Why the Utilitarians Shot President Kennedy
Author(s): Don Locke
Source: Analysis , Mar., 1976, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Mar., 1976), pp. 153-155
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3327840
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WHY THE UTILITARIANS SHOT PRESIDENT KENNEDY*
By DON LOCKE
T now appears that sometime in the early i96os, when othe
philosophers were agonizing over the logic of moral judgem
the meaning of 'good', a group of Utilitarians was meeting in t
States to discuss the practical applications of their theories and
they might do in the world. Among their principal concerns
evident increase in inner-city violent crime, which seemed to
threaten the very roots of civilized life, and they placed the cau
and squarely in the traditional American policy of ease of acces
arms. Yet they knew that public pronouncements and political
from a handful of academic moralists would count for nothing agai
powerful gun-lobby in Congress and the ingrained attitudes of
of their countrymen. The only hope of change lay in shocking
to its senses by demonstrating how easy it was to purchase a gu
American main street, or through the mails, and shoot any
might take your fancy.
Accordingly they decided on the course of action which
most likely to produce the desired benefit at least cost, one whi
appear bad on the surface, but which would ultimately prove m
ductive of good than evil. They decided to shoot just one indiv
as to minimize the inevitable suffering and misery, but the one ind
whose prominence and popularity-personal if not political-
most likely to horrify the country and lead in a mood of national m
ing and self-criticism to the imposition of stringent gun contro
Even so the conspirators had their qualms. It was not simpl
their Utilitarianism was permitting, indeed requiring, an acti
on any non-Utilitarian ethic must seem horribly and unquesti
wrong: as Utilitarians they had long been inured to that famili
bility. But Utilitarianism was requiring an action because it was
inasmuch as its eventual rightness depended precisely on its b
versally condemned, even among Utilitarians. But they comfort
selves with the thought that what was necessary was not that their
be wrong, but only that it seem wrong. Evidently a Utilitarian
prepared to make the right seem wrong, and also, presumably,
the wrong seem right: unlike Justice, Utility need not be seen to b
And so the deed was done, for the best of Utilitarian reasons
the best of Utilitarian results. But unhappily things went spect
wrong. Not only did the desired results fail to accrue, but it i
* I uncovered this plot while reading Utilitarianism: For and Against by J. J. C.
Bernard Williams (Cambridge, 1973), and especially Section 6 of Williams' pap
evidence may be found in 'It Makes no Difference Whether or Not I do it' by
Glover, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XLIX, I975.
153
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154
ANALYSIS
possible that this incident w
cult of political assassination
death became even more an
But
although
the
conspirat
objective terms, it is diffic
rightness. The plotters may
would be irrational of them
the
Utilitarian
gun-lobby,
equivalents
the
depth
terference
with
his
to
least
harm
involve
then
that
sight.
was
They
it,
right
and
took
a
may
of
in
we
th
to
c
itsel
are
a
calculat
estimating the consequences
through any fault of their o
outweighed
praise
praise
les
or
or
blame,
autres,
moral
the
blame
fault
and
even
in
probable
them
if
their
no
h
must
doubt
they
had
acting
as
wholly reasonable expectatio
blameworthy, but by no me
In another respect, moreov
the wrong. It was, of cours
discover why or by whom t
crease the resulting harm, w
Utilitarian penalty for thei
Utilitarianism
Utilitarian
the
plot
itself
policies
might
into
and
fail
pract
here
t
motives and justification lai
happily for the prevention o
to a solitary individual, agai
avoid the risks of exposure i
In fact it proved easy enoug
enquire into these incidents
Utilitarian importance, whi
the Utilitarian secret; and t
no one has so far come near
The original action may hav
of good will would be able to
an unmitigated moral succes
But
now
Indeed
if
the
jig
people
is
up,
are
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the
led
to
wo
qu
WHY THE UTILITARIANS SHOT PRESIDENT KENNEDY 155
luck, would have justified the murders of two innocent men and all t
subsequent political intrigue and public deception, then I fear this not
guilty, not only of bad taste, but of moral subversion. But I have tw
defences.
One is that the fault cannot wholly be mine, if the same evil woul
have followed without my intervention. In fact the Utilitarians the
selves are equally to blame. For generations they have been publicizing
morality which insists that the value of a deed depends not on
reasons but on its results. So even if the assassination had been the work
of the unfortunate who, for good Utilitarian reasons, was made to take
the blame, his action could still have been justified, would still have been
right in Utilitarian terms, if only it had had the desirable result of a drop
in violent crime via firearm controls. His acting thus, supposing he had
acted thus, would then have been more productive of good than his not
acting thus, and worthy of honourable mention in the annals of great
twentieth-century moral achievements (not that such annals should
ever be made available to public inspection). This conclusion was there
to be drawn, even by those with no inkling of the Utilitarian plot;
sooner or later the truth-about Utilitarianism, if not about Dallaswould have emerged. There are, then, good Utilitarian reasons why a
Utilitarian should not preach his Utilitarianism, except to those so
secure in their Utilitarianism that no consequence thereof will lead them
to question it. But driven by a natural human desire to make converts,
rather than doing good in the world, the Utilitarians have not been content to follow this precept, and they must bear some of the responsibility.
Of course it is possible that the conspirators were mistaken in think-
ing that the likelihood of people's performing good Utilitarian acts
would be affected by their acceptance or rejection of Utilitarian principles; and equally it is possible that no Utilitarian harm will be done by
publishing the consequences of Utilitarianism. In that case the preaching
of Utilitarianism will not be harmful, merely idle, though there will
still be no good Utilitarian reason for publicizing Utilitarianism. That at
any rate is my hope and my second defence: that however much the
morally unsophisticated might be appalled by the deeds that Utilitarianism can be used to justify, and the deeds that might be done in its name,
a modicum of ignorance, deception or human perversity may yet suffice
to ensure that everybody acts for the Utilitarian best in the best of
Utilitarian worlds.
University of Warwick 0 DON LOCKE 1976
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