey Doberstein
Department of Political Science
University of Toronto, Ontario
Même s'il n'a pas de façon explicite autorité pour légiférer dans ce domaine, le gouvernement fédéral a, en 2000,
mis sur pied l'Initiative nationale pour les sans-abri. Dans cet article, j'avance que ce programme fédéral ressemble
beaucoup, dans plusieurs de ses aspects fondamentaux, à un modèle de gouvernance conçu par l'Union européenne
et appelé « méthode ouverte de coordination » (MOC). Le contexte institutionnel dans lequel ce modèle a été créé
est intéressant, parce que, si la Commission européenne n'a pas formellement autorité pour obliger les membres
de l'Union à coordonner leurs politiques sociales, elle utilise néanmoins des mécanismes non contraignants ou
de nature volontaire pour tenter d'y arriver. Pour démontrer dans la pratique la flexibilité du programme fédéral
canadien, qui ressemble à la MOC, ainsi que ses implications en matière de gouvernance, d'obligation de rendre
des comptes et d'efficacité, j'analyse de plus près les cas de Vancouver et de Toronto. J'en conclus que, alors que
la solution du problème de l'itinérance se bute constamment à un manque de financement stable, une application
des principes du modèle MOC - adapté à la situation canadienne - pourrait permettre d'améliorer la gestion, la
coordination et l'efficacité des politiques publiques liées à l'itinérance, et que cette question devrait donc attirer
l'attention des décideurs politiques et des chercheurs qui s'intéressent au fédéralisme canadien.
Mots clés : fédéralisme canadien, gouvernance à paliers multiples, méthode ouverte de coordination, itinérance, relations intergouvernementales, réseaux de gouvernance
Despite not having explicit authority to legislate on matters local in nature, in 2000 the federal government
launched the National Homelessness Initiative (NHI). I argue that this federal program, in many critical aspects,
mirrors a governance model developed in the European Union called the Open Method of Coordination (OMC),
a model developed in an institutional context whereby the European Commission has no formal authority to
coerce member states into coordinating social policy, but nonetheless uses "soft" or voluntary mechanisms to
work toward this goal. Vancouver and Toronto are examined more closely to demonstrate how the flexibility of
the OMC-style model manifests itself in practice, and the implications for governance, accountability, and ef-
fectiveness. I conclude that while the issue of homelessness is principally plagued by insufficient and unstable
funding, further application of principles in the OMC model - uniquely applied to the Canadian context - holds
promise for improving governance, coordination, and effectiveness of the public policy response to homelessness
Application of the OMC model thus calls for more attention from Canadian federalism scholars and policy-makers.
Keywords: Canadian federalism, multilevel governance, Open Method of Coordination, homelessness,
intergovernmental relations, governance networks
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396 Carey Doberstein
Introduction
has its own authority to make coercive policy that
applies throughout the country. Yet the federal
government has also demonstrated an interest in
Homelessness
citiescities
bear the
bearburden
the asofburden
larger structural
a policy of
forces
larger issue structural is one in which forces
being active in policy fields for which it does not
and policy failure, yet do not have the capacity to
have constitutional authority. Health policy is per-
address the problem on their own (Golden 1999;
haps the most obvious and important example in the
Layton 2000). As a result, in Canada provincial
Canadian federal context. The federal government
governments and, more recently, the federal govern-
exercises power in this domain through a trad-
ment have developed policies and programs with
itional use of spending power - offering substantial
respect to homelessness. The entry of the federal
transfers to the provinces, provided they adhere
government into the domain of homelessness is the
to the principles of the Canada Health Act. The
focus of this article. Despite not having explicit
federal government's entry into the homelessness
authority to legislate on such matters local in
policy field, however, is not fundamentally based
nature, in 2000 the federal government launched
on a spending power model (though this feature is
the National Homelessness Initiative (NHI) - later
present), but rather, I argue, reflects the principles of
renamed the Homelessness Partnering Strategy
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) typically
(HPS) - the aim of which was to generate the
applied in a European context.
capacity in communities to develop a coordinated
response to homelessness. I suggest that this fed-
This article begins with a brief history of the
eral program, in many critical aspects, mirrors a
OMC model, outlining its purpose and application in
governance model developed in the European Union
Europe. Following that, I demonstrate that a number
called the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).
of key OMC principles are reflected in the federal
The NHI/HPS thus offers a critical test case to as-
government's homelessness policy activity in Can-
sess the broader application of the OMC model to
Canadian federalism.1 In the institutional context
that are not applied in the Canadian context. In the
of the OMC model, the European Commission has
third section of the paper, I more closely examine
no formal authority to coerce member states into
two cities in this policy framework - Vancouver
ada, as well as identify several OMC principles
coordinating social policy, but nonetheless uses
and Toronto - to demonstrate how the flexibility
"soft" or voluntary mechanisms to work toward
of the OMC model manifests itself in practice, and
this goal. Homelessness policy in Canada, from
the implications for governance, accountability,
the perspective of the federal government, mirrors
and effectiveness. In the final section of the paper,
this institutional scenario often found in European-
I consider how well the OMC model, as applied in
wide policy-making, and therefore serves as fertile
Canada, is serving the development of homelessness
ground for comparative analysis. At its core, the
policy. I conclude that while the issue of home-
OMC model privileges flexibility in the approach
lessness is principally plagued by insufficient and
and instruments used to address the policy problem;
unstable funding, further application of principles
the inclusion of diverse civil society and state actors
in the OMC model hold promise to improve govern-
to define the problem and develop solutions; and
ance, coordination, and effectiveness of the public
the setting of targets, benchmarks, and performance
policy response to homelessness.
measures to improve policy responses (Benz 2007;
Buchs 2007; Tömmel and Verdun 2009).
The Open Method of Coordination
This governance model may, at first, appear
largely inapplicable to the Canadian context, given
that in many policy fields, the federal government
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) was
launched at the European Council in 2000 as a
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Applying European Ideas on Federalism and Doing It Better? 397
third-way governance model between the undesir-
The OMC is a model of multilevel governance,
able fragmentation of policy among member states
as it conceives of the policy process as consisting
and the impossibility of a European superstate to
of both intergovernmental and state-society di-
drive policy harmonization (Zeitlan 2011). It was
mensions. Multilevel governance is a concept that
conceived as a governance instrument to assist the
broadly captures the "increased complexity, prolif-
European Union (EU) in achieving the goals of the
erating jurisdictions, the rise of non-state actors, and
Lisbon Strategy (which was focused on promoting
the related challenges to state power" (Bache and
sustainable economic growth and social cohesion
Flinders 2004, 3-4). "Governance" implies that the
in the Union) through flexible and voluntary
focus is not just on institutions (like intergovern-
means, using mechanisms of benchmarking goals,
mental structures or bureaucratic mandates) but also
public monitoring of progress, and mutual learning
on process. As such, scholarly attention should not
(Tömmel and Verdun 2009). The OMC has been
be reserved for only the division of powers between
applied in a wide range of policy areas, including
governments and the nature of bureaucratic design,
research and development, economic reform, social
but also the distribution of power between public
inclusion, education and training, pensions, and
and private actors, the potential for synergy in col-
health care (Buchs 2007). The widespread adop-
lective action, and the empowerment and inclusion
tion of the OMC model was argued by many to be
of civil society in the policy process (Marwell 2007;
an implicit rejection of the "Community method"
Pierre 1998). Civil society actors are thus important
of European integration, which focused on bind-
policy actors in the OMC in terms of defining prob-
ing legislation (or "hard law") from the European
lems, setting priorities, and requiring accountability.
Commission that would compel member states to
harmonize policy to achieve common objectives
(Zeitlan 2011).
On the ground, OMC-style governance has several general features. In a specific policy domain, the
European Commission will, in very broad strokes,
The OMC was rapidly embraced by academics
set targets and benchmarks for the achievement of
and policy-makers in Europe because it is a mode of
a goal. For example, one of most recent goals in
governance that carves out a path to achieve com-
the European Employment Strategy is to get school
mon EU goals, while at the same time respecting
dropout rates below 10 percent and have at least
national diversity (Buchs 2007). That is, it provides
a framework under which member states work
40 percent of 30- to 34-year-olds completing third-
together to define and achieve shared policy goals,
201 1). The European Commission thus has a crucial
yet does not compel them to abandon preferred or
traditional policy approaches or institutions. This
agenda-setting role in the OMC, though certainly
after extensive consultation with member states
method is particularly attractive in policy areas that
(Buchs 2007). Each member state is then pressured
level education by 2020 (European Commission
are domestically sensitive, where the Treaty base
to produce what is typically known as a National Ac-
for European Community action is weak, or where
tion Plan (NAP) specifying the measures to be taken
diversity among member states prevents harmoniza-
tion (Zeitlan 201 1). Advocates argue that in addition
to reach the goal articulated by the Commission.
Member states have the latitude to determine the
to being a politically feasible framework for govern-
strategies, policy instruments, and settings they feel
ance, the OMC promotes experimental learning and
are most appropriate to achieve the broader goals.
deliberative problem-solving because it institution-
Member states are also asked to involve civil society
alizes comparison among member states through the
groups in the development of the NAPs in order to
assessment of policy approaches and instruments
incorporate diverse views, draw on their expertise,
against their relative performance (Tömmel and
and generate broad acceptance of the approach from
Verdun 2009; Trubek and Trubek 2005).
a domestic perspective. NAPs are typically revisited
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398 Carey Doberstein
and modified after a few years. The monitoring and
reforms (for more examples see Buchs and Friedrich
performance evaluation follows, when the European
2005; Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008). Second, in
Commission produces reports that track developments
many ways, a federation like Canada is arguably
in a particular sector. It is an institutionalized reporting
better suited to the application of OMC principles
system whereby information about the approaches
than Europe, as our federal government can more
of various member states, as well as their successes
effectively use a light form of spending power in
and challenges, is presented to the broader European
conjunction with OMC principles to generate policy
political community and their citizens. The evaluations
capacity, more forcefully compare and contrast
are thus mechanisms of policy learning and peer pres-
policy approaches, and promote policy learning
in a number of policy domains. The next section
sure (Buchs 2007).
introduces a federal government program in Canada
The OMC, however, has not exactly turned out
to be the governance panacea that so many hoped
that can be characterized by OMC-style governance
mechanisms.
(Buchs 2007; Zeitlan 201 1). The features that make
it so attractive and feasible in theory - "soft" law
and its voluntary nature - are, somewhat predictably, the very ones that many blame for its alleged
OMC Principles in Action in Canada;
The National Homelessness Initiative
ineffectiveness. For example, because member
states know that OMC objectives are not legally
The OMC model of governance is particularly rel-
binding, that their parliaments need not approve
evant to homelessness policy in Canada given the
them or make them national law, and that no EU
complexity of the policy issue and the political,
sanctions can be imposed, they tend to commit to
institutional, and financial dependence of local
ambitious objectives that have little chance of being
government on other public and private actors
met. Likewise, member states have demonstrated a
and organizations (O'Reilly-Fleming 1993; Pierre
willingness to pressure the European Commission
1998). The homelessness phenomenon has complex
on the language and content of their evaluation
roots and intersecting personal and societal patholo-
reports, meaning the "policy learning" mechanism
gies - as such, all levels of government have policy
is sometimes undermined (Buchs 2007). So why
interest in its resolution. The issue touches many
should Canadian scholars and policy practitioners be
policy files, including health, housing, corrections,
attentive to a governance model in Europe that held
skills development, and employment. The vari-
so much promise, yet after a decade of application
ous levels of government have acknowledged that
is so widely disparaged as ineffective?
such "wicked" problems call for arrangements of
multilevel governance with the capacity to resolve
It would be premature to condemn the OMC to
complex social problems that one level of govern-
the governance-model trash bin, for two reasons.
ment or organization cannot do alone (Hooghe and
First, while it is true that the OMC model does
Marks 2003; see also Doberstein 2011 for urban
not always result in the achievement of common
development agreements in Canada as forms of
EU goals, many scholars have in fact credited the
multilevel governance).
OMC as a catalyst for policy reform in member
states. For example, Buchs (2007) conceptualizes
Intergovernmental relations and policy co-
the influence of the OMC as a "two-level game
ordination characterized by multilevel governance
process" in which member states try to upload their
eschew constitutional hierarchy and, in the case
interests to the OMC agenda (to avoid implemen-
of Canada, establish cities and civil society rep-
tation costs of another approach), or strategically
resentatives as prominent policy players (Smith
invoke OMC objectives to justify domestic policy
and Stewart 2004; Young and Leuprecht 2004).
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Applying European Ideas on Federalism and Doing It Better? 399
Multilevel governance - of which the OMC is a
(Smith 2004). This was a significant shift in federal
specific model- as a theoretical framework helps
government thinking, as federal bureaucrats long
us understand why in some policy fields govern-
believed that basic and emergency services were
ments engage in partnership with each other and
the preserve of provincial governments; moreover,
civil society, and why these partnerships are moving
the federal government was not eager to allocate
away from rigid governance structures toward more
funds when provinces were tightening social assist-
flexible arrangements.
ance benefits and eligibility - a key element in the
growth of homelessness (Gaetz 2010). But it was
The homelessness policy context in Canada in
in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and Privy
many ways mirrors the customary relationship
Council Office (PCO) - not in the line department
between the European Commission and a member
Human Resources and Skills Development Canada
state: the federal government acknowledges a
(HRSDC) - where the strategic plans for federal
growing structural problem and has an interest in
intervention were being developed (Smith 2004).
assisting all cities in developing a response to the
An early policy preference from the centre was to
issue, yet does not have constitutional authority to
engage directly with community organizations and
direct cities to do so. Provincial governments tend to
municipalities, rather than funnel the money through
be suspicious of federal government entry into their
provincial governments (Smith 2004). This view
constitutional competencies - like the regulation of
was reinforced when the newly appointed minister
local affairs - and so a "soft" policy becomes the
in charge of homelessness - Claudette Bradshaw -
only conceivable method of entry into the field of
travelled the country and heard from homelessness
homelessness (Smith 2004).
advocates, service providers, and local governments
that communities should play a lead role in craft-
This section outlines the federal government's
ing the homelessness response, while the federal
National Homelessness Initiative (NHI) and the
government remained primarily a capacity enhancer
transition to its current form as the Homelessness
and funder (Smith 2004). So a traditional spending-
Partnering Strategy (HPS), and makes the case that
power model of federal government contributions
this program shares many similarities to the OMC
with a coercive element was simply not in the cards,
model, as well as some important differences.2 As
not only because of the involvement of municipal
such, this program is - conceptually speaking - a
actors (and provincial resistance to the federal
hybrid of the traditional spending-power model of
government's dictating policy on local matters par-
federalism and the new EU OMC-style of multilevel
ticularly in Quebec,4 but also true elsewhere), but
also given the feedback from those on the ground
governance.3
on how the program ought to be structured.5
In the late 1990s, as federal budgets achieved balance, in addition to widespread acknowledgement of
In 1999 the federal government launched the
the growing problem of homelessness, the federal
National Homelessness Initiative (NHI) to "help
government initiated its first explicitly defined
ensure community access to programs, services and
"homelessness" program. Despite the economic
support for alleviating homelessness in communities
stability of the period, homelessness began to grow
in all provinces and territories" (HRSDC 2008,
rapidly in Canada's major cities, and coupled with
i). There was recognition that homelessness has
local task force reports demanding federal engage-
complex origins and requires partnerships between
ment (for example, Dr. Anne Golden's 1999 report)
governments and community organizations at the
and Federation of Canadian Municipalities' (FCM)
local level. It must be noted that many provincial
lobbying, the federal government began to imagine
governments were "less than enthusiastic" about the
a role for itself in the homelessness policy domain
new program (Smith 2004, 5). Provinces viewed the
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400 Carey Doberstein
program with suspicion for two primary reasons:
it meant opening a new shelter, providing drop-in
(a) cities "belong" to provinces, and (b) federal
services, or building new supportive housing. Third,
withdrawal would leave them with the bill. That the
the CAB is required to produce a Community Plan
federal government proposed to allocate funding
Assessment (CPA) for the federal government
directly to local governments was presumptuous,
outlining how the funding allocations are consist-
given that cities are created by provincial legislation
ent with the priorities identified by the community
and have no authority to enter into bilateral deals
and demonstrating the incremental impact of the
with the federal government without provincial ap-
program on homelessness in the locality.
proval. The second, and more important, source of
suspicion was related to the nature of funding. The
Notwithstanding the above federal requirements,
provinces were still recovering from the large cuts in
the NHI/HPS has considerable flexibility built into
federal transfers in the early to mid 1990s, including
the program from a governance perspective. Even
the Canada Health and Social Transfer, and would
the "requirements" from the federal government
have preferred that funding to be reestablished to
are flexible. For example, the federal government
help them build capacity to address the problem
did not dictate who within the community and civil
(Smith 2004). And they were likewise fearful that,
society needed to be involved in the CAB, and
while this may be a federal government priority at
likewise accepted the unique priorities for fund-
the time, a change of heart (or ruling party) could
ing identified in each Community Plan (provided
very well leave them with an extraordinary bill once
they were consistent with the very broad strategic
additional homelessness projects and services were
priorities of the federal government).7 In terms of
up and running, and thus very difficult to cancel.6
governance, communities were afforded flexibility
in the design of the planning and decision-making
The NHI (now called HPS) operates as follows.
institutions - they could form a "community en-
The federal government initially selected ten cities
tity" (usually via a prominent community group or
(later expanded to 61) to be eligible for a funding
the City itself) and assume full decision-making
envelope. The federal outlay per year averaged
autonomy as well as full legal and financial liabil-
$184 million, and was available to the selected
ity, or they could adopt the partnership or "shared
cities based on a formula that captured the local
delivery" model, whereby HRSDC would receive
poverty rate, rental vacancy rate, and population
recommendations from the CAB and formally vet
(Smith 2004). Access to this money required the
and approve projects.
city (or in some cases region) to perform several
actions. First, the city had to form a Community
The federal government renewed its role in the
Advisory Board (CAB) consisting of diverse civil
homelessness policy domain in 2007 under the new
society actors - ranging from shelter providers, to
title of Homelessness Partnering Strategy (HPS), at
mental health organizations, to advocacy groups - to
a slightly reduced $135 million/year. The major ele-
exchange ideas and perspectives on homelessness
ments of the NHI were continued, though renamed
in the specific locality. Second, the CAB is required
(HRSDC 2008). An important new component is
to develop, after extensive community consultation,
the Homelessness Accountability Network, a more
a Community Plan to address homelessness, which
effective accountability framework for measur-
would set the strategic priorities over a three-year
ing the results of interventions. Also new in the
period and serve as a framework for funding allo-
HPS are Federal Horizontal Pilot Projects, which
cations to specific projects and services. The CAB
encourage federal departments to work together in
solicits proposals from non-profits and service pro-
areas linked to homelessness - such as corrections,
viders to carry out the work on the ground, whether
crime prevention, mental health, family violence,
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Applying European Ideas on Federalism and Doing It Better? 401
skills development, and immigration. The HPS is
and make better use of reporting and performance
measurement, and how citizens and stakeholders
currently funded until 2014.
would be important accountability enforcers. The
At first glance, one might be tempted to argue
marquee feature of SUFA, however, was that the
that this is merely a dressed-up version of the trad-
federal government would not initiate unilateral
itional use of federal spending power in Canada,
spending in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdic-
whereby the federal government uses financial
tion without extensive consultation and agreement
transfers to spur other governments to implement
from provinces and territories (Lazar 2000). The
its policy choices.8 I argue that while the NHI/
NHI/HPS, announced not even a year after SUFA
HPS indeed involves the use of spending power,
was established, violates this core principle, as the
its features resemble the OMC model from Europe
local matters are the exclusive domain of provinces
in many important ways, the analysis of which has
(despite cities demanding a federal role), and prov-
broad public policy significance. First, the NHI/
incial governments certainly were not celebrating
HPS is a voluntary program. Eligible cities and
this new program (Smith 2004).9 Thus while the
communities are not mandated to participate in the
NHI/HPS may share some of the ideas contained
program, though all have drawn on some of the funds
in SUFA regarding accountability frameworks,
available to them. Second, the program is flexible
NHI/HPS is obviously not a SUFA-inspired federal
to local and regional needs, while at the same time
program.
establishes a coordinated and national response to
homelessness. That is, the federal government does
It is clear that the NHI/HPS shares a number of
not define for Calgary decision-makers their specific
important features with the OMC model. Yet there
policy priorities or the policy instruments they
are also critical differences to be acknowledged.
should use to address the problem, but Calgary and
First, while the development of benchmarks and
all other medium-large cities now have plans and
demonstrated actions that address homelessness -
targets and the evaluation of impact are present in
a direct result of the federal program. Third, civil
There are no national targets, for example, to reduce
society actors - those on the ground, working with
the number of persons sleeping on the street or to in-
the homeless population - are essential players in
crease the annual production of social housing units.
the NHI/HPS, the targets are specific to the city.
defining the policy problem, setting the strategic
Second, the deliberative activity among civil society
direction, and helping to make decisions on funding
and state actors is at the bottom (local level), not
allocations. Finally, the evaluation of action plans
at the top (federal level) as is the case in the OMC
model. There is no institutionalized framework for
and incremental policy and program effects is built
into the institutional framework, such that best prac-
civil society involvement in the design of the federal
tices are shared and policy successes are celebrated.
program and the development of its broad strategic
priorities. Third, the principle mechanism through
Or one could argue this is simply a reflection of
which the federal government obtains collaboration
the Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA)
of such policy actors at the local level is through the
of 1999, an informal agreement among the federal
financial incentive - access to the funding envelope.
government and provinces (and territories), with
This is but one of several mechanisms within the
the exception of Quebec, which created a flexible
OMC model that is used to promote coordination
framework for intergovernmental social policy-
and collaboration; external pressure by naming and
making in Canada (Lazar 2000). SUFA sought to
shaming policy underperformers and the creation of
establish, in general terms, how the various govern-
sites of mutual learning and information exchange
ments would work together on social policy matters
are other mechanisms under the OMC (Buchs 2007).
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4 02 Carey Dober stein
The federal government's NHI/HPS therefore
Vancouver
represents a unique model of governance that in
In contrast to most other large cities in Canada that
many ways resembles the OMC, yet is distinct given
defined the boundaries of the "community" as the
the nature of the policy issue and the institutional
municipality (Toronto included), the approach in
context in Canada. This model represents a hybrid
Vancouver is unique because of its regional focus.
of the traditional use of federal spending power and
the OMC model. The Government of Canada can
That is, federal funds allocated to "Vancouver" are
distributed throughout the metropolitan area of Van-
exercise legitimate use of spending power that the
couver (which includes 21 municipalities), rather
EU as a governance authority does not enjoy, making than the single municipality, as is the case for the
it easier to create capacity for a "national" response City of Toronto. Thus rather than the City of Vancou-
(in the sense that all medium and large cities now ver conducting the NHI planning and distribution,
have homelessness action plans). Yet the federal a newly created group of regional government and
government has also acknowledged the value in
civil society actors, called the Greater Vancouver
both civil society involvement in the policy process Regional Steering Committee on Homelessness
and flexible institutional design in terms of govern- (RSCH), was formed as the Community Advisory
ance, priority setting, and decision-making in this
Board (CAB) as required by the NHI.10 The RSCH
program - all key features of the OMC model. The was established based on the recognition that home-
next section is a comparative analysis of responses lessness exists in the broader metropolitan area and
by two cities in this policy framework - Vancouver that a regional, coordinated approach is required to
and Toronto - to demonstrate how the flexibility of make effective policy interventions (RSCH 2007).
the adapted OMC model manifests itself in practice, It operated under the "shared delivery" model rather
and to examine the implications for governance, than the "community entity" model. The shared deaccountability, and effectiveness.
livery model for legal reasons was viewed as more
appropriate because the RSCH is a coalition of local
Case studies: Vancouver and Toronto
government officials and community representatives
to which it is difficult to ascribe legal and financial
liability. Consistent with NHI (and subsequent HPS)
Given an institutional program design that allowsrequirements, the RSCH developed the Greater
for flexibility in terms of governance and the settingVancouver Regional Homelessness Plan and made
of priorities to reflect unique local needs regardingfunding recommendations to the federal NHI (and
homelessness, it is not unsurprising to find thatlater HPS) program - all of which historically have
Canadian cities have made distinct choices that havebeen accepted by the federal minister, effectively
resulted in rather different trajectories of govern-making the RSCH the real collective decision maker.
ance, strategic priorities, and policy instruments. It
is important to engage in comparative work in the Toronto
context of this program, as it will allow us to makeThe City of Toronto took a more conventional ap-
tentative judgments with respect to not only theproach, establishing itself as the "community entity"
value of flexibility in such national programs, butwith the responsibility to implement a Community
also the consequence of governance choices on thePlan and make funding allocations. Toronto, in
role of civil society actors and policy development. contrast to Vancouver, is effectively a municipal
This section presents the cases of Vancouver and government with regional scope (given its 1998
Toronto, and compares them along the dimensions of
amalgamation of surrounding municipalities) but
decision-making and accountability, leadership, andmore importantly, it had an established relationship
the effectiveness of coordination and collaboration.with the Government of Ontario with respect to
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Applying European Ideas on Federalism and Doing It Better? 403
homelessness policy and programs- an arrange-
stage - only in the setting of strategic priorities in
ment that did not exist in Vancouver. Whereas in
the Community Plan to address homelessness. To
British Columbia provincially funded homelessness
ensure that that all proponents were treated fairly,
policy and administration is centralized in an agency
City officials hired an external Fairness Monitor to
called BC Housing, in Ontario the administration is
follow the evaluations (City of Toronto Staff Report
entirely devolved to "municipal service managers,"
2007). The evaluation teams consisted entirely of
which in this case is the City of Toronto.11 As such,
City administrative staff and are monitored by
City officials were already administering major
a Service Canada (federal government) official.
homelessness programs funded by the provincial
The evaluation criteria are approved by council,
government, and it was decided that if the City of
and include proponent qualifications, value for
Toronto was the "community entity" under the fed-
money, support service plan, and alignment with
eral NHI program, the City could more efficiently
City priorities (City of Toronto Staff Report 2007).
coordinate homelessness programs and project
Decision-making thus follows a hierarchical path:
funding (Carter and Polevychok 2006; City of To-
staff evaluation, senior administrator approval,
ronto 2003). The NHI likewise required the City of
council committee approval, and then full council
Toronto to consult community groups and service
approval of projects (City of Toronto Staff Report
providers in the creation of the Community Plan
2007). In contrast to the RSCH in Vancouver, the
(which guides investment decisions). A Community
Toronto City Council is the "community entity" in
Reference Group (CRG) was created (their version
which accountability and liability rests and final
of the CAB required by NHI/HPS), consisting of
decision-making occurs. This may explain the
community groups and the private sector, to provide
formal decision-making process that is essentially
ongoing advice and identify funding priorities, but
closed to community group involvement - though
the role remained consultative (City of Toronto
of course community groups retain access to coun-
2003). The CRG is not involved in the evaluation
cillors and council committees, the involvement of
of proposals or the specific recommendations for
elected officials on these matters occurs toward the
funding; the Toronto City Council is the final deci-
end of the process.
sion maker on all projects.
In Vancouver, by contrast, all levels of governThe distinct institutional and governance choices
ment and diverse civil society actors jointly craft the
made in Vancouver and Toronto with respect to
strategic priorities for the locality, but also jointly
the NHI/HPS have corresponding implications for
make decisions on funding allocations. The RSCH
decision-making and accountability, the role of civil
in Vancouver, as a collective body, establishes the
society, and the effectiveness of coordination and
collaboration. These features are considered below
the federal government homelessness program. In
strategic priorities for the locality with regard to
to demonstrate how the OMC principle of flexibility
some years, they decided to make supportive hous-
has both positive and negative consequences.
ing a priority, while in others they prioritized street
Decision-Making and Accountability
process that involves all levels of government and
In Toronto, funding proposals under the NHI/HPS
a diverse set of civil society actors, and is informed
homelessness (RSCH 2002). This is a deliberative
are evaluated by City of Toronto staff under strict
by the research conducted by the RSCH. Even in
bureaucratic guidelines and, in contrast to Vancou-
this vein of strategic priority-setting, Vancouver dif-
ver, involve very few people.12 The Community
fers from Toronto: the ultimate decision-maker on
Reference Group (CRG), the mandated Community
the Community Plan (which contains the strategic
Advisory Board (CAB), does not participate in this
priorities) is the Toronto City Council, whereas in
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404 Carey Dober stein
Vancouver it is the multilevel governing body, the
In Toronto, by contrast, the Community Refer-
RSCH. The RSCH creates the Request for Proposals
ence Group (CRG) is tasked with helping to guide
(RFP), evaluates them, and makes recommenda-
the strategic priorities within the Community Plan,
tions to the federal government. Given established
which is then used by City staff to assist in the
norms of ministerial responsibility in Canada, the
evaluation of projects to fund (City of Toronto Staff
final decisions with respect to policy and funding
Report 2007). The Community Reference group
services rest with elected officials, but the RSCH is
is in no way associated with funding allocations,
tasked with making recommendations to the federal
and is not a decision-making body. A similarly
government funding program (RSCH 2000). 13
tasked group, called the Street Outreach Steering
Committee, which was created to advise the City
Civil Society Role and Leadership
of Toronto on its street outreach policies, was like-
The different modes of shared governance in To-
wise structured as a consultative, not deliberative
ronto and Vancouver with respect to homelessness
decision-making body. Some individuals involved
policy development result in rather distinct oppor-
in these groups became frustrated in the Toronto
tunities for civil society influence in concrete policy
networks, as consultation is frontloaded and on a
development. Ostensibly, in both cases, community
more abstract level, after which community input
groups are afforded an opportunity to influence
is closed when it comes to decision-making (Falvo
the strategic priorities for the locality, and in both
2009). 15 The nature of the engagement in Vancouver,
cases the adopted Community Plans fairly reflect
with community involvement at every step, while
the community perspective (City of Toronto 2003;
maintaining clear and enforced conflict of interest
RSCH 2003). Thus we do not find substantial varia-
policies, appears to keep morale high among govern-
tion in group influence at the strategic level when
ment and civil society actors (RSCH 2010).
comparing Toronto and Vancouver, but there are big
differences in how those priorities are realized from
Effectiveness in Coordination and
a governance perspective.
Collaboration
It is in cultivating coordination and collaboration
Membership in the RSCH entails not only voting
in the policy domain where the RSCH in Vancouver
on funding proposals but also serving on at least one
subcommittee - governance, finance, communica-
appears most consequential when compared to the
CRG in Toronto. The RSCH was built from the
tions, membership, etc. - where the real work is
ground up in 1999, with little formal institutional
done (RSCH 2005). The consequence is that mem-
foundation, yet now has become the authoritative
bers, over time, develop a stake in the process and
take the work of the RSCH with a seriousness and
voice for homelessness in the region.16 In the
meantime, the CRG in Toronto remains a working
rigor that is distinct from normal consultative pro-
group with little profile and activity.17 The evolu-
cesses (RSCH 20 10). 14 This result is consistent with
tion of the RSCH is consistent with the widespread
the public management literature, which has found
understanding that institutions with substantive
that civil society participation in decision-making,
policy roles, for better or worse, "have an uncanny
designed appropriately, can bring a heightened level
ability to take on a life of their own" (Crosby and
of seriousness to the contributions (Clayton 1995;
Bryson 2005, 329). The RSCH has over time built
Irvin and Stansbury 2004; King, Feltey, and Süsel
up legitimacy in the region, in part because of the
1998). The ever-expanding mandate and regular
transparency, inclusiveness, and perceived fairness
meeting intervals of the RSCH foster continued
in its activity, particularly with regard to equitable
engagement and maintain open channels of com-
distribution of services and representation in the
munication and exchange between government and
region (RSCH 2005). As such, its mandate has ex-
civil society actors.
panded significantly from merely making funding
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Applying European Ideas on Federalism and Doing It Better? 405
recommendations to HRSDC, to also taking on an
was able to create governance mechanisms ap-
advocacy role for homelessness issues, as well as
propriate to the local context. A federally imposed
assisting in subregional coordination in homeless-
governance model and decision-making authority
ness response.
distinct from the activity of the City of Toronto's
existing homelessness policy activity (and on top
In Toronto, however, collective leadership on
of the existing provincial policy framework) would
homelessness is conspicuously absent. There are
have presented coordination challenges and need-
plenty of individuals, organizations, coalitions of
less layers of bureaucracy. So while we are able to
organizations, and even working groups in Toronto
tentatively conclude that the principle of flexibility
that advocate for the homeless, but nothing with
in governance mechanisms has been advantageous
the sustained capacity and legitimacy of the RSCH.
in this policy domain, we have yet to consider the
There is no authoritative, multilevel voice in To-
question of whether further application of OMC
ronto for these issues, and as such, homelessness
principles under this program would result in im-
issues rarely receive the public attention required to
proved outcomes with respect to coordination and
build on successes (Toronto City Summit Alliance
policy learning. More important, would it improve
2010). The Greater Toronto Civic Action Alliance
the life chances of homeless persons?
(Civic Action) - formerly known as the Toronto
establishing a regional voice on these issues in
Without a doubt, the most significant problem
in the domain of homelessness is insufficient and
Toronto. Civic Action is a large network of local
unstable funding of affordable housing and re-
government administrators and civil society actors
lated services to marginalized citizens (Gaetz 2010;
City Summit Alliance - is perhaps the closest to
with goals of collaborative and collective leadership
Shapcott 2001). Federal, provincial, and municipal
on regional issues, including housing and homeless-
investment in social housing needs to be orders
ness. However, Civic Action has neither received
of magnitude higher than current outlays to make
the local government political buy-in (Wolfe 2009)
homelessness a phenomenon of the past (Gaetz
nor achieved the representative legitimacy to be a
2010; Hulchanski 2002). But even if all levels of
leading and sustained voice for homelessness and
government were showering communities with
housing in Toronto. The RSCH can actually drive
funds, it would still be important to think about how
the agenda on homelessness in Vancouver, act-
decisions are made, how accountability is ensured,
ing as sort of regional lobby group to provincial
and how policy innovations are promoted. In this
and federal governments (RSCH 2001) and, most
sense, there remain OMC principles that could be
significantly, remains effective across changes in
applied to the NHI/HPS program to enhance its
government leadership, which is not at all clear in
the case of Toronto.
effectiveness: (a) direct comparison of cities' approaches; (b) institutionalized information sharing
among cities; and (c) enhanced local influence on
national policy and program design.
OMC: Take (More of) It or Leave It?
Arguably one of the most powerful mechanThe comparative analysis of the cases of Vancou-
isms to encourage policy innovation, the adoption
ver and Toronto in the context of the federal NHI/
of best practices, and accountability is to directly
HPS reveals that the flexibility contained within
compare how cities are performing with respect
the program can have significant governance and
to this program (Benz 2007; Mintrom and Vergari
policy effects. It also reveals that while Toronto
1998). 18 Indeed, performance measurement and
may not receive the additional spillover effects of
institutionalized comparison are fundamental fea-
the activity of the RSCH in Vancouver, the City
tures of the OMC model, yet are practised only in
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406 Carey Dober stein
a marginal manner in the NHI/HPS. While greater
requirements on service providers, but the review
use of performance measurement and targets was
should be conducted by civil society representa-
an innovation in the federal government shift from
tives, homelessness advocates, and academics. It is
the NHI to the HPS, the federal government appears
critical that the institutions for a meaningful evalua-
reluctant to "name and shame" underperforming
tion exercise are distanced from direct political
cities, but rather focuses on "celebrating success"
influence, and that the process be viewed by those
in programwide evaluations. To be fair, there are
being evaluated as fair, objective, and consistent
some important challenges to greater use of per-
(Saint-Martin 2004).
formance measures that are specific to the issue of
homelessness. First, data are perhaps the biggest
Information sharing, like direct comparison
challenge in this domain. Homeless counts are
among constituencies, is at the core of the OMC
increasingly conducted by cities, but with varying
model. Yet, the NHI/HPS has likewise only made a
methodologies, therefore making it difficult to dir-
half-hearted effort to promote information sharing
ectly compare cities. Even when data are available
among cities with respect to their policy successes
and comparable, the findings are often difficult
and failures. Though the NHI was created in 2000,
to interpret, given the sensitivity of homelessness
the first national meeting of chairs of the Com-
rates to regional issues, the impact of senior level
munity Advisory Boards from across the country
government decisions, and broader structural trends.
occurred in 2007. Subsequent meetings of chairs
Additionally, the Community Advisory Boards
have been infrequent and are not an institutional-
responded mostly negatively to the increased use
ized feature of the program. It should be noted that
of performance measures under the Homelessness
regional networks of CABs meet more frequently,
Partnering Strategy, arguing that given the scarce
resources for homelessness and the seriousness of
messages out into the communities, not to promote
but their primary function is to channel HRSDC
the issue, all money and time should be devoted to
information sharing among cities. In 2010/11 there
service provision (RSCH 2009).
was a proposal originating from a member of the
CAB in St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador,
Yet the federal government is in a unique position
to create a National Learning Network of CABs
to make such demands on cities, given their des-
in order to share experiences - good and bad -
peration for funds, and although time-consuming,
and promote best practices (RSCH 2011). This is
direct (and even negative) comparison is essential
therefore a bottom-up proposal from civil society
to promote the adoption of best practices and ensure
actors, not the federal government. As of the time of
accountability. Political considerations in Canada
writing, the federal government has not committed
make it such that the federal government should not
to providing funding for a National Learning Net-
be the peer reviewer; this would deeply politicize the
work of CABs, and without a source of funding to
process and likely dilute the assessments of cities'
institutionalize a gathering of policy actors, it will
successes and failures as the federal government
remain aspirational.
would feel immense pressure from provincial governments to avoid embarrassing cities (Saint-Martin
One final feature of the OMC model found in
2004). As such, peer review needs to be conducted
Europe, but absent from its Canadian manifestation
by a multilevel, inclusive body consisting of mainly
under the NHI/HPS, is local influence on national
civil society actors at the national level. The federal
policy with respect to homelessness. Under the OMC
government would supply the funding, as it has
model in Europe, member states contribute to the
demonstrated an interest in promoting best practices
selection of broad strategic priorities in the domain.
and performance evaluation with amendments to the
In the NHI/HPS, local ideas and experiences are not
program in 2007 that placed additional reporting
channelled into the federal decision-making process
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Applying European Ideas on Federalism and Doing It Better? 407
regarding overarching policy and direction of the
attests. While no one labels the NHI/HPS an OMC
program. While in theory the mandated evaluations
model, it shares many of the features, though an-
from the community that are sent in to HRSDC give
chored in a traditional spending-power model of
federal bureaucrats a sense of how issues are evolv-
governance. The NHI/HPS is a truly innovative
ing on the ground, there is limited evidence that this
approach in a Canadian multilevel governance con-
influences decision-makers. During each (usually)
text, but I argue the possibilities for more effective
three-year phase of the NHI/HPS, an edict is laid
policy and accountable decision-making would be
down on what is the overarching strategic priority
enhanced if the NHI/HPS added the most powerful
for the federal government (i.e., emergency needs)
OMC features that are currently missing: direct
without the input of civil society groups or com-
comparison of cities using comparable performance
munities. They often find out in the news release
measures, institutionalized information-sharing
along with everyone else. Also, there is no role for
among CABs, and deliberative activity and ex-
civil society groups and communities in the overall
change from the local to federal level to advise on
direction and structure of the program. As such, all
the overall direction and structure of the program.
the deliberative activity among diverse actors occurs
While this article focused on one policy domain,
at the local level, not at the federal level, in contrast
the OMC model undoubtedly has a much broader
to the OMC model as applied in Europe where local
application to Canadian federalism in shared or
actors participate in the development of overarching
complex policy domains, the existing model for
policy. If the federal government acknowledges the
which is in dire need of new ideas.
benefits of bringing diverse actors to the table to set
priorities at the local level, it is difficult to justify
their exclusion at the federal level. As such, CAB
chairs could be selected as part of a larger advisory
committee to advise on the direction of the HPS at
the national level.
Notes
The author gratefully acknowledges the considered comments from the journal's anonymous reviewers.
1 The relatively untapped potential for comparative
work between the European Union and Canada with
respect to federalism and multilevel governance - and
Conclusion
in particular the Open Method of Coordination - was
The multilevel governance theoretical framework
helps us understand why in some policy fields gov-
introduced to me by Prof. Amy Verdun and Donna Wood,
who organized the Comparing Modes of Governance in
Canada and the European Union conference in Victoria,
ernments engage in partnership with each other andBritish Columbia, in the fall of 2011, at which the early
civil society, yet resist imposing rigid or universal thoughts in this article were presented.
governance structures in favour of more flexible ar-
rangements. That the European Union and member
states' experimental governance relations can serve
as an analogy to Canadian federalism and multilevel
governance might at first seem to be a conceptual
2 It should be noted that the NHI (now HPS) represents
a fraction of total government spending on homelessness
in most major cities. Provinces and cities supply the vast
majority of taxpayer funds, and this activity is generally
outside of this program. It is nonetheless an interesting
stretch. However, this article has demonstrated and innovative governance approach in Canada that
that the OMC model of multilevel governance in complements other homelessness policy activity, and
Europe - whereby the EU uses "soft" law, mechan- most importantly for our purposes, provides a means to
isms of policy learning, and structured comparison assess whether OMC principles, as applied in a Canadian
of policy and performance - has interesting and context, hold their promised value.
relevant (though impure) application to Canada,
as experience of cities under the federal NHI/HPS
3 There is no evidence that the NHI/HPS was derived
from the EU experience (the initiatives actually appeared
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408 Carey Dober stein
on the policy scene more or less simultaneously). In fact,
behaviour, and the variety of institutional arrangements
federal government-sponsored research that documents
for intergovernmental fiscal transfers.
the history of the NHI makes no connection to the OMC,
but focuses on the emerging nature of the problem and
strong indications from community consultations that the
decision-making process should be locally driven and
inclusive (Smith 2004). Thus the NHI/HPS is not a direct
example of the OMC in Canada, but some of the ideas that
9 At the time, and to this day, provinces generally op-
pose the federal government's using its spending power
to achieve policy goals in local matters, although they
are not in a position - politically - to prohibit their cities
from engaging in the program.
underpin the OMC in Europe are present in this program.
10 While this group was not formally attached to the
I argue that adopting more of the OMC principles would
Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD), it was
improve the effectiveness of the NHI/HPS in Canada.
historic cooperation among regional actors on other is-
4 For an overview of the Quebec municipal system and
a discussion of how it is situated in the broader world of
sues that made such an institutional design feasible and
desirable.
intergovernmental relations, see Belley et al. (2009). The
11 Note that the administration of such funds through
central point is that the Quebec government severely limits
municipal service managers should not be viewed as a
the ties between the federal and municipal governments, a
flexible policy delivery model. It is a vestige from the
policy that transcends all recent Quebec administrations.
devolution process under the Harris government and was
5 This is certainly not meant to imply that the NHI
not particularly welcomed by the City of Toronto.
represents a revolution in the federal government ap-
12 Confidential interview with an individual know-
proach to its use of spending power. Rather, this model
ledgeable of Community Reference Group activity, 11
was favoured because of the sensitive nature of the federal
December 2011.
government's dealing directly with municipalities and
the particulars regarding the issue of homelessness. For
13 Since the RSCH is not a legal entity, it cannot be
a broader analysis of the variety of funding mechanisms
the "community entity" like the City of Toronto, which
and approaches used by the federal government in areas
then assumes legal responsibility and accountability for
it lacks constitutional authority, see Lazar (2006). Lazar
the program. All the work from the RSCH is returned to
classifies intergovernmental regimes using the criteria
the federal minister responsible for the program, in the
of interdependence/independence and hierarchical/non-
form of "recommendations." One might argue that the
hierarchical relations.
RSCH is not actually a deliberative decision-making body
because is does not have final decision-making authority.
6 Provincial officials were in some sense justified in
While true in a legal sense, in practice it is effectively the
this view, because in the early federal-provincial policy
real decision-maker, since all projects recommended to
discussions, federal officials marketed the NHI as "a
HRSDC from the RSCH have been approved since 1999
time-limited, targeted, demonstration initiative" (Smith
(RSCH 2009). It should also be noted that in 2011, the
2004, 11).
RSCH moved to the community entity model, with Metro
7 For example, in the first phase (1999-2003) the
federal government was particularly focused on the short-
Vancouver (GVRD) serving as the entity. Thus Vancouver
now holds full accountability and liability (like Toronto).
term emergency needs of communities (shelters, etc.) and
14 Interview with a manager of the Greater Vancouver
in the second phase (2003-2007) more focused on long-
Regional District Homessness Secretariat, 11 October
term solutions of transitional housing and establishing
2011. While there do exist challenges associated with
self-sufficiency.
retaining enthusiasm and active participation among
8 The use of spending power by central governments
in federations is a widely studied phenomenon, with
unique fiscal mechanisms established around the world.
The edited volume by Boadway and Shah (2009) is a
sophisticated introduction to the theoretical arguments
for the use of spending power, the impact of grants on
community members at the RSCH, meeting minutes and
interviews with staff confirm that among those who attend
regularly, there is a devotion to the process and seriousness to the strategic planning that are unlike traditional
consultative methods, which can result in community
groups staking out uncompromising positions.
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Applying European Ideas on Federalism and Doing It Better ? 409
15 Confidential interview, 29 November 2011.
City of Toronto. 2007. City of Toronto HPI Community
Plan, 2007-2009. Toronto: Shelter, Housing and Sup-
16 Interview with a manager of the Greater Vancouver
port Administration.
Regional District Homessness Secretariat, 11 October
City of Toronto Staff Report. 2003. Building on Successes:
2011.
The Community Plan for the Supporting Communities
Partnership Initiative in Toronto, 2003-2006. Toronto:
17 Confidential interview, 29 November 2011. In fact
Shelter, Housing and Support Administration.
on two occasions, members of the Community Reference
Group, when initially contacted for interviews on this
- . 2007. Recommendations Request for Proposals 9155-
topic, had forgotten they were a part of the group! This
07-7200 for the Development of Transitional Housing
did not occur in the Vancouver case.
and Supportive Housing. Toronto: Affordable Housing
Office.
18 Note that there are also more radical ideas on how to
Clayton, T. 1995. Public Participation in Public Deci-
introduce competition in policy areas, like the functional,
overlapping, competing jurisdictions pioneered by Frey
sions: New Skills and Strategies for Public Managers.
Paris: Lavoisier.
and Eichenberger (2004), who contend that introducing
Crosby, B., and J. Bryson. 2005. Leadership for the
political competition among governments by arranging
Common Good : Tackling Public Problems in a Shared-
jurisdictions according to functions rather than territory
Power World. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
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Doberstein, C. 2011. "Institutional Creation and Death:
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