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Negotiating the complex turn in IR
Abstract
Despite path-breaking work by major scholars in the field since the 1990s and
recurrent advocacy in favor of the adoption of a complex systems perspective in
the analysis of IR and international environmental politics in particular, the
profession still shies away from fully embracing it. This synthetic essay seeks to
overcome these hesitations with three main objectives in mind: (i) clarify the
nature of the properties associated with complex systems as they may apply to
international relations. While several of them are well-known and suffer little
confusion, consensus still eludes others; (ii) show that much of recent research
constitute the building blocks of a complex system approach, whether they
situate themselves within this framework or not; (iii) illustrate how a complex
system perspective encourages a reappraisal of key IR concepts, such as
multilateralism and governance.
Keywords: Complexity, Governance, Multilateralism, System Properties
1. Introduction
Not only is the field of International Relations (IR) a confusing archipelago of paradigms and
theories, it is also a dizzying world. Two generations ago, IR was all about debates; now it seems
that everyone would rather bifurcate, as shown by the numerous turns advocated in the literature.
To be sure, not all turns are alike. Some reflect new emphases in the practice rather than the study
of international relations. Many “turns” are mere wishful-thinking or attempts at selfaggrandizement (Baele and Bettiza, 2021). Several are incompatible or represent U-turns, while
others are complementary. Some overlap or are simple inflections; still others offer mere detours.
Rather than indicators of intellectual confusion or of the elusiveness of the field, however, this
proliferation of turns may simply reflect the need for a good compass.
Complex systems approaches1 represent a promising development toward this quest, although
they continue both to intrigue and to frustrate scholars. They intrigue because of the yearning for
Since my purpose is not to argue whether a complex systems perspective should be seen as a “framework,” an
“approach,” a “perspective,” a “macro-theory,” or a “paradigm,” I will leave those epistemological issues aside and
use these terms interchangeably. For a discussion of the appropriateness of particular qualifiers, see Bousquet and
Curtis, 2011.
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a coherent framework that would help bring together various theoretical developments of the last
decades and apprehend current turbulence; but they also frustrate, because the development of an
overarching conceptual framework that would follow the cannons of a generative research
program and help illuminate the dynamics of global relations appears elusive. Four reasons explain
why practitioners and academics have tended to keep going straight rather than begin turning.
First, many features of complex systems do not seem novel. Some of its core concepts have
been part of the vocabulary of social scientists for decades. Integration of those few notions into
existing paradigms appeared straightforward, although their implications rarely renewed thinking;
Second, an approach that does not offer solutions to existing problems or simple recipes for the
analyst or the practitioner may put off both the researchers themselves as well as the national or
private research foundations that support them (Jervis, 2012).
A third and more potent explanation lies with scholars who hold an epistemological bias in
favor of the analytical approach, hypothetico-deductive theories, and clear praxeologies. They then
ask complex system theorists to tell them how complexity can be reduced. The world, however, is
not a complicated machine that can be understood by cutting it down into manageable parts,
examining them, and rebuilding the whole. Complex systems cannot be reduced or simplified (for
example, though centralization) without being strongly altered or “mutilated”, and their behavior
is not predictable from the study of their parts (Morin, 1990). In addition, whereas each component
of a complicated system is necessary for the system to operate, in a complex system, such as the
global political system, specific actors can appear and disappear without the system itself evolving.
Finally, complex systems do not operate toward a single end or fulfill a single function.
As Jervis (2012: 395) points out, the focus on causation has led scholars to “[eliminate]
selection effects, reciprocal causation, and endogeneity” not only “as threats to causal inference
but as fundamental forces operating in the world.” But in a context where feedback loops dominate,
the notion of independent and dependent variables loses meaning (Jervis, 1997). Moreover, since
complexity theory admits both equifinality and equicausality, scholars looking for predictive
theories will reject an approach they deem guilty of being unable to guide decisions or capable, at
best, to explain event only a posteriori (see Posner 2012).
Finally, complexity theory is not a single coherent theory, but a collection of approaches rooted
in a variety of intellectual contexts, from physics to biology, from computer science to economics.
Consequently, there is no consensus across disciplines on the very notion of complexity and on
the nature of some of its properties. Its application to international politics, therefore, must be both
idiosyncratic and coherent. Smoothly negotiating the turn requires both an awareness that much
current research is going in that direction, as well as the development of a common understanding
of its key concepts as they apply to IR.
A large part of the misunderstanding lies in the perception that a complex perspective has in all
matters to prove itself superior to existing paradigms to be legitimate. The purpose of its
proponents, however, is not to impose a paradigm that would replace the analytical perspective
(which remains useful), but to demonstrate the appropriateness and usefulness of a synthetic
perspective. It is not meant to displace, but to offer a different way of conceptualizing the object
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of study depending on one’s purpose, provided its supporters work on the construction of an
intersubjective understanding of its main features as applied to the study of global politics.
Accordingly, rather than explain why IR scholars should start turning,2 or delve into the
philosophical and epistemological dimensions of complexity approaches or of various properties,
my purpose is simply to: (i) clarify the nature of the properties associated with complex systems
as they apply to global politics. Though several of them are well-known and their nature suffers
no confusion, others enjoy little consensus; (ii) show, in the process, that much of recent research
constitute the building blocks of a complex system perspective; and (iii) illustrate how a complex
system perspective encourages us to think about IR concepts differently, notably multilateralism,
and governance.
2. The properties of complex systems
A system is “a set of interacting units which has distinct properties and behaves differently from
the individual units that form it” (Jervis, 1997: 6).3 In the social sciences, it is not simply a matter
of elements being connected in some way. Either they are part of other actors’ calculations, or they
have an impact on the outcomes of a given actor’s decisions, or a change within them will affect
other parts of the system. Thus, a system is both a set of units and a set of relationships among
them (Jervis, 1997). Systems have different structures, which refer to the distribution of specific
properties of the units (such as their nature or their material capabilities), as well as to the specific
rules governing their interactions.
Let's look at a real-life example of the world political system in action: responding to a global
health crisis like a pandemic. Here's how the different parts work together:
States (Countries): When a new disease emerges, individual countries take actions to protect their
citizens. This might involve closing borders, implementing quarantines, or stockpiling medical
supplies. (State Action)
International Organizations (IOs): The World Health Organization (WHO), a UN agency, plays a
crucial role. They coordinate a global response by issuing public health recommendations, sharing
information about the virus, and deploying resources to affected areas. (IO Action)
Non-State Actors (NSAs): Pharmaceutical companies race to develop vaccines and treatments.
International NGOs like Doctors Without Borders provide medical care in hard-hit regions. (NSA
Action)
The literature that advocates a turn to a complex systems approach has expanded significantly since Jervis and
Rosenau used some of its basic concepts. See, inter alia, Harrison and Geyer (2022), Chandler (2014), Bousquet and
Curtis (2011), Cudworth and Hobden (2011), Kavalski (2007), Harrison (2006), Byrne (1998), Jervis (1997), Rosenau,
(1990). Scholars now largely focus on governance issues and on the specific properties of complex systems in the
context of a single issue-area.
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Some authors advocate the term “system” include other forces and dimensions (such as the physical environment),
not just agents and their relations; see Shipping Tang (2014).
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This is a simplified example, but it illustrates how different parts of the international political
system:
Communicate and collaborate: Countries share information with the WHO, while the WHO
coordinates the global response.
Follow international norms: Countries might have obligations under international health
regulations to report outbreaks and cooperate with the WHO.
Compete and cooperate: Pharmaceutical companies compete to develop a vaccine, but ultimately
all nations benefit from a successful solution.
The first challenge lies in the diversity of existing conceptions of what makes a system complex.
One difficulty lies in separating the characteristics of a complex system (how do we distinguish it
from a complicated system?) from its dynamics (how does it behave and with what
consequences?). Regardless of disciplines, many authors define complex systems based on their
consequences, as, for example, adaptive systems that “exhibit emergent properties and selforganization” (Carmichael and Hadžikadić, 2019: 2. See also Mitchell, 2009; Wells, 2009). But
these are propensities. Treating them as ontological elements of complex systems precludes
studying the relationships between their attributes and their dynamics, as well as the relationships
among the latter. It seems useful, therefore, to distinguish between what I will call (for want of
better terms) first and second order properties, keeping in mind that they are interlinked.4 First
order properties are conditions that are necessary for a complex system to exist, whereas second
order properties pertain to its behavior. Whether a given property is to be considered first or second
order can be disputed in some cases; the basic idea, however, is to avoid confusing potentialities
with attributes. For example, a complex adaptive system has at least the potential to be adaptive
(however this concept is construed), although that property may remain latent. Many complex
systems fail to adapt. It is not because a system does not adapt, self-organize, or feature emergent
properties that it is not complex. In this context, a slightly modified version of Bousquet and Curtis’
definition is operationally useful: Complex systems are open systems composed of multiple actors
operating at a variety of spatial scales, that interact according to nonlinear and networked patterns”
(Bousquet and Curtis , 2011: 51). These elements define what we shall call “first order properties”,
while the unique dynamics they display will be referred to as “second order properties”.
Complex systems are constantly influenced by outside factors (open) and involve many players
(actors) of various sizes (spatial scales) who interact in unpredictable and interconnected ways
(nonlinear and networked).
2.1 First order properties
2.1.1 Multiple elements
The global system is “global” and not “international” or “interstate” precisely because it is
composed of many heterogeneous units (or “agents”5) which act more less independently
Jones-Rooy and Page (2010) offer a similar distinction between “attributes” and “consequences,” but my
characterization and classification differ slightly. For example, I distinguish between behavior rules (a first order
property linked to the units of the system) and adaptation (a second order property relative to the system and rooted
in the behavior of the units).
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Although fine distinctions could be made between them, the terms ‘units”, “agents” and “actors” will be used
interchangeably throughout the text.
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according to certain rules, hold various status, enjoy diverse connections, and form embedded subsystems. System complexity increases with the type, number, roles, and functions of these actors
who, themselves, are the product of a process of co-construction with the system (Morin, 2005;
Urry, 2005).6
A complex system approach does not a priori grant more importance to one type of agents.
Although states remain the most important actors, their identity, the identification of their interests,
the outcome of their behavior, and the definition and pursuit of a collective good do not depend
only on domestic variables, on their resources, or on their behavior. Other actors contribute to
shaping the global system through a process of co-evolution with the interstate system. In some
cases, a bifurcation of authority has taken place toward a polycentric system (Rosenau 1990),
where agents, who claim separate legitimacies and rely on specific power resources, act
independently in their sphere of action, but within the framework of rules and norms that enable
them to coordinate their action and even cooperate.7 Governance becomes “the orchestration of
distinct modes of power” (Bulkeley, 2016: 3) and legitimacies. The theoretical challenge remains
of explicating the criteria that will guide the selection of the level of description (who are the agents
to be considered?) and the identification of significant interactions, without implicitly regressing
to one of the established IR paradigms.
2.1.2 Interconnections
Connections define systems. With the absence of hierarchy among issue areas and the
disconnection between military force on the one hand, and influence and control on the other, the
multiplicity of connections is a key dimension of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye,
1988). Numerous connections are indirect, taking place through other actors (Jervis, 1997).
Interactions in the global system (military, political, economic, cultural, ideational, and
environmental) operate at different scales (the economic system is more extensive than the
politico-military system, for example) and correspond to distinct and interdependent sub-systems.
Traditionally, scholars have tended to define systems based on the nature of their units. Gilpin
(1981: 40), for example, identifies system change as change in the nature of the units of the
international system. But from a complex system perspective, interconnections matter as much, if
not more. For example, the change from feudalism to the Westphalian system in Europe represents
more a transformation of the existing links among these units than a profound change in their
nature.
In complex systems, the variety and strength of connections may generate networks which, in
turn, may be considered new types of units that comprise agents who share specific ways of
apprehending the world (Wells, 2009: 149). Networks lie at the heart of the governance of complex
systems. The formal analysis of networks, as opposed to the recognition that networks may be
important new actors (Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998; Reinicke, 1998), has consequently gained
Complexity theory, therefore, eschews both reductionism (to know its units is to know the system) and holism (to
know the system is to know its units), in favor of a synthetic approach (Morin, 2005).
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See Ostrom (2010). For an application to the global governance of climate change and analyses of the various
challenges that polycentric governance must address, see Andrew Jordan et al. (2018).
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increased attention (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Kahler and Montgomery, 2009; Maoz, 2011),
particularly in the study of international finance, trade, and the environment.
Agents form networks based on their nature or purpose. These networks, which may be
homogeneous (composed of units of a single type) or heterogenous (associating public and private
actors, for example),8 have four functions: (i) a learning function, through the exchange of
information and the dissemination of innovative modes of governance (Bocse, 2020; Papin, 2020);
(ii) a political function through the formation of policy-oriented coalitions, as exemplified by
epistemic communities (Haas, 2016) or the organization of transnational campaigns (Keck and
Sikkink. 1998); (iii) a regulatory function through the adjustment and coordination of their
members’ behavior; and (iv) a linkage function between different levels of governance. Networks
can be effective forms of governance, both within and among states, as an alternative or a
complement to classical sovereignty or hierarchy (Lake, 2009). Policy networks, for example, have
played key roles in the construction of global environmental governance.
Networks are no panacea, however. Regarding institutional learning, for example, the lack of
institutional memory, the variety of existing networks holding separate bits of information, and
limited decision-making capacities can also impede coordination and learning. These impediments
favor the development of hierarchies around a few hyper-connected nodes (Bocse, 2020). Finally,
scholars have tended to focus on static networks, that is on a set of relationships existing at a given
time, rather than on their evolution (Johnson, 2009). Yet, it may be important to know when, under
what circumstances, and with whom agents become interconnected, as initial conditions are likely
to affect the nature of subsequent connections.
The development of networks creates interlacing power structures. Cerny (2010) has proposed
a “transnational neo-pluralism” approach to world politics, where the system is characterized by
economic interdependence, important interconnections among societies, trans-governmental
networks of cooperation, epistemic communities that promote specific definitions and solutions to
common problems, fast and deep technological development, and by competition and even
ideological conflicts.
In such a system, power is not just a function of existing asymmetries, as in interdependence
theory, but also depends on one’s position in the system. The transnational and pluralistic structure
of complex systems tends to generate asymmetric networked structures with nodal points, that is
points that have many more connections with other parts of the system and constitute unavoidable
hubs. Thus, power rests more on the control of a nodal position than on an actor’s intrinsic material
capacities, although the latter may impact the former (Pattberg and Widerberg, 2020). States that
control key hubs (information, finance, trade, scientific data, etc.) enjoy a privileged position from
which to exercise coercive power (Farrell and. Newman, 2019). This position also opens more
options, which increases negotiating power. For example, if the overall objective is to maintain the
stability of the system, the more connected an actor is, the more likely it is to survive (as in the
case of banks that are “too big to fail”). In the same vein, the notion of empire may be seen as the
The adjective “hybrid” which in the literature often refers to composite networks (such as public-private networks,
see Dubash and Florini, 2011), is also used to refer to networks that have a mixed structure, hence our preferred use
of the words “heterogeneous” or “composite.”
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ability to control cultural and economic networks, forge intersubjective understandings, and affect
a web of interrelations (Bayly, 2021).
In this context, the development of relationality theory, where an actor’s position in the system
determines its power, regulates its behavior, and constitutes its identity (Qin, 2018), promises to
be a key building block of a complex system approach. Actors base their actions on the nature of
their relations with others, which generate expectations and specific ethics (in terms of
responsibilities and mutual obligations, for example). The logic of appropriateness assumes a large
role, compared to power differentials or to the logic of consequences. Significantly, and in line
with the complex system approach where both order and disorder co-exist, the essence of relations
is harmonious contradictions (as in Yin-Yang relationships where opposites are complementary
rather than exclusive); conflict and cooperation occur simultaneously.
2.1.3 Nonlinearity and feedback loops
A linear conception of political action is at the same time frequent, attractive, and often wrong
(Gunitsky 2013). In a nonlinear system, there is no proportional relationship between inputs and
outputs. A slight initial perturbation can lead to important changes. Increasing aid for economic
development will not automatically lead to a proportional reduction of poverty or yield higher
diplomatic dividends.
Nonlinearity lies at the heart of the dynamics of the global complex system and explains in part
the feeling of losing control experienced by political actors and societies alike. The fears of
catastrophe in the event of an accident triggering chain reactions in space amidst the proliferation
of communication satellites in low orbit in the absence of a governance framework, the fall of the
iron curtain in 1989, the “Arab springs” of 2010-2012, or the expansion and diversification of
Islamist terrorism or secession movements offer a few examples of such phenomena. Nonlinear
behavior can be circumscribed to a given issue area (for example the protection of the fundamental
properties of ecosystems, or the diffusion of protest movements) or involve different issue areas
(such as the impact of environmental protection measures on trade, human rights, and security).
Although they sometimes enter into bilateral agreements with a view to their possible impact
on third parties, decision-makers generally find it difficult to keep in mind that the consequences
of any action go beyond the immediate protagonists (Jervis, 1997). Bilateral relations are never
strictly bilateral, first because they may depend on other actors (the decision to ally, for example,
is influenced by external factors) and second, because policies and events have ramifications that
go beyond the moment, the geographical area, and the actors at play (Jervis, 1997). Actors will
draw lessons from events to which they were not parties.
Nonlinearity begets unexpected consequences, even perverse effects.9 One knows when and at
what level international multilateral negotiation start, but not when and at what level they will end.
Arms control agreements may trigger new arms races and an increase in military budgets. To vouch
For Boudon (1977: 10), perverse effects are intrinsic to complex systems and inevitable. He conceives perverse
effects and emergence as basically equivalent, since they both refer to unexpected individual or collective outcomes
stemming from the juxtaposition of individual behavior. This conception is too broad, however, for effects are
“perverse” precisely because they go against initial objectives.
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to support a weaker ally in case of aggression may encourage it to adopt a less cooperative stand
in its disputes with neighboring states or in the face of internal dissent (Jervis, 1997).
This property also explains the importance decision-makers grant to reputation. To maintain the
credibility of their actions or outsmart their adversaries, they may hold two basic types of
reputation concurrently: a positive reputation of trustworthiness and a negative one of
unpredictability. In other cases, they can act to restore credibility, as in the case of Russia’s alliance
with Serbia in 1914, or of NATO after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Melian and Mytilenian
debates during the Peloponnesian war largely revolved around Athens’ reputation, in the eyes of
both its adversaries and allies. The repercussions of the 2020-2022 pandemic on the reputation of
the Great powers have led some analysts to reflect on the redistribution of power in the world,
including the viability of balancing and bandwagoning strategies.
Nonlinearity rests on the existence of feedback loops which “simply defined, means that the
outputs of a system at time t affect the inputs of that system at time t+1” (Carmichael and
Hadžikadić, 2019: 10). Feedbacks are “positive” when they amplify a deviation from equilibrium,
and “negative” when they tend to move the system back to equilibrium. Positive feedbacks lead to
exponential growth with disproportionate and often unpredictable effects. The security dilemma,
bandwagoning, or the domino theory illustrate positive feedback dynamics, whereas the balance
of power is an example of a negative feedback loop. Whereas negative feedback loops imply a
unique equilibrium, their positive counterpart can lead to a variety of equilibria that represent many
possible future states of the system.
Some feedback loops are predictable, others less so. In a complex system, we can only hope to
assign a probability to a range of feedbacks, not predict those that will eventually occur or when
they might do so. A traditional and mechanistic approach will try to use feedbacks to promote
policy objectives. While not eschewing these efforts, a complex systems approach will also assume
that such actions will have unintended consequences.
The usual concern for controlling positive feedbacks is rooted in two assumptions. One favors
stability, hence negative feedbacks, which overlooks the possibility that the latter may impede
adaptation. The other considers positive feedbacks as inherently destabilizing and hampering
collective action (as in the case of common pool resources). Yet “[p]ositive feedback isn’t always
negative” (Resnick, 1997: 134). The ecological transition relies on creating synergies (or positive
feedbacks) among sectoral policies and policy instruments. The diffusion of new values regarding
humans’ relationship to the natural world will, it is hoped, benefit from similar dynamics. Positive
feedbacks can also lead to the transformation of social systems (as in the emergence of religion,
capitalism, or the scientific method) (Morin, 2005).
2.1.4. Multiscalarity
In a complex system, entities are nested in sets of interrelated organizational levels.10 Each level
of complexity displays characteristics that both are specific to that domain of interaction and stem
As used in the context of complex systems, the term “hierarchy” simply refers to interacting strata or levels of
organization. “Multiscalarity”, “stratification”, and “nesting” better capture this idea: “a city-region is nested within
global and national systems and has nested neighborhoods, households, and individuals within it. Nesting is not
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from the level below it. Whereas conventional approaches describe systems at only one level of
organization (e.g., community, state, region, or global levels), but not at two levels simultaneously,
“complexity theory provides a framework in which the relationships between constructs at
different hierarchical levels can be accommodated (Irving Barber, 2014).
At any level of analysis, order is an emergent property of individual interactions at a lower level
of aggregation, rather than explained by causal drivers at the same level of analysis (Holland,
1988). For example, international coordination (or the lack thereof) among regimes begins at the
national level. Complex models ask how changes in the agents’ decision rules (through norm
diffusion, for example), the interconnections among agents, or the strategies that agents employ
produce different aggregate outcomes. Since each agent and each system is nested within other
systems, all evolving and interacting, a single entity cannot be understood without considering the
others. A liberal theory of foreign policy is conceived both as a function of domestic politics and
values and of the structural forces at the international level they themselves help shape. Likewise,
progress at the regional level may seep up to the global one (as when the EU disseminates its norms
among its trade partners).
Not all actors at the same level are equal. Some can enjoy privileges that are not shared by
actors of the same type: states may not be recognized by the UN; only some transnational nongovernmental organizations enjoy consultative status with ECOSOC. Actors that are equal de jure
may not be so de facto. If all states enjoy a formal equality of legal status conferred by the principle
of sovereignty, their capacity to influence the system differs (Lake, 2009). Some sort of authority
relationship can also exist between actors, insofar as some enable others to operate. For example,
business firms and NGOs are subject to laws adopted by states, beginning with the right of
association.
When examining multiscale networks, a useful distinction is between multiplex and
multilayered configurations. A multiplex configuration links each level to the next, for example,
the local, national, regional, and global levels. A multilayered configuration, on the other hand,
also includes links between levels that are not proximate to one another (for example, between the
local and the global). An IGO or transnational NGO has direct links to national governments, but
also to local NGOs, political authorities, or populations. Negotiations will often involve several
interrelated games with different players. Different sources of authority, actors, and questions, such
as security and environmental degradation, coexist and interact. For example, the security game
may involve mainly Great powers, whereas the economic, ethical, and environmental games will
involve a greater variety of actors in the context of different distributions of power. Multiple
hierarchies may coexist (Keohane and Nye, (1988).
In addition to multiscale governance at the regional level, notably in the EU context, recent IR
scholarship has seen a renewed interest in regionalism, hierarchy, and status. First, globalization
has induced a return of societies and, through them, of regions (Acharya (2014). The trend is
toward a bidirectional relation, both top-down and bottom-up, the importance of each depending
hierarchy. Determination runs in all possible directions, not just top down” (Byrne, 2005): 105). Hierarchy (a
positional notion based on the unequal distribution of a valued good) may or may not be associated with authority (a
political notion that implies deference and legitimacy; see also Pouliot (2021). Sovereign members of the UN, for
example, do not have authority over states that remain unrecognized by the organization.
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on the historical and political context of a specific issue. Regional organizations no longer act as
mere relays of what takes place at the universal level. They have become arenas where specific
approaches to global problems are articulated based on the sensitivities, experience, and modes of
cooperation of their members, where norms and practices converge, where common definitions of
problems are developed, and where solutions that reflect regional needs hatch. A regional
perspective links the movement toward the construction of a global political community around
norms and processes of governance that are more transnational than supranational and encourages
political dynamics that are also rooted in the concerns and perspectives of civil societies.
Beyond anarchy, the field of IR has also turned its attention toward hierarchical models of world
order (Lake, 2011; Kang, 2005). In this context, scholars have (i) studied how practices (notably
diplomatic) reinforce existing hierarchies (Pouliot, 2017); (ii) argued that this model historically
has been much more common than anarchy and the balance of power (Zarakol, 2010); and (iii)
examined its contemporary manifestations, with the US as principal rule-maker. According to Lake
(2011), for example, the world is largely hierarchical rather than anarchic, with variegated
hierarchies being produced and reproduced by the interactions of states themselves. Focusing on
the philosophical foundations for hierarchical thinking and practice in East Asia, other writers have
argued in favor of a Confucian approach to harmony based on stable hierarchies (contra balancing
or interdependence), either through its imperial form—the concept of Tianxa—or its tributary
avatar (Zhao, 2019; Qin, 2018; Acharya and Buzan, 2017; Kang, 2005),
Finally, and linked to the preceding, globalization, the aftermath of the end of the cold war, and
power transitions have renewed interest in the importance of status in world politics, particularly
regarding conflict (Renshon, 2017; Wohlforth, 2014; Lebow, 2010), and the definition of national
roles, responsibilities, and interests (Hansen-Magnusson and Antje Vetterlein, 2021; Larson and
Shevchenko, 2019; Murray, 2019; Clunan, 2014). Decisionmakers may care about status because
it confers privileges, strengthens self-esteem, and helps build identity (Götz, 2021).
2.1.5 Openness
Complex systems are open systems because they interact with their environment. However, though
defining the environment of sub-systems is relatively easy, conceiving the environment of the
global system is less obvious. If the whole globe is the system, then what could constitute its
environment?
Two options exist. A narrow definition of the international system reduces the system to the set
of sovereign states (e.g. Wight, 1977). In this perspective, the contemporary system would be
closed, since it is free of any external pressure, unlike historical systems such as ancient Greece
facing the Persian Empire, 17th century Europe confronted by the Ottoman Empire, or the Chinese
tributary system threatened by Western powers. But the notion of the system’s environment must
be understood more broadly. First, the interstate system and other actors must cope with various
authorities that are both allies and rivals. Second, the environment of a complex system is twofold: operational and cognitive (Sprout and Sprout, 1965). It can be conceived as distinct
ideational, technical, political, and economic environments that shape and are affected by the
global system, but also as the set of threats that it confronts, from the degradation of the
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environment to pandemics and various forms of terrorism (see also Mainville, 2016). The
boundary between the system and its environment is the product of the actors themselves.
2.2 Second order properties
Complex systems are worthy of investigation because of the dynamics they manifest. These
dynamics may not always be present or observable, but their possible occurrence and their
dimensions must inform our approach or the questions we are asking.
2.2.1 Path dependence
Path dependence means that the state of the system at time t is both a function of its state at time
t-1 and of the order of succession of prior states. This notion goes beyond that of dependence on
initial conditions of chaos theory. It refers to the future steps that previous decisions and actions
impose or make easier to follow. One can then speak of the weight of history, understood as the
impact of previous behavior (and not as the impact of historical analogies on the interpretation of
a given situation). Classic examples are ecosystems successions, computer keyboards, institutions
and organizations, production standards, or consumer items whose widespread adoption follows
positive feedbacks (the more widely a particular communication program is used, the greater the
likelihood of it being further adopted). Path dependence, however, can also be the product of
negative feedbacks, as when the inertia of institutions perpetuates deleterious behavior (Dryzek
and Pickering, 2019).
Policies that have demonstrably little impact endure; money keeps being invested in projects
burdened by cost overruns and various technical problems, even when the prospects of a successful
outcome are thin. Past decisions create vested interests, making it politically more challenging to
switch direction. In general, unless strong negative consequences have been observed, actors keep
to a specific strategy even in the absence of positive data linking it to the observed results. Because
of path dependence, the nature and interplay of current institutions are likely to shape future
governance. Although they may adapt, institutions embody norms, rely on techniques, and
represent political relations that prevailed at the time of their creation and largely inform
subsequent decision-making.
Path dependence may not always promote inertia. It can be used to force the system to evolve,
as expressed in the notion of spillover in neo-functionalist integration theory (Lindberg, 1963).
But it may also mean that a series of partial decisions, each of them sound and apparently
inconsequential for the system, can lead to an unexpected end-state. The progressive reduction of
the private sphere, the self-organization of global supply-chains, or the enlargements of the EU
and NATO illustrate those dynamics. Such “surprises” follow a series of separate and logical
decision points. One then must ask to what extent past decisions constrain future options. Path
dependence points to the importance of reflexivity, that is the learning capacity of institutions and
their ability to question their basic objectives and the fundamental premises of their actions
(Dryzeck and Pickering, 2019).
2.2.2 Self-organization
12
Although its meaning may appear straightforward, the treatment of this property in the literature
has been confusing. It is often wrongly equated with emergence and adaptation, or treated as a
necessary precusor of these properties. Self-organization is the tendency of agents in complex
systems to develop regularities in their interrelations in the absence of external control. In social
systems, agents self-organize to pursue a particular end. Self-organization is a response to
uncertainty and reflects the ability of the system to change its internal structure in order to interact
with its environment (Wells, 2009). Examples are human societies, regimes, concerts and clubs,
the Westphalian system, or the development of networks. Governance arrangements are a form of
self-organization based on a functional differentiation of tasks and policy instruments (Pattberg
and Widerberg, 2020). Self-organization can take place at different scales and in different locations
of the system. “Pockets of order” can develop in a system that is not self-organized as a whole.
Finally, the end is indeterminate: there is no tendency, for example, for the system to move along
a gradient from minimum to maximum organization.
The structure of international systems can follow various models: anarchy can give way to empires,
and empires fragment (Buzan and Little, 1994). Governance systems can be based on different
organizing principles, such as the market, networks, formal hierarchy, or the adoption of rules
aimed at reducing the uncertainty attached to the behavior of other actors (See Barnett, 2013;
Powell, 1990). Complex system harbor dual dynamics of fragmentation (the multiplication of
agents, the increased density of their relations, the emergence of new sources of authority and
legitimacy, for example), and a tendency toward centralization (such as the tendency of networks
to evolve toward a hub and spoke structure).11
From a processual viewpoint, self-organization and adaptation refer to related dynamics
(Kavalski, 2007; Rihani, 2002), since self-organization is a collective response to the nature of the
system and the evolution of its environment. From a teleological viewpoint, however, this response
is not necessarily adaptive. Self-organization may or may not facilitate goal attainment. Indeed,
although self-organization may be expected, the probability of any given form arising varies. As
Mitchell (2003: 442) underscores in the case of the global environment, neither scientific
consensus nor public mobilization is sufficient to generate a formal regime. Moreover, long-term
regularities can hide short-term irregularities. The constructed order, in the form of long-term
regularities in the interactions among agents, can be sub-optimal, dysfunctional, or unstable in the
short term. Self-organization can serve a widely shared goal, or it can run counter to certain
established norms, or make the achievement of a common goal more elusive (Boulton et al., 2015 :
17).
Most importantly, self-organized systems tend to evolve toward a critical stage beyond which
the behavior and future state of the system become more unpredictable. When catastrophes strike,
analysts typically blame some rare set of circumstances or some combination of powerful
mechanisms. But many “[l]arge interactive systems perpetually organize themselves to a critical
state in which minor events start a chain reaction that can lead to a catastrophe; complex systems
(such as the biosphere, the stock market, or an ecosystem) can break down not only under the force
of a mighty blow but also at the drop of a pin” (Bak and Chen, (1991: 46). The system evolves
even in the absence of exogenous shocks (Scheffer, 2009). Chesterton long anticipated what
conservation ecologists later learned: “All conservatism is based upon the idea that if you leave
11
See Rosenau (1990) on these parallel processes of aggregation and disaggregation.
13
things alone you leave them as they are. But you do not. If you leave a thing alone, you leave it to
a torrent of change.”12
2.2.3 Tipping points
A tipping point is a stage in the evolution of the system at which it morphs into a new state
(Prigogine, 1997)13. The past (that is, the previous states of the system) is no longer a guide to the
future which is itself structurally different. Tipping points can be the resultant of history or be
triggered by an external shock. Classic examples are the last straw on the camel’s back, the last
grain of sand before the heap collapses, the extinction of keystone species that precipitate the
degradation of an ecosystem, or the five big mass biodiversity extinctions in the history of the
Earth. The notion of planetary or critical boundaries (Steffen et al., 2015) is based on the putative
existence of tipping points beyond which the biosphere is likely to face chaotic dynamics with
catastrophic impacts on human societies. Finally, such bifurcations can occur at different scales,
from the global (the global distribution of power or the advent of capitalism, for example) to the
regional (a change from empire to anarchy), or the local one (such as the destruction of traditional
modes of governing the local commons by outside forces).
The metaphor is often used unsparingly. Tipping points should not be confused with turning
points or with crises. A turning point implies an inflection or a change of direction, but no
fundamental change in the nature of the units of the system, in the density of interconnections, or
in the basic rules that govern their relations. The diversification of supply chains following the
2020 pandemic, for example, represents a turning point in the structure of a globalized trading
system, not a fundamental transformation of globalization.14 A crisis refers to a perturbation or to
pressures on a system. It is not because a system is under heavy pressure or is becoming unstable
that it is about to tip. A system can also temporally overshoot its limits then return to equilibrium.
What may seem like a bifurcation at the time may later prove to have been a simple perturbation
which the system was able to absorb. The so-called “Arab springs,” if conceived as the call for
more open political systems which many commentators presented as tipping points, ended up
being more a temporary inflection (at best) than a transformation of these political systems. Many
Arab countries resisted successfully (Arab peninsula, Syria), others saw the advent of new
authoritarian regimes (Egypt, Tunisia), still others fell into chaos (Lybia).
Tipping points can be sudden or slow. Complexity analysts usually conceive tipping points as
moments when key units, their interactions, and the rules of the system change suddenly. In IR,
some may be easily identifiable (such as the fall of the Soviet empire in 1991), while others are
identified ex post facto, since they represent a lack of resilience of the system. Examples might be
the decision of the Hungarian authorities to open their border with Austria in September 1989, or
Mikhaïl Gorbatchev’s refusal to support the leader of East Germany, the following month, which
led to the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989, and the end of the Soviet Union two years
later.
For example, the approach to forest management has evolved from strict protection (avoiding major perturbations,
such as fires) to one based on conservation, which involves the introduction of controlled fires in order to facilitate
species regeneration and enhance the long-term robustness and diversity of the ecosystem.
13
Different disciplines will use different terms to denote similar dynamics. “Bifurcation” come from mathematics,
“critical threshold” from physics, and “phase transition” from chemistry. “Tipping point” is used more generically.
14
“Decoupling”, rather than “de-risking”, however, would represent a bifurcation of the system.
12
14
In other cases, the system bifurcates without any easily noticeable event that would represent a
deep break. There is no specific date of the industrial revolution, for example. For heuristic
purposes, one could a posteriori identify an event (such as the development of the printing press
in Europe around 1450, the treaty of Westphalia of 1648, the invention of the steam engine in 1769,
or the arrival of Commodore Perry in Tokyo Bay in 1853) that symbolizes system change through
the subsequent positive feedbacks it triggered. Buzan and Lawson (2014), for example, have
identified four long transition periods of the world system that represent profound transformations
not always evident at the time.
As concepts from complex system theory are picked up by dominant IR paradigms, the
identification of a single tipping point appears arbitrary and of little value. Realists, Liberals,
Marxist, and Constructivists will not point to the same events or sequences of events. For example,
whereas some will underline the ideological division of the international system after the French
or Russian revolution as a major evolution of the system, others will insist on the permanence of
power politics among the Great powers. One, therefore, should avoid characterizing tipping points
based on specific paradigms, as if the latter were describing the complexity of the system. For
example, to conclude that the 2020-2022 Covid-19 pandemic or the Russo-Ukrainian war of 2022
represent tipping points, rather than crises or turning points, is highly speculative. What should the
complexity analyst look for, then? A few concomitant developments indicative of a transformation
of the system might include:
- an increase in the frequency of perturbations (such as violations of existing norms, especially
by those states that have promoted them, or recurring challenges to the existing hierarchy), and a
return to a previous stable state that is increasingly difficult or costly;
- new definitions of the nature of the problems or of the challenges that both the system and the
units face;
- the emergence or involvement of new actors;
- changes in the rules (formal and informal) governing relationships among all actors, which
includes the dissemination and adoption of new norms;
- a questioning of the doxa and the emergence of new conceptions of how the world does or
should work.
2.2.4 Stability
Understanding the nature and determinants of system stability matters for predictability purposes.
There is some confusion in the literature over the notion of stability in complex systems and how
it should apply to social systems, however. This confusion has four sources. First, different
disciplines hold distinct notions of stability. Second, the assumption of self-similarity common in
natural sciences — the idea that the same rules apply at different levels of the system — does not
apply to social systems. It then may make more sense to view a complex system as a system
without a true equilibrium, only attractors,15 and composed of subsystems that may tend to a quasiequilibrium. Third, the meaning of stability is tied to its socio-political context. For example, it
may mean resilience in polyarchic systems and robustness in authoritarian systems where power
An attractor refers to patterned behavior toward which systems tend to evolve (such as concerts of great powers,
or the emergence of clubs).
15
15
is centralized. Fourth, confusion also simply stems from incompatibilities between vernacular and
scientific use of the term.
As a generic terms, stability can refer at least to four distinct behaviors of the system:
robustness, constancy, resilience, and cyclical stability. Robustness is the capacity to resist
disruptive events, such as the capacity of the banking system to resist the 2008 financial crisis.16
Constancy, on the other hand, is a lack of significant change in the fundamental parameters of the
system; it is equivalent to true equilibrium. In IR, stability has thus been defined as the absence of
large-scale wars combined with the persistence of existing units and of a given distribution of
power (Waltz, 1979; Deutsch and Singer, 1964), or as the maintenance of the essential rules
governing interstate relations (Keohane, 1984), such as the sovereignty principle or free trade.
Constancy is thus understood narrowly as the maintenance of the status quo with respect to the
nature of the units, their relations, and the rules of the system. Likewise, governance usually refers
to the development of stable, formal, or informal, rules that shape relationships among agents. A
state of equilibrium is a situation where no agent has an incentive to change those rules, and system
stability then is defined as the maintenance of these rules over time in the face of endogenous or
exogenous disruptions. The system may not be stable even when agents do not seek to change the
rules, however.
For its part, resilience can be addressed in two ways. In a narrow sense, it is equivalent to
homeostasis, that is the capacity to return to a previous equilibrium. It then corresponds to the
elasticity of the system, that is, the range of fluctuations within which the main characteristics of
the system (nature of units, distribution of capabilities, relations, and rules) endure. This is how
Kaplan approached it, following classical mechanics (Kaplan, 1964).
It should be conceived more broadly, however. In ecology, resilience is the capacity not only
to persist over time, but also to adapt (Adger, 2017). Ecological resilience, therefore, is
evolutionary: it rejects the existence of a unique equilibrium. In a system, the nature of the units
and even the distribution of capabilities can change, but not the basic structure or the functions of
the system; the system maintains its identity even when it evolves (Mainville, 2016). The notion
of resilience, therefore, is not simply the ability to resist external shocks, or to bounce-back after
a disturbance (Chandler, 2014). Its essence is the maintenance of basic properties and functions
over time, and the development of new ones that make adaptation more likely (such as the
generation of new stable rules). This implies the existence of multiple attractors: the system can
be resilient while moving from one attractor (or quasi-equilibrium) to another (See also Bourbeau,
2018; Folke, 2016). Resilience then becomes a form of adaptation.17 One should also keep in mind
that though it may be valued positively from a systemic perspective, resilience may not be so
viewed from a social or IR perspective (Bourbeau, 2018), depending on one’s normative
preferences (for example, the resilience of the capitalist system is not valued positively by
Marxists).
For a general discussion of the robustness of complex systems, see Page (2010).
As illustrated by the definition of resilience as “the process of patterned adjustments adopted in the face of
endogenous or exogenous shocks, to maintain, to marginally modify, or to transform a referent object” (Bourbeau,
2018: 3).
16
17
16
Finally, cyclical stability refers to regular fluctuations of the system through a recurrent series
of distinct states. The system self-organizes to a tipping point which then leads to a return to the
initial rather than to the previous state of the system; successive instabilities hide long-term
stability. In ecology, it is illustrated by the predator-prey model or the notion of ecological
succession; in IR, it is Modelski’s (1987) long cycles theory; in economics, Kondratieff’s cycles.
This is also where the debate regarding the relationship between diversity and stability comes in.
In ecology, that debate has lasted for more than half a century and, although, the matter is not yet
fully settled, a consensus has emerged around the existence of a positive relationship. Political
philosophers have also argued similarly in the case of the stability of political institutions in
polyarchic systems (Huntington, 1968: 19-20). A composite system (that is composed of agents of
different types) linked by multiple connections would be more stable, which goes against the idea
that nonlinearity generates instability. Nonlinearity and stability (understood as the maintenance
of key populations of agents over time and their relations) are not necessarily antinomic. The
assumption that the number of interactions among key units is positively related to stability
(understood mainly as constancy) underlies arguments in favor of multipolarity in the IR literature
(see Rosecrance, 1966:.317). The literature on global governance now also tends to nuance the
traditional perspective that sees institutional fragmentation as inherently negative.
2.2.5 Emergence
Emergence has long been studied by philosophers and later by scientists (Gibb, et al., 2019). Even
though it often is considered a core (first order) property of complex systems, it is viewed here as
a second order (but no less important) property, because systems conceivably can be complex in
the absence of an identifiable emergent phenomenon. This concept is also beset with confusion, as
there is no common definition of it across or even within disciplines.
Fundamentally, emergence refers to the arising of new, unexpected structures, patterns,
properties, or processes in a self-organizing system (Wells, 2009; Jervis, 1997). Usually referred
to as “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts,” this expression is misleading for the sum is
not just greater but different (Jervis, 1997). Although the emergent property would not exist
without them, what is observed cannot be deduced a priori from the behavior or the attributes of
the units of the system. Classic examples include the taste of sugar, the social organization of some
insect colonies, or human consciousness. Regimes are examples of self-organization, but
polycentric governance, democratic peace,18 industrialization, colonization, globalization, or
sustainable development may be conceived as emergent properties of interactions between agents
and structure.
Emergent properties, therefore, stem from interconnections and not simply from the nature and
behavior of actors and institutions. International orders also emerge from practices. In social
systems, emergence arises from feedback mechanisms: the system molds the preferences and
constrains the behavior of the agents. What emerges is thus totally due to lower levels of
If one assumes that liberal democracies are ontologically more peaceful, then this phenomenon would be closer to
self-organization than to emergence. In fact, we know that is not the case. In these conditions, the existence of a
democratic peace understood as the occurrence of the Kantian triangle of trade, political regime, and international
institutions, becomes an emergent property of the system. On the Kantian tripod, see Russett and Oneal (2001).
18
17
organization and totally new. The market is a classic illustration of these dynamics, where the
common good is a function of selfish individual behavior. Likewise, Waltz uses the analogy of
macroeconomic theory to explain how his structural approach does not rely on a theory of foreign
policy (Waltz, 1979: 70). Knowing the units is not enough and sometimes not necessary in order to
predict the future state of a system.19
Several authors (e.g. Winston, 2023; Carmichael and Hadžikadić, 2019) equate selforganization with emergence. These two properties, however, are conceptually different (De Wolf
and Holvoet, 2004). Emergence is macro-level behavior that is novel (unpredictable) with respect
to the attributes or preferences of the agents, whereas self-organization refers to the development
of specific regularities in the relations among agents in order to reduce uncertainty. In the case of
emergence, there is no assumption of a predetermined end point, which would be contrary to a
complex system perspective. Moreover, self-organization does not automatically lead to
emergence, and emergence may arise without prior self-organization (such as crowd behavior in
social psychology). Whereas self-organization is a structural property of the system (referring to a
specific set of relations), emergence is a functional one (referring to the functions that the system
performs, such as economic growth, effective governance, or conflict).
Beyond the notion of world order,20 what constitutes an emergent property of the international
system is not obvious. Are regional organizations examples of self-organization or, as Wagner
would have it, of emergence? (Wagner, 2026: 92)). Probably both, depending on their purpose and
degree of autonomy. Administrative unions for example, are examples of self-organization; but the
more an IGO develops some autonomy, the closer it may represent an emergent phenomenon. As
carriers and producers of norms and services, regional organizations can help build a common
identity through the development of an “imagined community” (Adler, 1997). While stemming
from a process of self-organization, norms may be interpreted and used in such ways that new and
unintended types of relationships emerge among actors.” (see Winston, 2023). Likewise, whether
governance is an example of self-organization or emergence depends on whether one has in mind
“governance” as an output (the arrangements put in place to pursue a common goal) and
governance as an outcome (the results of these attempts). The global governance of a given issuearea does not simply emerge from norms, rules, and procedures edicted at the global level, but also
from the relationships within a regime “complex” and across levels (regions, states, communities,
networks), as well as from feedbacks between structure and agency. New networks among the
governance systems of multilateral environmental agreements could be approached from this
perspective, with emergence at the subsystem level leading to emergence at the system level.
2.2.6
Adaptation
Finally, a complex adaptive system, traditionally, has been defined as a system that has the capacity
to learn from and adapt to its environment. But adaptation is not just about coping with the
environment. It can also involve transforming it to maintain the capacity to pursue fundamental
Though the behavior or state of a given unit at time t+1 is not predictable, the state of the system might be. For
example, when water heats up, one can predict the gaseous state of the system without knowing the behavior of
individual molecules.
20
For example, many aspects and properties of complex systems characterize the post-liberal western world order that
Acharya (2017).
19
18
goals. This capacity is intrinsic, but its fulfillment depends, of course, on a variety of conditions,
including agents’ learning capacities.
The dominant perspective, rooted in agent-based modelling and evolutionary biology, is to
make the agent the primary unit of evolution. Only if agents adapt, then, can the system be
“adaptive” (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000). Governance systems are composed of organizations that
attempt to reduce the uncertainty attached to their access to the resources on which they depend.
Even if all agents hold convergent wishes regarding the state of the system, each agent or class of
agents will pursue it differently, depending on their resources and internal dynamics. Examples of
adaptation exist in each class of IR actors. As autonomous agents, IGOs have sometimes proven
capable of adaptation through changes in their goals, norms, rules, operation, technology,
membership, or structure. Business also provides a good illustration of this adaptation. From an
opponent, the private sector has gradually become a major partner in the development of a global
governance of the environment, for example. Adaptive capacity is thus an attribute of the agent,
and adaptation the outcome of their actions mediated by the system which does not adapt but
simply evolves. But even if the agents are successful in their individual adaptation, by no means
can we infer that the global performance of the system will tend to cooperation and effectiveness.
Thus, however fecund this unit-based traditional perspective may be, another approach should be
considered that again mirrors debates in the biological sciences.
“[S]ystem-level adaptation is when a group of agents changes in a correlated way, reacting
holistically to the environment” (Carmichael and Hadžikadić, 2019: 10)”. The behavior of a group
may change even though each component of this group has not adapted its behavioral rule to the
environmental perturbation. For example, a flock of birds can adapt to avoid a predator, even
though no individual bird has changed how it reacts to its neighbor or to a predator. Agents react
collectively to their environment through various dynamics (Ibid.).
Agent-based modelling is but one approach of complexity theory. Instead of looking at the
institutional evolution of the governance system as the result of variation and selection at the unit
level, one emphasizes the relationships among these units and the functions that the system
performs. In ecology, what survives is not the single species, but the ecology or community of
flora and fauna that are adapted to the prevailing conditions (Boulton et al., 2015 ). In
anthropology, it is the function it performs, not the rite, the tradition, or the specific taboo that
matters. In IR, one might loosely adapt two concepts from ecology to illustrate this perspective:
fitness and co-evolution.
The notion of “fitness” in ecology, that is, the optimal use of resources by a species, traditionally
applies to the agent. As such, it has been transposed to international organizations (Abbott et al.,
2016). But analysts have also extended the meaning of “fitness” to issue areas to denote a
governance system that fits the properties of the system it aims to address. In the case of global
environmental governance, it can refer to a governance system (the regime itself and the variety
of actors involved in its construction and implementation) that takes both the biophysical and the
social dimensions of the system into account, or, more generally, the fit between the governance
system and the nature of the problem (Young, 2022). Co-evolution refers to a process of reciprocal
evolutionary change that occurs between species and fosters co-dependence. In IR it may be
illustrated by institutional and policy diffusion (Papin, 2020), various forms of private governance,
19
stakeholder participation, the construction of policy networks, interactions among regions, or by
the dynamics of regime complexes.
Adaptation faces numerous challenges. Beyond developing learning capacities or selecting and
implementing specific strategies of adaptation, two traps deserve mentioning. First, at the level of
the system, is the risk of being trapped in a local maximum (Elster, 1989: 71, when there exists a
global maximum, which, however, could only be attained after passing through what would be
perceived as regression, from a goal-attainment or political perspective. A second trap, more at the
level of the unit, is reaching an adaptative dead-end, that is the conscious or unconscious selection
of a strategy of hyper-specialization that translates into hyper-dependence, with the concomitant
risk to the unit as environmental conditions change or access to basic resources is threatened. There
are easy parallels to be made with a centralized structure of international trade (Keohane and Nye,
1988). This illustrates the dilemma (or trade-off) between exploitation (maximize fitness) and
exploration (maintain a diversity of options (March, 1991).
3. Thinking complexity
A complex systems approach cannot predict the evolution of the international order globally or in
specific issue-areas, but it can help identify potential scenarios, assess the dimensions and
manifestations of possible dynamics, and develop policies to take advantage of them. It is a
method, a way of thinking about the world with practical implications (Morin, 2005). A complex
system approach invites us to revisit basic IR concepts (such as power, cooperation, order, stability,
governance, multilateralism, regimes, interdependence, identity) and our approach to the major
instruments that actors use in their relations (diplomatic, military, economic, ideational). This third
part briefly illustrates how complexity reshapes approaches to multilateralism and governance.
3.2 Toward complex multilateralism
Multilateralism strengthens and regulates the complexity of the system. The forms it takes,
however, must reflect the complex nature of the system. It means, inter alia, (i) accepting that
multilateralism is an instrument of governance whose legitimacy is not limited to the universalism
and formal equality embodied by the UN system; (ii) providing modes of representation and
communication to a variety of actors and not just to states, in order to found the stability and
adaptation of the system on the qualitative increase of transnational networks; and (iii) reflecting
an interaction model illustrated by the web-like structure of the system and multiple-level games,
rather than a billiard ball models and simple one-level games.
The current travails of multilateralism do not stem solely from a return to unilateralism on the
part of one Great power or from a resurgence of raw nationalism in several countries. They are
also a manifestation of the gap between the evolution of the international system and traditional
conceptions of multilateralism. Questioning the usefulness of some UN gatherings, prevailing
practices, or the existing rules of multilateralism is not questioning multilateralism itself. The
current situation sees competition and experimentation of different modes of multilateral
governance with a view to increase flexibility and effectiveness while reflecting the uncertainties
20
that societies face, the diversity of the issues at play, and the decentralization of power and
authority in the system.
In a complex perspective, the role of universal IGOs, for example, is moving from norm setting
and regulation to coordination, harmonization, and orchestration (Hale and Roger, 2014; Abbott
et al., 2011). IGOs find themselves at the center of networks of actors of various types that flow
through them, that they often help create, and which they associate to the governance of a given
issue-area, thereby establishing a system of transnational governance (Abbott and Snidal, 2010).
They become catalysts of actions undertaken by other actors, forums of harmonization of
developments that took place elsewhere, and hubs of information, rather than central regulating
operators within a hierarchical authority system. To be sure, some scholars would like their
functions to be “to construct the social world in which cooperation and choice take place and to
help define the interests that states and other actors come to hold” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004:
162), which they would carry through intellectual leadership and by setting and monitoring
objectives (such as development targets). Current dynamics point to another direction, however.
These functions may result from networks operating through them, or from other levels of
governance (such as the regional level), or be performed by different types of intergovernmental
arrangements (concerts, boundary-organizations or issue-specific and mission-oriented
organizations).
States, for example, form concerts on a pragmatic basis as alternate governance institutions
(Meerts, 2019). Their legitimacy relies more on outputs and outcomes than on inputs and
processes. This development does not negate considerations of justice. In such a system, equity
resides not only in the characteristics and operation of a single multilateral forum (such as the G7),
but in the plurality of existing multilateral fora and, consequently, in the capacity of the system as
a whole to give a voice to actors and stakeholders. Accountability is no longer centralized (around
a single organization or form of multilateral forum) but shared.
Through the study of four cases (the internet, genetically modified organisms, intellectual
property rights and public health), Drezner has shown why concerts are a necessary and sufficient
condition for effective global governance (Drezner, 2007). Beyond states’ actions, he also
considers the role of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and domestic
actors. Studies of the G7 and G20 have highlighted the more conclusive contributions of concert
governance and small group negotiation over the UN with respect to leadership and commitments
to clean energy and addressing climate change, thanks to the limited number of participants, greater
political cohesion, status recognition, and direct political control (Kirton and Kokotsis, 2015).
Likewise, the region is where local needs are expressed, interests reconciled, and a common
future outlined according to distinct modes of dialogue and cooperation, in opposition to a
disembodied and homogeneous universal policy space. Although global challenges and
globalization encourage a convergence of norms, they also give rise to a reaffirmation of local and
regional identities. In a context where uncertainty and surprises dominate, regions can become
laboratories of a new forms of governance at the global level (Bäckstrand (2008). Acharya has
elaborated on this perspective with the notion of “pluralistic universalism” that emphasizes the
need to formulate, understand, respect, and exploit the existing diversity of multilateralism rooted,
in part, in regional specificities and differences in political cultures (Acharya, 2014).
21
Finally, the proliferation of international organizations or multilateral arrangements has often
been seen as a problem to be overcome, and the notion of interplay among institutions (be they
individual organizations or regimes) has spawned an active scholarship based on the assumption
that the resultant fragmentation of authority is basically dysfunctional (Oberthür and Stokke,
2011). From the viewpoint of regime complexes, however, the densification of IGOs, can have
both negative (such as turf battles, a failure to coordinate efforts, an apparent waste of resources)
and positive effects (an increase in resource mobilization, greater inclusiveness, greater resilience,
or experimentation) (see Alter and Meunier, 2009; Harrison, 2006).
3.3. Classical vs complex global governance
The question of governing complex systems (that is devising and implementing stable rules
governing the relations among the agents of the system to pursue a common goal while keeping
the system resilient) has raised considerable interest (Harrison and Geyer, 2022; Orsini and Le
Prestre, 2020; Haas and Western, 2020; Young, 2017.) How should we approach governance in
the context of complexity approaches that emphasize unpredictability and absence of central
control, and fail to provide clear and simple precepts?
The main challenge is to pursue a double objective: stability (including robustness and
resilience) and adaptation (the construction of new interconnections, the inclusion of new actors,
the development of new forms of self-organization that may widen the range of potential future
definitions of the common good). A complex systems approach stresses that all knowledge is
contextual, which contrasts with the trend to set governance rules which quickly become universal
precepts, generating a doxa whose application without considering geography, cultures, social
systems, or historical periods, can only disappoint. Thus, identifying broad principles of
governance would seem antithetical to a complex approach. Nevertheless, one can usefully glean
from the literature a few reminders of what adopting a complex approach to governance entails.
Most are well-known and stem from the previous discussion of the various properties of the
system. Several appear banal yet remain largely outside prevalent modes of thought. The task is to
build a bi-directional (top-down and bottom-up) and transnational governance system based on the
properties of the system. In short, complex governance…
-
recognizes that pockets of order can exist within a generally unpredictable system. The
classical approach can be useful for certain issue areas, or among a given sub-set of actors, or
at certain times, or in specific locations. One of the great challenges of global governance is
precisely “[i]dentifying the more stable/orderly parts and less stable/disorderly parts of a
system and applying appropriate methods and meanings to them…” (Harrison and Geyer; 2022:
197);
-
starts with different questions. A complex systems approach demands that we first ask
ourselves “What is related to what and how?”, before acting on those interconnections that
stabilize or destabilize the system, and hinder or foster the pursuit of common goals;
-
integrates the certainty of surprises induced by feedbacks and nonlinearity. Self-organization
dynamics tend toward criticality. If you wish to conserve, do not leave things as they are. The
22
challenge is to acquire monitoring capacities and consider unexpected events as parts of the
normal dynamics of the system (Chandler, 2021). The goal is learning and resilience. Problems
are not avoided or solved but managed, since any action once performed escapes its originator
and enters into multiple sets of interactions that will affect its initial purpose (Morin, 2005);
-
uses the complexity of the system to one’s advantage instead of trying to simplify and control
it (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000). Governance is not about controlling but steering. The apt
metaphor is sailing. Sailors do control the sea, the winds, or the currents, nor are they always
aware of shallows and dangerous reefs. Yet, they will try to avoid the latter and use those
physical elements to reach their destination. And sometimes, storms may take the boat to new
and promising lands. Using the properties of the system to one’s advantage implies playing
with feedbacks, encouraging variations that allow the identification of possible scenarios and
options, and straying from path dependence that slows adaptation and experimentation.
Globalization, for example, is both a straitjacket and the source of new opportunities of action.
In this regard, networks play a key role, both vertically, as they act at various governance levels,
and horizontally, by linking issues, promoting learning, and enabling political coalitions among
states, organizations, and regions. New forms of collaborations between various types of
authorities (public, private and market) have induced a multiplicity of decentralized
governance strategies (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006), although with “uncertain accountability
mechanisms” (Dubash and Florini, 2011);
-
recognizes the importance of the actors’ relative position in the system in the assessment of
their power and in their definition of their role and interests (Zhao, 2019; Lake, 2009). The
governance of complex systems cannot rely on the illusory centralization of authority; rather
it attempts to reconcile the quest for status and the need to harmonize aspirations and
capabilities in the pursuit of a common goal;
-
remembers that policy is about trade-offs21 and that a problem is never solved, it is merely
displaced (Dryzek,1987). A good policy keeps future options open (as illustrated by the
precautionary principle);
-
integrates the history of the evolution of the system into the development of governance
strategies. For example, how does path dependence prevent the adoption of new and better
policies?
-
develops interconnections to reinforce resilience, learning, and adaptation. Diversity fosters
stability and adaptation;
-
acts at several governance levels or in different areas simultaneously. One cannot act only at
one location of the system or rely on a single set of policy measures (Jervis, 1997). To act
locally is also to act on the system. The global level is no substitute for the local level, or the
For example, between order and justice, autonomy and adaptation, exploitation and exploration (March, 1991),
cooperation and competition or accountability and effectiveness (Jessop, 1997).
21
23
global-local link for the national-local one. What is “true” at one level may not be at other
levels: local truths can be global errors, and conversely;22
-
fosters experimentation (with provisions for collective learning), given high uncertainties, the
decentralization of power and authority, and the contextual nature of problem definition;
-
reflects on the conditions for effective polycentric governance, such as norms that foster
legitimacy, transparency, and accountability; practices; learning; and the nature of the
underlying order (Scholte, 2021).
3
Conclusion
Even though, in 2005 Byrne claimed that “[c]omplexity is an idea whose time has come” and
Kavalski, two years later, announced the emergence of a new paradigm (Byrne, 2005; Kavalski,
2007), the discipline appears to have preferred a straight road. In reality, the field of IR de facto
has entered the age of complexity. Complexity theory is scattered around the scholarly literature
in numerous research strands that need be reassembled into a coherent whole, such as transnational
neo-pluralism, polycentric governance, agent-structure models, regime complexes, network
theory, agent-based models, multiscalar governance, or relational theory. In addition, it permeates
much of the current literature that uses concepts associated with theoretical ecology such as
populations dynamics, fitness, niches, adaptation, competition for access to resources, unintended
or perverse consequences, path dependence, co-evolution, keystone actors, cyclical stability,
resilience, or the relationship between diversity, stability, and adaptation. The challenge remains
of developing an intersubjective agreement on the nature and implications of the properties of
complex IR systems.
Indeed, although basic concepts from other paradigms are also polysemous and contested and
their resultant policy prescriptions contradictory, for the partial theories that form the substrate of
a complex approach to IR to coalesce into a full research program, there must be agreement on
how these properties are both understood and applied to the object of study. For some properties,
the matter is more one of observing their manifestations and drawing propositions from them. In
other cases, the need to agree more precisely on what is meant is more acute. In all cases, beyond
the examination of the nature, manifestations, and impact of given properties, scholars will also
have to study how these properties interact, and with what consequences, and, above all, reflect on
new ones that could be inferred from convergent studies of complex IR dynamics.
Competing interests: The author declares none.
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