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1 shall argue in this essay that there is much wrong with speciesism: ί shall begin by
examining the arguments made in defence of strong speciesism by Cohcn and Grg
evaluaiing them with reference to Steinbock, Graft, and Lafollette and Shanks, before moving
on to the arguments made by Holland in deilnce of weak speciesism, and evaluating them
with reference to Kaufman. I shall 1se the conclusion to tie together and fUrther develop the
evaluative remarks made throughout the essay. According to Singer, the speciesist believes
that it is ijustifiable, to give ‘preference to beings' on the basis of their membership of a
certain species (Singer, 2006、p.3). The strong speciesistjustifies Piscrimination or
exploitation' (Ryder, 1998, p.320) on the basis of"species membership alone' (Horta, 2010,
p.4), whereas the weak speciesistjustifies it on the basis that humans have 'certain
characteristics' that make 'moral consideration appropriate', and that nonhuman animals lack
(Holland,i984,p.284). 専2
Cohen argues that animals 'have no rights', because rights are 'claims' or ‘potential claims'
within a 'commιmity of moral agents' (Cohen, 1986, p.94). The existence ofrights requires
that they can be 'intelligibly defDnded' by beings who have 1he capacity to 'make moral
claims against one another': humans can satisfy these requirements because they are ‘morally
autonomous' and can understand 'rules of duty、and Teggnise possible confHct between
what is in theirown interest' and 'what is just', but animals lack this capacity for 'fYee moral
judgement' (Cohen, 1986. p.95). Gray argues that the empathy we feel for other human
beings is an ،extension' ofthe、genetically based concerns' that we 'f3el forkin'. Morality is
based on a 'biological' foundation, and ifwe act in Congmity with this foundation then we
value the lives ofmembers of our own species above those of other species. This fact not
only entitles us to prioritise the con81^ns of the human species, but gives us a、special duty' to
،members of our own species' that allows us tojustify discrimination against other species
(Gray,1990, p.23). |
■3
Cohen's argument is unpersuasive: 'the fact that an entity does not have rights' does not
mean that its interests 'count for less', or that we arejustificd in discriminating against it
(Steinbock, 1978, p.250). Our behaviour towards others is influenced by factors other than a
concern for their rights: the reason we refrain from assaulting others is not because it
'infringes' theirrights, but because we know that it 'hurts' them. The question is not ‘Can
they reason?', nor ‘Can they talk?、，but 'Can they su∏erγ,: we know that animals can suffer,
so the question ofrights is irrelevant (Bentham, 2000, p.l44). Furthennore, 'infants' and the
'mentally defective' are incapable ofmaking 'moral daims against one another', but this
obviously does not mean that we treat them in ways in which、it would not be permissible to
treat right-bearers'. Gray's argument is also unconvincing:just because something is namral
does not mean that it is 'unavoidable' (Lafollette and Shanks, 1996, p.44). We also have
、biological tendencies towards aggression', but we certainly do not 'encourage, praise, or
morally sanctify՛ this particular tendency. The very fact that non-speciesists exist proves 1hat
speciesism 'cannot be natural' in the 'strong nomological sense': we have the power to resist
our natural impulses, so we cannot use them as an excuse to discriminate against other
species that are also capable of suffering.
⅛4
A fUrther objection to LOhen and Gray's arguments comes from Graft: species is a
'problematic concept', one that is difficult to define (Graft, 1997, p.109). The strong
speciesist requires a species conceptwith clearly delineated boundaries between species to
fhcilitate moral discrimination, but the reality is that these kinds of species concept — of
which 'typism' might be considered an example —
—are plagued by 'arbitrariness'. With
typism for example, a 'broad partitioning' ofthe 'properties' that a group must possess in
order 1O be considered a species could lead to a massive 'extension ofmorality', such as if we
only distinguished 'animak from non-animals'. Conversely, a ،fine partitioning' could lead to
a 'restriction of morality', such as if we included 'skin cobur' among our criteria and thus
restricted morality to a 'single human "race'" (Graft, 1997, ρ.l 10). The speciesist might
argue that these arguments are 'irrelevant' (Graft 1997, p.116), because we 'know which
creatures are human”，but the fact is that over Molutionary time scales' human beings are
'virtually infants'. Ifhumans 8me to survive over ςevolutionari!y significanttime spans'.
natural 'varEbility' and selection could gradually create new species within the original
human species, or at the very least make it more difficult to define what a human is: the
definition of the human species is 'contingent' rather than absolute, and the concept of
species is thus unsuited to supporting a "generalisable, strong speciesist morality' (Graft,
1997, p,108).
Ü
Holland argues that a weak speciesism - based on the idea that morally relevant
characteristics are present to a 'significantly greater extent' in humans —
—allows the
speciesist to take a Faturalistic' approach, and to incorporate the evolutEnary and scientific
points that Graft raised (Holland, 1984, p.284). Holland believes thatweak speciesism can
accommodate the fact that 'the determinants of a species are not clearly established‘： Holland
recognises that the 'morally significant gap' between 'humans and other species' is partially
based on 'empirically open questions', and that a consequence of this is that the Evolutionary
affinities' between humans and other species require that some ofthe 'moral significance‘
attached to humans will be shared with other species (Holland, 1984, p.285). Holl&1d also
argues that the existence of‰deficient humans' (Holland, 1984, p.283)is not problematic for
the weak speciesist: even though deficient humans and nonhuman animals are 'alike' in that
they 'lack' the ñdl range ofmorally relevant characteristics that a noπnal human is endowed
with, the case ofthe deRcient humans is FiffbrenV, because they have been krobbed,.
Nonhuman animals never had the potential to achieve the moral status of normal humans,
while as deRcient humans had this moral stams stolen from them.
3
Holland's point regarding deficient humans is unconvincing: arguing that 'misfbrtune' is
morally 'signihcand (Kaufo1an, 1998, p.l60) is oMy possible when the action in question
will 'exploit、or 'take advantage、ofthat misfbrtune, but even then, one can still ask why
expbiting a misfbrtune is morally wrong. The answer suld not be that 'misfortune makes
one defbnceless' (Kaufinan, 1998, ρ.l61), because deficient humans and nonhuman animals
are 'both equally defEnceless' by virtue ofthe1r shared 'in^ationality'. While it is true that the
ibationality of a deficient human being is a 'misfortune' and the Fog's irrationality is not',
they are both、equally vu^erable': misfbrtune is 'inelevant' when the action in question
involves 'exploiting a shared vulnerability'. It is true that a Pue regard for misfortune| would
prevent one from doing certain Ihings to de^cient humans that it would be perfectly
acceptable to do to nonhuman animals, such as enticing them to perf”m circus tricks, but if
this 'due regard Srmisfbnune' (Kaufhian, 1998. p.l62) prevents us from discriminating
against deficient human beings, then a 'due regard fbrvulnerability' should prevent us from
discriminating against nonhuman animals.
φ7
It is clear that Cohen fails tojustify strong speciesism on the basis that animals do not have
rights, and that Gray fhils to provide a compelling reason to simply abide by our supposed
natural inclination towards species-based discrimination, but Holland also sails, because he
cannot provide a coherent explanation for why а weak speciesism — one that is based on the
presence of morally relevant characteristics —
—should insist on giving deficient humans
preferential treatment to nonhuman animals, even when we know that they do not possess a
greater level of morally relevant characteristics than these nonhuman animals. In fact, the
only element ofHolland's sρeciesism that is actually speciesist is the element concerning
deficient humans, aside from this, one does not have to be a speciesist to believe that certain
'contingent facts, about human beings may grant them greater 'moral significance'. As
Lafollette and Shanks point out, even if it is the case that the 'dif^rences between humans
and nonhuman animals' are ‘morally relevant', the resulting 'diference in treatment' is not
justified on the basis ofhumans belonging to a d^erent species, but on the basis ofhumans
possessing、morally relevant characteristics' (Lafollette and Shanks, 1996, ρ.45): the only
element of weak speciesism that is actually speciesist has been shown to be untenable, and
the remaining elements simply do not constitute a speciesist approach. Having rebutted the
arguments of Cohen and Gray, and having addressed this final concern, it is fair to conclude
that there is much wrong with speciesism.
里風
Bentham, Jeremy, 1823. An Introduction to the Principles of Morais and Legislation Vol.2
(London:
W. Pickering).
Cohen, Carl, 2009, 'Why Animals Have No Rights', in Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring
Ethics: An
Introductory Anthology (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 94-100.
Graft, Donald* 1997 'Against Strong Speciesism', Joumal of Applied Philosophy, V01.14,
No.2,
107-118
Gray, J.A., 1990 'In DefEnce of Speciesism', Behavioural and Brain Sciences, V01.13, No.l,
22-23
Holland, Alan J., 1984 'On Behalf of Moderate Speciesism', Journal of Applied Philosophy,
Vol.l,
No.2, 281-291
Horta, Oscar, 2010 'What is Speciesism?', Joumal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics,
Vol.23,No.3,243-266
Kauflnan, Frederik, 1998 'Speciesism and the Argument from Misfbnune', Vol.l5, No.2,
155-163
Lafollette| Hugh and Shanks, Niall, 1996 'The Origin of Speciesism', Philosophy, Vol.71,
No.275,
41-61
Ryder, Richard Dudley, 1998, The Political Animal: The Conquest of Speciesism (Jeffbrson:
McFarland and Co. Inc.).
Singer. Peter, 2006, In Defence ofAnimals: The Second Wave (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing Ltd).
Steinbock, Bonnie, 1978 "Speciesism and the Idea ofEquality', Philosophy, Vol.53| No.204,
247-256
s there anything wrong with 'speciesism'?
GRADEMARK REPORT
GENERAL COMMENTS
FINALGRADE
Instructor
©
This is an excellent essay. You make some
powerful criticisms of the notion ofspeciesism, and
draw some important distinctions along the way.
You address the topic at hand in an explicit yet very
8ncise mannerth2ughout, and present a sgent
overall argument. You display a sound knowledge
and understanding ofvarious articulations of
speciesism, and are 2bust but fair in your
criticisms. My one (minor) criticism is that, given the
breadth of positions you seek to cover, you are
sometimes too quick in making those criticisms,
which 8uld at times have been explained and
developed in a more careful and nuanced manner.
OveraIl, an impressive essay. Well done.
PAGE 1
Comment 1
Here, as elsewhere, you should give publication dates for the work of the authors you are
planning to discuss.
Comment2
A good introduction - you've set yourself an ambitious task here though, with lots of positions to
cover in a relatively small number of words.
PAGE2
C∙omment3
Good. A concise yet well-targeted summary.
Comment4
Good. Robust argumentation, well supported with appropriate sources.
PAGE3
Comment 5
Again, this is good - it is refreshing to see such strong and confident argumentation.
PAGE4
Good, but try not to rely *too* much on quotation.
Comment7
Good arguments, 8ncisely put.
PAGE5
Üomment8
A very good essay. You have managed to harness a lot of material here, in constructing a
spirited and - for the most part - persuasive argument. Well done.
PAGE6
PAGE7
RIIRRIU PHILOSOPHY RUBRIC 15-16
RELEVANCE
Very Good
Relevance Gfdiscussion to aims stated
VERY POOR
Largely irrelevant
P00R
Displays only a limited sense of relevance
AVERAGE
Reievance satisfactory but room for improvement
GOOD
Mostiy relevant
VERYGOOD
AII relevant
EXCELLENT
Highiy re!evant and well directed throughout
DEPTH
Good
Consideration of relevant Dositions/issues/debates
VERY POOR
Many important issues ignored
POOR
Some important issues ignored
AVERAGE
Covers an adequate range of reievant issues
GOOD
Covers a good range of relevant issues
VERYGOOD
Covers a very good range of Feievant issues
EXCELLENT
Covers the fuil range of relevant issues
UNDERSTANDING
Very Good
Grasp of key concepts and arguments
VERY POOR
Faiiure to grasp key concepts and arguments
P00R
Limited grasp of key concepts and arguments
AVERAGE
Reasonable grasp Qf key concepts and arguments
GOOD
Solid grasp of key concepts and arguments
VERYGOOD
Very good grasp of key concepts and arguments
FXCFMFNY
Excelient grasp of key concepts and arguments
Very Good
DEVELOPMENT
Development of arguments and critịcỉsms
UERY POQR
‫חחחח‬
Littie or no discernible argument
AVERAGE
Arguments persuasive in Naces but room for improvement
GOOD
Mosily weil argued and persuasive
VERYGOOD
Verywell argued and persuasive throughout
EXCELLENT
Highly sophisticated and persuasive standard ofargument
ORIGINALITY
Good
Tndepmndent thought and insight
VERYPOOR
No independent critical thinking.
P00R
Little evidence of independent critical thinκ∣ng
^VEWAGW
Some evidence of independent critical thinking
GOOD
Good level of independent critical thinking
VERYGCOD
Ver|/ good tevel Qf independent critical thinking
EXCFLLENT
Outstanding level of independent critical thinking
ORGANISATION
Very Good
SKucture of argument
VERYPOOR
LittIe or no discernible structure
P00R
Some serious structural problems
AVFRACF
Acceptable structure
GQOD
Good structure
VERYGOOD
Very good structure
EXCELLENT
Exempiary structure
CLARITY
Very Good
Clarity and fluency of expression
'VERY POOR
WhoHy unclear
P00R
Unciear in many places
AVERAGE
Reasonabiy ciear
匚：エコ
Good daπty
VERYGOOD
Very good clarity
EXCELLENT
Exemplary clarity
Standard of referencing and bibi!ography
VERY POOR
Littie or ‫ סה‬referencing
POOR
Some serious referencing problems
AVERAGE
Referencing mostly adequate
GOOD
Good referencing
VERYGOOD
Very good referencing
EXCELLENT
Exempiary referencing
LITERACY
Standard Ofwriting (grammar, spelling etc.)
VERY POGR
Many serious grammatical and/or spelling problems
P00R
Some serious grammatical and/or spelling problems
AVERAGE
Acceptable literacy
GC
Good literacy
VERYGOOD
Very good literacy
EXCELLENT
Exemplary literacy
Very Good