PREL 440: Sago Mine
Jade Scholten
I.
Introductory Statement
A. International Coal Group (ICG) has a problem. On January 2, 2006, a coal mine in
Sago, West Virginia, owned by ICG, exploded, trapping thirteen miners approximately two miles
into the mine. The blast was likely caused by a build-up of methane gas in the mine that was
later determined to be ignited by lightning. The first reports from the rescue team were that the
miners were alive. The news was spread nationally through mainstream media, giving their
families and the public a reason to celebrate. The report was later determined to be a
miscommunication, and in fact, only one miner had survived the explosion. A comprehensive PR
plan is needed to restore public trust, assure stakeholders of their commitment to safety, and maintain
their social license to operate globally.
II.
Situation Analysis
A.
The Sago Mine, located in Upshur County, West Virginia, was operated by the
(ICG) during the January 2006 disaster. It had a long history of operation, with ownership
changing hands several times. ICG had acquired the mine from Anker Coal Group in
2005. By then, the mine was already known for its safety challenges, reflecting broader
issues within the coal industry. In 2005, the Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) issued over 200 safety violations to the Sago Mine, 96 of which were
categorized as "significant and substantial." These violations addressed critical issues like
inadequate ventilation, roof stability, and equipment maintenance, which are key to
preventing hazards like methane buildup and explosions. Despite these infractions, the
mine remained operational, with violations addressed through fines or corrective
measures. Methane gas, coal dust, and geological instability pose ongoing risks common
in Appalachian coal mines. On January 2, 2006, an explosion occurred in the mine,
trapping thirteen miners underground. The blast, caused by a methane ignition, destroyed
ventilation systems and released deadly carbon monoxide into the mine. Rescue teams
faced dangerous conditions, including unstable tunnels and toxic gas, which delayed their
efforts for over 40 hours. As rescue operations progressed, it was reported that twelve of
the miners were found. As rescue operations progressed, a miscommunication led to
widespread false reports that twelve miners were found alive. This misunderstanding
arose when a rescue team relayed a message about finding the miners, which was
misinterpreted as confirmation of their survival. This information quickly spread to
officials and the media, sparking celebrations among the miners’ families and the public.
However, the truth that 12 miners had died and only one survived was revealed hours
later, devastating families and raising serious questions about crisis communication.
A comprehensive PR plan is needed to restore public trust, assure stakeholders of their commitment to
safety, and maintain their social license to operate globally.
B. Research
i.
Understand key groups involved, such as families of miners, employees,
regulators, media, and the public, and their concerns. This would involve
gathering feedback through surveys, focus groups, or one-on-one interviews to
understand their feelings.
ii.
Tracking how the media covered the miscommunication and public response is
critical. This involves analyzing news articles, TV coverage, social media
discussions, and online forums to identify the messages being communicated, as
well as misinformation or negative sentiments spreading.
iii.
Analyzing the current public perception of the Sago Mine, including sentiment
analysis on social media and press. This would help gauge how the
miscommunication has affected the mine's reputation and assess areas of
improvement or messaging gaps.
iv.
Researching to test new messages that would clarify the miscommunication. This
could be done through surveys or focus groups to determine how well new
messages resonate with the public and whether they restore trust.
v.
Researching the effectiveness of the crisis communication strategy during and
after the event. This would involve reviewing communication materials,
responses, and timing, to identify where improvements could be made for future
incidents.
vi.
Understanding how employees at the mine feel about the miscommunication and
its handling, which could also be done through surveys or interviews. This
research would help ensure alignment within the company and support positive
internal messaging to improve morale and company culture.
vii.
Analyzing other potential risks, the mine could face in the future and preparing
for how to handle them. This includes identifying areas of vulnerability in public
trust or operational transparency.
III.
Goal
A. For International Coal Group to be seen as a reputable and honest company running
safe and well-regulated mines.
IV.
Focus
A. Miner’s loved ones
i. Traits: Friends, Family, and people that have a close personal relationship with
the miners.
ii. Know-Feel: They are extremely concerned while anticipating the rescue of the
miners. They know the difficulties the rescue team is facing, as well as the low
probability of the miners surviving due to the high levels of carbon monoxide.
When it was reported that the miners were alive, they were emotional and
relieved. As the miscommunication was clarified, they were extremely angry and
rightfully devastated.
ii. Justify-Behavior: Being the loved ones of the miners and ultimately the victims of
the miscommunication, they are important because they suffered the greatest loss.
Desire results include forgiveness and understanding to ICG for the
miscommunication through support, transparency, and accountability.
B. General Public
i. Traits: People who followed the rescue efforts and aftermath of the explosion
closely
ii. Know-Feel: They watched in anticipation as rescue teams struggled to find the
miners. They relied on the press and officials of ICG to communicate key updates
about the conditions of the miners and rescue team. There was outrage after the
miscommunication with ICG.
ii. Justify- behavior: The public is important because they are invested in the safety
of the miners. They will demand accountability from ICG and follow up to make
sure family members receive the support they deserve. Desired results include
confidence in support to families and assurance in safety protocols.
V.
Objectives
A. Provide clear communication and support to miners’ families to develop forgiveness
for ICG to allow for healing and understanding.
B. To communicate remorse with the general public to accept ICG’s accountability,
decreasing accusations of negligence and criticism.
VI.
Strategies
A. ICG issued press releases to provide a clear and concise message. This message
contained information concerning the tragedy along with experience with personal
loss to show empathy. It was also an effort to honor the miners who died from the
explosion. The press release allowed for communication with the public and families
without having to personally face the media, which could have allowed for anger and
attacks on ICG’s officials.
B. Remaining transparent throughout the investigation allowed the public to view the
efforts of ICG to support miners affected by the explosion and miners employed by
ICG. It also allows the public to understand the steps ICG is taking to increase safety
for the mining community.
C. The financial fund set aside for those afflicted by the tragedy was promptly put into
action in hopes of possibly calming victims of the crisis and preventing any backlash
from those upset at the infamous miscommunication.
D. ICG holding a press conference at a later date allowed ICG to regroup, determine a
plan of action, and address the public and media through one voice. It allowed for the
full investigation to finish allowing them to have all the answers needed before
personally addressing the public. Showing up in person showcased sincerity and
remorse through tone of voice facial expression and body language.
VII.
Tactics
A. ICG issued two official press releases on January 4, 2006, two days after the
explosion at the Sago Mine in Tallmansville, West Virginia. In the first release, ICG
Chairman Wilbur Ross offered a response that combined elements of empathy and
acknowledgment of the tragedy. Ross shared his personal experience of loss, stating,
“I personally understand their trauma since I lost my own father when I was a
teenager, and my widowed mother was left with three children, the youngest of whom
was eight years old. I offer these families my heartfelt sympathy and my prayers.”
The second, shorter release announced the creation of a fund to support the families
of the deceased miners.
B. ICG established the Sago Mine Fund with an initial $2 million endowment and
invited public contributions for several months. While no official apology addressed
the miscommunication during the final moments of the rescue effort.
C. On January 5, 2006, ICG released a statement confirming the initiation of a full
investigation into the incident. This release also identified the miners who lost their
lives in the disaster. To manage the growing media attention, ICG enlisted the
services of Dix & Eaton, delegating all media inquiries to the firm. A subsequent
release provided more detailed information about the miners involved in the tragedy
and reiterated ICG’s commitment to employee safety, emphasizing its existing safety
measures and practices.
D. On January 11, 2006, ICG held a media briefing to update the public on the ongoing
investigation. During the briefing, the company addressed questions regarding safety
violations noted before the explosion that claimed 12 lives. Additionally, an online
pressroom was established to centralize press releases and provide contact
information for media and public inquiries.
VIII.
Evaluation
A. Output Performance: The tactics employed by ICG after the Sago Mine disaster had
mixed effectiveness. Chairman Wilbur Ross's initial statement expressing personal
empathy helped humanize the company, but the lack of an apology or
acknowledgment of the miscommunication during the rescue weakened its sincerity.
The creation of the Sago Mine Fund, with a $2 million endowment and public
donations, was a positive but insufficient response. While it helped the victims'
families, it did not address the company's accountability for the disaster, leading to
potential perceptions of an attempt to buy public forgiveness. ICG’s hiring of Dix &
Eaton to manage media inquiries provided a more polished response, but it could be
seen as distancing the company from the emotional aspects of the crisis. Their
repeated focus on safety practices, while aimed at rebuilding trust, felt disingenuous
due to past violations.
B. ICG’s response to the tragedy was largely ineffective in achieving forgiveness from
miners’ families and rebuilding public trust. Financial compensation and safety
measures were seen as inadequate, failing to address the emotional and psychological
toll on families. A lack of genuine remorse, transparency, and personal engagement
hindered healing and strained relationships. Efforts to communicate with the public,
such as updates and press statements, fell short, leaving unresolved concerns about
safety and accountability. Overall, ICG’s actions were viewed as more focused on
protecting its image than fostering trust or addressing deeper issues, limiting its
effectiveness in repairing relationships and reputation.
i.
To provide clear communication and support to miners’ families to develop
forgiveness for ICG to allow for healing and understanding. ICG did attempt to
provide support to the miners' families in the form of financial compensation,
but these efforts were perceived as inadequate given the scale of the tragedy.
While the company did settle with the families for millions of dollars, the
compensation was often seen as insufficient in comparison to the emotional and
psychological toll the disaster took on the families. These financial settlements,
while necessary, did little to address the deeper issues of trust and
reconciliation. The company’s public statements in the wake of the disaster
often appeared formulaic or lacking in genuine emotion. While ICG leaders
expressed sympathy for the loss of life, there was little indication that the
company fully grasped or communicated the extent of its responsibility for the
safety failures that led to the explosion. This made it difficult for many families
to find closure, as they felt the company was not truly taking accountability for
its actions. ICG did not take sufficient steps to engage with the families on a
personal level or offer meaningful support for emotional healing. There were no
sustained efforts to build a dialogue with the families or to provide
ii.
IX.
psychological counseling to help them cope with their grief. In addition, the
company's focus on minimizing its legal liabilities rather than fostering a more
empathetic, human response further alienated the families and hindered any
potential for forgiveness or understanding. In the long term, the lack of
transparency, genuine remorse, and direct engagement with the families
contributed to a strained relationship between ICG and those who were directly
affected by the disaster. While the company did take steps to improve safety
protocols in the aftermath, these actions were often viewed as too little, too late.
As a result, many of the miners' families struggled to forgive the company, and
healing was slow, hindered by the perception that ICG’s response was more
about protecting its image than offering real support or taking full responsibility
for the tragedy.
To communicate remorse with the general public to accept ICG’s
accountability, decreasing accusations of negligence and criticism. Regular
updates on the investigation and the establishment of an online pressroom
improved transparency but did little to address the public’s concerns about the
company’s role in the incident. Overall, ICG’s response managed immediate
needs but failed to fully address the ethical and safety issues, limiting its
effectiveness in rebuilding public trusting was not particularly successful in
communicating remorse and accepting full accountability in a way that would
have reduced accusations of negligence and criticism. While the company made
some public statements of sympathy and took legal and financial steps after the
disaster, the public’s view of the company remained largely negative due to the
initial misinformation, the lack of clear accountability, and ongoing concerns
about the company’s safety culture. This made it difficult for ICG to fully repair
its reputation in the eyes of the public
Analysis
A. Good: The response to the Sago Mine disaster had positive aspects. The memorial
services and ongoing tributes to the victims helped honor their sacrifice and brought
the community together in remembrance. This gesture provided a sense of closure
and solidarity for the affected families. Additionally, the disaster spurred significant
legislative action, including the passage of the MINER Act, which introduced new
mining safety regulations. This demonstrated a commitment to ensuring that such a
tragedy would not be repeated. Politicians, such as Senator Joe Manchin, have
consistently remembered the victims in statements, further reinforcing the importance
of the tragedy in shaping policy and safety reforms
B. Bad: Initially, misinformation was spread about the miners' fate, with reports falsely
stating that all 13 had survived. This caused widespread confusion and further grief
for the families when the truth came out. Communication with families was delayed,
and the authorities failed to quickly provide accurate information, adding to the
distress. Additionally, the command center was not tightly controlled, and
unauthorized access by media and others led to rumors and further confusion,
undermining trust in the response efforts
C. Insights: Immediate and transparent communication would be paramount to improve
PR in a similar crisis. Keeping both the public and families informed with accurate
updates would prevent misinformation and maintain trust. Establishing clear
communication channels between responders and families and offering emotional
support would help mitigate the shock and pain of such a disaster. Finally, ensuring
that only authorized personnel have access to sensitive areas would help manage the
narrative and prevent rumors from damaging the reputation of those handling the
crisis
X.
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