PRINCIPLES IN MLS PRACTICE 1 Title of the lesson: Basic Concepts on Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Lecturer/Professor: Ms. Arianne Rose A. Lim Transcriber/s: John Carlo P. de Pedro Basic Concepts on Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity OUTLINE Brief History of Laboratory Biosafety Brief History of Laboratory Biosecurity Local and International Guidelines on Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Different Organizations in the Field of Biosecurity Fundamental Concepts of Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Classifications of Microorganisms According to Risk Groups Categories of Laboratory Biosafety According to Levels BRIEF HISTORY OF LABORATORY BIOSAFETY In 1967, Mortality and morbidity increased due to small pox. Laboratory biosafety and biosecurity traces its history in North America and Western Europe. Individuals who handle and process microbiological specimen are vulnerable to pathogenic microorganisms which are possible sources of Laboratory Acquired Infections (LAI) In 1943, the origins of Biosafety is rooted in the US Biological Weapons program as ordered by the US President Franklin Roosevelt and was active during the Cold War. Ira L. Baldwin became the first scientific director of Camp Detrick. In 1969, President Richard Nixon terminated the US Biological Weapons program. Newell A. Johnson designed modifications for biosafety at Camp Detrick. He engaged some of the leading scientists about the nature of their work, and developed specific technical solutions such as Class III Safety Cabinets and Laminar flow hoods to address specific risks. In 1984, American Biological Safety Association (ABSA) was formed. In 1907 and 1908, Arnold Wedum described the use of Mechanical Pipettors to prevent laboratory-acquired infections. In 1909, a pharmaceutical company in Pennsylvania developed a ventilated cabinet to prevent infection from mycobacterium tuberculosis. Serious concerns about biosafety practices worldwide were raised, contributing directly to the decision of the World Health Assembly to consolidate the remaining virus stocks into two locations: the Center for disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the US and State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology Vector (SRCVB VECTOR) in Russia. In 1974, CDC published the Classification of Etiological Agents on the Basis of Hazard In 1976, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) of the United States published the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules. WHO’s first edition of Laboratory Biosafety Manual (1983) and the CDC and NIH’s jointly-published first edition of the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (1984), marked the development of the practice of Laboratory Safety. Biosafety officers adopted the administrative role of ensuring the proper equipment and facility controls are in place based on the specified biosafety level of the laboratory. Arnold Wedum, director of Industrial Health and Safety at the US Army Biological Research Laboratories was recognized as one of the pioneers of Biosafety that provided the foundation for evaluating the risk of handling infectious microorganism. In 1966, Wedum and Microbiologist Morton Reitman, analyzed multiple epidemiological studies of laboratorybased outbreaks.. BRIEF HISTORY OF LABORATORY BIOSECURITY In 1996, the US Government enacted the Select Agent Regulations to monitor the transfer of a select list of biological agents. In 2001, after the terrorist attacks and the anthrax attacks also known as Amerithrax, the US government changed its perspective. The revised Select Agent Regulations required specific security measures for any facility in the United States that used or stored one or more agents on the new, longer list of agents. In 2012, the Select Agent Regulations sought to address the creation of two tiers of select agents. Tier 1 Agents are materials that pose the greatest risk of deliberate misuse, and the remaining select agents. 1 of 3 Singapore’s Biological Agents and Toxins Acts is similar in scope with the US Regulations but with more severe penalties for noncompliance. In 2005, South Korea’s Act on prevention of Infectious Diseases was amended to require institutions that work with listed Highly Dangerous Pathogens to implement laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. In Japan, the Infectious Disease Control Law was recently amended under Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. It also established four schedules of select agents that are subject to different reporting and handling requirements for possession, transport, and other activities. In Canada, Canadian Containment Level (CL3) and CL4 facilities that work with risk group 3 or 4 are required to undergo certification. In 2008,The Danish Parliament passed a law that gives the Minister of Health and Prevention the authority to regulate the possession, manufacture, use, storage, sale, purchase or other transfer, distribution, transport and disposal of listed biological agents. DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIELD OF BIOSAFETY LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES ON LABORATORY BIOSAFETY AND BIOSECURITY In February 2008, the Comite Europeen de Normalisation (CEN), a European Committee for Stardardization published the CEN Workshop Agreement 15793 (CWA 15793) which focuses on Laboratory Biorisk Management. CWA 15793 can be applied to international stakeholders; however, they do not have the force of regulation while conformity is voluntary. Developed among experts from 24 different countries including Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Germany, Ghana, UK, US among others. In 2011, CWA 15793 was updated and intended to maintain a biorisk management system among diverse organizations and set out performance-based requirements with the exclusion of guidance for implementing a national biosafety system. In 2014, the agreement was used until it was officially expired. In 1983, WHO published its 3rd Edition of the Laboratory Biosafety Manual. In 2003, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety made effective which applies to the 168 Member-countries that provides an international regulatory framework to ensure an adequate level of protection in the field of safe transfer handling and use of living modified organisms (LMO) resulting from modern biotechnology The National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) established under E.O 430 series of 1990 was formed on the advocacy efforts of scientists. On March 17, 2006, the Office of the President promulgated E.O 514 establishing the National Biosafety Framework (NBF) which prescribes the guidelines for its implementation, strengthening the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines. NBF is a combination of policy, legal, administrative, and technical instruments developed to attain the objective of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety which the Philippines signed on May 24, 2000. In 1987, NBF considered as an expansion of the NCBP which played an important role in pioneering the establishment and development of the current biosafety system of the country. Department of Agriculture (DA) also issued Administrative Order No. 8 to set in place policies on the importation and release of plants and plant products derived from modern biotechnology. The Department of Health (DOH), together with NCBP, formulated guidelines in the assessment of the impacts on health posed by modern Biotechnology and its applications. American Biological Safety Association (ABSA) Promotes biosafety as scientific discipline and provides guidance to its members on the regulatory regime present in North America Asia Pacific Biosafety Association (A-PBA) Founded in 2005 Acts as a professional society for biosafety professionals in the Asia-Pacific Region. Active members of the International Biosafety Working Group are required to directly contribute to the development of the best biosafety practices. European Biological Safety Association (EBSA) Founded on June 1996 Aims to provide a forum for discussions and debates on issues of concern and to represent those working in the field of Biosafety. Philippine Biosafety and Biosecurity Association (PhBBA) The long term goal of the association is to assist the DA and DOH in their efforts to create a national policy and implement plan for laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. Biological Risk Association Philippines (BRAP) A non-government association that works to serve the emergent concerns of biological risk management in various professional fields such as in the health, agriculture, and technology sectors throughout the country. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF LABORATORY BIOSAFETY AND BIOSECURITY Biosafety defines as the containment principles, technologies and practices that are implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release. Biosecurity refers to the protection, control, and accountability for valuable biological materials within laboratories, in order to prevent their unauthorized access, loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release. 2 of 3 By simple definition, Biosafety protects people from germs while Biosecurity protects germs from people. In 1966, Charles Baldwin worked for the Dow Chemical Company containment systems products, created the biohazard symbol used in labeling biological hazards Biosafety and Biosecurity share common perspectives in terms of risk assessment and management methodologies, personnel expertise, responsibility and control and program management among others. aerosol route, for which there no available vaccines or treatment. Marburg and Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever CLASSIFICATIONS OF MICROORGANISMS ACCORDING TO RISK GROUPS Risk Group 1 – Includes microorganisms that are unlikely to cause human or animal disease. Low individual and Community Risk Risk Group 2 – Includes microorganisms that are unlikely to be a significant risk to laboratory workers and the community, livestock, or the environment. Laboratory exposure may cause infection, however, effective treatment and preventive measures are available while the risk of spread is limited. Moderate individual risk, and limited to moderate community risk Risk Group 3 – Include microorganisms that are known to cause serious diseases to humans or animals and may present a significant risk to laboratory workers. High individual risk, and limited to moderate community risk Risk Group 4 – Includes microorganisms that are known to produce life-threatening diseases to humans or animals. High Individual and community risk CATEGORIES OF LABORATORY BIOSAFETY ACCORDING TO LEVELS Biosafety Level 1 (BSL – 1) – Is suitable for work involving viable microorganisms that are defined and with well-characterized strains known not to cause disease in humans. Bacillus subtilis, Naegleria gruberi, and Infectious canine hepatitis virus Biosafety Level 2 (BSL - 2) – Is basically designed for laboratories that deal with indigenous moderate-risk agents present in the community. It observes practices, equipment, and facility design that are applicable to clinical, diagnostic and teaching laboratories consequently observing good microbiological techniques. Hepatitis B Virus, HIV, Salmonellae, Taxoplasma species Biosafety Level 3 (BSL – 3) – Puts emphasis on primary and secondary barriers in the protection of the personnel, the community and the environment from infectious aerosol exposure. Mycorium tuberculosis, St. Louis Encephalitis Virus and Coxiella. Biosafety Level 4 (BSL – 4) – Is required for work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose high individual risks of life-threatening diseases that may be transmitted via the 3 of 3