STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
From the book STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: Concepts and Cases by Ricardo M. Pilares III
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
1. DEFINITION
ARTICLE VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution vests judicial power
in the Supreme Court and such other courts established by law.
Judicial Power

includes “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on any part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government”
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“the right to determine actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction”
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Often times requires the construction of statutes as applied in the
case before them.
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Palomar defined construction as “the art or
process of discovering or expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to the application to a given case, where
that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact
that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law”
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law defines construction as “the act or
result of construing, interpreting or explaining [the] meaning or effect [of a
statute or contract]
This subject is also called LEGAL HERMENEUTICS, which is defined as
“the systematic body of rules which are recognized as applicable to the
construction and interpretation of legal writings”
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSTRUCTION
Based on the definition provided in Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Palomar,
statutory construction may be broken down into the following
characteristics:
a. It Is An Art Or Process
Construction is not an exact science. It does not depend on a set
of formulas that can be readily applied in every case. In fact, a
statute may be interpreted differently if different maxims of
construction are applied. The different principles of statutory
construction should not be used if its application will run counter
to the clear legislative intent which can be determined from the
other parts of the law.
NATURE OF CONTRUCTION
In Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals the
Supreme Court discussed that the very nature of construction is
to determine the intention of the legislature, lends itself to
subjectivity and uncertainty.
EXAMPLES:
The doctrine of last antecedent which is defined as “qualifying
words and phrases normally refer to the last antecedent word or
phrase, unless the context otherwise provides” was not adopted
in the case of Tañada v. Tuvera which involves the interpretation
of Article 2 of the Civil Code, where the Court held that the phrase
“unless otherwise provided” does not qualify its immediate
antecedent, which is the requirement of publication, but rather
the period of publication which is stated at the beginning of the
provision.
In the case of Philippine American Drug, Co. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue held that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is
but a rule of construction adopted as an aid to ascertain and give
effect to legislative intent but that the same “should not be given
such wide application that would operate to defeat the purpose
of the law.”
These cases show that the mere fact that the words of the statute
are organized in a manner contemplated by a rule of construction
does not automatically mean that such rule should be applied.
The canons of construction should be considered as auxiliary
rules of construction which are neither universal nor conclusive
in application.
Thus, as held in Primero v. Court of Appeals, “it should be
applied only as means of discovering legislative intent which is
not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the
plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.”
In Philippine American Drug Co. decision, a canon of
construction is not conclusive simply because the words used in
the statute, or the syntax of the provision calls for the application
of the same. Using different canons of construction can result in
different interpretations.
b. It Involves The Determination Of Legislative Intent
In Senarillos v. Hermosisima, the Court held that the judicial
interpretation of statutes constitutes part of the law as of the date
the law was passed, since said construction merely establishes
the legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.
Thus, when the courts construe a law, they are merely affirming
what was originally intended by the legislature in enacting the
same.
In Torres v. Limjap, it held that the intent of the law-maker
should always be ascertained and given effect, and courts will
not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true
intent and purpose of the Legislature and to conclusions
inconsistent with the spirit of the act.
It further held that the intent is the vital part, the essence of the
law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give
effect to that intent. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a
legislative enactment.
In Araeta v. Dinglasan, the Court held that a rule must be tested
according to its results, that is, the intention of the law in question
must be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplished,
the purpose to be subserved and its relation to the Constitution.
c. It Is Necessary When The Legislative Intent Cannot Be Readily
Ascertained From The Words Used In The Law As Applied Under
A Set Of Facts
In Bolos v. Bolos, the Court explained that the cardinal rule in
statutory construction is that when the law is clean and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for application. As the
stature is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis.
It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or ‘speech is
the index of intention’. Furthermore, there is the maxim verbal
egis non est recedendum, or ‘from the words of a statute
there should be no departure.
In People v. Mapa, the Supreme Court held that its first and
fundamental duty is to apply the law. The court further held that
“construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them.
In Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
the court held that construction is only necessary only if the law
is ambiguous. Thus “the rule is that only statutes with an
ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be subject of statutory
construction.”
In Del Mar v. PAGCOR, the Supreme Court defined a statute to
be ambiguous when “it is capable of being understood by
reasonably well-informed persons in wither two or more senses.”
In People v. Nazario, the Court held that the test to determine
whether a statute is vague is when it lacks comprehensible
standards that “men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”
It cannot be presumed that laws intend an absurdity, and the
courts should construe laws as to avoid it.
Complied by: Dania S. Alcoran
Page 1 of 4
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
From the book STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: Concepts and Cases by Ricardo M. Pilares III
TESTS TO DETERMINE
AMBIGUOUS:
1.
WHETHER
A
STATUTE
interpreting statutes do not enjoy the same level of recognition
as decisions of the Supreme Court, which form part of the legal
system under Article 8 of the Civil Code. A wrong construction of
the law by an administrative agency does not create vested rights
and such wrong interpretation cannot place the government in
estoppel to correct or overrule the same.
IS
TEST OF MULTIPLE INTERPRETATIONS – when the
statute is capable of two or more reasonable interpretations,
such that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
2.
TEST OF IMPOSSIBILITY – when literal application is
impossible or inadequate.
3.
TEST OF ABSURDITY OR UNREASONABLENESS –
when a literal interpretation of the statute leads to an unjust,
absurd, unreasonable or mischievous result, or one at
variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole.
3. PURPOSE
The purpose of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent
when the same cannot be readily ascertained from the plain language
of the law. Its primary consideration is the determination of legislative
intent. – Tañ ada v. Yulo
“The purpose of all ruled or maxims as to the construction or interpretations
of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law.” – Tañ ada v. Cuenco,
et al.
d. It Is A Judicial Function
In In re: R. McCulloch Dick, the court held that under the
Philippine system of government, the duty and ultimate power to
construe the laws is vested in the judicial department.
In Endencia v. David, the court explained that the interpretation
and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial
department.
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the
legislative may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts
by the Constitution.
Whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the
courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the
Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of
the Constitution.
Under the American system of constitutional government,
among the most important functions intrusted to the judiciary are
the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a loosely connected
power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the
legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal
and State Constitutions.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass
any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before
its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A
legislative definition of a word used in a s statute is not conclusive
of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature
would be usurping a judicial function un defining a term.
Under the principle of effectiveness, a statute must be read un such a
way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. The purpose
of construction is to discover the intention of the law, and not to create
doubt.
In City of Baguio v. Naga, the Court held that the true object of all
interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and will of the law-making body,
to the end that it may be enforced. In varying language, the purpose of all
rules or maxims in interpretation is to discover the true intention of the law.
The spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof. A statute
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far
as necessary, the letter of the law. By this, we do not correct the act of the
Legislature, but rather … carry ut and give due course to its true intent.
4. THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION
There are varying theories in statutory interpretation:
1. Textualist theory or originalism
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The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a
constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack
thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so
construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.
Note that the principle that statutory construction is inherently a
judicial function does not preclude Congress from enacting
curative legislations.
Furthermore, in Philippine Duplicators, Inc. v. NLRC, et al held
that the contemporaneous construction of laws by agencies
tasked with the implementation of the same is highly persuasive.
It held that “the principle that contemporaneous construction of a
statute by the executive officers of the government whose duty it
is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily
control and construction of states by the courts, is so firmly
embedded in our jurisprudence that n authorities need be cited
to support it.
In Laxamana v. Baltazar, the Court further added that “where a
statute has received a contemporaneous and practical
interpretation and the statute as interpreted is re-enacted, the
practical interpretation is accorded greater weight than it
ordinarily receives, and is regarded as presumptively the correct
interpretation of the law. Furthermore, “the rule x x x is based
upon the theory that the legislature is acquainted with the
contemporaneous construction of a statute, especially when
made by an administrative body or executive officers charged
with the duty of administering or enforcing the law, and therefore
impliedly adopts the interpretation upon re-enactment.
In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, the Court held that administrative decisions
Words used in the statute takes precedence over any other
modes of construction. Thus, the ordinary or plain meaning of
construction should control its interpretation.
Textualists focus on the text of the legal provision, as it is
presumed that the words, grammar, and punctuation
communicate its meaning.
Their main objective is to find the “public meaning” of the statute
or the meaning of legal text as ordinary people understand it.
Extrinsic sources of construction are avoided unless intrinsic
sources of meaning are found to be insufficient.
Modern textualists also refer to extrinsic sources as a means to
confirm and verify the plain meaning to interpretation.
Weakness: Words often do not mean the same to everyone.
There is false belief that language has intrinsic meaning.
Language evolve, and the meaning of words evolves.
2. Intentionalism theory or originalism
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Focuses on legislative intent “in the belief that the policies and
elected, representative body chose should govern society”
It is the duty of the court to discern the intent of that
representative body and interpret statutes to further that intent.
Difference with textualism:
It does not require the establishment of ambiguity before it can
resort to extrinsic sources of construction, because the original
intent of the framers of the law that should have primacy in the
determination of its meaning. Greater emphasis is placed on the
original intent of the drafters of the law and this requires a review
of legislative history and legislative deliberations.
Strength: Consistency with the objective of construction, as it
requires the court to inquire into the original intent of the
legislature who wrote the law.
Weakness: The legislature consists of many (in the Philippines,
hundreds) individuals coming from different backgrounds and
with different motivations. Legislative determination may not be
a reliable source of interpretation as it only serves as evidence
of the intention of but a few members of Congress who actively
participated in the deliberation of a law, and whose views may
not be necessarily shared by the other members of congress.
Complied by: Dania S. Alcoran
Page 2 of 4
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
From the book STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: Concepts and Cases by Ricardo M. Pilares III
It fails to reconcile between general legislative intent and
specific legislative intent. The former refers to the general
intention of congress in drafting a law as a while, while the latter
refers to the specific intention of the legislature in writing a
specific section or provision of the statute.
In its extreme, it focuses on specific legislative intent which could
be misleading in the sense that it fails to view the statute in the
light of the general intention that the legislature intended in the
statute as a whole.
However, it is equally fundamental that the legislative intent must be
determined from the language of the statute itself. This principle must be
adhered to even though the court be convinced by extraneous
circumstances that the Legislature intended to enact something very
different from that which it did enact.
An obscurity cannot be created to be cleared up by construction and hidden
meanings at variance with the language ised cannot be sought out. To
attempt to do so is a perilous undertaking, and is quite apt to lead to an
amendment of a law by judicial construction.
3. Purposivism or Legal process theory
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Focuses on determining the problem that the legislature is
seeking to address.
Interpretation is made with a view to the public policy that the
statute seeks to advance.
An analysis of the Philippine Supreme Court decisions shows that we do
not adopt a single, unitary theory of construction.
While our Courts are moderate textualists in theory, in focusing on the plain
meaning theory of construction, they are, on the other hand, intentionalists
and purposivists in approach.
This is evidenced by the fact that while the Court prioritizes the plain
meaning rule as the objective manifestation of legislative intent, the Court
has not hesitated to state that if the language of the statute is inconsistent
with its spirit or ratio legis, then the latter should prevail.
The fact that our legal system does not adopt a single theory of construction
gives the Courts flexibility in advancing its interpretation of a statute.
B. RELATED LEGAL PRINCIPLES
1. SEPARATION OF POWERS
In Angara v. Electoral Commission, the Court described the relationship
of the three branches of the government through the principles of
separation of powers and checks and balances: The separation of powers
is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute,
is to legislate not to interpret.
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION V. JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language
used, the subject matter, and the purposes of those framing them
are able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp
distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the
act of a court engrafting upon a law something that has been
omitted which someone believes ought to have been embraced.
The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise
of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by
the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of
government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.
In Naational Marketing Corporation v. Tecson, et. al., the Court held that
if public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised
Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by
judicial decree.
Courts cannot, under the guise of interpretation, “speculate as to an intent
and supply a meaning not found in the phraseology of the law” and “the
courts cannot assume some purpose in no way expressed and then
construe the statute to accomplish this supposed intention.
The court stated in Corpuz v. People that the primordial duty of the Court
is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative
powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise
of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law,
or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments
of the government.
The Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of
a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of
judicial legislation.
In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
2. HEIRARCHY OF LAWS
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed judicial supremacy
which properly is the power of judicial review under the constitution. Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very
lis mota presented.
Under the principle of separation of powers, the Constitution vests in the
legislative branch of government the power to enact laws, the executive
branch, the power to execute laws, and in the judicial branch, the power to
interpret laws.
As held in Endencia v. David, the interpretation and application of laws is
vested in the judicial department of government.
The principle of separation of powers likewise imposes a limitation to
judicial power. The power of the courts is limited to the interpretation of the
laws enacted by the legislature and not to legislate, which is vested
exclusively in the legislative branch of government.
ARTICLE 7 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.
Under the principle of hierarchy of laws, the Philippine Constitution is
supreme over all laws, and as such, acts of Congress, executive agencies
exercising quasi-judicial functions and local legislative bodies must be
consistent with the Constitution.
3. STARE DECISIS
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents
and do not disturb what has been settled) is embodied in Article 8 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
Once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further argument. This principle is one policy
Complied by: Dania S. Alcoran
Page 3 of 4
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
From the book STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: Concepts and Cases by Ricardo M. Pilares III
grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in judicial
decisions.
Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet or the interpretation placed upon
the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The Supreme
Court is described as having the last word on what the law is, as it is the
final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. As such, lower courts are
enjoined to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court.
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle
or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of
controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar
situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability
in the law and does not require identity of or privity of parties.
From the wordings of Article 8 of the Civil Code, it is even said that such
decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those
called upon to decide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
obedience thereto.
Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling
reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected
from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public’s
confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished.
For the doctrine of stare decisis to apply, the principle of law laid down by
the Supreme Court in the precedent case must pertain to the main issue of
the case and not merely obiter dictum. A dictum is an opinion of a judge
which does not embody the resolution or determination of the court and
made without argument, or full consideration of the point, not the proffered
deliberate opinion of the judge himself. As such, mere dicta are not
binding under the doctrine of stare decisis.
The Supreme Court is not precluded from changing its mind and reversing
a previous doctrine that is laid down. ARTICLE VIII, Section 4(3) of the
Philippine Constitution states that “no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in a division may be
modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.
How would other similar pending cases be decided in light of the
doctrinal change vis-à-vis the principle of stare decisis?
In Ting v. Ting, “the interpretation or construction of a law by courts
constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted” and that
“it is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view
is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good
faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, not
respicit.
Complied by: Dania S. Alcoran
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