Sociology of an illegitimate political grouping. The
Samoobrona (Self-Defense) movement in Poland
(1991-2010)
Cédric Pellen
To cite this version:
Cédric Pellen. Sociology of an illegitimate political grouping. The Samoobrona (Au- todéfense) movement in
Poland (1991-2010). Political Science. Bordeaux University; Montesquieu University
- Bordeaux IV; Institut d'études politiques de Bordeaux, 2010. French language. NNT : 2010BOR40066 . tel00544899
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UNIVERSITY OF BORDEAUX
UNIVERSITÉ MONTESQUIEU - BORDEAUX IV / SCIENCES PO BORDEAUX
ECOLE DOCTORALE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE DE BORDEAUX - E.D. 208
SPIRI T - Political Science, International Relations, Territory (CNRS UMR 5116)
SOCIOLOGY OF AN ILLEGITIMATE
POLITICAL GROUPING
The Samoobrona (Self-Defense) movement in Poland
(1991-2010)
Thesis for the Doctorate in Political Science
presented and publicly defended by Cédric PELLEN
December 8, 2010
Under the supervision of Professor Antoine ROGER
Jury members :
Mr Eric AGRIKOLIANSKY, Senior Lecturer, Université Paris-IX
Mr Eric DARRAS, University Professor, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Toulouse
(rapporteur)
Mr Yves DÉLOYE, University Professor, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux
Mr Georges MINK, Research Director, ISP/CNRS, Université Paris-X (rapporteur)
Mr Antoine ROGER, University Professor, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux
(thesis supervisor)
Frédéric SAWICKI, University Professor, Université Paris-I
1
Sociology of an illegitimate political grouping.
The Samoobrona (Self-Defense) movement in Poland (1991-2010)
Abstract: The aim of our research is to understand the genesis, rise and marginalization of the
Samoobrona (Self-Defense) movement in Poland's so-called "political games".
"post-communist". Founded in 1992 by a group of over-indebted farmers, the Samoobrona movement
brought together two legally distinct organizations, a farmers' union and a political party, under a
common label. In the 1990s, it became known for its
The group's members were "radical" during the peasant protests that shook Poland at the time. In the
early 2000s, it established itself as a central player on the Polish political scene, winning over 10% of
the vote in various elections and even entering government for a time, before being marginalized once
again following the early parliamentary elections of 2007. Breaking with the exceptionalist readings of
"populism" that are commonly given, this research shows that the study of the trajectory of the
Samoobrona movement benefits from being resituated within the ordinary frameworks of the social
sciences of politics. By questioning the conditions of production of a political grouping in a context of
redefinition of the rules of political competition, we give ourselves the means to think of the
"successes" and "failures" of the Samoobrona movement as the relatively unlikely products of bumpy
and hesitant processes of definition and legitimization of an original and mobilizing offer of
representation. The movement's dual organizational structure, as both trade union and party, enables the
actors who shape it to intervene jointly in a variety of spaces of interaction. In this way, it plays a
decisive role in their recognition at the start of the 2000s as essential participants in the competition to
define and represent social interests, and to gain positions of political power. At the same time,
however, it prevents them from being perceived as legitimate players in the political arena, from
institutionalizing their grouping and ultimately from enduring in the field of institutional politics.
Keywords: political representation, mobilization, institutionalization, legitimization, political parties,
trade unions, social movements, populism, peasantry, "post-communism", Poland.
Sociology of an illegitimate political movement
The Samoobrona (Self-defence) movement in Poland 1991-2010
Summary: The aim of our study is to identify the origins, rise and subsequent marginalisation of the
Samoobrona (Self-defence) movement within the interplay of Polish political forces known as "post
communist". Founded in 1992 by a group of financially over-extended farmers who combined into a
single entity two legally distinct organisations, one a farming union and the other a political party, the
Samoobrona movement became known in the nineties through the "radicalism" of its members during
the farming demonstrations which shook Poland. From 2000 on, it took up a position as a central player
on the Polish political scene, totalising more than 10% of the vote at various elections and even entering
the administration for a time, before being once again marginalized after the early parliamentary
elections in 2007. In this research, we break with the commonly held view of populism as an exception,
to show that the study of the path of the Samoobrona movement should be placed within the normal
social science spectrum of politics. If we examine the development conditions of a political group
within the context of a revision of the political competition rules, it is possible to see the "successes"
and "failures" of the Samoobrona movement as the relatively unlikely results of the clashes and
faltering processes of the definition and justification of a representational offer which presents both an
original option and a rallying force. The double organisation of the movement, at once party-political
and trade-union based, allows those who created it to operate simultaneously on various fields of
interaction. In this, from 2000 on, the twofold origin plays a decisive role in the recognition of the
leaders of Samoobrona as inevitable competitors for the definition and the representation of social
interests as well as contenders for positions of political power. At the same time, it prevents their being
seen as legitimate players on the political scene, stops the group becoming institutionalised, and finally
means they cannot last in the political and institutional arena.
Key-words : political representation, mobilisation, institutionalisation, legitimacy, political parties,
trade-unions, social movements, populism, peasantry, post-communism, Poland.
2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my thesis supervisor
Antoine Roger. His advice, encouragement, kindness and unfailing availability have
been invaluable at every stage of my thesis. It owes him a debt of gratitude.
My special thanks also go to Jérôme Heurtaux and Stéphane Portet. Both played a key
role in my decision to embark on my doctorate. They gave me invaluable support
throughout my research.
It was also thanks to them that I discovered the EHESS social science workshop at
Warsaw University, later renamed the Centre Michel Foucault. I'd like to thank all the
members of this institution for their warmth, friendship and all the fascinating
conversations we were able to have. The enthusiasm that animates this structure and
the projects we were able to carry out together greatly contributed to making my
doctoral years so stimulating. My special thanks go to Audrey Kichelewski, Agnès
Chétaille, Maya Szymanowska, Morgane Labbé and once again Jérôme Heurtaux and
Stéphane Portet for all the good times we had in Warsaw. My thoughts also go out to
all the staff at the French Civilization Center in Warsaw, and in particular to Iwona
Kotarbinska-Otto for her kindness and invaluable help.
I would like to thank Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot, Director of the IEP de Bordeaux,
and once again Antoine Roger, as Director of SPIRIT, for their constant support of
my work and for having enabled me to benefit from a research grant and then an
ATER position.
Many thanks to my fellow doctoral students and ATERs at IEP Bordeaux for their
kindness and for all the good times we shared in our cramped IEP office. My warmest
thanks to Thibaud Boncourt and Gilles Riaux for their proofreading, advice and,
above all, their friendship.
3
I would like to thank all the researchers whose paths I crossed during the course of my
thesis, at seminars and symposia. Through their advice, criticism and encouragement,
Klaus Bachman, Hélène Combes, Jean-Michel De Waele, Rose- Marie Lagrave,
Georges Mink, Laure Neumayer, Daniel-Louis Seiler and, in particular, Frédéric
Zalewski have greatly helped me to mature my thinking. I would also like to thank
Jean Petaux for supervising my DEA dissertation and giving me a taste for research.
This work owes a great deal to my family and friends for their constant support. I am
particularly grateful to my mother and father for supporting my professional choices
and, above all, for all the love they have given me over the years. I thank Laurent for
being an ideal big brother. A special thanks for the helping hand he gave me in the
last hours of this work. My thoughts also go out to Jennifer and little Eliott for all the
good times they have had and will have in the future. My thanks to Sally O'Farrell,
Thomas Le Goff and Marie-Anne Amant for their kindness, generosity and so much
more.
I can't imagine what the last few years would have been like without my friends. My
thoughts go out to Karl, Stan, Etienne, Alek, Alexandre, Morgane, Anne-Claire,
Ophélie, Charlotte B., Charlotte G., Stéphanie, Amandine, Matic, Johanna, Guilaine,
Françoise, Stéphane, Eva, Alexandra, Agnès, Cédric, Ben, Marie, Quentin, Baya,
Loïc, Lucile, Margot, Emilie, Paul, Sébastien, Delphine, David, Thierry, Sophie. I'm
especially grateful to Hélène, who helped me so much to finalize this work.
Finally, I have no words to express how much I owe to Anna, whose life I'm lucky
enough to share, and who has given me so much comfort in all circumstances over the
last few years.
4
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ARiMR (Agencja
Agency
Restrukturyzacji i
ModernizacjiRolnictwa):
for Restructuring and Modernization of Agriculture.
ARR (Agencja Rynku Rolnego): Agricultural Market Agency.
AK (Armia Krajowa): Internal Army.
Alternatywa RS (Alternatywa Ruch Społeczny): the Alternative Social Movement.
AWS (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność): Action Electorale Solidarité.
AWSP (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy): Action Electorale Solidarité de la
droite.
BBWR (Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rządem Józefa Piłsudskiego): Non-partisan
bloc collaborating with the government of Józef Piłsudski.
BBWR (Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform): non-partisan bloc in support of
reform.
BGŻ (Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej). Food economy bank. CBA (Centralne
Biuro Antykorupcyjne): Central Anti-Corruption Bureau.
CBOS (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej): Center for the Study of Social Opinion.
ChD (Chrześcijańska demokracja): Christian Democracy.
COGECA: General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the European Union.
COPA: Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations of the European
Union. FChD (Forum Chrześcijańsko-Demokratycznej): Christian Democratic
Forum.
FPD (Forum Prawicy Demokratycznej): Forum of the Democratic Right.
KKSR (Krajowy Komitet Samoobrony Rolnictwa ): National Agricultural SelfDefense Committee.
KLD (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny): Liberal Democratic Congress.
KPN (Konfederacja
PolskiNiepodległej):
for
an independent
Poland.
Confederation
KPN-Ojczyzna (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej- Ojczyzna): Confederation for an
independent Poland - Homeland.
5
KRUS (Kasa Rolniczego Ubezpieczenia Społecznego) Agricultural Social Insurance
Fund.
KZRKiOR (Krajowy Związek Rolników, Kółek i Organizacji Rolniczych): National
Union of Farmers, Agricultural Circles and Organizations.
LiD (Lewica i Demokraci): Left and Democrats. LiS (Liga
i Samoobrona): League and Self-Defense.
LPR (Liga Polskich Rodzin): the League of Polish Families.
MKKNS (Międzyzwiązkowy Krajowy Komitet Negocjacyjno-Strajkowy): Comité
national intersyndical de négociation et de grève.
MN (Mniejszość niemiecka): German minority.
NSZZRI "S" (Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy Rolników Indywidualnych
"Solidarność"): Independent, self-managed union of individual farmers "Solidarity".
NSZZ "S" (Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy "Solidarność"): Independent,
self-managed trade union "Solidarity".
OAKPRZ (Ogólnopolski Autonomiczny Komitet Protestacyjny Rolników
Zadłużonych): national autonomous protest committee of indebted farmers.
OBOP (Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej): Center for the Study of Public Opinion.
OKP (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny): Parliamentary Club of the Civic
Committee.
OPZZ (Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych): National Trade Union
Agreement.
OZZPiP (Ogólnopolski Związek Zawodowy Pielęgniarek i Położnych): National
Union of Nurses and Midwives.
PBS (Pracownia Badań Społeczny): Laboratory for social studies.
PC (Porozumienie Centrum): Center Agreement.
PChD (Partia Chrześcijańskich Demokratów): Christian Democratic Party. PD
(Partia Demokratyczna): Democratic Party.
PdlP (Przymierze dla Polski) : Alliance for Poland. PiS
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość): Law and Justice.
PKW (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza): National Electoral Commission.
6
PLD (Partia Ludowo-Demokratyczna): Peasant Democratic Party.
PO (Platforma Obywatelska): Civic Platform.
POC (Porozumienie Obywatelskie Centrum) Central Civic Agreement.
PPG (Polskie Przymierze Gospodarcze): Polish Economic Alliance. PPS
(Polska Partia Socjalistyczna): Polish Socialist Party.
PPPP (Polska Partia Przyjaciół Piwa): Polish Friends of Beer Party. PSL
(Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe): Polish farmers' party.
PSL-Mikołajczyk (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe-Mikołajczyk): Polish Peasant Party Mikołajczyk.
PSL-Piast (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe-Piast) : Polish Peasant Party - Piast.
PSL-PL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe - Porozumienie Ludowe) : Polish Peasant Party
- Peasant Entente.
PSL-Solidarność
(Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe
-Solidarność) :Polish
Peasant peasant party - Solidarity.
PSL-SP (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe - Sojusz Programowy): Polish Peasant Party Program Alliance.
PZPR (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza): Polish United Workers' Party.
PZZ (Polski Związek Zachodni): Western Polish Union.
RAŚ (Ruch Autonomii Śląska): Movement for Silesian autonomy. RdR (Ruch
dla Rzeczypospolitej): Movement for the Republic.
RL-PL (Ruch Ludowy - Porozumienie Ludowe) : Peasant movement - Entente
paysanne.
RS Samoobrona RP ( Ruch Społeczny Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej): Social
Self-Defense Movement of the Republic of Poland.
ROP (Ruch Odbudowy Polski): Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland.
Samoobrona RP (Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej): Self-defense of the
Republic of Poland.
SD (Stronnictwo Demokratyczny): Democratic Party.
7
SdPL (Socjaldemokracja Polska): Polish Social Democracy.
SdRP (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej): Social Democracy of the
Republic of Poland.
Sierpień 80': August 80'.
SKL (Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe): Conservative People's Party.
SL (Stronnictwo Ludowe): Peasant Party.
SLCh (Stronnictwo Ludowo-Chrześcijańskie): Christian Peasant Party.
SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej): Democratic Left Alliance
SLD-UP (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej - Unia Pracy): Alliance of the Democratic
Left - Labor Union.
"S "Pracy (Solidarność Pracy): Labor Solidarity.
Solidarność 80': Solidarity 80'.
TSKMNSO (Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne Mniejszości Niemieckiej na Śląsku
Opolskim): Socio-cultural association of the German minority in Opole Silesia.
TSKNWK
(Towarzystwo
Społeczno-Kulturalne
Niemców
Województwa
Katowickiego): Socio-cultural association of Germans in the Katowice voivodeship.
TVN (Telewizja Niezależna/Telewizja Nowa): Independent television/New television
(bouquet of private television channels).
TVP (Telewizja Polska): Polish Television (bouquet of public television channels).
UD (Unia Demokratyczna): Democratic Union.
UOP (Urząd Ochrony Państwa): State Protection Office. UP
(Unia Pracy): Labor Union.
UPR (Unia Polityki Realnej): Union for realistic politics. UW
(Unia Wolności): Union of Freedom.
WAK (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka): Catholic Electoral Action.
ZChN (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe): Christian National Union.
ZMW (Związek Młodzieży Wiejskiej): Union of Rural Youth.
8
ZNP (Związek Nauczycielstwa Polskiego): Polish teachers' union. ZSL
(Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe): United Peasant Party.
ZZRiOW "Regiony" ( Związek Zawodowy Rolnictwa i Obszarów Wiejskich
"Regiony"): Regiony" agricultural and rural union.
ZZR "Ojczyzna" (Związek Zawodowy Rolnictwa "Ojczyzna") : Farmers' union
"Patrie".
ZZR Samoobrona (Związek Zawodowy Rolnictwa Samoobrona): Self-defense
agricultural union.
9
10
General introduction
Warsaw, Ministry of Agriculture, April 27, 1992. The building's doors are closed
and guarded by police officers. Inside, a makeshift camp has been set up in the hall.
For nearly three weeks, several hundred activists from the ZZR Samoobrona ("SelfDefense" Agricultural Union) have been occupying the Ministry of Agriculture in the
center of the capital. Speaking to journalists, Andrzej Lepper, president of the farmers'
union founded just four months earlier, set out his conditions for evacuating the
building. He demanded an immediate halt to seizures of the property of over-indebted
farmers, a drastic reduction in interest rates on agricultural loans and the resignation
of the Minister of Agriculture, Gabriel Janowski. Having refused to join the
negotiations with the other farmers' unions, he threatened the government: "We don't
want war, but if need be, we won't hesitate to take up arms to defend ourselves against
state agents, bailiffs, bankers or tax inspectors"1 .
Czosnów (30 km northwest of Warsaw), Hotel U Witaszka, September 23, 2001.
To the music of a local band, the many journalists are welcomed to the election party
of the Samoobrona RP ("Self-Defense" of the Republic of Poland). The atmosphere is
euphoric. With over 10% of the votes cast, the party founded by leaders of the ZZR
Samoobrona farmers' union has pulled off the surprise of the parliamentary elections.
With 53 deputies and
With 2 senators, it has established itself as the third largest parliamentary force in the
country. In Warsaw, on television and on the radio, commentators on Polish politics
are in shock. None of the numerous pre-election polls had anticipated the extent of the
breakthrough achieved by the party chaired by Andrzej Lepper.
Brussels, Justus Lipsius building, May 22, 2006. Andrzej Lepper, Poland's new
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture, represents his country for the first
t i m e at a meeting of the European Union's Agriculture and Fisheries Council. He
joined the government at the beginning of the month, thanks to a coalition agreement
between his party, the Samoobrona RP, the Kaczyński brothers' PiS and the LPR.
1 "Bataliony Chłopskie "Samoobrony"", Gazeta Wyborcza, 30/04/1992, p.4.
11
intends to negotiate an increase in milk quotas for Poland with its counterparts in the
other member states, as well as more flexible procedures for Polish farmers to access
subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy.
Warsaw, Nowy Świat street, May 15, 2010. On the capital's main shopping street,
Andrzej Lepper, accompanied by a handful of Samoobrona RP activists, is handing
out leaflets promoting his candidacy for the early presidential election at the end of
June. While some passers-by are hostile towards him, most are amused to bump into
this fallen celebrity. Some even take photos with the former deputy prime minister,
who is credited with barely one percent of voting intentions in the various pre-election
polls.
These sequences from the "life" of the Samoobrona ("Self-Defense") movement
provide an anecdotal illustration of its trajectory in contemporary Polish politics1 .
Bringing together under a common label two legally distinct organizations, a farmers'
union (the ZZR Samoobrona) and a political party (the Przymierze Samoobrona,
renamed Samoobrona RP in the early 2000s), this movement initiated by overindebted farmers in the early years of the IIIe Polish Republic2 was seen throughout
the 1990s as a radical peasant group with little political future. Although its
spectacular and often illegal union activities made it one of the main driving forces
behind the agricultural strikes that swept Poland in the early and late 1990s, its
representatives failed to win any mandates in the various elections in which they took
part. Against all expectations, the Samoobrona movement finally established itself in
the early 2000s, almost ten years after its creation, as a major protagonist on the
Polish political scene. Consistently winning more than 10% of the vote in elections
held between 2001 and 2005, it has more than fifty deputies in the IVe and Ve
By trajectory, we mean here, according to Pierre Bourdieu, "a series of positions successively
occupied by the same agent (or group) in a space itself in the process of becoming and subject to
incessant transformations": Bourdieu Pierre, "L'illusion biographique", Actes de la recherche en
sciences sociales, n°62-63, 1986, p.71.
2 The IIIe Republic refers to the regime set up in Poland after 1989, marking a symbolic break with the
Communist regime. Initially informal, the name was formalized in the new Constitution adopted in
1997.
1
12
1
and even participated for a time in the exercise of governmental power. The
Samoobrona movement was ousted from the parliamentary game in the early
legislative elections of October 2007, and today appears bloodless. Faced with major
financial and legal difficulties, it was unable to win more than 2% of voters in the
2009 European and 2010 presidential elections.
Through its spectacular trajectory, the Samoobrona movement invites us to question
the conditions of entry and sustainability in politics in so-called "post-communist"
Poland. More generally, it provides a privileged observatory for grasping the
processes by which, in a pluralist regime, actors outside the established political
forces engage in competition for the political representation of social interests and
strive to gain recognition for their legitimacy in obtaining and occupying positions of
political power, despite their initial status as "outsiders". The relative "newness" of the
Polish democratic political competition in which it develops its activities allows us to
observe in "close-up" phenomena that are at work in a more concealed way in older
structured political fields, notably the processes of codification of the legitimate rules
of representation of social interests.
How do players from outside the established political forces come to be involved in
the recently opened competition for the representation of social interests? How do
they take part in the struggle for positions of political power? How do they go about
developing and legitimizing a form of representation that enables them to stand out
from the crowd? What obstacles do they encounter in the course of their activities,
and how do they seek to overcome them? How do the representatives of the
Samoobrona movement invest the various roles they are called upon to play in
different spaces of interaction? What are the effects of their entry into the field of
institutional politics on the Samoobrona movement's activities?
1 The Sejm elected in the parliamentary elections of October 27, 1991, the first to be fully
"Since the inter-war years, the Diet has been known as the Ie legislature, to mark a break with the
previous Diet, which was elected in semi-competitive elections in June 1989. In the Senate, on the
other hand, the Ie legislature is the one elected in June 1989. For the purposes of this thesis, we will
characterize the successive legislatures by referring to their appellation for the Sejm. The IVe and Ve
legislatures thus refer to the parliaments elected in 2001 and 2005 respectively.
13
movement? These are some of the key questions we'll be tackling in the course of this
research.
Before clarifying our approach, let's take a moment to consider how the trajectory of
the Samoobrona movement is commonly understood in the literature.
I- The pretense of the obvious: Samoobrona's populism.
Among commentators on Polish politics, the case seems to be made. Far from being
an enigma, the unexpected trajectory of the Samoobrona movement in the political
game is the main expression of a "populist upsurge" that hit Poland in the early 2000s.
Andrzej Lepper's movement, with its critical discourse on the modalities of regime
change and its protest practices at odds with democratic decorum, is said to have
succeeded in mobilizing in its favor a significant proportion of the many voters
disappointed by the traditional political parties and the economic policies
implemented by successive governments since 1989. A Polish expression of the
"wave of populism" that has been sweeping across Europe for the past twenty years,
the Samoobrona movement is said to have been unable to maintain the loyalty of
these voters, and to have suffered f r o m a "democratic" surge, as witnessed by the
2007 elections.
Although it is now the subject of a broad consensus in the literature, the
systematization of the qualification of the Samoobrona movement as populism was by
no means self-evident (1). It also conceals real interpretative divergences between
authors, which must be understood in the context of the theoretical struggles that
animate the field of "post-communist" studies (2). Above all, despite its apparent
scientificity, the notion of populism is of uncertain heuristic value. In addition to
conveying harmful normative and elitist prejudices, it provides an essentialist reading
of political phenomena that prevents us from grasping the concrete dynamics that
constitute them (3).
14
A) The paradoxical systematization of Samoobrona's
qualification as "populism".
In Polish, the noun populism (populizm) and the adjective populist (populistyczny) are
recent creations. Neologisms forged from the Latin populus (the people), they only
appeared in this language in the early 1990s, in the first moments of the IIIe
"democratic" Republic. They were first used in journalism. During the presidential
election in October 1990, several commentators on Polish politics believed they could
identify "populist tendencies" (tendencje populistyczne) in some of the candidates,
notably Lech Wałęsa and Stanisław Tymiński. On the eve of the vote, the editor-inchief of the daily Gazeta Wyborcza, former dissident Adam Michnik, thus justified his
refusal to vote in favor of the former president of the Solidarity trade union (NSZZ
"S") by accusing him of seeking to please "the followers of anti-intellectual populism
[antyineligencki populizm] and anti-Semitic phobias"1 . Similarly, the first-round
elimination of outgoing Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a favorite of
Solidarity's "intellectuals", was frequently interpreted as a sign of the "victory of
populism over competence"2 .
Rapidly gaining popularity in media discourse, the words populizm and populistyczny
appeared in dictionaries as early as 1992. Populism is then defined in the Dictionary
of the Polish Language (Słownik języka polskiego) as "the act of launching or
supporting political ideas by referring primarily to the morality or sense of justice of
the people in order to gain influence or power"3 . It is thus endowed with a field of
meaning substantially distinct from the word ludowość, translated nonetheless
similarly as populism in French. Forged at the end of the XIXe century on the Slavic
base lud (the people), the latter is defined either, in a sense linking it to the agrarian
political movement, as "the fact of supporting political ideas that value the
countryside and the peasants, as well as their traditions", or, with reference to its
usage at the time of the People's Republic
1 Cf. Michnik Adam, "Dlaczego nie oddam głosu na Lecha Wałęsę", Gazeta Wyborcza, 27/10/1990.
2 For example: "Zwyciężył populizm i sen o szybkich pieniądzach", Gazeta Wyborcza, 27/11/1990, p.5.
3 "Populizm", Słownik języka polskiego, Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, quoted in Zawadzki
Paul, "Entre ethnos et dêmos : les populismes en Pologne", Mots, n°55, 1998, p.28.
15
of Poland (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa), as "claiming to be a people, understood as
a social group composed of workers and peasants"1 .
At the same time, the terms populizm and populistyczny began to be used by
professionals in the scientific analysis of politics. In 1992, political scientist Maria
Marczewska-Rytko published the first Polish-language work devoted to the notion of
populism2 . Detailing the theories of populism developed by South American
researchers in the 1960s, she explores the possibility of applying them to the
transformations at work in Central and Eastern Europe. In so doing, she opened up a
flourishing field of research in Polish political science. Over the past fifteen years, as
in most other European countries, the notion of populism has met with real success
among academics, who have devoted numerous articles and several books to it3 .
In the same way as the appearance of the Front National on the electoral scene in the
early 1980s in France4 , the emergence of the Samoobrona movement at the forefront
of the political game in Poland played a decisive role in popularizing the notion of
populism in the academic field. At the beginning of the 2000s, the new category was
used systematically in scientific discourse, as well as in journalism and politics, to
describe the growing popularity of the grouping chaired by Andrzej Lepper, as
indicated by opinion polls and then confirmed by elections. In Polish and international
literature, Samoobrona's populism became the main, if not the only, interpretation of
its rise to power and relative electoral success. Beyond their differences
1 "Ludowość", Słownik języka polskiego, www.sjp.pwn.pl, accessed September 5, 2010.
2 Marczewska-Rytko Maria, Populizm: zagadnienia teorii i praktyki politycznej w Ameryce Łacińskiej,
Lublin, Oficyna Wydawnicza "John & John", 1992.
3 To mention only the main works devoted to the notion of populism (populizm), please refer to :
Marczewska-Rytko Maria, Populizm: teoria i praktyka polityczna, Lublin, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 1995; Dzwończyk Joanna, Populistyczne tendencje w społeczeństwie
postsocjalistycznym (na przykładzie Polski), Toruń, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 1999; Markowski
Radosław (dir.), Populizm a demokracja, Warsaw, ISP-PAN, 2004; Migalski Marek (ed.), Populizm,
Katowice, Instytut Regionalny w Katowicach, 2005. In 2007, Yves Mény and Yves Surel's
Democracies and the Populist Challenge, published in 2001 by Palgrave Macmillan, was translated
into Polish by historian of ideas Jerzy Szacki: Mény Yves & Surel Yves, Demokracja w obliczu
populizmu, Warsaw, Oficyna Naukowa, 2007.
4 On the genesis and popularization of the notion of populism in France: Collovald Annie, Le populisme
du FN : un dangereux contresens, Broissieux, Editions du Croquant, Savoir/Agir, 2004, p.25-53.
16
Theoretically, analysts agree that the movement is the Polish expression of a "populist
wave" which, although taking different forms and responding to different logics
depending on national situations, is challenging all European democracies, both West
and East of the former Iron Curtain1 . While its "success" from 2001 onwards would
seem to testify to a
While this wave has "surged" in Poland, its marginalization since 2007 is a sign of
"ebbing"2 .
Although now unanimously accepted, the classification of the Samoobrona movement
as populism (populizm) was by no means self-evident. When the movement appeared
on the Polish political scene during the peasant protests of the early 1990s, the label
populism - which had already been coined in Polish - was neither the only one nor the
most commonly used to designate it. At the time, the Samoobrona movement was
seen primarily as a "radical peasant group" (radykalne ugrupowanie chłopskie),
"nationalist" (nacjonalistyczny), or "with antidemocratic tendencies" (tendencje
antidemokratyczne)3 , the label of populist then remaining more commonly reserved
for formations such as Stanisław Tymiński's Partia "X" and the PSL peasant party, or
for political leaders such as President Wałęsa4 .
The systematization of the notion of populism to designate the movement
Samoobrona since the early 2000s is all the more paradoxical in that..,
1 From this perspective, see for example: Betz Hans-Georg, La droite populiste en Europe - Extrême et
démocrate?, Paris, Autrement, 2004; Leconte Cécile, L'Europe face au défi populiste, Paris, PUF,
2005; Rupnik Jacques, "From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash", Journal of Democracy,
vol.18, n°4, 2007, p.17-25; Krastev Ivan, "L'heure du populisme", Eurozine, 20/11/2007; or:
Guillemoles Alain, "Le populisme se lève à l'Est", Politique internationale, n°114, 2007, p.329-.
342. This perception of a "European populist wave" is put into perspective in: Chêne Janine, Ihl
Olivier, Vial Eric & Waterlo Ghislain (dir.), La Tentation populiste au coeur de l'Europe, Paris, La
Découverte, 2003.
2 Cf. Markowski Radosław, "The 2007 Polish Parliamentary Election: Some Structuring, Still a Lot of
Chaos", West European Politics, vol.31, n°5, 2008, p.1055-1068; the interpretation in terms of
The "reflux" of the Samoobrona RP's exit from Parliament, but also of its former coalition partner the
LPR, also prevails in the journalistic field, for example: "Populizm zanika, rośnie optymizm", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 10/22/2007.
3 For example: "Mała historia "Samoobrony"", Gazeta Wyborcza, 14-15/08/1993, p.3; "Czas
samoobrony", Polityka, 21/08/1993, p.3; Millard Frances, "Nationalist themes in Polish politics 19891993", Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol.2, n°4, 1994, p.43-55.
4 See, for example: Staniszkis Jadwiga, "Ciagłość i zmiana", Kultura i Społeczeństwo, n°1, 1992, p.2341; Zubek Voytek, "The rise and fall of rule by Poland's best and brightest", Europe-Asia Studies,
vol.44, n°4, 1992, p.579-608.
17
Even the authors who use it admit that it is particularly complex to handle. While
some pretend to ignore them1 , most specialists agree that it has two main weaknesses.
The first is its polemical use in public debate. Following Pierre-André Taguieff when
he notes that "a singular misfortune has befallen the word populism: it has recently
become popular"2 , it is fashionable to begin any publication devoted to populism by
expressing regret at its trivialization in media and political discourse. By
appropriating the word to indiscriminately denounce actors they deem detestable,
journalists and politicians are accused of having overused its meaning and
undermined its explanatory capacity. Once this observation has been made, however,
the authors tend to agree that the notion can be "saved" by rigorous definition. They
then come face to face with the second weakness identified: the extraordinary variety
of uses of the term "populism" in political science. Far f r o m having been coined for
t h e exclusive use of researchers seeking to understand the mechanisms behind the
unexpected emergence of the Samoobrona movement in "post-communist" Polish
politics, the notion has previously been used to describe disparate political phenomena
developing in varying socio-political contexts. As early as the 1950s, American
academics were the first to use it as a tool for analyzing political phenomena
contemporary with their own, principally MacCarthyism3 . Scientific studies based on
the notion of populism subsequently developed outside the United States, first in
Paradowska Janina & Władyka Wiesław, "Kto da więcej. Polski populizm '93", Polityka, 1993,
17/04/1993, p.1-11.
2 Taguieff Pierre-André, "Le populisme et la science politique du mirage conceptuel aux vrais
problèmes", XXème siècle Revue d'histoire, n°56, 1997, p.4.
3 The first attempts to conceptualize populism were made by American liberal intellectuals opposed to
MacCarthyism: two of the most representative works of this research trend are Shils Edward, The
Torment of Secrecy, New Y o r k , 1956; and Hofstadter Richard, The Age of Reform, in Bell Daniel
(ed.), The New American Right, New York, Doubleday, 1963. For a synthesis of the genesis of
populism as an analytical category in the post-war United States: Viltard Yves, "Archéologie du
populisme : les intellectuels libéraux américains saisis par le Maccarthysme", Genèses, n°37, 1999,
p.44-69. In reaction to these liberal works on populism, from the 1960s onwards a progressive reading
of populism developed, defining it in a meliorative way, as a profoundly democratic phenomenon. The
most influential of these authors is Lawrence Goodwyn: Goodwyn Lawrence, Democratic Promise:
The Populist Moment in America, New York, Oxford University Press, 1976. The debate between
"liberal" and "progressive" approaches continues to structure the field of research on populism in
Poland.
1
18
Latin America from the 1960s onwards1 , then for a little over twenty years in Europe2
. However, we need only look at these works for a moment to realize how disparate
they are. Far from constituting a unified corpus, they are marked by the diversity of
approaches, interpretations and conceptualizations of populism. There is no
agreement among political scientists on a minimum definition, on an essence of
populism capable of linking all the phenomena that have b e e n described in this
way3 .
Despite unanimous recognition of its imprecision, the notion of populism continues to
flourish in the academic field. Its appropriation by specialists in the so-called "postcommunist" democracies of Central and Eastern Europe is, in the final analysis, only
the latest peregrination of a term whose history is largely one of desemantization.
Paradoxically, it is certainly its very vagueness that is the main factor in its popularity.
By virtue of its nebulosity, the notion of populism tolerates a variety of uses and
adapts to disparate, even antagonistic, theoretical frameworks4 . As Peter Wiles noted
as early as 1969: "Everyone has their own definition of populism according to the
holy academy for
1 Taking it out of the American academic debate where it had been confined since the 1950s, South
American authors in the 1960s set out to make the notion of populism a tool for understanding the
particular dictatorships that had affected many countries on their continent from t h e 1930s onwards.
The regimes established in Brazil by Gétulio Vargas (1930-1945, then 1951-1954) and in Argentina by
Juan Perón (1946-1955, then 1973-1974) were considered archetypal. The main works developed in
this vein are by Torcuato Di Tella, Hêlio Jaguaribe and Gino Germani. See: Di Tella Torcuato,
"Populism and Reform in Latin America", in Veliz Claudio, Obstacles to change in Latin America,
London, University Press, 1965; Jaguaribe Hêlio, Problemas do desenvolvimento latinoamericano, Rio
de Janeiro, 1967; Germani Gino, Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism, New Brunswick,
Transaction Books, 1978.
2 In European political science, the notion of populism has been used since the mid-1980s, notably
under the impetus of French authors, to characterize atypical political parties, mainly from the far right,
such as the Front National in France, which were enjoying growing electoral success throughout
Europe at the time. Drawing on American debates on the "New Right", Pierre-André Taguieff was
responsible for importing the notion to France, where it quickly became a popular term among
historians and later political scientists. Taguieff Pierre-André, "La rhétorique du national-populisme",
Mots, n°9, 1984, p.113-139; Cf. Collovald Annie, op.cit., p.25-29.
3 Isaiah Berlin sums up a widespread opinion when he says that populism suffers from
"In the "Cinderella complex": "There is a shoe (the word 'populism') for which there is somewhere a
foot (its essence), but the problem is that, as soon as we find a definition of the 'populism shoe', we fail
to find the foot, i.e. the concrete realization of the phenomenon"; Quoted in Canovan Margaret,
Populism, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981, p.7. 4 Noting the inability of authors to
identify the essence of populism, Margaret Canovan proposed a typology of its various uses in the early
1980s. She identified seven. Canovan Margaret, Ibid.
19
to which he preaches"1 . In our view, it is not so much its heuristic contribution - as
we shall see, extremely dubious - but rather its convenient character that explains the
popularity of the notion of populism, particularly in works devoted to so-called "postcommunist" democracies. With its appearance of scientificity and coherence, it allows
those who use it to invest it with meanings and interpretations that conform to their
respective analytical grids. The beautiful unanimity with which the authors agree to
categorize the Samoobrona movement as populism thus conceals relatively
differentiated interpretations of the nature of this grouping, the causes of its
emergence and the reasons for its current marginalization.
B) An accommodating notion with a variable meaning.
To understand the genesis of the category "national-populism" and the systematization
of its use with regard to the Front National among historians of contemporary France,
Annie Collovald invites us to pay particular attention to the disciplinary
configurations in which these processes develop. She shows that the rapid popularity
of the new category when the FN appeared on the electoral scene, to the detriment of
other possible terms, notably fascism, is linked to historiographical controversies over
the ideological nature of the interwar Ligues and then the Vichy regime. In her view,
the reason why many specialists in political analysis have taken up the term "nationalpopulism" is that it has the advantage of enabling them to update their analytical
grids, by including the FN, without having to overturn them by calling into question
the central thesis on which they are built: that o f a "national-populist" ideology.
French society's "allergy" to fascism2 .
The processes involved in popularizing the notion of populism among specialists in
Central and Eastern European democracies known as "post
1 Wiles Peter, "A syndrome, not a doctrine: some elementary theses on populism", in Ionescu Ghita &
Gellner Ernest (eds.), Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics, London, Weidenfeld
Nicolson, 1969, p.166-179. Our translation.
2 Collovald Annie, op.cit. ; Collovald Annie, "Le 'national-populisme' ou le fascisme disparu: les
historiens du 'temps présent' et la question du déloyalisme politique contemporain", in Dobry Michel
(dir.), op.cit. p.279-321.
20
It seems to us that the "communist" approach, and more specifically the emergence of
a consensus on the populist character of the Samoobrona movement, responds to
logics of the same order. If it has been so widely used by authors since the 1990s, it's
mainly because it offers them the possibility of cataloguing and interpreting political
phenomena of unexpected emergence or permanence, without having to call into
question the analytical grids they traditionally mobilize to apprehend the political
systems of the former People's Republics. In other words, by integrating the notion of
populism into their conceptual "toolbox", they strive to maintain the coherence and
legitimacy of their approach within the interpretative struggles that animate the field
of "post-communist" studies. Although they see populism as "the solution found to
resolve the contradictions brought about by a political reality that belies their
forecasts"1 , the specialists who import the notion of populism into their work are far
from all belonging to the same research movement, sharing the same definition and,
ultimately, providing the same interpretation of the phenomena they nevertheless
agree on describing in this way.
The political reshaping brought about by the "fall" of communism in Central and
Eastern European countries has given rise to an abundance of work, reflecting a wide
variety of theoretical approaches and influences. Broadly speaking, however, it is
possible to identify two research perspectives that dominate this rich literature2 .
These differ mainly in the way they characterize the nature of the changes at work in
the former People's Republics. While authors belonging to the first perspective see
them as part of a global democratization movement, and strive to identify regularities
with previous experiences of
On the other hand, the latter tend to emphasize the specific features of the Eastern
European terrain, and seek to identify in the past of these societies the principles
presiding over their "transitions".
"transformations". Depending on whether their work falls into one or the other of
these perspectives, authors mobilizing the notion of populism to characterize
1 Ibid, p.283.
Cf. Dobry Michel, "Les voies incertaines de la transitologie : choix stratégiques, séquences
historiques, bifurcations et processus de path dependence", Revue française de science politique,
vol.50, n°4-5, 2000, p.585-614.
2
21
political phenomena observed in so-called "post-communist" countries, notably the
Samoobrona movement in Poland, attribute significantly different meanings and
interpretations to it. While some, influenced by
"Others see it as a sign of the resilience of political cultures specific to the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe.
1) A populism symptomatic of a transition crisis.
Specialists in democratic "transitions" and "consolidations" were the first to examine
the political reshaping brought about by the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Largely
denying the specificities of the former People's Republics of Central and Eastern
Europe, they see their "downfall" as a "political transition".
This "exceptional opportunity and field of quasi-experimentation"1 enabled them to
test the validity and refinement of hypotheses on democratization processes
previously developed in other fields. Behind their apparent diversity, the mechanisms
at work in the emergence from authoritarianism in Latin America, Southern Europe
and Central and Eastern Europe are, in their view, largely similar in nature2 .
"Transitologists" and "considologists" alike do not hesitate to shift their analytical
frameworks from one situation to another. Thus, the notion of populism, as theorized
thirty years earlier by specialists in Peronism in Argentina and Gétulism in Brazil,
was imported into the former "Soviet bloc" in the early 1990s to characterize political
phenomena perceived as posing a threat to the "smooth running" of the
democratization process.
1 Ibid, p.585.
2 Huntington Samuel,
The Third Wave, Oklahoma, Tulsa, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991; Przeworski Adam,
"The "East" Becomes the "South"? The "Autumn of the People" and the Future of Eastern Europe",
Political Science and Politics, vol.24, n°1, 1991, p.20-24; Hermet Guy, Le passage à la démocratie,
Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 1996; Bova Russell, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist
Transition: A Comparative Perspective", World Politics, vol.44, n°1, 1991; Pridham Geoffrey & Lewis
Paul (dir.), Stabilising fragile democracies: comparing new party systems in Southern and Eastern
Europe, London, Routledge, 1996. For a synthesis of democratizations studies: Mainwaring Scott,
O'Donnell Guillermo & Valenzuela Julio Samuel (eds.), Issues in democratic consolidation: the New
South American democracies in comparative perspective, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame
Press, 1992; Guilhot Nicolas & Schmitter Philippe, "De la transition à la consolidation. Une lecture
rétrospective des democratization studies", Revue Française de Science Politique, vol.50, n°4-5, 2000.
22
In this sense, populism is understood as a political movement feeding off the tensions
generated by the transition to capitalism and representative democracy1 . Frustrated at
not having immediate access to the new-found prosperity, the popular masses would
tend, during these periods of transition, to reject the nascent democratic political class
and turn to demagogic leaders2 . Thanks to their charismatic ability, the latter would
succeed in mobilizing these disenchanted masses by promising them the rapid
fulfillment of their social and political expectations3 . In the countries of the former
Soviet sphere of influence, it was the measures implemented to transform socialist
economies into liberal capitalist systems that, through their high social cost, produced
this feeling of frustration among the less privileged classes4 . Disappointed by the
much-vaunted reforms, these "transition frustrated" would constitute an electoral
clientele susceptible to the charms of a leader with authoritarian accents claiming to
transcend traditional partisan and ideological allegiances5 .
From this point of view, to classify the Samoobrona movement as populism is to
consider that its rise to power is essentially explained by the ability of its president,
Andrzej Lepper, to instrumentalize the resentments, discontents and fears of the least
economically and culturally endowed social circles. Through his charisma and "antisystem" rhetoric, Lepper questioned both the modalities of regime change,
particularly the Round Table negotiations6 , and the policies of economic
liberalization, symbolized by Leszek Balcerowicz, the main "anti-system" politician.
1 Cf. Germani Gino, op.cit.
2 On frustration as a prerequisite for populist mobilization: Di Tella Torcuato, art.cit.
3 On the importance of charisma in populist mobilizations: Jaguaribe Hêlio, op.cit.
4 For some authors, this feeling of frustration is all the stronger in former communist countries, where
the old economic regime had created habits of egalitarianism: Tismaneanu Vladimir, "The Leninist
Debris or Waiting for Peron", East European Politics and Societies, vol.10, n°1, 1996, p.504-535.
5 See, for example: Tismaneanu Vladimir, "Hypotheses on Populism: The Politics of Charismatic
Protest", East European Politics and Societies, vol.15, n°1, 2001, p.10-17.
6 The Round Table meetings were held from February to April 1989. Bringing together representatives
of the Communist government and the Solidarność trade union (NSZZ "S"), they resulted in the
legalization of Solidarność and the organization of semi-competitive parliamentary elections.
23
initiator of "shock therapy"1 , Andrzej Lepper would have succeeded, in the manner of
Stanisław Tymiński in 1990, in winning over a popular electorate disoriented by the
profound transformations inherent in the post-communist period and disappointed by
the behavior of traditional political elites. The Samoobrona movement's
"breakthrough" in the early years of the 2000s was therefore a symptom of the
profound socio-economic and political crisis that Poland was experiencing at the time2
. Conversely, its "fall" after 2007 would testify to an "improvement" in the country's
situation, both economically and in terms of the integration of the principles of
representative democracy by popular groups.
2) A populism symptomatic of the permanence of specific political traditions.
Although
they
continue
to
permeate
many
works,
"transitological"
and
"consolidological" readings of post-communist politics have come under fierce
criticism in recent years3 . In particular, they have been challenged by authors who,
refusing to interpret the regime changes of 1989 as a clean break, as a tabula rasa,
consider that "history and place matter"4 , and that a proper understanding of
democratization processes implies taking into account the specificities of the societies
in which they develop. With this in mind, particular attention is paid to identifying
factors in the authoritarian and pre-authoritarian pasts of the various countries of
Central and Eastern Europe that explain the dynamics of their political, economic and
social transformations in the "post-communist" era. Drawing on the Rokkanian theory
of partisan cleavages5 , some authors focus more specifically on highlighting the
dividing lines around which
The term "shock therapy" is used to designate the set of measures taken by the Mazowiecki
government from the beginning of 1990 to transition Poland as quickly as possible to a liberal market
economy.
2 See for example: Szawiel Tadeusz, "Kryzys demokracji a poparcie systemu politycznego w Polsce",
in Markowski Radosław, op.cit., p.145-171.
3 For a rigorous critique of transitological approaches: Dobry Michel, "Les voies incertaines de la
transitologie", art.cit.
4 Bunce Valérie, " Quand le lieu compte. Spécificités des passés autoritaires et réformes économiques
dans les transitions à la démocratie", Revue française de science politique, vol.50, n°4, 2000, p.635.
5 Rokkan Stein & Lipset Seymour, Party system and Voters Alignments. Cross national perspectives,
New York, Free Press, 1967.
1
24
1 . With this in mind, some of them use the notion of populism to situate in the
political arena and integrate into their classifications movements which, transcending
the opposition between former communists and former dissidents, are characterized
by an original, specifically Eastern European form of appeal to the people. In this
sense, populism is seen as an element of the
This "political culture" is specific to Central and Eastern Europe, a residue of political
traditions structured in the past and taking advantage of the return of pluralism to
express themselves once again. This "populist impregnation"2 has its roots in the
region's late entry into political and economic modernity.
"3 . In Poland, it is mainly embodied in "ethno-populist" ideological currents and
"4 .
The first appeared in the second half of the 19the century. In reaction to the division of
Poland between three tutelary powers since 17955 and the multi-cultural definition of
Polish identity proposed by Romantic writers6 , thinkers such as Jan Ludwig
Popławski and Zygmunt Balicki theorized an intolerant definition of Polish
nationality, based o n ethnicity (Slavic), language (Polish) and religion (Catholic).
This
1 For example: Kitschelt Herbert, Mansfeldova Zdenka, Markowski Radosław & Tóka Gabor, Post-
Communist Party System, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999; Kitschelt Herbert,
"Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions", Party
Politics, vol.1, n°4, 1995, p.447-472; Seiler Daniel-Louis, "La pertinence de la carte conceptuelle de
Rokkan après l'implosion de l'empire soviétique", Revue Internationale de politique comparée, vol.2,
n°1, 1995, p.61-91; De Waele Jean-Michel, Les clivages politiques en Europe centrale et orientale,
Bruxelles, Éditions de l'ULB, 2004.
2 Krulic Joseph, "Les populismes d'Europe de l'Est", Le Débat, n°67, 1991, p.84.
3 Bafoil François, Après le Communisme, Paris, Armand Colin, 2002. p.11.
4 In Polish works, by mimicry with the foreign authors who feed the flourishing field of research on
populism, the neologism populizm is gradually replacing the Polish word ludowość to designate this
agrarian ideological current. In his book Populizm a Demokracja, Radosław Markowski speaks of
populizm agrarny as follows: Markowski Radosław,
"Populizm a demokracja: ujęcia, dylematy, kontrowersje", in Markowski Radosław (dir.), op.cit. p.12.
5 In 1795, Austria-Hungary, Prussia and Russia shared Poland's lands for the third time, and this time
they did so completely, as Poland disappeared from the map of Europe. It would not reappear until
1918.
6 Romantic writers such as Joachim Lelewel and Adam Mickiewicz saw Polish nationality as a "supraethnic community of spirit, embodied in a common tradition and a liberating historical mission". Cf.
Walicki Andrzej, Naissance et développement du nationalisme moderne en Pologne, in Delsol Chantal
& Maslowski Michel (dir.), Histoire des idées politiques de l'Europe Centrale, Paris, PUF, 1998, p.407.
25
was quickly taken up by political movements - notably Roman Dmowski's National
Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczno-Narodowe) - which used it to
legitimize their resolutely xenophobic and anti-Semitic policies during the IIe Polish
Republic1 . This "ethnopopulist" current, which confuses the ethnic people, ethnos,
with the political people, demos, did not totally disappear during the People's
Republic2 and is now making a strong comeback in the political arena3 . Although
Poland is relatively ethnically homogeneous within its new 1945 borders, the fears
aroused in part of the popular electorate by Poland's entry into globalization and its
integration into supranational groupings such as NATO and the European Union have
provided fertile ground for its re-emergence. From this point of view, the Samoobrona
movement's "breakthrough" in the 2001 parliamentary elections, alongside the LPR
party, was mainly due to its ability to exploit these fears through a resolutely
nationalist, anti-European and even anti-Semitic discourse4 . Its collapse since 2007 is
a sign that its electorate has become aware of the benefits of opening up their country
to the capitalist, liberal West.
The second, the "agraro-populist" movement, also appeared at the end of the 19the
century, in the form of movements to defend the interests of the peasantry, which in
Poland remained over-abundant and extremely poor. Its main aims were to politically
educate peasants, defend their rights - particularly property rights - and provide them
with political influence commensurate with their weight in the country.
1 The IIe Republic is the name given to the regime set up in Poland following the proclamation of
independence on November 11, 1918, and which, despite successive political crises, remained in use
until the Second World War. With this name, the new regime took its place in the continuity of the
aristocratic Republic formed in 1569 by the union of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania, and which disappeared in 1795 when the national territory was divided between AustriaHungary, Prussia and Russia.
2 On the influence of this intolerant Polish nationalism at the time of the People's Republic: Kunicki
Mikołaj, "The Red and the Brown: Bolesław Piasecki, The Polish communists, and the Anti-Zionist
Campaign in Poland, 1967-1968", East European Politics and Societies, vol.19, n°2, 2005, p.185- 225.
3 Zawadzki Paul, art.cit.; Walicki Andrzej, "The troubling legacy of Roman Dmowski", East European
Politics and Societies, vol.14, n°1, 2000, p.12-46.
4 Cf. Vermeersch Peter, "Domestic discourses on European integration in Poland before and after 2004:
ideology, nationalism, and party competition", The Program on Central & Eastern Europe Working
Papers Series, CES, Harvard University, n°66, 2008, p.1-13; Kubiak Hieronim, "La rhétorique antieuropénne des partis politiques polonais. Le cas de Samoobrona (Autodéfense) et de la Ligue des
familles polonaises (LPR)", in De Waele Jean Michel (dir.), La Pologne et l'intégration européenne,
Bruxelles, Editions de l'ULB, 2003.
26
society, it flourished under the IIe Republic, notably through the PSL "Piast" (Polskie
Stronnictwo Ludowe "Piast": Polish Peasant Party "Piast"), whose leader Wincenty
Witos was Prime Minister three times. This "agrarian-populist" current, which had
been subservient to communism for over forty years within the ZSL (Zjednoczone
Stronnictwo Ludowe: Unified Peasant Party), reappeared in the early hours of the
Third Republice , taking advantage of the fact that Poland still had a vast population of
small independent farmers1 . At a time when successive governments' economic
liberalization policies largely treated this population as archaic, the agrarian-populist
movement managed to secure a significant electoral following by exploiting the
economic malaise of the countryside and promoting an identity that was politically
and culturally valorizing for the small peasantry. From this perspective, to understand
the Samoobrona movement as populism is to see it as a competitor to the PSL, the
ZSL's heir party, for the political representation of the peasantry. From the late 1990s
onwards, disillusioned by the historical peasant party's participation in the2
government and its inability to change the policies of economic liberalization that
were so painfully experienced in the countryside, part of the peasantry tended to
radicalize and turn away from the PSL's "traditional" agrarian political offering, to be
seduced by Samoobrona's protest invectives. A spokesman for "angry small farmers",
this movement represents a "maximalist" form o f Polish "agraro-populism", not
hesitating to break the traditional rules of the political game and develop a register of
violent actions to promote its vision of society and the peasantry3 . Having built its
electoral success on this radicalized agrarian offering, the Samoobrona movement is
said to have suffered from 2007 onwards as a result of improved living conditions for
rural dwellers, notably following Poland's accession to the European Union, and their
access to Common Agricultural Policy subsidies.
1 In 1956, the new General Secretary of the PZPR Communist Party, Władisław Gomułka, halted the
process of collectivizing farmland in Poland. Almost 80% remained in the hands of individual farmers.
In 1990, there were still over 2 million farms in Poland employing almost 25% of the working
population.
2 After supporting the Mazowiecki government from 1989 to 1990, the PSL participated from 1993 to
1997 in a coalition government with the SLD, the heir to the PZPR, the Communist party of the
People's Republic. PSL President Waldemar Pawlak even served as Prime Minister from 1993 to 1995.
3 Cf. Mudde Cas, "In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat and the People: Populisms in Eastern
Europe", East European Politics and Societies, vol.14, n°2, 2000, p.33-53; Seiler Daniel-Louis, Les
partis politiques en Occident, Paris, Ellipses, 2003, p.229.
27
Although they are largely ideal-typical, since the term is in fact often - and
increasingly as it becomes more popular - mobilized intuitively and allusively, these
reconstructions of the main uses of the notion of populism in the literature devoted to
so-called "post-communist" societies show that classifying a grouping in this category
does not always, despite appearances, amount to saying the same thing about it, nor to
explaining its trajectory in the same way. However, none of these different approaches
seems to us capable of providing a satisfactory account of the processes involved in
the emergence and then apparent marginalization of the Samoobrona movement in
contemporary Polish politics. Over and above real theoretical and interpretative
differences, these analyses in terms of populism converge in that they a r e fraught
with serious analytical biases.
C) An evidence to be deconstructed.
Regardless of the meaning they give it, the authors who use the notion of
In fact, there are two main presuppositions on which those who use the term
"populism" to describe phenomena developing in the so-called "post-communist"
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and particularly those who do so with regard
to the Samoobrona movement in Poland, agree. Firstly, they agree that the groups
they describe in this way draw most of their support from grassroots groups.
Secondly, they agree on a pathological reading of their relative success. In all cases,
the emergence or persistence of movements categorized as "populist" is seen as a
symptom of the difficulties experienced by democratic political elites in legitimizing
the political and economic transformations underway since the change of regime.
Conversely, the decline in their influence would be an encouraging indicator of a
certain "normalization", a gradual acceptance of democratic and liberal principles by
popular groups.
From this point of view, beyond their differences, the many analysts who categorize
the Samoobrona movement as "populism" interpret its "success" as follows
28
temporary in the early 2000s as the sign of an anti-democratic, anti-liberal "fever" that
would then have affected Polish working-class groups, or at least part of them1 . This
line of reasoning is fraught with biases that make it difficult to understand.
Firstly, because reasoning in terms of pathology only makes sense in relation to a
normality whose definition in the case of post-communist Central European countries
almost inexorably leads to the naturalization of developmentalist prejudices and the
idealization of a Western model erected as the master-standard of good political
functioning. The finalist tendencies of the transitological way of thinking, which sees
post-authoritarian transition as a linear process whose outcome cannot differ from a
Western-style liberal democracy, thus lead us to think of the existence of the
Samoobrona movement in the political landscape as a sign of the persistent archaism
of some of the most popular strata of Polish society. By giving their support to
Andrzej Lepper and his group, they would be demonstrating their lack of political
maturity, their inability to adapt to the market economy and their nostalgia for the
authoritarian practices of the Communist regime2 . Although less marked than in
works that take a more or less explicitly transitological perspective, these
presuppositions are found among authors who understand populism as a survival of
pre-democratic ideological traditions. Here too, popular groups and their supposed
archaism are at the heart of the analysis, with the success of the Samoobrona
movement interpreted as the expression of the identity of the most underprivileged
sections of society, notably the small peasantry, centred around anti-liberal and
reactionary ideologies. Behind the characterization of the Samoobrona movement as
populism, authors adopting this approach are in fact engaged in a veritable
stigmatization of popular groups.
1 By way of example: Učeň Peter, "Parties, Populism, and Anti-Establishment Politics in East Central
Europe", The SAIS Review of International Affairs, vol.27, n°1, 2007, p.49-62; Staszkiewicz Maria,
"Populist Discourse in Poland", Populism in Central Europe (Prague: Association for International
Affairs, 2007), pp.189-199.
2 For an apprehension of post-communist populism in this light, consider : Geremek Bronisław, La
Rupture, La Pologne du communisme à la démocratie, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1991, p.24-25 Hausner
Jerzy, "Populist Threat in Transformation of Socialist Society", Economic and Social Policy, n°29,
1992; Bozóki András & Sükösd Miklós, "Civil society and populism in Eastern European democratic
transitions", Praxis International, n°13, 1993, p.224-241; Ágh Attila, The Politics of Central Europe,
London, Sage Publications, 1998.
29
The latter are seen as backward-looking masses posing a danger to the democracy
under construction and its supposedly progressive, tolerant elites. Rarely based on
empirically substantiated analyses, this type of Manichean reasoning is a real
challenge to the competence of popular groups to participate in public debate, and is
certainly more ideological than scientific1 .
Beyond these undeniable normative and elitist biases, and the untruths to which they
may lead, it is more fundamentally the substantialist approach to politics induced by
such a pathological reading of the Samoobrona movement that seems to us
problematic for making this phenomenon intelligible. Indeed, to classify it as
populism implies, whatever the content given to this notion, postulating a difference
in nature, in essence, with phenomena classified outside this category2 . According to
the authors who adopt this point of view, it is in its charismatic organization or in the
radicality of its nationalist or agrarian rhetoric that the originality of this formation,
not to say its abnormality, is identified. By focusing on the atypical political style or
ideological discourse of its leaders, such a perspective naturalizes the particular
positioning of the Samoobrona movement in the Polish political landscape, without
providing the means to understand its origins. By assimilating a political movement to
its supposedly charismatic leader - in this case, by turning the Samoobrona
organizations into mere toys in the hands of Andrzej Lepper - we tend to deny the
collective reality of these groupings and leave unanalyzed the diverse interests and
struggles for influence that develop within them, as well as the varied investments of
which they are the object3 . This personalization of the partisan collective necessarily
leads to a substantialist reading of the notion of charisma, which, by focusing on the
person of the leader, his actions and his indisputables
"charisma is supposed to operate concretely, the way it is supposed to ensure the
success of a project.
1 Cf. Collovald Annie, "Le rêve d'une démocratie sans peuple", Le Courrier, June 24, 2005.
For a critique of classificatory logic and an analysis of its aporias: Dobry Michel, "La thèse
immunitaire face au fascisme. Pour une critique de la logique classificatoire", in Dobry Michel (ed.), Le
mythe de l'allergie française au fascisme, op.cit. p.17-67; and also: Dobry Michel, "Penser=Classer?",
Genèses, n°59, June 2005, p.151-165.
3 Offerlé Michel, Les partis politiques, Paris, PUF, 2006, p.49-64.
2
30
a leader's hold over a group and certain segments of society. More than an essence,
charisma is a particular type of social relationship between individuals and a man. It
cannot therefore be understood without taking into account the particular
configurations of the political game that enable this man to legitimately claim, at a
given moment, to be the personal embodiment of a political movement1 . Considered
in absolute terms, as is the case in works explaining the mobilizing capacity of the
Samoobrona movement by Lepper's person alone, charisma becomes a screen concept
that prohibits us from questioning the causes of the effects it merely designates2 . In
the same way, naturalizing the Samoobrona movement's status as a radical
spokesperson for popular groups weakened and frightened by the far-reaching reforms
brought about by the change in the economic and political regime leaves unthought
the work, both practical and symbolic, by which the movement succeeded in defining
and legitimizing a "new world".
This "representation group"3 enabled it to gain recognition in the political arena as the
representative of a given segment of society. Its "radical" rhetoric and modes of
action, for which it had far from a monopoly in the early 1990s, are not in themselves
sufficient to explain why the Samoobrona movement was able to mobilize, with some
success from 2001 onwards, a sufficient number of supporters in the electoral arena to
gain access to positions of political power.
In our view, a proper understanding of the Samoobrona movement and its particular
position in the contemporary Polish political landscape requires us to abandon the
symptom-based reasoning schemas contained in its a priori qualification as populism.
To make this notion the starting point for the study of a political grouping implies a
methodological exceptionalism that too often leads the analyst, by isolating the
collective actor under study, to "isolate" the movement in question.
1 On the use of the notion of charisma in political analysis, please refer to Ian Kershaw's indispensable
work on Hitler's charisma: Kershaw Ian, Hitler: Essai sur le charisme en politique, Paris, Gallimard,
1995. For a critical reading of Kershaw's work: Dobry Michel,
"Charisme et rationnalité : le " phénomène nazi " dans l'histoire", in Lagroye Jacques (dir.), La
politisation, Paris, Belin, 2003, p.301-323; see also: François Bastien, "Le président pontife
constitutionnel : charisme d'institution et construction juridique du politique", in Lacroix Bernard,
Lagroye Jacques (dir.), Le président de la République, Usages et genèses d'une institution, Paris,
Presses de la FNSP, 1992, p.303-331 or Pudal Bernard, Prendre Parti : Pour une sociologie historique
du PCF, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1989, p.209.
2 Bourdieu Pierre, Ce que parler veut dire. L'économie des échanges linguistiques, Paris, Fayard, 1982,
p.152.
3 Bourdieu Pierre, Propos sur le champ politique, Lyon, Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2000.
31
to confuse the judgments and fantasies conveyed by the label "populism" with the
content of the phenomenon it is supposed to describe1 . The qualification of a given
movement as populism is above all the result of classification struggles taking place in
the political, media and scientific fields, and its intuitive inclusion in analysis
introduces more bias than real enlightenment into the nature of this movement2 . In
our view, the change of perspective required is to make the qualification of the
Samoobrona movement as populism one of the materials of its study, rather than the
tool guiding it. In other words, following Howard Becker's advice3 , we need to
replace the question "Why is Samoobrona populist?" with the more fruitful "How did
Samoobrona become populist? This is the only way to break with the prejudices of
common sense and to place at the heart of the analysis, by contextualizing them
socially and historically, the activities of the actors, the class struggles developing
within the Polish political field, as well as the representational practices developed by
the members of the Samoobrona movement, which have led the latter to be
systematically affixed with the stigmatizing label of populism, to be perceived as an
illegitimate participant in the so-called "post-communist" political competition.
II- For a theoretical "normalization" of the study of the
Samoobrona movement.
In view of the many aporias and biases associated with the notion of populism, it
seems necessary to distance ourselves from the approaches that mobilize it to account
for the trajectory of the Samoobrona movement. To understand the concrete
modalities of its emergence, rise and marginalization in "post-communist" Polish
politics, we need to abandon the exceptionalist readings commonly given to the
movement, and place our study of it within the "normal" space of politics. In other
words, rather than naturalizing the illegitimate nature of the Samoobrona movement,
we need to question the reasons why it has been marginalized.
1 Collovald Annie & Gaïti Brigitte, "Introduction", in Collovald Annie & Gaïti Brigitte (dir.), La
démocratie aux extrêmes : Sur la radicalisation politique, Paris, La Dispute/SNEDIT, 2006, p.13.
2 Dobry Michel, "Penser = classer?", art.cit. p.161.
3 Becker Howard, Les ficelles du métier. Comment conduire sa recherche en science sociale, La
Découverte, Paris, 2002, p.105.
32
why it came to be perceived in this way, and the concrete ways in which it succeeded,
for a time, in overcoming them to gain recognition for its representativeness and
legitimacy to occupy parliamentary and governmental positions of power. This
change
of
perspective
has
important
epistemological
and
methodological
consequences.
First and foremost, it invites us to historicize the study of the Samoobrona
movement's trajectory, resituating it within the framework of the interactions shaping
political competition in the IIIe Polish Republic. If the Samoobrona movement has
come to be perceived as an illegitimate actor, systematically branded with the
stigmatizing label of "populism" by other protagonists and the vast majority of
commentators on Polish politics, it is because it is considered to have transgressed the
principles of political "normality", to have broken the rules of the democratic game.
Nonetheless, if players claiming to be part of the Samoobrona movement have
succeeded in gaining access to positions of political power, in gaining recognition for
their legitimacy to hold parliamentary and governmental office, it's because they have
respected some of these rules, that they have complied with a minimum of legal or
tacit conventions regulating access to electoral competition and the field of
institutional politics. Consequently, to understand the evolution of the Samoobrona
movement's position in the Polish political arena, as we intend to do in this work, we
need to pay particular attention to the processes involved in defining the contours and
rules of Polish political competition in the years following the "fall" of the People's
Republic (A).
Secondly, this change of perspective implies paying particular attention to the
concrete practices of the actors involved in the Samoobrona movement. Breaking
away from the reifying reading of the movement provided by approaches in terms of
If we are to understand the "populism" of the movement, we need to open its "black
box" and bring the actors who "bring it to life" back to center stage. Far from being
reducible to its president Andrzej Lepper, the Samoobrona movement must be
understood as a group of individual actors who, through their actions and cooperativecompetitive interactions, help to make it exist as a collective actor and as a participant
in the struggle to represent social interests (B).
33
A) The rules of political competition defined.
To study the Samoobrona movement in historical terms, we need to examine the
socio-political transformations at work in the so-called "post-communist" period, the
ways in which the new "democratic" regime was defined and, in particular, the now
formally "free" political competition for the representation of social interests and
positions of political power. We find the answers provided by the consolidological
literature unsatisfactory, in that they reflect a linear, finalistic and overly normative
reading of the regime change (1). In our view, this should be replaced by an approach
based on the transformation of configurations, which places at the heart of the
analysis the uncertainty and conflictuality of the processes involved in codifying
political competition and defining legitimate practices within it (2).
1) The illusions of "consolidology".
The question of how to define the rules of political competition is a major
preoccupation of the "consolidological" research movement which, in the continuity
of "transitology", aims to grasp the conditions under which democracy takes root in a
"post-authoritarian" context, its imposition as "the only game in town" whose
legitimacy is no longer questioned by any actor1 . Like "transitologists" - and they are
often the same authors - "consolidologists" adopt a comparative approach to
distinguish the stages they consider typical of these processes, and estimate the degree
of advancement of their case studies towards a stabilized and perennial democratic
regime. In addition to comparing different historical experiences of
"In the 1990s, the company began to consolidate its position in Latin America and Southern Europe,
1 Linz Juan J. & Stepan Alfred, "Toward Consolidated Democracies", Journal of Democracy, vol.7,
n°2, 1996, p.14-33; For a synthesis of the main hypotheses of the consolidological research trend:
Guilhot Nicolas & Schmitter Philippe, art.cit.
34
in Central and Eastern Europe1 , they also put them in perspective with Western
democracies, which are more or less explicitly held up as a model to aspire to. Three
complementary elements are commonly used to assess progress towards democratic
"normality" in political competition.
The first is the influence of political parties on the struggle for positions o f power,
which now involves winning the votes of the electorate. Indeed, political parties which, in Max Weber's image, are seen as the natural offspring of universal suffrage
and democracy - are expected to impose their monopoly on the political
representation of social interests, to the detriment of other collective actors claiming
to participate in the early moments of the
"These include trade unions, civic committees, the army and the clergy. The
emergence of party organizations of the type seen in Western democracies, the
structuring of a relatively stable party system and its limitation to a small number of
players, are thus seen as important indicators of the success of the "consolidation"
process2 . The second is the emergence of a democratic elite, a group of political
leaders who fully accept the new principles for allocating positions of power within
the state, and are therefore tolerant of their competitors. The differentiation of this
group from the rest of society, the specialization of its members in political activity
and the upward trend in their level of competence are, for "consolidologists", signs
that a "post-authoritarian" regime is moving towards a "consolidated" democracy3 .
Finally, the
From this perspective, see for example: Linz Juan J. & Stepan Alfred, Problems of Democratic
Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe,
Baltimore, The John Jopkins University Press, 1996.
2 From this perspective, see for example: Pridham Geoffrey & Lewis Paul G., "Stabilising Fragile
Democracies and Party System Development", in Pridham Geoffrey & Lewis Paul G. (eds.), op.cit.,
p.1-22; Lewis Paul G., "The 'Third Wave' of Democracy on Eastern Europe. Comparative Perspectives
on Party Roles and Political Development", Party Politics, vol. 7, n°5, 2001, p.543-565; or: Ekiert
Grzegorz, "L'instabilité du système partisan. Le maillon faible de la consolidation démocratique en
Pologne", Pouvoirs, vol.3, n°118, 2006 p.37-57.
3 On the link between "consolidation" and elites: Higley John & Pakulski Jan, "Jeux de pouvoir des
élites et consolidation de la démocratie en Europe centrale et orientale", Revue française de science
politique, vol.50, n°4-5, 2000, p.657-678; Burton Michael, Gunther Richard & Higley John,
"Introduction: elite transformation and democratic regime", in Gunther Richard & Higley John (eds.),
Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1992; or Bozóki András, "Theoretical Interpretations of Elite Change in East Central
Europe", Comparative Sociology, vol.2, n°1, 2003, p.215-247; For a critical synthesis of Polish work
on elites in post-communism, please refer to : Heurtaux Jérôme,
1
35
third, is the assimilation by citizens, by "civil society", of "democratic attributes such
as tolerance, moderation, the search for compromise and respect for other points of
view"1 . This "pacification" of citizen practices is said to take the form of a gradual
fading out of protest mobilizations, which are nevertheless recognized as playing an
important role in triggering the democratic transition process, in favor of more
institutional and "more democratic" forms of expressing interests, such as voting or
joining a political party2 .
The way in which the process of codifying the rules of political competition is
approached by the "consolidological" stream of research does not allow us to break
with an exceptionalist approach to the Samoobrona movement. Whether because of
its dual organizational structure (both party and farmers' union), the characteristics of
its representatives (many of its leaders and those elected in 2001 are farmers), its
political offer based on questioning the terms of regime change, or its involvement
in
organizing illegal protest actions, notably in the context of the peasant
demonstrations of the 1990s, the emergence of this grouping in the Polish political
arena frustrates the expectations of consolidologists. Unable to grasp its relative
success other than in terms of an anomaly, these authors are quick to relegate the
Samoobrona movement to the register of post-communist pathologies, setting it up,
often under the label of "populism", as one of several indicators of the difficulties in
the process of consolidating Poland's young democracy.
2) The Polish democratic regime as a configuration in redefinition.
"Social sciences and post-communism. The Polish sociology of political elites (1990-2000)",
Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest, vol.31, n°2, 2000, p.49-100.
1 Diamond Larry Jay, "Toward Democratic Consolidation", Journal of Democracy, vol.5, n°3, 1994,
p.8.
2 For a critical reading of these approaches, which see collective mobilizations as illegitimate actors in
post-authoritarian democracy and postulate an irreducible difference in nature between social
movements and political parties: Combes Hélène, De la politique contestataire à la fabrique partisane.
Le cas du Parti de la révolution démocratique au Mexique (PRD), thesis for the doctorate in political
science, Université Paris III, 2004, p.24-27.
36
Resituating the study of the Samoobrona movement within the "normal" space of
politics therefore implies a change of perspective on the process of codifying the rules
of political competition in so-called "post-communist" Poland. Breaking with the
linear,
finalist
and
normative
readings
conveyed
by
transitological
and
consolidological research currents1 , it seems salutary, following Jacques Lagroye,
Bastien François and Frédéric Sawicki, to apprehend regime change as a
transformation of configuration, i.e. as a process, with an uncertain and potentially
reversible outcome, of redefining a "set of institutions, roles, rules, knowledge and
know-how"2 . This process of transforming and codifying the rules and routines of the
political game pits a multitude of heterogeneous individual or collective players
against each other, none of whom can claim full control3 .
So, rather than simply opening up political competition to players who had hitherto
been excluded, the change of regime in Poland, as in the other former People's
Republics, must be understood as an erratic, non-linear process of defining and
objectifying new, legitimate ways of staging social interests and their political
representation. The gradual disintegration of the political relationships built up before
1989, based on a Marxist-Leninist reading of society in terms of antagonistic classes,
opens up a period of "uncertainty as to the rules of the game of political competition,
the references that will be considered...", as Magdaléna Hadjiisky puts it.
1 On the finalist tendencies of transitological thought patterns, see, for example: Michel Patrick, "De la
nature de la transition. Remarques épistémologiques", Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, n°96,
1994, p.213-223.
2 Lagroye Jacques, François Bastien & Sawicki Frédéric, Sociologie politique, Paris, Presses de la
FNSP/Dalloz, 2006, p.170.
3 In this sense, we need to break with an essentially institutional and linear vision of regime change, and
see it as a transformation of configuration, involving a redefinition not only of institutions, but also of
roles, rules, knowledge, know-how and models of political legitimacy. Politicians are not the only ones
involved in these redefinition processes. Experts" (Jeffrey Sachs' influence on the implementation of
Poland's "shock therapy" economic policy comes to mind), senior civil servants and judges can also
play a part. On political regimes as configurations: Lagroye Jacques, François Bastien & Sawicki
Frédéric, op.cit. p.169-174. A number of works on the transition from the IVe Republic to the Ve
Republic in France demonstrate the rich explanatory value of the break with a purely constitutional
approach to regime change. See in particular: François Bastien, Naissance d'une Constitution. La Ve
République (1958-1962), Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1996; Dulong Delphine, Moderniser la politique.
Aux origines de la Ve République, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1997; and Gaïti Brigitte, De Gaulle, prophète de
la Ve République, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1998.
37
1
and, one might add, to the principles of social construction that will come to
dominate2 . The transition from the "authoritarian" Polish People's Republic to the
"democratic" IIIe Republic, far f r o m being reducible to a single event, was a major
event in Poland's history.
The "trigger" - the signing of the Round Table agreements in April 1989, for example
- thus appears to be the product of a process spanning several years, the aim of which
is to "delimit, if not constitute, the political field and the set of activities that are
deemed to be part of it"3 , and in particular to define new, legitimate principles of
access to and occupation of positions of political power.
From this point of view, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of an actor, whether collective
or individual, in political competition, far from being an essence, appears to be the
product of competitive interactions between the different actors engaged in the
struggle to define legitimate principles of representation of the social world and
recognition of their representativeness in the new configuration. In other words,
through their very activities, and in particular through their work in shaping and
legitimizing a competing offer of representation, the various actors engaged in the
struggle to represent social interests and obtain positions of political power participate
in the construction of a dividing line between the legitimate and the illegitimate,
between "the normal and the pathological, the acceptable and the unacceptable in
democracy"4 . This dividing line can be gradually made explicit through legal rules,
such as electoral laws that specify the conditions of access to the struggle for positions
of political power and the legal practices involved in an electoral campaign. It can
also take the form of "normative rules", i.e. more or less shared beliefs about what is
and isn't legitimate in political activities5 .
1 Hadjiisky Magdalena, "Democracy through the market. The case of the Czech countries (1989-1996)",
Politix, vol.12, n°47, 1999, p.68.
2 Bourdieu Pierre, "Espace social et genèses de "classes"", Actes de la Recherche en sciences sociales,
n°52/53, June 2004, p.3-12.
3 Aït-Aoudia Myriam & Heurtaux Jérôme (dir), "Partis politiques et changement de régime", Critique
internationale, n°30, 2006, p.126.
4 Collovald Annie & Gaïti Brigitte, "Questions sur la radicalisation politique", in Collovald Annie &
Gaïti Brigitte (dir.), op.cit. p.23.
5 For Frédéric Bailey, "normative rules do not prescribe any particular type o f action, but rather
delimit, quite broadly, the field of possible actions. [...] [they] are very broad lines.
38
Thus, the valorization or depreciation of certain resources, certain practices, certain
discourses, or even certain types of organization in political competition, far from
responding to ahistorical and identical logics in all democratic regimes, essentially
depends on the state of the balance of power at a given moment in a given space of
interaction. If an actor, such as the Samoobrona movement in Poland, comes to be
perceived as illegitimate by most of the actors involved in defining the configuration,
it's because its activities, its offer of representation or even the characteristics of its
representatives have been considered as "infringements" of legal or political rules.
"It's also worth noting that an actor's illegitimacy is not a definitive, irreversible fact.
It should also be noted that the illegitimacy of a player is not a definitive and
irreversible fact. It can be re-evaluated under the impetus either of a change in the
configuration, which makes practices or resources previously perceived as
unacceptable acceptable, or of a shift in the activities of the actor in question in the
direction of conforming to the then-dominant rules of political competition.
The study of the Samoobrona movement's trajectory in the context of this uncertain
and conflictual process of defining the rules of so-called "post-communist" political
competition is essential to its understanding. We will show that the state of the
configuration and its progressive transformations have a major influence on the shape
and trajectory of the Samoobrona movement, from its unexpected emergence to its
current marginalization, via its access to positions of parliamentary and governmental
power.
B) Opening the "black box" of the Samoobrona movement.
"Lepper's gang", "Lepper's team", "Lepper's army"... The various syntagms used by
Polish journalists to describe the Samoobrona movement invariably emphasize its
strong personalization.
of conduct. They are used to judge particular actions according to moral criteria of right and wrong".
Bailey Frédéric, Les règles du jeu politique, Paris, PUF, 1971, p.18.
39
Andrzej Lepper, who has chaired both the farmers' union and the political party1 since
they were founded, is reputed to have undivided authority over both organizations. A
supposedly charismatic leader, he alone decides on the overall direction of a
movement which, in reality, is little more than a platform of supporters serving his
personal ambitions. This tendency to personify the Samoobrona collective also
permeates most of the scientific works that have been devoted to it in recent years.
Using the notion of charisma, often without caution, their authors tend to postulate the
perfect unity of the Samoobrona movement behind its president2 .
Admittedly, Andrzej Lepper has unquestionably secured a firm grip on the
movement's objectifying tools and its management apparatus. He has monopolized
public discourse, particularly in the media, and has been re-elected with impressive
scores, and without ever facing the slightest competition, to the presidency of ZZR
Samoobrona and of the Przymierze Samoobrona and Samoobrona RP parties at each
of their successive congresses. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that he
was all-powerful per se, and to reduce all other members of the movement to the
status of mere followers subjugated by their leader's charisma. Andrzej Lepper's
authority over the Samoobrona collective is by no means self-evident and, as we shall
see, has never been either total or uncontested. It appears as a sign of partial and
potentially temporary success in legitimizing her right to personally embody the
group, to obtain a mandate to speak, act and decide on behalf of the other members of
the party and the union3 . In other words, Andrzej Lepper's pre-eminent position in the
Samoobrona movement "can only be understood if we dialectically restore the way in
which [he] became a leader in the grouping that [made] him what he [is]"4 .
1 It's worth noting, however, that when Andrzej Lepper became Minister of Agriculture, he was forced
for a time to resign, formally at least, from the presidency of ZZR Samoobrona. He regained it
immediately after leaving the government.
2 For example: Ługowska Urszula, "Samoobrona versus the establishment", Labour Focus on Eastern
Europe, n°72, 2002, p.59-76; Bafoil François, "Pologne : Samoobrona, la montée des populismes", La
vie des idées, June 2004.
3 Cf. Bourdieu Pierre, "La délégation et le fétichisme politique", Actes de la recherche en sciences
sociales, n°52-53, 1984, p.49-55.
4 Fretel Julien, "Le leadership partisan", in Cohen Antonin, Lacroix Bernard & Riutort Philippe (dir.),
Nouveau manuel de science politique, Paris, La Découverte, 2009, p.463.
40
Breaking away from reifying, personifying and, ultimately, exceptionalizing readings
of the Samoobrona movement, we need to place its collective dimension back at the
heart of the analysis. Far from being reducible to their leader alone, the movement's
constituent organizations must be understood as social relations of particular types,
bringing together individuals who, through their activities and interactions, participate
in "shaping them as groups and as representation"1 . In other words, the ZZR
Samoobrona farmers' union, the Przymierze Samoobrona political party, then
Samoobrona RP, and the Samoobrona movement only really "exist" insofar a s they
are the product of
"the set of operations by which social agents commune in [their] name" and give them
"body"2 . With this in mind, we will approach the Samoobrona movement from two
complementary angles.
Firstly, we will think of it as a system of action, understood as a set of groupings that
participate, "each in its own way, and according to its own operating logics, in the
construction of a reference group"3 . This definition underlines the fact that the
Samoobrona movement's relative success in the trade union and electoral arenas must
be understood first and foremost as the product of a socialization process, the
activation of a sense of belonging among a group of individuals (activists, leaders and
voters alike) to a group sharing common interests, values and objectives. If the
Samoobrona movement succeeded, for a time at least, in gaining recognition from
certain individuals as the legitimate representative of their interests, it was not simply
because Andrzej Lepper "bewitched" them with his hypothetical charisma, but
because this grouping was able to shape and promote, through the speeches and
actions of its representatives, an original offer of representation enabling it to stand
out in the competition for the representation of interests and to mobilize a significant
number of supporters in its favor. Understanding the Samoobrona movement as a
system of action also enables us to place the various organizations that make it up the union and the party - and their relationships at the heart of the analysis.
1 Sawicki Frédéric, Les réseaux du Parti socialiste. Sociologie d'un milieu partisan, Paris, Belin, 1997,
p.14.
2 Pudal Bernard, op.cit. p.13-14.
3 Lagroye Jacques, François Bastien & Sawicki Frédéric, op.cit. p.273.
41
In most of the works devoted to him, this organizational duplication tends to be either
completely elided, or reduced to the status of a symptom of the illegitimacy, or even
dangerousness, of his participation in Polish political games1 . On the contrary, we
feel it's necessary to take it "seriously". Indeed, we can postulate that, by allowing it
to intervene in a variety of spaces of interaction and to be produced in a differentiated
manner depending on the context - in other words, to be
The Samoobrona movement's "multipositioned" organizational splitting is an
important key to understanding its trajectory in post-communist politics. In particular,
it is decisive for understanding the concrete ways in which it managed, at least in part,
to shape and promote an original reference group, and to gain recognition from
individuals as their spokesperson in the arena of protest mobilizations and then in the
electoral arena at the start of the 2000s2 .
Secondly, we will also understand the Samoobrona movement as a political
enterprise, i.e. as "a particular type of relationship within the community".
1 From the first point of view, Samoobrona's protest and trade union activities and its partisan activities
are distinguished in the analysis as being characteristic of two successive, and largely autonomous,
periods in the life of the organization: the date of the first entry into Parliament in 2001 is usually taken
as the date of the break between the "Samoobrona social movement" and the "Samoobrona social
movement".
"Samoobrona political party". Denying the movement's early electoral commitment and the
permanence of its organizational split in the 2000s, authors then focus, according to their objects of
predilection, on the Samoobrona movement's participation in the agricultural mobilizations of the
1990s (for example: Foryś Grzegorz, Dynamika sporu: protesty rolników w III Rzeczpospolitej,
Warsaw, WN Scholar, 2008; or Gorlach Krzysztof & Mooney Patrick, "Defending Class Interests:
Polish Peasants in the First Years of Transformation", in Pickles John & Smith Adrian (eds.),
Theorising Transition: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Transformations, New York,
Routledge, 1998), or on its insertion into the Polish party system from the 2001 elections onwards (For
example: Ługowska Urszula, art.cit.). Without the relationship between these two phenomena being
understood other than at the margins. From the second point of view, if Samoobrona's parallel
involvement in the field of agricultural unionism and politics is mentioned, it is only indirectly, in
support of approaches postulating the abnormality of this formation, its inadequacy with the democratic
rules of interest representation. Alongside its agrarian origins, the presence of a supposedly charismatic
leader in the person of Lepper, and its radical anti-liberal discourse, Samoobrona's organizational
splitting constitutes an additional argument in the eyes of the many authors who view it in terms of
"populism". For example: Deleersnijder Henri, "La dérive populiste en Europe centrale et orientale",
Hermès, n°42, 2005; Wysocka Olga, "Populism in Poland", paper presented at the 4th ECPR General
Conference, Pisa, September 6-8, 2007.
2 From this point of view, it is important not to reify the dictinction between so-called
"The aim is to place at the heart of the analysis the struggles that contribute to politicization or
depoliticization, and to defining the boundary between practices considered political and non-political.
Cf. Lagroye Jacques, "Les processus de politisation", in Lagroye Jacques (dir.), op.cit. p.359-372. See
also: Darras Eric, "Présentation. Pour une lecture réaliste des formes non conventionnelles d'action
politique", in CURAPP (collective), La Politique ailleurs, Paris, PUF, 1998, p.5-31.
42
in which one or more agents invest capital to reap political profits by producing
political goods"1 . The value of this definition is threefold. Firstly, it serves as a
reminder that the Samoobrona movement, like any other political grouping, is first
and foremost an aggregation of individuals with specific profiles, histories and
singular social characteristics. Far from being "clones" united in their adoration of
Andrzej Lepper, the members of the Samoobrona movement do not all have the same
individual capital (educational or economic, for example), cannot boast the same
political experience, and have neither the same expectations, nor the same objectives,
nor the same time to devote to it when they choose to get involved. Secondly, this
definition enables us to approach the Samoobrona movement as a space for the
genesis and accumulation of collective resources, subsuming the individual resources
of each of its members. The notoriety of the Samoobrona label, financial resources
and capacity for action, particularly in the form of consolidated collective networks,
are all resources that the group can draw on, in varying degrees depending on the
situation, and make available to individuals who have acquired the right to speak on
its behalf when they engage in the struggle to represent social interests2 . Thirdly, the
definition of the Samoobrona movement as a political enterprise allows us to place at
the heart of the analysis the interactions that unite and oppose its members for the
legitimate definition of the movement, for the right to speak and participate in the
struggle for positions of political power on its behalf, or to use the collective resources
it is potentially able to provide. Like all political groupings, the Samoobrona
movement is animated by the competitive struggles of the players who bring it into
existence, particularly at the level of its leadership, which, contrary to appearances,
has never been monolithic.
Our choice of method, which does not make the postulate of its exteriority to
democracy the starting point for the analysis of the Samoobrona movement, allows us
to place at the heart of the analysis the processes that established its particularities and
conditioned its trajectory in post-communist Polish politics.
1 Offerlé Michel, Les partis politiques, op.cit. p.11.
2 Cf. Offerlé Michel, "Partis et configurations partisanes", in Cohen Antonin, Lacroix Bernard &
Riutort Philippe (dir.), op.cit. p.455-456.
43
III. The trajectory of the Samoobrona movement as enigma(ies).
The aim of our thesis is to understand how the Samoobrona movement, initiated by
actors outside the networks of the former regime and dissidence, came to be
recognized as a major protagonist of the "post-communist" Polish political field, and
then to lose this status and be relegated to a marginal position. As we have seen,
answering these questions means resituating the study within the ordinary frameworks
of the social sciences of politics. By denaturalizing the mechanisms that presided over
its trajectory, this theoretical "normalization" makes it possible to uncover its
enigmatic character. More precisely, it is a whole series of enigmas that we need to
resolve in the course of this work. First of all, we'll need to question the mechanisms
by which individual actors, hitherto uninvolved or hardly involved in politics, come
together to collaborate in the construction of new groupings claiming to participate in
the definition and representation of social interests. We'll then look at the way in
which they set out to shape a representation offer that enables them to stand out and
legitimize themselves as representatives of society's interests, or at least those of
certain social groups, in a competitive field pitted against organizations that are a
priori better endowed with collective resources. Finally, we'll be looking at the ways
in which they invest in roles that are often unprecedented for them - as union and
partisan leaders, election candidates, members of parliament or even ministers - and
how these investments influence their activities and the way they produce the
collective they help to bring into existence.
Before detailing the questions that will guide our thinking, it should be pointed out
that we will be adopting a processual and relational approach in this work. To
approach the trajectory of the Samoobrona movement as a process is to emphasize its
non-linear, uncertain and contingent nature. Far from resembling the steady "ascent"
of a small group of over-indebted farmers to the upper echelons of government, we'll
see that it appears far more bumpy in reality than the movement's leaders and their
supporters would have us believe.
44
some observers, gripped by its unexpected electoral successes, tended to suggest
before the electoral "debacle" of 2007. The emergence of the Samoobrona movement
at the heart of Polish politics, and indeed its current marginalization, are not, despite
their spectacular nature, sudden events. They appear to be the relatively improbable
results of a chain of actions involving a plurality of actors, the unfolding of which no
one can perfectly control, nor foresee its exact effects, including those who claim to
do so1 . All the more so as these actions have no "objective" meaning. They have
meaning only insofar as they are attributed to them by the various actors who, in the
course of their cooperative and competitive exchanges, participate in defining the
situation2 . For example, the interpretation in terms of "failures" or "successes" of the
Samoobrona movement's protest actions and electoral results, on the basis of which
its trajectory is traditionally reconstructed, cannot be understood independently of the
competitive struggles for qualification and labeling that help to impose a reading of
the situation on other possibilities. We will therefore endeavour to grasp the
transformations of the Samoobrona movement and its position in the Polish political
arena by observing what is at stake in the course of events, by following "step by
step" the practices of the actors who participate in the movement, and by identifying
and analysing the causes of these transformations.
"We do this by contextualizing them within the particular configuration in which they
develop, and without ever presuming their consequences3 . Of course, our work does
not pretend to give an account of all the dimensions of the Samoobrona movement, an
ambition that would be illusory because based on an objectivist reading of social
phenomena. By focusing our study on the ways in which the Samoobrona collective
was built and inserted into the central Polish political field, we have condemned
ourselves, for example, to dealing only marginally with questions that could have
been addressed centrally, such as that of the practices of the Samoobrona collective.
In mobilizing the notion of process, we are of course referring to the work of Norbert Elias, in
particular : Elias Norbert, La civilisation des mœurs, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1991.
2 As Howard Becker notes, "things are just people acting together", emphasizing that "physical objects
have no 'objective' properties. Nor do less tangible social objects", Becker Howard, Les ficelles du
métier, op.cit., p.90.
3 In this sense, we are inspired by the approach proposed, among others, by Timothy Tackett in his
study of the itinerary of the deputies of 1789: Tackett Timothy, Par la volonté du Peuple. Comment les
députés de 1789 sont devenus révolutionnaires, Paris, Albin Michel, 1997.
1
45
1
or the articulation of the inseparable local and national dimensions of the2
movement. These blind spots, partially illuminated by occasional "spotlights", are as
much due to necessary methodological choices as to constraints linked to the
specificities of our field of investigation, as outlined below.
As we have said, the Samoobrona movement poses a number of enigmas. They have
to do with the conditions of production of a political grouping in a context of
redefinition of the rules of political competition specific to situations of regime
change. Broadly speaking, there are three types of mechanism that we shall endeavour
to highlight in the course of this work.
First, we need to study the processes by which the Samoobrona movement is made,
i.e. "all the bricolages that contribute to making, producing or, more modestly,
shaping what we call a political [grouping]"3 . How do individual actors come
together? Why do they decide to work together to build a new grouping? What are the
logics behind the choice of organizational form by which to objectify this collective,
and more specifically here, the choice of organizational duplication? What are the
means mobilized by its initiators to "shape" the group, in particular to build and
organize its structures? These are just a few of the key questions
1 In recent years, the sociology of militant commitment and practices has been a particularly active field
o f research in political sociology. For an overview of this often stimulating work, see the dossier
"Devenirs militants" coordinated by Nonna Mayer and Olivier Fillieule: Revue française de science
politique, vol.51, n°1-2, 2001. See also: Collovald Annie, Lechien Marie-Hélène, Rozier Sabine &
Laurent Willemez (dir), L'humanitaire ou le management des dévouements. Enquête sur un
militantisme de " solidarité internationale " en faveur du Tiers-Monde, Presses Universitaires de
Rennes, 2002; Sawicki Frédéric & Siméant Johanna,
"Décloisonner la sociologie de l'engagement militant. Note critique sur quelques tendances récentes des
travaux français", Sociologie du Travail, vol.51, n°1, 2009, p.97-125 ; Dechezelles Stéphanie,
Comment peut-on être militant? Sociologie des cultures politiques et des (dés)engagements. Les jeunes
militants d'Alleanza Nazionale, Lega Nord et Forza Italia face au pouvoir, Thesis for Doctorate in
Political Science, IEP Bordeaux, 2006. On activism in Central and Eastern Europe: Devaux Sandrine,
Engagements associatifs et post-communisme. Le cas de la République tchèque, Paris, Belin, 2005.
2 From this perspective, see Sawicki Frédéric, op.cit; Briquet Jean-Louis & Sawicki Frédéric,
"L'analyse localisée du politique: lieux de recherche ou recherche de lieux?", Politix, n°7-8, 1989, p.616.
3 Combes Hélène, "Faire parti(e) : construction et positionnement du PRD dans le système politique
mexicain", Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée, vol.12, n°3, 2005, p.335.
46
which we'll have to confront in order to shed light on the concrete modalities of the
genesis and structuring of the organizations that make up the Samoobrona movement.
This work implies freeing ourselves from a linear and mythified vision of their birth
and development, in order to take into account the hesitations, unforeseen events,
constraints and even failures that play a part in their making. All the more so since, as
we shall see, the Samoobrona movement was not created "all at once". It was built in
"fits and starts", as we tinkered, "succeeded" or "failed".
The "failures" of its members took relatively different forms depending on the state of
the political configuration.
We'll also look at the processes involved in shaping, maintaining and mobilizing a
representative group, i.e. all the activities by which the actors involved in bringing the
Samoobrona movement into existence strive to have it recognized as the spokesperson
for social interests and to rally support for it. How do newcomers set themselves apart
in the newly "free" competition to define and represent social interests? How can the
representativeness of a group in competition with other groups be attested and
publicized? How can we accumulate the collective resources needed to enter the
competition for political representation of society? How can we maintain the
coherence of a representative group while striving to broaden it to mobilize as many
supporters as possible? Answering these questions, which are central to understanding
the trajectory of the Samoobrona movement, and in particular its apparent electoral
"breakthrough" in the early 2000s, requires us to pay close attention to the concrete
activities of actors speaking and acting on behalf of the Samoobrona collective, and to
avoid reifying the distinction between trade union and political spheres of activity in
so-called "post-communist" Poland. Indeed, we shall see that it is by transgressing
this boundary, whose delineation remains relatively indeterminate in a context of
redefining political configuration, that the leaders of the multi-positioned Samoobrona
movement have endeavoured - with varying degrees of success and exposing
themselves to trials of illegitimacy - to build and promote an original offer of
representation enabling them to be recognized as actors to be reckoned with in
political competition.
47
We will also look at possible institutionalization processes in the Samoobrona
movement, understood here as processes of objectivization of know-how, models of
practice and roles that contribute to a certain routinization of its operating principles1 .
How do the constraints, norms of action and more or less stabilized rules of the
various spaces of interaction (arena of protest mobilizations, electoral arena, arena of
institutional politics) in which its representatives are brought to intervene influence
the organization of the Samoobrona movement? What are the effects of successive
transformations in the movement's position in the political arena on the way it is
produced by the actors who shape it? Are we witnessing processes of political
professionalization within the Samoobrona movement? Are we witnessing the
routinization of principles regulating relations between the various members of the
movement, and in particular the struggles for the right to speak and compete for
positions of political power on its behalf? To provide some answers to these
questions, we need to think in terms of learning2 . This notion proves particularly
valuable in understanding the way in which the actors involved in the production of
the Samoobrona movement strive to adapt their behaviour to the different situations
they are confronted with, and to the rules - still in the process of being defined - with
which they are expected to play. By drawing on their experience, both "failures" and
"successes", by imitating other players in the varied fields of interaction in which they
are called upon to intervene, or on the contrary, by opposing them, they seek to
accumulate know-how conducive to ensuring their success and their survival in the
competition for the representation of social interests. As we shall see, for the
representatives of the Samoobrona movement, this learning process is largely a
"bricolage"3 , constrained by the resources at their disposal and their ability to adapt to
new situations.
1 On institutionalization p r o c e s s e s : Lagroye Jacques, François Bastien & Sawicki Frédéric,
op.cit., 535-537.
2 With this in mind, socio-historical research, particularly on the apprenticeship of the political
profession and voting practices, makes a valuable contribution. See, for example: Guionnet Christine,
L'apprentissage de la politique moderne. Les élections municipales sous la monarchie de Juillet, Paris,
L'Harmattan, 1997; Garrigou Alain, Histoire sociale du suffrage universel en France. 1848-2000, Paris,
Le Seuil, 2002. For a synthesis of this socio-historical approach: Déloye Yves, Sociologie historique du
politique, Paris, La Découverte, 1997; Déloye Yves & Voutat Bernard (dir.), Faire de la science
politique. Pour une analyse socio-historique du politique, Paris, Belin, 2002.
3 On learning as "bricolage": Aït-Aoudia Myriam, L'apprentissage de la compétition pluripartisane en
Algérie (1988-1992). Sociologie d'un changement de régime, thesis for the doctorate in political
science, Université Paris I, 2008, p.34.
48
and by the ongoing transformation of the political configuration and their position
within it.
Before outlining how we will organize our approach to solving the riddles posed by
the trajectory of the Samoobrona movement and studying the processes that shaped it,
it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the survey protocol we followed to
gather the data required for our research.
IV- Survey methodology.
Studying a movement considered illegitimate by most other players in the political
arena exposes the researcher to particular constraints1 . In our case, these are
compounded by difficulties of a personal nature (the possibility of being present in a
"foreign" field, and language skills in particular), as well as others linked to the
transformations of the Samoobrona movement over the study period. These obstacles
forced us to adapt our survey protocol (A) in order to be able to build a corpus on
which to base our research (B).
A) A survey under duress.
The pace of our investigation of the Samoobrona movement has been dictated mainly
by the evolving level of our knowledge, in particular the degree of progress we have
made in learning the "trade" of politician and the Polish language. However, it has
also been constrained by recent transformations in our object of study. Broadly
speaking, we can distinguish three stages in our investigation.
The first, which can be described as a "preliminary phase", covers the period from our
"discovery" of the Samoobrona movement to the actual start of our thesis work in
2005. Residing in Katowice from September 2002 to July 2003, in the
1 See, for example: Birenbaum Guy, "Elites "illégitimes", élites illégitimées : les responsables des FN",
in Cohen Samy (ed.), L'art d'interviewer les dirigeants, Paris, PUF, 1999. Although our fieldwork
called for specific precautions and investigative strategies, we don't consider it inherently "difficult":
Campana Aurélie & Boumaza Magali, "Enquêter en milieu "difficile" : Introduction", Revue française
de science politique, vol.57, n°1, p.5-25.
49
As part of an Erasmus university exchange program, we had the opportunity to
explore Poland and "familiarize" ourselves with its political life. It was during the
local elections in October 2002 that we were for the first time in Poland.
In fact, he "came into contact" with the Samoobrona movement, or to be more
precise, with its president Andrzej Lepper. His attitude during the televised debates
organized as part of the campaign, as well as his attire - in particular, his systematic
wearing of a tie in the Polish colors (red and white) - clearly set him apart from other
politicians. Although we didn't have enough linguistic knowledge at the time to grasp
the subtleties of political exchanges, our curiosity was aroused and would continue to
grow as, through reading, informal discussions, meetings and following the campaign
for the referendum on accession to the European Union in June 2003, we tried to learn
more about this movement and its president. Our interest in the Samoobrona
movement was therefore born of a "pure curiosity for the specific"1 , not to say for the
original. It was only later, as part of our Master's studies in political science, that we
set out to replace our "lay" representations of this group with a "scientific" one, to
make it an object of study on which to forge our first weapons as aspiring researchers.
For two years, marked by regular stays in Poland, mainly Warsaw, we sought to refine
our knowledge of the language2 , to learn the rudiments of the
We began our "job" as political scientists and, more specifically, to gather data on the
Samoobrona movement, by reading the press, collecting programmatic documents
and conducting a few interviews in English with Mateusz Piskorski, the movement's
international relations officer at the time. This work enabled us to clear the ground
and lay the initial foundations on which to build our doctoral research.
1 We borrow this expression from : Veyne Paul, Comment on écrit l'histoire, Paris, Seuil, 1971, p.70.
After taking Polish courses at the University of Silesia (US) in Katowice during the 2002-2003
academic year, we continued our learning in 2003-2004 as part of a DU at Université Bordeaux III. In
addition to our personal work, we also took Polish courses at the French Institute in Warsaw during the
2005-2006 academic year, and completed a language internship at the Polish Language and Culture
Summer School of the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) in July 2007.
2
50
The second stage of our investigation began with the start of our thesis in October
2005 and our move to Warsaw until August 2006. Unfortunately for us, it also
coincided with a period of relative "closure" of the Samoobrona movement to outside
solicitations. Committed to legitimizing their claims to participation in the exercise of
governmental power, the movement's national leaders, following the parliamentary
elections of October 2005, were endeavouring to centralize the tools for objectifying
its public identity, in order to present it as a political formation "like any other" and
avoid "any slippage" that might be seized upon by the press and their political
adversaries. In this context, the ambitious fieldwork we had set ourselves the goal of
carrying out - a localized and comparative analysis of the Samoobrona movement's
ruling elites in different sites of interaction (at the time, we had in mind the
voivodeships of Łódź, Mazovia and Western Pomerania)1 - proved impossible to
implement. Having been instructed not to take a stand on behalf of the movement
without referring to the national leadership, local leaders refused, with a few rare
exceptions, our requests for interviews and systematically referred us to the "official"
spokesmen in Warsaw, in particular Mateusz Piskorski, an unavoidable interlocutor in
every sense of the word. Far from alleviating the situation, the Samoobrona
movement's official entry into the parliamentary majority in February 2006, and then
into government in May, exacerbated this
"closure". Forced to redefine our object of study in favor of a more "macro", but also
more dynamic, reading of the Samoobrona movement, we endeavored to take
advantage of our stay in Poland to flesh out our data on this group. To this end, we
mobilized every conceivable means - interviews, of course, but also library research
(mainly the Warsaw University Library and the National Library of Poland), archival
research, reading the daily and weekly press, following the news on TV and radio,
and travelling around the country (systematically trying, almost always in vain, to get
an interview with the movement's local leaders). This survey p r o t o c o l
"tinkered with t o adapt to the constraints of the moment continued to be the one who
1 We wanted to draw inspiration from the approach used to study the Socialist Party in France by
Frédéric Sawicki: Sawicki Frédéric, op.cit.
51
guided our research, following our return to France, during our regular stays in Poland
from summer 2006 to autumn 2007.
The third stage of our investigative work begins with what is presented by journalists
as the "rout" of the Samoobrona movement in the early parliamentary elections of
October 2007. Samoobrona's exit from parliament and government was accompanied
by a relative "liberation" of the union's and party's current and former leaders. Firstly,
having lost their parliamentary or government mandates, the movement's national
leaders had more time to devote to the solicitations of a young French researcher in
political science. During a two-month research trip to Poland in June and July 2008,
we were able to speak for the first time with several members of the Samoobrona RP
prezydium, including Andrzej Lepper. Secondly, because the increasing number of
challenges to the latter's authority in the weeks following the October 2007 elections
was accompanied by many of the movement's leaders distancing themselves from the
"official" line promoted by its national spokesmen, with several even taking the path
of open dissidence. Nevertheless, while it is now possible to find militants, elected
representatives and former elected representatives of the movement willing to talk
openly about their political experience, they are much harder to identify than before.
The rapid disintegration of the movement's structures (accompanied in particular by
the closure of all the party's regional offices) and the withdrawal of many of them
from political life represented a further obstacle to our investigation. In the end, by
dint of telephone calls ("the number is no longer allocated" being the most frequent
response), e-mails and post, we only managed to obtain a handful of new interviews,
mainly with MEPs (then still in office and therefore easy to "find") and local leaders
of the movement with whom we had had the opportunity to make contact several
years earlier.
Although it often resembled a "do-it-yourself" exercise under duress, our survey
nevertheless enabled us to gather a great deal of data and information that could be
used in our research.
52
B) Presentation of sources.
The sources we have gathered for our survey are mainly of three kinds: the press,
interviews and archives.
1) The press.
Press articles were central to our research. They enabled us to familiarize ourselves in
detail with Polish political life during the IIIe Republic, to gather factual information
on our object so as to be able to follow its trajectory "step by step", but also to grasp
the competing interpretations of which the activities of the actors giving it shape are
the object, on the part of the other actors in the political competition but also of the
journalists themselves.
Gazeta Wyborcza (the Electoral Gazette) and Polityka (the Political Gazette) were
systematically analyzed over the study period. The choice o f these newspapers was
dictated both by their central position in the Polish media and by the ease of access to
their archives, which can be consulted on the Internet and are available in numerous
libraries, notably the Warsaw University Library and the Bibliothèque nationale de
France. Founded in May 1989 to support the Solidarity lists in the June semi-free
elections - at the time the first "independent" daily in the "Eastern Bloc" - Gazeta
Wyborcza has established itself as the benchmark for journalism in the Polish media
landscape1 . At the time of its launch, its emblematic editor-in-chief, former dissident
Adam Michnik, aspired to make it the newspaper "of those who wish, for Poland, a
democratic order according to normal European criteria"2 . Despite losing its right to
call itself a member of the Solidarity movement in 1990, Gazeta Wyborcza flourished
throughout t h e 1990s, with a daily circulation of over 500,000 and numerous local
editions. Regularly attacked by its detractors, who criticize its hegemonic position in
the Polish press and the fact that it is overly
1 On the creation of Gazeta Wyborcza: Paweł Smoleński, Gazeta Wyborcza: Miroir d'une démocratie
naissante, Paris, Les éditions Noir sur Blanc, 1991.
2 Bouyeure Cyril, L'invention du politique. A biography of Adam Michnik, Paris, Les éditions Noir sur
Blanc, 2007.
53
It lost its political influence in the early 2000s following Adam Michnik's
involvement in a corruption scandal (the Rywin Affair, to which we'll return)1 . Even
today, however, it remains Poland's second most widely read daily after the tabloid
Fakt (the Fact)2 . Polityka, for its part, has been one of Poland's most widely
circulated and widely read weeklies since the start of the Third Republice 3 . Founded
in 1957 by the PZPR Central Committee, against a backdrop of de-Stalinization,
Polityka has gradually built up a reputation as one of Poland's most influential
newspapers.
"reformer" in the days of the People's Republic. Independent since 1990, it has since
claimed a "social-liberal" line.
Other newspapers were also the subject of a more targeted analysis, constrained by
time limits and access to archives.
With regard to the "general" press, we have used articles from the dailies
Rzeczpospolita (The Republic), from 1992, and Dziennik (The Daily), from 2006, as
well as from the weeklies Wprost (Directly), from 1998, and Newsweek Polska
(Newsweek Poland), from 2001. The daily Rzeczpospolita was founded in 1982, the
day after General Jaruzelski declared a state of war. A government and Nomenklatura
newspaper until the end of the People's Republic, it became independent following the
change of regime. With a daily circulation of over 200,000, making it Poland's fourthlargest behind the tabloids Fakt and Super Express, and Gazeta Wyborcza, it has a
reputation for rigor and a resolutely conservative orientation. Dziennik, for its part,
was founded in April 2006 by the German press group Axel Springer. While Gazeta
Wyborcza's credibility was damaged by the Rywin affair, its founders believe that
Dziennik is destined to establish itself as the new "newspaper of reference" in Poland4
. With mixed success
1 For an overview of the controversies surrounding Gazeta Wyborcza and Adam Michnik: Ziemkiewicz
Rafał A., Michnikowszczyzna. Zapis choroby, Warszawa, Red Horse, 2006.
2 For information on Polish newspaper circulation since 1994, please refer to the annual surveys of the
Press Distribution Control Union (Związek Kontroli Dystrybucji Prasy) available on its website
(www.zkdp.pl).
3 In March 2009, it had a c i r c u l a t i o n of 220,000, on a par with Wprost and ahead of Gość Niedzielny
(193,000) and Newsweek Polska (192,000). Cf. http://media2.pl/badania/51458-zkdp:-tygodniki-opiniitraca-sprzedaz.html, accessed 1er September 2010.
4 Cf. ""Dziennik": pierwsze (i drugie) wrażenie", Internetowy Obserwator Mediów, 18/04/2006
54
since, despite an aggressive marketing policy, it has not succeeded in supplanting its
direct competitors Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. Following a merger with the
daily Gazeta Prawna (Legal Gazette), it has been published since September 2009
under the name Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, with a daily circulation of 150,000. Wprost
has been one of Poland's leading weeklies since the early 1990s, claiming a liberal and
conservative identity. Renowned for its provocative covers and liberal-conservative
orientation, it has always taken a particularly critical stance towards the Samoobrona
movement. As for Newsweek Polska, the Polish version of the American weekly of
the same name published under license by the Axel Springer group, it has rapidly
established itself alongside Wprost and Polityka as one of the most widely read
weeklies in Poland since its launch in 2001.
From 1991 to 1994, and again from 1997 to 2000, periods corresponding to the two
main waves of peasant protests in so-called "post-communist" Poland, we also
systematically scrutinized two titles from the specialized agricultural press: Zielony
Sztandar (The Green Standard) and Chłopska droga (The Peasant Way). Claiming the
title of Poland's oldest weekly, Zielony sztandar is the official organ of the PSL
peasant party, having been the organ of Stronnictwo Ludowe in the 1930s and then of
the ZSL under the Polish People's Republic. Created in the aftermath of the Second
World War, Chłopska droga was originally a publication of the Communist regime,
then of the KZRKiOR. The weekly, which had an average circulation of 52,000 in
1998, moved closer to the Samoobrona movement in the early 2000s. Andrzej Lepper
wrote a weekly editorial from January 2003 to October 2006.
On a more ad hoc basis, we drew on articles published by the tabloids Fakt and Super
Express, as well as the dailies Nasz Dziennik (Our Daily), Trybuna (the Tribune),
Polska (Poland) and Życie Warszawy (Warsaw Life). Created in October 2003 by the
German press group Axel Springer, Fakt stands out for its particularly low prices,
racy articles and acerbic tone. It quickly established itself as the Polish daily with the
largest circulation. Super Express, founded in 1991, is its main competitor on the
market.
55
tabloids, with a daily circulation of over 350,000. Launched in 1998, Nasz Dziennik
asserts its conservative, nationalist and Catholic identity. Linked to the fundamentalist
networks of Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, it is one of the flagships of the Fundacja Lux
Veritatis group, which also owns the TV channel Telewizja Trwam (Television "I am
a believer") and Radio Maryja (Radio Marie). At the opposite end of the political
spectrum, Trybuna, heir to the main People's Republic newspaper Trybuna Ludu
(People's Tribune), was close to the PZPR's successor parties, the SdRP and then the
SLD, until its demise in December 2009. The daily Polska is a group of local dailies
published since 2007 in partnership with the British newspaper The Times for the
international and national pages. As for Życie Warszawy, it lays claim to the title of
Poland's oldest daily, having been published continuously since 1944. Today, it has a
circulation of less than 10,000, but retains a special following in the Warsaw region.
Finally, although this was not possible on a systematic basis due to the lack of a
Polish equivalent of the Institut National de l'Audiovisuel, we also occasionally relied
on television or radio archives, in particular interviews with representatives of the
Samoobrona movement archived on the group's website (www.samoobrona.org.pl).
As we can see, we have endeavored to mobilize a variety of press sources in our
investigation, in order to multiply the points of view on our subject. Depending on
their position in the media, political and economic spheres, different newspapers
convey different, even competing, interpretations of the events we are investigating.
Far from confining themselves to "recording" an event, journalists play a full part in
shaping it as such, if only by giving or withholding coverage, and in defining its social
image1 . They are part and parcel of the interactions that shape the political
configuration and its successive states. Likewise, they are fully involved in the
competitive struggles
1 On this subject: Neveu Erik, "Médias, mouvements sociaux, espaces publics", Réseaux, vol.17, n°98,
1999, p.17-85; and Juhem Philippe, "La participation des journalistes à l'émergence des mouvements
sociaux. Le cas de SOS Racisme", Réseaux, n°98, 1999, p.121-152.
56
that help shape the movement.
Samoobrona and characterize its trajectory.
2) Interviews.
In the course of our survey, we conducted some twenty semi-structured interviews,
lasting between one and two hours, with thirteen Polish political leaders, ten of them
from the Samoobrona movement1 . Although these interviews did not represent as
central a component of our corpus as we had initially wished, mainly due to the
complexity of accessing the field as mentioned above, they were nonetheless essential
to the construction of our research.
Firstly, they were a particularly effective remedy against any inclination towards
exceptionalism. Meeting and conversing with the leaders of the Samoobrona
movement face-to-face breaks down assumptions about their "abnormality". Far
f r o m being "wild beasts", "terrorists" or
"Although they helped shape a political group presented as illegitimate, they were
nonetheless "Poles like any others", systematically welcoming their guests with tea
and herbatniki cookies. Talking to Andrzej Lepper also reveals his "normality" and
the relativity of his hypothetical charisma. However prosaic and intuitive they may
seem, these clarifications are useful, given that the fantasies surrounding the
Samoobrona movement are commonly transferred to its members2 .
Secondly, the interviews we conducted enabled us to gather a great deal of factual
information on processes that are not usually made public: decision-making
mechanisms within the movement, the informal practices that take p l a c e within it,
the ways in which money circulates w i t h i n it, or even the
1 Please refer to the appendices for a detailed presentation of these interviews.
2 For example, it's not uncommon for Polish friends, concerned that we were taking an interest in a
movement they considered so "dangerous", to ask us after interviews with some of its leaders, "So what
does a Samoobrona leader look like?", as if they were aliens.
57
internal conflicts between its leaders. In addition, certain testimonies have enabled us
to refine our knowledge and understanding of little-documented or undocumented
episodes in the "life" of the movement, particularly in the early years of its existence1
.
Lastly, interviews prove invaluable for "reconstructing the subjective perspective of
the actors"2 , for uncovering indigenous interpretations of events involving the
Samoobrona movement and saturated with competing interpretations produced by
their political opponents or journalists. They also reveal any interpretive divergences,
difficulties or hesitations that animated the movement throughout the period under
study.
While the interview method was an important data-gathering technique for our
research into the Samoobrona movement, it nevertheless calls for a few specific
comments. Indeed, it is fraught with pitfalls, particularly acute in this particular case,
which we had to overcome.
Firstly, investigating the leaders of a political organization, particularly one
considered illegitimate by its competitors in the political arena and by most
commentators, is a delicate exercise. As professionals of the spoken word, political
leaders do not "give themselves up" easily, and tend to provide their interlocutors with
an agreed-upon discourse, in line with the public identity they intend to promote. This
is particularly true in the case of a group like the Samoobrona movement, whose
leaders pay particular attention to controlling their public speech3 . With the exception
of the former leaders we met after the 2007 parliamentary elections, the movement's
executives did not readily relinquish their "spokesperson" status during our
interviews, preferring to refer to the "spokesman" in their own words.
1 On semi-structured interviews as a source of "primary" survey data: Bachir Myriam, "L'entretien en
actes", in CURAPP (collectif), Les méthodes au concret. Démarches, formes de l'expérience et terrains
d'investigation en science politique, Paris, PUF, 2000, p.37.
2 Aït-Aoudia Myriam, op.cit. p.41.
3 In this respect, the difficulties encountered in interviewing leaders of the Samoobrona movement are
reminiscent of those encountered by Guy Birenbaum with FN leaders in France: Birenbaum Guy,
art.cit. On this subject, see also: Bizeul Daniel, Avec ceux du FN. Un sociologue au Front national,
Paris, La Découverte, 2003.
58
movement's program rather than their personal militant experience. In this context,
our status as "foreigners" was an undeniable asset. Firstly, by not being suspected of
being a Polish journalist or a political adversary hiding behind the mask of a
researcher, it helped us to overcome the mistrust of any external element de rigueur
within the Samoobrona movement1 . Secondly, by offering us the possibility of
feigning ignorance or naivety, it enabled us to ask certain potentially sensitive
questions candidly (for example, about relations with other political organizations or
the movement's internal modus operandi) and, very often, to obtain unexpected
answers.
Secondly, an interview is first and foremost an exchange between two speakers
playing a role - that of interviewer and interviewee respectively - and each often
belonging to different social and professional worlds. One of the main challenges for
the interviewer is to overcome this original distance and establish a relationship of
trust with the interviewee, enabling him or her to "talk" about subjects of interest to
him or her. This work, this "role-playing", takes place in interaction, requiring the
researcher to be responsive and attentive at all times2 . Our status as "foreigners" is an
undeniable handicap here. Almost all the interviews we conducted were in Polish, the
only language mastered by the vast majority of our respondents. Carrying out an
interview in a language that was not our own, and one that we had learned "late in the
game", undeniably made our task more complex, and in particular hampered our
ability to fully understand the situation.
"control" the interview relationship. If, at the price o f
constant linguistic
improvement and intense (and exhausting) concentration, we are able to
As a rule, we introduced ourselves as specialists in "Polish political parties, particularly those
involved in representing the interests of the peasantry". This enabled us to avoid having to specify that
we were working specifically on the Samoobrona movement, which could have aroused the suspicion
of our interlocutors. Of course, we have not escaped occasional invitations to express our views on the
Polish political scene, and on the Samoobrona movement in particular. Once again, our status as
foreigners helped us to sidestep these questions by pleading the incomparability of the French and
Polish situations. On the difficulty of gaining the trust of respondents whose ideas we don't share:
Avanza Martine, "Comment faire de l'ethnographie quand on n'aime pas 'ses' indigènes? Une enquête
au sein d'un mouvement xénophobe", in Bensa Alban & Fassin Didier (dir.), Politiques de l'enquête.
Épreuves ethnographiques, Paris, La Découverte, 2008, p.41-58.
2 Cf. Bachir Myriam, art.cit. p.45-46. On this subject, please also refer to : Chamboredon Hélène, Pavis
Fabienne, Surdez Muriel & Willemez Laurent, "S'imposer aux imposants. À propos de quelques
obstacles rencontrés par des sociologues débutants dans la pratique et l'usage de l'entretien", Genèses,
n°16, 1994, p.114-132; Laurens Sylvain, "Pourquoi et comment poser les questions qui fâchent?",
Genèses, n°69, 2007, p.112-127.
1
59
Although we gradually managed to acquire a certain fluency in Polish, we have to
admit that we didn't always have the necessary responsiveness to maintain trust and to
"reframe" our interviewee's comments. Two factors, however, helped us to overcome
this weakness. Firstly, the vast majority of our interlocutors were very understanding
and even benevolent towards us, many saying they were delighted that a Frenchman
had made the effort to learn their language. In this way, our handicap once again
became an asset in that it helped to lighten the atmosphere. Secondly, our imperfect
command of Polish enabled us to gain acceptance for the recording of the interview
most of the time, despite the fact that all the interviewees were resolutely opposed to
it at the outset. After retranscription, we were thus able to "optimize" the data
collected and exploit elements that we might otherwise have missed in the dynamics
of the interview.
Thirdly and lastly, the data collected in an interview cannot be considered as absolute
truths, any more than data taken from the press1 . Interviewees' testimonies must be
treated with caution, as reconstructions of a "life story", through which they
endeavour, more or less consciously, to make sense of and enhance their past actions2
. In addition to scrupulously preparing our interviews, so as to be in a position to
conciliatorily contradict our interlocutor in the event of a blatant untruth, we also
endeavoured to compare our interviewees' statements with other available sources,
and to historicize them. In this way, we were able to assess their relevance and make
them usable in our research, as clues to the "reality" of our respondents' practices and
perceptions.
3) The archives.
1 Cf. Donegani Jean-Marie, Duchesne Sophie & Haegel Florence, "Sur l'interprétation des entretiens de
recherche", in Donegani Jean-Marie, Duchesne Sophie & Haegel Florence (dir.), Aux frontières des
attitudes entre religieux et politique. Textes en hommages à Guy Michelat, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2002,
p.11-18.
2 Bourdieu Pierre, "L'illusion biographique", art.cit.
60
Apart from press archives, the archives we have drawn on for our research are mainly
of three kinds.
Firstly, we have endeavored to gather together as many documents, both trade union
and partisan, published by the Samoobrona movement since its inception. To this end,
the www.samoobrona.org.pl website has been a valuable resource. Indeed, since its
creation in 2001, the various publications of the movement, notably the monthly Głos
Samoobrony (The Way of Samoobrona) published from 2004 to 2006, as well as the
positions taken by its leaders and their media interventions, have been preserved
there. There are also full minutes of the most recent party and union congresses, as
well as Andrzej Lepper's various books, which are freely accessible. Gradually, we
have also collected a large number of propaganda documents: leaflets, posters, videos,
election programmes, and even a copy of the famous tie in the Polish colors regularly
worn by the movement's leaders. However, these documents relate only to the
contemporary period of the Samoobrona movement, after its entry into Parliament.
According to the various leaders and permanent staff interviewed, no archives prior to
2001 have been preserved. Two sources have enabled us to partially fill this gap, and
to find documents published by the group in the 1990s. Firstly, the collections of
programmes of electoral committees that had put forward candidates for the various
elections since 1989, published on the initiative of Professor Inka Skłodowska by the
Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (ISP-PAN). Secondly,
and most importantly, the archive of political parties maintained by the same institute.
Here we found hundreds of documents relating to the early years of ZZR Samoobrona
and Przymierze Samoobrona: propaganda texts, internal publications, open letters,
internal directives and letters from dissidents to the leadership. These various
documents have made a decisive contribution to our research.
61
Secondly, we collected information on the lists presented by the Samoobrona
movement at elections since its creation, in order to trace the profile of its candidates
(including their place of residence, profession, age, gender and the number of votes
they obtained). For the period 2001-2010, we found this data on the website of the
National Electoral Commission (www.pkw.gov.pl), which also provides the full
results of the various elections. For the period 1993-2001, we were able to retrieve
this data thanks to the invaluable help of Jérôme Heurtaux and the archive of the
Centre for the Study of Elections and Electoral Systems in Central and Eastern Europe
at the University of Essex (www.essex.ac.uk/elections/).
Thirdly, we mobilized the archives of the Sejm and Senate. On the one hand, these
enabled us to obtain detailed information on the profile of elected members of the
Samoobrona movement from 2001 to 2007. On the other, they gave us access to
stenographic records of parliamentary sessions and committee meetings, enabling us
to trace the activities (votes, speeches) of elected members of the Samoobrona RP
parliamentary club over the period.
The various sources collected as part of our survey are not lacking in gaps. It has been
impossible to reconstruct perfectly all the activities of the members of the
Samoobrona movement since its creation, and our data gathering has been less fruitful
for certain periods - notably the years 1994 to 1997, during which the movement was
relegated to an extremely marginal position within the field of agricultural unionism
and politics - than for others. Nevertheless, as Paul Veyne notes, "the heterogeneous
nature of the gaps does not prevent us from writing something that still bears the name
of history"1 , or in this case political science. We have endeavoured to deal with these
gaps, building our work "with inequalities of tempo that are proportional to the
unequal preservation of traces of the past"2 , in order t o trace as faithfully as possible
the various processes that made up the Samoobrona movement and its trajectory.
1 Paul Veyne, op.cit., p.31.
2 Ibid.
62
C) Story organization
In order to follow "step by step" the practices of the actors involved in "giving shape"
to the Samoobrona movement, and to break definitively with the illusion of the
linearity of its trajectory in Polish political games, we have chosen to organize our
account according to a chronological plan. We have distinguished three
These are the "sequences" in the history of the Samoobrona movement, around which
the various parts of our thesis1 are built. Punctuated by the movement's electoral
performance and successive transformations of its position in the political arena, these
different sequences are characterized by relatively distinct ways of organizing its
system of action, constructing its offer of representation and recruiting its leading
personnel. The first runs from the summer of 1991 to the 1997 parliamentary
elections. The second covers a period corresponding to the IIIe legislature of the Diet,
from October 1997 to the 2001 parliamentary elections. The third and final period
begins with the inauguration of the IVe legislature in October 2001 and ends after the
presidential election in June 2010.
In the first part of this paper, we will look at the processes by which actors outside the
elites of the old regime and the former opposition agreed to collaborate in the
construction of new trade union and party organizations, and sought to legitimize their
claim to participate in the representation of social interests in the early years of the IIIe
Republic.
"democratic". With this in mind, we will pay particular attention to the actual
activities of these actors, to the ways in which they set up new organizations and seek
to have their representativeness recognized, and to the successive transformations of
the political configuration over the period studied. We shall see that understanding the
genesis of a new farmers' union at the beginning of 1992, the ZZR Samoobrona,
followed by the certification of its representativeness by the public authorities in the
spring of the same year, implies paying particular attention both to the properties of its
initiators and to the evolution of the relations of power between the parties involved.
We borrow the expression "partisan sequence" from Guy Birenbaum and Bastien François:
Birenbaum Guy & François Bastien, "Unité et diversité des dirigeants frontistes", in Mayer Nonna &
Perrineau Pascal (dir.), Le Front National à découvert, Paris, presses de la FNSP, 1996, p.83.
1
63
force within the field of peasant representation and the central political field during
1991 and 1992 (chapter 1). We will then show that the gradual reorientation in a
political direction of the activities of ZZR Samoobrona leaders, which takes the form
in particular of an attempt to redefine the meaning of the movement contesting the
policies of the Suchocka government which developed during 1992 and 1993, appears
particularly constrained both by their deficit in resources traditionally valued in
political competition and by the rising trend in the cost of participation in the struggle
for positions of political power. In the end, we shall see that these constraints proved
too great, preventing the leaders of the Samoobrona movement from entering the field
of institutional politics and maintaining the relative representativeness they had
managed to achieve in the dynamics of the protest movement (chapter 2).
In the second part, we look at the mechanisms involved in the re-emergence of the
Samoobrona movement at the heart of the political game during the IIIrd legislature,
when it seemed to have been durably marginalized since the bitter defeat of its
representatives in the 1997 legislative elections. The movement's rise to prominence
during this period, first in the arena of protest mobilizations and then in the electoral
arena, is best understood in terms of the struggles that helped define successive states
of political configuration. We shall see that the unexpected ability of the
representatives of ZZR Samoobrona, and in particular its president Andrzej Lepper, to
gain recognition as the main leaders of the peasant protest movement that began in the
summer of 1998, and to present their union as a key player in the field of peasant
representation, is due as much to their actual activities as to the way in which these
are translated into the framework of struggles to define and interpret the situation
(chapter 3). We will then show that the ways in which the leaders of ZZR
Samoobrona set out to reclassify their activities in a political sense, and to reinvest in
political competition the resources accumulated in the arena of protest mobilizations,
appear particularly hesitant and differ significantly from those implemented at the
beginning of the decade. We shall also see that the trend towards greater fluidity in
the partisan arena at the end of the IIIe legislature plays a key role in this process.
64
The relative success of the Samoobrona movement's original offer of representation in
the 2001 legislative elections (chapter 4).
In a third and final section, we look at the implications for the Samoobrona
movement's system of action of the entry of its representatives into the field of
institutional politics. We will show that the progressive conformation of the activities
of the movement's constituent organizations to the main rules of the game of
institutional politics observed during the IVe legislature, far from being self-evident,
appears to be the result of an erratic and hesitant process by which its leaders strive to
invest the role of parliamentarian that now falls to them, while maintaining a
representativeness based, at least in part, on a denunciation of dominant political
practices. In the end, the organizations in which they participate are engaged in a
"forced march" to conform to the dominant rules of institutional politics, because in a
given political configuration, this appears to them to be the best way of maintaining
their political credentials and legitimizing their claims to occupy high positions of
power within the Polish state (chapter 5). We will then show that this conformation
has ambivalent effects. On the one hand, it enables the leaders of the Samoobrona
movement to take advantage of the parliamentary "crisis" following the 2007
elections to gain access to governmental power within the framework of a coalition
with the PiS party and the LPR. On the other hand, it was not accompanied by a
suspension of the trials of illegitimacy to which they had been subjected since their
entry into politics; on the contrary, these tended to increase with their participation in
government, resulting in a gradual depletion of the collective resources available to
the ZZR Samoobrona and the Samoobrona RP. This proved particularly damaging
during the early parliamentary elections of 2007, which resulted in the long-term
ousting of the Samoobrona movement's representatives from institutional politics
(chapter 6).
65
Part 1
The genesis of a multi-positioned group
(1991-1997)
66
Introduction
"Samoobrona's history as a broad social movement began in the summer of 1991, when the party's
future founder, Andrzej Lepper, led the many farmers demonstrating against the disastrous economic
conditions in agriculture and the government's lack of assistance to ruined farmers. Even then, Andrzej
Lepper saw the need to change the direction of the systemic transformations underway. In autumn
1991, he had the opportunity to meet the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Leszek
Balcerowicz, whose name is synonymous with neo-liberal, monetarist and anti-social policies in
Poland. After two hours of conversation, Andrzej Lepper realized the need to warn Poles of the
economic and social disaster to which the state's policies were leading the country. As he recalls in one
of his books: "Everything that happened later - for me and Samoobrona - had its origins in that
conversation over ten years ago". In 1992, the ZZR Samoobrona farmers' union was registered, and
shortly afterwards a political party, then called Przymierze Samoobrona, was formed. Andrzej Lepper,
who headed both the party and the union, began the arduous and difficult task of building a broad social
movement. He lacked the financial resources and media support of the establishment parties. Despite
this unfavorable context, the party and the union gradually managed to gather more and more members
and supporters. The numerous protest actions organized on Samoobrona's initiative undoubtedly
contributed to the development of the movement and its support base. While these actions were initially
aimed at highlighting the disastrous consequences of successive governments' policies on agriculture
and rural areas, the president of Samoobrona gradually established himself as the last hope for all those
in need of help. Samoobrona then becomes the spokesperson for all those social groups who, as a result
of the reforms of the 1990s, find themselves on the brink of misery and despair."
From Piskorski Mateusz, "Samoobrona: kim jesteśmy i o co walczymy", www.samoobrona.org.pl,
November 18, 2004.
This extract from the "official" historiography of the Samoobrona movement, written
in 2004 by one of its leaders, provides an initial reading of the phenomena to which
this first part is devoted. Covering a period from the summer of 1991 to the
parliamentary elections in autumn 1997, its aim is to highlight the processes by which
actors come together in trade union and party organizations, united under the common
label Samoobrona, and strive, with varying degrees of success, to be recognized as
legitimate participants in the representation of social interests in so-called "post-war"
Poland.
67
communist". Our aim here is to provide answers to three main questions: How did
actors from outside the elites of the old regime and the former opposition come to
collaborate in the construction of new groupings claiming to participate in the
definition and political representation of the social world in the early years of the IIIe
Polish Republic? What was the rationale behind the "non-specialization" of the
movement they initiated, and its dual institutionalization as both a trade union and a
political party? How do they concretely strive for recognition of their
representativeness in competition with other organizations, often better endowed with
collective resources valued in the political and trade union fields?
Unsurprisingly, the description of the early years of the Samoobrona movement in its
"official" historiography does not provide satisfactory answers to these questions. An
integral part of the "movement novel", it tells us more about the presentation
strategies favoured by its leadership when the text was written than about the concrete
conditions of its appearance in Polish politics1 . Naturalizing the creation process, it
maintains the illusions of a grouping unified from the outset, and of the evidence of its
dual trade-union and partisan orientation. Emphasizing the role of Andrzej Lepper, it
acknowledges the domination that he later managed to gain over the organizations
that made up the Samoobrona movement, and glosses over the hesitations and internal
conflicts that accompanied the processes of shaping and defining the offer of
representation. On the other hand, ignoring the mistakes and setbacks, this description
portrays the trajectory of the Samoobrona movement since its creation as a
discontinuous rise to power, as a steady ascent towards electoral "success" achieved
for the first time in the early 2000s.
More surprisingly, the presuppositions contained in this "official" history of the
Samoobrona movement are also to be found in most of the analyses of the
Samoobrona movement.
The expression "movement novel" is inspired by the "party novel" coined by Pierre Ansart to
designate the "work of rewriting the past, of reorganizing memories by which the various adversaries by allusion, affirmation or development - recompose a past that suits their strategy": Ansart Pierre, La
gestion des passions politiques, Lausanne, Editions l'Âge d'Homme, 1983, p. 126; see also, Pudal
Bernard, op.cit., p. 23.
1
68
scientific pretensions that have been devoted to it in recent years. Although they
belong to a radically singular register of intelligibility and have quite different aims1 ,
the vast majority of these works testify to their authors' adherence to a Lepperocentric, finalist reading of the Samoobrona movement's trajectory. Undoubtedly
seized by the unexpected nature of its electoral "breakthrough" in 2001, they focus
primarily on identifying the causes of this "success" in the past of the movement's
constituent organizations, commonly assimilated to their president alone, and the
strategies and actions that are said to have driven the dynamics of this "success".
From this perspective, the early years of the Samoobrona movement are often reduced
to the status of premises, prefigurations of a future.
"Paradoxically, although they set out to do so, these causalist, linear approaches do
not shed light on, or understand, the concrete ways in which the Samoobrona
movement emerged. Paradoxically, although they set out to do so, these causalist and
linear approaches neither highlight nor understand the concrete modalities of the
emergence of the Samoobrona movement in contemporary Polish politics. Ignoring
the contingency and unpredictability of the phenomena involved in the creation and
structuring of the ZZR Samoobrona trade union and then of the Przymierze
Samoobrona party, and reifying these collectives by reducing them to their president,
Andrzej Lepper, they leave unanalyzed the very enigma of the processes by which
individual actors come together in collectives and strive for recognition of their
representativeness in the face of other groupings.
To replace these "regressive" readings of the genesis and primo-activities of the
organizations making up the Samoobrona movement, which consist in thinking of
their first years of existence solely in terms of their subsequent trajectories, with an
approach that places the historicity and uncertainty of the processes at work at the
heart of the analysis, is the change of perspective that is required2 . In other words,
restoring the dynamics through which individual actors, not necessarily
1 This observation needs to be qualified, however, as the scientific field is not immune to more or less
euphemistic partisan investments. In this respect, it is interesting to note that Mateusz Piskorski, an
executive of the Samoobrona movement and editor of its official historiography, is also, this time as a
professor of political science, the author of several articles devoted to the Samoobrona RP party in
publications with scientific pretensions. See, for example, Piskorski Mateusz, "Samoobrona
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej", in Kowalczyk Krzysztof & Sielski Jerzy (eds.), Polskie partie i
ugrupowanie parlamentarne, Toruń, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2004, p.197-226.
2 As Michel Dobry notes: "One of the most dangerous intellectual traps is to transform what has
happened into a historical necessity": "Michel Dobry: "Penser=classer?"", art.cit., p.157.
69
The fact that politically-experienced members of the Samoobrona movement come
together to work on building collectives that enable them to act as union and political
representatives means taking into account both the context in which they do so, and
their imperfect grasp of the effects of their actions. The activities by which the
initiators of the Samoobrona movement set about shaping their grouping must be
understood in the context of the more general processes of redefining legitimate
representation practices at work in the early years of the IIIe Republic. The outcome
of this process is anyone's guess. With this in mind, in this section we shall endeavour
to consider the commitment of "independent" actors to the formalization of a new
collective, and their decision to invest the trade union and electoral arenas by creating
two formally distinct organizations - the ZZR Samoobrona and the Przymierze
Samoobrona - in relation to the dynamics of the gradual codification of the rules of
Polish pluralist political games in the early years of the so-called "post-communist"
period.
We will begin by highlighting the reasons behind the genesis of the ZZR Samoobrona
farmers' union, a newcomer to a field of peasant representation hitherto dominated by
the opposition between organizations inherited from the old regime and those
claiming their affiliation with the Solidarité rurale movement. The creation of this
organization and its recognition as a legitimate participant in the definition and
representation of the peasant group and its interests cannot be reduced to the will of its
founders alone, and must be understood in the light of the changing balance of power
within the field of representation of the peasantry and the field of institutional politics
during 1991 and 1992 (chapter 1).
Secondly, we'll look at the ways in which the initiators of this new farmers' union
invest in political competition. For them, the task of constructing an explicitly
political offer of representation is akin to an apprenticeship, during which they strive
to reorient the relations of representation in their favor, in order to legitimize their
stated claim to obtaining positions of political power in the face of established
competitors, while conforming to the essential values of the political field.
Constrained
70
The initial weakness of the collective and individual resources at their disposal,
combined with the increasing codification of the political game, make this work
particularly delicate and hesitant. It affects the ability of ZZR Samoobrona and
Przymierze Samoobrona to institutionalize themselves, and of their representatives to
withstand successive electoral setbacks and remain in the political and union game
(chapter 2).
71
Chapter 1: The structuring of a new player in
the field of peasant representation.
In the Polish People's Republic, the peasantry was recognized as a relatively distinct
class, and even had its own professional and political bodies. In addition to
cooperative structures, notably the Union of Agricultural Circles (KZRKiOR)1 ,
which were designed to accompany the collectivization of agriculture, a "peasant"
political party, the ZSL, was integrated into the institutional system of the socialist
state as early as 19492 . The ZSL was officially described as an "allied formation" of
the PZPR, which was given the leading role, and political posts were reserved for it in
state structures. The Polish political crisis of the late 1980s provided the ZSL
leadership with the opportunity to autonomize itself from the PZPR and regain control
over the tools of objectification of their party3 . In a context of general redefinition of
legitimate modes of political representation of social space, however, ZSL
representatives had to contend with
1 In 1958, the government of the Polish People's Republic unified the agricultural circles, local self-help
structures dating back to the late 19th century, within a national organization, the Central Union of
Agricultural Circles (Centralny Związek Kółek Rolniczych). Its mission was to participate in the
implementation of national agricultural policy and to set up a cooperative for the use of agricultural
equipment by individual farmers. In spring 1981, the Central Union of Agricultural Circles is given the
newly created status of a national union of individual farmers and adopts the name National Union of
Farmers, Agricultural Circles and Agricultural Organizations (Krajowy Związek Rolników, Kółek i
Organizacji Rolniczych), more commonly known as the Union of Agricultural Circles. It retains this
status and name to this day. On the Union of Agricultural Circles in the days of the Polish People's
Republic, please refer to: George Pierre, "Les cercles agricoles en Pologne", Annales de Géographie,
vol.73, n°398, 1964, p.500; and to: "Historia KZRKIOR", http://www.kolkarolnicze.eu/, accessed 1er
September 2010. On the "indirect" and "direct" socialization policies implemented in Poland up to the
end of the 1980s, see for example: Maurel Marie-Claude, Les paysans contre l'État. Le rapport de
forces polonais, Paris, l'Harmattan, 1988; Pouliquen Alain, "La Pologne : de la socialisation indirecte
de l'agriculture à la reprise de la socialisation directe", Économie rurale, n°112, 1976, p.47-53; or
Durbiano Claudine, "Les transformations récentes de l'agriculture polonaise. Une voie nouvelle pour la
socialisation de l'agriculture privée", Annales de Géographie, vol.88, n°487, 1979, p.351-368.
2 On Polish institutional tripartism, associating the peasant party ZSL, the party of the "intelligentsia
and the non-state sector" SD with the workers' party PZPR, which is recognized as having a leading
role: Hanicotte Robert, "Le tripartisme polonais ou la coopération politique institutionnelle", Revue
française de science politique, vol.33, n°3, 1983, p.480-503. On the specific relationship between the
ZSL and the PZPR: Frédéric Zalewski, "L'improbable autonomisation d'un "parti satellite". Réflexions
sur les rapports de pouvoir entre le ZSL et le PZPR dans la Pologne communiste (1949-1989)", Revue
d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, vol.49, n°2, 2002, p. 78-101.
3 Zalewski Frédéric, "Partis politiques et changement de régime en Pologne : mobilisations autour de la
restauration du parti paysan polonais PSL", Revue française de science politique, vol.54, n°6, décembre
2004, p.911-944.
72
the rise of multiple competitors also claiming to speak on behalf of the peasantry and
its interests. A number of independent peasant mobilizations emerged, most of them
from the more or less clandestine activist networks of the former PSL, the powerful
agrarian party of the immediate post-war period1 , or from the rural branch of the
Solidarity opposition movement, notably the NSZZRI "S" trade union, which was
relegated in April 19892 .
Parallel to the crisis of routine principles of regulation of social space and the
transformation of the configuration of political games, the turn of the 1980s and 1990s
saw the gradual emergence in Poland of a relatively autonomous space of competition
between actors claiming to speak on behalf o f the peasantry, in other words, a field
of representation of the peasantry3 . This field is based on the shared belief of the
actors involved in it, and making it exist through their more or less competitive
positions and interactions, in the existence o f a differentiated peasant group, whose
members
From 1945 to 1949, the PSL, which followed in the footsteps of the pre-1939 SL peasant party,
established itself as Poland's most important political party in terms of activists, and as the main
obstacle to the Communists in their bid to take over state structures. Under the presidency of Stanisław
Mikołajczyk, Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile in London from July 1943 to November
1944, the PSL took part in the 1947 parliamentary elections, the first since the end of the war. Although
the PSL was officially credited with only 10.3% of the vote, in an election marked by numerous frauds
organized by the Communist leadership, some reports suggest that it actually won almost 70% of the
votes. Following Mikołajczyk's forced departure into exile in October 1947, control of the SLP
gradually passed into the hands of officials favoring union with the Communists. In November 1949,
the PSL was dissolved into the ZSL, which was integrated into the institutional system of the Polish
People's Republic. On the post-war PSL: Zalewski Frédéric, Paysannerie et politique en Pologne :
trajectoire du Parti paysanonais du communisme à l'après communisme. 1945-2005, Paris, Michel
Houdiard Éditeur, 2006, p.31-33.
2 NSZZRI "S" was created at the time of the Polish political crisis of the early 1980s by the union of
several "free" peasant groups, promoting alternative principles for building the peasant class to those
promoted by socialist ideology. Its representatives claimed to belong to the Solidarity movement, which
was then spreading throughout the country. In May 1981, seven months after NSZZ "S", the NSZZ "S"
RI farmers' union was legalized, becoming the first body representing individual farmers independent
of the regime. Banned following the proclamation of the state of war on December 13, 1981, it was
legalized again under the Round Table agreements in April 1989. On the genesis, claims and activism
of the Solidarité Rurale movement in the early 1980s: Rambaud Placide, "Les agriculteurs polonais à la
conquête de leur identité", Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, n°41, 1982, p.47; Szurek JeanCharles, Aux origines paysannes de la crise polonaise, Le Paradou, Actes Sud, 1982, p.156; Maurel
Marie-Claude, op.cit., p.181-194.
3 We borrow from Sylvain Maresca the notion of the peasantry's field of representation, understood as a
space of specialized competition whose stake is the control of the peasantry's representation, i.e. the
right to produce this class and to speak and act on its behalf within the central political field: Maresca
Sylvain, Les dirigeants paysans, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1983, p.233-276.
1
73
and specific interests, and the need to provide this group with its own representative
bodies.
In the months leading up to the parliamentary elections of October 1991 - the first
fully competitive elections since the interwar period - the peasantry's field of
representation was gradually organized around two competing "poles". Reproducing
the classification patterns that dominate the central political field, these "poles" are
formed respectively around organizations inherited from the old regime and groups
claiming their affiliation with the Solidarité rurale movement. At the time, the
boundary between trade union and partisan activities remained extremely blurred in
Poland1 , and these "poles" both brought together trade union and partisan
organizations. The KZRKiOR and the PSL, formed in May 1990 from a union
between the ZSL and groups claiming the heritage of the historic agrarian movement2
, thus joined forces, in the run-up to the elections, within the PSL-PL electoral
committee, while the NSZZRI "S" trade union and the PSL-" S" party are involved in
the creation of the RL-PL electoral committee.
In January 1992, a few weeks after the elections, the ZZR Samoobrona, a new trade
union organization claiming to represent the interests of the peasantry and particularly
of over-indebted farmers, was registered with the Warsaw Tribunal. From the outset,
the initiators of this union set out to break away from both the organizations inherited
from the old regime and those claiming to be part of the Rural Solidarity movement,
thus challenging the principle of classification according to the past during the time of
the People's Republic, which then dominated the field of representation of the
peasantry.
In the scholarly literature devoted to the political transformations at work in Central
and Eastern Europe since the "fall" of the People's Republics, the question of the
creation of a new organization, whether partisan or, as in this case, trade-union-based,
by a group of actors outside the elites of the old regime or the
1 On the indeterminate nature of the actors entitled to participate in the struggle for positions of political
power in Poland in the early 1990s, please refer to the second part of Jérôme Heurtaux's thesis:
Heurtaux Jérôme, Une partisanisation controversée : codification de la compétition politique et
construction de la démocratie en Pologne (1989-2001), thesis for the doctorate in political science,
Université de Lille 2, 2005, p.273-472.
2 Cf: Zalewski Frédéric, op.cit. p.126-128.
74
the former democratic opposition is rarely addressed as such. The problematic nature
of this question, its status as a sociological enigma, is largely evaded. Firstly, because
the persistent dominance of transitological postulates over analytical schemes too
often leads specialists to regard the emergence of political parties and professional
trade unions in the former People's Republics as self-evident, as an expected
phenomenon in the context of "democratic transition". From this point of view, the
processes of structuring collective actors specialized in defining and representing
social interests tend to be apprehended from a finalist and naturalist perspective, with
the emergence of political parties and trade unions reduced to the status of one
indicator, among others, of the smooth progress of "democratization"1 . Secondly,
because many studies continue to be fuelled by modes of thought that insist on the
"amorphous" nature of "post-communist" societies, on the difficulty of their members
to participate actively in public debates and, a fortiori, to engage in a collective
undertaking to shape and represent social interests2 . Consequently, the few analyses
devoted to the emergence of partisan or trade-union collectives in the post-communist
era focus essentially on the trajectory and recompositions of pre-existing groupings,
whether they originate from official forces of the former communist regime,
opposition movements or even formations that predate the establishment of the
People's Republics3 . The emergence of
1 For authors following this developmentalist approach to the emergence of political organizations, the
"degree of structuring of party systems" is seen as an important indicator of the progress of
"democratization" in the various post-communist democracies, of the "smooth progress" of their
political systems towards a reified, idealized Western model. See, for example: Pridham Geoffrey &
Lewis Paul G., "Stabilising Fragile Democracies and Party System Development", in Pridham Geoffrey
& Lewis Paul G. (eds.), Stabilising Fragile Democracies. Comparing New Party Systems in Southern
and Eastern Europe, London & New York, Routledge, 1996; On the Polish case: Ekiert Grzegorz,
art.cit.
2 For example, Sztompka Piotr, "Civilizational Incompetence: The Trap of Post-Communist Societies",
Zeitschrift für Soziologie, vol.22, no 2, 1993, p.85-95; or Howard Marc Morjé, The Weakness of Civil
Society in Post-Communist Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003. This observation
feeds the "missing-middle" or "disintegration" thesis, according to which the principles for the
emergence of organizations claiming to represent social interests cannot be identified in the former
People's Republics. With this in mind, we refer to : Evans Geoffrey & Whitefield Stephen, "Identifying
the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe", British Journal of Political Science, vol.23, n°4,
1993, p.521-548.
3 The majority of these studies, however, pay little attention to the concrete activities by which these
different players strive to shape a political, programmatic or organizational offer that conforms to the
new rules of the political or union games, and to legitimize their representativeness. In a perspective
explicitly linked to Seymour's theory of cleavages
75
As for the partisan or trade union activities initiated by "new" players, outside the
political and trade union elites formed before the change of regime, they are often left
in the realm of the unthought, or relegated to the status of marginal or even abnormal
phenomena1 .
To understand the emergence and institutionalization of a new group claiming to
defend social interests in an uncertain context of redefinition of legitimate modes of
political representation in social space, as we propose to do in this chapter with regard
to the ZZR Samoobrona, requires a renewed analytical approach. Breaking with a
mechanicist, naturalist and exceptionalism-tinged reading of the genesis and
institutionalization of partisan or trade-union organizations in young
"Without denying the specificity of the Polish socio-political context of the early
1990s, the processes involved in the creation and recognition of a new organization
claiming to aggregate and represent the interests of the Polish peasantry in the early
1990s will be examined from the perspective of a new trade union in the making, and
the activities involved in the genesis and construction of a new agricultural union,
even if their main aim is not necessarily to establish it2 . Without denying the
specificity of the Polish socio-political context of the early 1990s, the processes
involved in the creation and recognition of a new organization claiming to aggregate
and represent the interests of a given group cannot a priori be considered radically
different from those observable in other geographically and culturally remote areas.
Three false facts hinder understanding of the genesis and construction of the
Samoobrona
ZZR:
the
objective
existence
of
a
problem
-
agricultural
overindebtedness - around which the union's future initiators focused their energies;
and the fact that the ZZR's members were in the process of being formed.
Lipstet and Stein Rokkan, work tends to focus on identifying the lines of conflict structuring their
opposition, and the influence of their respective histories on defining them. De Waele Jean-Michel,
L'émergence des partis politiques en Europe centrale, Brussels, Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles,
1999; Kitschelt Herbert, art.cit.
1 There are, however, a few exceptions. Magdalena Hadjiisky's study of the Czech Civic Democratic
Party (ODS) comes to mind: Hadjiisky Magdalena, art.cit.
2 Our discussion is thus in line with the analysis of the genesis of political organizations proposed by
Myriam Aït-Aoudia and Alexandre Dezé: Aït-Aoudia Myriam & Dezé Alexandre,
"Contribution à une approche théorique et empirique de la genèse partisane: une analyse du FN, du
MSI et du FIS", text presented at the 10ème AFSP Congress, Sciences Po Grenoble, September 7-9,
2009.
76
In the end, it's all about the immediate recognition of their new organization as a
legitimate representative of the peasantry. This chapter will focus on challenging
these three false self-evident truths. Initially, we will look at the concrete conditions
of the emergence of a public controversy on the question of agricultural
overindebtedness in the months leading up to the legislative elections of October 1991
(section 1). We will then look at the ways in which actors with singular characteristics
came together around this issue, and how this grouping was formalized by trade
unions (section 2). Finally, we'll show that the recognition of the newly-created ZZR
Samoobrona as an organization to be reckoned with in the field of peasant
representation, far from being natural, must be understood primarily as the
consequence of a "coup"1 attempted by its initiators in the spring of 1992 in a context
of tending fluidity in the political conjuncture (section 3).
1 By moves, we mean here, according to Michel Dobry : "individual or collective acts and behaviors
that have the property of affecting either the expectations of the protagonists of a conflict concerning
the behavior of the other actors, or what Goffman calls their "existential situation" (i.e., broadly
speaking, the relationship between these actors and their environment), or, of course, both
simultaneously, with the modification of this existential situation almost always being accompanied by
a transformation of the expectations and representations that the various actors have of the situation",
Dobry Michel, Sociologie des crises politiques, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 2009, pp.11-12.
77
Section 1.
Agricultural overindebtedness as a public issue.
Economists and sociologists agree that the phenomenon of over-indebtedness
affecting some Polish farmers in the early 1990s was a direct consequence of the
dramatic deterioration in the economic situation of agriculture following the change of
regime. The relative decline in prices and farm incomes1 coupled with the explosion
in inflation and interest rates2 would have profoundly affected the ability of
agricultural creditors to repay their debts. As Mieczsysław Adamowicz summarizes:
"Weak demand for agricultural products, adverse movements in price relationships,
and falling family incomes created [after 1989] unfavorable conditions for investment
[...]. These constraints were exacerbated by restrictions on the granting of credit,
linked to the steep rise in interest rates. Farmers who had not settled their debts before
the onset of inflation found themselves caught in the credit trap"3 .
Nevertheless, however undeniable this deterioration in indebted farmers' ability to
repay their loans may be, the potential "target" nature of a public controversy4 and
state intervention in the issue o f their over-indebtedness seems rather unlikely until
late summer 1991. Since the implementation of the Balcerowicz plan, successive
Polish governments have been characterized by their adherence to a style of action
based on the belief in the virtuous nature of deregulation and the withdrawal of the
state from the economic sphere. Erecting free competition as the driving force behind
modernization, the Polish
1 Zdzisław Grochowski estimates that the income parity index, i.e. the ratio between farm and non-farm
income, fell from 104 in 1989 to 63 in 1991: Grochowski Zdzisław, "sytuacja ekonomiczna gospodarki
chlopskiej", Rynek Rolny, vol.3, n°16, 1992.
2 According to the Central Statistical Office (GUS), inflation reached 251.1% in 1989, 585.8% in 1990
and 70.3% in 1991: see http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_1638_PLK_HTML.htm (accessed February
25, 2010). For more details on the evolution of interest rates in post-communist Poland, please refer to :
Szydło Stanisław, "Stopy procentowe banków komercyjnych", Bank i Kredyt, August 2004, p.46-55.
3 Adamowicz Mieczsysław, "L'agriculture et l'agro-alimentaire en Pologne: situation et facteurs
d'évolution", Économie rurale, vol.214, n°1, 1993, p.85.
4 As defined by Pierre Lascoumes, by controversy we mean "a sequence of discussion and
confrontation between divergent points of view on a subject". Cf. Lascoumes Pierre, "Controversy", in
Boussaget Laurie, Jacquot Sophie & Ravinet Pauline, Dictionnaire des politiques publiques, Paris,
Presses de la FNSP, 2006, p.125-133.
78
The government's approach to the agricultural sector can be summed up as a
significant reduction in agricultural subsidies, the rapid privatization of state farms,
and the implementation of measures to encourage farmers to seek the financial
resources they need to develop their businesses from banks. At the beginning of 1991,
for example, the new Prime Minister Bielecki deplored the level of indebtedness of
individual farmers in the Polish countryside, because he considered it too low, rather
than the other way round1 . As for the main organizations claiming to represent the
interests of the peasantry in the post-communist political game, despite their
convergence from 1990 onwards in their criticism of a purely liberal approach to the
agricultural question, none of them raised the issue of farmers' over-indebtedness. The
demands they make during demonstrations, parliamentary debates or public speeches
by their leaders are essentially limited to guaranteeing the income of farmers
integrated into the market and promoting a return to minimum state intervention,
mainly through price controls and the introduction of import quotas. So how is it that
an issue as largely ignored by all political players as that of agricultural
overindebtedness suddenly gave rise to lively debate in a variety of public arenas
during the 1991 autonomous period ?2
The rich literature on the construction of public problems seems to us to provide the
keys to relevant analyses in an attempt to grasp the dynamics guiding this apparently
paradoxical process. To speak of the construction of public problems is to emphasize
that "the processes of publicization are anything but natural or spontaneous, and that
there is no direct link between the objective importance of a problem and the public
surface it occupies, or even between its objective contours and its contours".
"Żeby chłopi chcieli chcieć", Gazeta Wyborcza 05/11/1990, p.11; "Expose Bieleckiego", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 07/01/1991, p.7.
2 According to Daniel Cefaï and Dominique Pasquier, public arenas can be understood as "places of
debate, polemic or controversy, testimony, expertise and deliberation, where public problems gradually
emerge". In this sense, the parliamentary arena, the media arena, but also the judicial arena and the
scientific arena, can be constituted, at given moments and depending on the actors and issues that invest
them, as public arenas. Cf. Cefaï Daniel & Pasquier Dominique, "Introduction", in Cefaï Daniel &
Pasquier Dominique (dir.), Les sens du public : Publics politiques, publics médiatiques, Paris, PUF,
2003, p.23. On this question, please also refer to : Cefaï Daniel, "La construction des problèmes
publics. Définitions de situations dans des arènes publiques", Réseaux, vol.14, n°75, 1996, p.43-66.
1
79
public"1 and thus emphasize the conflictual and contingent dimensions of the process
of defining a phenomenon as problematic. Two elements appear to be decisive in
understanding the conditions that made it possible to publicize the problem of
agricultural overindebtedness in the early autumn of 1991: the status of the actors who
took a public stance on the problem, and the situation in which they did so2 . In this
section, we'll see that while the phenomenon of overindebtedness was the subject of
local mobilizations as early as the summer of 1991, particularly in the town of
Zamość (A), it is to its appropriation by the RL-PL coalition that it owes its
construction as a national problem, a potential target for public intervention (B). We'll
also see that the political context plays a decisive role in the dynamics of the overindebtedness controversy, both in its development during the month of October (C)
and in its rapid demobilization once the October 27 elections were over (D).
A) The emergence of the problem: Zamość's action.
It was in the town of Zamość, in the far south-east of Poland, that the first protest
action of significance, in terms of the audience it acquired, on the issue of overindebtedness of individual farmers took place. On August 19, 1991, several dozen
indebted farmers from the region invaded the Voivodship headquarters to protest
against the refusal of the banks and local authorities to negotiate the rescheduling of
their loan instalments. They called on the national authorities to intervene, and
addressed their demands in writing to President Wałęsa, the Council of Ministers and
the Sejm. Expelled by the police on the orders of the Voivode on August 24, the
demonstrators decided to continue their occupation in front of the building, where
they set up an encampment. Regularly visited by local political figures, some of
whom enjoy a national audience3 ,
1 Henry Emmanuel, "Construction des problèmes publics", in Fillieule Olivier, Mathieu Lilian & Péchu
Cécile (dir.), Dictionnaire des mouvements sociaux, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 2009, p.147. See also:
Collovald Annie & Gaïti Brigitte, "Des causes qui 'parlent'...", Politix, vol.4, n°16, 1991, p.7-22.
2 Dubois Vincent, "L'action publique", Cohen Antonin, Lacroix Bernard & Riutort Philippe (dir.),
op.cit., p.322.
3 As elections loom, a visit to the encampment in front of the Voivodeship building is becoming a must
for candidates campaigning in the Zamość constituency. According to journalists, the strikers receive
regular visits from, among others, Sławomir Siwek (Secretary of State in the President's Chancellery
and head of the local POC list), Henryk Wujec (former secretary of the
80
their action is gradually attracting the attention of the NSZZRI "S" union, the national
media and the highest state authorities. On August 28, at the call of local Solidarité
Rurale elected representatives, NSZZRI "S" activists from the Zamość area joined the
strikers camped out in front of the Voivodship headquarters1 . A few days later, the
union's president, Gabriel Janowski, received a delegation of protesters in Warsaw
and assured them of his organization's support for their local action2 . At the same
time, the protest movement, which had been totally ignored at national level when it
first emerged, received increasing media coverage as it lasted and became more
"radical", particularly from September 17 onwards, when several demonstrators went
on hunger strike3 . Whereas the protesters' initial letters had gone unanswered, and
management of the case had initially been delegated to local authorities and then to
officials in the Ministry of Finance, the highest levels of the State were led, mainly as
a result of this growing publicity, to take a direct stance on the problem of the Zamość
farmers' overindebtedness. On September 13, Prime Minister Bielecki agreed to meet
with a delegation of protesters4 . On the 24th, a few days after the Presidency's
Chancellery5 , he sent them a letter in which, while inviting them to cease their action
and seek an agreement with their banks, he assured them of the priority of the
agricultural issue for his government6 . In the end, it was the Prime Minister's promise
to organize a meeting in Warsaw on October 10, under the auspices of representatives
of the
Civic Committees, outgoing OKP deputy and head of the UD list), Ryszard Bartosz (outgoing deputy
and second on the SLD list), or again, the outgoing senator from Zamość, Janusz Wożnica (OKP),
candidate for his own succession on the RL-PL lists. Cf. in particular "Aż do Skutku", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 05/09/91, p.12-13.
1 The NSZZRI "S" activists who joined the demonstrators in front of the Voivodeship headquarters,
bringing their numbers to around 50 according to journalists on the scene, came mainly from the
Tarnów and Chełm regions: "Zajazd w Zamościu", Gazeta Wyborcza, 30/08/1991, p.2.
2 On September 4, the NSZZRI "S" National Council adopts a resolution in support of the Zamość
strikers and their demands. The resolution nevertheless states that the union does not then intend to
expand the protest movement on the issue of agricultural indebtedness beyond this town. "Rolnicy dłużnicy nadal protestują", Gazeta Wyborcza, 05/09/1991, p.2.
3 "Głodujący rolnicy ocieplają namioty", Gazeta Wyborcza, 19/09/1991, p.5.
4"Bony dla zamojskich rolnikow?", Gazeta Wyborcza,14-15/09/1991, p.2.
5 On September 16, the demonstrators received a letter from the office in charge of agricultural issues in
the President's Chancellery. In this letter, the Presidency absolved the government of any responsibility
for resolving the issue of overindebtedness in the agricultural sector: "Our office regularly intervenes
on agricultural and financial issues, but resolving the problems of peasants is not one of the President's
constitutional prerogatives. Decisions in this area are the sole responsibility of the government", quoted
in "Prezydent chłopom nie pomoże", Gazeta Wyborcza, 17/09/1991, p.2.
6 "Premier do rolników w Zamościu", Gazeta Wyborcza, 25/09/1991, p.3.
81
government, a conciliation meeting between indebted farmers and banks in Zamość
that the last demonstrators agreed, on October 2, to remove the camp set up in front of
the Voivodship building1 . During their action, which ultimately lasted almost a
month and a half, the issue of farmers' overindebtedness made an appearance in public
arenas from which it had hitherto been absent.
Nevertheless, as Blumer reminds us, "it is not because groups of people strive,
through their agitation in a society, to focus attention on a situation they deem serious,
that this situation will necessarily succeed in being recognized as such", that it will
acquire sufficient legitimacy to be considered in the "circles of public action"2 . In
other words, in the present case, the emergence during the Zamość mobilization of the
issue of farmers' overindebtedness is by no means synonymous with its accession to
the status of "societal problem" and recognition of the need for political intervention
to resolve it. Moreover, the government's proposed "way out of the crisis" does not
directly involve it, since it is limited to organizing a dialogue between farmers and
bankers, envisages only a case-by-case settlement of disputes and, moreover, concerns
only the Zamość region. In our view, it is mainly to its appropriation and
problematization by the RL-PL coalition as part of its electoral bid that the issue of
agricultural overindebtedness owes its success in not being "nipped in the bud"3
following the cessation of Zamość's action and in becoming an object of public
controversy within the national political field.
B) Electoral mobilization and appropriation of the problem.
On October 4, two days after the end of the Zamość action, t h e NSZZRI "S"
National Council adopted a resolution calling on the union's local leaders to mobilize
at national level on the issue of agricultural overindebtedness. A protest committee is
created on this occasion and placed under the responsibility of
1 "Rolnicy przerwali głodówkę", Gazeta Wyborcza, 03/10/1991, p.3.
2 Blumer Herbert, "Social problems as collective behavior", Politix, vol.17, n°67, 2004, p.195.
3 Ibid, p.196.
82
Zbigniew Obrocki, the union leader in the Koszalin voivodeship. The stated aims are
to obtain from the government the generalization of the conciliation procedures
promised to farmers in the Zamość region, the rapid implementation of a national
program to reduce farmers' debts and the financing of agricultural credits at
preferential rates1 . This protest committee had a decisive influence on the
organization of the protest action that began in front of the Parliament building the day
after the union's National Council. It was also Zbigniew Obrocki who headed the
"Autonomous National Protest Committee of Indebted Farmers" (OAKPRZ), where
the first demonstrators gathered. They also received active material support from
NSZZRI
" S ". The union provided them with a room at its headquarters, as well as several
company cars, around which the first picket line was organized2 . In our view, the fact
that NSZZRI "S" has taken up the issue of overindebtedness on a national level,
which until now had remained marginal in the hierarchy of its demands, should be
seen as part of the formalization of an original electoral offer implemented by the
union in the run-up to the legislative elections of October 27, 1991. Along with the
PSL-Solidarność, it was the main component of the electoral coalition.
The "Ruch Ludowy-Porozumienie Ludowe" (RL-PL) then entered the fight for
parliamentary posts. However marginal this theme may seem in the context of the
electoral campaign, for RL-PL leaders, its promotion was an element of
particularization and assertion of their identity, enabling them to attempt to stand out
in the competition for the construction and electoral mobilization of the "peasantry"3 .
Despite the sharp antagonisms between their leaders on the question of their past
during the People's Republic, the two coalitions explicitly claiming their peasant
identity, the RL-PL and its main competitor the PSL-SP
1 "Dziesięciu rolników koczuje na Wiejskiej", Gazeta Wyborcza, 07/10/1991, p.2.
2 Journalists were not fooled by the role played by NSZZRI "S" in organizing the protest action: Cf.
"Rolnicy protest w Mercedesie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 08/10/1991, p.2.
3 On the mechanisms of production and mobilization of issues, sometimes unprecedented, within the
framework of an electoral campaign, and on their effects in differentiating political offers: Gaxie
Daniel & Lehingue Patrick, Enjeux municipaux : la constitution des enjeux politiques dans une élection
municipale, Paris, PUF, 1984, in particular p.153-169; see also: "Enjeux électoraux, enjeux municipaux
- Entretien avec Daniel Gaxie", Politix, vol.2, n°5, 1989, p.17-24.
83
In the summer of 1991, the two parties' offers to politicize and define the agricultural
issue, the causes of the economic crisis affecting farmers, and the responses to it, were
broadly similar. Likewise insisting on the need for a break with the liberal economic
policy implemented since 1989, their campaign documents call, in virtually identical
terms, for the State to introduce investment aid for farmers and for greater regulation
of the agricultural market, through the introduction of price controls and import
barriers1 . The appropriation, construction and promotion in early October of a
hitherto largely unheard-of "agricultural overindebtedness" issue offered the RL-PL
leaders an opportunity to distinguish themselves from their PSL-SP rivals and attempt
to gain an advantage over them on the eve of a ballot with an extremely uncertain
outcome.
In addition, highlighting the issue of excessive farm debt has the advantage of
enabling RL-PL leaders to denounce the government's record without denying their
membership of the "farmers' camp".
Solidarité's "reformers" sought to reconcile criticism of economic liberalism with
promotion of the market as the driving force behind agricultural modernization. The
phenomenon of over-indebtedness mainly affects independent farmers who play the
market card, having taken out loans following the change of regime in order to
modernize or expand their farms. By highlighting the figure of the over-indebted
farmer, we can point to the perverse effects of shock therapy, which affect the very
people - capitalist, productivist farmers - who are supposed to represent the future of
Polish agriculture, without fundamentally calling into question the direction of the
reforms.
Finally, while the question of the "right form" of representation was a central issue in
the 1991 legislative elections2 , the reinvestment of protest movements in the arena
just a few weeks before the ballot constituted a major challenge for the RL-PL.
Cf. "PSL wobec najważniejszych problemów kraju", in Słodkowska Inka (ed.), Wybory 1991.
Programy partii i ugrupowań politycznych, Warsaw, ISP-PAN, 2001, p.96-100 and "Tezy programu
wyborczego Porozumienia Ludowego", in Ibid, p.160-162.
2 As Jérôme Heurtaux notes: "In an unstabilized and poorly codified context of electoral struggles, as
was the case in Poland in 1991, these are as much about the content of the 'political offer' [...] as about
the good form of the collective whose spokesperson is the candidate", in Heurtaux Jérôme, op.cit.,
p.376.
1
84
The RL-PL is not only a place for the practical remobilization of the "peasantry" particularly its essentially unionized militant base - but also for the promotion of its
original offer of representation for this blurred group. By supporting, or even
initiating, protest actions such as the one in front of the Parliament building, the RLPL is able to promote a form of representation that combines union and partisan
repertoires of action and, in the legacy of the Solidarité movement, transgresses the
boundary between institutional and "unconventional" politics. This offer of
representation clearly distinguishes it from the PSL-SP which, despite the presence
within the coalition of extra-parliamentary organizations, promotes an essentially
partisan and institutional conception of the representation of peasant interests1 .
The definition by the National Council of the NSZZRI "S" of agricultural
overindebtedness as an important element of the Polish agricultural crisis requiring
specific and rapid intervention by the public authorities has a decisive impact on the
The issue's "career". From a localized issue, publicized, albeit with some success, by a
small protest committee, agricultural overindebtedness abruptly changes its status to
become a national issue carried simultaneously in multiple arenas by one of the main
protagonists in the field of peasant representation. Through its two major components,
the PSL-Solidarność and the NSZZRI "S", the RL-PL has a variety of means of action
at its disposal to attempt to legitimize its construction of the phenomenon of
overindebtedness as a public problem. As a parliamentary force, it can strive to ensure
its promotion in parliamentary debates and proceedings. As a competitor in the
parliamentary elections on October 27, it can publicize the issue by linking it to its
offer.
1 PSL spokesman Jan Komornicki sums up his party's commitment to a vision of the future.
"One of our aims is to convince farmers that it is much more useful for them and for the defense of their
interests to vote in elections than to take part in demonstrations in the streets of our towns", "PSL liczy
elektorat i Długi", Gazeta Wyborcza, 10/09/1991, p.2. The different conceptions of representative
democracy held by the two peasant coalitions are clearly reflected in their electoral platforms. The PSLSP advocates a strengthening of political parties: "We advocate the rapid adoption of a new law on
political parties. It should establish the legal framework and economic foundations for the development
of large parties, without which there can be no true parliamentary democracy". While the RL-PL
defends a more "dialogical" conception of democracy: "We need to create new links [between politics
and society] and build a genuine social dialogue. For the most sensitive issues, we need to resort to a
national referendum. We need to know how to listen to and discuss with society" in Słodkowska Inka
(ed.), Wybory 1991..., op.cit. p.97 and p.162 respectively.
85
elections. Finally, as a representative farming union, NSZZRI "S" can both make its
demands directly to the government within the framework o f sectoral negotiations,
and express them in the arena of protest movements by initiating collective actions,
the most emblematic of which is of course the one held in front of the Parliament
building from October 6. Essentially geared to dramatize the "drama" of overindebted farmers - as evidenced by the choice of venue, the form taken by the
demonstration and the care taken by the "Comité National Autonome de Protestation
des Agriculteurs Endettés" to organize frequent press conferences - this spectacular
protest action enabled the issue of over-indebtedness to benefit from sustained
journalistic attention throughout the month of October1 .
C) Genesis of a public controversy on the issue.
In his now classic book The Culture of Public Problems, Gusfield notes that "the
status of a problematic phenomenon is itself often a subject of conflict: interested
parties struggle to impose or prevent the definition of the subject as requiring public
action"2 . Similarly, while RL-PL's leaders are busy promoting in various arenas their
definition of the reality of the problem of agricultural overindebtedness, they have to
contend with the gradual emergence of alternative definitions carried by competing,
more or less institutionalized groups, which aim either to deny the public character of
this problem or to challenge their claim to ownership of it3 .
The members of the government and public officials potentially concerned initially
seek to avoid becoming involved in the processes of creating and resolving the
problem of agricultural overindebtedness. On the one hand, when called upon to take
a position on the subject, they are keen to minimize the impact of the problem.
1 On the demonstration as a space for mediatizing a cause: Champagne Patrick, "La manifestation. La
production de l'événement politique", Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, n°52-53, 1984, p.1941.
2 Gusfield Joseph, The Culture of Public Problems. L'alcool au volant : la production d'un ordre
symbolique, Paris, Economica, 2009 (1981), p.11.
3 Following Gusfield's definitions, by ownership of a public problem we mean here "the ability to create
or shape the public definition of a problem", and by denial the fact that certain groups "deliberately
seek to resist attempts to endorse the problem as their own": Ibid, p.11 and p.13.
86
reality of the phenomenon, to redefine it as marginal, even inconsistent. Thus,
following a meeting with indebted farmers from Zamość on October 10, Agriculture
Minister Adam Tański refused to consider overindebtedness a national problem.
Believing that "The difficulties that farmers in Zamość have experienced are specific
and accidental", he has no plans to generalize the "exceptional" aid they have received
at national level, and believes that "those demonstrating in front of Parliament in
Warsaw must understand that their action is in vain"1 . Similarly, Andrzej Topiński,
President of the National Bank of Poland, declared a few days later before senators
that "The overall indebtedness of individual farmers remains limited" before adding
that "Their situation is incomparably better than that of most companies or state
farms"2 . On the other hand, remaining faithful to the liberal line of action taken by
successive governments, representatives of the public authorities denounce as
unrealistic any idea of state intervention in this area. Calls for public support in the
form of subsidized agricultural loans or interest rate caps are thus illegitimized,
respectively on the grounds of their unreasonable cost and illegality3 . However,
government and administrative representatives are not the only ones to deconstruct the
problem of overindebtedness and illegitimize the public response to it. Non-state
actors who are more or less directly concerned by the issue, such as certain bank
directors4 and a number of commentators on Polish politics, are also involved.
Journalist Jan Bazyl Lipszyc provides a paradigmatic version of the latter's discourse
when he writes in Gazeta Wyborcza:
"It seems that farmers took out loans believing that the economic situation would always be favorable
to them. They were wrong [...]. Now they want the state budget to pay for their mistake. They also want
the banks to forget for a moment that they are banks, and transform themselves into charitable
organizations. [...] But the reality is that the state is short of money and [...] the
1 "Rolnik z bankiem się ułoży", Gazeta Wyborcza, 11/10/1991, p.2.
2 "Nie ścigać rolników", Gazeta Wyborcza, 14/10/1991, p.2
3 "Rolnicy bez tanich kredytów", Gazeta Wyborcza 18/10/1991, p.5.
4 As Gazeta Wyborcza put it on October 16: "Bankers remain divided in their assessment of current
financial conditions for farms. In general, however, bank managers believe that only a tiny proportion
of farmers are really having difficulty repaying their loans, the problem being that this is the noisiest
and most visible minority": "Czy Rolnicy maja pieniadze?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 16/10/1991, p.15.
87
overindebtedness is a private problem that must be settled between the banks and their debtors. The
Minister of Agriculture has no means of changing this; his power over the banks is nil.
From Lipszyc Jan Bazyl, "Nie ścigać rolników", Gazeta Wyborcza, 14/10/1991, p.2.
These efforts to deny the public nature of the issue of agricultural overindebtedness
are nevertheless facing vigorous opposition from a growing number of players. The
RL-PL is gradually losing the monopoly it had sought to establish for itself in the
formulation of the problem, and its solutions, as new groups enter the arena, both in
the institutional arena and in that of protest mobilizations. In Parliament, groups of
deputies from outside Solidarité Rurale, and even competitors, have taken up the issue
of overindebtedness in the context of debates at the end of the legislature, particularly
those concerning changes to banking law and agricultural policy. This is the case of
elected representatives who, irrespective of the group to which they belong, are
interested in the problematization of this issue because they consider it to be important
in the constituency from which they come, or in which they are standing for election.
Henryk Wujec (UD), MP for Zamość and member of the Committee for the
Economy, Budget and Finance, for example, on several occasions openly takes a
stand in favor of the creation by the State of a special fund dedicated to reducing
farmers' debt. Of course, this is also the case for PSL members, who, through their
parliamentary activism in the run-up to elections, are committed to expanding and
legitimizing their party's representation. Backed by the numerical strength of its
Parliamentary Club and its strong position on the Agriculture Committee1 , the PSL
plays a pre-eminent role in putting agricultural issues on Parliament's agenda and in
formulating legislative proposals aimed at resolving them. In this way, it has
gradually taken on the issue of farm debt, integrating it - alongside those of minimum
price guarantees, farm tax levels and social protection for farmers - into a "package"
of legislative proposals to support farm incomes, which it claims to have initiated and
which is submitted to the vote of the House of Representatives.
1 With 69 deputies at the end of the legislature, the PSL parliamentary club is the third largest in the
Diet. With 20 deputies out of 62, it is the best represented on the Agriculture Committee, ahead of OKP
(17 deputies) and the SLD parliamentary club (14 deputies). One of its members, Jacek Soska, chairs
this committee. Sources: Sejm archives available at http://www.sejm.gov.pl/archiwum/arch2.html.
88
Diète during the last sessions of the legislature1 . Just as Solidarité Rurale's elected
representatives in Parliament struggled to gain recognition for their leadership in the
process of putting the problem of overindebtedness on the political agenda, NSZZRI
"S"'s ability to control the dynamics and public identity of the protest movement it
had initiated gradually eroded over the course of October. A section of the
demonstrators gathered in front of the Parliament building increasingly contested the
union leadership's claim to speak on their behalf, and emancipated themselves within
the Protest Committee. The "Comité National d'Autodéfense Agricole" (KKSR:
Krajowy Komitet Samoobrony Rolnictwa) they set up at the time took a different
approach to defining the problem of overindebtedness and the meaning of the protest
from that of the union. Its members were responsible for organizing actions
considered radical within the camp, and adopted an uncompromising stance during
the negotiations they were invited to take part in from the end of October, demanding,
for example, that bank seizures be penalized. We'll come back to this later.
Thus, in the pre-election context of October 1991, a public controversy arose over the
definition of agricultural overindebtedness and its methods of resolution, pitting the
various players involved, voluntarily or otherwise, in the process of problematizing
this phenomenon against each other. Some groups, including representatives of the
public authorities, refuse to acknowledge the reality of the problem, let alone endorse
it as their own. Others, on the other hand, are keen to legitimize the State's assumption
of responsibility, but differ in their definition of how this should be done in practice:
through the implementation of a specific plan of action, for example.
1 In contrast to the government's agricultural policy, which is hostile to it, the inclusion on the
parliamentary agenda of this "package" of legislative proposals to support farm incomes must, in our
view, be seen as part, at least in part, of the PSL's campaign strategies to publicize its political offer and
distance itself from the government in power. Although some of these bills were passed with the
support of the left-wing parliamentary groups, which still have a majority in the Sejm, the texts
establishing t h e principle of minimum prices for milk and cereals, introducing preferential agricultural
credits a n d increasing social benefits for farmers have no chance of being enacted before the end of
the legislature, especially as the government and the majority in the Senate are hostile to them.
Concerning the texts on guaranteeing agricultural prices and reforming agricultural social security:
"Sejm zaleca ceny minimalne", Gazeta Wyborcza, 04/10/91, p.1 ;
"Sejm dołożył
rolnikom", Gazeta Wyborcza, 12/10/1991, p.3. On the draft laws providing for the introduction of aid to
indebted farmers and preferential agricultural credits, which themselves will not have time to be put to
the vote of deputies:
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/procX.nsf/0/5C3E179AEDE37515C12574640020C3E1?OpenDocument
and
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/procX.nsf/0/3D7B8EBEF4A29B64C12574640020C3DC?OpenDocument.
89
In the case of the PR-RL, this would involve an emergency reduction in agricultural
debt; in the case of the PSL-SP, it would be linked to a general program to support
farm incomes; in the case of certain deputies from outside the peasant movement, it
would involve the creation of a fund to help indebted farmers; and in the case of the
KKSR protesters, it would involve a ban on foreclosures, a freeze on interest rates and
a state guarantee for agricultural loans. During the month of October, the various
players in favor of a public solution to the problem of excessive farm debt struggled to
unify their positions. With the electoral campaign in full swing, they were even
tearing each other apart over the issue's ownership. Denouncing attempts by the
leadership of the PSL and its partner the KZRKiOR to recuperate the protest
movement, representatives of the NSZZRI "S" refused to take part in negotiations
with them1 .
D) Transformation of the political context and demobilization of the problem.
On November 14, 1991, representatives of the main players involved in the
agricultural overindebtedness controversy - farmers' unions, protesters in front of
Parliament, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank
and credit banks - ratified a memorandum of understanding following two days of
negotiations. The agreement included four main resolutions: an immediate halt to the
protest action in front of Parliament; the creation by the government of a Fonds de
Restructuration et de Désendettement de l'Agriculture by June 1992; the provision by
the Ministry of Agriculture of the means to enable banks to suspend liquidation
procedures until the Fund was up and running; and, finally, the creation of a "national
commission on overindebtedness and agricultural credit", comprising representatives
of the government and agricultural unions. Although this agreement puts an end, at
least provisionally, to the controversy surrounding the problem of agricultural
overindebtedness, it has all the hallmarks of an a minima compromise. The exact
definition of the problem of over-indebtedness, as well as the practical arrangements
for setting up and running the Fonds de désendettement (debt relief fund), introducing
preferential-rate loans and suspending liquidation procedures, have all been postponed
until a later date.
1 "Dlaczego rząd podzielił chłopów?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 02/12/1991, p.12.
90
later: it will be up to the national commission on overindebtedness and agricultural
credit to specify them. How can we understand the convergence of the various
protagonists in the controversy over the problem of agricultural overindebtedness
formalized by the November 14 agreement, when up until the end of October their
oppositions and divergences in their definition of the "right conception" of the
problem and of what could be undertaken to deal with it seemed unsurpassable? To
solve this enigma, we need to pay particular attention to the transformation of the
political context and to the logics of recomposition at work within the Polish political
field following the parliamentary elections of October 27, 1991. The end of the
electoral campaign, the relative clarification of the balance of power between the
various players and, above all, the prospect of a change of government profoundly
altered the perception that the various protagonists had of the costs and benefits of
collaborating to bring the conflict over agricultural overindebtedness to an end.
The elections of October 27, 1991 put an end to the parliamentary order resulting
from the Round Table agreements and revealed the highly fragmented nature of the
Polish political market1 . While no fewer than 111 groups - parties, trade unions,
associations and local committees - put forward candidates, 29 different electoral
committees won mandates for deputies to the Sejm. Ten of these committees obtained
more than fifteen MPs, but none more than sixty-two. In the absence of a formal
constitution and, above all, of a precedent to serve as a point of reference, the renewal
of the Diet and Senate ushered in a period of considerable uncertainty. This
uncertainty relates as much to the attitude of President Wałęsa, suspected by some of
authoritarian aims, to the durability of the Bielecki government, as to the possibility
o f finding a majority within such a fragmented Parliament.
Table 1: Results of the parliamentary elections of October 27, 1991.
Election committee
UD (Democratic Union)
Number of
votes
(Diet)
1 382 051
Percentage of
total votes
(Diet)
12,31
Diet
Senate
mandates
mandate
s
62
21
1 Millard Frances, "The Polish Parliamentary Elections of October 1991", Soviet Studies, vol.44, n°5,
1992, p.837-855; Jasiewicz Krzysztof, "From Solidarity to Fragmentation", Journal of Democracy,
vol.3, n°2, 1992, p.55-69; Żukowski Tomasz, "Wybory parlamentarne'91", Studia Polityczne, vol.1,
n°1, 1992, p.35-60.
91
SLD (Alliance of the Left
1 344 820
11,98
60
4
democratic)
WAK (Electoral Coalition
980 304
8,73
49
9
Catholic)
PSL-SP (PSL-Alliance
977 344
8,67
48
7
Programmatic)
KPN (Confederation for a
972 952
7,5
46
4
Independent Poland)
POC (Entente civique du center)
841 738
8,71
44
9
KLD (Liberal Congress
839 978
7,48
37
6
Democrat)
RL-PL (Mouvement Paysan613 626
5,46
28
5
Entente Paysanne)
NSZZ "S" (Syndicat Solidarité)
566 553
5,05
27
11
PPPP (Polish Party of Friends of
367 106
3,27
16
0
beer)
ChD (Christian Democracy)
265 179
2,36
5
3
UPR (Union de la politique
253 024
2,25
3
0
real)
"S "Pracy (Solidarité du Travail)
230 975
2,05
4
0
SD (Democratic Party)
159 017
1,41
1
0
MN (German minority)
132 059
1,17
7
0
PCD (Christian Democratic Party)
125 314
1,11
4
0
Partia "X" (Party "X")
52 735
0,47
3
0
RAŚ (Autonomist Movement
40 061
0,35
2
0
Silesian)
PZZ (Polish Union of
26 053
0,23
4
0
l'Ouest)
Other local committees
1 047 713
9,44
10
21
Total (Participation rate)
11 218 602 (43,2%)
100
460
100
Sources: Data supplied by the National Electoral Commission (PKW) and Millard Frances, "The Polish
Parliamentary Elections of October 1991", Soviet Studies, Vol.44, n°5, 1992, p.846 and 847.
While the prospect of a change of government quickly became clear in the days
following the election, the question of possible alliances to form a majority coalition
remained open for several weeks. With the notable exception of the former SLD
communists, all the main groups represented in Parliament have declared their
intention to participate in the formation of the new government. Against this
backdrop, there was a marked increase in the volume of exchanges between the main
protagonists on the Polish political scene, as evidenced by the growing number of
more or less formal meetings between their leaders in early November. The PSL-SP
and RL-PL are particularly involved in these discussions. Despite the dispersal of
votes and low voter turnout in the countryside, these two electoral coalitions have
managed to maintain their status as leading parliamentary forces, winning 48 and 28
mandates respectively in the Sejm, and constitute a major force in Polish politics.
92
important partners in the formation of a majority coalition.
The reorientation of the tactical activity of almost all the protagonists in the Polish
political field towards the objective of participation in the government seems to us to
have had decisive effects on the dynamics of the controversy over the recognition and
resolution of the problem of agricultural overindebtedness.
Firstly, it is accompanied by a relegation of the problem in the hierarchy of concerns
of the main players who took a stance in favor of it being taken over by the State
before the elections. The PSL-PL and RL-PL leaderships are no longer concerned
with standing out and promoting their offer of representation in the electoral
competition, but rather with legitimizing their claim to participate in government and
their ability to be reliable and responsible partners in a coalition. Participation in a
social conflict over an issue that is commonly denounced as categorical in the political
and media spheres appears in this light potentially costly for organizations that must
also shed a whole series of stigmas linked to their peasant identity. All the more so
since, with four demonstrators going on hunger strike on November 6, the
demonstration in front of Parliament presented the stigmatizing image of a conflict in
the process of radicalization1 . In this context, the shift in focus of the NSZZRI "S"
and its president Gabriel Janowski's strategies is particularly clear. A declared
candidate of the PR-RL for the post of Minister of Agriculture, or even Prime
Minister, Janowski has made no secret of his desire to find a rapid solution to the
controversy surrounding over-indebtedness, and not to make it an obstacle to his and
his organization's access to power in France.
"2 . Inviting the various parties to resume dialogue - "we need to talk to each other",
he declared - he even took the initiative of requesting the rapid organization of a new
round of negotiations between representatives of the government and agricultural
organizations3 . At the same time, he clearly shifted his previous positions, and in
particular moderated his opposition,
1 Cf. "Desperacja czy szantaż", Gazeta Wyborcza, 09/11/1991, p.2.
2 Dobry Michel, "Le jeu du consensus", Pouvoirs, n°38, 1986, p.52.
3 "Chłopski lament bankowy", Gazeta Wyborcza, 14/11/1991, p.2.
93
to the solution of solving the problem of overindebtedness b y creating a fund to help
farmers in debt, initially put forward by deputies from outside the peasant movement
and gradually adopted by the government in October1 .
Secondly, we can hypothesize that this tactical convergence, based on the challenge of
forming a government coalition, contributes to the reconfiguration of interactions
between the most institutionalized protagonists of the controversy, and to the
tendency to pacify their relations that was observable at the beginning of November.
Rival in their definition of the problem of overindebtedness and its resolution, they
are now jointly engaged in cooperative processes of seeking political alliances to
participate in government. The RL-PL leadership is involved in parallel negotiations
with the PSL-PL, to reunite the peasant movement within a hypothetical "AgrarianChristian" coalition2 , and with three parties participating in the outgoing government,
the PC (main component of the POC coalition), the ZChN (at the heart of the WAK)
and the KLD, within the framework of pentapartite discussions also including the
KPN. The re-emergence of the theme of the unity of the peasant movement, mobilized
jointly by the leaders of the PSL-SP and the RL-PL to legitimize the possibility of a
political rapprochement between their two formations, is undeniably an important
factor in understanding the rapid convergence of the various peasant organizations in
their approach to the problem of agricultural overindebtedness in mid-November. This
was formalized on November 14 with the ratification by 10 peasant leaders - 5 of
whom were also members of the
1 The proposal to set up a fund to help farmers get out of debt was first put forward at the end of
September 1991, at the time of Zamość's action, by three deputies from outside the peasant movement:
Henryk Wujec (UD, Zamość), Maria Stolzman (UD, Pińczów) and Ryszard Pidek (PKP, Ciechanów).
A provision enabling the creation of such a structure by providing for its financing through taxation of
the National Bank of Poland's minimum reserves is included in the bill amending banking law adopted
on October 17 in second reading by the Sejm. Initially hostile to the proposal, the members of the
government involved in the controversy over over-indebtedness finally rallied behind it at the end of
October, following Leszek Balcerowicz. On October 24, following a meeting with representatives of
protesters and agricultural organizations, Balcerowicz declared himself in favor of the plan. Gabriel
Janowski, on the other hand, considered that "the creation of this Fund will in no way solve the
problem" and called for the protest movement to continue: "Rolnicy u Balcerowicza", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 25/10/1991, p.2.
2 "Sojusz wielkiej wsi", Gazeta Wyborcza, 2-3/11/1991, p.3; "Otwarci na różne warianty", Zielony
Sztandar, 17/11/1991, p.1.
94
RL-PL (Bak, Baumgart, Janowski, Ślisz and Obrocki) and 3 from the PSL-SP (Bury,
Pawlak and Maksymiuk) - of a declaration acknowledging the collaboration of the
peasant forces in the negotiations opening today.
Text of the joint communiqué of November 14, 1991, announcing the
collaboration of the leaders of peasant parties and unions.
Declaration
We, the leaders of peasant parties and unions, understanding the tragic situation currently facing Polish
agriculture, and through it Poland as a whole, today resolve to join forces to solve this problem.
1. Roman Bartoszcze (no signature)
2. Henryk Bąk: PSL Mikołajczyk
3. Piotr Baumgart: "ROLA
4. Jan Bury: ZMW
5. Gabriel Janowski: NSZZ RI "S
6. Andrzej Lepper: KKSR
7. Waldemar Pawlak: PSL
8. Janusz Maksymiuk: KZRKiOR
9. Janusz Ślisz: PSL-Solidarność
The National Autonomous Protest Committee of Indebted Farmers Zbigniew
Obrocki
Warsaw, November 14, 1991.
(Seal of the Comité National de Protestation Autonome des Agriculteurs Endettés)
Translated by u s . Sources: Rolnik Rzeczypospolitej, 1992, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, ZZR
Samoobrona 1991-1996.
Similarly, the status of the government and NSZZRI "S" negotiators as potential
partners in a future coalition - or even KZRKiOR, given the uncertainty surrounding
the composition of the next government - certainly influenced the "success" of the
November 14 talks. A later report states that the negotiations took place in a cordial
atmosphere and that an agreement was quickly reached between representatives of the
government and the agricultural unions. Only the KKSR's initial refusal to put an
immediate end to the demonstration in front of Parliament appears for a time to have
threatened the compromise, which was finally ratified by all parties after twelve hours
of talks1 .
In the weeks following the November 14 agreement, the issue of farm
overindebtedness quickly disappeared from the public arenas where it had been hotly
debated in October and November 1991. The end of the demonstration in front of the
1 "Dlaczego rząd podzielił chłopów?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 02/12/1991, p.12.
95
Parliament and the relegation of this issue in the hierarchy of positions taken by the
main protagonists of the controversy lead to its rapid demise.
It's not a question of "deconstruction" as a public problem. The answers that were
supposed to be provided by the State following the November 14 agreement are being
called into question even before the concrete details of their application have been
defined. At the beginning of December, NSZZRI "S", whose president Gabriel
Janowski had just been appointed Minister of Agriculture in the new government,
decided to boycott the meetings of the national commission on overindebtedness and
agricultural credit, thus putting an end to its activity before it could deliver its
conclusions. A few days later, it was the turn of the Fonds de Restructuration et de
Désendettement de l'Agriculture project - the most emblematic measure of the
agreement - to be torpedoed by President Wałęsa's veto on December 12 of the law
amending the banking law of October 17, which allowed its financing1 . It wasn't until
1992 that the issue of agricultural overindebtedness re-emerged at the forefront of
national political debate, mainly under the impetus of a new agricultural union formed
by former KKSR members, the ZZR Samoobrona, whose genesis we will now
examine.
1 See: http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/proc1.nsf/opisy/177-z.htm.
96
Section 2.
The structuring of the Samoobrona ZZR: the union formalization
of a collective of over-indebted farmers.
In this section, we focus on the concrete conditions of the genesis of ZZR
Samoobrona, which was registered with the Warsaw court on January 10, 1992,
becoming the third organization to acquire the status of a professional union of
individual farmers at national level, after KZRKiOR and NSZZRI "S". In order to
understand the creation of ZZR Samoobrona, we believe it is necessary to break with
the naturalistic view of this organization that tends to reduce its birth to a spontaneous
grouping o f over-indebted farmers1 . Far from being natural, the process by which
actors decide to reach agreement and work together to build a union seems to us to be
particularly complex and uncertain2 . The creation of a new organization claiming to
represent the Polish peasantry, or at least one of its bangs, in competition with
established unions with far greater organizational, militant and political capital, is
neither a trivial act, nor one within everyone's reach.
By studying the process of creating the ZZR Samoobrona "in the making", i.e.
without presupposing its outcome or taking it "for granted", we will endeavor to make
intelligible the concrete conditions presiding o v e r
this grouping of individuals
around a particular cause, that of agricultural overindebtedness, and then its union
institutionalization. Initially, we will study the gradual genesis and autonomization of
the KKSR, a group of over-indebted farmers unaffiliated with existing trade union
organizations, in the context of the interactions that shaped the demonstration held in
front of Parliament in October and November 1991 (A). We will then see that the
triggering of t h e union institutionalization process
1 For example: Piskorski Mateusz, art.cit. p.197-198.
2 Aït-Aoudia Myriam & Dezé Alexandre, art.cit. p.3-4.
97
of this "pre-constituted structure of potential action"1 bringing together actors holding
singular capitals is the product of the practical interpretations they make of their
situation and of the political conjuncture following the stoppage of the demonstration
(B).
A) Creation and formalization of a pre-constituted action structure in the
dynamics
of
the
public
controversy
over
agricultural
overindebtedness.
1) The demonstration in front of Parliament as a gathering of pre-constituted
groups.
While they claim to represent "all indebted farmers and agricultural businesses across the
country"2 , the dozen or so demonstrators gathering in front of the Parliament building
from October 5 onwards actually come from an extremely small number of regions.
Initially, they were mainly farmers from the voivodships of Zamość in the southeast and
Koszalin on the Baltic coast. This paradoxical over-representation - Zamość and Koszalin
are almost eight hundred kilometers apart - is of course primarily due to the particular
prevalence of the phenomenon of over-indebtedness in these two territories.
What the Koszalin and, to a lesser extent, the Zamość voivodships have in common is that
they were both regions of relatively strong state farms during the Communist era3 . From
1990 onwards, the dismantling of these farms was accompanied by the mass privatization
of their properties. This led to
1 We borrow this expression from Loïc Blondiaux: Blondiaux Loïc, "Les clubs: sociétés de pensée,
agencements de réseaux ou instances de sociabilité politique?", Politix, vol.1, n°2, 1988, p.32.
2 "Dziesięciu rolników koczuje na Wiejskiej", Gazeta Wyborcza, 07/11/1991, p.2.
3 As Jerzy Bański recalls: "The most state farms were found in the north and west of the country [in the
former German territories attached to Poland after 1945]. In the voivodships of Szczecin, Koszalin,
Słupsk, Zielona Góra, Elbląg and Gorzów Wielkopolski, they accounted for more than half of the total
agricultural area at the end of the 1980s. Conversely, in the center and south of the country, state farms
did not occupy a significant place in the structure of agricultural property. With the exception of the
voivodeships of Przemyśl and, to a lesser extent, Krosno, Zamość and Chełm, where state farms had a
relatively greater weight in the agricultural sector due to the land left vacant following the displacement
of the Ukrainian population [after the Second World War]." Bański Jerzy,
"Cześć III: Historia rozwoju gospodarki rolnej na ziemiach polskich", in Bański Jerzy, Geografia
rolnictwa Polski, Warsaw, Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 2007.
98
represented an opportunity for individuals wishing to set up or expand their farms1 . As
most of these people went into debt to complete their land purchases, they were
particularly affected by the rapid rise in interest rates and the fall in farm prices. The
phenomenon of over-indebtedness thus took on an even greater dimension in regions
where, in the early 1990s, more land was available for purchase than elsewhere, due to the
privatization of state farms.
Nevertheless, the specificity of the agrarian structure of the Zamość and Koszalin
voivodships alone cannot explain the strong presence of farmers originating from them in
the demonstration taking place in front of Parliament. Other regions similarly affected by
the phenomenon of agricultural overindebtedness for similar reasons (such as Słupsk or
Zielona Góra, for example) were in fact not represented at all, at least initially. To
understand this, we also need to consider the existence of links prior to the demonstration
between groups of over-indebted farmers in these two regions and the initiators of the
action in front of Parliament within NSZZRI "S".
In the summer of 1991, the voivodships of Zamość and Koszalin were both the scene of
mobilizations around the issue of agricultural overindebtedness. As early as July, local
committees were formed by over-indebted farmers to structure protest actions around this
issue, which had not yet been taken up by the main agricultural organizations. In Zamość,
a protest committee was set up on July 102 . It was this committee that organized the
demonstration and hunger strike in front of the Voivodship headquarters from August 19
onwards. On this occasion, as mentioned above, its representatives had several meetings
with local and national NSZZRI "S" leaders. Similarly, in the Koszalin Voivodeship, a
Communal Agricultural Self-Defense Committee (Gminny Komitet Samoobrony
Rolnictwa) was set up in the town of Koszalin.
1 Maurel Marie-Claude, "La naissance de nouveaux acteurs sociaux sur la scène locale", Revue d'études
comparatives Est-Ouest, n°4, 1994, p.137-139.
2 "Głodujący rolnicy ocieplają namioty", Gazeta Wyborcza, 19/09/1991, p.5.
99
small town of Darłowo as early as July 271 . Its members organized several protest actions
over the course of the summer, which, while not achieving an audience comparable to that
of the Zamość demonstration, nevertheless enabled them to draw the attention of local
politicians to their situation, including that of the regional president of NSZZRI "S",
Zbigniew Obrocki, future head of the "National Protest Committee of Indebted Farmers"
initiated by the union2 . Thus, we can safely hypothesize that the main reason for finding
several representatives of Zamość's local committees (including its vice-presidents Jan
Musolf and Teresa Czuchra, and its secretary Henryk Jacuniak) and Darłowo (including its
two "leaders" Andrzej Lepper and Wiesław Muszyński3 ) among the dozen or so
demonstrators who began the occupation in front of the Sejm building on October 5, is
quite simply that they had been invited there by NSZZRI "S" officials with whom they had
had occasion to come into contact in the preceding weeks.
While the action in front of Parliament attracted protesters from other regions as it gained
momentum, activists from the Zamość and Darłowo committees retained a particular
influence throughout October and November. Indeed, it was among them that the initiators
of the movement for autonomy from the NSZZRI "S" leadership, which gradually
developed within the protest committee, were to be found.
2) The genesis of KKSR: empowerment and demarcation of a protest group
from existing farmers' organizations.
Differences of opinion quickly emerged among the demonstrators. These had as much to
do with the meaning to be given to the action as with the methods to be used to push the
government to open negotiations on the problem of over-indebtedness. While the leaders
of the
"The "Comité Autonome de protestation" (Autonomous Protest Committee) of the NSZZRI "S
the "good image" of the mobilization, to keep it within the framework of the legitimate
rules of the demonstration in order to maintain the political "respectability" of their
formation otherwise
1 Cf. Socha Krzysztof, "Trudno jest tworzyć...", Rolnik Rzeczypospolitej, 1992; Ul Jan, Lepper Andrzej:
Samoobrona: dlaczego? przed czym?, Warszawa, AWP "Wyraz", 1993; "Trafiła Kosa na Leppera",
Polityka, 05/27/2006, p.37.
2 Socha Krzysztof, "Trudno jest tworzyć...", Rolnik Rzeczypospolitej, 1992.
3 "Trafiła Kosa na Leppera", Polityka, 05/27/2006, p.37.
100
engaged in the electoral competition, strikers from outside the union, foremost among
them members of the Darłowo Committee, advocated on the contrary a hardening of the
conflict. The October 11 issue of Gazeta Wyborcza reported:
"We came here [in front of Parliament] to discuss agricultural problems, not to demand anything. We don't
want to organize a revolt, the peasants aren't going to demonstrate with pitchforks!", [Protest Committee
leaders] told journalists at a press conference held yesterday [October 10, 1990]. [...] Nevertheless, profound
differences between the demonstrators became apparent at the press conference. Some of them, mainly from
the Koszalin voivodship (where a protest committee has been active since July), publicly stated that they did
not believe in the effectiveness of these peaceful methods: "The government will only give in when there is
bloodshed and dead bodies. The only solution is to show them our strength and invade the city". It was in an
electric atmosphere that the press conference ended, without the protest committee being able to specify how
long it will be prepared to wait for the government to enter into negotiations."
From "Czekamy na kredyt", Gazeta Wyborcza, 11/10/1991, p.2.
Far from dissipating, these tensions exacerbated during the month of October, culminating
in the formation of an autonomous grouping within the Protest Committee, the Comité
National d'Autodéfense Agricole (KKSR: Krajowy Komitet Samoobrony Rolnictwa)1 .
Despite its name, this structure, which had no legal existence, was more akin to a group of
protesters with no formal leadership than to a genuine national organization. It brings
together members of the Darłowo (including Andrzej Lepper) and Zamość committees
(including Teresa Czuchra and Henryk Jacuniak), but also farmers from other regions who
have joined the demonstration. These included Marek Lech from the Łódź voivodeship,
Ryszard Kozik from Słupsk and Paweł Skórski from Kielce. Taking advantage of the
strong journalistic presence in the temporary camp set up in front of Parliament, the KKSR
set out to make up for its lack of initial resources and to stand out within the protest
movement by developing a strategy akin to the register of "scandalization" highlighted by
Michel Offerlé2 . Its members strive to dramatize the situation
1 Cf. Ul Jan, op.cit; "Jak powstała Samoobrona", Polityka, 27/05/2006, p.37.
2 According to Michel Offerlé, "to scandalize is not only to assert that a threshold has been crossed, that
it is not tolerable, bearable, possible, it is also to find the means to make people say and believe that the
fact, the ongoing situation is indeed scandalous". He also notes: "The strategy of scandalization, while
not reserved for certain types of group, is more likely to appear among those who do not have the
necessary resources to appeal to secrecy, numbers or
101
of over-indebted farmers in their public speeches, notably at the press conferences
regularly organized by the protest committee. Referring to the numerous cases of suicide
that this phenomenon has already provoked, some of them do not hesitate to go so far as to
demand that Prime Minister Bielecki be indicted before the State Court for high treason
against national agriculture1 . In order to dramatize the despair of over-indebted farmers,
the KKSR is also behind the organization of "radical" protest actions within the camp. The
hunger strike it initiated on November 6 was undoubtedly the most spectacular expression
of this, in that it "established a link between the visible suffering of the strikers and the
cause they endorsed"2 .
3) Recognition of KKSR as a legitimate representative of over-indebted farmers.
Recourse to what are considered radical modes of action further increases existing tensions
within the Autonomous Protest Committee. Nevertheless, it enables the KKSR to attract
media attention and to be recognized by the other players in the controversy over
agricultural overindebtedness as an actor to be reckoned with within the protest
movement. On October 24, KKSR representatives were among the delegates of the
Autonomous Protest Committee invited to join NSZZRI "S" leaders at a meeting with the
Minister of the Economy, Leszek Balcerowicz3 . At the same time, KZRKiOR leaders,
until now largely absent from the mobilization on agricultural overindebtedness, are
seeking closer ties with this grouping, which is increasingly openly challenging NSZZRI
"S" leadership of the Protest Committee. As NSZZRI "S"'s main rival for union
representation of the peasantry and the PSL's partner in the PSL-SP electoral coalition,
KZRKiOR gave informal support to the structuring of KKSR, as its then president Janusz
Maksymiuk testifies:
expertise". Cf. Offerlé Michel, Sociologie des groupes d'intérêts, Paris, Montchrestien, 1998, p.122123.
1 "Chłopski lament bankowy", Gazeta Wyborcza, 14/11/1991, p.2.
2 Siméant Johanna, La grève de la faim, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 2009, p.63.
3 "Rolnicy u Balcerowicza", Gazeta Wyborcza, 25/10/1991, p.2.
102
"I make no secret of the fact that, although we envy them their media splash and journalists' interest in
them, we helped to give birth to the Samoobrona movement. I don't hide the fact that when they
camped out in front of the assembly we supported them. At the time, Gabriel Janowski [then president
of NSZZRI "S"], the future minister, claimed to represent the demonstrators. So that's how it was.
Gabriel Janowski would go to the camp to talk to journalists at around two or three in the afternoon.
Then, during the night, around midnight, we'd go and help them [the KKSR members], bringing them
blankets and food for example. That's when I met Andrzej Lepper. We helped them, I won't hide it.
Once we'd helped them enough and they'd strengthened a little, only then did we become competitors."
Janusz Maksymiuk.
Interview conducted on June 25, 2008 in Warsaw.
The transformation of the political context following the October 27 elections, insofar as it
was accompanied by a change of strategy on the part of the main protagonists in the
controversy over agricultural overindebtedness, further accelerated their recognition of the
legitimacy of the KKSR to speak on behalf of the Protest Committee and to participate in
defining the interests of overindebted farmers. In mid-November, the refusal of KKSR
members to lift the camp in front of Parliament and halt the hunger strike led by four of
their number constituted the main obstacle to the rapid finalization of an agreement to end
the conflict, which the leaders of the main farmers' organizations, first and foremost those
of NSZZRI "S", were now calling for. Against this backdrop, the KKSR succeeded in
gaining recognition for its representativeness, which was out of all proportion to its actual
degree of structuring: at the time, it still had no legal existence, and brought together no
more than a few dozen demonstrators. One of its representatives, Andrzej Lepper, was
invited to co-sign the joint appeal published on November 14 by the main national peasant
leaders. The following day, no less than four of its members took part in negotiations with
the government as part of a team of ten "peasant" delegates, including only two
representatives from the KKZR and three from the NSZZRI "S".
Table 2: List and affiliation of "peasant" delegates taking part in the November 14,
1991 negotiations.
Name of delegate
Organization
represented at
negotiations
Other affiliation
103
Gabriel Janowski
NSZZRI "S
/
Janusz Maksymiuk
KZRKiOR
/
Zbigniew Obrocki
OAKPRZ
NSZZRI "S
Andrzej Lepper
OAKPRZ
KKSR
Marek Lech
OAKPRZ
KKSR
Piotr Baumgart
ROLA
NSZZRI "S
Czesław Kulczycki
KZRKiOR
/
Ryszard Kozik
OAKPRZ
KKSR
Jan Musolf
OAKPRZ
/
Paweł Skórski
OAKPRZ
KKSR
Produced by us Sources: Rolnik Rzeczypospolitej, 1992, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, ZZR
Samoobrona 1991-1996.
Finally, after talks in which they found themselves in a position of strength, the delegates
of the Protest Committee, who were also members of the KKSR, agreed to ratify the
memorandum of understanding and cease their protest action in front of Parliament. In
return, they obtained a major concession from the union and government representatives:
the right to sit alongside government, NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR representatives on the
newly-created national commission on overindebtedness and agricultural credit1 . The
Protest Committee, over which KKSR members now exercise unquestionable leadership,
is thus recognized as a legitimate representative of overindebted farmers beyond the time
of the demonstration in front of Parliament for which it was created.
B) From KKSR to ZZR Samoobrona: union creation as a palliative to
isolation.
The existence of a pre-constituted potential action structure, the KKSR, does not
mean that the process by which this structure adopts a trade union form at the
beginning of 1992 can be taken as natural. To understand the concrete modalities of
this institutionalization, we also need to pay particular attention to the composition of
the founding group and the context in which the process of registration as a trade
union was set in motion. Far from being simple farmers on the verge of bankruptcy,
the future founders of ZZR Samoobrona were in possession of singular assets (1),
which influenced the practical interpretations they were led to make of their situation
at the end of the 1991 demonstration, and of their own situation.
1 "Dlaczego rząd podzielił chłopów?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 02/12/1991, p.12.
104
on the other hand, the conditions under which their group can operate as a trade union
(2).
1) The singular properties of the Samoobrona ZZR initiators.
Information on the founders and early activists of ZZR Samoobrona is extremely
patchy. This is due as much to the relative marginality of the union in the early
months of its existence as to its later trajectory. Indeed, Andrzej Lepper's successful
takeover of the organization's apparatus in the late 1990s was accompanied by a
rewriting of its "founding plot". While the role of Andrzej Lepper was emphasized,
that of the other people involved in the union's foundation tended to be downplayed or
even concealed, all the more so as most of them had by then left the organization and
renounced any union or political involvement. This halo of mystery surrounding the
exact composition of ZZR Samoobrona's founding group was the source of much
speculation, relayed abundantly by the media and the formation's political opponents
during the 2000s. It was not uncommon to hear that former members of the special
services, the Communist Party or even foreign agents had played a central role in the
initial structuring of the union1 . Without going into these speculations, which may
appear to be unfounded but are essentially the stuff of fantasy, we shall confine
ourselves here to noting, on the basis of the data available, that the founders of ZZR
Samoobrona are the bearers of singular social properties. Whether in terms of their
level of education, their career path or their politicization2 , they are quite distinct
from the majority of Polish farmers.
For example: "Operacja Kosa? Ciemna przeszłość Samoobrony", Gazeta Wyborcza, 24/04/2006;
"Rokita ws. związków Samoobrony ze specsłużbami", Wprost, 05/05/2006; "Trafiła Kosa na Leppera",
Polityka, 27/05/2006, p.37. We'll return to these polemics in Chapter 6, Section 2.
2 Politisation is understood here in Daniel Gaxie's sense as "attention paid to the functioning of the
political field", Gaxie Daniel, Le cens caché, Paris, Seuil, 1978, p.240.
1
105
On the eve of ZZR Samoobrona's first congress in April 1992, a list of six farmers
presented as the union's founders was published by "Rolnik Rzeczypospolitej", a
union publication.
Table 3: The founders of ZZR Samoobrona.
Name
First name
Year of
birth
Place o f origin (voivodeship)
Farm area
Kozik
Ryszard
1935
Cewice (Słupsk)
10 ha
Secondary
Lech
Marek
1945
Chlebowice (Lodz)
10 ha
Secondary
Education level
Lepper
Andrzej
1954
Darłowo (Koszalin)
120 ha
Secondary
Okorski
Zbigniew
1957
Ząbkowice Śląskie (Wałbrzych)
78 ha
Secondary
Skórski
Paweł
1950
Bosowice (Kielce)
84 ha
Superior
3 ha
Superior
Wycech
Roman
1962
Zakroczyn (Warsaw)
Sources: "Oni Tworzyli Związek", Rolnik Rzeczypospolitej, 1992, p.10.
This list calls for a number of comments.
Firstly, all the "founders" mentioned are men. Significant as it is for the clear overrepresentation of men among the first ZZR Samoobrona activists, this phenomenon,
spectacular though it is, is not unique to this organization. Above all, it seems to us to
be just one illustration of the dominant position occupied by Polish women both on
the job market and in the political arena. Numerous studies have shown that, since the
change of regime in Poland, women's employment rate has been significantly lower
than men's1 , with the agricultural sector being no exception to this rule2 , and that
women tend to be less inclined to political and trade union involvement than their
male counterparts1 .
1 Estimated at 57% in 1988 (compared with 74.3% for men), the activity rate for women fell throughout
the 1990s, reaching 49.7% in 2001 (compared with 64.3% for men): figures taken from Fodor Éva,
"Women at Work: The Status of Women in the Labour Markets of the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland", Occasional Paper n°3, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, February
2005, p.6. For a more detailed analysis of gender inequalities on the Polish labor market (activity rates,
wages, but also part-time work), please refer to : Portet Stéphane, "Le temps partiel en Pologne : Un
trompe-l'oeil de la segmentation sexuée du marché du travail", Travail, genre et sociétés, vol.2, n°12,
2004, p.127-144; Heinen Jacqueline, "Genre et politiques étatiques en Europe centrale et orientale",
Recherches féministes, vol.12, n°1, 1999, p.123- 135.
2 In 1992, the activity rate for women in the countryside was estimated at 57% (GUS, November 1992).
Moreover, women working in the agricultural sector are particularly affected by part-time work (cf.
Portet Stéphane, "Le temps partiel en Pologne...", art.cit.) and are much more rarely at the head of a
farm than men (between 1988 and 1992 only 20% of the
106
Secondly, the "founders" featured in the publication are relatively homogeneous in
terms of age, farmed area and level of education. With the exception of Ryszard
Kozik, they were all born after the Second World War. The size of their farms was
significantly larger than the Polish average at the time, which was no more than 7
hectares2 , with the exception of Roman Wycech, who owned a mushroom farm.
Finally, they all had secondary or even higher education, whereas in the early 1990s
this was the case for barely one in ten Polish farmers3 . To understand this triple
specificity, we need to pay particular attention to the atypical career paths of the
farmers behind the creation of the Samoobrona ZZR. Broadly speaking, we can
identify two dominant groups among them.
The first is made up of farmers who worked on state farms before acquiring their own
holdings in the 1980s, often by buying up and leasing previously collectivized land.
However, as Marie-Claude Maurel points out, this type of entrepreneurial strategy is
reserved for individuals endowed with specific capital: "Professional skills and
managerial abilities qualify specialists in collective farms to embark on the creation of
their own business.
farms are run by women). For a detailed overview of the situation of women in the agricultural sector,
please refer to : Stankiewicz Dorota, "Sytuacja kobiet wiejskich w świetle badań Instytutu Ekonomiki
Rolnictwa i Gospodarki Żywnościowej", Kancelaria Sejmu Biuro Studiow i Ekspertyz, n°189, 1994; as
well as the comprehensive dossier: Krzyszkowski Jerzy (ed.), "Diagnoza sytuacji społeczno-zawodowej
kobiet wiejskich w Polsce", Ministerstwo Pracy i Polityki Społecznej, Warsaw, 2008, in particular:
Kretek-Kamińska Agnieszka, "Charakterystyki społeczno-zawodowe badanych kobiety wiejskich na tle
danych ogólnopolskich", p.39-62..
1 See for example: Fuszara Małgorzata, "New gender relations in Poland in the 1990s", in Gal Susan &
Kligman Gal (eds.), Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, And Everyday Life After Socialism,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000, p.259-285; Graham Ann & Regulska Joanna
"Expanding political space for women in Poland: An analysis of three communities", Communist and
Post-Communist Studies, vol.30, n°1, 1997, p.65-82; Fuchs Gesine, Political participation of women in
Central and Eastern Europe: a preliminary account, Friedrich Ebert Foundation Berlin, Conference
"Access through Accession", September 26, 2003.
2 According to GUS statistics, in 1990 the average size of a farm in Poland was 6.6 hectares, with 82.6
of these not exceeding 10 hectares: Quoted in Bafoil Francois, Guyet Rachel, L'Haridon Loïc & Tardy
Vladimir, "Pologne. Profils d'agriculteurs", Le Courrier des Pays de l'Est, vol.4, n°1034, 2003, p.40.
3 According to a 1993 census, 0.4% of farmers then had a higher education diploma, 10.7% a high
school diploma, 24.7% an elementary vocational school, 53.7% had completed primary school and
10.5% had no school education at all : Leszczyńska Małgorzata, "Zmiany w poziomie wykształcenia
gospodarstw domowych związanych z rolnictwem", Nierówności społeczne a wzrost gospodarczy,
n°11, Rzeszów, Uniwersytet Rzeszowski, 2007.
107
a private company. It was the middle-level managers in charge of production units
who were the most determined. More professionalized and less "political" than upperlevel managers, they quickly saw the opportunities for conversion [...] Specialists and
technicians, generally well-trained (with specialized secondary and higher education
diplomas), still young and often committed to the new ideology of private enterprise,
were the group most suited to entrepreneurial initiative. Armed with information,
managerial experience and networks of contacts, they proved able to negotiate their
professional conversion in their own best interests"1 . Andrzej Lepper's career path is
a perfect illustration of this type of trajectory: a graduate of an agricultural
engineering school, he held several positions of responsibility within state-owned
farms before setting up on his own in the early 1980s.
Andrzej Lepper was born in 1954 in Stowięcino in the Słupsk voivodeship. In 1974,
he graduated from the National School of Agricultural Technology in Sypniewo.
After working at the Selective Plant Cultivation Center in Górzyno and then at a State
Farm in Rzechcino, he was appointed manager of the State Breeding Farm in Kusice.
In 1980, he set up on his own, acquiring a 22.5-hectare farm in Zielnowo (Koszalin
voivodship). Following successive acquisitions and the leasing of 50 hectares of land,
financed on credit, the farm reached 120 hectares in 1991.
Sources: Sieciera Tomasz, Niepokorny, Warsaw, 1999; "Andrzej Lepper", Wprost,
http://ludzie.wprost.pl/sylwetka/Andrzej-Lepper/, accessed 1er March 2010; Krok-Paszkowska Ania,
"Samoobrona: The Polish self-defence movement", Mudde Cas & Kopecký Petr (eds.), Uncivil
Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe, London, Routledge, 2003.
The second group consists of farmers with even more atypical profiles. Having
worked outside the agricultural sector during the time of the People's Republic, they
took advantage of the opportunity presented by the dismantling of the State Farms to
acquire a farm in the early 1990s. This acquisition may be part of a professional
reconversion strategy, as in the case of Ryszard Kozik and Genowefa Wiśniowska,
both of whom would go on to hold important responsibilities within the union, or
simply a strategy for diversifying their activity. Paweł
1 Maurel Marie-Claude, art.cit. p.139.
108
Skórski continues to work as a veterinary surgeon alongside his new business as a
farmer1 .
Ryszard Kozik was born in 1935 into a family of non-commissioned officers in
Sarny, in the Wołyń voivodeship [now Ukraine]. At the end of the war, his family
moved to the "recovered lands" (over Germany). Kozik completed his secondary
education at Gdansk's Conradium Lyceum before joining the navy. He then worked as
an electrician at shipyards in Gdansk and Szczecin. Finally, in 1990, he decided to
move to the countryside, to Cewice, to set up a farm and try, as he puts it, "to live on
his own".
Sources: "Naji Goche: Ziemia Słupska", Zabory, Bory i Gochy, n°5/31, 2006, p.67.
Genowefa Wiśniowska was born in 1949 in the village of Ożary in the Wałbrzych
voivodeship. After attending an agricultural vocational school, she went on to study
economics in Legnica. From 1968 to 1986, she worked as an accountant at the
Agricultural Mechanics and Repair Factory in Ząbkowice Śląskie (Wałbrzych
Voivodeship), then at the Wałbrzych Regional Chamber of Commerce. In 1990,
together with her sister, she became co-owner of a farm and a small agribusiness in
Ząbkowice Śląskie.
Sources:
"Wiśniowska
Genowefa:
Mniejszy
potencjał
zdrady,"
Polityka,
http://www.polityka.pl/kraj/ludzie/185794,1,wisniowska-genowefa.read, accessed 1er March 2010 ;
"Wiśniowska Genowefa", Wprost, http://ludzie.wprost.pl/sylwetka/Genowefa-Wisniowska/, accessed
1er March 2010.
Farmers with unique socio-professional characteristics, the
The "founders" of ZZR Samoobrona are also distinguished by their prior political
involvement. Indeed, most of them can claim to have been involved in politics or
trade unions prior to their participation in the mobilization against overindebtedness
and the creation of the union. Andrzej Lepper, for example, was a member of the
PZPR in the late 1970s and makes no secret of his long-standing interest in politics:
"I became a member of PZPR as the youngest manager of a State Farm in Poland. I was still a young
man and was entrusted with such a position. I assume I was up to the task. In those days there wasn't
much choice. They simply brought me my party card and deducted the membership fee from my salary.
On the other hand, I've never been an activist - that's easy to check. Even at local level I was a nobody
and remained a rank-and-file member for 2 years. Nevertheless, I've always been very interested in
politics. I took part in
1 "15 lat w obronie Polskiej", Głos Samoobrony, December 2006, vol.13, n°4, p.8.
109
political, economic and agricultural culture competitions, and even won some at national level. I've
also always had a social streak."
Andrzej Lepper.
Interview conducted on June 25, 2008 in Warsaw.
Lepper's interest in politics was confirmed in the early 1990s, when, in addition to
initiating the Darłowo Communal Agricultural Self-Defense Committee, he took part
in the formation of a local list for the 1991 parliamentary elections. He ran in the
Koszalin constituency with two other farmers. Although he was not elected, he
received over 1,600 votes for his name, demonstrating his ability to mobilize certain
local networks in his favor1 .
While this is not the case for Andrzej Lepper, it does seem that it was within the
Solidarity movement that most of the early members of ZZR Samoobrona first gained
political experience2 . According to Andrzej Lepper, this was the case for the majority
of the union's founding leadership:
"Apart from myself, most of the other founding members of Samoobrona were former Solidarity
members, disillusioned with Solidarity. The union's first board [...] was even made up of a majority of
former Solidarity activists, from both Rural Solidarity [NSZZRI "S"] and Workers' Solidarity [NSZZ
"S"]3 ."
Andrzej Lepper.
Interview conducted on June 25, 2008 in Warsaw.
Clearly, the future founders of ZZR Samoobrona were not the "Jacques" that some
later portrayed them to be. Despite their delicate financial situation in the early 1990s,
they were not without social and political capital. Whether through their
1 Andrzej Lepper is running alongside Leszek Siudek and Józef Kołodziej under the list name
"Daj Nam Szansę" (Give us a chance). This list, which brings together disparate and autonomous local
candidacies, is registered under committee number 66 at national level. Andrzej Lepper and his partners
received a total of 3,247 votes, or 1.35% of the votes cast in the Koszalin constituency. Sources: Polish
National Electoral Commission (PKP) data compiled by "the Project on Political Transformation and
the
Electoral
Process
in
Post-Communist
Europe",
University
of
Essex,
http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/.
2 In the first few months of ZZR Samoobrona's existence, this fact was highlighted several times in the
press: "Samoobrona", Gazeta Wyborzca,12/01/1992, p.2 ;
"Świąteczna okupacja", Gazeta Wyborcza, 21/04/1992, p.5.
3 This is particularly true of Ryszard Kozik and Genowefa Wiśniowska, both of whom were NSZZ "S"
activists in the 1980s.
110
By virtue of their level of education, their career path and the capitalist form of their
farms, they even appear in some way to be members of the peasant "elite", as
"dominants" within the dominated group of "peasants" in both the social and political
spheres. Coupled with their previous political experience, these atypical socioprofessional characteristics seem to us to be able to be understood as constituting a
predisposition of these individuals to become politically involved, not in a
deterministic sense, but as a probability of producing an opinion on an issue,
mobilizing around it and, in the present case, engaging in a work of organizational
objectification1 .
2) The choice of union formalization: institutionalizing to continue to exist.
At first, it seems that KKSR members had no intention of formalizing their grouping
within a trade union. As Andrzej Lepper testifies, it was only at the end of the
demonstration in Warsaw that this prospect began to be considered:
"When we set up protest committees in Darłowo or Zamość, none of us were thinking of creating a
trade union, let alone a party. It was long after the first demonstrations in July, and even after the
autumn demonstration in Warsaw, during which we staged a hunger strike in front of Parliament, that
this idea began to germinate in our minds."
Andrzej Lepper.
Interview conducted on June 25, 2008 in Warsaw.
The questioning in early December 1991 of the right of representatives of the Protest
Committee to sit alongside delegates from the two official agricultural unions on the
national commission on overindebtedness and agricultural credit seems to have played
an accelerating role in the change of perspective that led the
1 On the correlation between social position and the propensity to participate politically, please refer to
the two reference works on the subject: Gaxie Daniel, Le cens caché, op.cit. in particular p.96-163; you
may also wish to refer to : Bourdieu Pierre, La distinction : Critique sociale du jugement, Paris,
Editions de Minuit, 1996 (1979), especially chapter 8.
111
KKSR members to think about creating a new farmers' union. As the PL-RL's
participation in the future government and Gabriel Janowski's appointment as
Minister of Agriculture were confirmed, the NSZZRI "S" leaders reversed their
November 14 pledge and decided to boycott the work of the national commission on
overindebtedness and agricultural credit. Denouncing the lack of representativeness of
the Protest Committee's delegates, mainly from the KKSR, they voted in early
December to set up a new commission reserved for representatives of the two official
agricultural unions, the NSZZRI "S" and the KZRKiOR1 . Disavowed of their claim
to represent over-indebted farmers, KKSR members perceive this decision as a
betrayal and a sign of contempt for them on the part of existing agricultural
organizations2 . Faced with the question of their group's durability and prospects for
action, some of them decided to give it legal status.
"Following the signing of the November 14 agreements, we thought that the official trade union
organizations, NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR, would take our demands into consideration and defend the
interests of the Polish countryside. Nothing of the sort happened. Both preferred to consider that, from a
legal point of view, we were intruders in the public space. In Warsaw, they told us straight out: "We
don't need you here, go back home, you don't have a legal existence, so there's no reason for us to talk
to you! So we decided to prove that we weren't archaic pre-war peasants and that we knew how to go
about acquiring a legal existence. As early as December 1991, we went to the Warsaw court to collect
the documents needed to set up an agricultural union, and we filled them in."
Andrej Lepper.
Quoted in: Ul Jan, Lepper Andrzej: Samoobrona: dlaczego? przed czym?, Warsaw, Agencja
Wydawniczo-Prasowa "Wyraz", 1993.
Nevertheless, at the beginning of December 1991, the project of transforming the
KKSR into a national farmers' union was not self-evident, given the low level of
structuring of the group and its limited number of members. Two factors contributed
to its future founders' perception that it was within the realm of possibility. The first is
the specific capital available to them, as described above. Previous political or trade
union experience, as well as the
1 "Dlaczego rząd podzielił chłopów?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 02/12/1991, p.12.
2 Socha Krzysztof, "Trudno jest tworzyć...", Rolnik Rzeczypospolitej, 1992.
112
The relatively high level of education that most of them could boast undeniably
helped them to feel competent to initiate the creation of a new union organization, and
to attenuate the symbolic obstacle represented by the administrative steps required to
do so. The second was the objective simplicity of the procedures for registering a
national agricultural union in Poland at the time. Detailed in articles three and four of
the law of April 7, 1989, the formalities for registering an individual farmers' union
were relatively straightforward, particularly as regards the number of founding
members required.
Extract from the law of April 7, 1989 on individual farmers' unions.
Article 3
1. Farmers intending to set up an individual farmers' union must elect a founding committee and vote
on the articles of association. On the day the articles of association are filed with the court for
registration, the number of farmers participating in the creation of the syndicate must be at least thirty;
in the case of local syndicates associating farmers residing in one and the same commune, only ten.
2. As far as national unions are concerned, the number of farmers taking part in the creation must be at
least thirty, and they must reside in at least twenty-five different voivodships.
Article 4
The articles of association of an individual farmers' union must specify its name, its headquarters, the
territorial and thematic scope of its activity, as well as its objectives, the procedures for acquiring and
losing membership status, the rights and duties of its members, the organizational structure of the union
and its management, the procedures for appointing and dismissing the latter, the sources of funding for
the union's activity, the procedures for revising and changing the articles of association, and the means
for dissolving the union.
Translated by us. Sources: "Ustawa z dnia 7 kwietnia 1989 r. o związkach zawodowy rolników
indywidualnych", Dziennik Ustaw, n°20, 1989.
Submitted in December, the ZZR Samoobrona's articles of association were validated
and registered by the Warsaw court on January 10, 1992. By mobilizing the KKSR's
pre-constituted networks, its founders succeeded in obtaining sponsorship from 32
different voivodships (out of 49) and thus endowing the union with the status of a
national organization1 . In its founding statutes, the union sets out to "defend private
property and the economic and social interests of farmers and their families" and
reaffirms the centrality of the issue of agricultural overindebtedness in its offer of
representation2 . Andrzej Lepper is appointed
1 "Samoobrona", Gazeta Wyborzca,12/01/92, p.2.
2 "Broń się sam", Zielony Sztandar, 26/01/92, p.3.
113
president of the new organization, which claimed at the time, and certainly
exaggeratedly, to have 5,000 members. The new union is given a prestigious address
on Nowy Świat Street, one of Warsaw's main commercial thoroughfares1 .
1 At the time, however, it was just a single room in the Pałac Branickich at 18/20 Nowy Świat, a
building in which many other organizations (including KPN) and companies had their addresses.
114
Section 3: A representativeness to conquer.
Article 8 paragraph 2 of the law of April 7, 1989 on individual farmers' unions
stipulates that "State and local authority bodies are obliged to treat all individual
farmers' unions or farmers' socio-professional organizations equally within the scope
of their activities". Although this principle has the force of law, in practice it is not the
only one to govern relations between agricultural unions and public authorities1 .
Personal acquaintanceships, forged in particular by shared militant practices during
the People's Republic, whether in the regime's official formations or in opposition,
political alliances expressed during election periods and within parliamentary groups,
as well as habits linked to regular participation in consultative bodies, play an equally
decisive role, if not more so, in defining interactions between those in positions of
power within the State and representatives of agricultural unions. For example, when
the Warsaw Tribunal formalized the creation of the ZZR Samoobrona, the authorities
did not automatically recognize it as a legitimate interlocutor and representative of the
peasantry. As a newcomer to the field of peasant representation, this union lacks the
resources that enable NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR to g a i n routine access to political
decision-making centers. All the more so as the announcement of the creation of ZZR
Samoobrona was greeted with circumspection tinged with mistrust by the leaders of
the pre-existing agricultural unions and by most politicians. In early January, Gabriel
Janowski, president of the NSZZRI
"S" and new Minister of Agriculture, describes the ZZR as follows
Samoobrona from a mere "whim of a few individuals"2 .
In this section, we'll be looking at how the Samoobrona ZZR, in the first few months
of its existence, sought to gain recognition from the public authorities for its claim to
participate in the definition and management of the Samoobrona ZZR.
1 On the frameworks and conditions of interaction between state agents, elected representatives and
interest group representatives, exemplified by the case of the "local political-administrative system",
please refer to Lagroye Jacques, François Bastien & Sawicki Frédéric, op.cit., p.121-131.
2 Socha Krzysztof, "Trudno jest tworzyć...", Rolnik Rzeczypospolitej, 1992.
115
representing the interests of the farming community, and more specifically those of
over-indebted farmers. How can we republicanize the problem of over-indebtedness
in agriculture, when it has been largely absent from national political debates since the
action before Parliament in October and November 1991? What modes of action
should we adopt to establish ourselves as a key player in the field of peasant
representation, despite the limited resources available? This was the double dilemma
facing the union's leaders at the start of 1992.
We shall see here that, in the weeks following its registration, the first actions taken
by ZZR Samoobrona within a legal framework to draw the attention of public
authorities to the problem of agricultural overindebtedness and its existence proved
ineffective in overcoming its isolation (A). We will show that it was only in April,
when the union organized an occupation of the Ministry of Agriculture, that it
succeeded for the first time in acquiring a certain notoriety and, in a context of
extreme social, political and institutional tensions, in forcing the public authorities to
consider it as an essential interlocutor in the handling of agricultural issues (B).
A) A new union in search of recognition.
At the time of its creation, the ZZR Samoobrona was an extremely marginal player in
the field of peasant representation, and a trade union "dwarf" alongside its
counterparts, the NZZRI "S" and the KZRKiOR (1). The initial means of action
defined by the leaders of the new union proved incapable of remedying this situation
(2).
1) The original isolation of ZZR Samoobrona.
Breaking with the normative theme of the unity of the peasant movement, the
founders of ZZR Samoobrona adopted an extremely critical stance towards all
traditional peasant organizations right from its registration. Accusing these
116
In the last few years, they have given priority to the political ambitions of their leaders
rather than defending the interests of the peasantry, and have endeavored to legitimize
their undertaking to structure a new union by advocating a renewal of union practices,
at a distance from any "political" commitment. Witness these two statements by
Andrzej Lepper to journalists from Gazeta Wyborcza and Zielony Sztandar:
"There is no union today that is really fighting to improve the difficult situation of farmers, those that
do exist are fighting instead for a place in Parliament or the Government".
Quoted in: "Samoobrona", Gazeta Wyborzca,12/01/1992, p.2.
"The new Samoobrona union is the product of farmers' discontent, which was expressed last year in
Zamość, Darłowo and Warsaw. Farmers then became aware that, despite the multitude of existing
political forces, the Polish countryside had been abandoned and there was no one to defend it. It
became clear to them that the existing unions were unfortunately not effectively looking after farmers'
interests and were compromising with the government."
Quoted in: "Broń się sam", Zielony Sztandar, 26/01/1992, p.3.
This strategy of denouncing the other protagonists in the field of peasant
representation, while offering the new union the opportunity to stand out, also
deprived it of any political and institutional relays. For the first time since the summer
of 1990, the main peasant organizations, united within the PSL-SP on the one hand
and the RL-PL on the other, monopolized most of the positions of national political
power linked to the agricultural sector. In addition to the Ministry of Agriculture
(Gabriel Janowski: RL-PL), they share the chairmanships of the Agriculture
Committees in the Sejm (Antoni Furtak: RL-PL) and Senate (Sylwester Gajewski:
PSL-SP). In addition, Henryk Bąk (PL-RL) and Józef Zych (PSL-SP) are elected
Deputy Marshals of the Sejm, and Józef Ślisz (PL-RL) of the Senate. Thanks to their
large number of elected representatives and their participation in alliances that took
part, more or less directly, in government, KZRKiOR and above all NSZZRI "S"
enjoyed privileged, if not reserved, access to the centers of political power.
117
At the beginning of 1992, ZZR Samoobrona's capacity for action seemed extremely
limited1 . A newcomer to the field of peasant representation, the union was still poorly
endowed with financial and militant resources2 and had no connections within the
administration or established political forces, particularly not among organizations
asserting their peasant identity, who perceived it as a new, illegitimate competitor.
2) How do you take action?
Despite its stated ambition to "defend the Polish countryside" as a whole, the first
demands made by ZZR Samoobrona were in fact limited - logically enough, given the
way the organization came into being - to the single issue of agricultural indebtedness.
At the time of the union's registration, Andrzej Lepper stated that the union's primary
objectives were to obtain the effective application of the November 14 agreements
and to cap interest rates on agricultural loans at 12%3 . Nevertheless, without being
able to directly influence political decision-making bodies or "make numbers talk" by
organizing large-scale demonstrations4 , ZZR Samoobrona is forced to define
alternative means of action to put forward these demands and attempt to gain
recognition of its right to participate in the representation of the farmers' group, or at
least one of its bangs. Indeed, as Erik Neveu reminds us, "No group chooses a type of
protest action 'off the shelf', on the basis of rationality or appeal alone. The choice of a
form of action is made within constraints: of resources, of dispositions, of situation, of
perception....
1 A group's capacity for action is largely a function of "the financial resources it can obtain, the social
positions of its members and the connections they have in the administration or political parties, their
ability to mobilize support in different sectors of social life and to lend strong symbolic weight to the
defense of their interests": Lagroye Jacques, François Bastien & Sawicki Frédéric, op.cit., p.286.
2 There is no precise information on the extent of ZZR Samoobrona's original financial resources,
which has fuelled rumours about the organization's origins. However, there is also no evidence to
suggest that the union received any outside financial support, and it seems that at this stage of its
existence, activists' dues were the main source of its meagre income.
3 "Broń się sam", Zielony Sztandar, 26/01/1992, p.3.
4 Offerlé Michel, Sociologie des groupes d'intérêts, op.cit. p.110.
118
modalities of confrontation"1 . With this in mind, the union's activism essentially
developed in two complementary directions in the first few weeks after its
registration: at local level, by setting up groups to protect over-indebted farmers,
"anti-seizure sections", and at national level, by more or less directly questioning
public authorities about the situation of over-indebted farmers.
The creation of "anti-seizure committees" is justified by the management of ZZR
Samoobrona by the non-application in the field of the provisions of the November 14
agreement concerning the suspension of the seizure of the assets of over-indebted
farmers. Accusing local authorities of turning a blind eye to the situation, the union is
calling on farmers to organize their "self-defense" in order to enforce their rights. As
Andrzej Lepper explains, this means reversing the balance of power in favor of the
farmer, in order to push the bankers to negotiate:
"We are going to set up "anti-seizure sections". These sections will intervene in the event of an
illegitimate seizure procedure taking place on the farm of an indebted farmer. Initially, negotiations will
be held with the bank manager and the bailiff to find a solution that satisfies all parties, if possible. In
cases where the illegitimate seizure is implemented despite everything, we intend to draw up a list of all
the officials who a r e harming farmers and all the people behind their bankruptcy. We will then
publish this list of names in our newspaper Gazeta Rzeczypospolitej."
Quoted in "Broń się sam", Zielony Sztandar, 26/01/1992, p.3.
While at this stage in the organization's life, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness
and efficiency of this mode of action, which had only modest ambitions at the time2 ,
there can be little doubt that it also contributed to the development of the union's local
structures.
The most visible component of ZZR Samoobrona's activism in the first weeks after its
registration was the repeated attempts by its management to
1 Neveu Erik, "Répertoire d'action des mobilisations", in Cohen Antonin, Lacroix Bernard & Riutort
Philippe (dir.), op.cit. p.503.
2 All the more so as it seems that the Gazeta Rzeczypospolitej newspaper mentioned by Lepper never
actually saw the light of day. As for Rolnik Rzeczypospolitej, the union's first publication, its circulation
remains confidential and limited to the Koszalin region.
119
to draw the attention of public authorities to the problem of over-indebtedness, and to
be recognized as a fully-fledged interlocutor in their handling of agricultural issues,
on an equal footing with other unions - a status that the law is supposed to guarantee.
To this end, the leaders began by writing to the highest authorities in the land: the
Prime Minister, the President, the Marshal of the Diet and the Minister of Agriculture.
On January 20, an initial letter was sent to Prime Minister Jan Olszewski, calling
attention to the situation of Polish agriculture, which ZZR Samoobrona's management
described as dramatic, and asking him to change government policy in this sector:
Warsaw, January 20, 1992.
Dear Prime Minister,
the situation of Polish agriculture and its workers is becoming more dramatic by the day and hour. In
the absence of a clear legal framework, the many legal loopholes are leading the Polish countryside to
its ruin, and there is no sign of the slightest improvement. [...] The creation of our union, as its name
suggests, is a specific form of self-defence for agriculture in the face of the threat o f annihilation
hanging over it as a result of the failings and deliberate errors of the government, the central trade
unions and, to a lesser extent, local decision-makers. [...] In this situation, we are obliged to demand
that the central and regional authorities consider the Polish countryside as an integral part of Poland's
current problems. We look forward to a written statement from you on the situation and prospects of
the Polish countryside.
With our most respectful sentiments,
For the Prezydium of the National Council of ZZR Samoobrona
Andrzej Lepper
Translated by us. Sources: "Pan Premier Rządu PR Jan Olszewski", 20/01/1992, reproduced in
Rolnik Rzeczypospolitej, 1992.
A few days later, it was the turn of the President of the Republic Lech Wałęsa to be
vigorously challenged:
Warsaw, January 25, 1992.
Dear Mr. President of the Republic,
Aware of the quantity and importance of the tasks you have to deal with, we ask you to show particular
understanding for the dramatic situation of Polish agriculture, which is a source of personal tragedy.
[...] Wishing to avoid the risk of a wave of actions
120
The Prezydium of ZZR Samoobrona reiterates1 its request for a meeting. [During this meeting] we
would like to explain the situation to you and discuss with you what has caused the collapse of
agriculture and what can be done to put an end to the tragedy and prevent uncontrolled protests. [...] We
ask you to take ZZR Samoobrona, and through it Polish agriculture as a whole, seriously and schedule
this meeting without further delay. Yours respectfully
ZZR Samoobrona President: Andrzej
Lepper
Translated by us. Sources: "Pan Lech Wałęsa Prezydent RP", 25/01/1992, reproduced in Rolnik
Rzeczypospolitej, 1992.
Alternating between polite formulas, a threatening tone and denunciations of existing
farmers' organizations, even though they were part of the government majority, these
manifesto-mails, which broke with the canon of official addresses, did not meet with
the expected response. Almost all went unheeded and were not published in the
national press.
Faced with the failure of this "activism of the pen", at the end of February 1992 the
Prezydium of ZZR Samoobrona embarked on a strategy of legalizing the problem of
overindebtedness2 . On February 26, Andrzej Lepper, Paweł Skórski and Marek Lech,
as authorized by the official status of the ZZR Samoobrona Individual Farmers'
Union, filed a petition with the Constitutional Court, seeking in particular to
invalidate the legal possibility for banks to unilaterally revalue the interest rates on a
current loan3 . Rather than aiming for a legal settlement of this issue - which can only
lead to
On January 16, a first request for an appointment was refused by the President's Cabinet on the
grounds that "due to the number of tasks he has to deal with at the head of the State, the President will
not be able to receive union representatives in the immediate future": Quoted in "Pan Andrzej Lepper"
(Letter to Andrzej Lepper), 16/01/1992, reproduced in Rolnik Rzeczypospolitej, 1992.
2 As Eric Agrikoliansky notes: "Le droit, technologie propre aux États modernes, constitue une voie
privilégiée d'accès à l'État et d'expression de revendications normatives", in Agrikoliansky Eric, La
ligue française des droits de l'homme et du citoyen depuis 1945 : Sociologie d'un engagement civique,
Paris, L'Harmattan, 2002, p.277. On the use of law as a resource for interest groups, see the dossier
devoted to this issue in Sociétés Contemporaines :
"Groupes d'intérêt et recours au droit", Sociétés Contemporaines, n°52, 2003, p.5-104. See also: Israël
Liora, "Usages militants du droit dans l'arène judiciaire : le cause lawyering", Droit et société, 2001,
vol.3, n°49, p.793-824 and more recently Israël Liora, L'arme du Droit, Paris, Presses de la FNSP,
2009.
3 "Wniosek do Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w Warszawie" (Application to the Warsaw Constitutional
Court), 26/02/92, reproduced in Rolnik Rzeczypospolitej, 1992.
1
121
At the end of a lengthy and resource-intensive procedure, of which the syndicate is
largely deprived1 - the filing of this petition seems to us to be best understood as
taking part, in the manner of open letters, in an attempt to question the public
authorities on the problem of over-indebtedness around which the syndicate was
formed.
Despite the multi-faceted activism of its militants at the start of 1992, ZZR
Samoobrona was unable to republicatize the issue of agricultural overindebtedness,
for which it claimed to be the spokesperson, or to overcome its lack of notoriety and
political isolation. As a result, only the Minister of Agriculture agreed to receive a
delegation from the new union at the end of January. The meeting turned into a tugof-war: accused by Andrzej Lepper of not being aware of the reality of the situation in
Polish agriculture, Gabriel Janowski retaliated by roundly denouncing the
demagoguery of the new union2 . As for Poland's other political leaders - President,
Prime Minister, party leaders - they ignore the ZZR Samoobrona. Although invited,
none of them attended the union's first Congress, held in Warsaw's "Hala Gwardii" in
early April 19923 .
B) Proving its representativeness by force.
The first months of the legislature elected in the October 27 elections were marked by
the Olszewski government's inability to secure a stable majority in the Sejm, the
resurgence of protest mobilizations by workers and public-sector employees, and the
recurrence of institutional conflicts between Parliament, the Government and the
Presidency. This situation has resulted in a tendency for the political situation to
become more fluid4 , exacerbated from the spring onwards, affecting
1 The request was finally rejected by the Constitutional Court in December 1992: Cf.
"Orzeczenie w imieniu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 15 grudnia 1992 r" accessed April 2, 2009 at
http://prawo.money.pl/orzecznictwo/trybunal-konstytucyjny/orzeczenie;z;dnia;1992-1215,k,6,92,136,orzeczenie.html.
2 "Minister w helikopterze", Gazeta Wyborcza, 30/01/1992, p.2.
3 "Samoobrona nie Znaczy w Pojedynkę", Zielony Sztandar, 05/04/1992.
4 Michel Dobry identifies three main properties characteristic of situations of fluid conjuncture:
conjunctural de-sectorization of social space, structural uncertainty and de-objectification of sectoral
relationships. Cf. Dobry Michel, op.cit., p.125-169. In our case
122
interactions between different sectors of the political arena (1). It was in this context,
certainly perceived as a "window of opportunity"1 for action by the union's leaders,
that ZZR Samoobrona organized its first nationwide protest action. Nearly one
hundred and fifty of the union's activists, who had gathered in Warsaw a few days
earlier for its 1er Congress, entered the Ministry of Agriculture building on April 9 to
begin an occupation that would ultimately last almost three weeks. The object of an
intense struggle to impose a definition of conflict2 , initially pitting the demonstrators
against the Ministry of Agriculture, this action should be understood as a "coup"3
attempted - as we shall see, successfully - by the union's leaders to redefine in their
favor the nature of their relations with those in positions of power, and to establish
themselves as legitimate actors in the representation of the peasantry (2).
1) A fluid political situation: the "crisis" at the start of the Ie legislature.
In the weeks following the parliamentary elections of October 1991, an analysis of the
political situation in terms of "crisis" quickly became the norm among the various
protagonists in the political arena. As a result of the players' belief in the existence of
this "crisis", the political situation began to fluidify at the start of 1992, with
increasing vigour from the spring onwards. This was reflected in the high degree of
uncertainty affecting interactions between the various parliamentary forces, between
the different arenas of the political arena, and between the main state institutions.
The recurrent debates over the composition of the government coalition are
undoubtedly the most visible sign of the uncertainty characterizing relations between
the two parties.
Although the situation cannot, in our view, be considered a crisis in Dobry's sense, processes of deobjectification of sectoral relationships and blurring of routine sectoral logics are nonetheless clearly
identifiable, as we shall see.
1 Lagroye Jacques, François Bastien & Sawicki Frédéric, op.cit., p.525.
2 Ibid, p.33.
3 Dobry Michel, op.cit. p.11-12.
123
between the parliamentary forces1 . Jan Olszewski's government, which brought
together several minor parties - the ZChN (49 deputies), the PC (44 deputies) and the
RL-PL (28) - had no majority in the Sejm and owed its inauguration on December 23,
1991 to the non-participating support of several parliamentary clubs, including the
PSL-SP (48 deputies)2 .
Figure 1: Parliamentary clubs' voting instructions for the December 23, 1991
vote on the investiture of the Olszewski government.
ZChN (WAK): 49 = Name of parliamentary club (Name of electoral coalition if different): number of MPs elected on October 27.
Coalition participation: 121
Abstention: 145
Non-participating support: 1 1 0
Opposition: 63
No club instructions: 21
In the end, out of 434 votes cast, 235 deputies voted in favor of the Olszewski government, 60 against
and 139 abstained.
Compiled by u s . Sources: stenograms of the Diet session of December 23, 1991, www.sejm.gov.pl.
1 For more information on the political situation following the 1991 elections, please refer to : Millard
Frances, The anatomy of New Poland, Aldershot, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1994, p.93-99;
Jasiewicz Krzysztof, "Polish Politics on the Eve of the 1993 Elections: Toward Fragmentation or
Pluralism?", Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol.26, n°4, 1993, p.387- 411; o r : Wiatr Jerzy,
"Pięć parlamentów III Rzeczyspolitej", in Wiatr Jerzy, Raciborski Jacek, Bartkowski Jerzy, FrątczakRudnicka Barbara & Kilias Jarosław (dir.), Demokracja Polska: 1989-2003, Warszawa, WN Scholar,
2003, p.106-110.
2 As Frances Millard notes: "The Sejm agreed to invest the Olszewski government mainly because there
was no credible alternative. Failure to grant confidence to a government risked serious consequences:
either the President himself would take over as head of government (a constitutionally dubious
proposition), or new elections would be held", Millard Frances, op.cit., p.95.
124
Against this backdrop, negotiations between the various players interested in joining
the government continued throughout the first months of 1992, and the question of
alliances continued to be the focal point of tactical activity for most political leaders.
While various coalition projects were discussed on an almost daily basis, strategic
differences emerged within certain parties, leading to a number of reshuffles in
Parliament1 . The PL-RL coalition exploded in the first days of January. The leaders
of PSL-Solidarność, including ten deputies, decided to break with their allies in
NSZZRI "S" and PSL Mikołaczyk in order to draw closer to Jarosław Kaczyński's
PC2 . Without going so far as to provoke a split, the questions of alliances and the
relationship with the Olszewski government were also the subject of lively debate and
strategic hesitation within the PSL-SP coalition. Blowing hot and cold with the Prime
Minister, PSL President Waldemar Pawlak regularly threatens to join the opposition,
while taking part in several rounds of negotiations to formalize his party's
participation in the government. But to no avail: by the end of March, all talks aimed
at enlarging the coalition had failed. More than four months after its formation, the
Olszewski government remains deprived of a majority in the Sejm, is under the
permanent threat of a motion of censure and appears unable to pass its draft budget3 .
The fluidity of the situation was not confined to the parliamentary arena, however,
and also affected relations between the field of institutional politics and that of social
movements. In the first few weeks of 1992, there was a marked increase in the
number of protest mobilizations in various sectors: industry, the civil service,
transport, etc. While the demands of the strikers were principally of a political nature,
they were also of a social nature. Although the strikers' demands were mainly socioeconomic, the movement had an undeniable political significance. The main
organizers of the
1 Ibid, p.141.
2 The day after the elections, tensions emerged between PSL-Solidarnosc leaders and their partners in
the RL-PL coalition. The ten PSL-Solidarnosc deputies formed their own parliamentary club. However,
it wasn't until early January that the "divorce" was formally finalized, due to deep-seated differences
over political alliances. While the PSL-Solidarnosc signed a cooperation agreement with the PC, the
NSZZRI deputies favored a rapprochement with the ZChN or even the PSL-SP: "Nowe Alianse
Centrum", Gazeta Wyborcza, 06/01/1992, p.3; "Ślub PC z PSL 'S'", Gazeta Wyborcza, 13/01/1992, p.3.
3 "Sejm odrzucił program rządu", Gazeta Wyborcza, 06/03/1992, p.1.
125
What the OPZZ and Solidarity (NSZZ "S") unions have in common is that they are
also involved in politics and have parliamentary representation, the former in coalition
and the latter autonomously. Easily understood by the OPZZ, the main ally of the
SLD opposition party, strike action at the start of the new parliamentary term seems
more paradoxical for the NSZZ "S", which formally supports the new government in
parliament, without taking part. In our view, it should be seen as part of the union's
strategy to increase its influence on the political balance of power. Indeed, despite the
relatively small size of its parliamentary club (27 deputies and 11 senators), NSZZ
"S"'s participation in a protest movement is particularly embarrassing for the
Olszewski government, given its heritage and the symbolic strength of the Solidarity
label, which is also claimed by the various coalition partners. By "playing on different
levels" and transgressing the boundary between trade union and parliamentary
activities, NSZZ "S" representatives a r e forcing government forces to pay particular
attention to their demands, whether they concern
union" issues - such as employment and wages - or more directly, "union" issues.
They are also involved in "political" issues - such as the composition of the
government or the direction of the government's proposed budget1 . In other words, by
urging the government to be more receptive to the demands of extra-institutional
players, they seek to compensate for the secondary importance of the NSZZ "S"
parliamentary club, in order to maintain the union's central position in the Polish
political game. In so doing, they help to "open up the arenas of confrontation"2 and
further blur the already extremely labile distinction between political, union and
protest practices. Paradoxically, at the same time, we observe exactly the opposite
dynamic within the field of peasant representation. The KZRKiOR, which at the time
was tending to integrate into the PSL's system of action, with which it was allied
within the PSL-SP parliamentary club, and the NSZZRI "S" gave up mobilizing a
repertoire of protest action at the beginning of 1992. Their leaders now clearly
favored institutional practices of representation, whether in Parliament or, for
NSZZRI "S", in government. Replacing
1 Cf. Ost David, The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe, Ithaca &
London, Cornell University Press, 2005, p.73.
2 Dobry Michel, op.cit. p.128-129.
126
of Gabriel Janowski as head of NSZZRI "S" by Roman Wierzbicki, who was also a
member of parliament, did not initially call this strategy into question. Although
critical of the government's policies, Wierzbicki confirmed the union's support for the
coalition and its at least temporary renunciation of strike action1 .
Lastly, in the absence of institutional routines, i.e. "stable arrangements for the tasks
usually attached to a role"2 , the fluidity of the political situation following the
parliamentary elections of October 1991 also led to an exacerbation of tensions
between the Republic of Poland's main political institutions. While the question of
drafting a new constitution was one of the main issues at stake in the Ie legislature of
the Sejm, non-euphemistic conflicts concerning the organization and form of the
regime emerged between the holders of different positions of power within the
institutional order. Weakened by its lack of a parliamentary majority, at the beginning
of 1992 the government was faced with repeated initiatives from the Diet and the
Presidency aimed at limiting its prerogatives and sphere of action. The government's
legitimacy to take charge of certain issues is regularly challenged by members of the
Sejm, notably within parliamentary committees3 . Nevertheless, it is undeniably from
the presidency that the strongest attacks on the prime ministerial institution and the
government come4 . Since his election in 1990, President Wałęsa had been clearly in
favour of strengthening the presidential function. In the aftermath of the 1991
parliamentary elections, to the horror of most members of parliament and
commentators on Polish political life, he even evoked the idea for a time,
1 Roman Wierzbicki, who was appointed acting president of the union in early January 1992, quickly
cleared up any ambiguity regarding NSZZRI "S"'s attitude towards the government, confirming his
support and announcing that he would continue to favor negotiation over any form of protest: "Związek
rolnikow pełen zrozumienia", Gazeta Wyborcza, 15/01/1992, p.2. while expressing certain reservations
about the government's budgetary policy and its composition, he reaffirmed this orientation when he
was formally elected president of the union on March 22, 1992: "Solidarność RI za rządem i przeciw",
Gazeta Wyborcza, 03/23/1992, p.5.
2 Lagroye Jacques, François Bastien & Sawicki Frédéric, op.cit. p.146.
3 On the importance of parliamentary committees in Poland and their decisive influence on the
legislative process and control of the executive, please refer to : Sanford George, Democratic
Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002,
p.120-121.
4 For more on the recurring tensions during Wałęsa's term between the Presidency and the Government:
Baylis Thomas A., "Presidents versus Prime ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern
Europe", World Politics, vol.48, n°3, 1996, p.297-323.
127
the possibility of appointing himself Prime Minister, thus combining the functions of
head of state and government. Ultimately forced to appoint Jan Olszewski as Prime
Minister, Wałęsa reiterated his preference for a strong presidency in a set of
constitutional reform proposals he presented to the Diet in the first weeks of the
legislature1 . Making no secret of his admiration for the institutional system of the Ve
French Republic and regularly denouncing the instability of the government, the
President endeavored in early 1992 to impose his "leadership" in several areas of
public action, notably Defense and Foreign Affairs. This strategy naturally provoked
open conflicts with several ministers, including Jan Parys2 , and further accentuated
the mediocrity of relations between President Wałęsa and his Prime Minister
Olszewski.
It was against this backdrop of high political, social and institutional tensions that
ZZR Samoobrona launched its first large-scale protest action in early April.
2) The occupation of the Ministry of Agriculture: a "coup" that paid off.
On April 9, 1992, around one hundred and fifty ZZR Samoobrona activists broke into
the Ministry of Agriculture building in Warsaw and set up camp in one of the
reception rooms on the first floor. The demonstrators' demands were clear: they called
for implementation of the November agreements, in particular with regard to halting
the seizure of the assets of over-indebted farmers, the introduction of agricultural
loans at preferential rates, 12% maximum, and a meeting with the Prime Minister3 .
The fact that the first national protest action organized by ZZR Samoobrona was the
occupation of a public building is not insignificant. In fact, we feel that the use of this
practice reflects both the limited resources available to the group at the time, and the
fact that the ZZR Samoobrona was able to hold a public meeting.
1 Millard Frances, op.cit. p.96.
2 Ibid, p.100.
3 "Samoobrona okupuje", Gazeta Wyborcza,10/04/1992, p.5.
128
mobilized by the union than to the dominant position it still occupies a few months
after its creation within the field of peasant representation1 . At a time when ZZR
Samoobrona is struggling to establish itself as a legitimate spokesperson for the
peasantry and to mobilize around the issue of overindebtedness, this mode of action
offers several potential advantages for the union.
Firstly, the occupation of the Ministry of Agriculture offered the union an opportunity
to draw attention to itself, despite its relative numerical weakness. A march through
the streets of the capital by the 150 participants in the action would have had far less
media and political impact. On the other hand, the illegality and spectacular nature of
the occupation of a ministry guaranteed ZZR Samoobrona unprecedented media
coverage, which continued throughout April [Table 4]. At the same time, it created a
balance of power that forced the public authorities to recognize it and pay some
attention to its demands. Indeed, as Cécile Péchu points out, "the publicity given to
actions, in the primary sense of the term, affects the way the authorities and 'public
opinion' - or at least the way the authorities perceive public opinion - perceive
collective action and its perpetrators, thus partly conditioning the likelihood of
repression or satisfaction of demands"2 .
Table 4: Number of Gazeta Wyborcza articles referring to ZZR
Samoobrona in the first four months of 1992.
January 1992
February 1992
April 1992
March 1992
from 1st to 9th
Articles focusing on
ZZR Samoobrona or
one of its actions
Articles mentioning ZZR
Samoobrona as part of
the treatment of a
other topic
Total items
evoking the ZZR
2
1
from 10 to 30
17
0
0
17
3
1
0
1
0
3
1
1
3
20
Indeed, as Etienne Pénissat notes, "appropriations of a mode of action refer as much to the
dispositions of actors as to the positions of organizations in the space of social movements": Pénissat
Etienne, "Les occupations de locaux dans les années 1960-1970 : Processus sociohistoriques de "
réinvention " d'un mode d'action", Genèses, vol.2, n°59, 2005, p.72.
2 Péchu Cécile, "Quand les 'exclus' passent à l'action. La mobilisation des mal-logés", Politix, vol.9,
n°34, 1996, p.123.
1
129
0
20
Produced by us. Sources: archives of the national edition of the daily Gazeta Wyborcza for January,
February, March and April 1992.
Secondly, by bringing together over a hundred farmers directly concerned by the
problem of over-indebtedness in one place, the occupation enabled ZZR Samoobrona
to "show the numbers", to demonstrate the importance of the group of over-indebted
people and therefore the prevalence of this problem neglected by the public
authorities, without having to mobilize a crowd of demonstrators. Highlighting the
diverse geographical origins of the demonstrators at the Ministry of Agriculture,
Andrzej Lepper declares that over-indebtedness affects half of all individual farmers,
whereas, according to the Ministry, it affects no more than one percent of them1 .
Last but not least, the protest occupation of a ministerial building enabled ZZR
Samoobrona to set itself apart within the field of peasant representation. By attacking
a symbol of government power, the union is able to demonstrate its difference from
other agricultural organizations, whose leaders have constantly denounced its
connivance with the authorities since its creation.
Initially, the Minister of Agriculture adopted a rather conciliatory attitude towards the
ZZR Samoobrona demonstrators. While assuring them that he would not use force to
remove them from the Ministry, he invited them to submit their demands to him in
writing and to take part, along with the other agricultural unions, in a new round of
negotiations devoted to the issue of excessive agricultural debt. In so doing, he set out
to "normalize" the treatment of this issue, to reintegrate it into the institutional
framework, but also to redefine its contours and the solutions to be found. In fact,
following on from the Bielecki government's approach to overindebtedness in the
final weeks of the demonstration before Parliament in October and November 1991,
Janowski endeavors to relativize, though not completely deny, the importance of this
problem in Polish agriculture - in his view, it concerns a small minority of
1 "Samoobrona okupuje", Gazeta Wyborcza,10/04/1992, p.5.
130
farms - and to promote a resolution method that favors case-by-case negotiation
between farmers and their banks. As early as April 13, the Minister of Agriculture
solemnly invited bankers to show understanding towards over-indebted farmers, by
exempting them from penalties for late payment and granting them credit facilities if
necessary1 . At the same time, Gabriel Janowski relaunched the project for an
Agricultural Restructuring and Debt Relief Fund, which had been provided for in the
November 14, 1991 agreements but which had since stalled, to enable farmers' debts
to be rescheduled. The first meeting in the cycle of negotiations on agricultural
overindebtedness between representatives of the Ministry and leaders of the three
central agricultural unions, which he has scheduled for April 15, is intended to set out
the practical arrangements for the creation and operation of this institution2 .
Nevertheless, the representatives of ZZR Samoobrona firmly reject the method of
construction and resolution of the over-indebtedness problem developed by the
Minister of Agriculture and have decided to boycott this meeting. "The Minister's
proposals are exactly the same as those promised to us by Minister Tański in
November, which he failed to deliver. What we demand now is the immediate
satisfaction of all our demands, until then we're not leaving the ministry"3 Andrzej
Lepper told journalists. ZZR Samoobrona's refusal to take part in the round of
negotiations organized by the Minister of Agriculture prompted a change in the latter's
attitude towards the union, and led to a hardening of the conflict between the two
parties.
Now denouncing the irresponsibility and radicalism of the organization chaired by
Andrzej Lepper, Janowski set about minimizing its representativeness and isolating it
within the field of representation of the peasantry by pursuing discussions on
overindebtedness and the creation of the Agricultural Restructuring and Debt Relief
Fund with the two other agricultural unions, the NSZZRI
"S" and KZRKiOR. Arguing the illegality of the occupation at the Ministry, he refuses
1 "Wielkanoc w Ministerstwie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 15/04/1992, p.4.
2 "Samoobrona przed licytacją", Gazeta Wyborcza,13/04/1992, p.5.
3 "Okupacja parteru aż do skutku", Gazeta Wyborcza,14/04/1992, p.5.
131
from now on to enter into any dialogue with ZZR Samoobrona before the
demonstrators have completely evacuated the building.
At the same time, the agricultural union redefined the purpose and form of its action
at the Ministry. In addition to their initial economic demands, the demonstrators
added more political demands, notably the immediate resignation of Gabriel
Janowski1 . Initially essentially symbolic, as it was confined to a reception room and
did not disrupt the work of its employees, the occupation of the Ministry gradually
took on the form of a veritable blockade, with the demonstrators taking almost total
control of the building2 . During the Easter weekend, the occupiers imposed access
restrictions, and in the days that followed, a cordon of police officers was deployed
around the building to prevent the influx of new strikers3 . The Ministry of
Agriculture became a veritable island in the hands of the ZZR Samoobrona in the
heart of Warsaw. What's more, the occupation soon doubled as a hunger strike by
some of the participants in the action. From April 16, eleven of them stopped eating.
By resorting to this form of action, already mobilized in November 1991 by KKSR
demonstrators4 , the union once again sought to dramatize the situation of overindebted farmers and, while ensuring sustained media coverage of the protest
movement, to attempt to shift the balance of power with the government in its favor.
Despite this "radicalization", the Minister of Agriculture remains adamant in the face
of ZZR Samoobrona's demands. Stigmatizing the hunger strike as an attempt at
blackmail and a further sign of the irresponsibility of the leaders
1 "Wielkanoc w Ministerstwie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 15/04/1992, p.4.
2 On the diversity of possible uses of occupation as a form of protest action: Etienne Pénissat, art.cit. in
particular p.83.
3 "Świąteczna okupacja", Gazeta Wyborcza, 21/04/1992, p.5.
4 Some hunger strikers in the Ministry have already taken part in the action in front of Parliament, as
this protester interviewed by journalists testifies: "This is my third hunger strike, after the one I led in
Zamość and then in front of Parliament. We're going to fast until all our demands are accepted, and this
time we won't accept waiting": "Wziąć banki głodem", Gazeta Wyborcza, 17/04/1992, p.5.
132
of the union1 , he persists in rejecting any form of resolution to the problem of
agricultural overindebtedness other than the creation of an Agricultural Restructuring
and Debt Relief Fund, to which the leaderships of NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR have
agreed to collaborate. As the Gazeta Wyborcza newspaper headlined on April 27,
while the occupation had been going on for more than a fortnight and the hunger
strikers had begun a thirst strike, "there is still no sign of goodwill"2 f r o m either the
Ministry of Agriculture or ZZR Samoobrona to bring about a rapid resolution to the
conflict.
In the context of the political fluidity mentioned above, however, the definition of the
situation was not limited to a duel between the union and Gabriel Janowski. It was
also shaped by players who were initially outside the conflict, but who had a more or
less direct interest in effectively resolving the problem of overindebtedness. The
stagnation of the ZZR Samoobrona's protest action provided an opportunity for
players who, for various reasons, wanted to distance themselves from the government
and its methods of defining the situation. The strategy of marginalizing ZZR
Samoobrona implemented by the Minister of Agriculture, with the support of the
Prime Minister, is thus gradually being undermined. As early as April 16, the leaders
of KZRKiOR lent their support to the demands of the occupiers of the Ministry3 .
While the PSL-SP continued negotiations to join the government coalition, they
confirmed their support for Minister Janowski's proposal to set up an Agricultural
Restructuring and Debt Relief Fund. The
On April 22, deputies from the Agriculture Committee broke away from the
Janowski's "cordon sanitaire" around ZZR Samoobrona. They invited representatives
of the ministry's occupants, including Andrzej Lepper, to come to the Diet to present
their demands and their analysis of the economic situation of agriculture. On this
occasion, some members of the committee were quick to criticize Gabriel Janowski's
attitude, accusing him of letting the conflict fester, as newspapers and television had
done.
1 As Johanna Siméant notes, "opponents of the hunger strike [were] quick to label it illegitimate: the
authorities, the press, groups hostile to the demands, quick to stigmatize 'the blackmail of strikers', their
manipulation by extremist and irresponsible groups, or the trivialization of their use": Siméant Johanna,
op.cit., p.69.
2 "Dobrowolnie stąd nie wyjdziemy", Gazeta Wyborcza, 27/04/1992, p.4.
3 "Wziąć banki głodem", Gazeta Wyborcza,17/04/1992, p.5.
133
speak out on a daily basis1 . At the end of the month, however, the biggest challenge
to the Minister of Agriculture's strategy came from the President's office. Going
against the government's wishes, presidential advisors began informal, confidential
negotiations with ZZR Samoobrona leaders over the weekend of April 25. On the
28th, to everyone's surprise, Lech Wałęsa himself received union representatives at
his Belvedere residence and formalized the signing of an agreement ending the
occupation of the Ministry. The latter was a real slap in the face for the Minister of
Agriculture.
Text of the April 28, 1992 press release on the end of the occupation of the
Ministry of Agriculture and the creation of the Council for Rural and
Agricultural Affairs.
Warsaw, April 28, 1992
Press release
Following discussions in the offices of the Presidency, representatives of the
Samoobrona Farmers' Union were receptive to the President's arguments concerning
the current situation in the country, particularly the political crisis, one illustration of
which is the stalling of the Samoobrona action - to which the Ministry of Agriculture
is no stranger. They announced the end of the protest action taking place in the
Ministry of Agriculture building at 5pm today.
The Presidential Administration sets up a Council for Rural and Agricultural Affairs,
to which representatives of Parliament and the Samoobrona farmers' union are
invited. Experts from various scientific fields are also invited.
The council's mission will be to resolve problems affecting agriculture, with a
particular focus on agricultural credit and overindebtedness.
For the Presidency:
1. Mieczysław Wachowski1
2. Andrzej Zakrzewski2
For the Prezydium of ZZR Samoobrona :
. Mr Andrzej Lepper
. Mr Marek Lech
3. Mr Jerzy (illegible)
4. Mr. Ryszard Kozik.
Sources: "Komunikat z dnia 28 kwietnia 1992 r.", Archiwum Partii Politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona
1991-1996.
1 "Atak Samoobrony", Gazeta Wyborcza, 04/23/1992, p.5; "Licytacja oświadczeń", Gazeta Wyborcza,
04/24/1992, p.4.
134
In addition to explicitly criticizing the management of the conflict by the Minister of
Agriculture, the agreement provides for the creation of a Council for Rural and
Agricultural Affairs, directly attached to the President and supposed to have "very
numerous prerogatives, superior to those of the Ministry"1 , as well as the
implementation of a plan to help over-indebted farmers that competes with the draft
Fund for Restructuring and Debt Relief in Agriculture that Janowski is nevertheless
due to present to the Council of Ministers the day after tomorrow. President Wałęsa
announced the suspension of seizure proceedings against over-indebted farmers and
the immediate release of 920 billion Złoty to finance agricultural loans at preferential
rates, i.e. more than the projected budget for the Fund. Disavowed by the President
who, at the end of April, was multiplying his attacks on an Olszewski government that
was weaker than ever, Gabriel Janowski submitted and recognized the validity of this
agreement, which nevertheless potentially divested him of entire sections of his
ministerial prerogatives2 . As an editorialist in the peasant weekly Zielony Sztandar
noted a few days after the end of the action at the Ministry of Agriculture: "President
Lech Wałęsa approached the strikers because, as he declared, he 'does not accept that
in Poland we are not capable of solving problems'. This is what it's all about: as the
conflict between the elites in Poland deepens, Mr. President has decided to go on the
offensive, and to do so he's counting on the support of the peasants. [...] Samoobrona
has been caught up in the spiral of big politics. The meeting with Lech Wałęsa and the
Belvedere agreements are a political game, one of the elements of the presidential
offensive"3 .
While President Wałęsa's instrumentalization of the ZZR Samoobrona's actions in the
context of his conflict with the Olszewski government is undeniable, it should not
obscure the fact that it is the ZZR Samoobrona that appears to be the main beneficiary
of the April 28 agreements. Thanks to the President's intervention, the union has
emerged considerably stronger from the conflict that pitted it against the government
throughout April. Firstly, it was able to overcome its original lack of political and
institutional support to impose its definitions of the
1 "Bataliony Chłopskie "Samoobrony"", Gazeta Wyborcza, 30/04/1992, p. 4.
2 Although Gabriel Janowski told journalists that he was "happy and relieved" by the signing of this
agreement, he made no secret of his skepticism about the possibility of enforcing it and his concern
about its possible consequences for Polish agriculture: "Bataliony Chłopskie 'Samoobrony'", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 04/30/1992, p.4.
3 Markert Hanna, "Zakpiono z polskiego Chłopa", Zielony Sztandar, 10/05/1992.
135
In this way, he was able to take his place alongside Minister Janowski in the debate on
agricultural overindebtedness and how to deal with it. Above all, the union finally
succeeded in gaining recognition from the public authorities as a legitimate
representative of the peasantry and its interests. The institutionalization of the union's
participation in the President's Council for Rural and Agricultural Affairs, followed by
Andrzej Lepper's appointment to chair the inter-union commission on agricultural
overindebtedness reactivated by the1 government, bear witness to this recognition.
Last but not least, the extensive media coverage of the action at the Ministry of
Agriculture gave the union a new notoriety. Although virtually unknown just a few
weeks earlier, its president Andrzej Lepper is now regularly interviewed by journalists
and invited to appear on television.
*
**
By studying the emergence of ZZR Samoobrona in the Polish field of peasant
representation, we were able to see that, far from being the natural consequence of the
discontent of over-indebted farmers, it appears to be the result of a complex and
uncertain process. By questioning the evidence of organizational creation, we can
schematically identify two main stages in the formation of the Samoobrona ZZR: that
of its primo-genesis and that of the construction of its representativeness.
During the first, farmers not affiliated to pre-existing peasant organizations agreed to
join forces and work together to formalize a new national union in competition with
the already established peasant organizations. Far from being spontaneous, the
grouping of these actors is to be understood as an unexpected by-product of the public
controversy over agricultural overindebtedness that began to develop in Poland in the
summer of 1991. The fact that the RL-PL's constituent organizations took up this
issue in an electoral context, and organized a long-term demonstration in front of the
Parliament building in Warsaw, played a decisive role in bringing together overindebted farmers with atypical profiles. A special moment
1 "Rekompensaty i akcje dla rolników", Gazeta Wyborcza, 07/05/1992, p.4.
136
In this way, the demonstration in front of Parliament contributed significantly to the
gradual formation of a "pre-constituted potential action structure" bringing together
several of its participants. The demobilization of the issue of overindebtedness by
other protagonists in the field of peasant representation in the weeks following the
elections was accompanied by the rapid marginalization of the representatives of this
informal group. In an attempt to overcome their isolation, they finally agreed to
initiate the creation of a new national union of individual farmers, an organizational
form whose cost of access appeared low to them at the time.
The second moment encompasses all the activities undertaken by the founders of this
new union, christened ZZR Samoobrona, to establish it in the months following its
creation as a legitimate participant in representing the interests of the peasantry, a
process that culminated temporarily with their invitation to sit on the Council for
Rural and Agricultural Affairs attached to the Presidency, created in April 1992. The
"act of institution" constituted by the registration of the ZZR Samoobrona's articles of
association with the Warsaw court on January 10, 1992 was not accompanied by any
autonomous recognition of this collective by the dominant players in the field of
peasant representation and by the public authorities1 . Politically isolated and still
poorly endowed with collective resources, both organizational and symbolic, the new
union initially struggled to establish itself as a legitimate participant in defining the
interests of the peasantry. Although it seemed to be assigned an extremely marginal
position within the field of peasant representation, its leaders finally succeeded in
having its representativeness certified following a spectacular protest action at the
Ministry of Agriculture. This recognition, however, cannot be reduced to a mere
It's not a question of the "tactical intelligence" of ZZR Samoobrona's leaders. It
should be understood as the result of a multiplicity of interactions between individual
and collective actors with varied interests who, by opposing each other in a context of
fluid political relations, helped to make ZZR Samoobrona appear
1 On "acts of institution": Bourdieu Pierre, "Les rites comme actes d'institution", Actes de la recherche
en sciences sociales, n°43,1982. p.58-63.
137
as a player to be reckoned with within the field of peasant representation, even though
it wasn't necessarily their main objective to do so.
However, this recognition was not seen as the end of the road for the initiators of the
farmers' union. In the weeks following the "success" of their protest action at the
Ministry of Agriculture, they endeavored to "push their advantage" by broadening the
scope of their activities and presenting themselves as potential participants in the
electoral competition in the event of early elections, which seemed highly likely at the
time.
138
139
Chapter 2
Crossing the border: the Samoobrona movement
in political competition.
The uncertain context of regime change is as much an opportunity as it is a constraint
for actors engaged in the struggle for positions of political power now filled in the
context of pluralist elections, particularly for "newcomers" seeking to compete with
pre-constituted collectives drawn from the forces of the old regime or the opposition1 .
An opportunity in that the unusual opening-up of the field of possibilities enables
these actors to mobilize repertoires - practices, references or discourses - hitherto
unheard of or devalued to promote their representativeness. Stanisław Tymiński's
ability to qualify for the second round of the 1990 presidential election by promoting
his novelty and status as a successful businessman abroad is a paradigmatic example
in the Polish case. But it is also a constraint, in that the ability of these different actors
to anticipate the scope of their "moves" and estimate the value of their
representational assets is reduced by the absence of routine frameworks2 . The
uncertainty inherent in situations of regime change tends gradually to fade, although it
does not suddenly vanish, nor is it mechanical or irreversible. Through their very
activities, the various protagonists of the political game play a part, in the context of
their competitive interactions, in specifying the rules of political competition and
laying the foundations for the institutionalization of new principles of political
legitimization. This gradual codification can take the form of legal rules as well as
These are "normative rules", more or less shared beliefs according to which actors
will judge the legitimacy or illegitimacy of certain practices3 .
Understanding the "politicization" of ZZR managers
Samoobrona, understood here as the "political requalification" of some of their
1 Hadjiisky Magdalena, art.cit. p.68.
2 Cf. Dobry Michel, op.cit. p.138-145.
3 Bailey Frédéric, op.cit. p.18.
140
activities1 , as we propose to do in this chapter, implies paying particular attention to
these processes of defining and institutionalizing the rules of the political game. The
notion of apprenticeship seems to us particularly relevant to understanding the
dynamics of the activities through which the leaders of the farmers' union set out,
from the spring of 1992 onwards, to elaborate an explicitly political offer of
representation and to legitimize it in a context of progressive codification of political
activities. The initiators o f ZZR Samoobrona had to learn to present themselves as
legitimate contenders for positions of political power, and to redefine their collective
and individual identities, as well as the meaning of their actions, in order to adjust
them to the new role they intended to play. If the persistent indeterminacy of certain
principles regulating pluralist political games offers the representatives of ZZR
Samoobrona the opportunity - or at least is perceived as such by them - to attempt to
reorient the relations of representation in their favor, in the manner of Stanisław
Tymiński in 1990, this learning appears doubly constrained.
Firstly, because of the limited resources, both individual and collective, available to
the representatives of ZZR Samoobrona, at least initially. Recently recognized as
legitimate participants in defining and representing the interests of the peasantry, the
representatives of ZZR Samoobrona remained in the spring of 1992 in a secondary
position within the field of representation of the peasantry and, a fortiori, within the
central political field. Their notoriety remained relative, they had few financial
resources and, through the union, they could only count on an extremely small and
highly localized support base, both socially and geographically. In this context, as we
shall see, their apprenticeship takes the form of a "bricolage", whereby they strive to
produce themselves as politicians and build and legitimize their representativeness on
the basis of what they have, the few skills, experiences and resources they are striving
to accumulate2 .
1 We refer here to Jacques Lagroye's definition of politicization processes as: "the requalification of the
most diverse social activities, a requalification that results from a practical agreement between social
agents inclined, for multiple reasons, to transgress or question the differentiation of activity spaces". Cf.
Lagroye Jacques, "Les processus de politisation", art.cit. p.360-361.
2 On the form of interpretative and practical "bricolages" that t h e learning of rules in the process of
being defined can take for the protagonists of political games, in a context of change in the world of
politics.
141
Secondly, by the gradual rise in the cost of access to the competition for political
representation. Although still prevalent, the indeterminacy of the rules of the political
game appeared much more reduced in 1992 than in previous years. A number of laws
had gradually come into force to regulate the activities of political players, including a
law on political parties in July 1990 and a new electoral law in June 19911 , and
certain previously tolerated practices now appeared morally illegitimate, such as
questioning the validity of the regime change itself. As a result, the leaders of ZZR
Samoobrona must learn to adjust to these new constraints, and adapt their practices
and their group's system of action to the legal and normative rules that are becoming
increasingly clear.
Schematically, we believe it is possible to identify three moments in the process o f
ZZR Samoobrona representatives learning the role of participants in political
competition, a role most of them had never played before: that of the entry into
politics itself, i.e., of the explicitness of a claim to participation in the struggle to
obtain elective mandates, that of the engagement in the electoral competition and
finally that of the management of the results of the elections, which come to confirm
or invalidate the anticipations. We will begin by looking at the ways in which the
leaders of the newly-created farmers' union strive to reorient their activities in a
political direction, in order to define a political offer and accumulate collective
resources that will enable them to stand out in the political competition (section 1).
We will then look at how, in the run-up to the early parliamentary elections of
September 1993, they endeavoured to shape and promote an original offer of
representation within the particularly constrained framework, both practically and
symbolically, of electoral competition (section 2). Last but not least,
For more information on this topic, please refer to Aït-Aoudia Myriam, L'apprentissage de la
compétition pluripartisane en Algérie (1988-1992). Sociologie d'un changement de régime, thesis for
the doctorate in political science, Université de Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne, 2005, p.33-35.
1 Cf. Heurtaux Jérôme, "Démocratisation en Pologne: la première loi sur les partis (1989-1990)",
Critique internationale, n°30, 2006, p.161-175; Heurtaux Jérôme, op.cit., chapter 5.
142
we will study the processes involved in gradually calling into question the
representativeness of the Samoobrona movement and its leaders in the political arena,
following the imposition of an interpretation of their performance in the September
1993 elections in terms of a rout (section 3).
143
Section 1: Trade union leaders enter politics.
In this section, we focus on the conditions under which ZZR Samoobrona officials
"entered politics", i.e., how their activities were at least partially reclassified as direct
participation in the competition for positions of political power. Barely a month after
the end of their union's first nationwide protest action, the occupation of the Ministry
of Agriculture, they made their political ambitions clear by announcing, on June 12
1992, their participation in the creation o f a new political party, the Przymierze
Samoobrona. In the numerous studies of the process of democratic construction in
post-communist Poland, the years 1991 to 1993 are commonly presented as a period
of extreme fragmentation of the political market and an increase in the number of
contenders for political power1 . In addition to the disintegration of the former
Solidarity camp, the loose character of electoral and party law are the main arguments
put forward to explain the emergence at this time of a multitude of new party
organizations, including Przymierze Samoobrona. Without denying the influence of
legal rules on the definition of the cost of access to political competition and the
partisan form, these alone do not seem to us to be able to resolve the enigmas
represented by the reclassification by certain players of their activities in explicitly
political terms and the creation of a political party. At first glance, the creation of
Przymierze Samoobrona seems rather paradoxical. Firstly, it took place in June 1992,
even though no elections were formally scheduled until 19942 . Secondly, it was
initiated by the leaders of a union whose denunciation of the politicization of
"historic" agricultural unions has been one of its main vectors of legitimization since
its creation. Finally, these leaders, despite the relative notoriety acquired by some o f
them during the occupation of the Ministry of Agriculture,
See, for example: Szczerbiak Aleks, Poles Together? Emergence and Development of Political
Parties in Post-communist Poland, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2001, p.17; Millard
Frances, "The Shaping of the Polish Party System: 1989-93", East European Politics and Societies,
vol.8, n°3, 1994, p.467-494; Smolar Aleksander, "Poland's Emerging Party System", Journal of
Democracy, vol.9, n°2, 1998, p.122-133.
2 The term of office of the President of the Republic, elected in December 1990, is five years, while that
of members of parliament, elected in October 1991, is four years. Local elections are scheduled for
1994.
1
144
still occupied a relatively marginal position in the field of peasant representation at the
end of spring 1992, and therefore a fortiori in the central political field. To understand
the entry into politics of the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona and the formalization of an
explicitly political offer of representation that they initiated in the spring of 1992, we
need to pay particular attention both to the concrete conditions in which they set about
redefining the meaning of their activities in an explicitly political mode, and to the
ways in which they sought to legitimize their new claims t o participate in the
competition for political representation of society and for political office.
First, we'll see that the ZZR Samoobrona leaders' practical interpretation of the
political situation following the overthrow of the Olszewski government at the
beginning of June played a decisive role in re-characterizing the objectives of their
action beyond the sole domain of trade union activity, which they made explicit
through their participation in the creation of a new political party (A). We will then
see that, in a context of easing political and institutional tensions, the arena of protest
mobilizations, reinvested by the ZZR Samoobrona from the end of June 1992,
constitutes for its leaders a practical space for promoting their political offer and
accumulating collective resources that can potentially be mobilized in political
competition (B).
A) Explaining political ambitions: the creation of the Przymierze
Samoobrona party.
After several months of institutional, political and social tensions, the Sejm passed a
motion of censure against the Olszewski government in early June. Following the
publication by Interior Minister Macierewicz of a highly controversial list of alleged
collaborators of the Communist special services, the overthrow of the government
fuelled the perception of a worsening political crisis among the various protagonists in
the political arena, and ushered in a period of increased conflictualization in relations
between the various protagonists in the political arena (1). It is in this context,
interpreted by the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona as a potential opening-up of their
145
political opportunities, that they choose to make their political ambitions explicit
through the creation of a new partisan-type organization (2).
1) Fall of the Olszewski government and "moral radicalization".
By the end of April 1992, the prospect of forming a majority government coalition
was receding with the failure of a new round of negotiations between the Prime
Minister and representatives of the "small coalition" (comprising the UD, the KLD
and the PPG, a faction of the former PPPP)1 . Worse still, the fragile parliamentary
majority with which the government was sworn in in December is clearly eroding.
Regularly outvoted in the Sejm and unable to pass his budget, Jan Olszewski is facing
increasingly virulent criticism from his own supporters. While PSL president
Waldemar Pawlak has made no secret of his weariness following the repeated failure
of talks aimed at formalizing his party's participation in the government, relations
between the various coalition members are deteriorating. Some influential members of
the government coalition openly distanced themselves from the Prime Minister, as in
the case of Artur Balazs, Chairman of the SLCh (formerly PSL- Solidarność), who
resigned from his post as Minister on May 92 . At the same time, the conflict between
the President and the Government had been escalating for several months. Lech
Wałęsa even formally withdrew his support for his Prime Minister on May 26,
multiplying his attempts to widen his sphere of action and his signs of mistrust. In a
letter to the Marshal of the Sejm, he wrote: "Lately, the political crisis that has
developed in our country has taken an inextricable turn. The collaboration necessary
for the smooth functioning of the executive power between the Government and the
President has been replaced by open conflict. [...] Against this backdrop, my
confidence in the current government has eroded, and I am forced to withdraw my
support.
1 "Fiasko Wielkiej Koalicji", Gazeta Wyborcza, 23/04/1992, p.1.
Artur Balazs (SLCh), Minister for Relations with Political and Social Organizations, resigned to
denounce the Prime Minister's inability to reach a majority coalition agreement: Cf. Rzeczpospolita,
05/15/92. Similarly, Agriculture Minister Gabriel Janowski (PL) and ZChN vice-president Henryk
Goryszewski, while reaffirming their support for Jan Olszewski, call for a revitalization of government
action and the rapid formalization of a majority agreement in Parliament: "Zaprzestać ciągłych roszad",
Gazeta Wyborcza, 05/20/92, p.4. The next day it was the turn of PC chairman Jarosław Kaczyński to
call for a redefinition of the government coalition: "Z premierem przeciw rządowi", Gazeta Wyborcza,
21/05/92, p.1.
2
146
support. In order to resolve this crisis, I propose the formation of a new cabinet with
the support of Parliament"1 . However, it was not until the so-called "Macierewicz
list" episode in early June that Wałęsa's request was heard by the deputies. On May
28, a "lustration" resolution was adopted by the Sejm on the initiative of Janusz
Korwin-Mikke, of the small UPR party2 . Among other things, it stipulated that
Interior Minister Antonio Macierewicz must disclose information available in state
archives concerning civil servants and elected representatives who had collaborated
with the Communist secret services between 1945 and 19903 . Adopting highly
controversial investigative methods4 , he presented two lists of alleged collaborators
to Parliament on June 4. In addition to some fifty sitting MPs and senators, these lists
named eleven members of the government, Marshal of the Sejm Wieslaw
Chrzanowski, and above all the President of the Republic himself, Lech Wałęsa. The
emotion aroused by the disclosure of these lists was immense, and the deputies passed
a motion of no confidence in the Olszewski government by a large majority on the
same day. The very next day, they nominated Waldemar Pawlak, the President's
candidate for Prime Minister.
Table 5: instructions from the main parliamentary clubs and results of the June
4, 1992 vote of no confidence in the Olszewski government.
Number of votes
Voting instructions from the main Parliamentary Clubs
For
273
UD, SLD, PSL, KPN, KLD
Counter
119
ZChN, PC, PL-RL
Abstention
33
NSZZ "S
Total
425
/
Produced by us. Sources: stenograms of the Diet session of June 4, 1992. www.sejm.gov.pl.
Table 6: instructions from the main parliamentary clubs and results of the June
5, 1992 vote on Waldemar Pawlak's nomination as Prime Minister.
Number of votes
Voting instructions from the main Parliamentary Clubs
1 "Wycofuję poparcie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 05/27/92, p.1.
2 In Poland, as in other Central European countries, the term lustration (lustracja) has come to designate
policies to verify the communist past and purge the state apparatus. On this subject, please refer t o :
Szczerbiak Aleks, "Dealing with the Communist Past or the Politics of the Present? Lustration in PostCommunist Poland", Europe-Asia Studies, vol.54, n°4, 2002, p.553-572; More specifically on the
"Macierewicz list" episode: Osiatyński Wiktor, "Agent Walesa?", East European Constitutional
Review, n°2, 1992, p.28-30.
3 "List Macierewicza o listach agentów", Gazeta Wyborcza, 03/06/1992, p.3.
4 "Lustracja bez gwarancji", Gazeta Wyborcza, 03/06/1992, p.3; Rzeczpospolita, 30-31/05/1992.
147
For
261
UD, SLD, PSL, KPN, KLD
Counter
149
ZChN, PC, PL-RL, NSZZ "S
Abstention
7
/
Total
417
/
Produced by us. Sources: stenograms of the Diet session of June 5, 1992. www.sejm.gov.pl.
Nevertheless, far from allaying concerns, Olszewski's overthrow in favor of Pawlak
fanned the flames of a perceived worsening of the political crisis, an "escalation of
confrontations"1 , among the various protagonists in the political arena.
On the one hand, the change of Prime Minister in no way solved the recurring
problem of the Ie legislature, that of building a stable majority in Parliament. On the
contrary, the day after Waldemar Pawlak's investiture, negotiations between
representatives of the various parliamentary forces interested in taking part in the
government immediately proved extremely delicate, given the composite nature of the
coalition of circumstance that emerged in the votes of June 4 and 5. As the differences
between the potential coalition members became increasingly clear as the discussions
continued, the idea of early parliamentary elections quickly reappeared as a possible
way out of the crisis2 . On the other hand, Pawlak's opponents, mainly the former
members of the Olszewski coalition and the majority of NSZZ "S" leaders and
parliamentarians, set out to impose the image of an anti-democratic drift in the
situation, of a degradation of the regime. Even though, a few weeks earlier, they had
been holding talks with the PSL with a view to integrating it into the government
coalition,
they
now
denounced
Pawlak's
appointment
as
a
sign
of
a
"recommunitization" of the Polish state, an attempt to call into question the changes at
work since 1989. At the CP Congress in mid-June, Jarosław Kaczyński declared: "In
Poland, we are currently witnessing a recommunitization offensive. We must firmly
oppose the government of Pawlak's recommunizers, the government of the new
nomenklatura and the agents of the special services"3 . At the same time, NSZZ
The "S" adopted a similar position at its IVe Congress, marked in particular by
1 Dobry Michel, op.cit. p.186-194.
2 See for example: "Pawlak Szuka Rządu", Gazeta Wyborcza, 08/06/1992, p.1; "Czy Pawlak da radę",
Gazeta Wyborcza, 11/06/1992, p.1.
3 Quoted in "Front Oporu Kaczyńskiego", Gazeta Wyborcza, 13-14/06/1992, p.2.
148
the ovation given by the delegates to Jan Olszewski and the booing that accompanied
Lech Wałęsa's speech. The final resolution of the Congress thus affirms the union's
commitment to the continuation of the process of "decommunization" of the Polish
state, and its fierce opposition to the "post-communist forces"1 . Similarly, the various
groupings that emerged from Rural Solidarity - the SLCh, the NSZZRI "S" and the PL
- joined forces in the name of anti-communism in opposition to Waldemar Pawlak,
despite the latter's claimed peasant identity. Thus, while Józef Ślisz (SLCh) asserts
that he "refuses to support a political party [the PSL] that was on the wrong side of the
Round Table", Henryk Bąk (PL) calls for "everything to be done to ensure that the
Pawlak government can never see the light of day"2 .
Thus, in addition to the great confusion surrounding Pawlak's ability to form a
majority government, the Polish political situation in June 1992 was characterized by
increased conflict between the various protagonists in the political arena, as some of
them began to denounce their opponents' communist past. At a time when the
possibility of early elections is on everyone's mind, this "moral radicalization" is
affecting all political players and further increasing the uncertainty of the situation3 .
By upsetting previous political balances, it is forcing each of the protagonists in the
political arena to redefine their political identity and alliances in line with the
challenge of "decommunization". At the same time, it is interpreted as opening up
political opportunities for a whole range of personalities who were on the verge of
marginalization, and who are now in a position to make their mark on the political
landscape.
1 "Solidarność z Olszewskim", Gazeta Wyborcza, 15/06/1992, p.3.
2 Quoted respectively in "Chłopi nie chcą chłopa-premiera", Gazeta Wyborcza, 10/06/1992, p.2 and in
"Pawlakowi Chłopskie nie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 9/06/1992, p.1.
3 We borrow the notion of "moral radicalization" from Jean-Louis Briquet, who, in his study of the
crisis of the Italian First Republic that began in 1992, seems to have highlighted a process comparable
to that observed in June of the same year in Poland. Like their Italian counterparts, Polish politicians
experienced "the reduction of the [wide margins of maneuver, discussion and alliance available to
them], the impossibility of pursuing ordinary arrangements and conciliations. All the complexity of
their previous identity, the subtleties of their partisan, parliamentary or governmental positioning are
considerably simplified". They are redefined in the establishment of a cleavage between, not "the old
and the new" as in Italy, but between, schematically, the pro-decommunizationists and those who lay
claim to the spirit of concord of the Round Table. Cf. Briquet Jean-Louis, "Radicalisation morale" et
crise de la Première République Italienne", in Collovald Annie & Gaïti Brigitte (dir.), op.cit. p.285-307.
149
of players hitherto relegated to secondary positions in the political arena, or even
outside the parliamentary arena1 . During the month of June, several new political
groupings were formalized. Some, like the Forum Chrześcijańsko-Demokratycznego
(Christian Democratic Forum: FChD) or the Forum Prawicy Demokratycznej (Forum
of the Democratic Right: FPD), are the result of splits within parliamentary
formations, respectively the PC and the UD2 . Others are the result of the aggregation
of extra-parliamentary groups and the reconversion of the aims assigned to them. This
is the case, for example, of the Ruch Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej (Movement of the
Third Republic) party, formed from support committees for former Defense Minister
Jan Parys3 , and the Przymierze Samoobrona (Self-Defense Alliance) party, whose
creation was announced by ZZR Samoobrona President Andrzej Lepper on June 12.
2) Politicization through organizational diversification.
Throughout the spring of 1992, the ZZR Samoobrona leadership, emboldened by the
successful occupation of the Ministry of Agriculture, stepped up its threats against
those in positions of power within the Polish state. On May 14, the union's Prezydium
sent an open letter to the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Marshal of
the Sejm and the Marshal of the Senate, demanding immediate implementation of the
measures set out in the April 28 agreement4 . At a time when the Council for Rural
and Agricultural Affairs had been slow to be set up by the Presidency, and when the
funds promised to finance agricultural credits at preferential rates were being
reallocated
1 Ibid, p.286.
2 Following the vote on June 4, twelve PC deputies, hostile to the fact that Jarosław Kaczyński was
considering forming a coalition with Solidarity formations that had voted to censure the Olszewski
government, decided to form their own parliamentary club. Excluded from the PC on June 12, the
following day they formalized the creation of a new organization under the provisional name of Forum
Chrześcijańsko-Demokratycznego. Former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski was appointed honorary
president: see "Obrońca Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej", Gazeta Wyborcza, 15/06/1992, p. 3. As for the
Forum Prawicy Demokratycznej, chaired by Aleksander Hall, at the beginning of June it was also
tending to emancipate itself from the UD, of which it was a founding current, and to assert itself as a
political force in its own right. Unlike the UD leadership, the members of Forum Prawicy
Demokratycznej, including eleven members of parliament, are resolutely hostile to the appointment of
Waldemar Pawlak as Prime Minister: "Unia się Dzieli?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 09/06/1992, p.3.
3 "1500 patriotów i sekretarka Parysa", Gazeta Wyborcza,13-14/06/1992, p.3.
4 Andrzej Lepper za Prezydium ZZR Samoobrona, "List Otwarty", 05/14/1992, Archiwum Partii
Politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona 1991-1996.
150
to the ministerial project for an Agricultural Restructuring and Debt Relief Fund, the
union's leadership declares its readiness to break off all discussions with the
government in order to return to the path of protest. However, more than a sharp
reminder of the government's promises, this open letter is above all a clear affirmation
of the ambition of ZZR Samoobrona's leaders to broaden its scope of intervention
beyond the sole question of agricultural overindebtedness, and even beyond the scope
of agricultural unionism. The situation of over-indebted farmers is used as the basis
for a general denunciation of the country's economic, social and political situation,
and for an overall criticism of the government's actions. In the letter, the leaders of
ZZR Samoobrona explicitly mention their plans to initiate a vast "Ruch Społeczny
Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej" (Social Self-Defense Movement of the
Republic of Poland) with the aim of "changing the country's economic and sociopolitical situation" and "remedying the national tragedy that [Poland] is once again
facing"1 . Elaborating on this project in front of journalists, Andrzej Lepper declared
that he wanted to set up "a vast movement open t o all throughout the country" by
uniting within this "RS Samoobrona RP" various professional organizations opposed
to the government's policies. He even claims that contacts have already been
established with a dozen unions, including those for manual workers, hospital workers
and the unemployed2 .
However, it wasn't until mid-June that ZZR Samoobrona's leaders formalized their
claims to reclassifying the objectives of their action beyond the sole sphere of trade
union activity, and to engaging in political competition proper. Against the backdrop
of the uncertainty and reconfiguration of the political situation referred to above, they
took part in the creation of a new political party, Przymierze Samoobrona, and made
no secret of their ambition to take part in the elections as soon as possible. Their first
demand was for early parliamentary and presidential elections. The leaders of this
new partisan organization, including Andrzej Lepper, who has been appointed its
president, are keen to present it as a break with the established order.
1 Ibid.
2 "Orły same się obronią", Gazeta Wyborcza,18/05/1992, p.12.
151
political system in force since the change of regime and, at a time when the
"decommunization" controversy is making headlines, to make its novelty the very
criterion of its probity1 . Denouncing "the current political caste's lack of interest in
the fate of the Nation"2 and the "disastrous record of four successive 'post-Communist'
governments" (Mazowiecki, Bielecki, Olszewski and Pawlak), they declared their
refusal to consider the slightest alliance with existing parliamentary forces3 .
The choice of name for the new party illustrates the desire to capitalize on the relative
renown of the Samoobrona label since the occupation of the Ministry of Agriculture
in April. However, this cannot be reduced to a simple transposition of the union and
its structures into the political arena. Formally, Przymierze Samoobrona is the product
of an alliance between ZZR Samoobrona and pre-existing political and trade union
groups, principally the confidential Związek Zawodowy Metalowców (Metalworkers'
Union) and a fraction of the former Polska Partia Zielonych (Polish Green Party)
united around Janusz Bryczkowksi4 [see box]. Bryczkowksi was appointed vicepresident of the new party. Although almost all the party's instigators and leaders
came from the ZZR Samoobrona, their union with groups and individuals not linked
to the agrarian movement testifies to their desire to situate the new party outside the
sole field of representation of the peasantry and to broaden its reference group beyond
the agricultural sector. From the outset, Przymierze Samoobrona's ambition was to
represent all those who "are neglected, who suffer, who are deprived of the means to
live and who are ignored or even persecuted by the policies [pursued since 1989]"5 ,
i.e. farmers of course, but also workers, the unemployed, the homeless and young
people6 .
1 Briquet Jean-Louis, art.cit. p.286.
2 Lepper Andrzej, "Odezwa do społeczeństwa polskiego", June 1992, Archiwum Partii Politycznych,
ZZR Samoobrona 1991-1996.
3 "Sztucer w dłoniach", Gazeta Wyborcza, 16/06/1992, p.3.
4 Cf. Piskorski Mateusz, art.cit. p.197-198.
5 Lepper Andrzej za Przymierze Samoobrona, "Przymierze Samoobrona: założenia ideoweprogramowe", July 1992, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona 1991-1996.
6 "Apel Partii Przymierze Samoobrona do bezrobotnych, bezdomnych, zagrożonych utratą dachu nad
głową", August 1992, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona 1991-1996.
152
Janusz Bryczkowski was born in 1948 in the Mazurian town of Pisz. Although little
is known about his professional activities during the time of the People's Republic,
when he took part in the creation of Przymierze Samoobrona, he presented himself as
both an entrepreneur and a farmer. At the head of his company "Import-eksport
Janusz Bryczkowski", he claims to have made numerous investments in the former
Soviet bloc. Mainly in Kazakhstan and Russia, where he claims to have highly-placed
contacts. He also owns a 17-hectare farm in the Pisz region (Suwałki voivodship). In
1988, he helped found the Polish Green Party (PPZ). Nominated as the party's
candidate for the 1990 presidential election, he was eventually forced to abandon his
candidacy as he was unable to gather a sufficient number of signatures. He left the
party and ran unsuccessfully in the 1991 parliamentary elections on the Eko-Zieloni
list, heading the national list.
Sources: "U Bryczkowskiego", Gazeta Wyborcza, 10/07/1992, p.12; "Trafiła Kosa na Leppera",
Polityka, 27/05/2006, p.37; Ferry Martin & Rüdig Wolfgang, "Sofa Parties, Factions and Government
Participation: Greens in Poland", 52nd Annual Conference of the UK Polical Studies Association,
Aberdeen, 5-7/04/2002.
The choice of forming a political party to take part in political competition may seem
"normal" in a representative democracy. As Jérôme Heurtaux has shown, however, it
was by no means a matter of course in Poland in the early 1990s1 . Thus, the electoral
law adopted in the run-up to the first "free" parliamentary elections in October 1991,
and still in force at the time of the Przymierze Samoobrona's creation, far from
limiting access to electoral competition to political parties alone, also opened it up to
trade unions, associations and even individual committees2 . The decision by ZZR
Samoobrona's leaders to objectify their political ambitions by participating in the
creation of a new party organization, rather than by directly engaging their union in
political competition, thus appears in fact relatively paradoxical. In our view, there are
three key factors to be taken into account if we are to understand the reasons for this.
Firstly, the very low cost of access to the party form. The law on political parties,
adopted after lengthy controversy on July 28, 1990, lays down very flexible
conditions for the creation of a political party.
1 On this subject, please refer to the second part of Jérôme Heurtaux's thesis: Heurtaux Jérôme, op.cit.
For a summary, please also refer to the article: Heurtaux Jérôme, "Démocratisation en Pologne...",
art.cit.
2 Cf. Heurtaux Jérôme, "Les impensés non démocratiques en Pologne postcommuniste", in Dabène
Olivier, Geisser Vincent & Massardier Gilles (eds.), Autoritarismes démocratiques et démocraties
autoritaires au XXIe siècle : Convergence Nord-Sud, Paris, La Découverte, 2008, especially p.123125.
153
The first of these is "a social organization which, presenting itself under a defined
name, forms itself with the aim of participating in public life, in particular by exerting
an influence on the formation of State policy and the conduct of power"1 . To register
a new political party, it is legally sufficient for three people to file an application with
the Warsaw Tribunal, specifying the name and headquarters of the future
organization, and submitting the signatures of fifteen citizens supporting the initiative.
Thus, although not necessary for participation in the electoral competition, partisan
formalization is a simple way of clearly and rapidly spelling out an organization's
political aims. Against the backdrop of great uncertainty in June 1992, it proved
particularly well suited to the expectations of the founders of Przymierze
Samoobrona, who wanted to get involved in the political game as quickly as possible,
with a view to the early elections they hoped would be imminent.
Secondly, the creation of a partisan organization distinct from the union formally
makes it possible not to question the latter's non-politicization. It should be
remembered that the ZZR Samoobrona's denunciation of the involvement of
competing agricultural unions, the NSZZRI "S" and the KZRKiOR, in political
competition has been one of the main vectors for legitimizing its offer of
representation and demarcation within the field of trade unionism since its creation.
The purely trade-union orientation of ZZR Samoobrona, at a distance from any
political commitment, remains officially claimed after the creation of Przymierze
Samoobrona. Although party and trade union officials were in fact strictly the same2 ,
they made a point of formally maintaining the distinction between the objectives and
means of action of the two organizations in their public speeches, whether in writing,
using two separate headed papers for example, or orally, specifying, if necessary,
from which position they were speaking. As Andrzej Lepper declared to journalists at
the end of August:
"As a member of ZZR Samoobrona, I have never called for the overthrow of the government.
1 Art. 1, "Ustawa z dnia 28 lipca 1990 r. o partiach politycznych", Dziennik Ustaw, n°54, 1990.
Thus, members of the Union Prezydium automatically become members of the Party Prezydium.
Conversely, the few newcomers to the Przymierze Samoobrona, such as its Vice-President Janusz
Bryczkowski, are integrated into the Union Prezydium.
2
154
government. At most I did it as a member of the Przymierze Samoobrona party"1 .
At the same time, thirdly, organizational diversification offers party and union leaders
the opportunity to invest in a variety of areas of interaction: agricultural unionism,
institutional politics and collective mobilization. The ZZR Samoobrona and the
Przymierze Samoobrona, although produced in distinct ways and responding to
different representation logics, form a system in that they are presented from the
creation of the latter as constituting the two main components of the same social
movement, the "RS Samoobrona RP", which is commonly referred to simply as
Samoobrona. Multi-positioned party and union officials can thus vary the modalities
of their interventions in public arenas according to the organizational form they
happen to represent at any given time. Each of these forms is accompanied by specific
modes of action. As a supposedly apolitical national union of individual farmers, the
ZZR Samoobrona can take part in defining and representing the interests of the
peasantry, challenge public authorities on a particular demand, or take part in protest
actions. As a political party, the Przymierze Samoobrona can extend its range of
representation beyond the farming sector, claim to be an alternative to the government
and become directly involved in political struggles, particularly in the run-up to
elections. Lastly, as a social movement, Samoobrona can transgress the
institutionalized distinction separating these two fields of activity in order to make
them resonate and, by referring back to the imaginary of the Solidarity movement of
the early 1980s, claim to embody Polish society as a whole.
Diagram 1: representation of the Ruch Społeczny Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej
Polskiej by the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona and Przymierze Samoobrona in the
summer of 1992.
1 Quoted in "Milion sto dla każdego", Gazeta Wyborcza, 20/08/1992, p.1.
155
Made by us.
B) Playing with the uncertain boundaries of politics: union protest as a
political resource.
As we have already mentioned, less than a fortnight after the occupation of the
Ministry of Agriculture ended, the union's leadership threatened, in an open letter
addressed to the holders of the main positions of power within the Polish state, to
initiate new protest actions if the agreements of April 28 were not rapidly honored1 .
The appointment of a Prime Minister with a strong peasant identity in early June did
nothing to dampen ZZR Samoobrona's determination. Just a few days after taking
office, Waldemar Pawlak (PSL) received another threatening open letter from Andrzej
Lepper, warning: "If our demands are not met as soon as possible, we will commit our
union to a general strike against the government"2 . On June 18, ZZR Samoobrona
carried out its threat. Around a hundred of its activists set up a blockade with their
tractors between Toruń to Włocławiek on international route no. 13 . This action is the
first of many and initiates what Krysztof Gorlach and Grzegorz Foryś consider to be
the second cycle of the wave of peasant protests of the early 1990s, running in their
view from summer 1992 to spring 19934 .
1 Lepper Andrzej za Prezydium ZZR Samoobrona, "List Otwarty", 05/14/1992, Archiwum Partii
Politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona 1991-1996.
2 Quoted in "Oświadczenie Samoobrony", Gazeta Wyborcza,10/06/1992, p.2
3 "Samoobrona z kosą na szosie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 19/06/1992, p.3.
4 Foryś Grzegorz & Gorlach Krzysztof, "The Dynamics of Polish Peasants Protests under Postcommunism", Eastern European Countryside, n°8, 2002, p.47-65; Foryś Grzegorz, op.cit., p.176-179.
156
Graph 2: number of peasant protest actions per month, from January 1992 to
May 1993.
Compiled by us. Sources: Center for European Studies, Harvard University Database, Foryś Grzegorz,
Dynamika sporu: protesty rolników w III Rzeczpospolitej, Warszawa, WN Scholar, 2008, p.174.
While the two main farmers' union organizations, NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR,
continued until the end of 1992 to give priority to institutional practices for
representing the peasantry, ZZR Samoobrona was the main driving force behind this
second cycle of peasant protest, initiating - again according to the two Polish
sociologists - almost half of all organized actions.
Table 7: Organizers of agricultural protests in 1992 and 1993 (as a
percentage of the total number of protests).
Organization name
1992
Percentage
Number
of total
of shares
shares
1993
Percentage
Number
of total
of shares
shares
ZZR Samoobrona
12
57,1
8
33,33
NSZZRI "S
8
38,1
8
33,33
Other (mainly KZRKiOR)
1
4,8
6
25
"Spontaneous
/
/
2
8,4
157
Total
21
100
24
100
Compiled by us. Sources: Center for European Studies, Harvard University Database, Foryś Grzegorz,
Dynamika sporu: protesty rolników w III Rzeczpospolitej, Warszawa, WN Scholar, 2008, p.155.
It was in the name of the immediate application of the April 28, 1992 agreements that
the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona justified the organization of new protest actions from
mid-June 1992 onwards. While the failure of the public authorities to keep their
presidential promises was an undeniable factor in the union's return to the arena of
protest mobilization, it could not be understood independently of the political
situation at the time, and the political reclassification of the objectives of their action
undertaken by its leaders. The political significance of the road blockades organized
by ZZR Samoobrona in June is undeniable, at a time when the Przymierze
Samoobrona party has just been created with a view to the possible dissolution of
Parliament. In addition to demanding the implementation of the April 28 agreements,
Andrzej Lepper took advantage of the media coverage provided by these actions to
develop, formally as president of Przymierze Samoobrona, an acerbic criticism of the
general actions of successive governments and to reiterate his calls for early elections1
. While the formation of a majority government around Hanna Suchocka at the
beginning of July, at least provisionally, closed the debate on the forthcoming
organization of new parliamentary elections2 , such an interweaving of union activism
and the promotion of an openly political project seems identifiable throughout the
cycle of peasant protest actions initiated by the ZZR Samoobrona from summer 1992
to spring 1993. Playing with the boundaries of politics by appearing according to the
issues at stake and the context as spokespersons for a trade union, a party or a social
movement, the leaders of the ZZR Samoobrona, principally its president as we shall
see, endeavoured, in the dynamics of the protest movement, to establish themselves as
actors to be reckoned with in the Polish political field, despite their absence from the
political arena.
1 "Blokada zbóż?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 26/06/1992, p.2.
2 On July 3, Waldemar Pawlak, unable to formalize a coalition agreement with the "small coalition"
(UD, KLD and PPG) was, at his own request, dismissed as Prime Minister by the President of the
Republic. He was replaced by Hanna Suchocka (UD), who on July 10 announced the formation of a
government bringing together seven parliamentary forces (UD, ZChN, PChD, PL, KLD, PPG and
SLCh) and supported by NSZZ Solidarity and German minority deputies.
"Zakończmy okres waśni", Gazeta Wyborcza, 11-12/07/1992, p.1; Millard Frances, op.cit., p.105- 108.
158
and the objective weakness of their organizations, at least initially. In other words,
without formally calling into question the distinction between their union and political
activities, they set out to reinvest in political competition the resources accumulated in
the arena of social conflict, in order to strengthen their position within the field of
peasant representation and, more broadly, to legitimize their claim to embody a vast
movement of social opposition to the rulers. Broadly speaking, we believe it is
possible to identify three main processes involved in the ZZR Samoobrona's
accumulation of collective resources1 , which can be reconverted in the political field
as part of its protest activities. In practice, these processes are of course concomitant
and largely interdependent, and it is only for the sake of clarity that we will
distinguish them here in the analysis. Firstly, we'll see that the "radical" practices
employed by ZZR Samoobrona activists during their actions play a decisive role in
making2 the Samoobrona acronym more visible, and in promoting it as a symbol of
protest against government policy (1). Next, we'll see that protest actions are also an
important recruiting ground for both the union and the party, enabling its leaders to
project an image of structured, powerful groups (2). Finally, we shall see that
investing in the arena of protest mobilizations offers the union's leaders the
opportunity to broaden the scope of their interventions and positions, and thus
legitimize their claim to redefine their offer of representation beyond just overindebted farmers (3).
1) Spectacular actions to subvert the political order.
Table 8: Samoobrona ZZR's main protest actions relayed by
the daily Gazeta Wyborcza from June 1992 to April 1993.
Date
Type of action
Location
Duration of
Number of
1 On the collective resources of political organizations: cf. Offerlé Michel, Les partis politiques, op.cit.
p.35-49.
2 As Michel Offerlé notes, "The first resource that an organization can offer is its brand, its acronym
[...]: by guaranteeing a second identity to those who can claim it, through its age and notoriety, it makes
it possible to gather the profits of distinction that are attached to it on the political market and in
everyday interactions", Offerlé Michel, Ibid., p.37.
159
the action
End of June 1992
Road blockades
(approx. 12)
Mainly in the
voivodeships of
Poznań, Gorzów
Wielkopolski, Leszno,
Kalisz and Zamość.
"Marsz gwiaździsty"
("star" march to
Warsaw by
processions of
On various routes to
demonstrators from
Early July 1992
Warsaw
different parts of the
country, culminating
in a parade through
the
streets of the capital)
Forced eviction of a
producer who bought
Strzelce Małe
out the assets of an
July 29, 1992
(Leszno voivodeship)
over-indebted farmer
in liquidation.
Wild mowing of a
parcel of wheat leased
by an individual
August 1 to 2,
Babin (Lublin
farmer to a State Farm
1992
voivodeship)
in the process of
privatization.
Road blockades
In the voivodeships of
(between 3 and 7
Kalisz, Leszno and
August 19, 1992
depending on the
Sieradz
source)
Occupying
the
regional headquarters
August 25, 1992
Lublin
of
Agence
Immobilière Agricole
from
the
State
Treasury.
Occupation of a wing
of the
December 11, 1992
Warsaw
Agriculture
Seat occupancy
December 15, 1992 Leszno Voivodeship
Leszno
Blockades of two
border crossings
December 17, 1992
between Poland and
Germany
Ten days or so
Ten days or so
participants
From a few
dozen to 150,
depending on the
dam
A few dozen ZZR
Samoobrona
vehicles
organized in
seven
processions.
A few hours
About ten
One night
A few dozen
A few hours
From a dozen to
a hundred,
depending on the
roadblock
A few hours
A few dozen
A few hours
Some thirty
A few hours
About twenty
Kołbaskowo (Szczecin
Voivodeship) and
A few hours
Świecko (Szczecin
Voivodeship).
Gorzów Wielkopolski)
Central Warsaw:
from the Parliament
February 19, 1993
Parade
A few hours
building to the
Belvedere
Warsaw Centre:
April 3, 1993
Parade
A few hours
in front of the
Parliament
building
Produced by us. Sources: Gazeta Wyborcza archives from June 1992 to April 1993.
A few dozen
One hundred and
fifty
Nearly a thousand
Roadblocks, occupations of public buildings and "coup de poing" operations were
among the most popular methods used by ZZR Samoobrona f r o m summer 1992 to
160
late winter 1993. Recourse to these practices
161
"1 must once again be understood in the context of the constraints on action faced by a
trade union that could only count on a limited militant base and was only active in a
limited number of voivodships, mainly in the west of the country.
Echaudé par l'échec relatif d'un projet de grande marche vers Varsovie au début du
mois de juillet 1992, la " marsz gwiaździsty "2 , la direction du ZZR Samoobrona
privilégie jusqu'à la toute fin de l'hiver 1993 le recours à des actions localisées qui
présentent l'avantage de ne nécessiter ni une lourde logistique ni de nombreux
participants. While several dozen demonstrators were enough to take possession, at
least partially, of a public building, such as the Leszno Voivodeship headquarters in
December3 , a few tractors were enough to completely block traffic on a national
highway. Thus, none of the various roadblocks set up by the ZZR Samoobrona in
June, August or December 1992 mobilized more than one hundred and fifty militants,
according to the journalists present at the scene4 . Moreover, as they did not require
demonstrators to be away from their workplaces for long periods and, if necessary,
allowed for rotating occupations5 , these modes o f action proved to be very effective.
1 For a detailed analysis of the repertoires of action observable during the peasant mobilizations of the
years 1990 to 1993, please refer to : Foryś Grzegorz, op.cit. p.198-201. More broadly, and based on the
French example, on the question of the specificity of peasant protest practices: Duclos Nathalie, "Y a-til une exception paysanne? : réalité et limites de la violence contestataire des paysans bretons",
Cultures & Conflits, n° 9-10, 1993, p.293-314.
2 For almost ten days at the beginning of July, Andrzej Lepper kept the media on its toes by announcing
that "columns" of several hundred thousand ZZR Samoobrona supporters from all parts of the country
were converging on Warsaw to march en masse. The operation, dubbed "marsz gwiaździsty", was
aborted when the police intercepted some of the demonstrators before they entered the capital (a few
hundred at most, according to the police), and when activists in a number of localities, against Andrzej
Lepper's instructions, quickly turned back and headed for home. In the wake of this "failure" - a relative
one, since it nonetheless enabled the union to occupy the front pages of the main national daily
newspapers for several days - the ZZR Samoobrona leadership announced a change of strategy:
"Today, we're going home. But our protest movement will continue, it's just our methods that we're
going to have to change. Everyone will go home to gather strength, to build a strong and powerful
organization", Andrzej Lepper, quoted in "Odwrót 'Samoobrony'", Gazeta Wyborcza, 13/07/992, p.2.
3 "Zajazd "Samoobrony" w Lesznie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 12/15/1992, p.3.
4 See in particular: "Blokada "Samoobrony" zawieszona?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 24/06/1992, p.1.
5 The existence of such systems is highlighted on several occasions by journalists covering ZZR
Samoobrona actions. For example: "Między Toruniem a Włocławkiem", Gazeta Wyborcza,
22/06/1992, p.1.
162
particularly well-suited to the farming profession and the need for regular farm
maintenance.
However, while these protest actions hardly differ in form from those implemented by
NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR in 1990 and 1991, they are radically different in practice
and symbolism. Whereas in the past, roadblocks and building occupations were seen
as "ordinary" strike tools used to support demands in negotiations with public
authorities, ZZR Samoobrona activists use them in a much more radical way, akin to
direct action unionism1 . Unlike the blockades organized by KZRKiOR and NSZZRI
"S" activists, which rarely brought traffic to a complete standstill, those of ZZR
Samoobrona took the form of real barricades, sometimes holding up traffic for several
days2 . Above all, multiplying the verbal provocations directed at political personnel
and repeatedly refusing invitations to negotiate from the Minister of Agriculture
Gabriel Janowski3 - who has retained his post despite successive changes of Prime
Minister - Andrzej Lepper sets out to present his union's actions as the first stage in a
peasant insurrection against the government. In explicit reference to the uprisings led
by Tadeusz Kościuszko against the Russian occupiers in the XVIIIe century, many
demonstrators sported scythes at roadblocks or during building occupations organized
by
1 It was among French revolutionary syndicalists and anarcho-syndicalists at the beginning of the XXe
century that the birth of direct action syndicalism theories is commonly identified. Georges Yvetot, a
signatory of the Amiens Charter in 1906, defined direct action as follows: "Direct action is that which,
outside of any foreign aid, without relying on any influence from power or Parliament, is exercised by
the interested parties themselves with the aim of obtaining partial or complete, but definitive,
satisfaction." Quoted in Martin Jean-Yves, "Action directe" et négociations dans la grève nazairienne
de 1955", Agone, n°33, 2005, p.67-82. On the theories of direct action and their practice, please refer to
: Julliard Jacques, Autonomie ouvrière: Etude sur le syndicalisme d'action directe, Paris, Editions du
Seuil, Hautes Etudes, 1988, especially chapter 1.
2 Similarly, in the French case, Nathalie Duclos notes profound differences in the organization and
management of roadblocks, depending on the meaning that farmers seek to give to this action, and
whether they insist on its expressive or protest dimension: Duclos Nathalie, Les violences paysannes
sous la Ve République, Paris, Economica, 1998, p.14-25. For a perspective on roadblock technology as
used by groups of truck drivers: Courty Guillaume, "Barrer, filtrer, encombrer : les routiers et l'art de
retenir ses semblables", Cultures & Conflits, n°12, 1993, p.143-168.
3 As an example of the recurrent reluctance expressed by ZZR Samoobrona leaders to negotiate with
the government: ""Samoobrona" przy stole...ale krótko, bo ją wyprosili", Gazeta Wyborcza,
05/08/1992, p.2.
163
the ZZR Samoobrona. The union's president also made headlines by announcing the
transformation of the anti-seizure sections created by the union at the beginning of the
year into Bataliony Chłopskie (Peasant Battalions), named after the Peasant Party
(SL) resistance movement during the Second World War1 . More than simply creating
a balance of power conducive to negotiation between farmers and their bankers, these
groups are now intended to ensure that the presidential promises of April 28, 1992 are
honored, and to physically prevent any attempt to seize the assets of over-indebted
farmers or any abuse linked to the bankruptcy of a farmer:
"We're not kidding around anymore. God forbid that any of our demands should not be met. We are
going to reconstitute the Peasant Battalions [...]. We will train their members in physical techniques,
cultivate their patriotism and teach them military methods. We don't want war, but if our State breaks
the law, we won't hesitate to t a k e up arms against its agents, bailiffs, bankers or Treasury inspectors".
Andrzej Lepper.
Quoted in "Bataliony Chłopskie "Samoobrony"", Gazeta Wyborcza, 30/04/1992, p.4.
By implicitly likening the post-Communist period to those of partitioned Poland or
the Nazi occupation, and by encouraging farmers "to defend, with arms if necessary,
their individual rights against attacks by the state"2 , it is the very legitimacy of the
Third Republic and its laws that the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona, foremost among
them Andrzej Lepper, set out to challenge. This subversion of the political order3 led
to the further marginalization of the union. Denounced by all the main political
leaders for its demagoguery, radicalism and even terrorism, the union was even the
subject of several legal proceedings aimed at delegitimizing it4 .
"Bataliony Chłopskie "Samoobrony"", Gazeta Wyborcza, 30/04/1992, p.4. This announcement
provokes immediate indignation among PSL leaders, who claim the heritage of the historic peasant
movement: "Samoobrona łamie Prawo", Zielony Sztandar, 17/05/1992.
2 Quoted in "Sejm to cyrk, rząd to teatr", Gazeta Wyborcza, 15/05/1992, p.4.
3 According to Jacques Lagroye, Bastien François and Frédéric Sawicki, subversion is an attempt to
"[question] the classifications that establish the specificity and supremacy of the existing political
order" and thus to "[challenge] the normative orientation of political acts": Cf. Lagroye Jacques,
François Bastien & Sawicki Frédéric, op.cit., p.221.
4 The ZZR Samoobrona and Przymierze Samoobrona are the summer and autumn destinations for
the subject of several legal proceedings for breaches of the constitution and, respectively, of trade union
and party law. Cf. in particular: "Delegalizacja "Samoobrony"?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 18/08/1992, p.1.
The government itself has initiated a number of complaints, and several of its members are explicitly
calling for the union and party to be delegalized. For this reason
1
164
Taking advantage of the media's penchant for the spectacular, it also enabled the
group to rapidly benefit from publicity out of all proportion to its real influence in the
countryside and the actual scale of its actions1 . The bellicose rhetoric mobilized by
Lepper and the other leaders of ZZR Samoobrona resonates with journalists'
spontaneous representations of a peasantry stigmatized in the dominant discourse for
its archaism and latent aggressiveness2 and enables the union to enjoy a scandaltinged audience in a variety of public arenas - the media, of course, but also
parliamentary debates and public speeches by key political and union leaders. While
in practice its actions are often small-scale, and acts of violence are rare - the
exactions committed by demonstrators or Peasant Battalions in 1992 and 1993 can be
counted on the fingers of one hand - ZZR Samoobrona ensures sustained visibility in
public debates. The union thus established itself, at least symbolically, as the main
spokesperson for discontent in the Polish countryside, at a distance from the
KZRKiOR and NSZZRI "S" who, after having abandoned the arena of protest
mobilizations throughout 1992, subsequently set out to keep the protest actions they
initiated within the framework of the legitimate rules of demonstration, in order to
maintain their political "respectability".
2) The paradoxical organizational structure of the union and the party.
For example, Jan Rokita, Minister in charge of administration at the Council of Ministers, who, during
a question time in the Diet on January 7, 1993, considered that
"Cf. Sténogramme 1ère Législature, 33e Séance, 2nd jour, 07/01/1993, http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/. In the
end, none of the various legal proceedings undertaken were successful.
1 Patrick Champagne notes: "A street demonstration cannot be reduced to a simple act of collective
protest; given the political benefits that can result from the media's focus on a social group in struggle,
it is also a strategic action aimed at influencing journalists in order to occupy media space, with the aim
of triggering the positions taken by the various agents seeking to influence "public opinion" and hence
power", Champagne Patrick, "La manifestation comme action symbolique", in Favre Pierre (dir.), La
manifestation, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1990, p.339..
2 Cf. Zalewski Frédéric, "Démobilisation et politisation de la paysannerie en Pologne depuis 1989",
Critique Internationale, n°31, 2006, p.149. On "traditional" journalistic representations of peasant
violence, see : Guillemin Alain, "Doucement c'est tout de même une femme" : remarques sur le statut
de la violence dans les manifestations paysannes", Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, n°5253, June 1984, p.42-48.
165
In the weeks following the success of the action at the Ministry of Agriculture, the
ZZR Samoobrona's leaders made it a priority to increase its territorial coverage and
the number of its activists. As early as May 14, 1992, at the union's National Council,
Andrzej Lepper announced to the two hundred delegates gathered in Warsaw his wish
to increase the number of local circles in all voivodships in order to best "defend
farmers threatened with dispossession of their property due to their inability to pay
outstanding loan instalments"1 . With this in mind, the protests that began in June
were an important recruiting ground for the union. The number of members claimed
by the union's leaders rose from 60,000 at the end of April 1992 to over 300,000 in
January 19932 and, by November 1992, Andrzej Lepper assured us that the union was
now present in all 49 voivodships3 . While there can be little doubt that, in line with
widespread practice in Poland at the time, these figures are "inflated" to the extreme,
they nonetheless bear witness to an undeniable increase in the union's militant base in
the final months of 1992.
Without wishing to delve into the complex debate on the motivations behind militant
action4 , we shall confine ourselves here to formulating two main hypotheses as to the
origin of this increase in the number of ZZR Samoobrona members in the dynamics
of the protest movement. Firstly, it seems possible to envisage the existence of a
"media recruitment" phenomenon comparable to that highlighted by Todd Gitlin in
his study of the "Students For a Democratic Society" in the United States5 . The high
profile of the union, which, as we saw earlier, has acquired a sulphurous image in the
media as the main opponent of the
1 "Orły same się obronią", Gazeta Wyborcza, 18/05/1992, p.12.
2 Figures quoted respectively in "Świąteczna okupacja", Gazeta Wyborcza, 21/04/1992, p.5 and in
"Lepperiada", Gazeta Wyborcza, 20/01/1993, p.10.
3 "Samoobrona zmienia taktykę", Zielony Sztandar, 22/11/1992.
4 On this subject, please refer to the special issue of the Revue Française de Science Politique devoted
to the question of commitment: Fillieule Olivier & Mayer Nonna (dir.), op.cit. p.19-215, especially his
introduction p.19-25; numerous references can also be found in Juhem Philippe,
"Investissements et désinvestissements partisans", art.cit., p.478-491; and in the introduction to the
article: Sawicki Frédéric, "Le temps de l'engagement. À propos de l'institutionnalisation d'une
association de défense de l'environnement", in Lagroye Jacques (dir.), op.cit., p.123-146.
5 Gitlin Todd, The Whole World Is Watching: mass media in the making & unmaking of the new left,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980, especially pages 129 to 133; for a summary of the
author's main theses, see: Neveu Erik, "Médias, mouvements Sociaux, espaces publics", art.cit. p.2528.
166
government's agricultural policy, offers it the opportunity to attract new members
from among farmers determined to do battle with the authorities, notably former
members of KZRKiOR or NSZZRI "S" disappointed by the passivity of these
organizations in the field of protest1 . Secondly, a not inconsiderable proportion of
new union memberships can be attributed to the extension of support through local
protest actions. These actions, such as roadblocks, provide practical opportunities to
promote the union's2 offer of representation, and also to mobilize pre-existing
networks of personal relations and acquaintances in the areas concerned3 . In other
words, and to oversimplify, the existence of professional, friendly or even family
relationships between participants in a ZZR Samoobrona protest action in a small
rural commune and the inhabitants of that commune seems to us to be a factor that
favours involvement in the action and eventual membership of the union.
It's an extremely delicate task to retrace precisely the process of union structuring i.e., the material and symbolic operations involved in setting up and arranging the
various territorial bodies4 - that accompanied the integration of these new members. In
the absence of any organizational archives available for this period5 , we will have to
content ourselves with outlining the broad outlines that seem to have guided the
organization of the various regional bodies at the time.
1 As in the case of anti-globalization activism, ZZR Samoobrona "recruits", at least in part, from pre-
constituted militant circles, in this case "peasant" circles. Journalists interested in the emergence of this
new player in peasant trade unionism regularly stress the importance of the number of former NSZZRI
"S" members who join its ranks, for example: "Orły same się obronią", Gazeta Wyborcza, 18/05/1992,
p.12. On alterglobalist activism and the recompositions of old groups from which it partly originates,
please refer to : Agrikoliansky Eric, Fillieule Olivier & Mayer Nonna (dir.), L'altermondialisme en
France : la longue histoire d'une nouvelle cause, Paris, Flammarion, 2005; especially chapter 4:
Szczepanski-Huillery Maxime, "Les architectes de l'altermondialisme. Registres d'action et modalités
d'engagement au Monde diplomatique", p.143-173.
2 Cf. Mann Patrice, "Les manifestations dans la dynamique des conflits", Favre Pierre (dir.), op.cit.
p.280-281.
3 Cf. Cefaï Daniel & Lafaye Claudette, "Lieux et moments d'une mobilisation collective : le cas d'une
association de quartier", in Cefaï Daniel & Trom Danny (dir.), Les formes de l'action collective :
mobilisations dans des arènes publiques, Paris, Editions de l'EHESS, 2001, p.195-228.
4 Aït-Aoudia Myriam, op.cit. p.346.
5 According to the management of ZZR Samoobrona, the archives of the union's first months of
existence were lost as a result of exactions committed by militants of the KPN, engaged in 1992 in a
dispute with Samoobrona over the ownership o f premises in Warsaw's Nowy Świat street. On this
subject:
"Samoobrona KPN-u", Gazeta Wyborcza, 28/08/1992, p.2.
167
union structures. Schematically, it seems possible to identify the combination of two
antagonistic structuring modalities, not unlike the types of partisan construction by
"territorial diffusion" and "territorial penetration" evoked by Angelo Panebianco1 . On
the one hand, the organization of the union's grassroots structures seems to take place
essentially at local level, at a distance from the national leadership. Indeed, the latter
seems to intervene only exceptionally in the organization of local Circles, whether it's
a question of defining the modalities of their effective operation, the choice of their
leaders, or even the process of creating a new Circle in a commune where the union is
not yet established2 . On the other hand, the national leadership pays particular
attention to the development of intermediate structures and the control of the union's
public voice. The creation of regional circles in each of the country's 49 voivodships,
presented as a priority by Andrzej Lepper as early as May, was steered directly from
Warsaw. Although the statutes provided for the election of regional structure leaders
by local Circle representatives, according to officials at the time, it was essentially at
national level, or even directly by Andrzej Lepper, that they were in fact appointed3 .
Similarly, the organization of the most spectacular protest actions and the production
of the union's position papers remained highly centralized. Regularly visiting in
person the sites of roadblocks, building occupations or actions by the
"These included the president of ZZR Samoobrona Andrzej Lepper and, to a lesser
extent, members of the Prezydium, mainly Janusz Bryczkowski,
Drawing on the work of Kjell Eliassen and Lars Svaasand, Angelo Panebianco notes that the
organizational development of a party (although his observations seem to apply equally to other forms
of political organization) is due to "either territorial penetration, territorial diffusion, or a combination
of the two". According to him,
"We can speak of territorial penetration when the "center" controls, stimulates or guides the
development of the "periphery", i.e. the formation of local or intermediate party groups. We can speak
of territorial diffusion when development occurs by 'spontaneous germination': local elites form local
party groups which are only later integrated into a national organization", quoted in: Panebianco
Angelo, Political Parties: Organization and Power, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988,
p.50. See also, Eliassen Kjell & Svaasand Lars, "The Formation of Mass Political Organizations: An
Analytical Framework", Scandinavian Political Studies, n°10, 1975, p.95-120.
2 According to the bylaws, five farmers from the same locality need only send a written request to the
union's head office, stipulating their commitment to abide by the union's bylaws, to formalize the
formation of a local Circle.
3 See in particular: "To nie jest problem Leppera", Rzeczpospolita, 19/08/1994; Krok-Paszkowska Ania,
"Samoobrona: The Polish self-defence movement", in Mudde Cas & Kopecký Petr (eds.), Uncivil
Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe, London, Routledge, 2003, p.120.
1
168
Paweł Skórski and Marek Lech, thus monopolize almost all the union's public
interventions, to the detriment of action participants or local officials.
The ZZR Samoobrona, as it developed from the second half of 1992 onwards, thus
appeared to be structured around a paradoxical mode of organization. Extremely
labile at the communal level, where the local Cercles in most cases resemble small
sub-groups, often relying on pre-constituted networks of sociability and relatively
autonomous from the other levels of the organization, the union's structures are, by
contrast, highly centralized and hierarchical at the national and regional levels. If the
control of the "base" by the
While the "center" appears very limited in reality1 , the formal existence of numerous
local Circles and the control of the union's objectifying tools at national and regional
level enable the national leaders to give their organization the appearance of a
coherent, highly-structured, nationwide grouping. While the bulk of actions are
decided directly from Warsaw and, as we saw earlier, often mobilize only a handful of
militants, they can thus claim to be highly representative in the countryside and
develop a discourse that showcases their ability to rapidly mobilize a militant base
presented as plethoric and extremely active. Abundantly relayed by journalists, who
also unhesitatingly repeat the impressive figures for militant numbers put forward by
the management, this discourse helps to convey the reifying image of a massive union
- speaking and acting as one - and thus to increase the impression of its hold over the
peasant protest movement. At the same time, while union members are automatically
considered members of the Przymierze Samoobrona party and the Samoobrona social
movement, it also helps legitimize the ZZR Samoobrona leadership's claim to be the
spokesperson for a vast movement of resistance by Polish society against the state,
extending beyond the countryside.
1 This is evidenced by the recurrent difficulties encountered by the union's management in carrying out
coordinated actions across the country, organizing large gatherings of militants from different regions
in the same place, or controlling perfectly the end of protest actions.
169
Diagram 2: Territorial organization of ZZR Samoobrona and Przymierze
Samoobrona and relationships between their structures.
Diagram created by us. Sources: founding statutes of ZZR Samoobrona and Przymierze Samoobrona,
and our personal observations of how these organizations operated in 1992 and 1993.
3) Attempts to broaden the scope o f intervention and "g o mainstream".
As we saw in the previous chapter, from its inception in January 1992, ZZR
Samoobrona was presented by its founders as a union dedicated to representing the
interests of the Polish countryside as a whole. This issue remained undeniably central
to the protest movement the union launched in the summer of 1992. The immediate
application of the agreements of November 14, 1991 and April 28, 1992 was the main
demand put forward by the ZZR Samoobrona leaders in their public speeches and in
the various protest actions initiated by the union, from the road blockades in June and
August to the short protest rally in the summer of 1992.
170
occupation of a wing of the Ministry of Agriculture in December1 . However, the
dynamics of the protest movement also saw repeated attempts by the union's leaders
to extend their scope of action to new causes, linked to agriculture of course, but not
exclusively. In so doing, they endeavored to broaden the meaning of the protest
actions organized by the union, adopting a rhetorical justification of action that was
no longer linked solely to the defense of the interests of over-indebted farmers, but to
those of all workers in the agricultural sector, and indeed to those of Poles as a whole.
This
The "rise to generality" of2 , aimed at legitimizing their claim to constitute a vast
social movement embodying Polish society as a whole, developed in two
complementary ways.
Firstly, until December 1992, ZZR Samoobrona enjoyed the status of the only
national agricultural organization openly contesting the government's agricultural
policy, and its leadership led it to develop positions on issues that had hitherto been
marginal in its representation. Guaranteed agricultural prices, limits on imports, the
fight against rural unemployment and improved conditions for the privatization of
state farms are just some of the demands that are gradually making their way onto the
ZZR Samoobrona platform, alongside the more traditional demands for the
introduction of preferential-rate agricultural loans and the immediate suspension of all
seizure proceedings against over-indebted farmers. Occasionally, union activists even
take part in protest actions around these unprecedented issues, for example in August
against the conditions of privatization of the Babin state farm (Lublin voivodship)3 .
But, secondly, it was above all by formalizing alliances with other union
organizations involved in the movement to challenge the company's policies that we
were able to achieve our goals.
1 See respectively: "Z kosami na szosy", Gazeta Wyborcza, 06/23/1992, p.2; "Pełzające strajki", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 08/19/1992, p.5; and "Usuwanie "Samoobrony"", Gazeta Wyborcza, 12/11/1992, p.1.
2 On the processes of "rising generality", understood as "the adoption of a rhetoric of justification that
relates to a common good", in the dynamics of a collective mobilization, see Hassenteufel Patrick &
Hétet Erwan, "Internes en grève. Une approche de la "montée en généralité" des mouvements sociaux",
Politix, vol.12, n°46, 1999, p.99-125.
3 Cf. "Protest w pocie czoła", Gazeta Wyborcza, 05/08/1992, p.1.
171
of the Suchocka government that the union's leaders are committed to expanding its
scope of action.
On the one hand, in the name of the unity of the peasant movement, partnerships were
envisaged from December 1992 onwards with KZRKiOR and NSZZRI "S", which
had just returned to the arena of protest mobilizations. On December 2, an inter-union
protest committee was even formed for the first time by the three national agricultural
unions against the import of agricultural products from the European Economic
Community1 . Nevertheless, relations between ZZR Samoobrona and the two
"historic" agricultural unions remained extremely strained, and the common front was
dissolved even before the first unitary action, scheduled for December 17, was
actually organized. Piotr Baumgart, the NSSZRI "S" representative on the protest
committee, put an end to the rapprochement by telling journalists: "We cannot ally
ourselves with terrorists who threaten to use weapons and who put our activists at risk
of police repression. What's more, Andrzej Lepper no longer hides the fact that his
real ambition is to take power in this country. [...] Samoobrona harms farmers'
interests and torpedoes attempts to unify the peasant movement"2 . Stigmatized for its
radicalism and perceived as an increasingly serious competitor for union, as well as
political, representation of the peasantry, ZZR Samoobrona was not considered a
legitimate partner by the national representatives of the other agricultural
organizations and, until the very end of May 1993, remained on the sidelines of any
new project to unite the peasant movement in protest3 .
On the other hand, ZZR Samoobrona's leaders are seeking to forge alliances with nonagricultural organizations. Initially, the main aim was to make their union appear as
the peasant component of a "trade union".
1 "Na Gwiazdkę Blokada Granic", Gazeta Wyborcza, 03/12/1992, p.1; "Bieda połączyła chłopów",
Zielony Sztandar, 12/13/92.
2 Quoted in "Trójki Wypatrują", Gazeta Wyborcza, 18/12/1992, p.18.
3 Occasionally, however, joint actions were organized by ZZR Samoobrona and KZRKiOR activists,
without any formal collaboration agreement between the national leaderships. This was the case with
the two blockades of border crossings with Germany, which took place despite the withdrawal of the
NSSZRI "S" on December 17. Cf. "Trójki Wypatrują", Gazeta Wyborcza, 18/12/1992, p.18; "Kółka i
Samoobrona protestują", Chłopska droga, 03/01/93.
172
social discontent against the government's economic policy. In August 1992, a
cooperation agreement was signed with OPZZ, Solidarność 80' (Solidarity 80'),
Związek Zawodowy Górników (Miners' Union) and Związek Zawodowy Maszynistów
(Machinists' Union). The only agricultural organization to participate in the National
Intersyndical Negotiation and Strike Committee (MKKNS : Międzyzwiązkowy
Krajowy Komitet Negocjacyjno-Strajkowy) set up by these various unions, the ZZR
Samoobrona was one of the signatories of the common platform of 21 demands then
addressed to Hanna Suchocka on issues as varied as privatizations, protection of the
domestic market and dealing with unemployment1 . However, the leaders of ZZR
Samoobrona soon began to make no secret of their ambitions to build around their
union an independent, generalist movement. Several attempts were made to bring
together independent or branch unions, with the avowed aim of creating a new
generalist trade union centre to compete with NSZZ "S" and OPZZ. In January 1993,
Lepper unveiled an initial project involving local unions for miners, industrial
workers and railway mechanics in the ZZR Samoobrona, and even dreamed of
creating a "major Samoobrona union on a European or even global scale"2 . Similarly,
at the end of February, from Katowice, he announced the forthcoming official
creation of a cross-industry center called Wolne Związki Zawodowe (Free Trade
Unions)3 . Although none of these projects actually came to fruition, the leaders of
ZZR Samoobrona did not give up their claim to speak on behalf of a broad social
movement, supposedly embodied by a "RS Samoobrona RP" transcending sectoral
boundaries. Although mainly made up of farmers, the ZZR Samoobrona also
organized a march past the Sejm on April 2, 1993, on behalf of the unemployed,
workers and miners. According to Gazeta Wyborcza, nearly a thousand people took
part, making it by far the largest action of its kind.
1 See "Strajk generalny?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 11/08/1992, p.1 and "Sierpień '92", Gazeta Wyborcza
12/08/1992, p.11. The number of demands addressed to Hanna Suchocka by the MKKNS, is an explicit
reference to the 21 demands of the "Intersectoral Strike Committee" (MKS: Międzyzakładowy Komitet
Strajkowy) formulated in August 1980 and which led to the Gdańsk agreements and the creation of the
NSZZ "S". On this episode, see in particular Potel Jean-Yves, Scènes de grèves en Pologne, Paris, Noir
sur Blanc, 2006 (1981).
2"Lepperiada", Gazeta Wyborcza, 20/01/1993, p.10.
3 Cf. "Czwarta Centrala związkowa", Gazeta Wyborcza, 20/02/1993, p.21.
173
This demonstration, which was the largest organized by the union since its creation,
illustrates to the point of caricature the subversive strategy implemented by union
members since their reinvestment in the arena of protest mobilizations: many activists
march with scythes, to which some have even attached the remains of raw meats. At
the end of the demonstration, some sixty participants, including Andrzej Lepper,
attempted to enter the Parliament building and clashed violently with the forces of law
and order, securing themselves front-page coverage in the major national dailies the
following day1 .
1 "Lepperiada pod Sejmem", Gazeta Wyborcza, 03/04/1993, p.1. See also: "Samoobrona spacyfikowana
przed Sejmem", Chłopska droga, 04/11/93 and "Pacyfikacja Samoobrony", Chłopska droga, 04/18/93.
174
Section 2.
Putting the constraints of electoral competition to the test.
On May 31, 1993, following the Sejm's adoption of a motion of censure against the
Suchocka government, President Wałęsa announced the dissolution of Parliament. As
a result, early parliamentary elections are scheduled for September. These elections,
the fourth since the regime change1 , provide an opportunity for ZZR Samoobrona
leaders to finalize their ambition, never denied since their participation in the creation
of the Przymierze Samoobrona party a year earlier, to engage directly in the
competitive struggle for positions of political power and, consequently, for the votes
of voters2 . This section will focus on the modalities of this investment in the electoral
arena. More specifically, we'll be looking at the concrete steps taken to formalize and
promote an electoral offer3 , which such participation in the competition for votes
implies. Understanding the latter as a configuration in the sense of Norbert Elias4 , we
will
1 Indeed, three competitive elections have already been held since the removal of the word "people"
from the title of the Republic of Poland on January 1er 1990: a local election in May 1990, a
presidential election in December of the same year, and a parliamentary election in October 1991.
2 As Daniel Gaxie and Patrick Lehingue note, "in the particular case where access to political trophies
results from the election, the political game will take the form of a competitive struggle between
companies seeking to conquer positions of political power and the electorate's vote", Gaxie Daniel &
Lehingue Patrick, op.cit., p.10.
3 Drawing on the work of Daniel Gaxie and Patrick Lehingue, we mobilize here the notion of electoral
supply in a broad sense to refer to the set of political goods that "entrepreneurs competing for lay
investment and the legitimate occupation of positions of political power attempt to exchange [...] for the
various forms of support that lay people can give them". Ibid, p.30. That is, in our view, "speeches,
analyses, programs, promises" of course, but also the characteristics (socio-professional, gender or age,
for example) and self-presentation modalities of the candidates, or the form taken by the collective
engaged in the election (party, trade union, voters' association, etc.) and the conception of
representation that this gives rise to. Moreover, the adoption of the supply-side economic analogy is by
no means synonymous with the adoption of a strictly utilitarian and rationalist approach to political
relations, and electoral interaction in particular. On the contrary, the production, promotion and
reception of the electoral offer appear to be processes over which the actors have, despite their
reflexivity and undeniable "profit-seeking", an extremely imperfect control, and on which a multitude
of factors largely external to them have an influence. On the use of the concept of supply in political
science: Ibid. p.113-121.
4 That is to say, as a web o f interactions in which "as in a game of chess, every action
accomplished in relative independence represents a move on the social chessboard, which infallibly
triggers a counter-move by another individual (on the social chessboard, it's actually many countermoves executed by many individuals) limiting the first player's freedom of action": Norbert Elias, La
société de cour, Paris, Flammarion, 1985, p.152-153.
175
we'll be paying particular attention to the constraints that, in the context of the
competitive interactions that link them, weigh on the players engaged in such
activities.
The struggle to mobilize objective support in the form of votes that is electoral
competition is in fact governed by a set of "institutional rules" that limit the freedom
of action of the individuals and groups that bring it to life by investing in it1 . Whether
they are spelled out in legal terms, for example in the form of an electoral law, or
whether they are more in the realm of beliefs and representations, these rules
constrain the practices of the various actors who take part in electoral interaction. In
other words, to take part in an election is to express, at a minimum, one's belief in the
legitimacy of this mode of allocating positions of political power, and in return to
agree to submit to the rules of behavior and practice that govern it at a given moment2
. More specifically, as far as candidates are concerned, standing for election can thus
be likened to "taking on a role", to a process of acquiring know-how and internalizing
representations that enable them to adjust their practices to the expectations of the3
exercise, for example by formalizing a program or taking part in public meetings.
Thus, like all new entrants to the electoral competition, the leaders of ZZR
Samoobrona and Przymierze Samoobrona "have to pay an entry fee which consists in
the recognition of the value of the game [...] and in a practical knowledge of the
operating principles of the game"4 . In other words, while it is through the subversion
of the political order in the context of protest mobilizations that they have
accumulated the bulk of the resources they intend to reinvest in the competition for
political office, by extending their repertoire of action to the electoral struggle they
are forcing themselves to redefine their practices in order to accommodate the rules,
both practical and symbolic, governing the role of candidates they intend to endorse.
Cf. Nay Olivier, "Les règles du recrutement politique. Pour une approche institutionnaliste de la
sélection politique", Politix, vol.11, n°44, 1998, p.161-190.
2 On the historicity of the process of codifying electoral competition, see Ihl Olivier, Le vote, Paris,
Montchrestien, 1996, p.71-109 and, using the French example, Garrigou Alain, Le Vote et la vertu.
Comment les Français sont devenus électeurs, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1992.
3 On role-taking processes: Lagroye Jacques, François Bastien & Sawicki Frédéric, op.cit., p.141-146.
For an illustration, see : Lefebvre Rémi, "Être maire à Roubaix. La prise de rôle d'un héritier", Politix,
vol.10, n°38, 1997, p.63-87.
4 Bourdieu Pierre, "Quelques propriétés des champs", in Bourdieu Pierre, Questions de sociologie,
Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1980, p.116.
1
176
However, this accommodation is by no means synonymous with perfect conformity1 .
In the context of the struggle to distinguish themselves and promote their electoral
offering, candidates can develop autonomy and even subvert their role. Such
distancing from the rules of the election, while offering them the opportunity to stand
out in the electoral competition, also exposes them to symbolic or judicial sanctions,
which can marginalize or even exclude them2 . In short, the art of political actors in
the electoral arena, and specifically in the period of heightened interaction that is the
electoral campaign, consists, as Frédéric Sawicki notes, "in mobilizing social groups
and representatives without losing control of the game"3 , in developing undertakings
to promote their electoral offer and to set themselves apart from their competitors,
while at the same time "correctly" fulfilling the role of candidate assigned to them.
Thus, the main challenge for the ZZR Samoobrona and Przymierze Samoobrona
leaders engaged in the electoral competition lies in their ability to play between these
registers of conformation and demarcation, to "play the game" of the election while
developing an original political offer, consistent with their previous trade union and
political practices, and enabling them to mobilize a maximum number of supporters in
their favor.
Initially, we will return here to the political context in which the dissolution of
Parliament is pronounced by President Wałęsa. We will see that while the
announcement of early elections represents an opportunity for new actors eager to
engage in political competition, notably for the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona and
Przymierze Samoobrona who make little secret of their ambitions to reinvest there the
resources accumulated in the arena of social conflict, the concomitant adoption of a
new electoral law also places increased constraints on pretenders to positions of
political power (A). By taking a closer look at the concrete activities of actors
involved in the electoral arena
1 Lagroye Jacques (interview with), " On ne subit pas son rôle. Interview with Jacques Lagroye",
Politix, n°38, 1997.
2 Bourdieu Pierre, "Quelques propriétés des champs", art.cit. p.116.
3 Sawicki Frédéric, "Introduction", in Lagroye Jacques, Lehingue Patrick & Sawicki Frédéric (dir.),
Mobilisations électorales : le cas des élections municipales de 2001, Paris, PUF, 2005, p.8.
177
under the Samoobrona label, we'll then see that the practical and symbolic demands of
electoral competition have a strong influence on the ways in which they set about
formalizing an original electoral offer (B) and promoting it in the months leading up
to the election (C). Finally, we'll look at the results they achieved in the elections of
September 19, 1993, and how they were interpreted (D).
A) Towards new parliamentary elections: fall of the government and
tougher rules for electoral competition.
In the days following its formation, Hanna Suchocka's government was widely
perceived by observers of Polish political life as marking the end of the period of
instability and uncertainty characteristic of the Olszewski and Pawlak governments.
The UD MP's ability to quickly secure a majority in Parliament by uniting the main
parliamentary clubs that had emerged from the Solidarity movement, with the
exception of Jarosław Kaczyński's PC and the
The "Ruch dla Rzeczypospolitej" formed around former Prime Minister Jan
Olszewski, is thus almost unanimously hailed as a sign of a "return to normal" in
Polish politics after the "crisis" of June1 .
Table 9: The investiture of the Suchocka government on July 10, 1992.
Number of members of the
Parliamentary Club
UD
62
Participation in
the coalition
Name of Parliamentary Club
Nonparticipa
ting
support
KLD
37
PPG (fraction of former PPPP)
12
ZChN
48
PSL-PL
19
SChL (formerly PSL-Solidarność)
10
PCD
6
NSZZ "S
27
MN
7
CD
5
Total
233/460
In the end, out of 407 votes cast, 233 deputies voted in favor of the Suchocka government, 61 against
and 113 abstained.
1 See in particular: "Koalicje i Kompetencje", Gazeta Wyborcza, 07/13/1992, p.1; "Suchocka na lata?",
Gazeta Wyborcza, 07/28/1992, p.1.
178
Compiled by us. Sources: Millard Frances, op.cit. p.106.
Although this majority remains fragile, and does not completely erase the earlier
tensions between the coalition parties, it does pacify relations between Parliament and
the Government, and facilitates legislative work. For the first time in months, the
government succeeded in passing most of its bills. On October 17, 1992, a series of
texts on the organization of state institutions and the codification of their relations,
which had been under discussion since the start of the legislature, was finally adopted.
Forming what came to be known as the "Little Constitution", these texts notably
"rationalized" relations between the Government and the Presidency, which had
already improved considerably since the overthrow of Jan Olszewski1 .
However, in contrast to the relative stabilization of interactions between the various
parliamentary forces and state institutions, the Suchocka government was also
characterized by an increased fluidity in relations between institutional politics and
social movements. From the summer of 1992 onwards, protest mobilizations
multiplied, particularly in the agricultural, industrial and civil service sectors. Initially,
the OPZZ, whose elected representatives were members of the SLD parliamentary
club, Solidarność 80' and, as detailed above, the ZZR Samoobrona were the main
driving forces behind this protest movement. From December onwards, the two
historic trade unions of the Solidarity movement, the NSZZ "S" and the NSZZRI "S",
reinvested the arena of protest mobilizations in their turn, although they formally
continued to support the government majority. It seems to us that the paradoxical
recourse to strike action by these two unions should be understood primarily as part of
a strategy on their part to try to increase their "influence" on the political balance of
power, and to force the government to pay particular attention to their demands in the
definition of government action, particularly in the economic sphere2 . At the
beginning of January 1993, the management of NSZZ "S" announced that
1 On this question: Baylis Thomas A., art.cit. p.306.
Two other factors should also be taken into account to understand the change in strategy of the
historic Solidarity unions at the end of 1992: internal tensions within these groupings and the logics of
the trade union field itself. On the one hand, the reinvestment of the
2
179
suspend the strikes it had initiated, for example in the Silesian mines, after obtaining,
among other things, a radical change in the government's program for restructuring
the industrial and mining sector1 .
From February onwards, discussions on the budget bill in the Diet gave rise to a new
tug-of-war between the leaders of the main unions in the Solidarity movement and the
government. Denouncing the inadequacy of the resources allocated to the agricultural
sector, the NSZZRI "S" leadership called on its local sections on March 8 to take
protest action throughout the country2 . Under pressure from their union base, PL
Parliamentary Club MPs repeatedly threaten to join the opposition if the budget is not
amended. They finally made their withdrawal from the coalition official at the
beginning of April, following Gabriel Janowski's dismissal from his post as Minister
of Agriculture3 . The NSZZ "S" leadership, for its part, vigorously denounced the
planned budget cuts in the state sector (industry, mining, education and health in
particular). While engaging in talks with the government on this subject, union leaders
endeavored to increase the pressure on the government by initiating numerous strikes
and demonstrations throughout the spring. In May, as the talks stalled, they took a
new step in the conflictualization of their relations with the government. Calling for a
general strike by the end of the month, and inviting the members of the NSZZ
parliamentary club
"S" to table a motion of censure against Hanna Suchocka, the union's National
Committee issued a veritable ultimatum to the government coalition4 . In the days
leading up to the motion's consideration by the Sejm, the protest movement reached a
level not seen since the change of government.
For the union leaderships of NSZZ "S" and NSZZRI "S", the protest mobilizations are a means of
attempting to coerce their elected representatives in the NSZZ "S" and PL clubs, with whom differences
of opinion are frequent. On the other hand, as David Ost suggests, it is certainly also partly guided by
the fear of a loss of leadership by these two unions due to competition from OPZZ, Solidarność 80' and
ZZR Samoobrona, all three of which are particularly active in the field of protest. Cf. Ost David,
op.cit., p.74-77.
1 Cf. "spór o spór i porozumienie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 08/01/1993, p.1.
2 "Złość rolników na przednówku", Gazeta Wyborcza, 09/03/1993, p.3.
3 "Pogróżki Ludowe", Gazeta Wyborcza, 15/04/1993, p.3; "Koalicja bez ludowców", Gazeta Wyborcza,
29/04/1993, p.1.
4 As a member of the NSZZ "S" National Committee said to the government: "We've been negotiating
for two years. We're not interested in that now. What we want is for the government to fulfill its
commitments"; quoted in "'S' nie chce rządu", Gazeta Wyborcza, 20/05/93, p.1.
180
regime. Strikes multiplied in many sectors, and all the main Polish trade unions joined
in the protest. In the agricultural sector, for example, the three main agricultural
unions - NSZZRI "S", KZRKiOR and ZZR Samoobrona - organized a joint
demonstration for the first time on May 26 in Warsaw1 .
Two days later, it was in an extremely tense social context that MPs were asked to
vote on the motion of censure tabled by the NSZZ "S" MPs. Although the motion's
primary aim was explicitly to force the government to amend its economic policy, it
was finally adopted by just one vote, following a largely unexpected turn of events.
The Suchocka government was thus overthrown barely ten months after its formation2
. Immediately, once again to the surprise of most of the protagonists in the political
field, President Wałęsa announced his intention to dissolve Parliament, as authorized
by the "Little Constitution". This decision was made official on May 31. Early
parliamentary elections were scheduled for September 19, 1993, and Hanna Suchocka
was entrusted by the President with the task of "expediting current affairs" until that
date.
In the hours following the overthrow of the Suchocka government, and thus in the
final moments of the Ière legislature, the deputies voted urgently on a new electoral
law. The subject of intense parliamentary controversy for several months, the text
adopted was a compromise that did not overturn the terms of access to electoral
competition as much as some would have wished3 . While it had been envisaged that
participation in elections would be limited to political parties, the right to present lists
remains open, as in 1991, to "political and social organizations [i.e. trade unions] as
well as to voters".
1 Ten thousand demonstrators, according to the organizers, and a few thousand according to Gazeta
Wyborcza, gathered on the Place des Trois Croix in front of the statue of agrarian Prime Minister
Wyncenty Witos. In addition to the leaders of the three organizing unions, several PL and PSL MPs
took part in the demonstration, which was the largest peasant protest action organized in years. See:
"Chłopska młócka", Gazeta Wyborcza, 05/27/1993, p.1; "Słoma dla rządu", Zielony Sztandar,
06/06/1993; "Lechu puścił nas z torbami", Chłopska droga, 06/06/1993.
2 Out of 446 votes cast, 223 MPs voted in favor of the motion of censure, 198 against and 24 abstained.
21 NSZZ "S" MPs voted in favor, 2 against, and 4 abstained. The PL parliamentary club abstained.
Two MPs from the government coalition arrived late for the session and were unable to take part in the
vote. "Bez Rzadu? Bez Sejmu? Bez Sensu?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 29/05/1993, p.1.
3 Cf. Heurtaux Jérôme, op.cit., chap.6.
181
individual"1 . In the new law, however, the conditions for registering lists have been
redefined to raise the cost of access to national electoral committee status2 . While the
number of voter signatures required to register a constituency list has been reduced
from 5,000 to 3,000, the right to register lists at national level is now conditional on
the filing of lists in at least half of the 52 constituencies, which implies gathering a
total of at least 78,000 signatures, whereas previously it was sufficient to gather
50,000 signatures in at least five constituencies. However, it is in the introduction of
thresholds for access to the distribution of deputy mandates that the main novelty of
the electoral law of May 28 1993 lies. These thresholds are set at 5% of total votes
nationwide for autonomous electoral committees and 8% for coalition committees
between different organizations. The new electoral law, whose stated aim is to limit
parliamentary fragmentation, significantly tightens both the conditions of access to the
national electoral competition and to the parliamentary arena. It comes into force
immediately and therefore applies to the early elections in September.
B) Formalize an electoral offer.
Lech Wałęsa's announcement of the dissolution of Parliament was seen as a godsend
by the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona, who had been calling for early elections ever
since Przymierze Samoobrona was founded. In the early days of June 1993, Andrzej
Lepper reaffirmed his political ambitions and announced that the organization he
chaired would field candidates in the September elections3 . With this in mind, the
activities of the union's leaders, and therefore of the party, were reoriented towards
the electoral arena. For a time
1 Art. 77, "Ustawa z dnia 28 maja 1993 r. Ordynacja wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polkiej",
Dziennik Ustaw, n°45, 1993.
2 The distinction between the two types of mandate in the 1991 electoral law is maintained in the 1993
law. Of the 460 deputy mandates, 391 are allocated on the basis of constituency lists and 69 on the
basis of national lists. For the former, mandates are distributed on the basis of proportional
representation (d'Hondt method) in 52 constituencies (compared with 37 in 1991), subject to
compliance with national thresholds. Each constituency has between 3 and
17 deputies according to population. The latter are also distributed on a proportional basis, but at
national level. Access to them is thus reserved for committees that have succeeded in obtaining national
electoral committee status, giving them the right to submit a national list.
3 "Czarno-biały świat Leppera", Gazeta Wyborcza, 02/06/1993, p.2.
182
In line with the new electoral law, they are committed to specifying the terms and
conditions of their participation in the battle for parliamentary posts, and to
formalizing an electoral offer that complies with the rules of electoral competition. As
we shall see, this work cannot be reduced to its strategic dimension of seeking
electoral profitability. For the ZZR Samoobrona and Przymierze Samoobrona leaders,
who are new entrants to the electoral competition, it is much more akin to a
"bricolage" in which they endeavour to reconcile their asserted atypicalism with the
constraints of the role of candidates in an election, constraints made all the stronger by
the fact that they appear to be largely devoid of the resources traditionally valued in
the Polish political field since the change of regime. So, whether we're talking about
defining the modalities for ZZR Samoobrona militants' participation in the electoral
competition (1), the production of programmatic goods (2) or the composition of
candidate lists (3) - three elements on which we'll focus here - the union's leaders have
only an imperfect command of the processes involved in formalizing their electoral
offer. As we shall see, they are primarily concerned with
"This is a way of ensuring and legitimizing their participation in the fight for
parliamentary office.
1) How can I take part in the elections?
The question of how members of the ZZR Samoobrona, and therefore formally of the
Przymierze Samoobrona, can participate in the electoral competition remains, for the
time being, largely open. Relatively permissive, the new electoral law offers several
possibilities to union and party leaders. Firstly, they can directly engage ZZR
Samoobrona in the elections. In this case, the farmers' union could either set up its
own electoral committee or participate in the formation of a coalition committee with
other unions or political organizations. Secondly, they may decide to involve the
Przymierze Samoobrona party, again either alone or in alliance. Thirdly, they can set
up an ad hoc electoral committee, taking the form of a
183
of individual electors formally distinct from the constituent organizations of the RS
Samoobrona RP.
On August 10, 1993, a few minutes before the legal deadline for filing candidacies,
the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona finally registered lists with the National Electoral
Commission1 as a committee of individual voters called the "Samoobrona Electoral
Committee of Lepper" (Komitet Wyborcza Samoobrona-Leppera). To understand this
a priori paradoxical choice to objectify a new structure alongside the union and, above
all, the party, which had been set up with the declared aim of taking part in the
elections, we need to take into account both the dynamics of the pre-electoral
bargaining that animated the Polish political field from June onwards and the
constraints, particularly organizational, that weighed on the RS Samoobrona RP
organizations at the time.
At the beginning of June, Andrzej Lepper seemed to give priority to ZZR
Samoobrona's participation in a broad "trade union coalition", when he announced his
intention to put forward farm union candidates in the elections2 . A few days after the
united demonstration of May 26, during which several thousand farmers gathered in
front of the statue of the agrarian Prime Minister Wyncenty Witos in Warsaw on the
call of the three major agricultural unions, he even began to dream of a farmers' list
uniting the ZZR Samoobrona, the KZRKiOR, sections of the NSZZRI "S" and even
the PSL3 . This project quickly proved unrealistic. The leaders of the main political or
trade union organizations claiming their peasant identity all unambiguously ruled out
the possibility of an electoral alliance with a union stigmatized for its radicalism, and
whose leaders had not shied away from vilifying them in the past. A partnership with
the workers' unions with which ZZR Samoobrona had collaborated for a time during
the protest movement against the Suchocka government's economic policies seems
equally unlikely. The most important of these are either historically linked to, or have
since joined forces with, other groups.
1 "Dwudziestu na fotel?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 11/08/1993, p.1.
2 "Czarno-biały świat Leppera", Gazeta Wyborcza, 02/06/1993, p.2.
3 Ibid.
184
otherwise better endowed with political resources than the farmers' union,
respectively the SLD for the OPZZ and Jan Olszewski's RdR for Solidarność 80'.
Against a backdrop of increasing tactical exchanges between the various protagonists
in the political and trade union fields, with a view to building electoral alliances
capable of crossing the thresholds set by the new electoral law1 , the leaders of ZZR
Samoobrona proved unable to mitigate the stigma attached to its image as a radical
organization by forging closer ties with groups occupying a central position in these
fields. It is therefore always possible to form an autonomous electoral committee
around the union or party. However, this option has two major drawbacks. Firstly,
given the composition and image of these two organizations, which are still
essentially agricultural, it complicates the task of legitimizing a form of representation
that is not limited to farmers. However, the ambition of ZZR Samoobrona's leaders to
politically represent other social groups, notably the unemployed, pensioners and
teachers, was reaffirmed as early as June2 . Secondly, and more importantly, the union
and the party alone do not seem to have sufficient organizational and militant
resources to register candidate lists throughout the country. As we have seen, under
the new electoral law, 3,000 voter signatures must be collected in at least half of the
52 constituencies in order to present candidates at national level. However, despite the
assertions of its leadership, the union's mobilization potential remained limited at the
end of spring 1993, with only a very weak presence in urban areas and most of the
country's southern regions. As Andrzej Lepper himself acknowledged several years
later:
"It's true that back then [in 1993] we had representatives in most regions, but not all. For example,
we've always found it very difficult to get a foothold in the Gdansk region. We also had great difficulty
in the south, for example in Silesia, Opole or Lesser Poland. These regions have always been different
from the others.
On the general dynamics of these pre-election exchanges: Cf. Millard Frances, "The Polish
Parliamentary Election of September 1993", Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol.3, n°27,
1994, p.302-303.
2 "Samoobrona Wyborcza", Gazeta Wyborcza, 08/06/1993, p.2.
1
185
Andrzej Lepper.
Interview conducted on June 25, 2008 in Warsaw.
Forced to expand their electoral committee beyond their own organizations in order to
participate in the electoral struggle at national level, ZZR Samoobrona's leaders had
no choice but to seek alliances with groups occupying a marginal position in the
political arena, but which nonetheless had sufficient resources to enable them to
register lists in constituencies where the union had little presence. With this in mind,
at the end of June, the union leadership announced the formalization of an agreement
with certain regional structures of the Polish Union of Pensioners and Invalids (Polski
Związek Emerytów, Rencistów i Inwalidów)1 . Nevertheless, it was mainly through
militant nationalist networks that they sought to find the organizational resources
needed to set up a national electoral committee. The first contacts between these
networks and the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona date back to late 1992. With the
declared aim of drawing up a
A "common program for the self-defense of the Polish Nation", a Committee for the
Self-Defense of the Nation (Komitet Samoobrony Narodu) was even set up at the
time. In addition to Andrzej Lepper, this committee included the "patriotic" painter
Ludwik Maciąg, the anti-liberal economist Józef Balcerek, and three prominent
former members of the "Grunwald" Patriotic Union, general Stanisław Skalski, the
writer Jan Marszałek and the film director Bohdan Poręba. However, the committee's
activity was limited in the following months, and it only met formally on two
occasions2 . It was finally partially reactivated during the summer in the run-up to the
September elections. At the beginning of July 1993, the presence of Stanisław
Skalski, Jan Marszałek, Bohdan Poręba and several of their relatives on the lists that
ZZR Samoobrona leaders intended to present was confirmed3 .
The "Grunwald" Patriotic Union (Zjednoczenie Patriotyczne "Grunwald"), named after the Grunwald
victory.
In late 1980, in the context of relative political liberalization following the signing of the August
agreements between the Communist government and the strikers' committees that led to the creation of
NSZZ Solidarność, the "Polish" association of the Teutonic Knights in 1410 was created. Registered
1 Piskorski Mateusz, art.cit. p.199.
2 See "Powstał Komitet Samoobrony Narodu", Samoobrona, February 1993, Archiwum Partii
Politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona 1991-1996.
3 "Komplety Leppera", Gazeta Wyborcza, 07/07/1993, p.3.
186
officially in April 1981, the group defines itself in its "ideological declaration" as a
A "cultural and social movement bringing together Poles determined to firmly defend the Polish nation
and preserve the interests of the State". Its members are mainly drawn from
The members of the Union are "nationalist communists", and a large minority of them are former senior
officers in the Polish army. From the outset, the Union was noted for its virulent anti-Semitism, and
was suspected of benefiting from high-ranking support within the PZPR apparatus, notably among
conservatives hostile to dialogue with the opposition. In fact, it was not banned after the proclamation
of the state of war on December 13, 1981, and its leaders supported Jaruzelski's coup de force.
Nevertheless, it was soon marginalized, notably by t h e regime's creation of PRON (Patriotyczny
Ruch Odrodzenia Narodowego: Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth), and, without being formally
dissolved, seems to have had no real activity since the mid-1980s.
Sources: Sabbat-Swidlicka Anna, "The Rise and Fall of the Grunwald Patriotic Union", RAD
Background Report/213, Radio Free Europe Research, October 13, 1982; Jasiewicz Krzysztof, "The
(Not Always Sweet) Uses of Opportunism: Post-Communist Political Parties in Poland", Communist
and Post-Communist Studies, 41, 2008, p.426-427; Dudek Antoni, "Grunwald w PRL",
http://grunwald600.pl/pl,d47,grunwald_w_prl_prof_dr_hab_antoni_dudek.html, accessed May 10,
2010.
Faced with the marginalization to which they are subject in the pre-electoral
bargaining dynamic on the part of the main protagonists in the political and trade
union fields, the choice of the "electoral committee of electors" organizational form
thus has the advantage for the ZZR Samoobrona leaders of legitimizing their ambition
to extend their offer of representation beyond that of the union, and of compensating
for the latter's lack of organizational resources by integrating into their lists
individuals or groups from outside the union. It also means they don't have to
formalize a coalition, which would have raised the threshold for their lists to be
elected to the Diet from 5% to 8%. As for the potential handicap represented by the
prohibition on a committee of individual voters claiming to be directly affiliated to an
active political or trade union organization, in this case mainly to ZZR Samoobrona or
Przymierze Samoobrona, this proves to be relative. In fact, the name of the registered
committee, "Samoobrona-Leppera", is more than enough to compensate for this,
allowing candidates on the lists to hope to reap the benefits of the distinction attached
to the union and its president on the political market, and to benefit from the visibility
and notoriety acquired by the latter two during the protest movement of 1992 and
1993.
2) What kind of representation should you offer?
187
Denouncing the established political players and the political and economic
equilibrium in force since 1989 is the central theme mobilized by the leaders of ZZR
Samoobrona to legitimize their participation in the parliamentary elections. Thus, as
soon as the dissolution of Parliament was announced, Andrzej Lepper justified the
union's ambition to field candidates in the elections1 in the name of a "Third Way,
neither right nor left", aimed at "putting an end to economic scandals and the abuses
of politicians". This "anti-system" stance was reaffirmed a few weeks later in the
electoral program published by the Samoobrona-Leppera Committee:
"Samoobrona is the slogan calling on the whole of Polish society to mobilize to fight to safeguard our
identity and national sovereignty, to fight for the future of our country, to fight against betrayal and
political deceit, against the lies, lack of morals and cynicism of sold-out politicians who cheat the
Nation. [...] After several years of "reformist" government, after numerous legislative measures
inadequate for the country as a whole and for the living conditions of its citizens, Polish society has
come to the conclusion that it can only rely on itself, independently of the elites in power".
Quoted in: "Materiały wyborcze: Samoobrona-Leppera", in Słodkowskiej Inka (ed.), Wybory 1993Partie i ich programy, Warsaw, ISP-PAN, 2001, p.452-453.
This virulent denunciation of the "politico-economic system" essentially revolves
around two sets of accusations. On the one hand, it is the direction of the socioeconomic reforms developed since the Mazowiecki government that is criticized in
the committee's programmatic documents. Under the slogan "Może, a więc musi być
lepiej" (It can, and therefore it must be better), these call for a break with their
capitalist orientation, blamed for its inefficiency and social cost :
"The majority of Polish society is living far worse today than it did four years ago. Inflation lasts,
unemployment grows, and miserable wages are not enough to live on [...] There is an alternative to the
meaning given to the reforms. Against capitalism by force, against the anti-social and anti-humanitarian
orientation of economic reforms, against economic anarchy and scandal, it is necessary to return to a
modern and organized social market system, favourable to growth and social progress, fighting
inflation, unemployment and poverty.
1 "Samoobrona Wyborcza", Gazeta Wyborcza, 08/06/1993, p.2.
188
misery which, in the name of the triumphant capitalism of the 1990s, was destined to last for decades".
Quoted in: "Materiały wyborcze: Samoobrona-Leppera", art.cité, p.453.
On the other hand, it is the foreign influence on established political actors that is
vilified. Explicitly comparing the supposed subordination of the rulers of the Third
Republic to the West with that of the leaders of the People's Republic to the Soviet
Union, the Samoobrona-Leppera committee advocates new government practices,
free from the "diktats of the IMF, the World Bank and the European Community"1 :
"It is necessary to condemn and get rid of the new "concrete"2 , which is locked into its dogmas of
thought. Its actions are dictated by foreign interests and lifestyles, by the renunciation of sovereignty
and the integration of the country within a "Europe of Soviets", a great bureaucratic machine governed
by international finance. [...] We need to unleash the creative force of our country's society and appoint
to government intelligent people who passionately love their country and are incorruptible".
Quoted in: "Materiały wyborcze: Samoobrona-Leppera", art.cité, p.454.
To understand the objectification of such subversive positioning by the SamoobronaLeppera Committee, we feel it necessary to consider both the career trajectories of the
committee's initiators and the relative position it occupies in the electoral competition3
.
Firstly, it should be remembered that the denunciation of established political forces is
a constant in the union and political activity of ZZR Samoobrona leaders, and that
they have regularly used it in the past to legitimize the creation of a new agricultural
union4 and a new political party5 . This claimed distance from the dominant political
forces is shared by groups and individuals outside the union who took part in the
formation of Przymierze Samoobrona and then the Samoobrona-Leppera Committee.
1 To quote Andrzej Lepper in: "Nie chcemy dużo: jakieś 60 bilionów",
Gazeta Wyborcza, 19/08/1993, p.10.
2 Under the People's Republic, "concrete" was the nickname given to hard-line conservatives within the
PZPR, as opposed to reformers.
3 Cf. Offerlé Michel, Les partis politiques, op.cit. p.94.
4 See chapter 1, sections 2 and 3.
5 See chapter 2, section 1.
189
Whether we're talking about Janusz Bryczkowski or the former members of the
Grunwald group, their militant careers were characterized by the fact that they always
developed on the margins of the political field, both before and after the change of
regime.
Secondly, because of their inability to formalize pre-electoral alliances with
organizations that already have parliamentary connections, the electoral committee
formed on the initiative of the representatives of ZZR Samoobrona appears as a new
entrant, an outsider, in the electoral competition. And yet, "entrants" traditionally tend
to oppose "incumbents" and all established forces and agents in order to compensate
for their relative inferiority in the competition, to make themselves heard, known and
recognized by stigmatizing corruption, complacency, neglect of ordinary citizens'
concerns or the principles supposed to characterize good government1 . This is all the
more true for the Samoobrona-Leppera committee as the main capital of recognition
enjoyed by the Samoobrona label, and on which it intends to capitalize electorally, is
that of the active participation of ZZR Samoobrona in the protest mobilizations of late
1992 and early 1993. During these mobilizations, as we have already seen, the ZZR
Samoobrona established itself, at least symbolically, as one of the main protagonists
of the Suchocka government.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to reduce the political offer developed by the
Samoobrona-Leppera committee in the run-up to the September 1993 elections to its
"anti-system" dimension alone. Building on the work carried out in the preceding
months, when the Przymierze Samoobrona was set up, and then on the momentum of
the protest movement, its initiators also set out to develop an original offer of
representation aimed at broadening their base of potential supporters beyond that of
the union. While the committee's initiators make no secret of the fact that rural
dwellers are their core electoral target and that their ambition is to win over at least
30% of the agricultural electorate2 , they refuse to present themselves as a peasant
group and to limit their offer of representation to the rural population.
1 Gaxie Daniel, La démocratie représentative, Paris, Montchrestien, 2003, p.20-21.
2 "Samoobrona startuje do wyborów", Chłopska droga, 20/06/1993.
190
even broadly defined. A case in point is this campaign d o c u m e n t published by
the committee in the summer of 1993:
Samoobrona-Leppera National Electoral Committee campaign leaflet.
SAMOOBRONA is currently the name of a socio-political movement that no longer unites farmers
alone, but also social and professional organizations including workers, the unemployed, pensioners,
people from the educational and cultural sectors, budget workers and environmentalists. This
movement, originally born of a protest movement by rural dwellers, now represents the interests of
many professional and social classes. It is a non-ideological movement. Common sense, concern for the
well-being of people who suffer on a daily basis, defense of the Nation's interests - these are its
fundamental programmatic orientations.
Voter!
Read SAMOOBRONA's program and convince yourself that by supporting SAMOOBRONA and its
program, you are defending your interests, you are defending Poland. SAMOOBRONA is waiting
for your support and your vote in the elections. This will be your personal SELF-DEFENSE
(SAMOOBRONA)!
Translated by us. Sources: "Wybory Parlamentarne 1993. Materiały programowe", June 2003,
Archiwum partii politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona 1991-1996.
Despite the image of the electoral committee as a "trans-professional" movement that
its members are keen to project, in reality it has very few contacts outside the
agricultural sector. The few non-agricultural groups with which ZZR Samoobrona's
leaders were able to formalize alliances during the pre-election negotiations were all
extremely small in size, and were only active at regional or even communal level1 .
Thus, for want of being able to mobilize it concretely, the members of the
Samoobrona-Leppera committee have to work essentially at the symbolic level to
build and homogenize the very broad reference group they claim to embody in the
electoral competition. Once again, it is essentially in the criticism of the economic
policies of post-communist governments and in the ideological corpus of nationalism
that they seek to draw the vectors o f unification of the different groups.
1 For example, the leaders of the Polish Pensioners' and Invalids' Trade Union with whom the ZZR
Samoobrona leaders have partnered in the Samoobrona-Leppera committee ultimately come mainly
from the Łódź and Koszalin regions. Similarly, the latter only managed to formalize partnerships with
unemployed groups in t h e Sieradz and Częstochowa regions.
191
This is the only way to ensure the coherence of the interests of the categories that
make up this group. Farmers, the unemployed, blue-collar workers, miners, public
sector employees and pensioners are presented in campaign documents and public
speeches by committee representatives as the common victims of the "anti-social" and
"anti-patriotic" policies implemented by successive governments since 1989. This
group of "neglected", always evasively objectified, is defined in opposition to a group
of "profiteers of the old and new Nomenklatura"1 , in a dichotomy reminiscent of the
dyadic vision (us-society versus them-the rulers) developed by the Solidarité
movement in the 1980s.
3) How do you create candidate lists?
A comparison of the composition of the electoral bids for the 1991 and 1993
parliamentary elections reveals a paradox. On the one hand, between the two
elections, there was a sharp increase in the number of candidates running for one of
the 460 mandates of deputy. The number rose from less than 7,000 in 1991 to almost
9,000 two years later2 . Conversely, the number of electoral committees registered by
the National Electoral Commission fell sharply. Whereas in 1991, over a hundred
different committees presented candidates, in 1993 there were just 35. In addition, the
number of committees meeting the criteria for submitting a national list for Sejm
elections, tightened up by the new electoral law, was halved from 27 to 15.
Despite the invalidation of four of its constituency lists for late filing or falsification
of signatures3 , the Samoobrona-Leppera Electoral Committee is finally one of the 15
committees entitled to take part in national elections. A total of 370 different
candidates are running under its banner. For the Sejm, Samoobrona-Leppera lists with
352 candidates were drawn up.
1 "Materiały wyborcze: Samoobrona-Leppera", art.cit. p.454.
2 The number of candidates for one of the 100 senatorial posts rose slightly, from 612 to 684.
3 "Wszystko Obstawione", Gazeta Wyborcza, 12/08/1993, p.3; "Samoobrona oskarżona", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 14/08/1993, p.1.
192
registered in 44 out of 52 constituencies. The national list, made up as required by law
of individuals running simultaneously in each constituency, comprises 119 names. For
the Senate, the 18 candidates presented by the committee are spread across 11 out of
49 constituencies.
Table 10: Composition of electoral lists for the parliamentary elections of
Electoral committees
September 19, 1993.
Committee
number
Commit
tee
name
Commi
ttee
type
Senate elections
Election of the Diet
Constituency
lists (of 52)
1
2
PCZP
"Ojczyzna
Party
Coalition
52
52
Candidates
565
presented
Average age 44,9
(Standard (10,5)
deviation)
Male
488
applicants
(86,4)
(% of total)
Candidates
declaring a
32
profession
agricultural (5,7)
(% of total)
Candidates
declaring a
373
profession
"superior"
(66)
(% of total)
Lists of
district
30
(of 49)
Candidates
32
presented
Average age 52,8
(Standard (11,4)
deviation)
Male
29
applicants
(90,6)
(% of total)
Candidates
declaring a
1
profession
agricultural (% (3,1)
of
total)
Candidates
declaring a
profession
"superior"
(% of total)
31
3
4
PSLKPN
PL
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
15
LTC
PSL
KLD
NSZZ
"S
UD
BBWR
UP
UPR
KdlR
Voters'
Voters'
Party Party Coalition Party Party Syndicat Party
Party Party
Committe
Committe
e
e
e
52
52
691
407
697
45
(10,7)
45,26 41
(10,1) (11,6)
621
(89,9)
356 594
(87,5) (85,2)
101
269
52
52
52
52
52
610
719
528
551
498
45,9
(9)
46,6 39,2
(8,7) (7,7)
42,9
(8,3)
43,9
(9,7)
528
(86,6)
647
(90)
475
(90)
456
408
(82,8) (81,8)
577
(91,4)
44
41
354
22
12
22
85
18
(14,6)
(66,1) (6,3)
(6,7)
(49,2) (4,2)
(2,2)
(4,4)
484
136
307
470
441
306
(70)
(33,4) (44)
51
19
/
Partia Samoobrona- Other
"X
Leppera
committ
ees
Party
51
Voters'
Miscella
Committee
neous
44
From 1
to
21
Total
/
/
52
52
631
491
549
553
308
352
639
8789
45,5
(9,5)
44,4 36,8
(9,6) (9,4)
46,7
(11,7)
46,5
(10,6)
44,8
(9,9)
47,1
(13)
44,1
(10,5)
415 500
(84,5) (91,1)
485
(87,7)
242
(78,6)
293
(83,2)
552
7637
(86,4) (86,9)
19
50
32
166
51
1318
(13,5)
(3,7) (3,5)
(9)
(10,4)
(47,2)
(8)
(15)
423
439
341
293
366
123
130
350
5362
(77)
(61,3) (73,1) (55,5) (84,9)
(69,6)
(69,4) (53,4)
(66,2)
(39,9)
(36,9)
(54,8)
(61)
386
52
17
/
9
8
49
48
49
22
40
47
34
19
10
12
1
11
1 à 16
/
10
9
51
78
66
23
46
61
51
20
13
14
1
18
191
684
51,7
(9,8)
41 47,7
(3,6) (9,4)
50,3
(10,6)
48,4 45,5
(9,5) (9,2)
51,2
(9,6)
51,1
(10,4)
51,2
(11,4)
54,5 43,4
(13,2) (4,4)
43,4
(10,6)
42
(0)
52,8
(11,6)
48,1
(9,8)
49,3
(10,2)
10
(100)
8
47
(88,9) (92,2)
71
(91)
63
22
(95,4) (95,6)
40
(87)
54
(88,5)
46
(90,2)
17
11
(85) (84,6)
14
(100)
1
(100)
17
(94,4)
166
616
(86,9) (90,1)
6
31
2
0
3
3
0
0
4
0
10
(7,7)
(47)
(8,7)
(0)
(4,9)
(5,9)
(0)
(0)
(28,6)
(0)
(55,6)
70
44
22
34
55
43
18
7
13
0
1
(10)
10
7
6
(77,8) (11,8)
6
39
27
101
(14,1) (14,8)
156
556
8 (44,4)
(96,9)
(100)
(66,7) (76,5)
(89,7)
(66,7) (95,7) (73,9) (90,2)
(84,3)
(90) (53,8)
(92,9)
(0)
(81,7) (81,3)
Compiled by us. Sources: our own calculations based on data from the National Electoral Commission
(PKW).
193
An analysis of the lists of candidates registered with the National Electoral
Commission reveals a clear predominance of male candidates for parliamentary office
in 1993. The lists of the Samoobrona-Leppera Committee are no exception to this rule
of selection of Polish political personnel, which is particularly prevalent in the postcommunist era1 : less than 20% of its candidates for the Sejm are women, and of the
Committee's eighteen contenders for the Senate, only one is a woman. Similarly, the
average age of Samoobrona-Leppera candidates is comparable to that of other
committees, with the vast majority aged between 35 and 55.
Conversely, in terms of the professions declared by candidates, the SamoobronaLeppera lists stand out quite clearly from those of most other committees. The
percentage of candidates declaring an agricultural profession is significantly higher
than the average for all candidates. Only the PSL-PL and the PSL, two formations
which unlike the Samoobrona-Leppera Committee explicitly claim their agrarian
identity, show a more marked over-representation of workers in the agricultural
sector. Similarly, far fewer Samoobrona-Leppera candidates than those on the other
lists, with the exception of the PSL-PL list for the Diet, declare that they work in an
upper-category profession, i.e. one that reflects the possession of a high level of
economic, cultural or educational capital2 . This is the case for barely a third of its
candidates for the Sejm and less than half of those for the Senate.
Highlighting this dual specificity in the composition of the Samoobrona-Leppera lists
calls for a closer look at the concrete modalities of selection and self-presentation of
the committee's candidates. Indeed, the over-representation of workers in the
agricultural sector and the under-representation of declarants of professions
We believe that "superior" candidates on the lists testify both to the self-presentation
strategies implemented by certain candidates and, above all, to the strong
1 Cf. Wasilewski Jacek, "Socjologiczny portret polskiej elity potransformacyjnej", in Wasilewski Jacek
(ed.), Elita polityczna, Warsaw, ISP-PAN, 1998.
2 By "higher professions", we mean those that either reflect a high level of education (engineer, teacher
or doctor, for example), or carry a particular social prestige and reveal the possession of significant
economic (businessman, for example) or cultural (actor, writer) capital.
194
constraints that weighed on the committee's initiators in their work of recruiting
candidates. Firstly, observation of the professional declarations of the SamoobronaLeppera committee's parliamentary candidates reveals a tendency for some of them to
define their profession in terms that emphasize their membership of socially and
politically disadvantaged groups in Poland in the early 1990s. Andrzej Lepper, for
example, describes himself simply as a farmer, without specifying his qualifications
or the size of his farm. Similarly, Janusz Bryczkowksi advertises himself as a
shopkeeper when, in view of his activities, he could have opted for a more dignified
title, such as entrepreneur or businessman. While the existence of this type of
subversive self-presentation strategy, based as it is on the promotion of professional
characteristics usually devalued in political competition, is undeniable, and helps to
enhance the "popular" appearance of the Samoobrona- Leppera lists, its scope must
nevertheless be qualified. In fact, these strategies remain extremely marginal and are
only used by a small number of candidates, most of whom come from the national
leadership of ZZR Samoobrona and/or have a certain personal, national or local
notoriety due to their previous involvement in protest mobilizations against the
Suchocka government. In contrast to these occasional instances of subversive selfpresentation, the main trends in the composition of the Samoobrona-Leppera lists
remain, as in most other committees, those of promoting candidates with properties
that conform to the traditional rules of political personnel selection and relegating the
most disadvantaged agents. Thus, among the forty-four heads of constituency lists, the
percentage of those declaring an agricultural profession fell slightly to 40.9%, while
that of those declaring a "higher" profession rose to 38.6% (see Table 3). Among the
top twenty on the national list, the promotion of individuals with resources usually
valued in electoral competition is even more notable. Only four of them, including
three national leaders of ZZR Samoobrona, identify themselves as agricultural
workers (20%), while eleven declare a higher profession (55%) (see Table 2). Above
all, several of these candidates can boast previous political experience, sometimes at
national level (Józef Pawelec and Edward Kowalczyk, for example), and h a v e
economic capital of
195
In addition, the company's employees were also relatively well known in Poland at the
time, thanks to their military (Stanisław Skalski) or sporting (Andrzej Supron and
Wladysław Komar) backgrounds.
Table 11: Top twenty candidates on the committee's national list
Samoobrona-Leppera in the parliamentary elections of September 19, 1993.
Position on
the national
list
1
Name
First name
Profession declared
Biographical highlights
Lepper
Andrzej
Farmer
2
Bryczkowski
Janusz
Retailer
3
Skalski
Stanisław
Driver
President of ZZR Samoobrona and Przymierze Samoobrona
Vice-Chairman of the Przymierze Samoobrona, member of the
Prezydium of the ZZR Samoobrona.
Polish air force ace during the Second World War, retired Polish
Army General, member of the Grunwald Patriotic Union in the early
1980s, unsuccessful candidate
to the Senate in 1991.
4
Pawelec
Józef Jacek
University Professor
5
Supron
Andrzej
Wrestling coach
6
Walkiewicz
Zdzislaw
Agricultural technician
7
Komar
Wladyslaw
Teacher
Former Olympic shot put champion (1972).
8
Borowik
Ksawery
Engineer
Ranked among Poland's top 100 fortunes in 1992.
9
Nowak
Edward
Kazimierz
University Professor
/
10
Mikołajczyk
Karol
/
11
Kasowski
Julian
12
Skórski
Pawel Andrzej
Contractor
Construction
engineer
Engineer, farmer
Vice-President of ZZR Samoobrona and Przymierze Samoobrona
13
Muszyński
Stanisław
Artisan
/
14
Gołębiewski
Janusz Andrzej
Doctor
15
Kowalczyk
Edward
Teacher
16
Wycech
Roman
Farmer
/
Twice a member of parliament in the days of the People's Republic
Telecommunications from 1969 to 1980, Chairman of the SD Central
Committee from 1981 to 1985.
Member of the Prezydiums of ZZR Samoobrona and Przymierze
Samoobrona.
17
Glinicki
Janusz
Artisan
/
18
Krzyszczak
Józef
Retired
Former AK resistance fighter.
19
Gaworski
Henryk Michal
Writer
20
Poręba
Bohdan
Film director
Former AK resistance fighter and participant in the Warsaw
Uprising.
Chairman of the National Council of the Grunwald Patriotic Union
in the early 1980s.
Officer in the Polish Army, Member of Parliament for the Ière
Parliament (1991-1993) elected on the KPN lists.
Former world champion (1979) and Olympic vice-champion
(1980) in wrestling.
/
/
Compiled by us. Sources: National Electoral Commission (PKW) data and personal research.
Secondly, it is the constraints placed on the committee's initiators in drawing up the
lists that seem to have played the most decisive role in the over-representation of
agricultural workers and the under-representation of "higher" professions observed
among the Samoobrona-Leppera candidates. In other words, rather than a genuine
attempt to promote socially and politically underprivileged personnel, or at least to
present themselves as such, the lists above all testify to the difficulties encountered by
the committee in recruiting the right candidates.
196
candidates with social properties and resources deemed conducive to political success.
Marginalized in the dynamics of pre-election bargaining, the initiators of the
Samoobrona-Leppera committee were unable to present complete lists in all the
constituencies1 and were only able to rally a limited number of individuals endowed
with the personal resources traditionally valued in the competition for political office:
a degree, the exercise of a profession, etc. The Samoobrona-Leppera committee was
also unable to win the support of a limited number of candidates.
"The majority of them were promoted to the most visible positions on the lists, those
which were also potentially eligible. Having promoted the vast majority of them to the
most visible positions on the lists, those which are also potentially eligible, they have
subsequently only mobilized agricultural activists from the Samoobrona ZZR as "addons", in order to complete the lists on which the latter are thus often relegated to
marginal positions. This general observation needs to be refined, however, by taking
into account the very wide disparities in list composition from one constituency to
another.
Table 12: Composition of the constituency lists of the Samoobrona- Leppera
committee for the parliamentary elections of September 19, 1993.
District
Number
of MP
mandates
at stake
Entire list
Percentage of
Number
occupational
Percentage
of
declarants
of men
agricultural
applicant
s
Top of the list
Percentage of
occupational
declarants
superior
Name
First name
Agric District
ultur resident
al
profe
ssion
No
Yes
Profession
Warsaw 1
17
12
100
0
75
Skalski
Stanisław
Driver
Warsaw 2
8
13
92,31
30,77
38,46
Wycech
Roman
Yes
Yes
Biała Podlaska
3
4
75
100
0
Grabczan
Zofia Anna
Yes
Yes
Białystok
7
6
66,67
0
33,33
Cieślak
Zbigniew
Farmer
Technician
agricultural
Mechanic
No
No
Bielsko-Biała
9
Bydgoszcz
11
14
92,86
57,14
No list Samoobrona-Leppera
MarmuckaTeresa
28,57
Lalka
Jadwiga
Biologist
No
Yes
Chełm
3
4
100
75
25
Podleśny
Kazimierz
No
Yes
Ciechanów
4
5
100
0
20
Paliński
Ireneusz
Teacher
Technician in
buildings
No
Yes
Częstochowa
8
7
100
0
42,85
Pawelec
Józef Jacek
No
No
Elbląg
5
3
100
66,66
66,66
Bogacz
Michał
No
No
Gdańsk
15
13
76,92
23,08
53,85
Pyliński
Andrzej
No
Yes
Gorzów
Wielkopolski
5
5
80
80
20
Borucka
Grażyna
No
Yes
Jelenia Góra
5
4
100
75
25
Kalita
Yes
Yes
Kalisz
7
11
63,64
81,82
18,18
Orzeszyna
Bogusław
Edward
Feliks
University
Doctor in
medicine
Veterinary
doctor
Textile
industry
technician
Breeder
Farmer
Yes
Yes
Sosnowiec
10
Katowice
17
8
100
0
Trainer of
No
No
No list Samoobrona-Leppera
25
Supron
Andrzej
197
1 Apart from the eight constituencies where it was unable to field candidates, the Samoobrona-Leppera
committee presented lists in fourteen constituencies with fewer candidates than there were positions to
be filled.
198
Fighting
Gliwice
14
7
85,71
42,86
57,14
Szymanski
Kielce
11
12
83,33
100
25
Skórski
Konin
5
7
85,71
28,57
57,14
Andrzejczak
Koszalin
5
6
100
33,33
16,67
Lepper
Krakow
13
Krosno
5
3
100
0
Legnica
5
9
100
77,78
Leszno
4
8
75
50
Lublin
10
12
75
41,67
Łomża
4
3
100
33,33
Łódź
12
16
68,75
50
Nowy Sącz
7
15
66,67
86,67
Jacek
Pawel
Andrzej
Ewa
Lucyna
Andrzej
Agricultural
Engineer
Agricultural
Engineer
Executive,
retailer
Farmer
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No list Samoobrona-Leppera
33,33
Businessman
Refrigeration
22,22
Majka
Zdzisław
technician,
breeder
25
Berus
Wacław
Farmer
Carpenter25
Rymarz
Stanisław
upholsterer
0
Glinicki
Janusz
Artisan
Włodzimier
50
Kusik
Engineer
z
No list Samoobrona-Leppera
Olsztyn
8
Opole
10
0
Ostrołęka
5
5
100
0
80
Piła
5
9
88,89
55,56
Piotrków
Trybunalski
7
12
91,67
25
Ejssymont
Borowska
Lech
Grażyna
Farmer
Yes
Yes
Gołębiewski
Janusz
Andrzej
Doctor
No
No
33,33
Trojanowski
Jerzy
Agricultural
mechanic
Yes
Yes
66,67
Surowiecki
Andrzej
Economist
No
Yes
Farmer
Yes
Yes
Artisan
No
Yes
Teacher
No
Yes
No list Samoobrona-Leppera
Płock
5
7
85,71
28,57
85,71
Kaczmarek
Poznań
14
10
100
80
40
Muszyński
Przemyśl
4
5
80
40
60
Lis
Tadeusz
Ryszard
Stanisław
Michał
Alicja
Radom
8
6
100
16,67
16,67
Pankowski
Alfred
Mechanic
No
Yes
Rzeszów
7
3
66,67
0
33,33
Rumianek
Contractor
No
No
Siedlce
7
9
88,89
77,78
11,11
Lipka
Farmer
Yes
Yes
Sieradz
4
8
62,5
50
37,5
Rożniata
Jerzy
Krzysztof
Franciszek
Anna
Małgorzata
Economist
No
Yes
Skierniewice
4
Słupsk
4
7
85,71
42,86
28,57
Zydroń
Ryszard
Contractor
No
Yes
Suwałki
5
6
66,67
33,33
33,33
Bryczkowski
Janusz
Retailer
No
Yes
3
100
0
100
Komar
Władysław
Teacher
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No list Samoobrona-Leppera
Szczecin
10
Tarnobrzeg
6
No list Samoobrona-Leppera
Tarnów
7
No list Samoobrona-Leppera
Toruń
7
5
60
40
60
Rochnowska
Renata
Maria
Wałbrzych
8
12
83,33
58,33
33,33
Łągiewka
Bogusław
Włocławek
4
7
71,43
85,71
0
Majchrzak
Zbigniew
Economist,
Farmer
Agricultural
technician
Farmer
Yes
Yes
Wrocław
12
14
71,43
35,71
42,86
Borowik
Ksawery
Engineer
No
Yes
Zamość
5
10
80
80
50
Czuchra
Yes
7
7
57,14
57,14
28,57
Póltorak
Farmer
Technician
agricultural
Yes
Zielona Góra
Teresa
Wojciech
Kazimierz
Yes
Yes
Total
391
352
83,24
47,16
36,93
Compiled by us. Sources: our own calculations based on data from the National Electoral Commission
(PKW).
Once again, these major variations in the composition of the lists by constituency
seem to us to be mainly due to the constraints placed on the initiators of the
Samoobrona-Leppera committee in the
199
These vary considerably depending on the geographical location of the Samoobrona
ZZR. In constituencies where the union has little or no presence, the distribution of
nominations was dominated by the logic of external recruitment, through the
formalization of partnerships with pre-existing groupings and the promotion of
individuals endowed with characteristics supposedly conducive to political success.
For example, in Warsaw's first constituency, none of the twelve candidates is a
member of the ZZR Samoobrona, and three-quarters of them claim to belong to the
upper classes1 . Similarly, in the constituencies of Szczecin and Ostrołęka, no
agricultural professionals appear on the lists, while candidates declaring a higher
profession are, conversely, very clearly over-represented there. In these last two
constituencies, as in almost a dozen others, we can even observe "parachuting"
practices whereby individuals with personal resources traditionally valued in political
competition are "parachuted in".
"In the case of the ZZR Samoobrona, however, it is the union's militant base that is
the main source of candidates for the Samoobrona-Leppera committee. On the other
hand, in constituencies where the Samoobrona ZZR is relatively well established, the
union's militant base is the main source of recruitment for Samoobrona-Leppera
committee candidates. Indeed, it is often the union's national or regional officers who
head the list there, for example Roman Wycech in Warsaw's second constituency,
Pawel Skórski in Kielce, Teresa Czuchra in Zamość or, of course, Andrzej Lepper in
Koszalin and Janusz Bryczkowski in Suwałki. Nonetheless, in these regions too, there
were undertakings to recruit and promote individuals from outside the union with
personal resources supposedly conducive to electoral success. Whether selected for
their previous membership of a partner group, or for their socio-professional
properties, these candidates from outside the ZZR Samoobrona generally occupy
better-placed positions on the lists than their farming union counterparts. For example,
in the Koszalin constituency, one of the union's historic strongholds, the local head of
the Polish Union of Pensioners and Invalids was promoted to second place behind
Andrzej Lepper. The only other ZZR
1 The twelve candidates include two engineers, two writers, two economists, a journalist, a lawyer, a
university professor and retired general Stanisław Skalski, who heads the list.
200
Samoobrona was relegated to fifth place, behind a Koszalin lawyer and another
pensioners' union official. Constituencies in which ZZR Samoobrona activists inherit
most of the top positions on lists thus remain relatively rare in practice: in only seven
cases do the top three candidates on a constituency list of the Samoobrona- Leppera
committee all belong to the union1 .
In the final analysis, careful observation of the composition of the lists submitted by
the Samoobrona-Leppera Committee to the National Electoral Commission allows us
to qualify their subversive scope. More than the consequence of a strategy to promote
underprivileged personnel, whom the committee nevertheless claims to represent, the
relative under-representation of candidates declaring a higher profession and the
relative over-representation of those declaring an agricultural profession testify above
all to the Samoobrona-Leppera's relegation in the political field and its inability to
recruit as widely as desired individuals with properties in line with the dominant rules
for selecting political personnel.
C) Mobilizing support: Samoobrona in the election campaign.
According to the Electoral Law of May 30, 1993, the electoral campaign begins on
the day of the official announcement of the organization of new elections by the
President of the Republic, in this case May 31, and ends 24 hours before the election
is held, on September 182 . In this sense, it covers the period during which committees
collect the signatures they need to register with the National Electoral Commission,
recruit candidates and promote their electoral offer by the committees actually
presenting lists. This sequence is the subject of a specific codification that provides a
framework for the activities of groups engaged in the electoral struggle, for example
by defining places where canvassing for signatures, electoral posters or the
distribution of campaign materials are prohibited, or by specifying the
1 These are the districts of Biała Podlaska, Kalisz, Kielce, Olsztyn, Siedlce, Włocławek and Zamość.
Section 14 of the electoral law of May 28, 1993 is explicitly devoted to the codification of the
electoral campaign and comprises 17 articles. The duration of the official campaign is set out in the first
of these, article 133. Cf. "Ustawa z dnia 28 maja 1993", art.cit.
2
201
television and radio broadcasting of campaign spots by the various committees1 .
Similarly, the funding of campaign-related committee activities is subject to legal
oversight. While no spending limits are explicitly set, and committees remain
relatively free in their fund-raising endeavours, electoral law formally prohibits the
mobilization of public money and capital from abroad2 . In addition to the law, the
definition of legitimate and illegitimate campaign practices also results, in a less
formalized and more fluctuating way, from the competitive interactions linking the
various players engaged in electoral competition. Indeed, by opposing each other on
the legitimacy of their respective political offers, or even on the legitimacy of their
participation in the competition, they help to define the field of legitimate and
illegitimate campaign practices.
"The media also play a decisive role in this competitive process. The media also play
a decisive role in this competitive process. Through their coverage of the campaign,
they influence the selection and prioritization of themes and controversies developed
during the campaign3 , but also the legitimization or illegitimization of the modes of
self-presentation and support mobilization implemented by candidate groups4 .
So, what is the repertoire of techniques for legitimizing and promoting its political
offering that a newcomer largely devoid of resources supposedly conducive to
political success, such as the Samoobrona-Leppera committee, can mobilize in the
campaign? What control do its leaders have over its image and public identity, in the
context of the legitimization and labeling struggles that characterize electoral
competition?
We shall see that while the repertoire of electoral mobilization used by the candidates
of the Samoobrona-Leppera committee is dominated by "conventional" techniques
1 Ibid, art.142 to 145.
2 Ibid, art.153.
3 See Sawicki Frédéric, "Les questions de protection sociale dans la campagne présidentielle française
de 1988. Contribution à l'étude de la formation de l'agenda électoral", Revue Française de science
politique, vol.41, n°2, 1991, in particular pages 189 to 192. See also Missika Jean-Louis & Bregman
Dorine, "La campagne : la sélection des controverses politiques", in Dupoirier Elisabeth & Grunberg
Gérard (dir.), Mars 1986 : la drôle de défaite de la gauche, Paris, PUF, 1986.
4 See for example: Bourmeau Sylvain, "La presse, les candidats, la campagne", paper presented at the
AFSP congress, Bordeaux, October 1988; Darras Eric, "L'illégitimité d'un intrus dans le jeu politique",
Les dossiers de l'audiovisuel, vol.11/12, nº 106, 2002.
202
to promote their political offering, in the final weeks of the campaign it expanded to
include practices that broke with the rules of electoral competition (1). While these
practices enabled the Samoobrona label to regain the media visibility it had largely
lacked since the beginning of the summer, we shall see that the committee leaders'
control over the campaign and, more broadly, over their group's public image became
increasingly uncertain as the election date drew closer (2).
1) A repertoire of electoral mobilization between subversion and conformation.
As we have already seen, the subversive scope of the Samoobrona-Leppera
committee's electoral offer needs to be qualified. The mobilization of a discourse
critical of the established political players and the prevailing political and economic
equilibrium is hardly accompanied by a questioning of the very foundations of the
political order, in particular the procedures for selecting those in power. On the
contrary, the formalization of the committee's electoral offer reflects a concern to
conform to the rules of electoral competition. Likewise, the vast majority of practices
implemented by members of the Samoobrona-Leppera committee during the electoral
campaign are indistinguishable, at least in form, from those of other candidate groups.
Far from behaving like "game breakers", Samoobrona-labeled candidates in fact
comply with the main campaign rules1 . On several occasions, Andrzej Lepper,
president of the ZZR Samoobrona, chairman of the Samoobrona-Leppera Committee
and head of the national list, even explicitly reaffirms his full adherence to the laws
governing electoral competition. For example, as early as June, he boasted that "the
money for our campaign comes from donations by supporters of the movement. We
don't receive a single dollar or a single
1 In this, they stand out from other outsiders in electoral competition, who combine their denunciation
of the prevailing political order with a concern for innovation in campaigning. A case in point are the
Motivées lists in the 2001 French municipal elections, studied by Christine Guionnet in Rennes and
Baptiste Giraud and Benoît Leroux in Toulouse. Cf. Guionnet Christine ""La politique autrement à
Rennes" entre récurrences et réinventions", in Lagroye Jacques, Lehingue Patrick & Sawicki Frédéric
(dir.), op.cit., p.117-143 Giraud Baptiste, "Les Motivé-e-s, ou l'innovation prisonnière des règles du jeu
politique", Sociologies pratiques, vol.2, n°15, 2007, p.55-67; Leroux Benoît, "Une campagne électorale
spectaculaire : les "Motivé-e-s" en représentation", Revue Interrogations, n°1, 2005, p.78-93.
203
Mark de l'étranger"1 , paradoxically making the committee's respect for the law a
criterion of probity and even distinction. Similarly, at the beginning of the summer, he
announced that the union and the electoral committee he chaired would refrain from
organizing protest demonstrations between now and the elections2 . Adhering to the
dominant
vision
of
the
election
as
a
moment
of
exchange
between
candidates/producers and citizens/consumers, where the main challenge for the former
would be to win over the latter, the candidates of the Samoobrona-Leppera committee
thus mobilize essentially
The committee's leaders, mainly Andrzej Lepper, are happy to take part in
"conventional" debates with competing national committees, especially on television
and radio. The committee's leaders, mainly Andrzej Lepper, also willingly took part in
debates with representatives of rival national committees, especially on television and
radio, where they were invited from time to time.
From August onwards, as the Samoobrona-Leppera committee struggled to make its
mark in the campaign and the first polls were not very favourable3 , we could
nevertheless observe variations in the electoral mobilization techniques used by its
members. In addition to the "conventional" methods of promoting the committee's
electoral offer, candidates implemented more unusual practices. These were mainly
developed in the judicial arena and in that of protest mobilizations, and seem to testify
to a redefinition of the Samoobrona- Leppera Committee's campaign strategy in the
sense of a revival of the undertakings to subvert the political order on which the
reputation of the Samoobrona label was built in the months preceding the dissolution
of Parliament.
Firstly, there were attempts to politicize the various trials held in the summer of 1993
against ZZR Samoobrona activists for
1 "Samoobrona Wyborcza", Gazeta Wyborcza, 08/06/1993, p.2.
2 "Samoobrona startuje do Wyborów", Chłopska droga, 20/06/1993.
A poll conducted by the CBOS institute in mid-August 1993 gave the Samoobrona-Leppera
committee just 1% of the vote. In a mock "pre-election" organized in the town of Września by the
weekly Wprost on August 22, it received just 1.1% of the votes cast by the four thousand participants in
this experiment. See respectively: "Lewą marsz", Gazeta Wyborcza, 21/08/1993,
p.2 and "Sojusz wrześniowy", Gazeta Wyborcza, 23/08/1993, p.1.
3
204
the exactions committed, often in the name of the "Peasant Battalions", during the
demonstrations of 1992 and 1993. Taking advantage of the media attention given to
these trials, some of the defendants transformed the courtroom into a political forum1 .
Andrzej Lepper, himself a defendant, explicitly linked his line of defense to the
Samoobrona-Leppera committee's electoral bid. Reiterating his criticism of the
political and economic equilibrium in force since 1989, he endeavors to legitimize the
union demonstrators' recourse to violent practices by placing them in perspective with
what he describes as the government's "betrayal of Polish interests" and "manipulation
of democracy"2 . He repeatedly denounces the incompetence and cynicism of the
politicians in power, and even implicitly questions their commitment to democratic
values, accusing them of seeking to politically instrumentalize the trials against ZZR
Samoobrona activists in order to eliminate them from political competition. Once
again drawing on the analogy with the Solidarity movement, he declared: "When
those in power fail to meet their obligations, there are no longer any illegal forms of
protest. None of the actions carried out by our union in the past can therefore be
considered a crime. [...] Those who accuse us today of breaking the law should
understand this, since they themselves brutally broke the law in the 1980s when they
fought against the authorities"3 .
Secondly, contrary to Lepper's earlier commitments, candidates from the
Samoobrona-Leppera committee took part i n protest actions in certain constituencies
in the final weeks of the campaign. Mostly focused on the issue of unemployment,
these actions are often organized in association with local groups. The first and most
spectacular of these actions took place in the small town of Praszka, in the
Częstochowa voivodship. The
On August 3, several dozen activists from ZZR Samoobrona and the "Praszka
Unemployed Protest Committee" broke into the office of the town's mayor,
Włodzimierz Skoczek (UD), whom they accused of being too inactive in the face of
rising unemployment.
1 For another example of attempts to invest the judicial arena as a space for political mobilization, this
time as a plaintiff, see Emmanuel Brillet's work on the Harkis. Cf. Brillet Emmanuel, "Scène judiciaire
et mobilisation politique. Les actions en justice des représentants de la communauté Harkie", Pôle Sud,
vol.1, n° 24, 2006, p.45-58.
2 "Samoobrona oskarżona", Gazeta Wyborcza, 14/08/1993, p.1.
3 "W obronie narodu", Gazeta Wyborcza, 14/08/1993, p.3.
205
unemployment in the commune. After forcing him to sign a letter of resignation, they
forced him into a wheelbarrow, which they then wheeled around the market square1 .
Widely reported in the national media, this spectacular action was followed a week
later by a new occupation of the municipal administration building by around a
hundred demonstrators2 . This lasted almost ten days and was once again the subject
of extensive press coverage. The link between the committee's election campaign and
this reinvestment of the protest arena by union activists is clear. In the case of
Praszka, two leaders of the "Unemployed Protest Committee" behind the actions
against the municipal administration, Antoni Arndt and Bogusław Przybył, are also
candidates on the Samoobrona-Leppera lists in the Częstochowa constituency, in
second and seventh place respectively. During the operation against Mayor
Włodzimierz Skoczek, himself a UD candidate for the Senate in the constituency,
several demonstrators actually sported the committee's campaign signs and posters3 .
Finally, Andrzej Lepper, who visited the commune several times in August, made
repeated references to Praszka's situation in his public speeches, and made no secret
of his desire to set it up as a symbol of the "incompetence and greed of traditional
politicians" denounced at national level in the committee's program4 .
The participation of candidates from the Samoobrona-Leppera committee in activities
that broke with traditional campaign practices enabled the Samoobrona label to
regain, from August onwards, the high media profile it enjoyed during the protest
mobilizations of late 1992 and early 1993 [table 13]. While the increase in the number
of articles devoted to the activities of the Samobrona-Leppera committee is partly
attributable to the growing media coverage of the campaign following the
officialization by the National Electoral Commission of the list of committees
authorized to take part in the elections, it is in fact due above all to the extensive
coverage given by the main national media to the trials of ZZR Samoobrona activists
and the
1 "Taczka z Praszki", Gazeta Wyborcza, 04/08/1993, p.1.
2 "Oblężenie przerwane", Gazeta Wyborcza,12/08/1993, p.2.
3 "Praszka napiętą", Gazeta Wyborcza, 10/08/1993, p.2.
4 "Taczka Samoobrona", Gazeta Wyborcza, 14/08/1993, p.5.
206
protest actions involving Samoobrona-Leppera candidates, particularly those of
Praszka1 .
Table 13: Number of Gazeta Wyborcza articles mentioning a Samoobrona
organization (trade union, party or electoral committee) in June, July and
August 1993.
June 93
Total
Articles focusing on a
Samoobrona
organization or one of
the
its actions
Including on the
front page
Articles mentioning a
Samoobrona organization
in the
as part of the treatment
of another subject
Total number of
articles
mentioning a
Samoobrona
organization
On protest
actions
July 93
On legal
proceeding
s
Total
Protest actions
August 93
On legal
proceeding
s
Total
On protest
actions
On legal
proceeding
s
4
0
0
4
0
2
28
14
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
3
1
3
0
0
5
0
0
27
6
5
7
0
0
9
0
2
55
20
12
Compiled by us. Sources: our own calculations based on the archives of the national edition of the daily
Gazeta Wyborcza for June, July and August 1993.
The expansion of the Samoobrona-Leppera Committee's electoral mobilization
repertoire to include unusual and spectacular campaigning practices from August
onwards, enabled it to benefit from a media visibility it had largely lacked since
announcing its participation in the elections. However, the extent of this apparent
inflexion in the committee's campaign needs to be tempered. Up until the elections,
traditional mobilization practices remained largely dominant in the committee's
activities, with less conventional actions remaining the exception and being
implemented only in a limited number of constituencies. Above all, the strategic
dimension should be qualified. In fact, the committee's management appears to have
only limited control over the campaign activities of its candidates, particularly those
who are not members of ZZR Samoobrona, whether in their public appearances or
their participation in campaign activities.
1 The wide coverage given to Praszka's actions is also the subject of controversy in certain media. In
Gazeta Wyborcza, readers regularly complain that the Samoobrona-Leppera campaign receives too
much publicity in the newspaper's columns. For example: "Telefoniczna opinia publiczna", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 17/08/1993, p.12; "Telefoniczna opinia publiczna", Gazeta Wyborcza, 23/08/1993, p.14.
207
protest. In other words, contrary to what we observed during the protests of late 1992
and early 19931 , farm union leaders seem to be struggling to impose their monopoly
on the committee's public voice, to force candidates to adhere to nationally-defined
themes and practices, and, more broadly, to control the group's public identity in
electoral competition.
2) The difficulty of controlling the dynamics of an election campaign.
The first difficulty encountered by the committee in controlling its campaign and
public identity is linked to the group's lack of internal cohesion. As we saw earlier,
many of the candidates it puts forward, including several heads of constituency lists,
are not members of ZZR Samoobrona or Przymierze Samoobrona and have had
previous, sometimes radically different, political experiences. Thus, while some
entered politics within the PZPR or SD, others have long been linked to organizations
hostile t o
communist power, such as Rural Solidarity or the KPN. Once the lists
have been made official, the ZZR Samoobrona leaders who initiated the formation of
the Samoobrona-Leppera committee have very little leverage over these candidates,
whose profiles vary widely, particularly in districts where the union has little or no
presence2 . As a result, many of them, especially those with their own social or
political resources, quickly distanced themselves from the committee's instructions,
behaving like free electrons, preferring their own convictions or interests to the line
officially set by the party and objectified in its electoral program. In this sense, the
repeated anti-Semitic considerations of Stanisław Skalski, head of the list in the
Warsaw 1 constituency and third on the national list, seem to express his personal
opinion much more than the positioning that the
1 See chapter 2, section 1.
2 More generally, on the relationship between national party leaderships and their candidates at local
level, and in particular on the empowerment logics that may emerge, please refer to : Sawicki Frédéric,
"La marge de manœuvre des candidats par rapport aux partis dans les campagnes électorales",
Pouvoirs, n°63, 1992, p.6.
208
committee intends to endorse in the electoral competition1 . Similarly, it seems
unlikely that Józef Pawelec's regular breaches of electoral law - he repeatedly appears
at campaign meetings dressed in his army officer's uniform - are the product of a
subversive strategy implemented at the level of the Samoobrona-Leppera
Committee's leadership, at a time when the latter is endeavouring to multiply pledges
of compliance with campaign rules2 . The ability of the Samoobrona-Leppera
Committee's national leadership to control the electoral mobilization practices
implemented by its candidates in the constituencies also seems to be gradually
diminishing as the campaign progresses and the polls crediting it with less than the
5% needed to enter Parliament multiply. The example of the protest actions taking
place in Praszka is particularly eloquent here. On August 19, the chairman of the local
protest committee, Antoni Arndt, announced that the demonstrators who had been
occupying the municipal administration building for ten days had decided to distance
themselves from the Samoobrona-Leppera committee and the ZZR Samoobrona.
Renouncing his own candidacy, he announced his rapprochement with Władysław
Serafin, outgoing MP and PSL candidate in the constituency, who offered to mediate
between the strikers and the public authorities. "Protest action in Praszka has always
been the work of the Local Committee of the Unemployed alone, and not of
Samoobrona. [...] At present, Mr. Serafin has far more access to the government than
Samoobrona"3 , he declared, inflicting a real slap in the face on the national leadership
of the Samoobrona-Leppera Committee, which for several days had been making the
Praszka action a central element of its campaign. The camouflet was made all the
harder by the fact that the mediation of Władysław Serafin
While some ZZR Samoobrona leaders, including Andrzej Lepper, have in t h e past u s e d antiSemitic rhetoric to criticize members of the government (notably during the demonstrations in the
summer of 1992), this way of denouncing the current political order is completely absent from the
1
programmatic offer and public interventions of the union's leaders during the election campaign. Thus,
when Stanisław Skalski declares, as he does at a press conference on August 13: "In Poland there is no
real Democracy, it is at most a Judeocracy", he clearly seems to be at odds with the themes the
committee intends to promote in the campaign. On this episode: "Dowody tolerancji", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 13/08/1993, p.2.
2 Electoral law explicitly prohibits the wearing of military uniforms and medals for campaign activities.
Thus, by appearing in an officer's uniform at public meetings, Józef Pawelec exposes himself to
disciplinary proceedings within the army, but also exposes the Samoobrona-Leppera committee to
sanctions from the National Electoral Commission: Cf. "Rękawica Podjęta", Gazeta Wyborcza,
30/07/1993, p.2.
3 "Moralne prawo do taczki", Gazeta Wyborcza, 20/08/1993, p.4.
209
proved successful, and the demonstrators called off their action on August 22, having
obtained satisfaction for several of their demands1 .
The second difficulty is linked to the dominant position occupied by the SamoobronaLeppera committee in the electoral competition. Far from fading away, its
marginality, due as much to its outsider status as to its image as a radical formation,
tended to increase during the campaign. Firstly, because the prospect of a victory for
the former SLD communists quickly became the most likely outcome of the election.
This image, widely conveyed by the media, helped to guide the tactical activities of
the main groups involved in the campaign2 . It tended to organize the competition
around an axis pitting the formations inherited from the communist regime (SLD and
PSL), presented as the main "contenders", against those claiming their affiliation with
the Solidarity movement in different ways, whether they were "outgoing" (UD, KLD)
or themselves contenders (PC-ZP, Ojczyzna, UP3 ). In this context, electoral offers
based on a negation of this opposition, such as that of Samoobrona-Leppera, which
claims to send the "old and new Nomenklatura" back to back, struggle to make
themselves heard and their bearers are relegated to the status of secondary, even
farcical, competitors. Secondly, from August onwards, as the Samoobrona-Leppera
committee expanded its repertoire of electoral mobilization to include practices that
broke with traditional campaigning methods, the illegitimacy suits against it began to
intensify. The other protagonists in the electoral competition are denouncing with
increasing vigor the incoherence, demagoguery and even dangerousness of the
committee's electoral offering, whether in terms of its program per se or the
personalities on its lists. Visit
1 "Praszka bez taczki", Gazeta Wyborcza, 23/08/1993 , p.2.
2 Indeed, as Patrick Lehingue notes, "all the operations, both ordinary and complex, that lead to the
collective production of verdicts are an integral part of electoral campaigns, or at least constitute a
central - though often ignored - dimension of the journalistic narration of them", in Lehingue Patrick,
"Mais qui a gagné? Les mécanismes de production des verdicts électoraux (Le cas des scrutins
municipaux)", in Lagroye Jacques, Lehingue Patrick, Sawicki Frédéric, (dir.), op.cit. p.323.
3 The Unia Pracy (Union of Labor) party was created in June 1992 by the union of two groupings from
the "left" wing of Solidarity (Solidarność Pracy and the Ruch Demokratyczno-Społeczny) and a
formation made up of former PZPR reformers (Polska Unia Socjaldemokratyczna). Despite this
original "double filiation" in the Poland of the early 1990s, UP claims in its campaign documents to be
the legacy of the Solidarité Ouvrier of the 1980s and 1981. Cf.
"Broszura Wyborcza Unii Pracy, sierpień 1993", in Wybory 1993. Part i ich programy, op.cit. p.351376.
210
Attacks are particularly fierce from groups who see themselves as being in direct
competition with him for a segment of the electorate, i.e. mainly the protagonists in
the field of peasant representation, the PSL and PSL-PL, and the many committees
claiming a nationalist identity, notably the KPN or Ojczyzna. The leadership of the
latter even went so far as to submit an official request for the delegalisation of the
Samoobrona-Leppera committee to the National Electoral Commission1 . Similarly,
the main Polish media, particularly the press, convey an image of the SamoobronaLeppera Committee that is at odds with the one its leaders are keen to promote. In
addition to focusing on its least legitimate campaign practices, political journalists
from the main national dailies and weeklies, regardless of their political orientation,
do not hesitate to openly denigrate its electoral offering. The incompetence of its
candidates and the vacuity of its economic program are the arguments most
commonly used to challenge the committee's claim to positions of political power.
Despite protests from Lepper, who regularly denounces media bias in the campaign2 ,
the Samoobrona-Leppera Committee is thus relegated by most journalists to the rank
of illegitimate participant in the electoral competition, in the same way as Partia "X",
created by Stanisław Tymiński following his participation in the second round of the
1990 presidential election, to which it is moreover often equated. Both are accused of
trying to exploit the dissatisfaction of certain sections of the Polish population with
socio-economic reforms, or even their nostalgia for the Communist period, to satisfy
their political ambitions.
D) Dealing with the "verdict" of the ballot box.
The final days of the election campaign are specifically codified in the electoral law.
Fifteen days before the election, campaign clips of equal length for all national
committees are broadcast on the
1 "Wszystko Obstawione", Gazeta Wyborcza, 12/08/1993, p.3; "Ojczyzna ma różnych wrogów",
Gazeta Wyborcza, 06/09/1993, p.5.
2 The leadership of the Samoobrona-Leppera committee is not alone in expressing reservations about
media coverage of the campaign, particularly on television. Several other committees, including the
UPR, the PC-ZP and the "X" Party, are openly contesting the lack of airtime given to them on public
channels: Cf. "Zacznie "X", skończy UD", Gazeta Wyborcza, 19/08/1993, p.3.
211
television and public radio. Twelve days before, the publication of polls was
prohibited. Finally, the day before, the campaign is officially over. All electioneering
activities and demonstrations are prohibited until polling stations close1 . These
various legislative rules help to dramatize the run-up to election day and convey an
image of voting as a reasoned choice by citizens from among the various electoral
offers, with the law guaranteeing voters the opportunity and time to become
acquainted with them and evaluate them. From this perspective, election results are
themselves commonly understood as the objectification of citizens' political
preferences2 . The performance of the various committees is then seen as a reflection
of their ability to convince voters of the relevance of their program, with the
distinction between winners and losers resulting from the simple arithmetical
operation of adding up and comparing the number of votes obtained by each
committee. This purely arithmetical vision of the election is problematic. Firstly, it
levels out the performance of the various committees at national level, thereby largely
ignoring the sometimes significant regional variations. Secondly, it tends to negate the
subjective dimension of interpreting election results. The latter appears to be the
uncertain product of a set of competing operations implemented by the various
protagonists of electoral interaction, whether candidates or political commentators, in
order to "make the votes speak", to "assign an often narrowly political meaning to
printed ballots"3 , and, in so doing, to impose their reading of the "verdict of the ballot
box" as the only valid one.
First, we'll look at the results obtained by the Samoobrona-Leppera Committee on
September 19, 1993, highlighting the significant variations in these results from
constituency to constituency (1). We will then show how the interpretation of the
committee's electoral performance as a "rout", which was by no means self-evident, is
rapidly gaining ground, even among some of its candidates and leaders (2).
1 Respectively Art.142, Art.136, and 133 and 141 of the Electoral Law of May 28, 1993. "Ustawa z
dnia 28 maja 1993 r.", art.cit.
2 Cf. Lagroye Jacques, François Bastien & Sawicki Frédéric, op.cit. p.359-360.
3 Lehingue Patrick, "Mais qui a gagné?", art.cit. p.325.
212
1) The test of results.
On Sunday September 19, 1993, almost fourteen million Poles went to the polls to
elect their deputies and senators. At 52%, voter turnout was almost ten percent higher
than at the previous parliamentary elections in October 1991. The official results
proclaimed a few days later by the National Electoral Commission largely confirmed
the expectations of commentators, as well as the first estimates emerging from the
ballot boxes. While the two "heir" parties to the communist regime, SLD and PSL,
came out on top, only eight out of thirty-five committees managed to secure
parliamentary representation, twenty-one fewer than two years earlier.
Table 14: Results of the parliamentary elections of September 19, 1993.
Election committee
Percentage of
total votes
Diet
Senate
Number of
cast
mandate
mandate votes (Diet)
(Diet)
s
s
LTC
20,41
171
37
2 815 169
PSL
15,4
132
36
2 124 367
UD
10,59
74
4
1 460 957
UP
7,28
41
2
1 005 004
Ojczyzna
6,37
/
/
878 445
KPN
5,77
22
/
795 487
BBWR
5,41
16
2
746 653
NSZZ "S
4,9
/
9
676 334
PC-ZP
4,42
/
1
609 973
KLD
3,99
/
1
550 578
UPR
3,18
/
/
438 559
Samoobrona-Leppera
2,78
/
/
383 967
Partia "X
2,74
/
/
377 480
KdlR
2,7
/
/
371 923
PSL-PL
2,37
/
1
327 085
TSKMNSO
0,44
3
1
60 770
RAŚ
0,19
/
/
26 357
TSKNWK
0,17
1
/
23 396
Other committees
0,89
/
6
123 723
Total
100
460
100
13 796 227
Compiled by us. Sources: data from the National Electoral Commission (PKW).
Number of votes
obtained in 1991
(Diet)
1 344 820
972,952 (PSL-SP)
1 382 051
/
/
841 738
/
566 553
977,344 (POC)
839 978
253 024
/
52 735
/
613,626 (RL-PL)
/
40 061
/
3 333 720
11 218 602
By doubling their number of votes, the SLD and PSL succeeded in electing almost
three times as many MPs as in 1991 (171 versus 60 and 132 versus 48). Although the
213
gaining almost 100,000 votes, the UD of outgoing Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka
came third, winning only twelve deputy mandates (74 against 62). Nevertheless, it
was well ahead of the other committees claiming to be part of the Solidarity
movement. With 6.37% of the vote, the "Ojczyzna" committee failed to pass the 8%
threshold imposed on electoral coalitions. Similarly, neither the NSZZ "S", the PCZP, the KLD, the KdlR of former Prime Minister Olszewski, nor the PSL-PL, which
lost almost half its electorate compared with 1991, obtained a single mandate in the
Sejm. As for the BBWR, a committee set up in June 1993 by President Wałęsa
himself1 , it barely breaks through, sending just 16 deputies to the Sejm. Apart from
two committees of the German minority, the other two formations with enough votes
to obtain mandates in the Diet were the KPN, which nevertheless lost almost half its
seats compared to 1991 (22 elected against 42), and above all the UP. With 7.28% of
the vote, this party significantly outperformed pollsters' expectations, winning 41
deputy and 2 senatorial mandates. As for the Samoobrona-Leppera Committee, it
came in at 12ème with 2.78% of the vote, and failed to get any of its candidates elected
to parliament.
However, these national results conceal profound disparities between constituencies,
which call for local contexts to be taken into account when interpreting them. Poland's
regions are characterized by varying social, economic and political configurations,
which influence the establishment of different political and trade union organizations,
the campaigning practices of candidates and, consequently, the balance of power
between the various electoral committees2 . As a result, the results of these
committees vary considerably from region to region. For example, the percentage of
votes cast for the SLD lists varies by a factor of three between the constituencies of
Krosno (12.51%) and Sosnowiec (33.65%), while the differences are even more
impressive for the UD lists (from 4.22% in Zamość to 22.87% in Poznań) and PSL
(from 2.77% in the urban constituency of Warsaw 1 to almost
1
The name and acronym of this committee (BBWR: Bloc Non-partisan de soutien aux réformes),
whose creation was announced on June 1er by Lech Wałęsa at a press conference at his official
Belvedere residence, is a direct reference to the BBWR (Bloc Non-partisan de collaboration avec le
gouvernement) created before the 1928 elections by supporters of Marshal Józef Piłsudski.
2 On the influence of the local context on candidates' campaigning practices, based on the French case,
please refer to : Sawicki Frédéric, "La marge de manoeuvre des candidats" art.cit. p.5-6.
214
44% in Płock). Similarly, the performance of the Samoobrona- Leppera committee
was far from homogeneous between the different regions where it fielded candidates
[see table 15 and map 1]. Gathering less than 2% of the vote in the constituencies of
Warsaw 1, Katowice and Ostrołęka, its lists pass the 5% mark in those of Chełm,
Elbląg, Legnica, Piła and Suwałki, and even peak at over 10% in those of Koszalin
and Słupsk.
Table 15: Results by constituency of the Samoobrona- Leppera committee lists
in the parliamentary elections of September 19, 1993.
District
N°
Name
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Warsaw
Warsaw 2
Biała Podlaska
Białystok
Bielsko-Biała
Bydgoszcz
Chełm
Ciechanów
Częstochowa
Elbląg
Gdańsk
Gorzów
Wielkopolski
Jelenia Góra
Kalisz
Sosnowiec
Katowice
Gliwice
Kielce
Konin
Koszalin
Krakow
Krosno
Legnica
Leszno
Lublin
Łomża
Łódź
Nowy Sącz
Olsztyn
Opole
Ostrołęka
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
General results
Committee
ranked 1e (%
Total votes
of total)
cast
of votes)
Samoobrona-Leppera committee results
794 936
267 394
111 207
254 247
338 840
429 732
83 839
143 138
286 685
156 821
549 952
LTC (22.60)
LTC (15,12)
PSL (32.68)
SLD (24.77)
SLD (16,12)
LTC (29.41)
PSL (26.13)
PSL (26.51)
LTC (20,27)
LTC (24.79)
LTC (15.59)
8 831
6 379
4 328
5 309
/
18 346
4 377
4 477
9 530
8 036
14 003
1,11
2,38
3,89
2,09
/
4,27
5,22
3,13
3,32
5,12
2,55
Committee
rank/total
number of
committees
13/19
14/17
9/17
15/16
/
8/18
5/17
10/17
14/17
5/15
14/18
169 902
LTC (25.21)
8 193
4,82
6/15
175 955
272 970
384 067
518 482
420 986
397 167
158 602
185 313
462 456
178 219
177 018
151 593
364 341
115 809
458 284
248 573
258 912
320 439
121 073
LTC (24.43)
LTC (23.50)
LTC (33.65)
LTC (18.97)
LTC (16,11)
PSL (27.55)
PSL (24.52)
LTC (25.21)
UD (18.47)
PSL (17.92)
LTC (25,27)
LTC (21.88)
PSL (21.48)
PSL (29.18)
LTC (26.62)
PSL (18,23)
LTC (23.70)
LTC (16.72)
PSL (27.31)
8 137
9 401
/
7 075
8 491
12 336
6 224
25 812
/
5 977
9 007
6 184
10 024
4 250
11 093
/
12 077
/
1 825
4,62
3,44
/
1,36
2,02
3,11
3,92
13,93
/
3,35
5,09
4,08
2,75
3,67
2,42
/
4,66
/
1,51
8/15
10/16
/
15/21
15/19
8/17
10/16
2/15
/
12/15
7/15
7/16
13/18
11/16
14/19
/
8/16
/
15/15
Number of
votes
% of total votes
215
32
Piła
184 079
SLD (27.48)
11 309
6,14
5/16
Piotrków
33
222 107
PSL (24.02)
7 815
3,52
11/17
Trybunalski
34
Płock
191 646
PSL (43.97)
4 748
2,48
11/17
35
Poznań
540 424
UD (22.87)
12 667
2,34
12/19
36
Przemyśl
146 582
PSL (29.28)
3 677
2,51
11/15
37
Radom
254 385
PSL (26.59)
6 833
2,69
12/20
38
Rzeszów
268 467
PSL (20.91)
5 885
2,19
13/17
39
Siedlce
212 710
PSL (29.71)
5 988
2,82
13/17
40
Sieradz
146 172
PSL (28.26)
5 145
3,52
10/16
41
Skierniewice
139 011
PSL (30.95)
/
/
/
42
Słupsk
142 805
LTC (25.83)
14 338
10,04
3/16
43
Suwałki
145 247
LTC (18.64)
8 323
5,73
7/15
44
Szczecin
346 067
LTC (22.96)
13 823
3,99
12/17
45
Tarnobrzeg
197 551
PSL (27.98)
/
/
/
46
Tarnów
231 863
PSL (29.12)
/
/
/
47
Toruń
232 498
LTC (25.13)
9 188
3,95
10/16
48
Wałbrzych
257 894
LTC (24.86)
11 641
4,51
10/16
49
Włocławek
150 742
LTC (32.53)
5 117
3,39
9/16
50
Wrocław
419 091
LTC (19.96)
12 488
2,98
12/18
51
Zamość
184 325
PSL (39.86)
6 097
3,31
9/17
52
Zielona Góra
225 609
LTC (26,30)
9 163
4,06
10/16
Total National
13 796 227
LTC (20.41)
383 967
2,78
12/35
Compiled by us. Sources: our own calculations based on data from the National Electoral Commission
(PKW).
Map 1: results by constituency of the Samoobrona-Leppera committee lists in
the parliamentary elections of September 19, 1993.
216
Compiled by us using data from the National Electoral Commission (PKW).
In our view, three additional factors need to be taken into consideration to shed light
on the wide variations in the Samoobrona-Leppera Committee's results in the various
constituencies where it ran candidates. Firstly, "campaign facts" undeniably
influenced the performance of the committee's lists in certain constituencies. In
Ostrołęka and Częstochowa, for example, the withdrawal of Janusz Andrzej
Gołębiewski and Antoni Arndt, respectively first and second on the local lists, just a
few weeks before the election, made the task of mobilizing and promoting the
committee's political offering all the more complex. All the more so in the case of
Częstochowa, where Antoni Arndt, who played a central role in organizing Praszka's
actions, implicitly supported the PSL's rival list following his withdrawal. Secondly,
local political configurations appeared more or less conducive to the emergence of
newcomers such as the Samoobrona-Leppera committee. In some constituencies, the
presence of organizations developing a political offer similar to that of the committee
chaired by Andrzej Lepper, or seeing themselves as being in direct competition with
the latter for a segment of the electorate, undoubtedly played a role in the latter's
ability to mobilize support. This is the case, for example, in the Płock constituency,
where the PSL has extremely solid structures and networks. Thirdly and lastly, the
degree to which the Samoobrona ZZR was established seems to have had the greatest
influence on the performance of the Samoobrona-Leppera committee in the various
constituencies. Indeed, it is in the regions where the union is best structured that the
committee achieves its best results, mainly in the rural areas of the former "recovered
lands" in the north and west of the country. While most of the organizational and
activist resources that the committee was able to mobilize for the campaign were
those of the union, it thus seems that it was in these regions that the SamoobronaLeppera candidates were best able both to publicize the committee's electoral offer
most widely through an active grassroots campaign and, above all, to adapt it to local
audiences and issues in order to broaden their base of support. Conversely, the results
obtained by the committee's candidates in the following regions are significantly
below the national average
217
and, to a lesser extent, in the east of the country, testify to their difficulties in
promoting the construction of a group of
"In other words, they had little success in mobilizing social groups whose interests
were not directly represented by the union. In other words, they had little success in
mobilizing social groups whose interests were not directly taken care of by the union,
be they the unemployed, industrial sector workers, public sector employees or even
small farmers who were poorly or not at all integrated into the market and therefore
largely unrelated to the issue of overindebtedness. While there are no reliable statistics
on the electoral behaviour of the peasantry, not least because the very definition of
this category is the subject of controversy, the Samoobrona-Leppera committee has
clearly failed to mobilize as much support as its leaders had hoped in the countryside,
particularly in the east of the country where the agrarian structure is dominated by the
small peasantry, and is in any case well ahead of the PSL.
2) The imposition of a "rout" interpretation of the Samoobrona results.
As soon as the first estimates were announced, the Samoobrona-Leppera committee
was presented by the most influential commentators on Polish politics as one of the
main losers of the election. In his editorial of September 20, Gazeta Wyborcza editorin-chief Adam Michnik wrote: "Samoobrona, Partia "X" and Jan Olszewski's KdlR
suffered a total rout", before adding "Parties that mobilized nostalgia for communism
(Partia "X" and Samoobrona) failed"1 .
It's true that the results achieved by the Samoobrona-Leppera committee fall far short
of the targets set by its leaders in previous months. Claiming to be part of a vast social
movement, Andrzej Lepper had no hesitation in predicting an electoral tidal wave in
favor of his committee. More modestly, he confessed in July that he was aiming for a
score of 7%2 . Nonetheless, the Samoobrona-Leppera committee's unambiguous
interpretation of the results as a "rout" is not the only one possible in France.
1 Michnik Adam, "Dołem nasi", Gazeta Wyborcza, 20/09/1993, p.1.
2 "Dziś oskarżony, jutro poseł?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 22/07/1993, p.3.
218
At the time the results were announced, there were a number of factors that could
have helped to qualify this assessment. Despite its status as a new entrant in the
electoral competition, the Committee managed to win more votes in several
constituencies than groups occupying a more central position in the political arena and
a priori better endowed with political capital valued in political competition. Although
it did not present lists in all constituencies, it even outperformed some at national
level, namely former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski's KdlR and former Agriculture
Minister Gabriel Janowski's PSL-PL, whose poor performance is paradoxically rarely
highlighted. Moreover, it should be noted that the "failure" of the SamoobronaLeppera committee would have been relative if the 1991 electoral law had still been
in force: with almost 400,000 voters, it would have been able to obtain around ten
deputy mandates.
Initially, members of the Samoobrona-Leppera committee, including its chairman
Andrzej Lepper, were invited to comment on the committee's performance in the
elections. While some went so far as to mention the possibility of fraud, most were
content to denounce the media's bias prior to the elections, to emphasize the lack of
resources available to the committee for campaigning, or to stress the fact that the
number of votes it had garnered was greater than that of most of the other lists1 .
Nevertheless, the interpretation of Samoobrona-Leppera's electoral performance as
mediocre quickly took hold not only among the various protagonists of the electoral
competition, but also among most of the committee's members. The press widely
echoed the disappointment, even anger, of its militants and several of its candidates
when the results were announced. The most spectacular reaction came from Janusz
Bryczkowski, vice-president of Przymierze Samoobrona and second on the national
list, who told journalists to remove the Samoobrona posters f r o m his office,
declaring: "From now on, Samoobrona has no place here. This is my own office
again"2 . Similarly, many candidates, including most of those who are not
1 "Gdy INFAS ogłaszał wyniki", Gazeta Wyborcza, 09/20/1993, p.2; "Co mówiły sondaże", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 09/20/1993, p.2.
2 "Tu nie ma "Samoobrony", Gazeta Wyborcza, 22/09/1993, p.3.
219
members of ZZR Samoobrona, quickly distanced themselves from the committee. On
election night, some of them even tried to link up with rival parties that had enjoyed
better electoral fortunes, notably the PSL1 .
1 Ibid.
220
Section 3
The relegation of the Samoobrona movement to the margins of
the political game
The elections of September 19, 1993 heralded a delicate period for the constituent
organizations of the RS Samoobrona RP, and especially for its central organization,
the ZZR Samoobrona. While the ZZR Samoobrona gave the impression of
experiencing a steady "rise to power" since its creation, the interpretation of the
Samoobrona-Leppera committee's election results as a rout seemed to mark a lasting
halt in its development. Kept out of the arena of institutional politics by a lack of
elected representatives, the constituent organizations of the Samoobrona movement
were unable during the second legislature (1993-1997) to recapture the image of
structured, powerful opposition groups that they had managed to acquire during 1992
and 1993. On the contrary, they were progressively marginalized both within the field
of peasant representation, over which the PSL, presented as one of the great winners
of the 1993 elections, imposed its domination, and within the central political field.
New attempts to reinvest themselves in the institutional arena ended in bitter failure,
with a sharp erosion of support. As a candidate in the 1995 presidential election,
Andrzej Lepper won only 235,797 votes (1.32% of the total), almost 150,000 fewer
than the Samoobrona-Leppera committee had won in 1993. Two years later, in the
parliamentary elections, the Przymierze Samoobrona was relegated to the status of a
tiny group, garnering just 10,073 votes, or 0.08% of the national total.
In this section, we will focus on three processes that we believe contributed to the
gradual relegation of ZZR Samoobrona to the political arena during the second
legislature. Firstly, we shall see that the union, shaken in the months following the
elections by sharp conflicts within its leadership, proved incapable of sustainably
building on the collective symbolic and organizational resources it had accumulated
during the demonstrations of 1992 and 1993 (A). This was all the more the case given
that protest mobilizations by peasants became less frequent after 1993, under the triple
effect of a marked improvement in the economic situation.
221
economic situation of the country, a redefinition of the modalities of State
intervention in the agricultural sector by the government coalition formed in October
by the PSL and the SLD, and the transformation of the balance of power within the
field of representation of the peasantry following the 1993 elections (B). Finally, we
shall see that the recompositions at work within the political field, in that they lead to
an increased bipolarization of political competition between the formations inherited
from the communist regime and those claiming to be part of the Solidarity opposition
m o v e m e n t , contribute to the marginalization of organizations which, like those
making up the Samoobrona movement, place themselves in neither of these two
camps (C).
A) Leadership crisis and organizational breakdown.
From the creation of ZZR Samoobrona to the elections of September 1993, challenges
to Andrzej Lepper's authority remained rare within the union. An important part of the
political resources of ZZR Samoobrona and Przymierze Samoobrona resides in the
name of their president, who has become a symbol of contestation of the postcommunist political and economic balance. Although two founding members, Marek
Lech and Ryszard Kozik, tried to denounce the organization's lack of democracy and
Lepper's authoritarian tendencies at the beginning of 1993, their criticisms met with
little response from the management. Deprived of support, they were expelled from
the union in March and were soon forced to cease all political and union activities1 .
The interpretation of the Samoobrona-Leppera committee's election results as a rout
changed the situation. Some ZZR Samoobrona and Przymierze Samoobrona leaders
saw it as an opportunity to alter the balance of power within their organizations in
their favor. The main internal challenge to Lepper's authority came from Janusz
Bryczkowski, vice-president of Przymierze Samoobrona and member of the ZZR
Samoobrona Prezydium. Making no secret of his anger when the results of the
Samoobrona-Leppera committee were announced, he openly laid the blame at
Andrzej Lepper's door and sought to position himself as an alternative.
1 "Samoobronna paranoja", Gazeta Wyborcza, 01/04/1993, p.2; "Trafiła Kosa na Leppera"
Polityka, n°21, 05/27/2006, p.37.
222
to the incumbent president. Although he was expelled from the party and the union at
the end of 1993, Janusz Bryczkowski did not give up contesting Andrzej Lepper's use
of the Samoobrona label. On January 9, 1994, he announced the registration of a new
political party called Front Narodowy " Samoobrona" ( National Front) .
"Samoobrona"). In addition to former members of the ZZR Samoobrona who had
followed Bryczkowski when he was expelled, several candidates from the
Samoobrona - Leppera committee, including most of those from the "Grunwald"
Patriotic Union, took part in the creation of this organization, of which Bryczkowski
became president1 . Under the patronage of the controversial Russian nationalist
leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, which ensured their initiative sustained media attention
during t h e month of January, the founders of the new party claimed the heritage of
the Samoobrona movement and stepped up their attacks on Andrzej Lepper2 . Andrzej
Lepper was not to be outdone. The very day after the new party was registered, he
called a press conference to "reveal Janusz Bryczkowski's true face". During the
conference, he portrayed him as a swindler and even a psychopath3 . The tug-of-war
between the president of ZZR Samoobrona and his former right-hand man continued
throughout the first months of 1994. It took a new turn in August. Taking advantage
of Andrzej Lepper's imprisonment, Janusz Bryczkowski attempted to take over the
management of ZZR Samoobrona.
On August 13, 1994, Andrzej Lepper was arrested for molesting a former ZZR
Samoobrona member, Antoni Chodorowski. He was immediately detained pending
trial4 . The following week, union officials, denouncing
In response to "the divisions created within the ZZR Samoobrona by Andrzej
Lepper's recurrent illegal activities", they approached Janusz Bryczkowski and
announced that an extraordinary congress would be held on September 10 to renew
the organization's leadership5 . A few days later, Lepper's loyalists, led by union vicepresident Paweł Skórski, counterattacked by announcing
1 "Żyrynowski w Polsce", Gazeta Wyborcza,10/01/1994, p.1.
2 In an interview with Gazeta Wyborcza, Janusz Bryczkowski mocks the ZZR Samoobrona chairman's
lack of tactical sense and political fickleness: "Trzecie wcielnie Bryczkowskiego Janusza", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 10/01/1994, p.5.
3 "Techniki i chwyty samoobrona", Gazeta Wyborcza, 11/01/1994, p.3.
4 "Lepper w śledztwie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 10/08/1994, p.2.
5 "Pucz w Samoobronie?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 17/08/1994, p.2.
223
the convening of a National Council on the same date1 . Thus, on September 10, 1994,
two competing meetings, both claiming to be ZZR Samoobrona, were held in central
Warsaw. While participants at the Extraordinary Congress chaired by Janusz
Bryczkowski at the Palace of Culture and Science voted to expel Andrzej Lepper
from the union, delegates at the ZZR Samoobrona headquarters voted to expel the
dissidents. In the end, Andrzej Lepper's followers won the day: 72 of the 98 members
of the National Council confirmed their support for the union president. The latter
also received the support of the leaders of the two other national agricultural unions,
NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR, who refused to recognize Bryczkowski's legitimacy2 .
Despite Janusz Bryczkowski's failure to successfully claim the leadership of ZZR
Samoobrona, the organization emerged deeply weakened from the conflict, which
ended in a split. When Andrzej Lepper was released from prison at the beginning of
October, he found himself at the head of a weakened union that had lost many, if not
most, of its militants since 1993, and which seemed to be active only in an
increasingly small number of regions, mainly in the west of the country. This erosion
of the union's militant base was implicitly acknowledged by Lepper himself at the
Second (official) Congress of ZZR Samoobrona in May 1995. At that time, he once
again exaggerated his estimate of the union's 100,000 members3 . He had claimed
three times as many two years earlier. This erosion was particularly evident during the
presidential election of November 1995. Having reaffirmed his political ambitions at
the Congress, Andrzej Lepper found it extremely difficult to gather the 100,000 voter
signatures required to register his candidacy for the presidency4 . Far from reversing
itself, the trend for the constituent organizations of RS Samoobrona RP to lose
activists and supporters seems to have intensified in 1996 and 1997. Thus, while the
leadership of ZZR Samoobrona once again decided to put forward candidates, this
time they did so on the basis of their own experience.
1 "Samoatak na Samoobronę", Gazeta Wyborcza, 12/09/1994, p.1.
2 "Modlitwa Świętej Bernadetty", Gazeta Wyborcza, 12/09/1994, p.12.
3 "Samoobrona" z przymiotnikami", Gazeta Wyborcza, 06/05/1995, p.2.
4 He is the latest of the seventeen candidates to be validated by the National Electoral Commission:
"Tejkowski odrzucony", Gazeta Wyborcza, 03/10/1995, p.2.
224
time under the Przymierze Samoobrona label, in the parliamentary elections of
September 1997, it proved unable to mobilize sufficient support to be able to register
lists at national level. Przymierze Samoobrona only managed to gather the necessary
3,000 voter signatures in 16 out of 52 constituencies, almost all of them in the west of
the country. In the end, only 84 Samoobrona-labeled candidates ran for parliamentary
office, 76 for the Sejm and 8, including Lepper, for the Senate1 . The elections proved
disastrous for them. None of the lists for the Sejm exceeded 1% in the constituency,
and the total number of voters nationwide was barely 10,000 (0.08% of the total votes
cast). Although the union executives running for the Senate fared better, garnering a
total of 50,000 votes, more than half of which went to Lepper in Koszalin alone, they
were all very far from being elected.
Map 2: results by constituency of the Przymierze Samoobrona Committee
lists in the parliamentary elections of September 21, 1997.
Compiled by us using data from the National Electoral Commission (PKW).
The rout of the Przymierze Samoobrona candidates in the 1997 elections bears
witness to the organizational disintegration of ZZR Samoobrona since 1993. Above
all, it seems to mark the end of a union that most of the founding members
1 The eight Przymierze Samoobrona candidates are running in the voivodships of Konin, Koszalin,
Legnica, Leszno, Łomża, Piła, Słupsk and Zielona Góra.
225
left1 . While Andrzej Lepper expressed his desire to continue as head of ZZR
Samoobrona, he was surrounded by little more than a handful of supporters:
"The 1997 elections were the most difficult moment of our existence, and even I didn't expect [such a
result]. But it was a political depression, and some people thought it was the end of Samoobrona, that it
wasn't going to be able to rebuild, that it was the end of Lepper. At that point, a group of us made the
decision that we were going to continue with our political activity. [...] There were very few people left
[...] a handful, the most dedicated. We had no premises, practically no financial means. It was special. I
told people who wanted me to come [to hold a public meeting] that it would be at their own expense.
We had to cover the cost of transport and accommodation, of course, for me and the one or two people,
no more, who came with me. People chipped in for gas, I lived in private homes, and so on. After this
electoral failure, it was really very difficult to rebuild my life...".
Andrzej Lepper
Interview conducted on June 25, 2008 in Warsaw.
B) The rarefaction of peasant protest mobilizations during the IIe legislature.
As soon as Lech Wałęsa announced the dissolution of Parliament on May 31, 1993,
the activities of the various players involved in contesting the Suchocka government
were redirected towards the electoral arena. This was notably the case for the main
agricultural trade union organizations, which abandoned protest actions in favor of
practices more in line with the rules of electoral competition. Their leaders all intend
to take part in the fight for parliamentary posts, albeit in different ways. While those
of ZZR Samoobrona have, as we have seen, initiated the creation of a new committee,
those of KZRKiOR have chosen to join forces with existing formations. However,
they are divided on the partnerships to be finalized. Some, including chairman Janusz
Maksymiuk, are running on SLD lists, while others, like vice-chairman Władysław
Serafin, are running on PSL lists. As for the NSZZRI "S" leaders, they were torn apart
over which electoral strategy to adopt. Although
1 This is particularly true of Roman Wycech. Following the expulsions of Marek Lech and Ryszard
Kozik in 1994, and the death of Paweł Skórski in 1995, Wycech, along with Andrzej Lepper, was the
last of the six farmers who initiated the union's creation to remain members.
226
Roman Wierzbicki, the union finally joined Jan Olszewski's KdlR1 , with several of
its leaders opting to join the PSL-PL committee of former union president and
Minister of Agriculture Gabriel Janowski, or Lech Wałęsa's BBWR.
According to Krysztof Gorlach and Grzegorz Foryś, the end of the wave of peasant
protests in the early 1990s2 was marked by the interruption of agricultural protests in
the late spring of 1993, when the main protagonists in the field of peasant
representation entered the electoral campaign. Agricultural protests became
increasingly rare during the second legislature. Two main factors are commonly held
to explain the significant reduction in the number of peasant protests from 1993
onwards: the improvement in the Polish economic situation, particularly in the
agricultural sector, and the shift in the government's agricultural policy following the
arrival in power of the former communists of the SLD and the agrarians of the PSL3 .
Firstly, most economists agree that the Polish economy enjoyed a period of relative
prosperity from 1992 onwards, with some going so far as to speak of a "Polish
economic miracle"4 . After two years of recession, Poland's gross domestic product
returned to sustainable growth, accompanied by limited inflation and a gradual fall in
unemployment. In the agricultural sector, average farm incomes rose for the first time
since 1990, between 1994 and 1996.
Table 16: Poland's main macro-economic indicators and growth in farm
income from 1990 to 1997.
Year
GDP growth
rate
1990
1991
1992
- 11,6
-7
+ 2,6
Annual
inflation
rate
+ 585,8
+ 70,3
+ 43
Unemployme
nt rate
6,1
11,4
13,6
Annual growth in farmer
income (compared to
previous year)
previous)
- 39,07
- 46,74
- 2,04
1 "Rolnicy "S" z Koalicją", Gazeta Wyborcza, 14/07/1993, p.4.
2 Foryś Grzegorz & Gorlach Krzysztof, art.cit.
3 Ibid.
4 For example: Kolodko Grzegorz (ed.), Polish Miracle: Lessons for the Emerging Markets, Ashgate,
Aldershot, 2005.
227
1993
+ 3,8
+ 35,3
16,4
+ 20,83
1994
+ 5,2
+ 32,2
16
- 1,72
1995
+7
+ 27,8
14,9
+ 21,05
1996
+ 6,1
+ 19,9
13,2
- 5,8
1997
+ 6,9
+ 14,9
10,3
- 18,46
Compiled by us. Sources: for unemployment and GDP growth rates: Portet Stéphane, "La société
polonaise après 1989. Les incertitudes de la modernité le poids des traditions", in Bafoil François (dir.),
La Pologne, Paris, Fayard, 2007, p.317 for inflation rates: Kwaśnicki Witold, "czy w długim okresie
poslka inflacja jest przewidywalna", Working Papers, Uniwersytet Wrocławski, 2004,
prawo.uni.wroc.pl/~ kwasnicki/; for peasant incomes: Bafoil François, "La question agricole en
Pologne : le défi de l'intégration européenne", Les Etudes du CERI, n°74, April 2001, p.33.
Secondly, in October 1993, the formation of a coalition government between the PSL
and the SLD - two parties which, during the campaign, developed an electoral
platform critical of the liberal orientation of the economic reforms implemented since
1989 - was accompanied by a return to a certain interventionism on the part of the
State in the agricultural sector. Without fundamentally questioning the belief in free
competition as the driving force behind the modernization of Polish agriculture, the
government led by Waldemar Pawlak (PSL) introduced a number of support
mechanisms for farmers. On December 29, 1993, the Sejm passed a law creating an
Agency for the Restructuring and Modernization of Agriculture (Agencja
Restrukturyzacji i Modernizacji Rolnictwa)1 . The agency's remit includes improving
rural infrastructure, setting up retraining programs for unemployed agricultural
workers, and establishing mechanisms to encourage farmers to invest in modernizing
their farms. To this end, a cooperation agreement has been signed between the new
agency and the Food Economy Bank (Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej)2 to set up
agricultural loans at preferential rates and a loan repayment assistance scheme for
farmers3 , two of the main demands made by ZZR Samoobrona since its creation. In
addition, the Agricultural Market Agency intervenes more than under previous
governments to support agricultural prices, whose amounts
1 This agency replaces the "Agencja zamiast Funduszu", Gazeta Wyborcza, 18/11/1993, p.16.
Created by the state in 1975, Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej was transformed into a joint-stock
company by the Pawlak government in 1994, and saw its missions redefined to support the
restructuring and modernization of the agricultural sector.
3 "Agencja tańszego", Gazeta Wyborcza, 20/01/1994, p.12; "Tradycja, rozwój i kolejne etapy w
historii", bank B G Ż , h t t p : / / w w w . b g z . p l / o _ b anku/historia.html#tabs=6, accessed June 6,
2010.
2
228
minimum taxes are regularly increased, and tax levels on agricultural imports are
redefined upwards1 .
Without denying the influence of these two elements on the dynamics of agricultural
protest mobilizations, understanding their rarefaction during the second legislature
implies, in our view, also taking into consideration the recompositions at work within
the field of representation of the peasantry following the September 1993 elections.
By mobilizing the history of the Polish agrarian movement in its favor, the PSL was
able to legitimize its offer of representation to a large section of the electorate,
providing a social and political identity that enhanced the peasantry's standing, and
established itself as one of the main forces in Polish politics. Following the signing of
a coalition agreement with the SLD in October, its president Waldemar Pawlak was
appointed Prime Minister for the second time, and the agrarian party took control of
the main positions of political power linked to the agricultural sector, from the
Ministry of Agriculture (Andrzej Śmietanko) to the chairmanships of the agriculture
committees in the Sejm (Stanisław Kalemba) and Senate (Sylwester Gajewski). On
the other hand, ZZR Samoobrona, PSL-PL and NSZZRI "S" emerged from the
September 1993 elections profoundly weakened. The poor performance of their
candidates, which deprived them of parliamentary representation2 , profoundly
affected their ability to legitimize their claim to speak on behalf of the peasantry and
to be recognized as actors to be reckoned with in the political arena. Against this
backdrop, their leaders, who were also faced with fierce internal protests, initially
opted for dialogue with the new government rather than protest. As early as October
1993, ZZR president Samoobrona even lent his support to Prime Minister Waldemar
Pawlak, with whom he declared himself ready to collaborate3 . In fact, at the end of
1993, the leaders of NSZZRI "S" and ZZR Samoobrona were actively involved in
negotiations prior to the creation of the Agency for Restructuring and Development.
Cf. Tłuczak Agnieszka, "Wpływ działań państwa na kształtowanie się cen wybranych produktów
rolnych w Polsce", Kunasz Marek (dir.), Problemy gospodarowania w dobie globalizacji - materiały
konferencyjne, Katedra Mikroekonomii Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, Szczecin, 2006, p.120-129.
2 With the exception of the PSL-PL, which has one senator.
3 "Lepper za Pawlakiem i przeciw burdom", Gazeta Wyborcza, 13/10/1993, p.2; "Zapach wsi, smak
ananasów", Gazeta Wyborcza, 26/11/1993, p.2.
1
229
modernization of agriculture, a project to which they were quite supportive at the
time1 . However, relations between the two farmers' unions and the government were
short-lived. At the beginning of 1994, denouncing the budget proposal and the failure
to take their proposals into account, they once again placed themselves clearly in
opposition2 . In February, ZZR Samoobrona returned to the practices on which it had
built its reputation, organizing several protest actions3 . However, weakened by
internal conflicts and isolated in the arena of protest mobilization, the union proved
incapable of initiating a cycle of demonstrations on the scale seen in 1992 and 1993.
Increasingly exhausted, ZZR Samoobrona was content throughout the second
legislature to organize occasional small-scale actions, often on local issues, which
national journalists gradually lost interest in. As for the leaders of Solidarité Rurale's
heir organizations, although they had lost their privileged access to the centers of
political decision-making to KZRKiOR's leaders, throughout the second legislature
they favored institutional practices to promote their demands. Only sporadically reentering the arena of protest mobilization, NSZZRI "S" and PSL-PL leaders focused
on strengthening their position in the political arena by forging closer ties with other
formations claiming to be part of the Solidarity movement's heritage, particularly in
the run-up to the 1995 presidential elections and the 1997 legislative elections4 .
C) The bipolarization of the political field.
Although anticipated throughout the summer by the opinion polls, the results of the
September 1993 elections were traumatic for the leaders of the Polish "right-wing"
parties claiming to be the legacy of the Solidarity opposition movement. In power for
four years, they were clearly outdistanced by the PSL and SLD. Of the parties
involved in the formation of the Suchocka coalition in 1992, only the UD
1 "Rada rolnicza", Gazeta Wyborcza, 11/12/1993, p.21.
2 "Postulaty "Samoobrony"", Gazeta Wyborcza, 17/01/1994, p.3.
3 "Powracająca "Samoobrona", Gazeta Wyborcza, 09/02/1994, p.4.
4 Confirming the alliance forged during the 1993 elections, Roman Wierzbicki associated the union he
had chaired since 1991 with Jan Olszewski's candidacy in the 1995 presidential elections, and with
Olszewski's creation of the Ruch Odbudowy Polski (ROP) party in November of the same year.
230
retained parliamentary representation. Above all, the rapid formalization of a coalition
agreement between the leaderships of the PSL and SLD sanctioned the return to
government of the formations inherited from the communist regime. While during the
campaign these parties were at pains to promote a political offer that emphasized their
respectability, competence and full conversion to market democracy, they are still
perceived by some Polish politicians who were active in the Solidarity and Rural
Solidarity movements as illegitimate participants in the political competition. The
President of the Republic himself makes no secret of his hostility to the former SLD
communists, and sets out his conditions for their participation in the government. As
the Communist authorities had demanded of Mazowiecki in 1989, he required them to
leave the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and the Interior to personalities close
to Solidarity. As a token of their "sense of responsibility", the SLD leaders agreed to
these demands, which had no constitutional basis whatsoever, and, despite having
come out on top in the elections, invested the PSL president Waldemar Pawlak, who
had a reputation for consensus, at the head of the coalition government.
Relegated to the opposition, many of them extra-parliamentary, the main leaders of
the Solidarity camp quickly agreed that their lack of unity was the main cause of their
electoral failure. It's true that their combined electoral results exceeded those of the
SLD. In the months following the elections, tactical exchanges between
representatives of the various parties claiming to be part of the former opposition
movement multiplied, with the aim of uniting their different organizations into
groupings capable of maximizing their chances of electoral success against a united
left. Although negotiations between these players, who had sometimes been at
loggerheads in previous years, often proved tricky, in the spring of 1994 they led to
the creation of the "Union of Freedom" party (UW) and the "Alliance for Poland"
coalition (PdlP). While the former was the product of a union between the UD and the
KLD, the latter brought together various extra-parliamentary "conservative" rightwing organizations, principally the PC, the ZChN, the PSL-PL and Jan Olszewski's
RdlR. The unification of the post-solidarity Polish right continued apace in the wake
of the December 1995 presidential election, in which Lech Wałęsa was defeated in the
second round by the
231
President of the SLD Aleksander Kwaśniewski. At Jan Olszewski's initiative, a new
extra-parliamentary "conservative" right-wing alliance, the ROP, was set up in
December 1995 on the ruins of a PdlP that had not withstood the recurring divisions
of its founding members1 . Above all, in June 1996, a year ahead of the new
parliamentary elections, some thirty parties, including the PSL-PL, ZChN and PC,
united around the NSZZ "S" to form the "Solidarity Electoral Action" (AWS).
The process of unifying the various fractions of the former democratic opposition
movement following the 1993 elections resulted in a gradual reorganization of the
political game around a divide between the forces inherited from the old regime - the
SLD and the PSL back in power - and the formations inherited from Solidarity. Now
united in a reduced number of groupings, the latter temporarily abandoned the most
divisive debates within their ranks, notably the one on "decommunization"2 , and set
out to present themselves once again as components of the same camp, sharing
common values and destined to govern together. This bipolar representation of a
political game pitting the former protagonists of the 1989 Round Table negotiations
against each other, who legitimize each other through their competition as the main
contenders in the struggle for positions of political power, is widely conveyed by
observers of Polish political life and leads to the increased marginalization of
organizations not positioning themselves in one or other of these camps. Whether it's
the KPN3 , the UPR, Partia X or, of course, Przymierze Samoobrona, they struggle to
be recognized as serious protagonists in the political competition and to legitimize
their original offers of representation. During the 1997 election campaign, which was
presented even before its launch as a duel between the incumbents of the SLD and
PSL and the
While the PdlP quickly exploded due to recurrent divisions among its founding members, a new
alliance of the extra-parliamentary "conservative" right was initiated the day after the elections by Jan
Olszewski. In addition to the former Prime Minister's RdlR, it brought together the Ruch Trzeciej
Rzeczypospolitej (RTR) and the Akcja Polska movement, led respectively by his former ministers Jan
Parys and Antoni Macierewicz, under the name of Ruch Odbudowy Polski (ROP). On the creation of
the ROP: "Odbudowa Polski zamiast reformy", Gazeta Wyborzca, 18/12/1995, p.3.
2 See in particular: Heurtaux Jérôme & Pellen Cédric, "Pologne. La Table ronde, un meuble
politiquement encombrant", in Heurtaux Jérôme & Pellen Cédric (dir.), 1989 à l'Est de l'Europe. Une
mémoire controversée, La Tour d'Aigues, Editions de l'Aube, 2009, p.23-56.
3 After participating in the launch of the AWS, Leszek Moczulski's KPN withdrew in 1997 to form its
own parliamentary election committee.
1
232
AWS, UW and, to a lesser extent, ROP contenders, they are relegated to the status of
insignificant political players by the main protagonists of electoral interaction, be they
competitors or observers.
*
**
The process of "political requalification" of their activities, undertaken by the ZZR
Samoobrona representatives from spring 1992 onwards, far from being linear and
guided by their rationality alone, appears particularly hesitant and constrained. A
study of the concrete ways in which these union leaders politicized their activities
during the Ie and IIe legislatures highlights the erratic and antagonistic logics that
guided their efforts to shape and legitimize their political representativeness.
On the one hand, the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona, newcomers lacking the individual
and collective resources that appeared to be the most valued in the Polish political
arena of the early 1990s, strove to legitimize their
In the months following the creation of the Przymierze Samoobrona party, they
declared their intention to "enter politics" by expressing their opposition to all the
established players and to the principles that tended to regulate the political game at
the time. In the months following the creation of the Przymierze Samoobrona party,
they made clear their intention to take part in political competition, and embarked on
a self-assumed enterprise to subvert the political order. Calling into question the very
legitimacy of the IIIe Republic regime, and transgressing the still labile boundary
between trade union and political activities, the main representatives of the
Samoobrona movement did not hesitate to mobilize the symbolism of revolutionary
insurrections to broaden their reference group and gain recognition for their
representativeness beyond the sole field of representation of the peasantry. The arena
of protest mobilizations, which they formally invest in the name of ZZR Samoobrona,
constitutes for them the main space for promoting their political offer and
accumulating collective resources that can potentially be mobilized in political
competition. Reorienting their activity, at least partially, towards the electoral arena
following the dissolution of the Sejm by President Lech Wałęsa, they reaffirmed their
"subversive" and "political" inclination.
233
During the campaign for the 1993 parliamentary elections, these "anti-system" groups
were given the opportunity to represent themselves. Denouncing the established
political players and the political and economic balances in force since 1989, they
strove to reinvest the symbolism of the Solidarity opposition movement to gain
recognition as the spokespersons of a society united in its struggle against an
illegitimate state.
On the other hand, the activities of the leaders of the Samoobrona movement also
testify to the conformation of their political offer to the values that have become
essential in the Polish political arena since 1989. Despite the revolutionary rhetoric
used in protest actions organized in the name of the ZZR Samoobrona, their
involvement in the electoral arena testifies to their recognition of the legitimacy of
elections as a means of allocating positions of political power. The methods used to
select candidates and promote the offer of representation in the run-up to the 1993
elections also reveal a concern to adapt to the legal and normative rules governing
electoral competition.
While this "double game" between subversion and conformation, between
demarcation and adaptation1 , enables the leaders of the Samoobrona movement to
attempt to stand out in the political game without jeopardizing their right to
participate, it also undermines their ability to promote their representativeness and
transform their group into a perennial political enterprise. While their recurrent
denunciation of established political players goes hand in hand with their
stigmatization as unattainable radical actors, and the ostracization of their groups
within the central political field, as well as within the field of peasant representation,
their acceptance of the dominant norms of representative democracy affects their
ability to valorize their novelty and redefine relations of representation in their favor.
Moreover, the profound redefinition of
The distinction between adaptation and demarcation is borrowed from Alexandre Dezé, who has
shown the constant adjustment between strategies of adaptation (to electoral logic) and demarcation
(through doctrine) that drives the FN in France. Cf. Dezé Alexandre, "Le Front National comme
"entreprise doctrinale"", in Haegel Florence (ed.), Partis politiques et système partisan en France,
Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 2007, pp. 255-284; see also: Dezé Alexandre, "Between adaptation,
differentiation and distinction: extreme right-wing parties within democratic political systems", in
Eatwell Roger & Mudde Cas (eds.), Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge,
London, Routledge, 2004, p.19-40.
1
234
The Samoobrona movement's system of action, which accompanies its compliance
with the main rules of electoral competition - partisan activities gradually take
precedence over union activities, and union activists tend t o be marginalized in favor
of outside politicians with properties deemed more in line with the dominant rules for
selecting political personnel - considerably hampers its institutionalization by blurring
the group's collective identity and reducing the rewards for militant commitment1 .
The results of the 1993 elections, which revealed a significant gap between the
group's claimed representativeness and its actual support base, provoked a "crisis" in
the organizations that made up the Samoobrona movement. Removed from the arena
of institutional politics, the representatives of ZZR Samoobrona and Przymierze
Samoobrona proved incapable of sustainably building on the collective symbolic and
organizational resources accumulated during the demonstrations of 1992 and 1993.
Against a backdrop of dwindling protest mobilizations and increased bipolarization of
political competition between forces inherited from the old regime and groups
claiming affiliation with the Solidarity movement, they were unable to routinize the
functioning of these groups, build member loyalty and ultimately maintain their
representativeness. Unable to adapt their practices and their offer of representation to
the new constraints of the political game, the representatives of the constituent
organizations of the Samoobrona movement are progressively assigned to extremely
marginal positions within the central political field and the field of representation of
the peasantry. Despite the ZZR Samoobrona's status as a representative national
farmers' union since 1992, they do not appear to be in a position to survive in the
political and trade-union arena, and to maintain the symbolic value of the
Samoobrona label. The 1997 legislative elections seemed to confirm their definitive
failure to be recognized as participants in the political and trade-union games.
1 Based on a study of the Motivé-e-s movements that emerged during the French municipal elections of
2001, Christine Guionnet highlights the difficulties of institutionalizing groups that have based their
legitimacy on challenging professional politicians, while at the same time being forced to conform
to a minimum of the established rules of the game: Guionnet Christine,
"Marginality in politics and institutionalization processes. Les mouvements Motivé-e-s et citoyens
(2001-2003)", in Arnaud Lionel & Guionnet Christine (dir.), Les frontières du politique. Enquête sur
les processus de politisation et de dépolitisation, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2005,
p.263-291.
235
to represent social interests and, a fortiori, as serious contenders for positions of
political power.
236
Part 2
The re-emergence of the Samoobrona
movement (1997-2001)
237
Introduction
This part, covering a period corresponding to the IIIe legislature of the Diet
This article, published in conjunction with Poland's "democratic" magazine from
October 1997 to October 2001, is devoted to the re-emergence of the Samoobrona
movement at the forefront of Polish politics at the turn of the 1990s and 2000s. After
appearing permanently marginalized in the wake of the 1997 parliamentary elections,
the movement emerged as the main driving force behind the wave of peasant protests
that swept Poland in 1998 and 1999, before establishing itself as the country's thirdlargest political force in the 2001 parliamentary elections, winning over 10% of the
vote and gaining parliamentary representation for the first time.
Much commented on by observers of Polish political life, who from the day after the
2001 elections set out t o identify the causes of his
"This unexpected electoral "breakthrough" by the Samoobrona movement during the
IIIe legislature is commonly interpreted as a symptom of the "crisis" that Polish
democracy was going through at the time. The drastic deterioration of the country's
socio-economic situation and the setbacks of Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek's AWS-UW
coalition government are said to have led to a phenomenon of "democratic
disenchantment"1 . Disappointed with the functioning of the democratic system,
dissatisfied with the economic and other policies implemented since 1989, and
frightened by the prospect of joining the European Union, a section of the population mainly from the working classes, and particularly the peasantry - tended to turn away
from the dominant political leaders, to be seduced by radical political proposals
calling for a break with the current political and economic order. From this point of
view, the growing popularity of the Samoobrona movement and, in particular, of its
president Andrzej Lepper, as evidenced by the peasant demonstrations of 1998 and
1999 and the results of the presidential and, above all, parliamentary elections of 2000
and 2001, can be explained by their
1
As an example of this type of approach: Smolar Aleksander, "Les radicaux au pouvoir et la
transformation de la Pologne", Pouvoirs, n°118, 2006, p.101-112 Pop-Eleches Grigore, "Transition
Fatigue: The Changing Fortunes of Post-Communist Anti-Establishment Parties", paper presented at
the "Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies", Boston,
December 4-6, 2004; or Johnson Debra, "The new outsiders of central and Eastern Europe, with
specific reference to Poland", Journal of European Integration, vol.27, n°1, 2005, p.111-131.
238
ability to embody an outlet for this resentment by mobilizing radical protest practices
and a resolutely anti-system rhetoric.
While they may seem self-evident, these explanations in terms of
The "democratic disenchantment" of the Samoobrona movement's re-emergence at the
heart of peasant representation and central politics during the IIIe legislature leaves
unanalyzed the very enigma of this phenomenon. By naturalizing its "radicalism" and
neglecting the complex mechanisms of mobilization and political representation, they
prevent us from considering the concrete ways in which, in interaction with other
competing groupings, the Samoobrona movement managed to overcome its initial
lack of resources to gain recognition for its representativeness in the arena of protest
mobilizations and, subsequently, in the electoral arena. Breaking with these commonsense explanations, and without prefiguring their outcome, this section aims to shed
light on the concrete processes by which the leaders of the Samoobrona movement set
about formalizing and legitimizing their claim to union and then political
representation of social interests during the IIIe legislature. How did the ZZR
Samoobrona, an agricultural union occupying a marginal position in the field of
peasant representation, come to be recognized as the main spokesperson for the
"angry peasantry" in the dynamics of the wave of peasant protest in 1998 and 1999?
How do farmers' union leaders endeavour to reinvest in electoral competition the
resources accumulated in the arena of peasant protests, in order to establish
themselves as actors to be reckoned with in the central political arena, and as serious
contenders for positions of political power? These a r e the two main questions
guiding our discussion here.
Initially, we will focus on the concrete ways in which the ZZR Samoobrona
appropriated the cycle of peasant demonstrations in 1998 and 1999. Far from being
reducible to a hypothetical appetite on the part of the groups mobilized for the radical
practices of Andrzej Lepper's union, we'll see that the latter's ability to establish itself
as the main representative of "angry peasants" must be understood in the context of
the struggles, to
239
the uncertain outcome, and the definition and interpretation of the situation that
mobilizes (chapter 1).
Secondly, we look at the process of re-politicization of the Samoobrona movement, of
re-qualifying its activities in the direction of participation in political competition. We
shall see that, far from being linear and self-evident, this process appears particularly
hesitant and constrained. Reinvesting in the electoral arena the resources accumulated
in the arena of protest mobilizations, in order to be recognized as legitimate
contenders for the political representation of social interests and the occupation of
positions of political power, obliges the leaders of the ZZR Samoobrona to comply
with a set of rules governing, much more strictly than in the early 1990s, the activities
of actors engaged in political competition (chapter 2).
240
Chapter 3: ZZR Samoobrona's appropriation of
the peasant protests of the late 1990s.
From summer 1998 to spring 1999, Poland was hit by a wave of farm strikes on an
exceptional scale. Although the Polish countryside had seemed calm since 1993, from
July 1998 onwards farmers engaged i n a long-running dispute with Jerzy Buzek's
government o v e r guaranteed agricultural prices. Following a unitary march in
Warsaw by the main agricultural trade unions, the mobilization quickly spread
throughout the country. Traditional demonstrations in the streets of the capital were
replaced by more violent and spectacular actions, such as destroying stocks of
imported wheat, clashing with the police and blocking roads and border crossings.
Andrzej Lepper, president of the ZZR Samoobrona, has come to symbolize the
radicalization of the movement through his presence in the field and the virulence of
his words. The most violent actions were even given the nickname Lepperiada in the
media. After the failure of the first phase of negotiations in February, due in particular
to Andrzej Lepper's refusal to associate the ZZR Samoobrona with the memorandum
of understanding ratified by the government and the other union representatives, the
cycle of demonstrations finally came to an end at the end of May 1999, with the
signing of an agreement this time involving all the agricultural unions. Andrzej
Lepper's ZZR Samoobrona, reputed to have broken the government's back, emerged
as the main beneficiary of the mobilization. Still ailing a year earlier, the union now
boasts several hundred thousand members and is recognized by all the protagonists in
the political arena as a key player in the field of peasant representation.
The academic literature offers a fairly consistent interpretation of the wave of farm
strikes in 1998 and 1999. The resurgence of peasant mobilizations, caused by the
deterioration of the economic situation in the countryside, is said to testify to the
persistent difficulties of part of the peasantry in adapting to the new conditions.
241
The "radicalization" of the movement, and the gradual rise of Andrzej Lepper and
ZZR Samoobrona within it, are symptomatic of a persistent leaning towards the
economic rules of the game and, more specifically, the reduction of state aid and the
opening up to competition brought about by Poland's rapprochement with the
European Union. The "radicalization" of the movement and the gradual rise to power
of Andrzej Lepper and the ZZR Samoobrona within it, meanwhile, were symptomatic
of the persistent penchant for violent action on the part of farmers, prey to "brutal,
blind and unreasoning anger"1 . In short, in the manner of the Jacqueries of the past,
the agricultural demonstrations of 1998 and 1999 were an expression of the discontent
of economically archaic Polish peasants, whose recourse to radical practices and
spokesmen demonstrated their inability to conform to "modern" forms of interest
representation.
Based on an often over-simplistic reading of the notion of relative deprivation, such
interpretations are fraught with analytical pitfalls long denounced by specialists in
social movements2 . In addition to their tautological and normative leanings, it is their
etiological failings that seem particularly problematic3 . By focusing on the search for
the structural causes of collective action, they convey an essentialist vision of it,
leaving the concrete dynamics that constitute it unanalyzed. Far from forming a
homogeneous whole with an obvious meaning, protest mobilizations in Poland, as
elsewhere, are extremely composite in nature. They are the product of a multitude of
actions, more or less well controlled by various mobilization entrepreneurs seeking to
legitimize their representativeness and their demands in public arenas. As for the
definition of these mobilizations, their meaning and legitimacy, this is the object of a
constant struggle, with an uncertain outcome, between more or less competing
mobilized groups, the political and institutional actors they address, and also the
media, insofar as they constitute the main forum for staging collective actions. More
than the simple mechanical consequence of structural factors, protest mobilization is
therefore more akin to a complex chain of processes which, by pitting agents with
different agendas against each other, can lead to the emergence of a new and more
complex form of action.
1 Guillemin Alain, art.cit. p.42.
For a particularly stimulating critical reading of interpretations reducing post-communist social
conflicts to the accumulated frustration of mobilized groups, please refer to : Zalewski Frédéric,
"Conflits d'interprétations et conflits sociaux dans la Pologne post-communiste : l'exemple des
mobilisations paysannes", in Roger Antoine (ed.), Des partis pour quoi faire ? Political representation
2
242
in Central and Eastern Europe, Brussels, Bruylant, 2003.
3 On the "etiological illusion": Dobry Michel, op.cit., pp. 46-58.
243
resources and interests, helps define its successive forms, including its hypothetical
"radicalization", the interpretations that are given to it, and its eventual audience1 .
To grasp the conditions of ZZR Samoobrona's re-emergence as a key player in the
field of peasant representation in the dynamics of the agricultural protest movement of
1998 and 1999, as we shall endeavour to do in this chapter, we need to pay particular
attention to this "work of signification"2 . To understand how Andrzej Lepper's union
developed, "radicalized" and appropriated the cycle of agricultural protests, we need
to place at the heart of the analysis the struggles over definition and interpretation to
which the latter was subjected, and to situate these in the context of the more general
struggles over the definition and political representation of the social world that
animated the Polish political field at the end of the 1990s.
How can we explain the unitary reinvestment in the arena of protest mobilizations by
competing and weakened agricultural organizations from summer 1998 onwards?
How did Andrzej Lepper, whose union appeared bloodless at the start of the protests,
come to be recognized as the main spokesman for the "angry peasants", the
undisputed leader of the protest against the government's agricultural policy? How is
the reputational capital he has accumulated reconverted into collective resources,
enabling ZZR Samoobrona to emerge in the spring of 1999 as a powerful
organization with a massive militant base throughout the country? These are the
questions that will guide our discussion here, and around which the various sections
of this chapter will be organized.
First, we'll see that, far from being mechanical and spontaneous, the resurgence of
agricultural protest mobilizations from summer 1998 onwards appears to be the
uncertain result of the work of politicizing and publicizing the malaise.
1 Lagroye Jacques, François Bastien, Sawicki Frédéric, op.cit., p. 333.
2 Snow David, "Analyse de cadres et mouvements sociaux", in Cefaï Daniel & Trom Danny (eds.),
op.cit., p.27.
244
We will then examine the processes involved in the symbolic appropriation of the
cycle of protests by Andrzej Lepper, and in the recognition of the President of the
Republic of Poland. Paying particular attention to the conflictual dynamics defining
the protest movement, we will then study the processes involved in the symbolic
appropriation of the cycle of demonstrations by Andrzej Lepper, and the recognition
of the president of ZZR Samoobrona as the main representative of the "angry
peasants" (section 2). Finally, we will look at the concrete activities through which the
leaders of the farmers' union endeavored to capitalize on the fame and reputation
acquired by their president in order to recruit new members, redevelop the union's
structures and objectify it as a massive grouping with strong mobilization potential.
(section 3).
245
Section 1: The resurgence of agricultural protest
mobilizations.
1997 ushered in a new period of crisis for Polish agriculture. Excessive imports, due
to an overestimation of the drop in production caused by the historic floods of the
summer1 , then the drop in exports, accentuated from the summer of 1998 by the
Russian crisis, provoked a sharp fall in the price of agricultural products, particularly
cereals, and a further sharp decline in farmers' incomes2 . Between 1996 and 1998,
incomes plummeted by almost 50% to reach their lowest level since the change of
regime; income parity, i.e. the ratio between farm and non-farm incomes, fell from
65% to less than 40% over the same period3 .
Nevertheless, as we shall see in this section, this objective deterioration in the
economic situation of many farmers, and their hypothetical awareness of it, was not
enough to solve the enigma of the resurgence of large-scale peasant protests in 1998.
Indeed, far from forming a coherent whole capable of spontaneously translating its
economic malaise into protest action, the Polish peasantry appeared at the end of the
1990s to be a particularly demobilized social group, both symbolically and practically
(A). Against this backdrop, to understand the emergence of a cycle of protests over
the economic situation of agriculture from the summer of 1998 onwards, we need to
break with the spontaneistic readings commonly given, and place at the heart of the
analysis the work done by the various organizations claiming to represent the interests
of the peasantry to define and publicize the rural world's malaise (B).
1 The flooding of the Oder and Vistula rivers in July 1997 killed 54 people and caused material losses
estimated at several billion dollars. 665,000 hectares were flooded, including 450,000 hectares of
agricultural land. Cf. Kundzewicz Zbigniew W., Szamałek Krzysztof & Kowalczak Piotr,
"The Great Flood of 1997 in Poland", Hydrological Sciences Journal, vol.44, n°6, 1999, p.863.
2 Bafoil François, "Les paysans polonais. Évolution des structures agricoles et mobilisations sociales et
politiques de 1989 à 2006", in Bafoil François (dir.), La Pologne, Paris, Fayard-CERI, 2007, p.337. 3
Foryś Grzegorz & Gorlach Krzysztof, art.cit.
246
A) An unlikely mobilization.
While the deterioration in the economic situation of the countryside from 1997
onwards is undeniable, its shaping as a social and political issue capable of giving rise
to public controversy seems highly unlikely at the start of the third legislature.
Following in the footsteps of its predecessors, the AWS-UW coalition government led
by Jerzy Buzek (AWS) is characterized by its adherence to a liberal "modernizing"
mode of action, accompanied by a denial of the political and economic autonomy of
the agricultural question and a demobilization of the peasantry as a congruent social
group in post-communist society (1). As for partisan and trade union organizations,
which had endeavored to build their representation on an objectification of the
peasantry as a group of individuals sharing common and specific interests, they
appear particularly weakened in the aftermath of the September 1997 elections (2).
1) The denial of the agricultural crisis as a public problem.
As we have seen, in the early 1990s, successive governments were characterized by
their adherence to a style of action based on the belief in the virtuous character of
deregulation and the withdrawal of the State from the economic sphere. Integrated
into the broader issue of modernizing the national economy, the agricultural question
is itself approached from a liberal perspective, illegitimizing all protectionist or
interventionist measures as obstacles to the adaptation of farms to the imperatives of
competition. From this point of view, rather than being seen as a problem calling for
state intervention, the deterioration in the economic situation of agriculture following
the change of regime was seen as a necessary step, allowing the sector to be "cleaned
up" b y evicting the least competitive farms. This orientation
The liberal "modernizing" approach thus conveys a stigmatizing vision of the
peasantry, presented as plethoric and largely archaic, and deconstructs the very unity
of this social group by splitting it up along economic lines.
247
Paradoxically, it was not fundamentally challenged by the political staff of the former
regime's heir parties when they came to power in 19931 . Although the Pawlak
government (PSL) implemented a number of targeted aid measures for farmers
integrated into the market, state intervention in the economic sphere, particularly in
the agricultural sector, remained limited. The main coalition party, the SLD, was
dominated b y its social-liberal faction, which made its adherence to a liberal vision
of modernization one of the main criteria for its competence and its conversion to the
new rules of the political and economic game. The Prime Minister's interventionist
tendencies are a source of recurrent tension between the various coalition partners.
This was particularly evident when it came to drawing up and voting on the 1994 and
1995 budgets. Waldemar Pawlak's increasingly open conflict with SLD President
Aleksander Kwaśniewski led to his resignation on March 1er 19952 . He was replaced
by Józef Oleksy (SLD) at the head of a new PSL-SLD coalition government. While
the agriculture portfolio remained under the control of the peasant party, it was
entrusted to Roman Jagieliński, Pawlak's main rival within the party, who presented
himself as a "farmer".
He is a "reformer", in favor of a productivist modernization of agriculture and a
restriction of state aid to the sector. According to him, "Farmers must stop relying on
the state budget. They need to be able to live better, with the satisfaction of earning
their own living"3 .
The change of parliamentary majority in 1997 did not result in a redefinition of the
government's style of action or its handling of agricultural issues. On the contrary, the
formation of a coalition government between the AWS and t h e UW in October
w a s accompanied b y a return to business of the
The most dogmatic "modernizers" were Leszek Balcerowicz (UW), father of "shock
therapy" and fervent advocate of ultra-liberal restructuring o f Polish agriculture4 .
The latter finds himself
1 Zalewski Frédéric, "Démobilisation et politisation de la paysannerie...", art.cit. p.151.
2 "Pół marszałek, pół Premier", Gazeta Wyborcza, 02/03/1995, p.1.
3 Quoted in: "Poczet Posłów Polskich", Gazeta Wyborcza, 11-12/10/97, p.VII.
4 Leszek Balcerowicz idealizes New Zealand's agricultural model, one of the most liberal, and sees any
state aid to the sector as a brake on its modernization. He explains his positions in his book:
Balcerowicz Leszek, Wolność i Rozwój. Ekonomia wolnego rynku, Krakow, Znak, 1995.
248
in Jerzy Buzek's government (AWS), the posts of Finance Minister and Deputy Prime
Minister he had held at the start of the decade. The government's statist stance,
outlined during the campaign by the AWS and reaffirmed in Jerzy Buzek's inaugural
speech1 , quickly gave way to Leszek Balcerowicz's imperatives of inflation control
and budgetary rigor. In addition to boosting privatizations, the 1998 Finance Act
provides for drastic cuts in public spending, particularly in the agricultural sector2 . In
government discourse, this disengagement of the State is legitimized by the prospect
of accession to the European Union and the need to bring the Polish economy into line
with the requirements of the common market3 . In this context, the deteriorating
economic situation of many farmers is largely denied as a social and political
problem. In fact, the government once again tends to see this as the inevitable
consequence of the restructuring of the agricultural sector and its reorganization
around the only production-oriented farms able to face up to European competition.
The new Minister of Agriculture, Jacek Janiszewski (AWS), himself clearly endorses
such a vision, declaring on his appointment that "the SLD-PSL government lacked
courage in restructuring agriculture. We must not support all farms, but limit aid to
those that are most promising for the future"4 .
Deconstructing this mode of government action, to present the economic situation of
Polish agriculture as an autonomous problem requiring specific intervention by the
public authorities, is a major challenge that the main organizations claiming to
represent the interests of the peasantry hardly seem in a position to take up in the first
months of the Third Legislature. Exits
1 Cf. "Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność", in Słodkowska Inka & Dołbakowska Magdalena (eds.), Wybory
1997. Part i ich programy, Warsaw, ISP-PAN, 2004, p.99 ff; regarding Jerzy Buzek's inaugural speech:
"Pierwsze Starcie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 12/11/97, p.4.
2 On the monetarist policy and budgetary austerity implemented by the Buzek government: Rusin
Philippe, "Pologne : quinze ans de réformes à marche forcée pour rejoindre l'Union européenne",
L'Europe en formation, n°1, 2004, p.58-62.
3 Neumayer Laure, L'enjeu européen dans les transformations postcommunistes, Paris, Editions Belin,
2006, p.213-214.
4 Quoted in "Gabinet premier Buzka", Gazeta Wyborcza, 10/30/1997, p.8; see also a later interview
with Jacek Janiszewski in which he explains his vision of agricultural modernization: "Nie walczyć z
miastem", Gazeta Wyborcza, 2/19/1998, p.12.
249
profoundly weakened by the September 1997 elections, they seemed to be
permanently marginalized in the political arena.
2) Farmers' organizations marginalized in the political arena.
In 1997, for the first time since the change of regime, the PSL was the only group
claiming a peasant political identity to register an electoral committee at national level
for the legislative elections. Following their electoral failure in 1993, the leaders of
the organizations that inherited Rural Solidarity renounced their autonomous
participation in the struggle for positions of political power. In order to maximize
their chances of obtaining parliamentary mandates, during the second legislature they
set about forging political alliances with other formations claiming to be part of the
democratic opposition movement's heritage, as part of the process of unifying the
various fractions of the Solidarity movement. However, they were once again divided
over the choice of partnerships to be formalized in the run-up to the September 1997
elections. While most of the initiators of the PSL-PL committee and former members
of PSL-Solidarność, renamed SLCh and later integrated into the SKL party,
eventually joined the AWS coalition, the main leaders of NSZZRI "S" associated their
union with the electoral committee registered by ROP. As for the leaders of ZZR
Samoobrona, as we have seen, the Przymierze Samoobrona committee they initiated
was only present in a small number of constituencies and, as in 1993, developed an
electoral offer claiming to address all "neglected" Poles, regardless of their profession
or social group to which they belonged.
Four years after its "success" in 1993, the PSL appears deeply weakened and divided
on the eve of the new legislative elections. Far from fading with his accession to
power, the stigma attached to his status as spokesman for the peasantry intensified,
even on the part of his social-liberal partners in the SLD, and gradually undermined
his unity. From 1995, when Pawlak was forced to leave the government, the agrarian
line developed since the change of regime was openly contested by some of the SLD's
leaders.
250
movement. This current, led by Roman Jagieliński, appointed Minister of Agriculture
and Deputy Prime Minister in Józef Oleksy's government, was able to claim the
support of the SLD leadership and argued in favor of converting the PSL to the
dominant "modernizing" theses, redefining its offer of representation towards the
most economically "viable" fringe of the peasantry1 . Although Jagieliński failed in
his bid to wrest the party presidency from Pawlak at the 1996 congress, this "war at
the top" profoundly weakened the party and undermined the legibility of its political
offering during the campaign for the 1997 parliamentary elections2 . On September
21, 1997, the PSL reached a ceiling of 7.31% of the vote. It lost more than half of its
1993 electorate, was now ahead of the AWS and SLD in the rural electorate3 and saw
its number of deputies and senators dwindle from 132 to 27 and 36 to 3 respectively.
Although better than most pre-election estimates, this result was immediately
interpreted as a failure, both by observers of Polish political life and by most PSL
leaders4 . Presented as the main culprits behind this electoral "defeat", party president
Waldemar Pawlak and Central Committee chairman Józef Zych, both in office since
June 1991, were removed from office on October 12 by members of the Central
Committee5 . They were replaced by Jarosław Kalinowski and Alfred Domagalski
respectively. Outgoing Minister of Agriculture6 , Kalinowski's actions were clearly in
line with those of Pawlak, to whom he was reputedly close. While calling for the PSL
to be rejuvenated and reformed, he reaffirmed his adherence to the agrarian political
line of his predecessor7 .
1 On the conflict between Pawlak and Jagieliński, cf. Zalewski Frédéric, op. cit. p.179-180.
2 Szczerbiak Aleks, "Electoral Politics in Poland: The Parliamentary Elections of 1997", Journal of
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol.14, n°3, 1998, p.74-75.
3 According to an OBOP survey, the AWS lists attract 35.2% of rural voters, those of the SLD 20.3%
and those of the PSL only 17%. While, according to the same survey, the PSL remains the party for
which farmers vote most (37.9% of voters who declared themselves to be farmers would have voted for
its candidates), it is followed by the AWS in this category (30.4%). Figures quoted in: Ibid, p.68.
4 Cf. interview with Janusz Piechocinski: "Sami jesteśmy sobie winni", Gazeta Wyborcza, 24/09/97,
p.7.
5 "Łzy Pawlaka", Gazeta Wyborcza, 13/10/97, p.4.
6 In April 1997, at Waldemar Pawlak's request, the PSL National Council withdrew the party's
confidence in Agriculture Minister Roman Jagieliński and asked Prime Minister Włodzimierz
Cimoszewicz to release him from his duties. Part of the internal conflict pitting Pawlak against
Jagieliński for control of the PSL, this episode leads to the latter's departure from the government and
his replacement on April 25 by Jarosław Kalinowski, considered to be close to Pawlak. Cf.
"Kandydat zmienił zdanie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 23/04/1997, p.4.
7 "Trzeba młodej krwi", Gazeta Wyborcza, 13/10/97, p.4.
251
The other protagonists in the field of peasant representation hardly benefit from the
PSL's electoral weakening. Like the ZZR Samoobrona, which seems to have been
relegated to the status of a tiny group by the results of the committee set up by its
leaders, the NSZZRI "S" failed to win a single seat in the Diet for the second
consecutive election. In fact, the ROP barely surpassed the 5% quorum and had only
six of its candidates elected as deputies, none of whom came from the farmers' union.
Only two members of the latter, Jerzy Chróścikowski and Krzysztof Głuchowski,
managed to win senatorial posts in the voivodships of Zamość and Siedlce, relying on
the political resources available to them individually at local level1 . What's more,
while a dozen former Rural Solidarity leaders are elected on AWS lists, they seem to
be increasingly clearly prioritizing their membership of the Solidarity camp over that
of the peasant movement in the construction of their self-presentation, thus giving up
on mobilizing their peasant identity as the main vector of distinction and
legitimization in the political field2 .
In the final analysis, the 1997 elections seem to have sanctioned the crisis of the
various organizations, both trade union and partisan, which had built their offer of
representation on an objectification of the peasantry as an autonomous social group.
They proved largely incapable of countering the dominant representations to build,
maintain and mobilize the peasantry as a group of individuals who, beyond their
disparities, shared a common identity and common interests. While the PSL now has
only a small number o f elected members in Parliament, the NSZZRI "S" and the
ZZR Samoobrona have once again failed to enter the parliamentary arena, and are
forced to fall back on their increasingly fragile union bases. As for the former leaders
of Solidarité Rurale elected on the AWS lists, their continued participation in the
parliamentary arena came at the price of their adherence to the government's reformist
discourse. However, the latter, by prophesying the
1 Activists in NSZZRI "S" since its creation in 1981, presidents of the Zamość and Siedlce regional
sections since the early 1990s and members of the union's National Council, Jerzy Chróścikowski and
Krzysztof Głuchowski are both influential local political figures. Chróścikowski has even chaired the
Zamość Gmina council since 1994. Cf.
"Senatorowie IV kadencji", Rzeczpospolita, 10/20/97.
2 Cf. Collovald Annie, "Identités stratégiques", Actes de la Recherche en sciences sociales, n°73, 1988,
p.29-40.
252
The decline of the peasantry and its fragmentation along competitive lines, contributes
to the very demobilization of the "peasant" social group at the heart of their political
legitimacy, and paradoxically keeps them in secondary positions in the political arena1
. Although Jacek Janiszewski (AWS) and Gabriel Janowski (AWS), appointed
respectively Minister of Agriculture and Chairman of the Sejm's Agriculture
Committee, are both former leaders of Solidarité Rurale, their room for manoeuvre
within the majority and their influence on the definition of the government's
agricultural policy appear in practice to be quite limited. Unlike his two predecessors
in the Agriculture portfolio, Jacek Janiszewski does not enjoy the symbolic rank of
Deputy Prime Minister in the government.
B) The slow unification of peasant organizations against the government.
How can we explain the involvement of divided and weakened peasant organizations
in a unitary movement to challenge government policy from the summer of 1998
onwards? How did they go about building common demands and making them
visible, despite the stigma attached to the "peasant" social group in whose name they
were mobilizing?
Far from being natural, the resurgence of agricultural protests in 1998 appears to be
the relatively unlikely result of the politicization of agriculture's economic situation
by the various organizations claiming to represent the interests of the peasantry in the
political arena. In our view, the relative reconfiguration of the field of peasant
representation following the 1997 elections plays a decisive role in this process. The
return to power of the most dogmatic modernizers and the weakening of the PSL,
particularly following its withdrawal from the government, in that they profoundly
transformed the ways in which the interests of the rural world were represented, in
effect shook the
1 As Frédéric Zalewski notes, the former heads of Solidarité Rurale found themselves
"Zalewski Frédéric, "Démobilisation et politisation de la paysannerie ...", art.cit., p.151.
253
These changes are gradually altering the way in which the various protagonists
perceive the risks and benefits of engaging in protest mobilization.
As we shall see, at the start of the Third Legislature, the various farmers' unions
clearly distanced themselves from the PSL, whose influence in t h e institutional
arena was now reduced, and independently entered into categorical negotiations with
the new government, each hoping to reap the benefits of a potential agreement to
strengthen their position relative to the others in the field of peasant representation
(1). Nevertheless, the persistent invisibility of the issue of agriculture's economic
situation in the public debate, and the perception of growing liberal domination of
government policy-making, gradually led them to envisage working together to shift
the balance of power with the government in their favor (2). To demonstrate this newfound unity of the peasantry against the government, union leaders decided, with the
support of a PSL seeking new alliances, to organize a unitary demonstration in the
streets of Warsaw on July 10, 1998. Initially conceived as a one-off action, this
unitary march helped to bring about conflictual relations between the government and
representatives of peasant organizations, and played a decisive role in the gradual
spread of protest actions throughout the country over the summer, autumn and winter
of 1998-1999 (3).
1) Competitive politicizations of the agricultural situation.
Far from sharing a similar definition of the economic situation in the agricultural
sector, its causes and the solutions to be found, the various organizations claiming to
represent the interests of the peasantry initially tackled this issue in different, even
competitive ways, each hoping to strengthen its position in relation to its competitors
in a field of representation of the peasantry that was undergoing complete
reconfiguration.
254
The new PSL leadership, thrown back into opposition by the signing of the coalition
agreement between the AWS and the UW, quickly adopted a critical stance towards
the new government. From the very first weeks of the IIIe legislature, it virulently
denounced the liberal orientation of the economic policy implemented. Her attacks
focused particularly on the agricultural section of the finance bill presented by Leszek
Balcerowicz, and more specifically on the reduction in state aid to the agricultural
sector. During the examination of the 1998 draft budget in the Sejm, the party's new
president Jarosław Kalinowski accused the government of contributing, through its
budgetary policies, to the deterioration in the economic situation of farmers and, more
broadly, of rural dwellers as a whole, whether they be farmers, pensioners or workers
in the agri-food industry:
Jarosław Kalinowski, PSL Parliamentary Club: "Ladies and Gentlemen. The budget presented to us
makes us realize the extent of the failure that [the PSL] suffered in the 1997 elections. Indeed, our
defeat has resulted in a dramatic deterioration in the economic situation of the countryside and farmers.
This is a painful reminder of our own mistakes. The current draft budget ratifies a 25% cut in spending
on agriculture and reduces to a minimum the resources committed to combating regional inequalities. If
the PSL had had any influence on the definition of this budget, we would never have accepted such
measures. [...] As far as agriculture and the agri-food industry are concerned, we find the drastic
reduction in operating and investment credits at preferential rates particularly incomprehensible. This is
a return to, or to put it bluntly, a
This was a "recurrence" of the policy pursued in the 1990s and 1991. [...] Unfortunately, the
consequences of such policies will soon become apparent. Hundreds of thousands of farms and many
sectors of the agri-food industry will find themselves in dire economic straits as a result. [...] The draft
budget proposed for 1998 does nothing to meet the major challenges facing the Polish economy. It fails
to reduce the risks associated with foreign competition, misjudges the financial consequences of the
floods, and shows a total lack of understanding of the immediate and long-term difficulties facing the
countryside and the agricultural sector. Its application will also exacerbate regional inequalities. [...]
During the elections, society gave its support to the AWS in the hope that it would pursue a social
policy that would address the most serious social problems. Unfortunately, the liberal option prevailed.
For this reason, we cannot in any way support the proposed budget. Extract from the stenogram of the
debates in the Sejm on the first day of the ninth session of the IIIe legislature (January 21, 1998).
255
Sources: Diet archives: http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata3.nsf.
However, in the early months of the IIIe legislature, the PSL leadership struggled to
impose its problematization of the rural economic situation as a social crisis
threatening all rural dwellers on the public stage. With only a small parliamentary
club, the PSL now occupies a marginal position in the political arena. Having
reaffirmed its commitment to the agrarian line defined since the early 1990s, the
party's new leadership is stigmatized for its demagoguery: its criticism of the liberal
modernization of agriculture is seen by its competitors as a sign of its archaism and
incompetence in economic matters1 . These challenges to the competence of the PSL's
leaders continued within the party itself, where debates on the formation's political
positioning and alliance strategy remained heated in the months following the 1997
elections. Although Roman Jagieliński left the PSL in November 1997 to set up his
own party2 , several party leaders and intellectuals continued in the first months of the
III legislaturee to argue for a redefinition of its political line and its offer of
representation, often in the direction of a renunciation of an essentialist definition of
the peasantry and a conversion to the modernizing discourse3 . These internal
controversies undermine the leaders' ability to control the party's public discourse and
legitimize their construction of the economic situation of agriculture as a social crisis
of the countryside as a whole, accentuated by the liberal policies pursued by the
government.
On the regular incompetence suits brought against Peasant Party leaders in the 1990s: Zalewski
Frédéric, op.cit., p.191.
2 Roman Jagieliński's new party was launched in early 1998. Named PLD (Partia LudowoDemokratyczna: People's Democratic Party), it was presented by its founding president as a generalist
party, aimed at all sections of the population, not just rural dwellers. However, Jagieliński's initiative
failed to attract the support he had hoped for, and the PLD was soon relegated to the margins of the
political arena. On Jagieliński's departure from the PSL: "Odchodzę, bo w PSL nic się nie dzieje",
Gazeta Wyborcza, 28/11/1997, p.2; on the creation of the PLD: "Nie tylko dla Chłopów", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 08/01/1998, p.3.
3 Cf. Zalewski Frédéric, op.cit., p.191-194. These internal debates were widely reported in the party
weekly Zielony sztandar. Cf. for example: "Z kim nam po drodze?", Zielony sztandar, 14/06/1998, p.6.
1
256
All the more so as the PSL leadership appeared isolated within the field of peasant
representation, and its approach to politicizing the economic crisis in the countryside
was not shared by the main farmers' unions.
For their part, the leaders of NSZZRI "S" and ZZR Samoobrona, who have no
parliamentary representation, as well as those of KZRKiOR1 , adopt a conciliatory
attitude towards the new government, preferring categorical negotiation to
contestation. Without seeking to broaden their unions' range of representation beyond
their traditional supporters, particularly the owners of large farms, the KZRKiOR
unions, which have lost the privileged position they occupied during the PSL-SLD
coalition, and the ZZR Samoobrona unions, exsanguinated since their electoral
debacle, are thus initially limiting their demands to the question of guaranteed
agricultural prices and incomes for farmers fully integrated into the market2 . As for
the NSZZRI "S", in the first months of the IIIe legislature, its leaders focused
primarily on strengthening their position within the political arena by forging closer
ties with the AWS and the former union leaders who had chosen to join this coalition
before the 1997 elections. Without denying the worsening economic situation of
farmers, particularly small individual farmers, they focused their attacks on the former
PSL-SLD coalition, accused of being responsible for the agricultural crisis, and on the
contrary, supported the Buzek government and the new Minister of Agriculture, Jacek
Janiszewski. At a demonstration organized by NSZZRI "S" in Warsaw in December
1997, Roman Wierzbicki declared: "Our demonstration is in no way in opposition to
the new government, which for the moment has done nothing wrong. It is the SLDPSL coalition that is responsible for the decline of Polish agriculture. The new
government is currently forced to deal with their mistakes. What we are asking for is
simply the realization of the AWS agricultural program"3 . In front of the Parliament
building, where they have gathered, the demonstrators carry placards reading
1 Unlike in 1993, there was no formal alliance between KZRKiOR and the PSL election committee for
the 1997 elections. Nevertheless, a number of the union's leaders appeared individually on the PSL or
SLD lists. In the end, only six of them were elected to Parliament, whereas the KZRKiOR had 22
deputies and 4 senators in the previous legislature. Cf. "Trzeba być razem", Zielony Sztandar,
25/04/1999, p.1.
2 Cf. "Czy po lnie i chmielu będzie...rzpepak?!", Chłopska droga, 22/02/98, p.3.
3 Quoted in "Oto głowa byka", Gazeta Wyborcza, 04/12/1997, p.5.
257
"SLD + PSL = thieves" or "Fix the mistakes of the communists"1 . While the NSZZRI
"S" leadership made no secret of its hostility to the UW's participation in the
government coalition and the return of its president Leszek Balcerowicz to the
Ministry of Finance, it reaffirmed its support for the Buzek government throughout
the first months of the IIIe legislature, and endeavored to position the union as a
privileged partner of the government majority. Having supported the ROP's election
committee during the parliamentary elections, the union's leaders are now showing
their support for the AWS's electoral campaign program.
At the beginning of spring 1998, the main organizations representing the peasantry
remained deeply divided both on the attitude to adopt towards the new government
and in their framing of the situation of farmers. While the new leadership of the PSL
clearly placed the party in opposition and strove to define the deterioration in the
economic situation of agriculture as a social crisis affecting the countryside as a
whole, the main agricultural unions collaborated, to varying degrees, with the
government and limited their definition of the agricultural crisis to the decline in
income of farmers integrated into the market, with KZRKiOR and ZZR Samoobrona
paying particular attention to large-scale farmers. It wasn't until May 1998 that the
various protagonists in the field of peasant representation began to come closer
together in their apprehension of the agricultural situation.
2) Towards a united farmers' front: the formation of an intersyndicale to
influence the balance of power with the government.
On May 21, 1998, the presidents of the three national agricultural unions - KZRKiOR,
NSZZRI "S" and ZZR Samoobrona - sent a joint communiqué to the Prime Minister,
in which they called on him to commit himself personally to the agricultural issue and
to respect the AWS's electoral commitments, particularly as regards guaranteeing
agricultural prices and protecting Polish production from foreign competition. Two
main points
1 Ibid.
258
This inter-union rapprochement, unprecedented since the beginning of 1993, was due
to the persistent invisibility of the agricultural issue in the public arena and the
impression, gradually shared by the leaders of the three unions, of its relegation to the
hierarchy of government concerns. Firstly, despite the objective deterioration in the
economic situation of farmers since 1996 and the efforts of PSL deputies to politicize
the issue in the context of Diet discussions on the Finance Act, the agricultural
question was scarcely debated in the parliamentary and media arenas in the early
months of the Third Legislature. These were dominated by the controversies
surrounding the opening of negotiations for Poland's accession to the European Union
and NATO, and the government's plan to reform the administrative map. Once the
1998 budget had been adopted, PSL leaders and deputies turned their attention from
the economic situation of the countryside to the reform of the administrative map, to
which they were vehemently opposed. Secondly, the discussions initiated between
representatives of the agricultural unions and the Ministry of Agriculture on the issue
of income guarantees for farmers seemed to stall in the early spring of 1998. While
they had not yet resulted in any concrete measures to raise minimum prices for
agricultural products or provide greater protection for the domestic market, the two
main demands shared by the various union leaders, the ability of the Minister of
Agriculture to relay their demands and influence the government's agricultural policy
was gradually being called into question by the various union negotiators. Indeed,
criticized within his own party, the SKL, of which he lost the presidency in February,
and implicated in a financial scandal from May onwards1 , Jacek Janiszewski seemed
increasingly marginalized within the government team. More generally, at the
beginning of 1998, the leaders of the main opposition parties, most of the trade
unions, but also some of the most influential political parties, began to converge.
1 Criticized for his lack of charisma and low profile within the government team, Jacek Janiszewski
loses his position as SKL chairman to Mirosław Styczeń at the party's congress at the end of February.
From May onwards, Jacek Janiszewski's position within the government was further weakened by the
publication by Gazeta Wyborcza of documents tending to show that he had embezzled state funds in his
favor when he was president of the Agricultural Real Estate Agency of the State Treasury in Szczecin
from 1992 to 1995. Cf. "W poszukiwaniu nowego lidera", Gazeta Wyborcza, 02/23/1998, p.5; "Partia
Zadowolonych", Gazeta Wyborcza, 03/02/1998 and "Koledzy skarbu państwa", Gazeta Wyborcza,
05/16/1998, p.4.
259
AWS member organizations, in their denunciation of the domination of UW liberals,
and in particular of the Finance Minister and President of this party, Leszek
Balcerowicz, over the definition of government policy. In this sense, the joint
communiqué from Andrzej Lepper, Janusz Maksymiuk and Roman Wierzbicki to the
Prime Minister testifies to the adherence of the three presidents of the national
agricultural unions to this interpretation of governmental power relations.
Balcerowicz, who makes no secret of his hostility to state intervention in agricultural
product markets and denies the very idea of an agricultural crisis, is openly accused
by agricultural union leaders of being the main culprit behind the stalemate in
negotiations. In their view, by imposing his liberal dogmas on his coalition partners,
he is limiting the latter's capacity for action and preventing the effective
implementation of the AWS's electoral program, particularly in agricultural matters.
In their joint press release, the presidents of the agricultural unions thus invite Prime
Minister Jerzy Buzek to meet them directly, without the mediation of the Ministry of
Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance, in order to "finally engage in a genuine
dialogue devoted to solving problems and not only, as has been the case up to now, to
defending [ideological] points of view and measures"1 .
However, this first joint initiative by the presidents of the agricultural unions in five
years went unanswered by the government. Nor did it draw any media attention to the
situation of agriculture, since it was only reported in the peasant press. Faced with the
government's silence and rumors of a planned increase in agricultural taxes and
reform of the agricultural social security fund (KRUS) by the Ministry of Finance, the
union leaders decided to step up their cooperation. On June 24, Andrzej Lepper,
Janusz Maksymiuk and Roman Wierzbicki signed a "cooperation agreement between
the presidents of the agricultural unions", which is intended to "guarantee proper
representation of farmers' professional and social interests vis-à-vis the government"2
. The union leaders also announced that they would organize an inter-union
demonstration in Warsaw on July 10, 1998, as a sign of the peasantry's new-found
unity with the government. Although not directly involved in
1 Quoted in "Zanim Wyszli na drogi", Zielony Sztandar, 14/02/1999, p.5.
2 Ibid.
260
PSL leaders explicitly associated themselves with this initiative, and several of them
announced their participation in the demonstration on July 101 . The inter-union
agreement of June 24, 1998 thus sanctions the convergence of the main protagonists
in the field of peasant representation in their representation of the agricultural
situation. Now unanimously denouncing Leszek Balcerowicz's responsibility for
worsening the situation, they agreed that for the government to take the situation into
account, it would have to define it as a social malaise affecting all components of the
agricultural sector, and therefore require the collaboration of the various organizations
claiming to represent the interests of the peasantry.
3) Reinvesting the arena of protest mobilizations: showing unity and
determination.
The decision taken by the presidents of the three national agricultural unions to
organize a unitary demonstration in the streets of Warsaw, with the support of the PSL
and several branch unions, marks a turning point in their approach to politicizing the
crisis in the countryside. Whereas their leaders had initially all favored negotiation
with the government, the organization of a unitary march through the streets of the
capital testifies to their desire to stage and publicize their demands, to take them out
of the hushed confines of ministerial lounges and place them directly in the public
arena. The demonstration's organizers' stated aim is twofold. On the one hand, the aim
is to put pressure on the decision-making powers, in particular the Prime Minister,
who has so far refused to commit himself personally to the agricultural issue, by
showing their unity and their capacity to mobilize. On the other hand, this
demonstration also aims to attract the attention of the media, to create an event
capable of raising the issue of the economic and social malaise of the rural world to
the front pages of newspapers and television channels2 . The appointment of a media
spokesperson for the
1 From the summer of 1998 onwards, the new leadership of the PSL set out to reinvest in the issue of
the rural crisis and to forge closer ties with the various farmers' unions in the run-up to the local
elections in autumn 1998.
2 Patrick Champagne notes: "A street demonstration cannot be reduced to a simple act of collective
protest; given the political benefits that can result from the media's focus on a social group in struggle,
it is also a strategic action aimed at influencing journalists in order t o o c c u p y media space with the
aim of triggering the positions of
261
The signing of the "agreement on collaboration between the presidents of the
agricultural unions" bears witness to the attention paid by union leaders to journalistic
coverage of their activities1 .
The effects of the July 10, 1998 demonstration on the dynamics of the controversy
surrounding the economic situation of agriculture are ambivalent. On the one hand,
the leaders of organizations claiming to represent the interests of the peasantry can
congratulate themselves on having succeeded in influencing the Prime Minister's
position by demonstrating their ability to mobilize. The day after the march, which
brought together between 10,000 and 18,000 demonstrators in the streets of Warsaw,
depending on estimates, and was undeniably one of the largest collective actions
organized by farmers since the early 1990s, Jerzy Buzek agreed for the first time to
meet representatives of the various trade union organizations to discuss the economic
situation of agriculture directly with them. The meeting took place on July 16, and
ended with the Prime Minister explicitly acknowledging the problematic situation of
farmers. In addition to promising a significant increase in government intervention in
the cereals market to stabilize prices, he announced that a round of negotiations would
be held on July 24 between government representatives and farmers' unions, to
discuss "the problems of agriculture and the countryside"2 . On the other hand, the
organizers of the July 10 parade failed to control the public image of the event.
Despite their communication efforts, the leaders of the agricultural unions, spokesmen
for culturally, socially and politically dominated agents, proved incapable of imposing
their definition of the demonstration and the malaise of the rural world3 . Thus, while
the march enabled them to get on the front pages of the main Polish media for the first
time, the description of the event
Champagne Patrick, "La manifestation comme action symbolique", art.cit. p.339.
1 This charge falls to Władysław Serafin, then vice-president of KZRKiOR.
2
Cf. "Zbożowe progi importowe", Gazeta Wyborcza, 17/07/1998, p.22; "Buzek przyjął
szefówrolniczych związków", Rzeczpospolita, 17/07/1998.
3 As Patrick Champagne reminds us, "the meaning that the organizers [of demonstrations] want to
impose on their 'demonstration' escapes them in part: they always have to deal with the relative
autonomy of the press field, which both manufactures and refracts the 'event'". According to
Champagne, while the ability of mobilized groups to control the media representation of their actions
depends of course on the care taken in preparing and organizing them, it is also a function of their
position in social space. Cf. Champagne Patrick, "La construction médiatique des " malaises sociaux "",
Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, n°90, 1991, p.67; Champagne Patrick, "La manifestation : la
production de l'événement politique", art.cit. p.25.
262
The picture given is largely unfavorable to them, since it shows violent, extremist and
even anti-Semitic demonstrators, with little mention of the root of the problem in the
agricultural sector. Without mentioning the official slogans of the organizers, the most
widely read national dailies devoted most of their coverage to the inconvenience the
demonstration caused Varsovians, and to the clashes between demonstrators and the
police.
Media coverage of the July 10 demonstration had an impact on relations between the
various protagonists in the controversy surrounding the economic situation of
agriculture during the month of July. In fact, it contributed to an increased
conflictualization of relations between union leaders and certain representatives of
public authorities, notably those most hostile to any state intervention in the
agricultural sector. While the version of the demonstration conveyed by the media
was vigorously contested by the former, who insisted on the dignity, calm and even
politeness of the participants, and blamed the blockades and scuffles that paralysed
the capital at the end of the march on "Balcerowicz's arrogance" and the brutality of
the forces of law and order, the latter took it on board1 . Government representatives,
such as his spokesman or that of the Minister of Finance, used it to denounce the
irresponsibility of the peasant representatives and to illegitimize their demands2 . This
interpretative conflict over the course of the demonstration was not without effect on
the failure of the round of negotiations begun on July 24 between representatives of
the farming unions and the government. The negotiations ended on the 28th, without
any agreement on guaranteed agricultural prices being reached between the various
parties3 . Immediately, Andrzej Lepper, Janusz Maksymiuk and Roman Wierzbicki
announced the organization of a new day of united national mobilization on
August 4 t o express "their disapproval of the treatment accorded by the
1 On the interpretative conflict between union leaders and the main national media regarding the course
and meaning of the July 10, 1998 demonstration, we refer you to our article: Pellen Cédric, "Les
manifestations paysannes polonaises de 1998-1999. Politisation, médiatisation et personnalisation d'une
mobilisation contestataire", Politix, vol.22, n°86, 2009, in particular p.180-183.
2 For example: "Rozmowa z ministrem finansów", Gazeta Wyborcza, 17/07/1998, p.24.
3 "Skup ratunkowy", Gazeta Wyborcza, 29/07/98, p.14.
263
government to the problems of agriculture and the countryside"1 . Confirming the
collaboration agreement ratified at the end of June, they nevertheless decided to
redefine the modalities of their collaboration and their involvement in the arena of
protest mobilizations. Giving up, at least temporarily, the idea of organizing a unitary
march in Warsaw, they declared that they would henceforth prefer to organize small
rallies throughout the country, and opted for decentralized management of the protest
movement, officially leaving the local structures of the various unions free to organize
and decide on the form to be given to their action2 . Partly reactivating the legacy of
the agricultural mobilizations of 1992 and 19933 and drawing explicit inspiration from
the actions of farmers in other European countries, notably France4 , this new way of
staging the
The "peasant malaise" had the advantage of not requiring as much organization as a
large-scale unitary demonstration. Mobilized as early as August 4, it dominated the
cycle of protest actions that developed over the following months. Indeed, throughout
the summer, autumn and winter of 1998-1999, the various organizations representing
the interests of the peasantry steadily reentered the arena of protest mobilizations,
with the actions implemented, often locally, punctuating the successive failure of
several rounds of negotiation between union leaders and the government.
Table 17: Main actions relating to the controversy over the state of agriculture
from July 10, 1998 to February 8, 1999.
Date
July 10
July 16
July 24 to 28
Type of event
Main organizers
National inter-union
NSZZRI "S", KZRKiOR,
day of action
ZZR Samoobrona and several
branch unions
Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek
Governmentand the presidents of
agricultural union
NSZZRI "S", KZRKiOR and
negotiations
ZZR Samoobrona.
A committee of government
Governmentexperts and representatives
agricultural union
f r o m NSZZRI "S",
negotiations
KZRKiOR and ZZR
Samoobrona
Form of action
Location
Duration
Number of
participants
(estimates)
police)
Parade
Warsaw
8 hours
10 000
Negotiation
Warsaw
/
/
Negotiation
Warsaw
/
/
1 "Zanim Wyszli na drogi", Zielony Sztandar, 14/02/1999, p.5.
2 "Rolniczy protest", Gazeta Wyborcza, 29/07/1998, p.5.
3 During the wave of demonstrations in 1992 and 1993, however, the movement appeared much less
homogeneous and centralized than in 1998 and 1999: Zalewski Frédéric, "Démobilisation et
politisation de la paysannerie ...", art.cit., p.155.
4 "Bierzemy przykład z rolników Unii", Zielony sztandar, 16/08/1998, p.1.
264
August 4
National inter-union
day of action
NSZZRI "S", KZRKiOR
and ZZR Samoobrona
Mainly in the
voivodeships of
Szczecin, Koszalin,
Słupsk, Gdańsk,
Roadblocks and
Elbląg, Olsztyn,
demonstrations in Suwałki, Gorzów
front of voivodeship Wielkopolski,
headquarters
Leszno, Jelenia
Góra, Legnica,
Wrocław, Płock,
Ciechanów, Siedlce
and Lublin.
August 11
Governmentagricultural union
negotiations
Deputy Prime Minister
Tomaszewski, Minister of
Agriculture and
representatives of NSZZRI
"S" , KZRKiOR and ZZR
Samoobrona
Negotiation
August 18
Local action
The ZZR Samoobrona
Roadblocks
August 18
Local action
Regional inter-organizational
protest committee
of Legnica
Roadblocks
August 20
Local actions
November 13
National interunion action
December 3
Day of action
national
intersyndicale
Regional inter-organizational
protest committees (support
from the national leadership of
NSZZRI "S", KZRKiOR and
ZZR Samoobrona).
Government representatives
and the presidents of NSZZRI
"S", KZRKiOR
and ZZR Samoobrona
The Prime Minister, the Minister
Governmento f Agriculture and the
December 28
agricultural union
Chairmen of the NSZZRI "S"
negotiations
and the
KZRKiOR
The Prime Minister, the Minister
Governmento f Agriculture and the
January 4, 1999 agricultural union
Presidents of NSZZRI "S" and
negotiations
KZRKiOR
Action days
NSZZRI "S", KZRKiOR
national interJanuary 22 to 24
and ZZR Samoobrona
union
December 4
January 22 to
February
4
February 3 to 8
Governmentagricultural union
negotiations
Bezledy (PolishPolish border)
Russian)
A few dozen dams
in the
Legnica
voivodeship
A few dozen dams
in the voivodships
of Elbląg, Gdańsk,
Olsztyn, Bydgoszcz
and
Toruń.
/
/
A few hours
Some fifty
tractors
A few hours
A few hundred
A few hours
A few hundred
Warsaw
/
/
Parade
Warsaw
A few hours
5 000
Negotiation
Warsaw
/
/
Negotiation
Warsaw
/
/
Negotiation
Warsaw
Roadblocks
Świecko (PolishGerman border)
Several days
Up to $3,000
Roadblocks
Boycott of a
The presidents of NSZZRI "S",
meeting with the
KZRKiOR and ZZR
Minister of
Samoobrona
Agriculture
NSZZRI "S", KZRKiOR
and ZZR Samoobrona
Warsaw
4 hours
From a few dozen
to several hundred,
depending on the
dam: 2000 in all
National action
days
NSZZRI "S", KZRKiOR
and ZZR Samoobrona
Roadblocks
Up to 120
blockages within ¾
voivodeships.
Several days
Several thousand
Governmentagricultural union
negotiations
Representatives of the
government and of NSZZRI
"S", KZRKiOR and
ZZR Samoobrona.
Negotiation
Warsaw
/
/
Compiled by us. Sources: Archives of the daily newspapers Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita, as
well as the peasant weeklies Zielony Sztandar and Chłopska droga from July 10, 1998 to February 8,
1999.
265
Section 2: Andrzej Lepper's symbolic appropriation of the
protest movement.
In this section, we shall focus on the processes by which Andrzej Lepper gradually
managed to symbolically appropriate the peasant protest movement that developed
from the summer of 1998 onwards, i.e. to gain recognition from the other protagonists
in the controversy over the economic situation of agriculture for his control over the
course of the demonstrations and their participants. Still perceived in the early months
of 1998 as a secondary player in the field of peasant representation, leading a union
with a very narrow militant base, the president of ZZR Samoobrona emerged barely a
year later as the main spokesman for the "angry" peasantry. To understand this reemergence of Andrzej Lepper at the heart of the political game, and through him of
the ZZR Samoobrona, we need to pay particular attention to the dynamics guiding the
cycle of peasant demonstrations during the summer, autumn and winter of 1998-1999,
and in particular to the competitive interactions between the various players involved.
We shall see that, far from being reducible solely to Lepper's strategic sense or
hypothetical charisma, the gradual emergence and imposition at the beginning of 1999
of a definition of the peasant protest movement setting up the president of ZZR
Samoobrona as its leader, appears to be the relatively unpredictable product of the
"blows" exchanged by the various players in the mobilization1 . In other words,
Andrzej Lepper's ability to steer the cycle of peasant demonstrations in 1998 and 1999
in his favor seems to us to have as much to do with the tactical activity he deploys
during the conflict as with that of the other protagonists in the struggle to define the
situation, be they the authorities, other union leaders or the media. While this struggle
for definition naturally pits the representatives of the mobilized organizations against
those of the public authorities, who seek to illegitimize their demands, it also pits the
representatives of the unions against those of the public authorities, who seek to
illegitimize their demands.
1 Cf. Dobry Michel, "Calcul, concurrence et gestion de sens. Quelques réflexions à propos des
manifestations étudiantes de novembre-décembre 1986", in Favre Pierre (dir.), op.cit. p.357-386.
266
leaders of the various organizations involved in the mobilization. The facade of unity
displayed, at least initially, by the leaders of the three main farmers' unions and the
PSL could not conceal the competition they continued to wage throughout the cycle of
demonstrations in order to strengthen their respective positions in the field of peasant
representation. The media also play a decisive role in this competitive process of
defining the peasant protest movement. Far from confining themselves to publicizing
the movement and transcribing its various stages, they participate in the construction
of the mobilization and the definition of its social image. Placed in an "associaterivals" relationship with the mobilized groups, they are part and parcel of the
interactions that shape the movement1 .
We begin by reviewing the conditions under which ZZR Samoobrona re-entered the
arena of protest mobilization through the intersyndicale formalized in early summer
1998 (A). We will then study Andrzej Lepper's gradual rise to prominence in the
dynamics of the protest movement, paying particular attention both to the demarcation
undertakings he endeavors to develop within the intersyndicale and to the struggles
over the definition of the conflict that animate it (B).
A) The integration of ZZR Samoobrona into the intersyndicale: recognition
of the representativeness of a bloodless union.
Stigmatized for its radicalism and the political ambitions of its president, ZZR
Samoobrona has maintained conflictual relations with other protagonists in the field
of peasant representation since its creation. Nevertheless, the forced refocusing of the
union's activities following the electoral failure of its leaders (1), has contributed to
the gradual pacification of its relations with other agricultural unions. Still enjoying
the status of a national agricultural union despite its objective weakness, it thus took
part alongside NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR in the formalization of the agricultural
intersyndicale, which offered it the opportunity to reinvest in its own interests.
1 Neveu Erik, "Médias, mouvements sociaux, espaces publics", art.cit.
267
the arena of protest mobilizations on the occasion of the united demonstration on July
10 (2).
1) The forced refocusing of ZZR Samoobrona's activities.
In the months following the debacle of the Przymierze Samoobrona committee in the
September 1997 parliamentary elections, the members of ZZR Samoobrona, now
essentially Andrzej Lepper and a handful of activists located mainly in the country's
north-western voivodships, embarked on a process of refocusing their activities.
Marginalized in the political arena and in the field o f peasant representation, they set
out to redefine the reference group whose interests they claimed to represent, and to
reclassify the objectives of their action towards the sole domain of trade union
activity.
Renouncing their earlier claim to speak on behalf of the peasantry as a whole, or even
of a broad social movement transcending sectoral boundaries, the leaders of ZZR
Samoobrona concentrated their activities in the early months of the IIIe legislature on
targeted issues of direct concern to farmers in the regions where they were based.
While the north-western regions of Poland are characterized by the relative
importance of large-scale, market-integrated grain farms in their agrarian structure1 ,
they endeavored to present themselves as spokesmen for the interests of capitalist
farmers whose income came solely from the sale of their produce. Without totally
abandoning the credit issue around which the union was formed, the members of the
ZZR Samoobrona set out to mobilize their resources in order to guarantee agricultural
prices - particularly cereal prices, some of which were falling sharply at the time - and
to help market agricultural products on the Polish, Russian and European markets.
1 Cf. Bafoil Francois, Guyet Rachel, L'Haridon Loïc & Tardy Vladimir, "Pologne. Profils
d'agriculteurs", art.cit. p.33.
268
The aim is to win over this fringe of the peasantry and legitimize their claim to
participate in its representation1 .
This restrictive redefinition of the ZZR Samoobrona reference group was
accompanied by a clear renunciation on the part of its leaders, first and foremost
Andrzej Lepper, to give an explicitly political meaning to their activities. Refraining
from taking positions on issues other than the income of capitalist farmers, and from
presenting themselves as potential contenders for positions of political power, at the
beginning of 1998, for the first time since June 1992, they limited their actions to the
field of agricultural unionism. Without being formally dissolved, the Przymierze
Samoobrona party was left "fallow", with ZZR Samoobrona officials no longer
claiming to be part of it at any point in their speeches. At the same time, we can also
observe a redefinition of the modes of action they use to promote the interests of the
reference group they claim to represent. Leaving behind the arena of protest
mobilization, they are now investing primarily in the arenas of concertation to which
they have access thanks to the status of national agricultural union acquired by ZZR
Samoobrona at the time of its creation. At the beginning of 1998, Andrzej Lepper was
invited to take part in several rounds of discussions with the Minister of Agriculture2
and to attend a meeting in Brussels organized by the leaders of COPA/COGECA, the
European confederation of agricultural unions3 . Far from being purely strategic, this
restriction of ZZR Samoobrona's activity appears to be linked above all to the
constraints weighing on a union that now has only an extremely small core of
activists, and whose main resources for remaining in the field of peasant
representation lie in its
1 In an interview with Zielony Sztandar Andrzej Lepper states: "There are a few issues we need to focus
on if we want agriculture to survive in our country. Firstly, the payment of a reasonable price for the
main agricultural products. Secondly, contractualization, i.e. guaranteed outlets. Thirdly, credit. Credit
must be adapted to agricultural production cycles. Production must be developed, not destroyed". :
Quoted in "Będziemy blokować", Zielony Sztandar, 05/07/1998, n°27, p.3.
2 Andrzej Lepper regularly takes part, along with other heads of agricultural organizations, in the work
of the Advisory Council to the Minister of Agriculture. In February 1997, for example, he took part in a
discussion at the Ministry of Agriculture on the price of rapeseed, alongside representatives of other
national agricultural unions and branch unions. Cf. "Czy po lnie i chmielu będzie...rzepak?!", Chłopska
droga, 22/02/1998, p.3; "Kosa jest Chora", Polityka, n°30, 15/07/1998, p.22-24.
3 Cf. "Na równych prawach", Chłopska droga, 03/05/1998, p.5.
269
earlier recognition as a representative national farming union, alongside NSZZRI "S"
and KZRKiOR.
2) Intersyndicale as an opportunity for ZZR Samoobrona.
Extremely weakened and only active in a small number of voivodeships, ZZR
Samoobrona was no longer considered a serious competitor by the other protagonists
in the field of peasant representation in 1998. On the contrary, its president's apparent
renunciation of his political ambitions, the limitation of its representation to a
relatively restricted fringe of the peasantry and the pacification of its modes of action
were perceived by them as a sign of the ZZR Samoobrona's "normalization", of its
conformation to legitimate trade union practices. Hitherto marginalized within the
field of peasant representation, ZZR Samoobrona and Andrzej Lepper are gradually
emerging as legitimate partners for the leaders of other agricultural unions, and even
the PSL, in the dynamic of negotiations with the Minister of Agriculture. All the more
so since, contrary to his earlier recurrent attacks on the latter, Andrzej Lepper now
displays his belief in the vocation of the various groups claiming to represent the
interests of the peasantry to collaborate or even, in time, to unite within a single
organization1 . Andrzej Lepper's participation in the joint communiqué of May 21,
1998, followed by the "collaboration agreement of the presidents of the agricultural
unions" signed on June 24, bears witness to this largely unprecedented
rapprochement2 , between the ZZR Samoobrona and the other protagonists in the field
of peasant representation, and to its leaders' new adherence to the normative theme of
the unity of the peasant movement.
The stated aim of the June 24 collaboration agreement is to pool the capacities for
action of the various national agricultural unions in order to showcase
"the determination and unity of farming organizations in defending their interests
1 Cf. "Będziemy blokować", Zielony Sztandar, 05/07/1998, n°27, p.3.
2 The joint demonstration on May 26, 1993 was the only example of joint action by the three national
farmers' unions. See chapter 2, section 2.
270
Polish farmers and Polish agriculture"1 . In other words, in exchange for adhering to a
unitary line of action, which takes the form of a common platform of demands, the
three unions are pooling their resources, notably militant resources, in an attempt to
increase their influence in the power struggle with the government. The first step will
be to organize a joint demonstration in the streets of Warsaw on July 10. In this sense,
ZZR Samoobrona can be considered the main beneficiary of the June 24 agreement.
On the sole basis of its status as a national farmers' union, it appears symbolically as
the equal of the other two signatories. In reality, however, it has far fewer resources,
particularly in terms of activists, than KZRKiOR and NSZZRI "S". While the latter
claim 1.8 million and 400,000 members respectively2 , the ZZR Samoobrona relies on
a very small militant core, which hardly enables it t o mobilize more than a few
dozen demonstrators during the rare actions it organizes in 1997 and 1998. The June
24 agreement thus represented a double opportunity for the leaders of ZZR
Samoobrona. In addition to being legitimized by the other farmers' unions as an
important protagonist in the field of peasant representation, it gave them the
opportunity to revive modes of protest action that they would have been unable to
implement and make visible on their own.
B) The "Lepperization" of the protest movement.
At the start of the cycle of farmers' protests, ZZR Samoobrona was by far the weakest
of the three farmers' unions involved in contesting the government's agricultural
policy. However, benefiting from the media's attraction to the spectacular and the
reputation as a radical peasant leader acquired by Andrzej Lepper during the farm
strikes of 1992 and 1993, from the demonstration of July 10, 1998 onwards it
enjoyed, mainly through its president, an audience out of all proportion to its real
influence within the intersyndicale (1). The latter never ceases
1 "Wielka demonstracja rolników w Warszawie", Chłopska droga, n°29, p.2.
2 Krok-Paszkowska Ania, art.cit. p.122.
271
as the protest movement grew. All the more so as Andrzej Lepper increasingly sought
to distinguish himself from his partner-companions in the intersyndicale by returning
to the subversive practices he had become accustomed to in the early 1990s (2).
During a unitary action at the Świecko border crossing at the end of January 1999,
Andrzej Lepper clearly broke with the peaceful definition attributed to demonstrations
by other union leaders. Questioning the legitimacy of the latter to effectively represent
the interests of the peasantry, he set out, as we shall see, to successfully alter the
balance of the protest movement in his favor by attributing a revolutionary meaning to
it (3). Having succeeded in gaining recognition as the "charismatic leader" of the
angry peasants, he then sought to "push his advantage" by not associating himself
with an agreement between the agricultural unions and the government signed on
February 8, even though he was the main instigator, and by keeping the ZZR
Samoobrona alone in the protest (4).
1) Media exacerbation
Andrzej
Lepper
media
of
influence of
on the demonstration of July 10, 1998.
On July 10, 1998, on the call of KZRKiOR, NSZZRI "S", ZZR Samoobrona, but also
several branch unions, for example dairy farmers, and non-union farmers'
organizations, such as Związek Młodzieży Wiejskiej (ZMW) close to the PSL,
thousands of farmers gathered in Warsaw to march through the streets of the capital.
In accordance with the law, the demonstration has been declared in advance to the
Voivodship Marshal and its route has been validated by the municipal authorities.
Starting from Warsaw's Insurrection Square, the march will end in front of the Prime
Minister's Chancellery building, after taking in Holy Cross Street, where the Ministry
of Finance is located, Nowy Świat Street, and finally Ujazdowski Alleys. Starting at
11 a.m., the demonstration is due to end at 3 p.m. with the reading of a joint
communiqué by the presidents of the three national agricultural unions, followed by
the reception, in the Prime Minister's Chancellery buildings, of a delegation of
demonstrators by government representatives, including Agriculture Minister
Janiszewski and Finance Minister Balcerowicz. At the end of the morning, Andrzej
Lepper, Janusz Maksymiuk and
272
Roman Wierzbicki, side by side under a Polish flag, start the march. In the procession,
some participants also carry Polish flags, others carry placards expressing their
demands, and still others carry forgeries. Several leaders and elected representatives
of the PSL, PPS and SLD took part in the demonstration, which their parties openly
supported.
Like all major collective movements, the July 10, 1998 demonstration was made up of
a multitude of actions more or less well controlled by the organizers, with the various
participants taking part on the basis of diverse motivations, and constrained to varying
degrees by the instructions of pre-constituted groups1 . Although presented by its
organizers as a peaceful action aimed at opening new negotiations with the Prime
Minister, the march was marred by several incidents. Three of them dominate the
accounts given of the demonstration the following day. Firstly, the procession came to
a halt for a few moments in front of the Ministry of Finance, where demonstrators
threw eggs and stones at Leszek Balcerowicz and h u r l e d insults. Later, the
procession diverted for a while from its planned route and took to the Jerusalem alleys
in the direction of the Dmowski traffic circle, where scuffles broke out between
participants and the police. Finally, while the farmers' delegates were being received
by government representatives, several demonstrators, who should have dispersed by
then, continued their march along the Ujazdowski alleys to block road traffic on Na
Rozdrożu square, where they once again clashed with the forces of law and order.
Diagram 3: route of the July 10, 1998 demonstration.
1 As Michel Offerlé reminds us: "Demonstration is a collective activity resulting from multiple social
mobilizations and incentives linked to the interactions of everyday life": Offerlé Michel,
"Descendre dans la rue de la "journée" à la "manif", in Favre Pierre, op.cit., p.110.
273
Compiled by us. Sources: reports on the demonstration of July 10, 1998 in the daily general press
(Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita) and weekly peasant press (Zielony Sztandar, Chłopska Droga).
Minimizing the unitary, organized nature of the protest movement and glossing over
the demands of the organizers, journalists from Poland's leading "reference"
newspapers, notably Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita, highlighted these
incidents in their coverage of the event, emphasizing the participants' outbursts of
physical and verbal violence, as well as their incivility towards the capital's
inhabitants1 . In this context, Andrzej Lepper received particular attention. Even
though the ZZR Samoobrona activists made up only a tiny proportion of the total
number of demonstrators, Lepper was given decisive responsibility for the march's
progress and for its success.
We're not just talking about "skidding", to the detriment of the other players involved
in the mobilization, whose presence is barely mentioned.
Andrzej Lepper's involvement in some of the incidents that marred the demonstration
is hardly in doubt. Returning in part to the subversive practices for which he was
renowned in the early 1990s, the president of ZZR Samoobrona seemed to distance
himself from the other leaders of the farmers' unions right from the start of the march,
hardly respecting the instructions laid down by the intersyndicale. At the time
president of KZRKiOR, Janusz Maksymiuk acknowledged a few years later that
1 Cf. "Żywią i blokują", Gazeta Wyborcza, 11/07/1998, p.1 Koza dla Balcerowicza", Rzeczpospolita,
11/07/1998; interviewing PSL vice-president Marek Sawicki the day after the demonstration,
journalists from the Warsaw edition of Gazeta Wyborcza mainly asked him about the demonstrators'
excesses: "Rozmowa z Markiem Sawickim", Gazeta Wyborcza, Warszawa, 11/07/1998, p.5.
274
that it was indeed Lepper who was behind the detour of the procession towards the
Allées de Jérusalem, which led to the first confrontation of the day between
demonstrators and the police:
"[On July 10, 1998], we're marching, we've formed a marching column and we're going up rue Nowy
Świat. Suddenly, as we're approaching Place Charles De Gaulle, I hear that Lepper is about to turn right
[onto the Jerusalem alleys] and not follow the agreed plan. What the hell do we do? So I get closer and
hear that he's already given the order to go right. I went up to the head of the procession and the police
came down on us with tear gas. After that we all had problems with the law... [...] We organized legal
demonstrations, we notified the town hall, we informed the mayor, we presented petitions the day
before to the voivodship marshal, so that he could take note of them... we were organized trade
unions... and then Lepper would show up and he'd push everything around... ".
Janusz Maksymiuk.
Interview conducted on June 25, 2008 in Warsaw.
However, the extent of Andrzej Lepper's subversion of the demonstration's rules
during the July 10 march must be qualified, as must his actual influence on the course
of the action. First of all, incidents were relatively rare within the procession, and did
not lead to any disruption of the planned sequence of events. After being pushed back
to the Dmowski traffic circle by the police, whom they didn't seem to resist, the few
demonstrators who had followed Lepper down the Jerusalem alleys quickly returned
to the legal route of the march. They then followed him smoothly to the Prime
Minister's chancellery, where the united speech by the union representatives went
ahead as planned. Moreover, far from using the same bellicose rhetoric as in 1992 and
1993, Andrzej Lepper hardly questioned, either during the march or at its conclusion,
the peaceful objectives set for the action by the intersyndicale and, on the contrary,
reiterated his support for a method of resolving the problem of the countryside that
favors negotiation with the government over protest1 . Finally, all the incidents that
occurred during the parade
1 Like the presidents of NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR, Andrzej Lepper was delighted that the Prime
Minister received them on July 16 and agreed to open a round of negotiations devoted to the economic
problems of agriculture: "I'm delighted that the government has agreed to start discussions with us.
Now we have to wait and see whether the promises will be implemented in practice", he declared after
the meeting with Jerzy Buzek. Cf. "Buzek przyjął szefówrolniczych związków", Rzeczpospolita,
17/07/1998.
275
cannot be attributed to ZZR President Samoobrona alone. The blockade of Na
Rozdrożu Square by demonstrators at the end of the day occurred just as he was
taking part in the meeting with government representatives at the Prime Minister's
Chancellery.
In our view, understanding the focus on Andrzej Lepper in journalistic coverage of
the July 10, 1998 demonstration means taking into consideration the logics of event
production specific to the media field. As Patrick Champagne notes, "The media act
in the moment and collectively fabricate a social representation, which even when it is
quite far removed from reality, endures despite later denials or rectifications, because
this first interpretation very often only reinforces spontaneous interpretations, and
therefore first mobilizes prejudices, tending thereby to redouble them"1 . Thus,
without denying their reality, there can be little doubt that the emphasis placed on the
incidents that punctuated the demonstration by Poland's leading daily newspapers is
largely explained by the dependence of most journalists on spontaneous
representations of the peasantry2 . Similarly, the prominent role given to Lepper in the
course of the demonstration had at least as much to do with the sulphurous reputation
he acquired during the farm strikes of 1992 and 1993 as with his actual activity on the
demonstration ground. Since the early 1990s, the president of ZZR Samoobrona has
been perceived as the archetypal radical peasant leader, the personification of the
rebellious "Jacques". The marked exaggeration of Andrzej Lepper's authority over the
demonstrators and his influence within the intersyndicale thus contributed to the
construction and legitimization of a representation of the July 10 march as a radical
action, led by peasants who were willingly violent and incapable of adapting to
democratic forms of interest representation3 . While this stigmatizes the president of
ZZR Samoobrona, it also gives him a media profile he hasn't had since the beginning
of the decade. This is confirmed in
1 Champagne Patrick, "La construction médiatique des 'malaises sociaux'", art.cit. p.65.
2 While the ability of mobilized groups to control the media representation of their actions depends of
course on the care taken in preparing and organizing them, it is also a function of their position in social
space: Ibid., p.67.
3 Editorialist Marek Beylin offers a paradigmatic version of such a reading of the July 10 demonstration
in Gazeta Wyborcza: Cf. Beylin Marek, "Uliczne zbiory", Gazeta Wyborcza, Warszawa, 17/07/1998,
p.21.
276
the months following the Warsaw demonstration, under the dual effect of the
journalistic treatment given to peasant protest actions and Lepper's increasingly clearcut attempts to demarcate himself within the intersyndicale.
2) The return of the "Lepperiadas": the imposition of a definition of the wave of
peasant protests as a radical movement.
As in the early 1990s, roadblocks played a central role in the cycle of agricultural
protests that began in August 1998. Indeed, roadblocks were by far the most
frequently mobilized means of action during the various days of action called by the
intersyndicale during the summer, autumn and winter. Even though, until the end of
January 1999, these roadblocks remained small-scale and relatively short-lived, and
rarely brought traffic to a complete standstill, the regular use of this practice by
activists from the various farming unions contributed to a gradual generalization of
interpretations of the cycle of farming demonstrations as a radical movement. As
early as summer 1998, several members of the government and influential public
figures, including the Polish Primate, denounced the demonstrators' "terrorist"
tendencies1 .
Against this backdrop of heightened controversy over the legitimacy of protest actions
by farmers' unions, Andrzej Lepper was once again singled out for special treatment
by the media. Although the few autonomous roadblocks organized by ZZR
Samoobrona activists in 1998 did not differ radically from those carried out by other
unions, Andrzej Lepper was attributed decisive responsibility for the supposed
radicalization of the protest movement. The president of the ZZR Samoobrona is
increasingly distancing himself from his colleagues.
1 On August 5, Janusz Tomaszewski, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, denounced
the illegality of roadblocks. Warning farm unionists against police repression and p r o s e c u t i o n , he
urged them to adopt more proactive m e t h o d s .
"moderate". Condemnations of the roadblocks multiplied in the following days. On August 15, in his
sermon at the Jasna Góra sanctuary in Częstochowa, Poland's Cardinal and Primate Józef Glemp
himself described the roadblocks as "the first step towards terrorism". Cf. "Rząd zaskoczony
protestem", Rzeczpospolita, 05/08/1998; "Niech Prymas przeprosi chłopa", Gazeta Wyborcza,
21/08/1998, p.4.
277
Andrzej Lepper's public speeches, which are now regularly reported in the media, are
a clear indication of his commitment to his inter-union partners. Contrary to the
presidents of KZRKiOR and NSZZRI "S", who throughout the year continued to
display their belief in negotiations as a way out of the crisis, Andrzej Lepper, at the
end of August, spoke of the possibility of breaking off talks with the government if it
did not immediately accede to all the demands of the inter-union1 . He also
distinguished himself by renewing his aggressive, even insulting, rhetoric against
several political leaders, with a predilection for the Minister of Finance, Leszek
Balcerowicz, against whom he multiplied his attacks2 . Finally, unlike Janusz
Maksymiuk and Roman Wierzbicki, Andrzej Lepper does not hesitate to put himself
on stage during days of inter-union protest. Dressed as a farmer, he sometimes
participates directly in roadblocks, where he sometimes comes face-to-face with the
forces of law and order.
Lepper's radical practices led to the exclusion of ZZR Samoobrona from the
negotiating table in December 19983 . Although they did not lead to the break-up of
the inter-union front, they did cause initial tensions within it. Indeed, some NSZZRI
"S" leaders made no secret of their reservations about the methods of the ZZR
Samoobrona president. Józef Leszczyński, head of the union in the Gorzów
Wielkopolski voivodeship, told journalists in early January 1999: "We all share the
same demands, but to be honest, I'd prefer it if we stopped playing on the same team
as Andrzej Lepper"4 . Above all, they enable Lepper to monopolize media coverage of
the various peasant protests, and to appear as the main instigator of the protest, when
in fact he is not, and his real control over the course of the protest is limited.
1 "Negocjacje i prowokacje", Rzeczpospolita, 20/08/1998.
2 Under Lepper's impetus, the slogan "Balcerowicz musi odejść" (Balcerowicz must go) became one of
the most popular and mobilized by demonstrators during protest actions. During the march on
December 3, 1998, Lepper even got himself filmed whipping a finance minister's dummy. See, for
example: "Bój to nasz nie ostatni", Chłopska droga, 12/13/1998; "Andrzej Lepper, le provocateur", Le
Courrier de Varsovie, no. 91, 01/29/1999.
3 "Bez Leppera o rolnictwie", Gazeta Wyborcza, Warszawa, 29/12/1998, p.14; "Decyzje za tydzień",
Rzeczpospolita, 29/12/1998.
4 "Lepperiada Na Granicy", Gazeta Wyborcza, Zielona Góra, 19/01/1999, p.1.
278
of demonstrations seems more than uncertain1 . At the beginning of January, w i t h
a new inter-union day of action scheduled for the end of the month, the term
"Lepperiada", coined by the media at the end of 1992 to designate the spectacular
actions of the ZZR Samoobrona2 , re-emerged, and was generalized to all protest
actions carried out by peasants, whether or not they belonged to the ZZR
Samoobrona.
3) Świecko's "coup": Lepper alone against all.
On January 4, 1999, a new round of negotiations between the presidents of
KZRKiOR, NSZZRI "S", the Minister of Agriculture and the Prime Minister came to
an end without any agreement being reached between the various parties. Discussions
continued to stall over the amount of state intervention in the cereals market, and now
also in the pork market, where prices fell sharply at the end of 19983 . Against this
backdrop, Janusz Maksymiuk and Roman Wierzbicki came to an agreement with
Andrzej Lepper, who since his exclusion from the negotiations has not ceased to
threaten further road blockades, to stage a joint protest action, the first since the
beginning of December. The three union leaders decided to organize a blockade of the
Świecko border crossing (Lubuskie4 ), the main road crossing between Poland and
Germany. On the night of January 21 to 22, 1999, more than 2,000 demonstrators
from various trade unions set up a blockade of used tires and barbed wire on national
road no. 2, one and a half kilometers from the border, bringing heavy goods vehicle
traffic between the two countries to a complete halt on this route. On January 22, at a
joint press conference, Janusz Maksymiuk, Roman Wierzbicki and Andrzej Lepper
announced that this action would last until the opening of the border.
According to Grzegorz Foryś's estimates, the ZZR Samoobrona was involved in organizing only
18.2% of peasant protest actions in 1998, compared with 50% for the NSZZRI "S" and 22.7% for other
agricultural organizations. Cf. Foryś Grzegorz, op.cit., p.157.
2 See chapter 2, section 1.
3 "Powołanie rządowego zespołu", Gazeta Wyborcza, Warszawa, 05/01/1999, p.4.
4 The administrative reform adopted on July 24 1998 came into force on January 1er 1999. The 49
voivodships of 1975 were merged into just 16 larger voivodships. In addition, 379 powiats
(intermediate administrative levels between the voivodeship and the commune (gmina)) were created.
Cf.
"Ustawa z dnia 24 lipca 1998r. o wprowadzeniu zasadniczego trójstopniowego podziału terytorialnego
państwa", available at http://www.mswia.gov.pl/portal/pl/53/1661/, accessed 1er July 2010. See map of
voivodships in appendix.
1
279
by the government of new discussions on agricultural price guarantees with all
agricultural unions, including the ZZR Samoobrona1 . While the presidents of
NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR travel to Warsaw in the evening to discuss the conditions
for opening this new round of negotiations with the Minister of Agriculture and
Deputy Prime Minister Tomaszewski, Andrzej Lepper joins the demonstrators in
Świecko. At the same time, several small-scale roadblocks are set up across the
country by the local structures of the various agricultural unions.
As the only national trade union leader present in Świecko from January 22, Andrzej
Lepper once again managed to monopolize the extensive media coverage given to this
action. Filmed on the barricades with a scythe in hand, haranguing his supporters, he
made a series of sensational statements and played to the point of caricature the role
of radical peasant leader expected of him by the many journalists present2 . Above all,
he returned to the insurrectionary rhetoric and symbolism of the 1992 and 1993
demonstrations, and quickly broke with the objectives set for the action by the
intersyndicale. During his speeches, he unilaterally redefined the meaning of the
roadblock, presenting it as the first stage in a peasant revolt aimed at overthrowing the
government3 . Lepper's break with his partners in the inter-union front came to an end
on January 24. On that day, Janusz Maksymiuk and Roman Wierzbicki accompanied
Minister of Agriculture Jacek Janiszewski to the demonstration site to finalize with
ZZR president Samoobrona how to organize new negotiations. Andrzej Lepper took
advantage of the fact that the presidents of NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR were arriving
in Świecko in the same car as the Minister of Agriculture to loudly accuse them, in
front of a crowd of journalists and demonstrators, of having sold out to the
government and betraying peasant interests4 . Refusing to meet the Minister, he
announced, once again
1 Cf. "Z kosą na terminal", Gazeta Wyborcza, 23-24/01/1999, p.4; "Brony i kosy w Świecku",
Rzeczpospolita, 23/01/1999.
2 Not all the media were fooled by Lepper's staging of the protests, and some even highlighted it in
articles dedicated to the president of ZZR Samoobrona. See, for example, "Lepper idzie na wojnę",
Polityka, n°6, 06/02/1999.
3 "Barykady Leppera", Gazeta Wyborcza, 26/01/1999, p.4.
4 On this episode, see in particular: "Odstąpili, ale wrócą", Gazeta Wyborcza, 25/01/1999, p.4 ;
"Rolnik na granicy", Polityka, n°5, 30/01/1999; "Wicepremier Lepper i mister Hyde", Wprost, n°14,
2006, p.20.
280
once unilaterally, the immediate lifting of the Świecko roadblock while calling on the
peasants to remobilize the next morning "to block all border crossings, roads,
railroads, bridges and administration buildings"1 .
The attribution of a political meaning to Świecko's action, the break-up of the
intersyndicale and the unilateral calls for a generalization of the blockades can, in our
view, be understood as a move attempted by the president of ZZR Samoobrona to
alter the balance of the mobilization in his favor and strengthen his position within the
field of representation of the peasantry. By breaking with the "peaceful" meaning
hitherto attributed to protest actions and denouncing the compromises of other union
leaders who, unlike him, had taken part in the last unsuccessful rounds of
negotiations, he set out to establish himself as the only spokesman for the peasantry
able to make the government give way on the issue of guaranteed agricultural prices.
Now firmly rejecting negotiation as a means of resolving the problem of the
countryside, he strove to impose the image of a conflict in the process of
radicalization, over which he alone would have control, and which could have only
two outcomes: the immediate and unconditional acceptance of all his demands, or the
overthrow of the government. "I'm the only person, like it or not, who can stop the
protests in Poland. But for the protests to stop, absolutely all proceedings against the
peasants must be stopped. [...] The government-guaranteed minimum prices for
agricultural products must also be increased significantly immediately", he declared
the day after Świecko's action2 . A veritable provocation to the other protagonists in
the controversy over the economic situation of agriculture, in that it is built on a
challenge to the authority of the government and the legitimacy of the other
agricultural unions to effectively represent the interests of the peasantry, this attempt
to redefine the public identity of the protest movement is not without risks. First of all,
the ability of ZZR president Samoobrona to maintain roadblocks in sufficiently
significant numbers from January 25 onwards for them to be perceived as a sign of
escalation in the peasant protest movement, and that
1 Quoted in: "Odstąpili, ale wrócą", Gazeta Wyborcza, 25/01/1999, p.4.
2 Quoted in: "Ja Mogę Wszystko", Gazeta Wyborcza, Szczecin, 30-31/01/1999, p.3.
281
The fact that the various protagonists in the controversy over the economic situation
of agriculture recognized its hold on the latter seemed highly uncertain at the end of
January. Indeed, although ZZR Samoobrona had strengthened its position in the
dynamics of protest mobilization, it was still considered to be the least structured
agricultural union with the smallest militant base. The largest autonomous action
organized by ZZR Samoobrona since the beginning of the protest cycle, the blockade
of the Bezledy border crossing on August 18, lasted only a few hours and brought
together, at most, a hundred demonstrators1 . Secondly, Lepper's attitude in Świecko,
unanimously denounced for its radicalism and irresponsibility, initially led to a
questioning of his legitimacy to speak on behalf of the peasantry. Thus, while the
Minister of Agriculture seemed ready to accept ZZR Samoobrona's return to the
negotiating table, the day after Świecko's action many voices were raised in
Parliament and the government calling for Lepper's arrest and the banning of his
union. "It's with the prosecutor that we're going to make an appointment with Mr.
Lepper, not with the Prime Minister," declared government spokesman Jarosław
Sellin on January 252 . As for the Minister of Agriculture, he now rules out any
possibility of discussion with representatives of ZZR Samoobrona. The same is true
of Deputy Prime Minister Tomaszewski, who considers it impossible to compromise
with a union whose
"leader clearly announces that his aim is the overthrow of the government and who
calls on farmers to arm themselves with Molotov cocktails, iron bars and even
grenades at roadblocks"3 . The leaders of NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR themselves
quickly distanced themselves from Lepper and condemned his attitude in Świecko.
Roman Wierzbicki declared as e a r l y as January 24: "Lepper has disrupted the
smooth running of the protest. What I accept least is that we led government
representatives to Świecko who were prepared to engage in unconditional discussions.
Lepper's behavior shows that his real aim is to destabilize the state". As for Janusz
Maksymiuk, he regrets that Lepper has squandered "an opportunity to put an end to
the
1 Cf. "Zmalałimport zbóż", Rzeczpospolita, 19/08/1998.
2 Quoted in "Barykady Leppera", Gazeta Wyborcza, 26/01/1999, p.4.
3 Quoted in "Lepperiada", Gazeta Wyborcza, 27/01/1999, p.4.
282
protest by signing an agreement with the Minister of Agriculture who was at our
mercy in Świecko"1 .
On January 26, 1999, the national dailies devoted lengthy articles to the roadblocks
set up the day before by peasant demonstrators. Under the headline "Lepper's
Barricades", Gazeta Wyborcza took stock of the situation across the country, counting
120 roadblocks in 12 voivodships out of 162 . In the days that followed, the peasant
protest movement never left the front pages of the main Polish media. The roadblocks
and the economic situation of the agricultural sector became the main topics of the
news, and several articles were devoted to them daily in the most widely read
newspapers, notably Gazeta Wyborcza [table 18]. Andrzej Lepper, commonly referred
to as "the leader of the peasant uprising", achieved media star status, with every one
of his numerous appearances widely reported and commented on. He appeared on the
front pages of daily and weekly newspapers3 , and was omnipresent on television
screens at the turn of January and February 19994 .
Table 18: Coverage of peasant protests and Andrzej Lepper in Gazeta
Wyborcza from January 4 to February 7, 1999.
Week of
Week of
Week of
Week of
Week of
Total for
January 4 January 11 January 18 January 25 February 1
the
to 10
to 17
to 24
to 31
to 7
period
Articles on the economic
situation of agriculture or on a
protest action
0
0
3
18
21
42
1 Quoted in "Odstąpili, ale wrócą", Gazeta Wyborcza, 25/01/1999, p.4.
2 This figure, based on estimates provided by the Ministry of the Interior, is also the one used by other
newspapers. Cf. "Barykady Leppera", Gazeta Wyborcza, 26/01/1999, p.4; "Policja usuwa blokady;
Polityczna odpowiedzialność wojewodów", Rzeczpospolita, 26/01/1999.
3 During the month of February 1999 Lepper appeared on the front pages of the weeklies Polityka,
twice, and Wprost: "Lepper idzie na wojnę" Polityka, No. 6, 1999 and "Zwierzę polityczne", Polityka,
No. 7, 1999; "Ruch oporu", Wprost, No. 7, 1999; Gazeta Wyborcza's weekend supplement of February
6-7 was also largely devoted to the president of ZZR Samoobrona:
"Ładny plon mi wyrósł", Gazeta Świąteczna, 06-07/02/1999. Andrzej Lepper also attracts the attention
of many foreign media, see for example: "Les barrages paysans se multiplient en Pologne", Le Monde,
27/01/1999 ; "Radikale Bauern legen Polen lahm", Die Welt, 27/01/1999 ;
"Poland Opens Talks With Bitter Farmers", The New York Times, 03/02/1999.
4 Cf. Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej, "Andrzej Lepper i protesty rolników w programach TVP",
Warsaw, 6-8/02/1999.
283
farmer
Including on the front page
0
0
1
5
7
13
Including Lepper's name in
the title
0
0
0
5
5
10
Including a photograph by
Lepper
0
0
0
2
5
7
Produced by us. Sources: Gazeta Wyborcza archives from January 4, 1999 to February 7, 1999.
Against this backdrop, Minister of Agriculture Janiszewski backtracked on his earlier
statements on January 28 and personally invited Lepper to return to the negotiating
table in order to find a way out of the conflict1 . Although the president of ZZR
Samoobrona initially refused to change his position and repeated his calls for revolt2 ,
on February 2 he finally agreed to join the discussions already underway between the
Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Labor and the presidents of NSZZRI "S" and
KZRKiOR. On February 8, these led to the signing of an unprecedented agreement
between representatives of the government and the three national agricultural unions.
By providing, among other things, for an increase of over 30% in the minimum price
of pork, the introduction of new agricultural credits at preferential rates and the
provision of additional resources to the Agricultural Market Agency to stabilize
agricultural prices, this agreement marks a clear shift in the way public authorities
intervene in the agricultural sector. Still unthinkable just a few weeks earlier, it seems
above all to mark Lepper's success in bending the government and establishing
himself as the undisputed leader of the peasant protest movement. "Over the past
week, Andrzej Lepper has established himself as the leader of the peasant rebellion.
He dominated the political scene and pushed the government to the ropes, before
manhandling it like a common sack of
1 Cf. "Zaproszenie dla Leppera", Gazeta Wyborcza, 29/01/1999.
2 On January 31, Lepper reaffirmed to participants in a road blockade near Poznań his rejection of
negotiation as a means of resolving agricultural problems. "We only know one way out: all or nothing,"
he declared. "Drogi W Blokadach", Gazeta Wyborcza, Poznań, 01/02/1999, p.3.
284
boxing", read the headline of an article on the ZZR Samoobrona president in the
weekly Polityka1 at the beginning of February.
Although Świecko's "coup" was likely to backfire and lead to the further
marginalization of his union2 , it was an undeniable success for Andrzej Lepper. Still
appearing as a secondary player in the field of peasant representation in mid-January,
the president of ZZR Samoobrona, by imposing his definition of the protest
movement on the media and then on the other protagonists in the controversy
surrounding the economic situation of agriculture, succeeded in legitimizing his claim
to be considered an unavoidable spokesman for the peasantry, as "the" leader of the
angry peasants, in the space of a few days. In other words, by gaining recognition as
the only person who can offer a solution to a situation that he himself has endeavored
to define as a crisis, he obtains, to use Michel Dobry's formula, an attestation of his
charismatic qualification3 . This recognition is due first and foremost, of course, to
Lepper's intense work during this period. From January 25 to the beginning of
February, he crossed the country several times, going from blockade to blockade and
holding numerous press conferences and public meetings, sometimes, as we'll come
back to later, in association with representatives of other groups mobilized at the time,
notably anesthetists and teachers4 . This activism enabled him, by capitalizing on his
earlier relative notoriety, to capture media attention as soon as Świecko's action and
above all to sustain it for almost two weeks, symbolically establishing himself as a
central player in the protest against government policy. Lepper's attestation as the
charismatic leader of the peasant demonstrators, however, also rests on actors other
than himself5 , mainly, in our view, the leaders of other agricultural unions and the
1 "Lepper idzie na wojnę", Polityka, no. 6, 1999.
As Michel Dobry notes: "if, in the final analysis, successful provocations seem relatively rare in
critical conjunctures, it's because, due to [their] re-translation [by other protagonists in the conjuncture],
they entail serious risks of not working in the direction intended by their promoters", Dobry Michel,
op.cit. p.187.
3 Ibid, p.243.
4 On February 1er , Andrzej Lepper took part in a joint meeting with representatives of several unions
mobilized against the government, including OPZZ, ZNP and Solidarność 80'. Cf. "Na Lep Leppera",
Gazeta Wyborcza, 02/02/1999, p.1.
5 Dobry Michel, op.cit. p.248.
2
285
government. Firstly, through their hesitations, his former partners in the intersyndicale
indirectly helped strengthen Lepper's symbolic position in the protest movement.
While denouncing the attitude of ZZR president Samoobrona in Świecko, they
immediately follow him in announcing the lifting of the border crossing blockade,
thus appearing to attest to Lepper's authority over the demonstrators. Above all, in the
days that followed, they did not explicitly call for a halt to the protest actions or the
lifting of the roadblocks set up by their supporters as early as January 22. In so doing,
they helped to convey the image of a strong mobilization of farmers, of which Lepper
appears to be the main beneficiary. Thus, of the 120 roadblocks counted by the police
on January 25, which are presented in the media as a sign of Lepper's ability to
mobilize1 , a non-negligible proportion are in fact organized b y NSZZRI "S" and
KZRKiOR activists and seem to have only a tenuous link with Lepper's calls for
revolt in Świecko. Finally, as Lepper monopolizes the media attention given to protest
actions, the leaders of NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR are divided over the attitude to
adopt towards the president of ZZR Samoobrona, and can hardly agree on an
alternative definition of the protest movement to the one promoted by the latter. On
behalf of the NSZZRI "S", Roman Wierzbicki continues to deny any political or
revolutionary dimension to the roadblocks, and continues to present them as strike
tools.
Lepper's "ordinary" protest actions were designed to strengthen the position of peasant
representatives in negotiations. Accusing Lepper of dividing the peasantry, he
explicitly condemned demonstrators who broke the law during protest actions2 .
KZRKiOR president Janusz Maksymiuk adopts a much more ambiguous stance.
W h i l e calling for the protests to be pacified and for negotiations to be reopened in a
calmer context, he refuses to condemn the provocative statements made by the
president of ZZR Samoobrona and the incidents at certain roadblocks. On several
occasions, he even declared his support for Lepper, despite the latter's criticism of
him3 . Maksymiuk's paradoxical attitude is explained by
The actual number of roadblocks on January 25, however, was well below the 300 nationwide
barricades Lepper had promised Świecko the day before. Cf. "Gnojowicą W Policjantów?", Gazeta
Wyborcza, Kraków, 25/01/1999, p.1.
2 "Wszystko zablokujemy", Gazeta Wyborcza, 30-31/01/1999, p.4.
3 At the end of January, he associated himself with a Lepper communiqué calling for the legalization of
roadblocks and the suspension of all sanctions against demonstrators: Ibid.
1
286
We owe our success primarily to the changing balance of power within KZRKiOR,
and in particular to the gradual emergence of internal ventures to challenge its
authority. Several union officials, led by vice-president Władysław Serafin,
questioned Maksymiuk's lack of firmness towards the government and called for
greater union involvement in the arena of protest mobilizations. These internal
criticisms constrained Maksymiuk's positions and forced him to qualify his distance
from a definition of the peasant protest movement as escalating. Secondly, like the
union leaders, the members of the government found it difficult to agree on the
definition of the situation to be promoted and the attitude to be adopted towards
Lepper. At first, the definition of roadblocks as an illegal form of action requiring
firm repression, and of Andrzej Lepper as a "terrorist" with whom any discussion is
unthinkable, seemed to be accepted by all government members, but by the end of
January they were being challenged by some AWS ministers. While several polls
showed massive public support for farmers' demands and for the practice of
roadblocks1 , several ministers, notably those in charge of Agriculture, the Interior and
Labor, changed their position significantly. Much to the dismay of UW elected
representatives and ministers, Jacek Janiszewski personally received Andrzej Lepper
at the Ministry of Agriculture on January 28 to offer him a seat at the negotiating
table. He thus implicitly recognized Andrzej Lepper as a legitimate and indispensable
interlocutor in resolving the agricultural crisis. Above all, by maintaining his
invitation despite the ZZR Samoobrona president's initial refusal, and by giving the
impression of multiplying concessions without quid pro quos in order to ensure his
participation in the union-government talks at the beginning of February2 , Minister
Janiszewski participates in
1 In a note published at the beginning of February 1999, the CBOS polling institute published a survey
carried out at the end of January, according to which the peasant protests were supported by "Polish
public opinion": 73% of respondents considered the peasant demands to be justified, 53% that the
roadblocks were a legitimate form of action and 70% that the Buzek government's agricultural policy
was bad: "Polish Public Opinion", CBOS, Warsaw, 2, February 1999, p.3. See also: "Opinie o polskim
rolnictwie na tle ostatnich protestów" Warsaw, CBOS, February 1999 and "Są powody do protestu",
Rzeczpospolita, 04/02/1999.
2 Jacek Janiszewski had initially made the lifting of the roadblocks a precondition for Lepper's return to
the negotiating table. In the face of the
287
the emergence of Lepper as the undisputed leader of the demonstrators. This
representation, conveyed by the media, is quickly taken up by other actors, who are
not necessarily his partners1 . It helped focus attention on ZZR Samoobrona
representatives
during
negotiations
between
the
government
and
union
representatives, and led to a widespread interpretation of the February 8 agreements as
Lepper's personal success over the government.
Despite the relative weakness of his union at the start of 1999, Andrzej Lepper thus
succeeded within a few weeks in establishing himself as the main player in the field of
representation of the peasantry, as the "charismatic leader" of the angry peasants and
in marginalizing, symbolically at least, the other agricultural unions as well as the
PSL in the controversy over the economic situation of agriculture. According to a
survey carried out by the OBOP institute during the negotiations, at the beginning of
February 1999, almost 60% of respondents considered that Lepper effectively
defended the interests of the peasantry, the rate even reaching 94% among
respondents declaring an agricultural profession2 .
4) Breaking the February 8 agreements: pushing back a fragile advantage.
The February 8 agreements seem to put an end to the "crisis" opened by the "Świecko
coup". For the first time, representatives of the Buzek government and the three
national agricultural unions - Roman Wierzbicki for the NSZZRI "S", Janusz
Maksymiuk for the KZRKiOR and Ireneusz Martyniuk, the union's vice-president, for
the ZZR Samoobrona - agree on a set of measures to be adopted to
ZZR Samoobrona to interrupt the protest, he finally reversed this demand at the beginning of February
and lifted all conditions on Lepper's return.
1 By way of example, PSL president Jarosław Kalinowski and KZRKiOR vice-president Władysław
Serafin, despite being leaders of rival ZZR Samoobrona organizations for the representation of the
peasantry, in some of their speeches at the beginning of February 1999, took up the analogy drawn in
certain media between Andrzej Lepper and Lech Wałęsa, as the union leader of the workers' strikes of
the early 1980s. Wałęsa himself doesn't seem to deny this comparison, as he invites Andrzej Lepper to
come and meet him in Gdańsk. Although highly controversial, the meeting took place on February 8.
Cf. Lepper na bohatera?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 01/02/1999, p.4 and "Gdańska niedziela lidera
"Samoobrony"", Gazeta Wyborcza, Gdańsk, 08/02/1999, p.4.
2 Cf. "OK. Lepper", Gazeta Wyborcza, 20-21/02/1999, p.3; Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej,
"Andrzej Lepper i protesty rolników w programach TVP", art.cit. p.6 and p.16.
288
resolve the agricultural economic crisis. When the Memorandum of Understanding
was signed at 8 a.m., after 17 hours of uninterrupted negotiations, all the participants
in the talks were delighted with the breakthrough it represented. While the Minister of
Agriculture saw it as "the start of the road that we will try to map out jointly with the
agricultural unions in order to find lasting solutions to the problems of the Polish
countryside", the President of KZRKiOR hailed it as "a good start", and the President
of NSZZRI "S" felt that "farmers have achieved a great deal with this agreement"1 .
But the enthusiasm was short-lived. On the evening of February 8, Andrzej Lepper
organized a press conference, broadcast live on television, during which he
theatrically tore up the memorandum of understanding. Disavowing his vicepresident, he reiterated his calls for widespread roadblocks across the country2 . "The
discussions led nowhere, no problem was resolved. This agreement deserves nothing
but a scythe. It's an insult to Polish farmers"3 , he declared.
Andrzej Lepper's denunciation of the February 8 agreements, of which he appeared to
be the main beneficiary, came as a surprise to all the protagonists of the controversy
surrounding the economic situation of the peasantry and to observers of Polish
political life. Lepper's attitude was particularly puzzling to representatives of other
farmers' unions. On behalf of NSZZRI "S", Roman Wierzbicki finds it "completely
incomprehensible", while KZRKiOR vice-president Władysław Serafin goes so far as
to call for an "examination of Mr. Lepper's psychological state"4 . In our opinion,
Lepper's calls for the mobilization to continue, and even to be radicalized, are yet
another attempt by the president of ZZR Samoobrona to "push his advantage", to
strengthen the position of main opponent to the government that he has managed to
secure in the preceding weeks. Once again, this move seems particularly risky.
Perceived as one provocation too many by the other protagonists in the controversy
over the economic situation of agriculture, it resulted in the immediate ostracization of
ZZR Samoobrona within the field of peasant representation. Refusing to follow
Lepper, the leaders of NSZZRI "S" and the
1 Quoted in "Przepis na wieś", Gazeta Wyborcza, 09/02/1999, p.3.
2 "Blokady Dzielą", Gazeta Wyborcza, 09/02/1999, p.1.
3 Quoted in "Pytanie o porozumienie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 09/02/1999, p.2.
4 Quoted in "Przepis na wieś", Gazeta Wyborcza, 09/02/1999, p.3.
289
KZRKiOR this time unanimously call on their militants to stop protesting.
"From now on, it's Mr. Lepper's personal war" declares Roman Wierzbicki1 .
Although he has up to now defended the legitimacy of roadblocks as a means of
action by the farmers' unions, the president of the PSL also believes that the time for
protest is over, and that dialogue should now take precedence2 . Lepper's denunciation
of the agreement was also accompanied by an updating of his unanimous
representation as an unapproachable "terrorist" within the government. Within
minutes of Lepper's speech, Deputy Prime Minister Tomaszewski ordered the
immediate crackdown on all remaining roadblocks3 . Above all, isolated and
unanimously criticized for his extreme stance, Andrzej Lepper initially proved
incapable of sustaining the protest movement at a level comparable to that of previous
weeks. Thus, despite his calls for new roadblocks, he struggled to mobilize a large
number of people, and by February 9, the Minister of the Interior could congratulate
himself on having succeeded in unblocking all the country's roads4 .
In the weeks following his February 8 coup, Andrzej Lepper further radicalized his
discourse. Constantly threatening new protest actions, he added clearly political
demands to his initial demands. On February 14, on the occasion of a National
Council of ZZR Samoobrona, Andrzej Lepper demanded, in addition to an immediate
increase in all agricultural prices, the resignation of the government, the dissolution of
the Sejm and the organization of a live debate on TVP1 between himself and Marian
Krzaklewski5 . President of the NSZZ "S" and the AWS, the latter was then
1 Ibid.
See interviews given in mid-February by Jarosław Kalinowski: "Nie pozwoli sobą poniewierac",
Zielony sztandar, 7, February 14, 1999, p.1-2; "Chłopi wygrali bitwę", Gazeta Wyborcza, 11/02/1999,
p.14.
3 Janusz Tomaszewski, also Minister of the Interior, had hitherto left the voivodships free to call in the
forces of law and order according to their assessment of the risk of the various actions going off course.
Cf. "Blokady Dzielą", Gazeta Wyborcza, 09/02/1999, p.1.
4 "Zima wasza, wiosną Lepper", Gazeta Wyborcza, 10/02/1999, p.4.
5 Lepper's request for a televised debate between himself and the president of Poland's leading trade
union, NSZZ "S", was openly inspired by the debate between Alfred Miodowicz, then president of the
official trade union OPZZ, and Lech Wałęsa, president of NSZZ "S" in the early 1980s, broadcast on
TVP1 on November 30, 1988. The reference to this historic debate, which turned to the latter's
advantage, is in our view part of Lepper's enterprise of political order. It enables him to implicitly
compare the Third Republic to the authoritarian regime of
2
290
commonly regarded as the real head of government. Declaring that the ZZR
Samoobrona now had one million members, he also promised, if his demands were
not met by then, to blockade the whole of Poland at the beginning of March and then
organize a new "Marsz gwiaździsty" to the capital to overthrow the government1 .
This rhetorical one-upmanship accelerated the marginalization of ZZR Samoobrona.
With the exception of the president of the small trade union Sierpień 80'2 , himself
labelled as a radical, all the main political and trade union leaders, from the majority
as well as the opposition, firmly denounced the agricultural union's plans, and many
voices were raised calling for its de-legitimization. However, it also enables Andrzej
Lepper to maintain the high media profile he has enjoyed since the end of January,
despite the lifting of the roadblocks. Throughout February, Andrzej Lepper continued
to be presented in the media as the leader of the angry farmers. His various positions
are widely reported and commented on, far more than those of the other contenders to
represent the peasantry, whether leaders of other agricultural unions or the PSL. Thus,
although not as spectacular as promised by Lepper, the first protest action organized
by ZZR Samoobrona since February 8, a march through the streets of Warsaw on
March 17, received extensive media coverage and once again secured it the front page
of the main national dailies3 . Above all, it testifies to the union's new mobilization
capacity since the beginning of 1999. According to police estimates, nearly 10,000
demonstrators took part in the march organized by ZZR Samoobrona alone, as many
as in the inter-union march of July 10, 1998.
of the People's Republic and, like Wałęsa in the 1980s, to position himself as the main opponent of the
ruling power.
1 On the ZZR Samoobrona National Council of February 14, 1999: "Lepper znów straszy", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 15/02/1999, p.3; "Lepper gwiaździsty", Rzeczpospolita,15/02/1999
2 A close associate of Andrzej Lepper since the early 1990s, Sierpień 80' president Daniel Podrzycki
announced in early March that his union would participate in any blockades organized by ZZR
Samoobrona, as well as in its Marsz gwiaździsty project. Cf. Lepper zablokuje totalnie", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 04/03/1999, p.4.
3 Cf. Lepper w Warszawie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 18/03/1999, p.1; "Tydzień na spełnienie postulatów",
Rzeczpospolita, 18/03/1999, p.1.
291
Section 3: Reconstruction under structural control of the ZZR
Samoobrona.
At the beginning of 1999, ZZR Samoobrona's recognition as a central player in the
peasant protest movement was essentially due to the fact that its president was seen as
the charismatic and radical leader of the "angry peasants". In the weeks following the
lifting of the roadblocks, the degree of structuring and the number of effective
activists of the third-largest farmers' union in the country remain highly uncertain. In
this section, we focus on the union's organizational shaping and the objectification of
the new dimension its leaders claim it acquired during the protests. In other words,
we'll be looking at the material and symbolic operations implemented to reconvert the
reputational capital accumulated by Andrzej Lepper in the dynamics of the conflict
into collective resources, in particular organizational resources.
First of all, we shall see that the restructuring of the union was a major preoccupation
of the ZZR Samoobrona leaders in the dynamics of the protest movement. From the
end of 1998, and with increasing speed in the early months of 1999, they set about
redeploying the union's local structures throughout the country and expanding its
militant base (A). Against a backdrop of re-emerging peasant unity issues in the
spring of 1999, the organization's IIIe national congress on May 5, 1999, offered them
the opportunity to showcase their organization's vigour and win recognition from
other protagonists in the field of peasant representation, and more broadly in the
political field as a whole, as a player to be reckoned with (B).
A) Convert symbolic resources into organizational resources.
The peasant protests organized by ZZR Samoobrona in 1998 and 1999, first as part of
the intersyndicale and then autonomously, provided the union with an important focus
for recruitment and training.
292
in organizational form. In line with the dynamics of the protest movement, the ZZR's
leaders are focusing on expanding its militant base and territorial coverage in a much
more centralized fashion than in the early 1990s (1). A localized study of the ZZR
Samoobrona's presence in the Garwolin powiat in Mazovia, from which it had been
absent for years, provides an empirical illustration of this process of redeployment of
the union's territorial bodies (2).
1) Union restructuring: a centralized process.
In the spring of 1999, ZZR Samoobrona presented a completely different face to that
of a year earlier. After the 1997 parliamentary elections, ZZR Samoobrona appeared
to be a fragile organization, based mainly among large-scale farmers in the north-west
of the country, but in the first few months of 1999 it emerged as one of the most
powerful Polish agricultural organizations. In the aftermath of the roadblocks of
January and February 1999, its leaders claimed that the union now had several
hundred thousand members, or even a million, and was organized throughout the
country1 . Far from limiting its offer of representation to large, market-integrated
producers directly affected by the fall in agricultural prices, as in previous months,
ZZR Samoobrona's president Andrzej Lepper was keen to present it as an
organization dedicated to defending the interests of all farmers, regardless of the size
of their holdings, and even of rural dwellers as a whole. It was thus in the name of
"safeguarding Polish agriculture and the countryside" that the union organized a
march through the streets of Warsaw on March 17, 19992 . While there can be little
doubt that the membership figures put forward by the management are, once again,
greatly exaggerated, the ZZR Samoobrona's unprecedented capacity to mobilize, as
well as the plurality of the geographical origins of its supporters3 shown by the March
17 demonstration, undeniably testify to a significant growth and diversification of the
union's membership.
1 "Sekta Wodza", Polityka, 13/02/1999, p.20-21.
2 "Tydzień na spełnienie postulatów", Rzeczpospolita, 18/03/1999, p.1.
3 This diversity is also highlighted by the participants in the action. As is common practice in Polish
marches, many of the demonstrators carried Polish or union flags, bearing the name of their home town
or powiat.
293
of the union's militant base since the beginning of the peasant protest movement.
At the turn of 1998 and 1999, Andrzej Lepper and the few remaining militants took
advantage of the resurgence of protest mobilizations to rally new supporters and
redevelop the union's structures throughout the country. As in 1992 and 1993, the
union's high media profile, especially that of its president, and protest actions, as
practical spaces for promoting the union and mobilizing pre-existing networks of
relations in its favor, seem to us to be the two main recruitment vectors for ZZR
Samoobrona. This was particularly true from the end of January 1999, when Andrzej
Lepper, the leader of the peasant revolt, became a media star, and roadblocks across
the country lasted exceptionally long, sometimes almost two weeks. However, the
process of (re)structuring the union that accompanied the integration of the new
members differed markedly from that observed a few years earlier. Whereas at the
end of 1992, the organization of the ZZR Samoobrona's grassroots structures was
largely "spontaneous" and took place at a distance from the national leadership, which
was concentrating its activities on the development of regional circles, in the first few
months of 1999, it appeared to be much more centralized and rationalized. As Andrzej
Lepper puts it, this time the union's national officers seem to be paying particular
attention to the organization of the union at all levels:
"Through our protest actions, we sought to build a structure. New leaders were identified, and
organizations emerged in the gminas and then in the powiats. That's how Samoobrona's structure was
created."
Andrzej Lepper.
Interview conducted on June 25, 2008 in Warsaw.
Schematically, the redeployment of ZZR Samoobrona's territorial structures appears
to be taking place in two stages. Firstly, at the end of 1998, regional directorates were
re-established in each of the voivodships, numbering 16 under the new administrative
organization due to come into force on January 1er 1999. As in 1992, their managers,
most of them new
294
are usually directly appointed by Andrzej Lepper. For example, Mieczysław
Aszkiełowicz, owner of a large dairy farm, was appointed president of the union for
the Varmie-Mazurie voivodeship following his first meeting with Andrzej Lepper at a
public meeting in Olsztyn. Likewise, Krzysztof Filipek, head of a tiling company in
Warsaw and owner of an 8-hectare farm in Węgrów powiat (Mazovia), was promoted
to president of the union in Mazovia a few months after requesting an interview with
Lepper at the union's Warsaw headquarters1 . In addition to their recent membership
of the union, the possession of a certain amount of economic capital appears to be the
main point in common between the new regional union leaders appointed at the end of
1998; indeed, the ability to finance union actions from their own funds seems to have
been one of the main criteria for their selection at the time2 . Then, mainly on the
occasion of the roadblocks at the beginning of 1999, local circles were formed in the
gminas and powiats where protest actions took place. Once again, the leaders of these
circles appear to be directly appointed by the union's regional officers, and sometimes
even by Lepper himself.
Thus, the redeployment of ZZR Samoobrona's structures at the turn of 1998 and 1999
resembles the type of organizational construction by "territorial penetration" defined
by Angelo Panebianco3 . The union's national leadership
is "piloting" the establishment of Regional Circles in each of the 16 new voivodships.
The new regional managers, selected directly by the center, are then themselves
responsible for identifying local managers to organize structures at the various
administrative levels set up by the July 1998 law, the gminas and powiats.
These general observations on the (re)structuring of the Samoobrona ZZR at the turn
of 1998 and 1999 need to be qualified. The ways in which the union was actually
structured, and the forms it took, can vary considerably from one site to another,
depending on the socio-political configuration.
1 "Rycerze Leppera", Rzeczpospolita, 22/09/2001.
2 "Sekta Wodza", Polityka, 13/02/1999, p.20-21.
3 Panebianco Angelo, op.cit. p.50.
295
local circles of the ZZR Samoobrona since the early 1990s. While in some regions,
notably in the north-western voivodships, the union's organizational construction
work resembles a reactivation of pre-existing militant networks, in other regions, such
as Garwolin in the centre-east of the country, it takes more the form of an ad-hoc
establishment by aggregating support hitherto outside the union1 .
2) Change of focus: the example of the ZZR Samoobrona layout
in Garwolin powiat.
Garwolin powiat is one of the 379 powiats created by the Administrative Reform Act
of July 1998. Part of the Mazovian Voivodeship, it comprises fourteen gminas2 and
has just over 100,000 inhabitants, less than a quarter of whom live in urban areas.
Garwolin, its capital and main town, had a population of around 17,000 in 19993 .
Agriculture is by far the most important sector of activity in Garwolin powiat,
particularly cereal and potato growing, as well as pig and dairy farming4 . At the end
of the 1990s, the powiat's agrarian structure was marked by the permanence of a large
number of semi-subsistence "micro-holdings"5 . The average surface area of the more
than 15,000 farms in the powiat at that time was only
On the influence of local socio-political configurations on the construction and establishment of
political organizations: Sawicki Frédéric, "Configuration sociale et genèse d'un milieu partisan. Le cas
du parti socialiste en Ille-et-Vilaine", Sociétés contemporaines, n°20, 1994, p.83-110.
2 These fourteen gminas are those of: Borowie, Garwolin miasto (Garwolin town), Garwolin wiejska
(Garwolin countryside), Górzno, Łaskarzew miasto (Łaskarzew town), Łaskarzew wiejska (Łaskarzew
countryside), Maciejowice, Miastków Kościelny, Parysów, Pilawa, Sobolew, Trojanów, Wilga and
Żelechów.
3 Cf. Kieruzal Paweł & al (dir.), Strategia rozwoju miasta Garwolin, Fundacja Rozwoju Demokracji
Lokalnej, Garwolin-Wrocław, 2002, p.9.
4 See http://www.garwolin-starostwo.pl/single.php?id=63, accessed July 20, 2010.
5 François Bafoil defines "micro-farms" as those whose "farm income is below the survival threshold.
On these farms, labor is very under-utilized. Very numerous in Poland, they cover less than 5 hectares
(less than 3 hectares per worker in farms with two workers), are not specialized and generate
insufficient income from farming to provide a living for the owner and his family. They are often run
by workers who have a job in a sector other than agriculture, or who receive transfer income
(retirement, pension), and are likely to give up this type of activity in the medium term. Even if these
farms produce little, they nevertheless sell most of their output on the market." Quoted in: Bafoil
Francois, Guyet Rachel, L'Haridon Loïc & Tardy Vladimir, art.cit. p.30-31.
1
296
no larger than 6 hectares, with less than 10% of them covering more than 10 hectares1
. According to a survey carried out in the early 2000s, just under a third of farmers in
the Garwolin powiat derive more than half of their income from farming2 , with most
supplementing their income with another professional activity or by receiving
retirement or pension benefits.
Map 3: Garwolin powiat.
Made by us.
Prior to the administrative reform of 1998, and since 1975, the gminas making up
Garwolin powiat were part of the Siedlce voivodship. This voivodeship, then one of
the most rural in Poland, was characterized during the People's Republic by t h e low
importance of state farms in the structure of agricultural ownership, with over 95% of
farmland in the hands of individual farmers3 . This specificity explains why the
Siedlce region was one of the main sites o f emergence of the Rural Solidarity
movement in the early 1980s. Several founding members of NSZZRI "S" came from
there, and the town of Siedlce was the scene of one of the union's main protest actions.
1 See http://www.garwolin-starostwo.pl/artykuly.php?id=327, accessed July 20, 2010.
2 See http://www.wrotamazowsza.pl/msip_main/showArticle?articleId=26, accessed July 20, 2010.
3 Rolnictwo i Gospodarka Żywnościowa 1986-1990, GUS, Warszawa, 1992, quoted in Bafoil Francois,
"La question agricole en Pologne : le défi de l'intégration européenne", Les Études du CERI, n°74,
April 2001.
297
before it was banned in December 19811 . With the change of regime, the union
quickly regained particular influence in the Siedlce voivodeship, including in the
future Garwolin powiat. In the 1991 parliamentary elections, the RL- PL committee,
combining the PSL-Solidarnosc and the NSZZRI "S", came out well ahead in the
Siedlce constituency, achieving its best national performance with 23.45% of the vote
(5.46% nationally). However, the PSL is also well established in the region, coming
second in the 1991 Siedlce elections with 17.4% of the vote (8.67% nationally).
Ryszard Smolarek, head of KZRKiOR in Garwolin, took third place on the peasant
party lists, regaining the deputy seat he had won in 1989 on the official PZPR lists.
Along with former opponent Marian Piłka, elected on the WAK lists, he is the only
resident of the future Powiat of Garwolin to sit in Parliament during the Ière
legislature.
Faced with the dense local networks of NSZZRI "S" and, to a lesser extent, PSL and
KZRKiOR, ZZR Samoobrona struggled to establish itself in the Siedlce voivodship in
the early 1990s. Especially as the agrarian structure inherited from communism and
the dominance of small individual farms meant that the theme of overindebtedness,
around which it was structured, had only a limited audience in the region. A regional
circle was indeed set up in the voivodship, but its actual activity remained
confidential. In the 1993 parliamentary elections, the Samoobrona-Leppera list, made
up mainly of local union activists, two of whom came from the future Garwolin
powiat, won just 2.82% of the vote. In thirteenth place, out of seventeen committees,
it fell well behind the PSL, which obtained almost 30% of the vote, and the PSL-PL
which, although clearly down on the RL-PL's 1991 result, once again achieved one of
its best results in the district at national level, with 10.12% of the vote. In the years
that followed, as in almost all the eastern regions of the country, the Samoobrona
ZZR disappeared from the political and trade union landscape of the Siedlce
voivodship. In the 1995 presidential elections, Andrzej Lepper obtained only 1.99% of
the vote.
1 On the emergence and structuring of NSZZRI "S" in the early 1980s: Rambaud Placide, art.cit. For
further details on the development of the trade union in the Siedlce voivodship, please refer to the
comprehensive website of the "Fondation Libre Parole" (Stowarzyszenie Wolnego Słowa) on opposition
to the communist regime in this region: http://www.sws.org.pl/siedlce/
298
and in 1997 no Przymierze Samoobrona list was submitted for the parliamentary
elections.
At the start of the Third Legislature, partisan and trade union organizations claiming
to represent the interests of the peasantry lost the predominant position they occupied
in the early 1990s in the Siedlce voivodship. Although in the 1997 elections, the PSL
still obtained a result well above its national average (20.6% versus 7.31%), it was
now outstripped by the AWS and the SLD. Above all, the farmers' party's share of the
vote was down by more than 30% on 1993, and by almost 10% on 1991. As in 1993,
Ryszard Smolarek, still in charge of the KZRKiOR in Garwolin, headed the PSL
regional list, but received three times fewer votes than four years earlier1 . Similarly,
although the regional president of NSZZRI "S", Krzysztof Głuchowski, is one of only
two union members elected to Parliament, and its former president Gabriel Janowski
is elected on AWS lists, the political weight and local presence of the organizations
that inherited Rural Solidarity are much weaker than in the early 1990s. Weakened by
divisions, they were unable to mobilize the peasantry in their favor over the long term,
particularly small individual farmers, who turned out in droves to vote. In 1997,
abstention reached 55.6% in the Siedlce voivodship, and even exceeded 70% in some
rural gminas2 .
From summer 1998 onwards, the various agricultural unions stepped up their
mobilization work at local level. They set out to broaden their support base, so as to
be able to "pull out all the stops" during the protest actions they staged to put pressure
on the government, notably the unitary marches organized in Warsaw in July and
December 1998. To this end, local NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR circles organized,
among other things, transport for farmers wishing to take part in demonstrations in the
streets of the capital. The
1 Despite the national dimension he acquired as Secretary of State to the Minister of Agriculture from
1993 to 1997 in the Pawlak and Oleksy governments, Ryszard Smolarek received only 5,000 votes in
1997, compared with almost 16,000 in 1993, and 6,500 in 1991, when he was only third on the list.
Sources: data from the National Electoral Commission (PKW).
2 "Obwieszczenie Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej z dnia 25 września 1997 r. o wynikach wyborów do
Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej przeprowadzonych w dniu 21 września 1997 r. ", PKW, Warsaw,
09/25/1997; "Przystosuj się albo zgiń: rozmowa z dr hab. Krzysztofem Gorlachem", Rzeczpospolita,
11/22/1997.
299
particularly in the Garwolin region, just 60 kilometers from Warsaw. Although in July
1998, the ZZR Samoobrona still had no structure in the Siedlce voivodeship, the
creation of a regional branch of the union in Mazovia at the end of the year enabled
the union to organize the arrival of demonstrators from the region for the march on
December 3, 1998.
It was on this occasion that Waldemar Chmielak made his first commitment to ZZR
Samoobrona1 . A resident of the Sobolew gmina, Waldemar Chmielak is one of the
region's biggest farmers. His cereal and pig farm covers almost 100 hectares. An
agricultural technician by training, he was in charge of an agricultural cooperative
during the time of the People's Republic. He went into business for himself in the
early 1980s following the death of his father, from whom he inherited the 20-hectare
farm. In 1990, he expanded the farm by purchasing 80 hectares of the neighboring
former state farm2 . Although, by his own admission, he remained relatively well-off
in the late 1990s, Chmielak was directly affected by the sharp drop in cereal prices
and then pork prices from 1997 onwards. Unlike most farmers in the region, he
derives most of his income from the sale of his agricultural produce. A ZSL member
in the past, Chmielak had not been involved in any trade union or political activity for
years when he joined ZZR Samoobrona on the occasion of the December 3, 1998
demonstration.
"I was a member of ZSL, but never of PSL. It was a unified grouping, and it was only later that it
became the PSL. After my studies, I was in charge of a cooperative of agricultural circles... As a leader,
I had no choice but to join either the PZPR or the ZSL. I chose the ZSL and stayed with it as long as I
worked [at the cooperative]. Then my political action died a natural death for a few years. Although
PSL colleagues encouraged me to dust off my membership card and come back to them, it was only
when Lepper [emerged] that I decided to get involved again. [...] I'd heard of Samoobrona and Lepper
in the early 1990s, but I didn't pay much attention to them then. T h e people who started protesting
[with Samoobrona] were those who were in debt. As it happened, I wasn't in debt, so I didn't feel
concerned, I didn't pay attention. As long as things were going relatively well for me... It wasn't until
1998 that I started to get actively involved. I believe that
1 "Jak To Było Na Blokadzie", Gazeta Wyborcza, Lublin, 06-07/02/1999, p.4.
2 Cf. "Buitenland wil ons Polen alleen maar uitzuigen", NRC Handelsblad, 22/07/2002, p.4; translated
into Polish in, Media Zagraniczne o Polsce, Departament Systemu Informacji MSZ, n°141, 25/07/2002.
300
that the situation in the countryside got much worse at that time, yes that's why. In 1998 prices fell
sharply..."
Waldemar Chmielak.
Interview conducted on June 13, 2008 in Garwolin.
A farmer with an atypical profile in the Garwolin region, Waldemar Chmielak seems
to have drawn closer to the ZZR Samoobrona mainly because of the deterioration in
his personal economic situation from 1997 onwards and his sympathy for Andrzej
Lepper, whose career path is not without similarities to his own. When he joined the
union, it no longer had any structures in the Garwolin region. Chmielak was
immediately put in charge of the local Garwolin Circle by the new ZZR Samoobrona
president for the Mazovia region, Krzystof Filipek, whom he had met at the Warsaw
demonstration. At the time, this local circle consisted of no more than a handful of
activists1 . At the end of January, Waldemar Chmielak crossed Poland in a bus
chartered by the union's regional leadership to take part in the blockade of the
Świecko border crossing. His first participation in a roadblock was an opportunity for
him to learn this form of protest action.
"It all started with blocking the border at Świecko, it was already cold. I remember that they [the
police] were putting obstacles in our way, that they wouldn't let us access the border. But after a few
kilometers on foot, because they made us stop the bus upstream, we made it.... So, during this blockade,
we realized that they were afraid of us. We were there, on the barricade, doing what we liked. At that
point, me and others started phoning around the country to try and organize such blockades on the
roads. Even though there weren't many people left in the union, not many had stayed at home. There
was a special atmosphere, it seemed so simple, whereas back home, we didn't know how to go about it.
It was only when we got back from the border, dispersed across the country, that everyone tried to do
the same at home."
Waldemar Chmielak.
Interview conducted on June 13, 2008 in Garwolin.
On January 25, the day after the Świecko blockade was lifted, there were five
roadblocks in the Mazovian Voivodeship. Three of them, organized by NSZZRI "S",
were quickly lifted. The last two, all located in the powiat
1 Interview with Waldemar Chmielak in Garwolin, September 23, 2006.
301
of Garwolin, will last almost two weeks. Waldemar Chmielak takes part in setting up
the main roadblock, on National Road 17 between Warsaw and Lublin, near
Gończyce in the Sobolew gmina. Initially bringing together a few dozen sympathizers
of the ZZR Samoobrona but above all of the NSZZRI "S", the blockade was gradually
rallied by new participants, the vast majority of whom did not belong to any trade
union or partisan organization, to bring together several hundred demonstrators at the
beginning of February. Despite the original inconsistency of the local ZZR
Samoobrona circle, Waldemar Chmielak took advantage of the notoriety and image of
the "leader of the peasant insurrection" acquired by Lepper to be rapidly recognized as
the main person responsible for the dam, whether by the participants themselves, by
the many journalists covering the action or by the various local authorities. Despite
altercations with the police and some drivers, Gończyce's action enjoyed widespread
support in the powiat.
"It was during the roadblocks at the beginning of the year that I began to take a very active role. There
were thousands of people at the roadblocks in the evenings, and maybe the media helped a little, as
more and more people turned up. We had a very big altercation with the police, which was kept secret,
but I think it was the only blockade that put up any resistance. We completely blew up the police
sections that had come to the scene... The police fled into the forest, in their cars. I think about twenty
of them ended up in hospital. The next day, I thought we were going to be locked up. But when they
came back in the morning, they just swept up the bullets, because there had been shots fired with rubber
bullets...[...] And then, as I said, the media brought up the information, they talked about it. And then
people came to the roadblock. They came to see themselves on television, because every night there
was television, the press, the media... We had the fire department with us, which was extra security
because we were expecting the ZOMO [equivalent of the CRS] to arrive. [...] E v e r y o n e started to
gain confidence. That's how it is when there are a lot of people. It took a long time, but during those
two weeks we were there day and night. A lot of people were helping us, mayors, businessmen,
everyone was starting to get involved. They brought us meals, sausages... [...] The mayors, the staroste,
helped us because they knew that a new force was being created, that there was great disarray in the
country, they all feared this Lepper, they thought that maybe something was happening... I organized
the order of arrival, which mayor, which day, what he should bring. But even if you didn't have to ask,
everyone helped out on a voluntary basis. As I said, the local businessmen helped us, but no one talked
about money, it was just a question of feeding the demonstrators, because it was cold, there was frost
... even the priest helped us, he lent us a tent, speakers ... "
302
Waldemar Chmielak.
Interview conducted on June 13, 2008 in Garwolin.
By the time the Gończyce roadblock was lifted, which punctuated life in the powiat
for almost two weeks, Waldemar Chmielak appeared to be the main beneficiary of the
protest action. His activism and, above all, his status as local representative of the
ZZR Samoobrona, and thus of Andrzej Lepper, enabled him to be recognized as a key
player in local politics, and as the spokesman for the angry peasants. The local
notoriety acquired during the roadblock and the charismatic credentials delegated to
him by his assimilation to Andrzej Lepper enabled him to rapidly rally numerous
supporters in Garwolin powiat to the ZZR Samoobrona. In the weeks following the
lifting of the roadblock, following the instructions of the national and regional
leadership, he set about recruiting new supporters and organizing local circles in the
various gminas of the powiat.
"It was at this point, after the wave of demonstrations, that we started moving around the powiat, from
gmina to gmina. In practically every gmina we managed to set up [ZZR Samoobrona] structures. By
then, a lot of people were joining. I was known here, I was presented as a leader in the media. Everyone
knew who I was. I was seen as an important rebel: "He paralyzed the traffic and yet he's free, no one
can do anything against him". I was a kind of idol for a while ... Yet I h a d trials, I was even convicted,
but they sentenced me to pay something like six złoty, a symbolic fine. Nobody was punished. [...] I
really didn't think it would be so quiet, I had created so much trouble. So organizing union structures
through the gminas was very easy at the time. Everyone was happy to join. We were creating a union,
not a party but a union, and everyone was happy to join our demands, our actions. Shortly afterwards,
Lepper was judged1 . I had no problem organizing three busloads of people from the powiat to
demonstrate in front of the court in Lublin. I never had any worries, back then everyone volunteered,
people believed very strongly in Lepper."
Waldemar Chmielak.
Interview conducted on June 13, 2008 in Garwolin.
1 Since February 1999, Andrzej Lepper has had to face several trials for his responsibility in organizing
illegal protest actions, in this case the roadblocks at the end of January. One of these trials is taking
place at the Lublin District Court. Despite the suspended prison sentences he had accumulated in
previous years, Lepper received only symbolic sentences in these trials. Cf. "Śpiewy "Samoobrony"",
Gazeta Wyborcza, 24/02/1999, p.1; "Andrzej Lepper w poczekalni", Gazeta Wyborcza, 13/04/1999,
p.10; "Małe szanse na wykonanie kary", Rzeczpospolita, 16/04/1999.
303
At the beginning of 1999, the ZZR Samoobrona militant base in Garwolin powiat
grew rapidly, and union structures were established in most of the gminas. The ZZR
Samoobrona, which had been completely absent just a few weeks earlier, succeeded
in mobilizing a large number of supporters in this region, whose agrarian structure is
dominated by small farms with little integration into the market, within the dynamics
of the protest movement. The ZZR Samoobrona became recognized, mainly through
its president Andrzej Lepper, as the representative not just of large-scale capitalist
farmers, but more broadly of all rural dwellers. Despite its subversive image at
national level, ZZR Samoobrona is readily accepted as a legitimate player in local
politics. A well-known and respected farmer in the region, Waldemar Chmielak,
appointed in March as President of the Garwolin powiat Circle and Vice President of
the Mazovian voivodship Circle, maintains good relations with most local elected
representatives, as well as with local leaders of the KZRKiOR and NSZZRI "S".
While the national leaders of the various farmers' unions are in sharp conflict,
relations between their local representatives in Garwolin powiat appear relatively
peaceful, and are dominated by the theme of the unity of the farmers' movement.
More than a competitor, the ZZR Samoobrona is thus perceived, initially at least, as a
legitimate partner in defending the interests of the peasantry.
"Here, in the lower spheres, we were all together, even if in the upper spheres it no longer worked. [...]
We organized joint meetings, because I knew the leaders of the KZRKiOR agricultural and Rural
Solidarity in Wierzbicki well. [...] Whereas upstairs, they quarreled fiercely, the leaders attacking each
other, [...] down here, we were more ... we tried to work together. Down here, everyone was in favor of
reunification [of the farmers' organizations], but up there, if you looked, there was no real union,
unfortunately it's the leadership... Down here, things were going well, and the higher up you got, the
more relations deteriorated..."
Waldemar Chmielak.
Interview conducted on June 13, 2008 in Garwolin.
304
Without denying the specificities of each site, we can safely assume that the process
of organizational construction of ZZR Samoobrona follows, in most of the regions
where the union was absent in previous years, modalities comparable to those we
have just highlighted using the example of Garwolin powiat. Protest actions, in
particular roadblocks, are the main means of promoting the union's offer of
representation and mobilizing support, which local officials appointed by the national
leadership are then responsible for converting into membership and organizing within
powiat and gmina circles.
B) Objectifying the power of the ZZR Samoobrona.
In mid-March 1999, the reconflictualization of relations between the government and
the leaders of NSZZRI "S", KZRKiOR and PSL following the forced resignation of
Agriculture Minister Jacek Janiszewski led to the re-emergence of the theme of
peasant unity and a pacification of relations between the president of ZZR
Samoobrona and other peasant leaders (1). Against this backdrop, the ZZR
Samoobrona's IIIe national congress on May 5 proved to be a real show of strength,
objectifying the new dimension acquired by the union and its recognition as a key
player in the field of peasant representation (2).
1) T h e end of isolation: recognition of ZZR Samoobrona as a key player in the
field of peasant representation.
On March 16, the day before the ZZR Samoobrona march through the capital, Prime
Minister Jerzy Buzek forced Agriculture Minister Jacek Janiszewski to resign. In
addition to his involvement in a financial scandal, he is accused of mismanaging the
agricultural crisis and negotiations with representatives of agricultural unions, notably
Andrzej Lepper1 . His departure came at a time of intense internal conflict within the
coalition government. For several weeks, the UW leadership has been multiplying its
1 "Rząd bez Janiszewskiego", Rzeczpospolita, 16/03/1999; "Minister odchodzi", Gazeta Wyborcza,
16/03/1999, p.1.
305
criticism of certain AWS ministers, notably those o f
Education, Labor and
Agriculture. Questioning their competence, she calls for a thorough reshuffle of the
government in order to "improve its efficiency"1 . On the other hand, several AWS
leaders denounced the harmful influence exerted by certain UW ministers on
government action, especially Leszek Balcerowicz, whom they openly blamed for the
government's fall in popularity in the polls2 . Contrary to the instructions of AWS
president Marian Krzaklewski, some members of the party's parliamentary club even
threatened to vote in favor of the motion of censure tabled against the Finance
Minister by the PSL on February 193 . Jacek Janiszewski's forced resignation
exacerbated these pre-existing tensions between the various coalition members,
especially as in the days that followed there was great uncertainty as to who would
succeed him. While the leaders of the SKL, Janiszewski's former AWS member party,
demanded that the Ministry of Agriculture once again be entrusted to one of their
number, several UW leaders, suspected of having orchestrated the Minister's
departure, made no secret of their desire to see the portfolio awarded to a member of
their party. UW Secretary General Mirosław Czech, on announcing Janiszewski's
resignation, said: "I would remind you that since 1989, the Ministry of Agriculture
has been entrusted to a politician from a peasant or agrarian group. Perhaps it is now
time to question this practice, so that the situation of the countryside and agriculture
can improve"4 .
1 Cf. "Wkrótce rozmowy o reorganizacji rządu", Rzeczpospolita, 11/02/1999.
2 "Rekordowy spadek ocen rządu i premiera", Rzeczpospolita, 10/02/1999; "Lider AWS ocenia rząd",
Rzeczpospolita, 18/02/1999.
3 The motion of censure against Leszek Balcerowicz was tabled on February 19 by the PSL
parliamentary club, whose aim was, in the words of its president: "to publicly denounce the anti-social,
anti-Polish liberal policy he initiated, which has brought the national economy to its knees". The
motion was put to a vote in parliament on March 18, and was rejected by 228 votes to 180. Apart from
the entire PSL parliamentary club and the vast majority of SLD deputies, the motion was supported by
Jan Olszewski's ROP parliamentary circle and a dozen deputies elected on AWS lists, three of whom
(Adam Biela, Gabriel Janowski and Ryszard Matusiak) still belonged to his parliamentary club at the
time of the vote. On this vote: see "Szturmem na Balcerowicza", Gazeta Wyborcza, 18/03/1999, p.1;
"Pieniądze i jaja", Gazeta Wyborcza, 19/03/1999, p.1; "Balcerowicz górą", Rzeczpospolita, 19/03/1999.
4 "Rząd bez Janiszewskiego", Rzeczpospolita, 16/03/1999.
306
Janiszewski's departure and the possibility - initially not denied by Buzek1 - of
someone close to Balcerowicz replacing him at the Ministry of Agriculture were
interpreted by the leaders of KZRKiOR, NSZZRI "S" and PSL as signs that the
content of the February 8 agreements might be called into question. In this context,
they are redefining the meaning of the united march of their organizations through the
streets of Warsaw on March 21, scheduled since the beginning of the month. Whereas
the initial purpose of the demonstration was simply to demonstrate their determination
and put pressure on the government to rapidly implement the measures defined on
February 8, it is now explicitly presented as an anti-Balcerowicz rally and as the
potential first step in their reinvestment in the arena of protest mobilizations. Thus, on
March 21, many of the placards displayed by the tens of thousands of demonstrators
called, sometimes in flowery terms, for the Finance Minister's resignation2 . Similarly,
criticism of Balcerowicz and his influence on government policy dominated the
speeches made after the march by the presidents of NSZZRI "S", KZRKiOR and PSL,
as well as by several leading politicians who joined the action, including SLD
president Leszek Miller, former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski of ROP and even
former Agriculture Minister Gabriel Janowski, despite being an AWS deputy. The
conflictual relationship between the government and the representatives of farmers'
organizations, due to the uncertainty surrounding the identity of the future Minister of
Agriculture, also encouraged the re-emergence of the theme of the unity of the
farmers' movement at the March 21 demonstration. During the march, Janusz
Maksymiuk, Roman Wierzbecki and Jarosław Kalinowski made repeated calls for the
reconstitution of a united peasant front, and thus, despite the sharp antagonisms that
had opposed them to its president since early February, for a rapprochement with the
ZZR Samoobrona3 . In our view, this change of attitude towards Lepper's union is to
be understood as both a tactical move to increase pressure on the Prime Minister
before the appointment of the new Minister of Agriculture, and the prospect o f an
alliance with a farmers' union.
1 "Buzek nie chce Balasza", Rzeczpospolita, 19/03/1999.
Moreover, the slogan "Balcerowicz musi odejść" (Balcerowicz must get out), is, according to
journalists covering the demonstration, the most chanted by parade participants. See reports on the
2
demonstration in national daily newspapers: "Politycy i rolnicy", Gazeta Wyborcza, 03/22/1999, p.7
and "Chłopi razem, ale oddzielnie", Rzeczpospolita, 03/22/1999.
3 "Chłopi razem, ale oddzielnie", Rzeczpospolita, 22/03/1999.
307
stigmatized for its radicalism, lends credibility to their threat to re-enter the arena of
protest mobilizations, and as a recognition of its representativeness in the countryside.
Having demonstrated its capacity for mobilization by autonomously gathering as
many demonstrators in the streets of Warsaw on March 17 as the other two farmers'
unions and the PSL combined on March 21, ZZR Samoobrona now seems to be
perceived as a major player in the field of peasant representation by the other
protagonists.
Although the SKL's candidate, Artur Balasz, was finally appointed Minister of
Agriculture on March 251 , the presidents of NSZZRI "S", KZRKiOR and PSL
maintained their calls for the unification of the farmers' movement in the final days of
March, and confirmed their policy of extending a helping hand t o ZZR Samoobrona.
Whereas in the preceding weeks Andrzej Lepper had been highly critical of the other
national farmers' unions, regularly denouncing their compromises with the
government, in early April he finally seized the opportunity to break his union's
isolation. On the occasion of the KZRKiOR's XIth national congress, to which he was
invited on April 12 and 13, he returned to his rhetorical style of
This was the "unionist" approach he had renounced since Świecko's action. While
reaffirming his rejection of the February 8 agreement, he then called, with the zeal of
new converts, for the reactivation of the agricultural intersyndicale, the definition of a
common action strategy and even, eventually, the creation of a single union
confederation uniting the various agricultural unions. "Despite the animosities that
may have existed in the past between the various farmers' unions, we must now
unite", he declared at the end of his speech to KZRKiOR delegates, the leaders of
most of the other farmers' organizations, including PSL and NSZZRI "S", as well as
several representatives of the public authorities, including the new Minister of
Agriculture, Artur Balasz2 . The day after the KZRKiOR congress, Andrzej Lepper
even agreed to join representatives of KZRKiOR and NSZZRI "S" at the negotiating
table with the government. Upon his arrival at the Ministry of Agriculture, Artur
Balazs
1 "Nowi ministrowie z AWS", Gazeta Wyborcza, 27-28/03/1998, p.1.
2 "Trzeba być razem", Zielony Sztandar, 25/04/1999, p.1 and p.3
308
initiates a new round of consultations, aimed at specifying the implementation of the
"Pact for Agriculture" provided for in the February 8 agreements, to which he invites
"all professional groups and political forces active in the countryside", thus breaking
with his predecessor, ZZR Samoobrona1 .
It was in this context of pacified relations between the main protagonists in the field
of peasant representation, linked to the reinvestment by all of them, albeit for varying
reasons, in the theme of the unity of the peasant movement, that the ZZR Samoobrona
organized its IIIe National Congress, the first since 1995.
2) The May 5, 1999 congress: a new "act of institution".
On May 5, 1999, over 2,000 delegates from ZZR Samoobrona gathered in the large
Congress Hall of Warsaw's Palace of Culture and Science, the same place where
PZPR congresses were held in the days of the People's Republic. Union flags cover
the walls of the hall, and an imposing banner reading "ZZR Samoobrona: we defend
Polish soil" hangs over the rostrum2 . This sumptuous congress was an opportunity for
the ZZR Samoobrona leadership to demonstrate the new dimension acquired by their
organization during peasant demonstrations, and to have the many union and political
leaders in attendance attest to its status as a major player in the field of peasant
representation. Leaders of all the organizations claiming their peasant identity,
including of course the PSL, the KZRKiOR and the NSZZRI "S", numerous
opposition parties, mainly on the left, the main professional unions, with the exception
of the NSZZ "S", and also representatives of the public authorities, including the
Minister of Agriculture and the President's agricultural advisor, honored the congress
with their presence3 .
1 "Artur Balaszs, nowy minister rolnictwa dla Chłopskiej drogi", Chłopska droga, 04/04/1999.
2 "Obronimy się polska ziemio!", Chłopska droga, 16/05/1999.
In attendance are, among others, newly elected KZRKiOR president Władysław Serafin, PSL
president Jarosław Kalinowski, NSZZRI "S" vice-president Andzrej Ryl, PLD president Roman
Jagieliński, SLD vice-president Jacek Piechota, OPZZ president Józef Wiaderny, PPS (far-left)
president Piotr Ikonowicz, general Tadeusz
3
309
In front of these guests and a packed hall, Andrzej Lepper made a point of presenting
the union as an extremely powerful group with a large number of activists throughout
the country:
"This is already the third time we've met at a ZZR Samoobrona national congress. But you only have to
look at this room, filled to the brim with delegates from our union, to realize that today Samoobrona is
no longer the spontaneous, loosely organized vigilante movement it was a few years ago. Today
Samoobrona has come back to life as a powerful, organized social force, able to act on a national level,
in every corner of the country, to defend the vital interests of the Polish countryside and its inhabitants.
[...] We have not only thousands of members in every voivodship, but also hundreds of thousands of
supporters throughout the country"1 .
To illustrate the advanced degree of structuring claimed by the union's leaders, a
detailed organizational chart was drawn up at the congress, listing the names of the
members of the national board and the union presidents in each voivodship. Andrzej
Lepper, the only candidate for re-election, was triumphantly re-elected by
acclamation.
The image of a massive, highly-structured union, united as one behind Lepper, that
the congress portrayed was abundantly echoed by the many journalists attending.
Whereas a month earlier, the KZRKiOR's national congress, which was attended by a
similar number of participants, had only been reported in a few small sections, the
ZZR Samoobrona's congress was given extensive coverage, securing front-page
coverage in the main national media.
Wilecki (Chief of Staff of the Polish Armed Forces from 1992 to 1997, reputedly close to the SND, a
nationalist party claiming allegiance to Roman Dmowski), Leszek Bubel (former PPPP MP and
presidential candidate in 1995) and Bohdan Poręba (former leader of the Patriotic Union of Poland).
"Grunwald" and candidate on the Samoobrona-Leppera lists in the 1993 elections). Also attending the
congress were the new Minister of Agriculture Artur Balacz, the State Secretary of the President's
Chancellery and former Minister of Agriculture Andrzej Śmietanko, the President of the Agricultural
Real Estate Agency of the State Treasury, himself a former Minister of Agriculture, Adam Tański, and
the National President of the Agricultural Chambers Józef Waligóra. Cf. "Goście Leppera", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 06/05/1999, p.1; "Partia Wodza", Polityka, n°20, 15/05/1999; "Atrakcyjny Lepper",
Rzeczpospolita, 06/05/1999, p.1; "Obronimy się polska ziemio!", Chłopska droga, 16/05/1999.
1"Wystąpienie Prewodniczącego Andrzeja Leppera", Warsaw, 05/05/1999: www.Samoobrona.org.pl,
accessed July 20, 2010.
310
It is also attested to by the various guests at the congress who, by their very presence,
testify to their recognition of the union as a player to be reckoned with in the political
field. From Władisław Serafin, who succeeded Janusz Maksymiuk at the head of
KZRKiOR, to PPS president Piotr Ikonowicz, to presidency representative Andrzej
Śmietanko, all insist in their addresses to delegates on the central position acquired by
ZZR Samoobrona in the peasant movement. When asked about bringing ZZR
Samoobrona back to the negotiating table, Minister Balasz himself admitted to Gazeta
Wyborcza journalists: "The fact is that Samoobrona is today one of the three most
important agricultural unions. It's an essential social partner. And I couldn't consider it
otherwise, so as not to give it any reason to change the responsible attitude it has
adopted [since I became Minister]"1 .
Nevertheless, the IIIe congress of the ZZR Samoobrona was more than just a
showcase for the union's growing importance in the field of peasant representation. It
was also an opportunity for its leaders to publicize their claims to extend the union's
scope of action beyond the economic situation of the countryside, and to reaffirm their
political ambitions. Thus, while most of the thematic declarations adopted by the
congress relate to agriculture, others tackle subjects a priori outside the concerns of an
agricultural union, such as defense, healthcare reform, or even the functioning of the
school system2 . In his speech to t h e congress delegates, Andrzej Lepper reaffirmed
his commitment to the ideal of the unity of the peasant movement, and reiterated his
calls for the dissolution of Parliament, declaring his readiness to return to the electoral
arena if his union's demands were not immediately met3 .
*
**
1 "Jestem ministrem od miesiąca", Gazeta Wyborcza, 06/05/1999, p.8.
See
"Postulaty
programowe",
ZZR
Samoobrona,
Warszawa,
05/05/1999:
http:/ / S a m o o b r o n a . o r g . p l / p a g e s / 0 3 . Z w i a z e k / 0
7 . Z j a z d / 0 1 . S t a n o w i s k a / i n d e x . p h p ? d o c u m e n t
= 0 6 . p o s t u l a t y.html, accessed July 20, 2010.
3 "Obronimy się polska ziemio!", Chłopska droga, 16/05/1999.
2
311
To reduce the cycle of agricultural protests in 1998 and 1999 to a mere outbreak of
protest fever by archaic peasants - a sort of post-Communist jacquerie - is to substitute
stubborn, hackneyed prejudices about Polish agriculture for the reality of the
observable phenomenon. Far more than farmers
Although it is more a question of "capitalists" affected by the fall in agricultural prices
than of small farmers retreating to a culture of "survival"1 , it appears to be the
uncertain result of the politicization and publicization of the economic malaise of the
countryside by pre-constituted agricultural organizations which, in a more or less
competitive way, are committed to controlling the process.
Similarly, far from being reducible to a hypothetical peasant attraction to radical and
violent spokesmen, the gradual rise of ZZR Samoobrona in the dynamics of the
protest movement must be understood as the relatively unpredictable product of the
"blows" exchanged by the various players in the mobilization, competitive
interactions participating in the definition and imposition of the social image of the
events. Despite their initial lack of resources, the leaders of the ZZR Samoobrona, and
in particular Andrzej Lepper, managed to steer these struggles to qualify the situation
in a favorable direction, so as to gain recognition as the main leaders of the protest
movement and to emerge at its conclusion as actors to be reckoned with in the field of
peasant representation. Three main elements can be identified to explain this unlikely
process of appropriation of the cycle of agricultural protests by the Samoobrona ZZR.
1 The dominance of market-integrated farmers in the Polish agricultural protests of the late 1990s is
reminiscent of certain observations made by Henri Mendras about French agriculture in the post-war
period: "We used to talk about parity between agriculture and other sectors, not parity within
agriculture; but disparities between the different categories of farmers were very great and, above all,
growing. Similarly, to say that a farmer's income is the equivalent of a worker's salary convinces no one
when the farmer has doubled the surface area of his farm, blocks the roads with his tractor, which is
worth two years of a worker's salary, and goes to demonstrations with his DS. It's obvious that this is no
longer a revolt of the poor, a jacquerie, but a demonstration by small producers, fighting to defend their
income, the ownership of their means of production and their status in society", in Mendras Henry, Les
sociétés paysannes, Paris, Gallimard, Folio/Histoire, 1995, p.289.
312
The first was the re-emergence of the theme of peasant movement unity in late spring
1998. While the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona seemed doomed to be rapidly ousted
from the political and trade union scene in the wake of the 1997 elections, the
formalization of an agricultural intersyndicale in June 1998 represented a double
opportunity for them. On the one hand, it enabled them to capitalize on their
organization's prior recognition as a nationally representative farmers' union, so that
they could continue to present themselves as legitimate spokespersons for the
peasantry, despite their group's objective weakness. On the other hand, it offers them
the opportunity to revive the protest action methods on which they built their relative
reputation in the early 1990s, and which they had gradually been forced to abandon
for lack of sufficient militant and organizational resources.
The second explanatory factor is the imposition of a definition of the wave of peasant
demonstrations as a radical movement. Right from the unitary march of July 10, 1998,
the stigmatizing image of the demonstration conveyed by the media and government
representatives was accompanied by an emphasis on Andrzej Lepper's role in its
unfolding. This focus on the president of ZZR Samoobrona, the archetypal radical
peasant leader, was part of an effort to illegitimize union demands. This was
exacerbated throughout the cycle of protests, as Andrzej Lepper took on the radical
stigma attached to him. While the leaders of KZRKiOR, NSZZRI "S" and PSL were
keen to give a "good image" of the mobilization, keeping it within the legitimate rules
of protest in order to maintain their political "respectability", the president of ZZR
Samoobrona, who was considered an "outsider" in the field of peasant representation,
multiplied his provocations and recourse to subversive or even illegal practices in the
early months of 1999. Benefiting from the media's attraction to the spectacular, but
also from the hesitations of the other players in the mobilization, Andrzej Lepper, and
through him the ZZR Samoobrona, succeeded in symbolically establishing themselves
as the main leaders of the protest movement.
313
Finally, the third explanatory element is the work of rebuilding the union's structures
which, from the end of 1998, was implemented by the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona.
By defining centralized procedures for re-establishing the union throughout the
country and selecting its local representatives, they were able to convert the
reputational capital accumulated by the union and its president during the protest
movement into organizational resources. By March 1999, t h e y had demonstrated
their new capacity for autonomous mobilization, and were thus able to shift the
balance of power in the peasantry's field of representation in their favour, and,
benefiting from a redefinition of the government's attitude towards the mobilized
groups, to have their representativeness recognized by the public authorities.
The congress held in Warsaw on May 5, 1999, in the final weeks o f the cycle of
peasant demonstrations, can be seen as a new "act of institution" for the ZZR
Samoobrona1 . After being given up for dead less than two years earlier, the union is
now seen as a powerful, healthy organization to be reckoned with in the field of
peasant representation, but also, more broadly, in the political arena. Showing off the
new dimension acquired by their organization in the dynamics of the movement to
challenge the government's agricultural policy, its leaders, principally Andrzej
Lepper, clearly display their ambitions to re-engage in the struggle for positions of
political power.
1 Bourdieu Pierre, "Les rites comme actes d'institution", art.cit.
314
315
Chapter 4
The hesitant reinvestment in political
competition
In the aftermath of the 1997 parliamentary elections, in which the Przymierze
Samoobrona was relegated to the status of a tiny group w i t h just over 10,000 voters
nationwide, the depoliticization of the Samoobrona movement appeared to be a
necessity for the handful of individuals who had decided to continue claiming it as
part of their activities. Reclassifying the objectives of their actions as solely trade
unionist, they seem to have given up the fight for positions of political power for
good. In this chapter, we look at the processes by which these union representatives
gradually questioned this forced refocusing of their activities during the IIIe
legislature, and reoriented them towards participation in political competition. How
do they come to interpret the political situation as a "window of opportunity" for
reaffirming their claims to take part in the definition and political representation of
social interests? In what ways do they transgress the distinction between union and
political activities, in order to reinvest in political competition resources accumulated
in the arena of protest mobilizations? How do they formalize and promote an
explicitly political offer of representation that enables them to stand out in electoral
competition, while at the same time respecting the main norms that regulate it?
At first glance, the process of politicization of the Samoobrona movement's activities
in the late 1990s appears to follow a similar dynamic to that observed at the start of
the decade. Initially, the movement's representatives entered the arena of protest
mobilizations through the ZZR Samoobrona and sought to gain recognition, by
adopting practices labelled as radical, as the spokespersons of "angry peasants" and
then, by extension, of society as a whole in struggle against the state. In a second
phase, they set out to reinvest the various resources available to them in political
competition.
316
accumulated in the contestation by formalizing an electoral offer under the name
Samoobrona, based on the denunciation of the economic and political equilibrium in
force since the change of regime.
Although attractive at first glance, the assumption of a perfect parallelism between the
ways in w h i c h representatives of the ZZR Samoobrona "enter politics" and then
"return to politics" does not stand up to analysis. By focusing on the undeniable
similarities between these two processes, it prevents us from thinking about the
differences between them. In other words, by positing their identity by nature, it leads
to reifying them and ignoring their historicity and contingency. Yet the contexts in
which ZZR Samoobrona representatives strive to attribute political meaning to their
activities and to perform as political representatives, as well as the knowledge and
know-how they are able to mobilize to achieve this, differ markedly between the Ie
and IIIe legislatures.
On the one hand, the configuration of political games was profoundly transformed
between the two periods. Still marked by a high degree of uncertainty in the early
1990s, by the end of the decade the political arena was governed by a set of routinized
rules providing a fairly strict framework for the activities of the players involved.
With the stated aim of "rationalizing" political games, several legislative and
constitutional acts gradually clarified relations between the various institutions,
specified the nature of players entitled to take part in electoral competition, and
refined the distinction between trade union and political arenas1 . What's more,
through their competitive interactions, the various players involved in the political
field have themselves contributed to specifying tacit, "normative" rules2 , restricting
the field of practices and themes that can legitimately be mobilized in political
competition. This increased codification of the political arena was reflected in a rising
trend in the cost of access to electoral competition and the arena of institutional
politics between the beginning and end of the 1990s. The constraints weighing on the
activities of actors wishing to engage in the struggle for the political representation of
social and political interests have also increased.
1 On the adoption of legal rules contributing to the codification of Polish politics during the IIe and IIIe
legislatures, please refer to : Heurtaux Jérôme, op.cit. in particular chapter 7.
2 Bailey Frédéric, op.cit. p.18.
317
positions of political power, as in the case of the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona, were
significantly stronger during the IIIe legislature than during the Ie legislature.
On the other hand, several leaders of ZZR Samoobrona, notably its president Andrzej
Lepper, had a much more substantial political "baggage" at the end of the 1990s than
they had when they first "entered politics". Having already taken part in three
elections on behalf of the Samoobrona movement, they had accumulated knowledge
and know-how over the course of the 1990s that enabled them to apprehend in a
different way the prescriptions of the role of participant in the political competition
that they once again intended to assume1 . Their experience of formalizing and
promoting a political offer, as well as of electoral failure, constitute referents that they
can now mobilize in an attempt to anticipate the effects of their actions and estimate
the value of their representational assets. In other words, while they remain largely
devoid of the resources traditionally valued in political competition, at the end of the
1990s the representatives of ZZR Samoobrona are no longer the political neophytes
they were a few years earlier.
Thus, despite apparent similarities, we shall see in this chapter that the concrete ways
in which the Samoobrona movement became politicized and invested in political
competition during the IIIe legislature correspond in fact to logics that are markedly
different from those observable in the early 1990s. In contrast to 1992, when the
creation of the Przymierze Samoobrona party followed the first trade union
"successes" of ZZR Samoobrona by just a few weeks, ZZR Samoobrona's leaders, no
doubt scalded by the electoral failure of 1997, hesitated during 1998 and 1999 about
the form to give to their eventual involvement in political competition (section 1). If,
at the beginning of 2000, Andrzej Lepper finally decided to present his
1 According to Jean-Louis Briquet, who himself borrows the notion from Anthony Giddens, a role
prescription can be understood as a set of normative prescriptions according to which an actor must act
in order to legitimately play his role, "normative prescriptions that are imposed on him by the image he
has of himself and his function, but also by the image that the audiences he is confronted with expect of
him", and which constitute for him "as much constraints as models for action". Cf. Briquet Jean-Louis,
"Communiquer en actes. Prescriptions de rôle et exercice quotidien du métier politique", Politix, vol.7,
n°28, 1994, p.16-26.
318
As a candidate in the 2000 presidential election, the work he put into shaping the offer
of representation and his electoral campaign reflected an ambivalent relationship with
the organization he presided over. Although invested by the Samoobrona ZZR alone,
and essentially mobilizing the collective resources at its disposal to take part in the
electoral competition, he is striving to build his public identity as a candidate at a
distance from the union and to broaden his reference group beyond the peasantry
alone (section 2). Questioned by some union executives in the aftermath of the
presidential election, won hands down by outgoing President Aleksander
Kwaśniewski, the political orientation of the Samoobrona movement's activities was
quickly reaffirmed by Andrzej Lepper and those close to him in the run-up to the 2001
parliamentary elections. Reactivating the partisan branch of the movement, which was
renamed Samoobrona RP, in order to comply with the new rules governing access to
the competition for parliamentary posts, the representatives of the Samoobrona
movement set about gaining recognition for their representativeness by insisting on
their exteriority to the established formations and by promoting a political offer
addressed to all the "victims of the transition", regardless of their profession or place
of residence. For the first time, they succeeded in doing so, as the Samoobrona RP
electoral committee managed, against all expectations, to cross the threshold for
parliamentary representation (section 3).
319
Section 1: A time of hesitation: how to take part in the political
competition?
This section is devoted to the study of the ZZR Samoobrona leaders' "return" to
politics, and to the gradual re-qualification of their activities in the electoral arena at
the end of the 1990s. Whereas, following the 1997 elections, they seemed to have
given up on broadening the scope of their interventions beyond the field of
agricultural trade unionism, in 1998 and 1999 they made increasingly clear their
claims to be once again involved in the competition for political office. Far from
being linear and reducible solely to the rationality of ambitious union leaders, we shall
see that this process of (re)politicizing their activities appears particularly bumpy and
uncertain. I n d e e d , scalded by the bitter failure of 1997, the leaders of ZZR
Samoobrona are hesitant, and sometimes even divided, about the form to give to their
potential participation in the electoral competition, first for the local elections of
October 1998 and then for the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for
2000 and 2001 respectively. What kind of explicitly political representation should be
developed? Should they enter the electoral competition independently or in alliance,
and if so, with which other groups?
The dynamics of the process of repoliticization of the ZZR Samoobrona leadership's
activities in the late 1990s, as well as its hesitations, must be understood in the light of
the union's concomitant involvement in the movement to challenge the Buzek
government's economic policy and its gradual rise to power within it. Firstly, because
for the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona, and Andrzej Lepper in particular, the union's
protest actions were the main means of reclassifying the objectives of their activities
in a political sense and publicizing their electoral pretensions. Secondly, as in the
early 1990s, it is in the arena of social conflict that they accumulate most of the
symbolic and militant resources mobilized to legitimize their potential participation in
the struggle for positions of political power. Broadly speaking, it seems possible to
identify four "stages", punctuated by the dynamics of the movement from
320
contestation, in the process of politically re-qualifying ZZR Samoobrona's activities
and clarifying its electoral objectives in the late 1990s.
Initially, during the spring and summer of 1998, while ZZR Samoobrona still
appeared as a relatively secondary player in the field of peasant representation, the
union's leaders sought to legitimize their participation in the competition for political
office by focusing on giving political meaning to the union of peasant organizations
contesting the Buzek government's policies (A). Nevertheless, from the end of 1998,
as their relations with other protagonists in the field of peasant representation
deteriorated and they were increasingly stigmatized for the radicalism of their
activities, they opted for closer ties with non-agricultural union organizations, which
were also involved in contesting the government's economic policy, in order to
broaden their field of intervention beyond agricultural issues (B). While the gradual
recognition of ZZR Samoobrona as an actor to be reckoned with in the Polish political
arena was accompanied by an intensification of the work of reclassifying their
activities in a political sense, in the months following the May 1999 congress, the
union's leaders still seemed to hesitate between different antagonistic orientations for
reinvesting the electoral arena: the formalization of an autonomous and generalist
political offer, a rapprochement with the PSL within the framework of a "peasant"
electoral alliance, or participation in the creation of a new political party associating
various extra-parliamentary opposition movements (C). As in 1992, ZZR
Samoobrona's leaders finally opted for organizational duplication by participating in
the creation of a new partisan organization bringing together players from outside the
peasantry's field of representation, at the turn of 1999 and 2000, to formalize their
claims to take part in the forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections (D).
A) A return to politics under the banner of political unity for the peasantry.
From spring 1998 onwards, the theme of the unity of the farmers' movement was
reinvested by the various national farmers' unions, which
321
and by the PSL, seeking new alliances in the run-up to the autumn local elections. The
unanimous mobilization of a discourse calling for the unity of the peasant movement
by the various protagonists in the field of representation, however, conceals
differentiated uses and definitions of this notion and the aims assigned to it. Unlike
the other union leaders, who have political networks outside the peasantry's field of
representation, the leaders of ZZR Samoobrona have been promoting a political
definition since summer 1998. Setting up the agricultural intersyndicale as a prelude
to the political unification of the various organizations claiming to represent the
interests of the peasantry, they set out to extend their field of intervention beyond the
sole question of agricultural prices, and to assert their claim to take part in the
autumn's local elections (1). A dominant player in the field of peasant representation,
and a fortiori in the political field, ZZR Samoobrona does not, however, appear to be
a desirable political partner for the other protagonists in the field of peasant
representation. In order to compete for positions of power in local government, its
leaders were eventually forced to join the Przymierze Społeczne electoral committee,
initiated by the PSL, in exchange for a few places on its lists in certain regions (2).
1) Attempts t o impose a political definition of the union o f
organizations.
farmers'
The rapprochement between the NSZZRI "S", the KZRKiOR and the ZZR
Samoobrona objectified at the end of June 1998 by the signature of the "collaboration
agreement of the presidents of the agricultural unions" bears witness to a compromise
on a minimal definition of the union of the three agricultural unions. The agreement
was limited to the pooling of militant resources for certain protest actions, and to the
unification of their demands in negotiations with public authorities on the issue of
guaranteed agricultural prices, for which they nonetheless retained autonomous
representation. Andrzej Lepper quickly set about broadening the scope of this
agreement, promoting its definition as the first stage in a process of unification.
322
of all the groups claiming to represent the interests of the peasantry. A few days
before the demonstration on July 10, 1998, he declared in the PSL weekly Zielony
Sztandar:
"Farmers need to be heard, and it's up to us to make this possible: farmers' forces need to unite. All
farmers' parties, farmers' unions and branch unions must begin to speak with one voice. We need to set
up a common structure which, under the slogan "Let's defend ourselves", will truly defend the interests
of peasants. [...] I don't believe that this project can be apolitical. Today, the fight for guaranteed prices
is already politics. It cannot be otherwise. [...] For example, in the French Chambers [of Agriculture],
90% of the representatives are also union representatives, and these Chambers also have representatives
in Parliament. One way or another, you can't escape politics."
Andrzej Lepper.
Quoted in "Będziemy blokować", Zielony Sztandar, 05/07/1998, n°27, p.3.
Andrzej Lepper's hitherto largely unprecedented mobilization of the theme of the
political unity of the peasant movement, and his explicitly political re-characterization
of the June 24 agreement, should be seen as part of an effort to broaden the scope of
the ZZR Samoobrona. By presenting it as a component of a vast peasant movement
destined to unite, the union's president is in effect seeking to extend the reference
group whose interests the union claims to represent to the peasantry as a whole, and
not just to the large capitalist farmers. Above all, by making an autonomous electoral
commitment a short-term objective of the rapprochement between peasant
organizations, he calls into question the distinction between union activities and
political activities, and implicitly reaffirms his ambition to take part in the competition
for political posts, which he seemed to have renounced since the 1997 parliamentary
elections.
President of an organization that still occupies a marginal position in the field of
peasant representation, Andrzej Lepper was unable to impose this political
interpretation of the June 24 agreement on its other protagonists1 .
1 As Pierre Bourdieu reminds us: "The effectiveness of performative discourse, which claims to make
what it states happen in the very act of stating it, is proportional to the authority of the one who states
it;
323
Throughout the summer of 1998, the leaders of both NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR
adopted a restrictive interpretation of the intersyndicale as an ad hoc and essentially
"technical" collaboration between the various agricultural unions in the context of
negotiations with the government on guaranteed agricultural prices. If they regularly
mobilize the theme of the union of the peasant movement to legitimize the formation
of the intersyndicale, it is essentially with the aim of influencing in their favor the
balance of power engaged with the State on the question of agricultural prices. On the
other hand, they refuse to question the autonomy of action of the various
organizations claiming to represent the peasantry. Moreover, their reference to
peasant unity is not exclusive, and they continue to mobilize other modes of
classification to define their political identity and legitimize their own claims to
political office, particularly in the run-up to the local elections in autumn 1998. Thus,
while participating in a movement to protest the agricultural policies of Jerzy Buzek's
government, the leaders of NSZZRI "S" sought over the summer to forge closer ties
with other groups claiming affiliation with the Solidarity movement. In the end,
without formally committing their union to the electoral competition, they decided to
take part in the AWS leadership's initiative to set up electoral committees uniting all
the "conservative" forces stemming from the former democratic opposition
movement. Like several leaders of the ROP, a movement with which they had
participated in the 1997 parliamentary elections, most of the national leaders of
NSZZRI "S" paradoxically stood as candidates on the lists of the Prime Minister's
party. Union president Roman Wierzbicki was even nominated to head the AWS list
in the Lublin powiat1 . Likewise, although no official alliance was formed between
their union and a political party for the parliamentary elections the previous year,
KZRKiOR leaders wishing to take part in local elections seemed to prefer their roots
in the "left-wing" opposition to their membership of the peasant movement in their
search for political partners. While some of them run for the
Bourdieu Pierre, "L'identité et la représentation", Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, vol.35,
1980, p.66.
1 "Dwunastu z Przymierza", Gazeta Wyborcza, Lublin,18/09/1998, p.3
324
committee initiated by the PSL, most ran on SLD lists1 . While reaffirming its
attachment to an agrarian political line and reiterating its calls for the political
unification of the various peasant organizations behind their party, the new leadership
of the PSL itself set about formalizing alliances with organizations outside the peasant
movement in the run-up to the local elections. The Przymierze Społeczne electoral
coalition, formalized as early as June 1998, thus unites the PSL with the UP and the
Pensioners' and Retirees' Party (Krajowa Partia Emerytów i Rencistów). While the
PSL's leaders legitimized the alliance by pointing to the convergence of these three
parties in their analysis of Poland's economic and social crisis, which they saw as
particularly affecting rural dwellers, their clear aim with this unprecedented political
alliance was to make up for their electoral weakness in urban areas, identified as one
of the main causes of their "failure" in 1997. They even aspired to build a political
force capable of competing with the AWS and SLD at national level2 .
Unable to impose their political definition of the June 24, 1998 agreement on the
other main protagonists in a field of peasant representation that had been reconfigured
since the 1997 elections, the latter preferring other identities or the quest for electoral
profitability to their membership of the peasant camp in the formalization of political
partnerships, Andrzej Lepper and the other leaders of ZZR Samoobrona seemed
forced at the end of the summer to give up on engaging their union in electoral
competition. Despite its growing reputation within the protest movement, the ZZR
Samoobrona did not have sufficient resources, either financial or militant, to hope to
present autonomous lists in a significant number of constituencies.
2) Participation in the Przymierze Społeczne: ZZR Samoobrona as a PSL union
partner.
This is particularly true of union vice-president Władysław Serafin, who successfully ran for a
councillor's post in the Kłobucki powiat (Silesia): "Pierwszy krok w Lewo", Gazeta Wyborcza,
Częstochowa, 16/10/1998, p.1.
2 "Nowe polityczne trójlistne drzewko", Gazeta Wyborcza, 29/06/1998, p.3.
1
325
Marginalized in the dynamics of pre-election haggling, the leaders of ZZR
Samoobrona were, at the beginning of September, the only leaders of one of the main
organizations claiming to represent the interests of the peasantry not to appear on the
lists of a committee for the local elections of October 1998. Barely a month before the
elections, Andrzej Lepper finally resigned himself to joining the PSL's "hegemonic"
peasant union project. On September 6, 1998, the electoral committee of Przymierze
Społeczne in the West Pomeranian voivodeship formalizes a local agreement with
ZZR Samoobrona. It was negotiated by Kazimierz Dziurski, the PSL leader in the
Koszalin region, the birthplace of ZZR Samoobrona, where it still has one of its best
national bases. This local agreement ensures the presence of two union leaders on the
lists of the voivodship Diétine Committee, its national chairman Andrzej Lepper and
its regional chairman Jan Łączny, in exchange for their unconditional adherence to the
Przymierze Społeczne program1 . A few days later, new regional agreements between
the committee and the ZZR Samoobrona were formalized on the same basis in six out
of sixteen voivodships. In the end, around 120 ZZR Samoobrona members stand for
election on the Przymierze Społeczne lists, which bring together a total of over 10,000
candidates nationwide2 . The PSL leadership seeks to minimize the significance of
this alliance, which is also a source of tension with its UP partners3 , by pointing out
that it is not national, that ZZR Samoobrona representatives are limited in number on
the committee's lists and that few are in an eligible position4 . Lepper, on the other
hand, hails it as a milestone in the political unification of the peasantry. This is
reflected in the tone of his press release
1 "Lepper z PSL", Gazeta Wyborcza, Szczecin, 07/09/1998, p. 4.
2 "Wyborczy uścisk", Gazeta Wyborcza, 19/09/1998, p.1.
3 At the time of the formalization of the presence of ZZR Samoobrona activists, including Lepper, on
the committee's lists, the UP president made no secret of his skepticism about the decision. "The UP i s
worried about this controversial candidate [Lepper]. We raised this topic at our last Przymierze
Społeczne board meeting. However, the PSL was supporting this person [Lepper], and I'm willing to
understand that. However, I leave it to them to take full responsibility for Mr. Lepper's adherence to our
alliance's program," he told journalists questioning him on the subject. UP founder and former
president Ryszard Bugaj is no different when he says: "I'm not particularly happy that Mr. Lepper is on
the Przymierze Społeczne lists. He could never have been a UP candidate, but he is supported by the
PSL. If it had been up to me to make the decision, I certainly wouldn't have accepted such a candidacy.
But from the point of view of local elections, maybe it's better to see Lepper in local assemblies than on
roadblocks...". Quoted in "Przymierze z Lepperem", Gazeta Wyborcza, 16/09/1998, p. 5.
4 "Lepper i Kalinowski w wyborczym uścisku", Gazeta Wyborcza, 19/09/1998, p.5.
326
publishes to formalize ZZR Samoobrona's participation in the Przymierze Społeczne
committee:
Warsaw, September 18, 1998.
"We'll get there together" is the slogan carried by the Przymierze Społeczne, and it
best reflects the reality of the economic situation in the countryside. After many years
of union and political divisions, it's high time for the countryside to unite. This
movement towards unification began with the signing of the agreement between the
three main agricultural unions on June 24. [...] This unity is already bearing fruit. The
local elections are an ideal opportunity to demonstrate the unity of the countryside.
This is why Samoobrona has decided to run on the Przymierze Spoleczne lists and to
support its candidates throughout the country.
Andrzej Lepper.
President of ZZR Samoobrona.
Translated by us. Sources: "Razem damy radę", press release by Andrzej Lepper, September 18, 1998,
Archiwum Partii Politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona 1998-1999.
In the end, the 1998 local elections enabled the ZZR Samoobrona to win its first
elective mandates, with Andrzej Lepper himself being one of the three elected from
the Przymierze Społeczne to the West Pomeranian Voivodeship Diétine1 . However,
these remained limited in number, barely a dozen or so, with most of the rare ZZR
Samoobrona candidates having been relegated to secondary positions on the
committee's lists.
While he did not hesitate to see the beginnings of a lasting political alliance, notably
for the presidential elections of 2000 and the legislative elections of 20012 , Andrzej
Lepper denounced the local electoral agreements formalized with the PSL in the days
following the elections. Refusing, contrary to his initial commitment, to sit on the
Przymierze Społeczne group in the West Pomeranian Dietina, he reaffirmed his
organization's autonomy and even set out to appropriate the committee's relative
electoral success in the region:
"[Voters] did not give their votes to Przymierze Społeczne, but to Andrzej Lepper of Samoobrona. [...]
If we had stood in the West Pomeranian Voivodeship as Samoobrona, the Przymierze Społeczne would
not have had a single elected member in the Diet, and we certainly
1 "Pat w wojewodztwie", Gazeta Wyborcza, Szczecin, 19/10/1998, p.1.
2 "Lepper i Kalinowski w wyborczym uścisku", Gazeta Wyborcza, 19/09/1998, p.5.
327
more than three [...]. I am not a member of either the Przymierze Społeczne or the PSL. I simply called
on all Samoobrona activists and supporters to vote for the Przymierze Społeczne. They owe me, not the
other way around. Without my appeal, they would not have obtained a single representative in the
Koszalin region. [...] The facts are clear: Samoobrona is not in the Przymierze Społeczne."
Andrzej Lepper.
Quoted in "Rozmowa z Andrzejem Lepperem", Gazeta Wyborcza, Szczecin, 24/10/1998, p.2.
The rupture between the PSL and the ZZR Samoobrona was consummated at the end
of November. Invited to represent his organization at the VIe Congress of the PSL,
Andrzej Lepper theatrically left the room during the address by the President of the
Republic, Aleksander Kwasniewski. When questioned by journalists about this
gesture, he roundly criticized the PSL leadership, accusing it of betraying the
peasantry and its interests by showing complacency towards a President who, in his
view, was collaborating in the government's enterprise to destroy Polish agriculture1 .
B) Seeking partnerships within the trade union left.
Calling into question the principle of unity in the peasant movement that he h a d been
championing just a few weeks earlier, Andrzej Lepper began to distance himself from
his inter-union partners in the dynamics of the agricultural protest movement in late
autumn 1998, with particular intensity in early 1999. In addition to its subversive
rhetoric and its questioning of negotiation as a way out of the crisis, it sought to
distinguish ZZR Samoobrona from NSZZRI "S" and KZRKiOR by broadening its
scope of intervention beyond agricultural issues alone. As during the wave of protests
in 1992 and 1993, the president of ZZR Samoobrona sought to legitimize his claim to
be involved in defending the interests of social groups other than the peasantry,
mainly by formalizing partnerships with non-agricultural trade union organizations
involved in challenging the Buzek government's economic policy.
1 "PSL na lewo", Gazeta Wyborcza, 23/11/1998, p.6; "Przed kioskiem z gazetami", Rzeczpospolita,
23/11/1998.
328
As early as August 13, 1998, Andrzej Lepper signed a "collaboration agreement
aimed at defending citizens against the neoliberal policies of the current government"
with the president of the Sierpień 80' ("August 1980") trade union, Daniel Tomasz
Podrzycki [see box]1 . Having already collaborated within the Comité National
Intersyndical de Négociation et de Grève set up in 19922 , the two men have
maintained good relations since the early 1990s3 . Little publicized, this
rapprochement between two unions labelled as radical and occupying marginal
positions in the political arena was quickly aborted, as the president of ZZR
Samoobrona seemed to give up his desire to broaden the latter's representation beyond
the peasantry for the time of the local elections. However, he was relaunched in late
autumn, following Lepper's break-up of his short-lived alliance with the PSL. In
November and December, Lepper and Podrzycki took part together in several protest
actions by groups mobilized against the government's economic policy. On November
18, for example, they took part in a miners' demonstration organized by the OPZZ in
front of Parliament4 . Similarly, on December 16, the two men attracted attention
when, along with several hundred militants from their unions, they disrupted a
ceremony organized in Katowice by NSZZ "S", a member of the AWS, to
commemorate the bloody repression of the Wujek mine demonstration in 19815 .
Their aim was to protest against what they described as the government's betrayal of
the ideals of the Solidarity movement6 .
Daniel Tomasz Podrzycki was born in 1963 in Siemianowice, Silesia. Still a high
school student in the early 1980s, he did not directly participate in the labor strikes
that shook Poland at the time, particularly in the industrial region of Katowice where
he lived. It was only after the declaration of a state of war and the banning of NSZZ
1 "Niech Prymas przeprosi chłopa", Gazeta Wyborcza, 21/08/1998, p.4.
2 See chapter 2, section 1.
3 In an interview conducted on June 25, 2008 in Warsaw, Lepper explains: "We didn't always have
good relations with the other farmers' unions. We were in competition with them, they thought
Samoobrona was useless, the KZRKiOR and the NSZZRI "S", they thought we were useless and that's
how they treated us. [...] On the other hand, I always maintained good relations with workers' unions,
with OPZZ, with Solidarność 80', not with Krzaklewski's Solidarność but Solidarność 80', and above
all with Sierpień 80'."
4 "Górnicy w stolicy", Gazeta Wyborcza, 19/11/1998, p.3.
5 On December 16, 1981, three days after General Jaruzelski declared a state of war, strikers at the
Wujek mine in Katowice clashed with the police who were trying to evacuate them. During the
crackdown, nine strikers are killed by the police.
6 "Przepychanki pod Wujkiem", Gazeta Wyborcza, 17/12/1998, p.4; "Nie było apelu poległych",
Rzeczpospolita, 12/17/1998.
329
"S", that he became actively involved in dissidence. In 1989, he came into contact
with Marian Jurczyk, a signatory to the August 1980 agreements and president of the
NSZZ "S" in the Szczecin region in the early 1980s. Opposed to the Round Table
negotiations, Jurczyk was engaged in a campaign to challenge Lech Wałęsa's
authority over the Solidarity movement. This led to a split within the NSZZ "S" and
the creation of the NSZZ Solidarność 80' union, which, as its name suggests, claimed
the legacy of the workers' Solidarity of 1980. Despite his young age and the fact that
some of the new union's delegates questioned his legitimacy, Daniel Podrzycki was
appointed head of the organization in the Silesia region, where it had only a handful
of members at the time. In 1992, he was appointed by Marian Jurczyk to represent
Solidarność 80' on the "National Intersyndical Negotiation and Strike Committee",
which brought together various unions involved in challenging the Suchocka
government, including OPZZ and ZZR Samoobrona. The following year, denouncing
the growing influence of delegates from Szczecin, and in particular its shipyards, in
defining the direction of Solidarność 80', Daniel Podrzycki seceded from the union's
Silesian structures. Around them, he formed the Sierpień 80' union, of which he took
over the presidency. Although the new union was only established in the Katowice
region and its militant base appeared extremely fragile, it came to prominence in the
mid-1990s for its use of practices labeled as radical during protest actions in Silesian
mines.
Sources: "Związkowa alternatywa", Gazeta Wyborcza, 15/06/1989, p.6; "Bolszewizacja opozycji
?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 13/09/1989, p. 6 ; "Strajk generalny?", Gazeta Wyborcza, 11/08/1992, p.1 ;
"Huta Katowice / Zaczęli okupować", Gazeta Wyborcza, Katowice, 06/06/1994, p.1; "Sierpień sądzi",
Gazeta Wyborcza, Katowice, 04/02/1997, p.5 ; "Historia Związku NSZZ Solidarność 80' Małopolska",
http://solidarnosc80malopolska.pl/page11.html, accessed July 23, 2010; "Śmierć kandydata na
prezydenta", Polska Dziennik Zachodni, 09/26/2005.
Despite the disapproval that their action of December 16 aroused among most of the
main protagonists in the Polish political arena1 , the presidents of ZZR Samoobrona
and Sierpień 80' were invited on December 22, 1998, along with some twenty other
trade union leaders involved in contesting the Buzek government's economic policy,
to take part in the creation of the "Intersyndicale Coordination Committee for a
Change in the Government's Economic and Social Policy"2 . Initiated by the OPZZ
leadership, this committee, whose founding text begins by denouncing "the
incompetence of the authorities and the arrogance with which the government treats
workers and farmers", sets itself the objective of "coordinating the action of trade
union organizations which, defending a variety of social groups and political options,
are currently engaged in the struggle against the government's economic and social
policies".
This action was labeled as radical and scandalous by both the parliamentary left and the various
groups claiming to be part of the Solidarity movement's heritage. It led to the opening by the Voivode
in Katowice of proceedings to ban the Sierpień 80' trade union, which were ultimately unsuccessful,
and was used by the government to justify the exclusion of ZZR Samoobrona from the negotiating
table at the end of December. Cf. "Solidarność: to było przestępstwo", Gazeta Wyborcza, 19/12/1998,
p.4.
2 "18 central i związków zawodowych", Gazeta Wyborcza, 23/12/1998, p.4.
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330
unsuccessfully in negotiations with the government over problems experienced by
their sector"1 . The impetus for this inter-union rapprochement and the invitation
extended to unions stigmatized for their radicalism, such as the ZZR Samoobrona and
Sierpień 80', to take part in it is, in our view, an attempt by the OPZZ leadership to
shift the balance of power with the government in their favor. By threatening to unify
and harden the protest movement, they intend to signify their categorical opposition to
the budget proposal then tabled by the Minister of Finance, as well as to several
reform projects submitted to the vote of deputies at the end of the year, notably
concerning pensions and taxation. However, it must also be understood in the light of
the tensions that were then running through the SLD coalition, in which the OPZZ
was participating, just a few weeks before its planned transformation into a fullfledged political party2 . Denouncing the hegemony of social-liberal advocates of the
coalition's leadership, as well as the marginalization of trade unionist deputies within
its parliamentary club, OPZZ's leaders set out to promote a more "left-wing"
reorientation of the future SLD party's representation offer, which, in their view,
involved systematic opposition to the Buzek government's economic policy3 . In this
sense, the formalization of a vast trade union alliance of the various organizations
involved in challenging the government offered them the opportunity to show their
autonomy from the leadership of the SdRP, the main party in the SLD coalition, as
well as their importance in the trade union field, in an attempt to reorient the economy
of internal relations within the SLD in their favor.
ZZR Samoobrona's participation in the "Inter-union Coordinating Committee for a
Change in the Government's Economic and Social Policy" legitimizes Andrzej
Lepper's claim that he is extending his stance beyond the government.
"Powstał Międzyzwiązkowu Komitet Koordynacyjny na Rzecz Zmiany Polityki SpołecznoGospodarczej Rządu", Kronika związkowa, 24/12/1998, n°37/98, p.1.
2 The SLD was created in 1991 to coincide with the parliamentary elections. At the time, it was simply
an electoral coalition, uniting around the SdRP party, which had emerged from the PZPR, various
organizations (partisan, trade union, associative) claiming to be left-wing and retaining their autonomy
of action outside the electoral period. With the prospect of the adoption of an electoral law raising the
cost of access to electoral competition for non-partisan organizations, the leaders of the SdRP expressed
their desire to transform the SLD into a full-fledged political party. Negotiations to this end are
underway with the various coalition partners, some of whom make no secret of their hostility to
participating in such a project, which they see as a challenge to their autonomy. Cf. "Celem jest władza
niepodzielna", Rzeczpospolita, 15/01/1999.
3 Cf. "Obniżona ranga OPZZ", Gazeta Wyborcza, 13/01/1999, p.5; "Narasta fala protestów",
Kronika związkowa, 12/01/1999, n°1/99, p.1.
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331
the sole issue of the economic crisis in agriculture, to undertake an "ascension en
généralité" starting from the situation of the peasantry. At the center of media and
political attention following his Świecko action, he took advantage of the committee's
first official meeting on February 1er 1999, at OPZZ headquarters, to adopt a
rhetorical justification for the roadblocks then set up by his union, linking it not just to
the defense of farmers' interests, but to that of all the "victims of the government's
anti-social policies". As he strove to impose a definition of the agricultural protest
movement as constituting an insurrection against the government, at the committee
meeting he even invited all mobilized groups, including workers, teachers and health
workers, to join the farmers on the barricades1 . While rejecting Lepper's goal of
overthrowing the government, the leaders of the other unions taking part in the
meeting - OPZZ and Sierpień 80', of course, but also ZNP, Solidarność 80' and even
KZRKiOR - shared ZZR Samoobrona's concern to unify the actions of the various
mobilized groups. The final declaration of the committee meeting thus announces the
forthcoming organization of a joint demonstration by the various participating unions,
as well as the eventual strengthening of their cooperation within a trade union
confederation. Often presented by the media as the initiator of the inter-union
coordination committee, to the detriment of the OPZZ leadership, Andrzej Lepper did
not hesitate to see in this union confederation project the beginnings of a powerful
social and anti-liberal union destined to play an important role in Polish politics2 .
In the weeks following the February 1er meeting, however, the momentum that had led
to the formation of the inter-union coordination committee quickly ran out of steam.
In addition to the "radicalization" of ZZR Samoobrona after February 8, which
resulted in most of the committee's protagonists temporarily distancing themselves
from him, this loss of momentum was mainly due to the government's satisfaction of
some of the unions' main demands.
1 "Na Lep Leppera", Gazeta Wyborcza, 02/01/1999, p.1.
2 "Ładny plon mi wyrósł", Gazeta Świąteczna, 06-07/02/1999.
332
mobilized1 and, to a lesser extent, by the short-term pacification of relations between
the OPZZ and SdRP leaderships within the SLD2 . The "Comité de coordination
intersyndicale pour un changement de la politique économique et sociale du
gouvernement" (inter-union coordinating committee for a change in the government's
economic and social policy) quickly withered away, and neither the project for a
unitary demonstration nor that for an inter-union confederation saw the light of day.
Although the inter-union rapprochement initiated by the OPZZ failed to produce the
social union Lepper had dreamed of, ZZR Samoobrona's participation in the "interunion coordination committee" enabled its president to broaden its scope of action at
the beginning of 1999 and reactivate contacts dating back to the early 1990s, or even
create new ones, within Polish left-wing networks. erOn May 1st, Andrzej Lepper and
several ZZR Samoobrona activists were invited by the leaders of the SdRP, OPZZ
and PPS to march alongside them in the streets of Warsaw. Four days later,
representatives of all the main left-wing formations took part in the IIIe National
Congress of ZZR Samoobrona.
C) The persistent indeterminacy of the modalities of participation in the
electoral competition.
In the months following the Congress, which Lepper described in his speech to the
delegates as "opening a new stage in the ZZR Samoobrona's presence on the Polish
socio-professional [trade union] scene, but also, let's not be afraid to say it clearly, on
the national socio-political scene"3 , the union's leaders increasingly focused their
activities on reinvesting the union in the electoral arena. While continuing to take part
in protest actions on a regular basis, in association with other farmers' unions but also
with the main left-wing unions, they are giving up assigning a revolutionary meaning
to these actions and are focusing on formalizing an offer
1 At the beginning of March, under pressure from the AWS, the government's budget proposal was
amended to reduce budget cuts, particularly in the areas of industrial restructuring, pensions and
education. The ZNP union thus obtained satisfaction for its demand for higher teacher salaries. Cf.
"Byle nie zepsuć!", Gazeta Wyborcza, 03/03/1999, p.24; "Jest podwyżka", Gazeta Wyborcza,
12/03/1999, p.6.
2 "OPZZ popiera nowe SLD", Gazeta Wyborcza, 15/04/1999, p.11.
3 "Wystąpienie Prewodniczącego Andrzeja Leppera", Warsaw, 05/05/1999, art.cit.
333
political parties enabling them to compete for political office in accordance with the
rules of the election1 . The many press releases, open letters and media appearances
by ZZR Samoobrona's leaders in the summer of 1999, especially Andrzej Lepper,
who now has a virtual monopoly on the movement's public discourse, bear witness to
the centrality acquired by this work of defining the modalities of participation in the
electoral competition and shaping an explicitly political offer of representation in the
union's activities. However, they also reveal the persistent hesitations that animate the
union. Although they now clearly spell out their electoral ambitions, ZZR
Samoobrona's leaders are not yet settled on the particular form their participation in
the electoral competition will take, and are directing their work on formalizing a
political offer in three parallel directions: the objectivization of an electoral program
intended to form the basis of an autonomous Samoobrona candidacy in the
presidential elections of 2000 and the legislative elections of 2001, the constitution of
a "peasant" electoral alliance with the PSL and, finally, the participation of ZZR
Samoobrona in an electoral coalition bringing together various extra-parliamentary
opposition groups.
Firstly, at the Congress of May 5, 1999, a program committee was set up within ZZR
Samoobrona. Comprising members of the national office, its mission was to provide
the union with a formal political program designed to make explicit the organization's
competence in dealing with a wide range of political issues, going beyond agricultural
ones2 . Thus, following on from a number of thematic declarations adopted at the time
of the Congress
1 In the run-up to a joint demonstration on September 24 by a number of trade union organizations
involved in challenging the Buzek government, in which ZZR Samoobrona is taking part, Andrzej
Lepper has issued a press release, addressed as much to union members as to competing players and the
media, which reads: "Through our participation in the forthcoming demonstration, we need to convince
people that our desire to change socio-economic policies is developing within a democratic framework.
Our protest is in no way aimed at breaking the law or disrupting the functioning of the state." Excerpt
from "Komunikat", statement by Andrzej Lepper, 01/09/1999, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, ZZR
Samoobrona 1998- 1999.
2 As Alexandre Dezé and Myriam Aït-Aoudia note, drawing up a program is one of the operations
perceived as inherent to the creation of a political enterprise: "Being able to claim to have a program
means conforming to the idea of what is expected of a party, and thus making the nascent enterprise
credible in the eyes of competing players, the authorities or the media [...] In this way, it is a question of
demonstrating [the organization's] skills in dealing with any political issue. "Cf. Dezé Alexandre and
Aït-Aoudia Myriam, art.cit.
334
and the guidelines set out by Andrzej Lepper in his speech to the delegates, the ZZR
Samoobrona Program Committee presented a series of proposals throughout the
summer, covering a wide range of topics: the economy, political institutions, social
policies, Poland's membership of the EU and NATO, and the environment1 . Intended
to outline a "third path of socio-economic development" as an alternative to
communism and the
According to Lepper, the "anti-human, anti-social, anti-national capitalism" that
succeeded it after 19892 , these various proposals led to the publication of a summary
document by ZZR Samoobrona in early September 1989. Presenting the latter as "a
socio-professional and political movement of a national-popular character, aiming at
the economic and moral rebirth of Poland", this "proto-programme", soberly entitled
"Main ideo-programmatic postulates of Samoobrona"3 , is organized around six rather
vague points and betrays iconoclastic ideological influences.
Samoobrona's main ideo-programmatic postulates
1) Samoobrona is in favor of a new "style" of socio-economic development guided
by :
a) priority to satisfying people's basic needs and restoring confidence in the
future;
b) the return to declining humanist-Christian values and the rejection of
We are committed to the "Satanist values" of maximum profit, enrichment, absolute
rivalry, degenerate consumerism, unbridled commercialism, contempt for the weak
and the unfettered promotion of evil;
c) the creation of order and harmony in the relationship between man and
nature, his direct environment. In other words, the implementation of ecological
principles. [...]
2) Introduce ethical principles into economics, breaking with the inhuman practices of
"unbridled capitalism" and the "unbridled free market". Roll back fiscal "terror" and
monetarist-banking parasitism.
3) The implementation of a major national program to revive the country's economy,
develop construction, crafts, agriculture, trade and industry, and eliminate
unemployment and poverty.
See for example: "Geneza obecnej struktury politycznej w Polsce", communiqué of ZZR
Samoobrona, 03/06/1999, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona 1998-1999 ; "Jesteśmy
przeciw społeczno-ekonomicznemu "satanizmowi"", 10/06/1999, ZZR Samoobrona press release,
22/06/1999, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona 1998-1999; "Jakiej Polski Chcemy",
ZZR Samoobrona press release, 22/06/1999, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona 19981999.
2 "Wystąpienie Prewodniczącego Andrzeja Leppera", Warsaw, 05/05/1999, art.cit.
3 "Ogólne postulaty ideowo-programowe Samoobrony", ZZR Samoobrona press release, September
1999, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona 1998-1999.
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335
4) The liquidation of "excessive" state and local government bureaucracies,
completely out of proportion with their costs and benefits to the population.
5) Defending the country's economic and political sovereignty, now threatened by the
"smokescreens" of European Union and NATO integration. The country's
development strategy must be based on the principle of "relying on our own
strengths".
6) The fight against all manifestations of satanic, inhuman and destructive liberalism,
or anti-Gospel morality within society.
Translated by us. Sources: "Ogólne postulaty ideowo-programowe Samoobrony", ZZR Samoobrona
press release, September 1999, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona 1998-1999.
At the same time, a biography of Lepper was published at the end of August by a
small Warsaw publishing house with close ties to the trade union, setting out several
of the programmatic proposals drawn up over the summer and explaining the ZZR
Samoobrona president's presidential ambitions. A veritable hagiography of Lepper,
the book, entitled Niepokorny (Inflexible), was distributed at various public meetings
and demonstrations attended by the union1 .
Secondly, in conjunction with the broadening and programmatic objectivization of
ZZR Samoobrona's political representation, the union's leaders reinvested the theme
of political unity for the peasantry throughout the spring and summer of 1999.
Following on from his statements at the KZRKiOR Congress in March, Andrzej
Lepper continued to promote the formation of a unified peasant front, capable of
supporting a single candidate in the presidential election in autumn 2000. While
several polls credit the ZZR Samoobrona with voting intentions comparable to those
of the PSL in t h e event of early elections2 , this mobilization of "unionist" rhetoric
by the
1 The book, signed under the pseudonym Tomasz Sieciera, is a mixture of hagiographic accounts of
Lepper's life, interviews with him, excerpts from articles dedicated to him and programmatic statements
by ZZR Samoobrona. It is published by Editions de la Fondation Odysseum, owned by Witold
Stanisław Michałowski, who claims to be Andrzej Lepper's personal adviser. Sieciera Tomasz,
Niepokorny, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Fundacji Odysseum, 1999; about the publication of the book
and its use as a propaganda document within the ZZR Samoobrona: "Program za 5zl", Gazeta
Wyborcza, Kraków, 06/09/1999; "Lenin z Zielnowa", Polityka, 04/09/1999, p.22-24.
2 In mid-February 1999, a poll by the OBOP institute, taking into account for the first time ZZR
Samoobrona, gave the latter 6% of voting intentions against 3% for PSL. At the end of April, a poll by
the same institute gave the PSL 4% and Samoobrona 3%. Over the same period, the CBOS institute
shows much greater gaps between the two formations, crediting the PSL with 11% of voting intentions
in April and ZZR Samoobrona with just 2%. See respectively
"AWS za SLD", Gazeta Wyborcza, 17/02/1999, p.2; "SLD wciąż górą", Gazeta Wyborcza,
336
ZZR Samoobrona must be understood in the context of the power struggle between
the union and the peasant party for leadership in the field of peasant representation1 .
Thus, while Lepper called for the negotiation of an electoral agreement between his
union and the PSL, he insisted on his definition of peasant representation as the only
valid one, and made no secret of his ambition to be the united candidate of both
parties. Similarly, without ruling out the prospect of an electoral agreement, the PSL
leadership is keen to mobilize the heritage of the agrarian movement in its favor, in
order to present their formation as the most legitimate one to defend the interests of
the peasantry. Despite this rivalry, a joint commission of six members - three from the
PSL and three from ZZR Samoobrona - was set up on June 15, 1999 to negotiate the
terms of a possible political alliance between the two organizations for the
presidential election2 . Its work continued throughout the summer.
Thirdly and finally, during t h e summer of 1999, the ZZR Samoobrona leadership
also sought to consolidate some of its extra-parliamentary opposition networks by
initiating the creation of a new political formation capable of uniting them politically.
On July 21, 1999, Andrzej Lepper published a call for the formation of a "National
Popular Self-Defense Bloc" (Blok Ludowo- Narodowy Samoobrona). Denouncing the
betrayal of their ideals by both left and right - "the right has given up defending the
Nation and the raison d'Etat, the left has stopped defending workers' social rights.
Together, they are now working to establish unbridled capitalism in Poland", he
writes, inviting disappointed members of both camps to join the ZZR Samoobrona in
a "massive electoral force capable of radically changing the situation in Poland and
the world".
28/04/1999, p.2; "Preferencje partyjne w kwietniu", Warsaw, CBOS, April 1999. See also on the
debates sparked off within the PSL by polls showing the party neck-and-neck with ZZR Samoobrona:
"Wierzyc? Nie Wierzyc?", Zielony Sztandar, no. 16, April 18, 1999.
1 Here, we agree with Rose-Marie Lagrave's observations on the "instrumental" mobilization of the
theme of the unity of the peasant movement by dominant peasant organizations, based on the French
case: "Unity and pluralism are the result of a balance of power between unions to impose their
representation of the peasantry, but also to ensure that the legitimate way of perceiving this balance of
power prevails, of which the debate on "union representativeness" - which, in the final analysis, is
decided by the state - is only one facet. Unitary discourse and practice are therefore the prerogative of
the dominant unions, or rather the dominant ones at a given time"; Hubscher Ronald & Lagrave RoseMarie, "Unité et pluralisme dans le syndicat agricole français. A false debate", Annales. Economies,
Sociétés, Civilisations, vol.48, n°1, 1993, p.121.
2 "Samoobrona z PSL?", Rzeczpospolita, 16/06/1999.
337
save it from extermination"1 . This appeal was addressed both to the leaders of
nationalist groups with whom the union leadership had sought to renew contact at the
beginning of the year - Bohdan Poręba, former leader of the "Grunwald" Patriotic
Union and candidate on the Przymierze Samoobrona lists in 1993, and Tadeusz
Wilecki, former chief of staff of the Polish army and close to the nationalist group
Front Polski, were among the guests invited to the Congress of May 5 - and to those
of the "Polskie" trade union organizations. Tadeusz Wilecki, former chief of staff of
the Polish army and close to the nationalist group Front Polski, was among those
invited to the May 5th Congress - as were the "left" trade union organizations with
which she collaborated within the "Comité de coordination intersyndicale pour un
changement de la politique économique et sociale du gouvernement", whether OPZZ
or, above all, Solidarność 80' and Sierpień 80'.
In early autumn, the ZZR Samoobrona leadership increasingly favoured the latter
option, which in both form and objectives is reminiscent of the Nation's Self-Defence
Committee (Komitet Samoobrony Narodu) set up by the union at the end of 1992.
D) An alliance of outsiders: Blok Ludowo-Narodowy.
In mid-September 1999, negotiations with the PSL for a single presidential candidate
broke down. Jarosław Kalinowski confirmed that his party would present its own
candidate, ruling out any alliance with "a trade union that calls on peasants to arm
themselves with Molotov cocktails". "A party that claims to be the third largest
political force in the country must have its own candidate for the presidency", he
declared at the time2 . A few days later, on the occasion of a joint demonstration by
several organizations protesting against the government's economic policy, Andrzej
Lepper reiterated to representatives of OPZZ, Solidarność 80' and Sierpień 80' his
calls for the formation of a Popular-National Bloc capable of constituting a "real
alternative to the ruling power"3 . By the end of the month, Sierpień 80' president
Daniel Tomasz Podrzycki, who since the end of 1998 has consistently cooperated
1 "O potrzebnie powołania do życia bloku ludowo Narodowego Samoobrona", statement by Andrzej
Lepper president of ZZR Samoobrona, July 21, 1999, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, ZZR
Samoobrona 1998-1999.
2 "Leppera Nie Poprą", Gazeta Wyborcza, Płock, 16/09/1999, p.4.
3 "Łatwo poszło", Gazeta Wyborcza, 25/09/1999, p.1.
338
with ZZR Samoobrona in the protest movement, confirms his union's participation in
this initiative. The creation of a monthly magazine common to both unions,
"Samoobrona Narodu", materializes this union. The publication, whose first issue
appeared in November, aims to
"to present [the Blok Ludowo-Narodowy's] program and projects to society, to clarify
our positions on various issues concerning the country [...] and to reveal the ineptitude
of the ruling power and the threats resulting from integration into the European
Union"1 . The formalization of the Blok Ludowo-Narodowy with the Sierpień 80' did
not meet with unanimous approval within the ZZR Samoobrona leadership. Several
union officials, including Ireneusz Martyniuk, former vice-president and member of
the national board, openly criticized the growing politicization of the union and the
expansion of its representation beyond the peasantry, as evidenced by the creation of
this union alliance with political pretensions. In an interview with the PSL weekly
Zielony Sztandar, Ireneusz Martyniuk called on Andrzej Lepper to renounce his
personal political ambitions, refocus ZZR Samoobrona's activities solely on the trade
union field, and lend his support to a PSL peasant candidacy in the presidential
elections2 .
However, the impact of these criticisms remained limited. Ireneusz Martyniuk soon
disappeared from the union's organization chart and, far from changing his positions,
Andrzej Lepper continued throughout the autumn to promote his Blok LudowoNarodowy project and to seek new supporters for it. At the end of September,
negotiations began with the leadership of Solidarność 80' and with Marian Jurczyk,
former president of this union and mayor of Szczecin, who sits alongside Lepper on
the West Pomeranian Diet3 . Similarly, the president of ZZR Samoobrona is seeking
closer ties with former general Tadeusz Wilecki [see box]. On November 10, 1999,
Andrzej Lepper took part with Daniel Tomasz Podrzycki in the launch of the
committee supporting Wilecki's candidacy. Suggesting that he might support the
general in the presidential election, he invited him to join the Blok
1 "Szanowni Państwo", Samoobrona Narodu, November 1999, n°1, p.1.
2 "Nie samym Lepperem Samoobrona stoi", Zielony Sztandar, 07/11/1999, n°45, p.3.
3 "Jurczyk i Lepper zakładają partię", Gazeta Wyborcza, 27/09/1999, p.4.
339
Ludowo-Narodowy1 . Finally, despite the failure of earlier negotiations, Andrzej
Lepper sent an open letter to the PSL leadership at the end of November, inviting
them to join his initiative2 .
Tadeusz Wilecki was born in 1945. After graduating from the Poznań military
academy in 1964, he pursued a career in the Army of the Polish People's Republic.
Promoted to general in the early 1980s, he commanded the Fifth Armored Division in
Gubin and, from 1987, the Armed Forces Headquarters in Silesia. In 1992, at the
suggestion of Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz, he was appointed Chief of Staff
of the Polish Army by President Wałęsa. He held this position until March 1997,
when Aleksander Kwaśniewski replaced him, against his wishes, with General
Henryk Szumski. Coming out of his reserve, Wilecki denounced the new president's
political revenge. Retired in 1998, he clearly asserted his political ambitions and drew
closer to the networks of the nationalist right, notably the Front Polski and
Stronnictwo Narodowo- Demokratyczne. An admirer of Roman Dmowski, in October
1999 he announced his candidacy for the following year's presidential election.
Sources: Website of the Armed Forces General Staff in Silesia: www.sow.mil.pl, accessed July 27,
2010; "Tadeusz Wilecki", http://ludzie.wprost.pl/sylwetka/tadeusz-wilecki/, accessed July 27, 2010;
"Wilecki na aut", Gazeta Wyborcza,11/03/1997, p.1; "Polityk z rezerwy / Rozmowa z gen. Tadeuszem
Wileckim, byłym szefem Sztabu Generalnego WP", Gazeta Wyborcza, Poznań, 05/27/1998, p.4;
"Wilecki Na Prezydenta", Gazeta Wyborcza, 10/23/1999, p.2.
On December 16, 1999, at a press conference in Szczecin, Andrzej Lepper announced
the transformation of the "Blok Ludowo-Narodowy", which at that time only involved
ZZR Samoobrona and Sierpień 80', into a genuine political party. Called "Blok
Ludowo-Narodowy Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej" (People's Bloc-National
Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland), this new formation was intended to "embody
a third way in Polish politics", and to field its own candidates in the 2000 presidential
and 2001 parliamentary elections. While negotiations with Marian Jurczyk and
Tadeusz Wilecki to associate them with this initiative are ongoing, the PSL leadership
having unambiguously refused to participate, Lepper indicates that the
1 "Być może poprze go Andrzej Lepper", Rzeczpospolita, 12/11/1999; "Komitet Wileckiego", Gazeta
Wyborcza, 12/11/1999, p.8; "Potrzeba powołania Bloku-Ludowo-Narodowego", Samoobrona Narodu,
December 1999, p.5.
2 "List orwarty Prezydium Samoobrony do władz naczelnych PSL", 23/11/1999, Archiwum Partii
Politycznych, ZZR Samoobrona 1998-1999.
340