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CRIMINAL LAW: BOOK ONE
ACTS MALA IN SE v. MALA PROHIBITA
Qualifiers
MALA IN SE
MALA PROHIBITA
As to nature
Acts which are inherently evil or wrong. Wrong
per se, wrong by their very nature.
Acts which are only wrong because
there is a law that defines and punishes
the said act.
As to basis
The basis of criminal liability is the moral trait of
the offender.
The basis of criminal liability is the
moral trait of the offender.
As to good
faith
Good faith or lack of criminal intent is a valid
defense.
Good faith or lack of criminal intent, as a
rule, is not a defense.
As
to
circumstanc
es present
Modifying circumstances such as mitigating and
aggravating circumstances are considered by the
court in imposing the penalty.
No modifying circumstances may be
considered by the court unless
otherwise provided.
As to degree
of
participation
The degree of participation of an offender
whether as a principal, accomplice, or an
accessory is considered in imposing the penalty.
There are no degrees considered. All
perpetrators are punished to the same
extent.
As to stages
of execution
The stage of the execution of the crime whether
the crime is in the attempted, frustrated, or
consummated stage is considered by the court in
imposing the penalty.
No frustrated, no attempted stages. The
said prohibited/punished act must
always be in its consummated stage for
the offender to become criminally liable.
PEOPLE v. ACHARON G.R. No. 224946 | 9 November 2021
Q: Christian Acharon was an Overseas Filipino Worker. His wife sued her for economic abuse (violation of
Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262) as Acharon, while being gainfully employed abroad, failed to provide financial
support to his wife. Due to this, his wife was not able to pay off their debt – that debt was actually used by
Acharon in going abroad. Acharon also maintained a paramour abroad and even told his wife to look for
another man. The trial court convicted Acharon as it was proved that his failure to provide financial support to
his wife caused her psychological stress. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Is Y liable under RA
9262?
A: X is not liable for his failure to give financial support to his child and his spouse.
RULING: According to the Supreme Court, violation of Section 5 (i) Psychological Violence and Section 5 (e)
Economic Abuse of R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) are acts mala
in se not acts mala prohibit although they are both under R.A. No. 9262, a violation of a special penal law.
Therefore, before an offender can be held criminally liable there must be evidence that the said accused
willfully and consciously withheld financial support legally due to the woman and their children. Absent that
willful and conscious withdrawal of support the said man cannot be held criminally liable for violation of Sec. 5
(i) or (e) of R.A. No. 9262 because they are considered acts mala in se not acts mala prohibita.
CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW
GENERALITY
TERRITORIALITY
PROSPECTIVITY
Our penal laws shall be binding on all persons
who live, reside or sojourn in the Philippines.
Whether he is a Filipino citizen, or a foreigner,
for as long as he is here in the Philippines,
though temporary, he is obligated to comply
and to follow Philippine penal laws. Everyone –
regardless of race, creed, color, religion and
other circumstances – must comply with
Philippine penal laws. Otherwise, that person
Under
the
territoriality
characteristic of Criminal
Law, our penal laws shall
have force and effect only on
acts committed within the
Philippine
archipelago.
Therefore,
for
acts
committed
outside
the
Philippine archipelago, our
Under the prospectivity
characteristic of Criminal
Law, our penal laws can
only
be
applied
prospectively. They cannot
be
given
retroactive
application. Our penal laws
should only be applied
from the time of their
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who violates the law can be arrested,
prosecuted and punished.
penal laws will no longer
apply.
effectivity and thereafter.
Q: The ambassador of China to the PH arrived. After a meeting with the president in Malacañan, Ambassador
X headed to the Chinese Embassy in Makati. There, he was greeted by protestors with their angry placards
against China. X was mad at this kind of welcome. X told his driver to stop the car. He alighted from the car
and went to Y who threw paint on the car of X. The latter started punching his face a number of times. He
inflicted upon Y, serious physical injuries. Can X be prosecuted in the PH for the injuries he inflicted upon Y?
A: No. X cannot be prosecuted in the PH. As an exception to the generality principle of criminal law, diplomatic
agents are vested with blanked diplomatic immunity from criminal and civil suits. Under the Vienna Convention,
a diplomatic agent is one who is in charge with the duty of representing their states in political matters.
In this case, X being an ambassador is China's diplomatic representative to the PH, therefore, X enjoys blanket
diplomatic immunity from suit. He is immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the PH, hence, he cannot be
arrest, prosecuted and punished before the PH courts.
Exception to the Prospective Applicability of Criminal Laws
Q: X was charged and convicted of the crime of malversation. The amount proven to be appropriated by X was
Php.11,300. The SB affirmed the penalty imposed on him which is prision mayor. This judgement made by the
SB became final and executory. Congress enacted RA 10951 which reduced the imposable penalty for
malversation under Article 217 of the RPC. Under the new law, if the amount malversed is below Php. 40,000,
the penalty will only be prision correctional. Can the SB's judgment imposed on X still be opened in order to
retroactively apply RA 10951?
A: YES. See Hernan vs. Sandiganbayan, Infra
HERNAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 21787 | December 5, 2017
FACTS: Hernan was a public officer charged and thereafter convicted by the Sandiganbayan for the crime of
malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Allegedly, the amount that he malversed was the
amount that he failed to liquidate – 11,300 pesos. Because of that, the Sandiganbayan imposed upon Hernan
the penalty of prision mayor. The decision of the Sandiganbayan became final and executory. R.A. 10951 was
thereafter passed which reduced the imposable penalty on malversation under Art. 217 of the RPC. If the
amount malversed is less than 40,000 pesos, the penalty would only be prision correccional.
ISSUE: Can the judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan on Hernan be reopened in order to lower the
imposable penalty?
RULING: The Supreme Court said that as a general rule, a judgment that has already acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable. However, when there are circumstances after the finality of the decision which
render its execution unjust and inequitable, the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, can relax the doctrine on
immutability. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that it is necessary to reopen the case of Hernan and to
recall the entry of judgment made by the Sandiganbayan. Note that it is not for the purpose of further receiving
evidence or for further reception of evidence. It is only in order to modify the penalty imposed by the
Sandiganbayan. Hernan remains convicted. However, the case was only reopened in order to modify the penalty
by lowering it from prision mayor to prision correccional. In the latter part of the decision, the Supreme Court
said that since Hernan’s penalty has been reduced from prision mayor to prision correccional, which has a
maximum term of six years, Hernan may apply for probation under the new Probation Law under R.A. 10707.
DOCTRINES IN CRIMINAL LAW
DOCTRINE OF PRO REO
LENITY RULE
EQUIPOISE RULE
Penal laws shall always be
construed, applied liberally in
favor of the accused and
strictly against the state. The
maxim is In dubio pro reo. In
case of doubt, rule in favor of
the
accused.
Reason,
constitutional presumption of
Whenever a penal provision is
susceptible of two interpretations,
one interpretation is lenient and
will favor the accused, and the
other interpretation is strict and
will go against the accused, the
lenient interpretation shall prevail
over the strict interpretation.
Whenever the evidence of the
prosecution is equally balanced with
the evidence of the defense, the scale
of justice shall be tilted in favor of the
accused. Two reasons: constitutional
presumption of innocence; in every
criminal prosecution/action filed in
court, the conviction of the accused
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innocence. All accused are
presumed innocent unless
proven
guilty
beyond
reasonable doubt.
Reason behind this is the
constitutional presumption of
innocence. All accused are
presumed innocent unless proven
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
will depend on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution and not
on the weakness of the evidence of
the defense.
Q: The information filed in court alleges that Sps. X and Y falsely pretended to the buyers Sps. A and B owns
the property in Baguio and that they can sell the property and transfer the title to the buyers. The truth is, Sps.
X and Y do not own the property, they are not registered owners and do not have any claim on the title of the
said property. However, due to Sps. X and Y's deceit, false pretense and false representation of ownership
which was committed prior to and simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, the buyers were induced
and impelled to purchase the property in Baguio for a big amount of money. Later on, it was discovered by
Sps. A and B. Hence, the latter filed a case of estafa by deceit under Article 215(2)(a) against Sps. X and Y.
After trial, Sps. X and Y were convicted as charged. On appeal, they argued that pursuant to the Doctrine of
Pro Reo and the Lenity Rule, they can only be penalized under Art. 316(1) or Other Forms of Swindling
because it is more lenient and favorable to the accused. Is their argument meritorious?
A: No, their argument has no merit. See Dulay vs. People, Infra
PEOPLE v. DULAY, G.R. No. 193854 | 24 September 2012
RULING:
Yes, petitioners are guilty of estafa by means of deceit. The SC has applied the doctrine of pro reo and the
correlative rule on lenity when there is doubt as to the applicability of various penalties under different
amended or repealed laws. In this case, however, there is no doubt as to the applicability of Article 315(2)(a) of
the RPC: the constitutive offense of estafa by deceit under Article 315(2)(a) was specifically charged in the
Information,40 established and proven beyond reasonable doubt,41 and affirmed on appeal by the appellate
court.42 We therefore find no need to apply lenity and the doctrine of pro reo, and ignore the specific provision
of law and the penalty prescribed thereunder.
PEÑALOSA VS. OCAMPO, G.R. NO. 230299. APRIL 26, 2023 [J. HERNANDO CASE, BEYOND CUT-OFF DATE]
Q: On August 3, 2011 X posted on her Facebook account that Y is "bobo, hampaslupa, supot, patay-gutom,
inggitero." This imputations posted by X caused Y to be embarrassed. Y filed a case of libel against X before
the office of the city prosecutor. If you are the assigned city prosecutor, how will you resolve the case?
A: If I am the assigned city prosecutor, I will resolve to dismiss the case filed by X against Y. A libelous FB post
may only be punished under RA 10175 or the Cybercrime prevention act of 2012. This internet libel or a libelous
FB post is not under Article 355 of the RPC. Since the FB post -- subject of the complaint, was posted in 2011
which is a year before the Cybercrime Prevention Act was passed in 2012, there was yet no internet libel at the
time. Nullum crimen nula pena sine lege, there is no crime if there is no law that punishes it. Therefore, as the
public prosecutor, I will dismiss the case.
ARTICLE 3: FELONIES
Based on the manner of committing the felony, we have two (2) kinds of felonies:
INTENTIONAL FELONIES
These are felonies committed by means of
deliberate intent.
1.
2.
3.
Criminal intent on the part of the offender;
Freedom of action in doing the act; and
Intelligence of the offender.
CULPABLE FELONIES
These are felonies wherein the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack
of skill.
1.
2.
3.
Criminal negligence on the part of the
offender;
Freedom of action in doing the act; and
Intelligence of the offender.
CRIMINAL INTENT
An important element of an intentional felony is criminal intent. There are two (2) kinds of criminal intent:
1.
General criminal intent is presumed by law from the mere doing of the act. Therefore, it requires no
proof.
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2.
Specific criminal intent is never presumed by law. Specific criminal intent must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, just like any elements of the crime.
Q: A hacked X with a samurai hitting X on his right forearm. B, C and D hit X with steel pipes while E hit X with
piece of stone. Thereafter, A, B,C and D ran away leaving X slumped on the ground wounded. A, B, C and D are
not charged with frustrated murder. They were convicted by the RTC of attempted murder. Is the RTC's
judgement correct?
A: The RTC's judgment is wrong. A, B, C, D and E cannot be convicted of either attempted or frustrated murder
because based on the facts, there is no intent to kill. The crime committed by A,B,C and D is only serious
physical injuries. Based on the facts, the accused were armed with samurai, steel pipes and stone while X was
unarmed and defenseless. The accused possessed all the necessary weapons to kill X but they chose not to kill
him. After ganging up on X, all 5 of them left. Had they intended to kill X, they could have easily done so
because they have the means and force. When they left, without killing X, it shows their lack of intent to kill.
Hence, the crime cannot be attempted or frustrated murder because of the absence of intent to kill.
MISTAKE OF FACT
A defense against criminal intent is mistake of fact. It is the misapprehension of facts on the part of the person
who caused injury to another. If the offender acted under clear mistake of fact, that offender is absolved of
criminal liability because there is no criminal intent on the part of the offender.
Mistake of fact negates criminal liability because of the absence of criminal intent on the part of the offender.
However, it does not negate the offender’s civil liability.
Elements of Mistake of Fact
1.
2.
3.
That the act done would have been lawful and justifiable had the facts been as the accused believed
them to be. Granting for the sake of argument that the facts are what the accused believed them to be,
the said act will be justified.
That the intention of the offender in performing the act must be lawful. He must be guided by a lawful,
legitimate, justified intent.
That mistake must be without fault, mistake, carelessness, negligence on the part of the said offender.
NOTE: It is necessary that the offender must have exercised diligence in ascertaining the true facts of the case.
He cannot have acted with negligence and at the same time invoke mistake of fact. Therefore, mistake of fact
can only be a defense in intentional felonies. Mistake of fact is not a defense in culpable felony. In culpable
felony, what is present is criminal negligence, and the third element requires that there must be no negligence
on the part of the offender
Q: Police Officers (PO) X, Y and Z had an armed encounter with W who is a notorious serial police killer. PO Z
was shot near the shoulder. After which, W ran and the POs chased him. W entered a nearby dimly-lit
warehouse. POs X, Y and Z, although wounded, continued to pursue W. When they reached the mezzanine, X
saw a man crouching behind a pile of boxes and holding what appeared to be a long rifle. When the said man
stood up and faced the POs, X immediately fired at the man. The man was hit fatally. When they went to the
man, it turned out that he was not W. They learned that the man was the caretaker of the warehouse and he
was holding a lead pipe. X was prosecuted for homicide. Is X criminally liable as charged?
A: NO. PO X acted in clear mistake of fact (MoF). All the elements of MoF are present:
1.
2.
3.
The firing at the said victim would have been lawful and justifiable had the facts been as what PO X
believed them to be. It had been lawful if it was W who was a notorious police killer because W was
armed and dangerous as he was already able to wound PO Z.
The intention of PO X was lawful to protect themselves.
X's act of firing was without fault, negligence or carelessness. Based on the facts, the place was dimly
lit and who would have thought that the warehouseman was there. W was a dangerous man and X had
to fire the shot against him, otherwise, they will be killed. It all happened at the spur of the moment. PO
X had no opportunity to think.
Hence, PO X should be absolved of criminal liability but not of civil liability as MoF is only an absolutory cause.
PROXIMATE CAUSE DOCTRINE
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By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended
Elements of Art. 4, 1st par.
1. That the intended act is a felonious act;
2. The resulting act is a felony; and
3. The resulting felony is the direct, natural and logical consequence of the offender’s felonious act.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
Proximate cause is that cause that sets into motion all other causes and which, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the felony, without which the felony would not have resulted.
Based on this definition of proximate cause, for one to be liable under the proximate cause doctrine, it is
necessary that there is no efficient intervening cause that would have broken the causal connection between
the offender’s felonious act and the resulting felony. The moment there is an efficient intervening cause, the
offender will not become criminally liable for the felony.
EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE
An efficient intervening cause in an active cause which is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the
felonious act of the offender. Totally, it has nothing to do – it is not in any way connected – with the offender’s
felonious act. Only then can it be considered as an efficient intervening cause.
Q: X and their 2 children were about to enter their house when Y arrived at their door holding a casserole with
hot boiling oil. Without any warning, Y poured the contents of the casserole on X. X tried to dodge but her two
children who were 3 years old and 2 months old were hit by the said hot oil. The 2 minors suffered serious
physical injuries / burns. Y is being prosecuted of violation of RA 7610, Child Abuse. Y argued that she cannot
be liable as she merely intended on committing physical injuries against X, not on the children. Is Y's
argument meritorious?
A: NO. Y's argument has no merit. Even granting that it was not her intention to harm the children, Y was
performing an unlawful act when she threw the hot oil from the casserole. Therefore, she cannot escape
criminal liability from the violation of RA 7610, Child Abuse based on the settled doctrine under Art. 4(1) that a
person incurs criminal liability although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
PATULOT VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 235071, JANUARY 7, 2019
FACTS: CCC gathered clothes from the clothesline outside her house. As she was about to enter her house,
Patulot poured the cooking oil inside the casserole on her. CCC tried to dodge but to no avail. AAA (3-yr-old)
and BBB (2-month-old), who were nearby, suddenly ciried because they were hit by the cooking oil. The children
were brought to the Polyclinic in Taguig City. She then went to the barangay hall to report the incident.
In her defense Patulot denied all the allegations against her. When she was repacking black pepper at her
house, she heard CCC taunt her in a loud voice, “Bakit hindi ka pa sumama sa asawa mo? Dapat sumama ka na
para pareha kayong paglamayan.” Because of this, Patulot proceeded to the Barangay to file a complaint
against CCC, but she was ignored. She then went to another Barangay, but upon reaching said location, she was
apprehended by the tanods and brought to the Barangay Hall for questioning.
SC: "When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished
by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime;
otherwise, no crime is committed." The petitioner was convicted of violation of R.A. No. 7610, a special law.
However, physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the existence of a criminal intent on
the part of
the offender.
Q: X stabbed Y. While Y was being treated in the hospital because of the stab wound, Y developed infections
in her bloodstream. She suffered respiratory distress syndrome. Later on, because of complications, Y died.
Prosecuted for homicide, X claims that he cannot be liable because even if he inflicted stab wounds on Y, it
was not the proximate cause of her death but the complication that developed after. Is X's argument
meritorious?
A: NO, X's argument has no merit. Proximate cause is that cause which sets into motion all others causes,
without being broken by an efficient intervening cause (EIC), produces the felony and without which the felony
would not have been committed.
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In this case, it is the stab wounds inflicted by X which lead Y to be hospitalized and developed infections in the
bloodstream and respiratory distress syndrome that eventually caused her death. Therefore, the proximate
cause of Y's death is the stab wound inflicted on her. The infection and syndrome cannot be considered as EIC
because although it is an active force, it is not distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the stabbing.
PEOPLE vs. AGUSTIN, G.R. No. 250140. February 15, 2021
SC: Clearly it was the stab wounds inflicted by Agustin which led Mely to get hospitalized and develop
infections in her bloodstream and respiratory distress syndrome that eventually caused her death. It cannot be
denied that the root cause of Mely’s death, as testified by Dr. Quilala, were precisely the stab wounds inflicted
on her by Agustin.
INSTANCES WHERE THE OFFENDER BECOMES CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR THE RESULTING FELONY
Under Art. 4 (1) of the RPC, there are three instances where the offender becomes criminally liable for the
resulting felony although different from that which he intended:
1.
2.
3.
Aberratio Ictus (mistake in the blow);
Error in personae (mistake in the identity); and
Praeter intentionem (consequence went beyond the intention).
ABERRATIO ICTUS
Mistake in the Blow
ERROR IN PERSONAE
Mistake in Identity
PRAETER INTENTIONEM
Praeter Intentionem
Aberratio Ictus or mistake in
the blow is a situation
wherein the offender directed
the blow against his intended
victim but because of poor
aim, the blow landed on
another person.
It is a situation wherein the offender
directed the blow at a person whom he
thought to be the intended victim, but the
intended victim was not at the scene of
the crime. He has mistaken the actual
victim to be the intended victim.
It is when the consequence
went beyond the intention of
the offender. Here, no one
could have foreseen that out of
the offender’s act, this felony
would result.
1.
2.
Offender
directed
the blow against his
intended victim
The blow landed on
another person due
to poor aim
Generally, aberratio ictus will
result to two crimes – first,
the
crime against the
intended victim, and second,
the crime against the actual
victim.
If
these
two
crimes
happened to be grave or less
grave felonies, we apply Art.
48 – complexity of crimes.
1.
2.
Directed the blow at a intended
victim;
The intended victim was not at
the scene of the crime.
It depends if there is a variance between
the intended felony and the felony actually
committed.
WITH VARIANCE
If the intended felony is different from the
felony actually committed, then Article 49
applies. Based on Art. 49, the lesser of the
two penalties shall be the one imposed on
the said offender. Error in personae or
mistake in identity is a mitigating
circumstance.
1.
2.
That the felony has been
committed; and
That there is a notable
disparity
between
the
offender’s felonious act
and the resulting act.
Whenever praeter intentionem
is present, it is considered as a
mitigating
circumstance
because
it
is
expressly
provided under Article 13, third
paragraph of the RPC that the
offender has no intention to
commit so grave of a wrong as
that committed. It is always a
mitigating circumstance if the
elements were proven.
WITHOUT VARIANCE
If however, there is no variance between
the intended felony and the resulting
felony, error in personae has no effect on
the offender’s criminal liability.
Q: X is a 17 year-old student. He was aggrieved by the death of his only brother. The brother died in a gang
war. To take revenge, X staged an ambush against Y who is the leader of the rival gang. However, when X
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stages the ambush on Y, X missed his target and hit Z, a passerby who died instantaneously. What is the
proper charge against X?
A: The proper charge against X is the complex crime of murder with attempted murder. Although X was a minor
at the time of the commission of the crime, he must be charged in court because based on the facts, he acted
with discernment. It was proven by the fact that what he executed was an ambush, which means it was planned
and contemplated by him.
He is liable for the crime of murder with attempted murder because this is a case of aberratio ictus or mistake
in the blow. X out of revenge fired at Y in an ambush attach, however, because of poor aim or imprecision, X
missed the shot and instead hit Z, an innocent passerby.
The overt act to kill Y is attempted murder qualified by treachery since it is a planned ambush. The death of the
innocent passerby is also murder as held by the SC in the case of People vs. Flora and People vs. Adriano
where the SC said that the treachery that attended the attack on the intended victim is also present on the
actual victim because he too was defenseless.
Therefore, X is liable for the crime of murder with attempted murder.
PEOPLE VS. FLORA, G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000 (FLORA DOCTRINE)
The treachery attending the assault on the intended victim is also present on the actual victim. In Flora, the
accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of two victims, Ireneo, the intended
victim, and Emerita, the victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, qualified both killings to murder.
PEOPLE v. SABALONES G.R. No. 123485 | 31 August 1998
FACTS: Rogelio Presores, Rogelio Oliveros and Junior Villoria, drove to the residence of Stephen Lim at
Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu. Glenn Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo also went with them
riding in an owner type jeep, in order to bring back the group as soon as the car of Mr. Lim was parked in his
home.
The two vehicles traveled in convoy with the jeep, 3 to 4 meters ahead of the car. When they arrived at the gate
of the house of Stephen Lim, they were met with a sudden burst of gunfire. He looked at the direction where the
gunfire came and saw the persons who fired at the jeep. He identified accused, Teodulo Alegarbes, Rolusape
Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga as the persons who fired at the vehicle.
Five amended Informations were filed with the RTC of Cebu City charging Rolusape Sabalones, Artemio
Timoteo Beronga, Teodulo Alegarbes and Eufemio Cabanero, with two counts of murder and three counts of
frustrated murder.
ISSUE: Is the principle of aberratio ictus applicable in this case?
RULING: NO. Error in personae or mistake in the identity is NOT an absolutory cause. It is not an exempting
circumstance. Therefore, error in personae or mistake in identity will not absolve an offender from any criminal
liability. It can only be mitigating if there is a variance. However, in this case, there was no variance between
the intended felony and the felony actually committed. Therefore, X shall be criminally liable for serious
physical injuries although it was done from a different victim.
Q: The mother X, arrived home at 7-o clock in the evening. Their house had no electricity. X later learned that
Y, her 13-year old son, sold the bronze wire connected to the electric meter because Y needed money for his
project in school. The mother was mad at Y. X took a hanger and hit Y several times until it snapped. X took
the broom and hit Y with the wooden handle of the broom on his head and other parts of his body. The
following morning, the mother X saw that Y was in critical condition. There was vomit on the floor and Y's
pants were wet with urine. Despite this, the mother still got the broom and pushed the handle to her son's
mouth. When the son was brought to the hospital, the son died due to blood clot in the head a day thereafter.
X is being prosecuted and then convicted of parricide. X argued that she had no intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that of killing her son and that she only wanted to discipline her son. Is the mother entitled to the
defense of praeter intentionem?
A: NO. The 2nd element of praeter intentionem is absent. There was no notable disparity between the means
employed by the offender and the resulting felony. In this case, the mother kept on beating the said boy despite
seeing that he was already weak. The said mother's brutish acts are acts that would produce and indeed
actually produced the death of her son.
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Therefore, X cannot benefit from the mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem.
PEOPLE v. SALES G.R. No. 177218 | 3 October 2011
The Supreme Court convicted Noel Sales of parricide WITHOUT appreciating praeter intentionem. The Supreme
Court said that there was no notable disparity between the means employed by the father — hitting his son with
a piece of wood while tied to a tree, and the resulting felony which is the death of the said son. If you repeatedly
hit the frail body of a boy while he is tied to a tree, definitely, that boy will die. There was no notable disparity
between the means employed and the resulting felony. Therefore, the father was liable for parricide without the
mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem,
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME DOCTRINE
An impossible crime is one wherein the act done would have amounted to crime against persons or crimes
against property but is not accomplished because of its inherent impossibility because of the employment of
ineffectual or inadequate means.
Elements of Impossible Crime
1. The act done had it been accomplished would have been amounted to a crime against person or a
crime against property;
2. The act was done with evil intent;
3. The act was not accomplished because of its inherent impossibility or because of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means;
4. The act does not fall under any other provision of the Revised Penal Code.
TWO KINDS OF IMPOSSIBILITY:
1.
Legal Impossibility. There is legal impossibility when all the intended acts, even if accomplished, will
not produce a crime.
2. Physical or factual impossibility. When extraneous circumstances unknown to the offender,
extraneous circumstances beyond the control of the offender, prevented the consummation of the
crime.
Q: While A,B,C and D were at the public market, they discussed the plan to kill X. Thereafter, at 8 o' clock in
the evening, these 4 men went to the house of X. They saw X and asked for a lighter. A immediately struck X
with a piece of wood. A took his bolo and hacked X's body on the side. X fell on the ground. B stabbed X's
chest using a knife. After, A, B and C left the place. Only B was arrested and the others remained at large. B
was charged with the crime of murder as a co-conspirator of A,C and D. During trial, if ever he is liable, it
should only be for an impossible crime because it was legally impossible for him to kill X as the latter was
already dead when A stabbed him. Is B's argument meritorious?
A: NO, B's argument has no merit. Granting arguendo that it was A who killed X by hacking him and that X was
already dead when he was stabbed by B, the latter is still liable for murder because of the presence of
conspiracy between A,B,C and D. As such, A's act are considered as the act of B because in conspiracy, the act
of one is the act of all.
Hence, B's argument that he should only be liable for an impossible crime has no merit.
JACINTO v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 162540 | 13 July 2009
FACTS: Jacinto, collector of Megafoam, received a check from Aquino for the payment of the latter’s purchases
from Megafoam. The checks were deposited in Land Bank on Generoso Capitle’s account, the husband of
Jacinto’s sister.
Later on, one employee of Megafoam received a call asking if she could issue a check in the name of
Megafoam instead of issuing them payable to cash. The employee also received a call from Land Bank stating
that the check deposited in Generoso’s account was dishonored. This scheme was then reported to the owner
of Megafoam. Upon investigation, it was found that Jacinto never remitted the subject check to Megafoam.
However, Aquino said that she had already paid Megafoam in cash as replacement for the dishonored check.
Jacinto was charged with the crime of qualified theft.
The argument of the Office of the Solicitor General is that it should still be theft because he failed to remit the
said check. He took the check, and for that alone, he should be held criminally liable for qualified theft.
SC: The Supreme Court ruled that it was an impossible crime of theft. As may be gleaned from Art. 308 in
relation to Art. 310, the personal property subject of the theft must have some value as the intention of the
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accused is to gain from the thing stolen. In this case, Jacinto unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to
Megafoam. However, the checks were without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Even though Jacinto
was able to perform all acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property, and
that her act of unlawfully taking the check showed her intent to gain, she could not be liable of qualified theft
because were it not for the fact that the checks were unfunded, she would have the face value of the check
which did not belong to her. Thus, it was due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a
fact unknown to Jacinto at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced.
The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
STAGES IN THE COMMISSION OF A FELONY
Qualifiers
ATTEMPTED
FRUSTRATED
CONSUMMATED
As
to
codal
provision
/
definition
A felony is attempted when the
offender
commences
the
commission of a felony directly by
overt acts and does not perform
all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident
other than this own spontaneous
desistance.
A felony is frustrated when
the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a
consequence
but
which,
nevertheless, do not produce
it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
A felony is consummated
when all the elements
necessary
for
its
execution
and
accomplishment
are
already
present.
The
moment all the elements
for the commission of a
crime are already there,
present, it is indeed
consummated stage of
committing the felony.
As
to
elements
1. The offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by
overt acts;
2. The offender was not able to
perform all the acts of execution;
3. The offender was not able to
perform all the acts of execution
by reason of some cause or
accident other than this own
spontaneous desistance.
1.
The
offender
has
performed all the acts of
execution
which
would
produce the felony;
BALEROS v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 138033 | 22 February
2006
2.
The felony was not produced
by
reason
of
causes
independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
N/A
PEOPLE v. LAMAHANG, G.R. No. 43530 | 03 August 1935
FACTS: With the use of an iron bar, Lamahang tried to open a store. The accused was charged with attempted
robbery.
RULING: The attempt to commit an offense is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense
which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator leading to its
consummation. Absent any unavoidable connection, meaning that the nature of the act in relation to its
objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense which is a juridical
fact from the standpoint of the RPC. Lamahang’s act of making an opening on the wall of Tan Yu’s store did not
clearly showed his intention to take possession, for the purpose of gaining, of property of another.
It may only be inferred that his evident intention was to enter by means of force the store against the will of the
owner, and his final objective once he succeeded in entering may be other to commit different crime(s) other
than robbery.
Indeterminate offense
Where the purpose of the person in doing the act is not certain or ambiguous.
POSSIBLE BAR Q: What does the phrase “slightest penile penetration” mean? What is the genital contact
threshold that consummates rape?
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PEOPLE VS. AGAO, G.R. No. 248049. October 4, 2022 [BEYOND CUT-OFF DATE]
In this case, the Supreme Court clarifies the parameters that will distinguish consummated rape from
attempted rape based on the definition of what constitutes the slightest touch, the slightest penile penetration,
that consummates the crime of rape by sexual intercourse through penile penetration.
In the decision, the anatomy of the vagina was discussed: the vulva, the pudendum, the mons pubis, the labia
majora, and the labia minora. Thereafter, the Supreme Court said, as guided by the anatomical description of a
female’s genitalia, it now reiterates and clarifies that rape of a female victim by a male person through penile
penetration reaches the consummated stage as soon as the penis penetrates the cleft of the labia majora, also
known as the vulval or pudendal cleft, or the fleshy outer lip of the vulva, in even at the slightest degree.
Now it is necessary that the penis reaches the cleft of the labia majora even in the slightest degree. The
Supreme Court also said that, simply put, the mere introduction, however slight, into the cleft of the labia
majora by a penis that is capable of penetration, regardless of whether such penile penetration is thereafter
fully achieved, consummates the crime of rape. It is therefore necessary that the penis penetrates the cleft of
the labia majora, however minimum.
It must reach the cleft of the labia majora for it to be considered as consummated rape. It was further
discussed that the mere grazing of the fleshy portion, not the vulval cleft of the labia majora, will also constitute
only attempted rape and not consummated rape. Based on the new en banc decision of the Supreme Court in
People v. Agao, the doctrine laid down is that rape is consummated only when the erect penis touches the
vulval cleft of the labia majora of a woman’s vagina.
Only then will rape be consummated. If what the penis touches is not within that area – it did not reach the
vulval cleft of the labia majora – then it is only rape in its attempted stage.
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT A FELONY
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it and there is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes
its execution to some other person or persons. As a rule, conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony are not
punishable acts because they are mere preparatory acts, and the law requires an overt act to bring about the
felony. The exception to such rule, as provided for under Article 8, first paragraph, conspiracy and proposal to
commit a felony are punishable the moment the law provides a penalty therefor. So, when it is the law itself that
provides a penalty for merely conspiring, for merely proposing to commit a felony, they become crimes by
themselves.
Two kinds of conspiracy as a means of committing a felony:
1. Direct/Express Conspiracy
There is direct/express conspiracy when the conspirators met, planned, and agreed to commit a crime. It is a
conspiracy based on a preconceived plan or based on a preconceived agreement.
In case of a direct/ express conspiracy, since the conspirators met, planned, and agreed to commit the crime,
their mere presence at the time of the commission of the crime will make them liable already as conspirators
because they were part of the authors of the criminal design, they were the ones who planned for the
commission of the crime. Therefore, their mere presence at the scene of the crime will already make them
criminally liable as conspirators.
2. Implied/Inferred Conspiracy
There is an implied/inferred conspiracy is a conspiracy which is deduced from the mode or manner of
committing a crime. Here, the conspirators acted simultaneously in a synchronized and coordinated manner
towards a common criminal objective.
In case of implied or inferred conspiracy, since it is a conspiracy which is merely deduced from the mode and
manner of committing the crime, before one can be held liable as a conspirator, there must be an active
participation in the commission of the crime. In case of inferred or implied conspiracy, mere presence, mere
approval, mere acquiescence to the commission of the crime will not make the offender criminally liable. There
must be an active participation in the commission of the crime.
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The Act of One is the Act of All
The moment conspiracy is established, whether it is direct or express conspiracy, or implied or inferred
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It means that all the perpetrators are punished to the same extent,
regardless of the quantity and quality of their participation in the commission of the crime. Therefore, the
moment conspiracy is established, we do not ask which of these men inflicted the fatal wound, which of these
men merely served as lookout, which of these men performed only a minor act – that is immaterial. Conspiracy
having been established, the act of one is the act of all. All perpetrators are punished to the same extent,
regardless of the quality and the quantity of their participation in the commission of the crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ORLANDO PADILLA, G.R. No. 247824; February 23, 2022
FACTS: The prosecution's eyewitness, tricycle driver Antonio, testified that he chanced upon the brothers Danilo
and Orlando, who hired him to take them to the Municipal Hall of Agoo, La Union. Afterwards,, they were able to
drive back to Naguilian where they proceeded to a videoke bar. He saw the brothers and Rhandy drinking
together. After a while, Danilo told him to bring them all to Bagulin andAntonio agreed to do so. The brothers
pulled Rhandy out. Danilo boxed Rhandy while Orlando aided by choking the former. Danilo then stabbed
Rhandy on the waist and the two of them struggled to gain possession of the knife. Danilo thus got a hold of a
stone and hit Rhandy's head. Danilo and Orlando, with the help of Antonio, pitched Rhandy into the ravine.
Danilo got a bigger stone and dropped it into the ravine and hit Rhandy. Danilo also tossed the knife next.
Thereafter, Antonio, Danilo and Orlando all left together.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, accused-appellants contend that the allegation of conspiracy was
not established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt as trial court did not establish the common design
and purpose among the accused-appellants.
ISSUE: Were conspiracy and abuse of superior strength attendant in this case thus qualifying the killing to
murder?
SC: Yes, conspiracy and abuse of superior strength were attendant in this case thus qualifying the killing to
murder.
In the present case, it is readily apparent that they all ganged up on him; they brought the victim at a detour,
fought and mortally wounded him; participated in the disposing of the body; and went home together after the
gruesome incident and not reporting the incident to the authorities.
These circumstances were all geared towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, indicating
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. The evidence gathered shows that the
victim was unarmed when he was attacked by accused-appellants, who were not only superior in number but
had access to, and in fact used, a weapon in form of a knife. Moreover, it was established that when the victim
was already defenseless and weak from the stab wound and the mauling, he was unnecessarily hit with a big
stone that ensured his death.
Thus, the fact that the victim was outnumbered without means to put up a defense as he was taken to a place
where rescue would be close to impossible and the fact that accused-appellants and Antonio used weapons
out of proportion to the defense available to the victim, i.e., a knife and a big stone, fully establish the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Hence, the presence of conspiracy and abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder.
Q: A, B, C and D conspired to rob the house of E. Their agreement is that no other crime must be committed
except to rob the house of E. At the designated date, all of them went to house of by passing through the
window. They ransacked the house. Later, C left A and B to look around the house. C found F, the daughter of
E. C entered the room and raped F. All three left and were prosecuted for the special complex crime of robbery
with rape as conspirators. Is the prosecution correct?
A: NO. The prosecution is wrong. Only C should be prosecuted for the special complex crime of robbery with
rape while A and B should only be charged as conspirators for the crime of robbery. Based on the facts, A,B and
C expressly agreed to commit robbery only and that no other crime shall be committed. Hence, as conspirators,
they are liable only for the crime agreed upon and for such other crimes which could be foreseen or the natural
and logical consequences of the conspiracy.
PEOPLE v. CASTILLO, G.R. No. 132895 | 10 March 2004
In this case, SC said Padayhag has no intent to detain the victim; Padayhag has no intent to extort ransom;
Padayhag, in fact, did not even know the intention of Castillo. Therefore, the Supreme Court said Padayhag is
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not a co-conspirator. Because Padayhag is not a co- conspirator since conspiracy was not established, then
Padayhag was acquitted, but Castillo was convicted.
MULTIPLE CONSPIRACY
There are 2 kinds of multiple conspiracy:
1.
2.
Wheel or Circle Conspiracy. There is wheel or circle conspiracy when a person or group of persons
known as the hub deals individually with another person or group of persons known as the spokes.
Chain Conspiracy. There is chain conspiracy when, just like in ordinary business transactions, there is
that constant and continuous communication among the manufacturers with the wholesaler, the
wholesaler with the retailer, the retailer with the consumer.
NOTE: These two kinds of multiple conspiracy were first discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of Fernan
and Torrevillas v. People.
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
These are circumstances which, if present or attendant in the commission of a felony, would mean that the
offender acted within the bounds of the law. The offender did not transgress the law and therefore there is no
crime committed and there is no criminal, and also there is no criminal or civil liability.
SELF DEFENSE
Elements of self-defense
1.
Unlawful aggression;
a.
b.
c.
2.
3.
There must be a physical or material attack or assault;
The attack or assault must be actual or at least imminent; and
The attack or assault must be unlawful
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression coming from
the victim;
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Q: X was very mad, he barged inside the house of Sps. Y and Z. At that time, Y and Z were having dinner. X
tried to shoot Husband Y. Y and X struggled for the possession of the gun. Y gained possession of the gun
and shot X. X slumped on the floor but after which, X stood up, pulled out his bolo and tried to hack Z, the
common-law spouse of Y. Y again went to X and they struggled for the possession of the bolo. In the course,
Y gained possession of the bolo and he hacked X. The latter died and based on the autopsy, cause of death is
the gun shot wound and the hack. Y claimed self-defense and moved for his acquittal. Is there self-defense?
A: Yes, all the elements of self-defense are present. See People vs. Olarbe, Infra
PEOPLE v. OLARBE, G.R. No. 227421 | 23 July 2018
FACTS: The neighbor Arca tried to shoot Olarbe. They grappled for the possession of the gun, and Olarbe
gained possession and shot Arca on the head. Instead of going down on the floor, Arca pulled out his bolo and
tried to hack the common law spouse of Olarbe. Again, Olarbe was able to gain possession of the bolo and
once in possession, hacked Arca. In this case, based on the autopsy report, the cause of death of the victim
were both gunshot wounds and the hack wounds. The RTC and CA said the unlawful aggression already
ceased to exist and therefore, Olarbe should not have killed the victim.
RULING: The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that in order to determine whenever there is a need for self
defense, the right of a person to take a life in self-defense arises from his belief in the necessity of doing so. His
belief and the reasonableness thereof are to be judged in the light of the circumstances as they had appeared
to them, not in the light of the circumstances as they would appear to other people. According to the Supreme
Court, you have to take into consideration what the accused was feeling at that particular moment. His right to
defend his life must be adjudged in the light of the circumstances as they appeared to him and not as they
appeared to the other people. At that particular moment, Olarbe felt the unlawful aggression. Not just his life,
but the life of his common-law spouse was still in danger and hence, he has to defend themselves. The
Supreme Court appreciated self-defense.
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Q: X repeatedly stabbed W with a kitchen knife. W was able to escape as he was only sustained minor injuries.
W ran away and went to his house. Upon reaching his house, he took a bolo with which he would want to
defend himself against X. W armed with the bolo, called on X and dared X to come forward and fight. Later,
both of them struggled and in such event, W killed X. W is now charged with the crime of homicide but he said
he acted in self-defense. Is W entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense?
A: NO, W is not entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The first element of self-defense is
absent. There is no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Based on the facts, there are two stages in
the fight.The 1st stage is when X stabbed W repeatedly with a knife and W managed to escape. The 2nd stage
is when W reached the safety of his house. Once W reached his house, W was already safe from the unlawful
aggression from X. Hence, at that particular moment, the unlawful aggression from X had already ceased to
exist.
When W took the Bolo and went out of his house, and thereafter shouted on X and dared X to come forward
and fight, W became the unlawful aggression. There can be no self-defense. Further, when W challenged X to a
fight, a struggle ensued. This means that a challenge of W was accepted by X, hence, there is that agreement to
fight.
In an agreement to fight, there can be no unlawful aggression. There can be no self-defense.
FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY
Elements of Fulfillment of a Duty:
1.
2.
Offender acted in the due performance of his duties or in the performance of a lawful exercise of a
right or office; and
The resulting felony is an unavoidable consequence of the performance of his duty.
If a felony resulted from a public officer or a person’s fulfillment of one’s duty, the question is: is the said
resulting felony unavoidable? If it is unavoidable, a necessary consequence, his acts are justified, and he cannot
be held criminally and civilly liable. Otherwise, he can be held criminally liable.
Q: A is an escaped convict. He is a convicted felon who escaped from prison. A is the subject of a police
manhunt operation. One day, the police officers got a tip from a concerned citizen that A was staying in the
house of B. In full battle gear, the police officers went to the place to arrest A. Even before the police can
enter the yard of B, the police immediately saw A standing boldly at the front door of the house of B. A even
taunted the police to arrest him if they can. The leader of this group of police officers, that is police officer C,
ordered A to surrender peacefully. However, A did not heed the order. Instead, A entered the door and locked
it. Police Officer C shouted at A and warned A that if he does not surrender at the count of three, they will
enter the house and they will arrest A at all cost. Despite the count of three, A did not surrender. Hence, the
police officers broke opened the door of the House of B, and upon entering, the police officers immediately
shot A in rapid succession. A died. The police officers are now being prosecuted for the death of A. But, they
invoke fulfillment of duty as a justifying circumstance (JC). If you are the judge, will you appreciate fulfillment
of duty?
A: If I am the judge, I will not appreciate the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty in favor of the accused
police officers. Although the first element is present, the second element is absent because the act of
immediately shooting A in rapid succession instead of arresting him is not the unavoidable and necessary
consequence of the police officers' due performance of duty. Hence, I will not appreciate the JC in favor of the
accused. However, I will appreciate the PMC of Incomplete fulfillment of duty.
This justifying circumstance has only two elements, and based on the rules, if there are only two elements, the
presence of one is considered as majority, hence, it will be a privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete
fulfillment of duty.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Exempting circumstances are those which, if present or attendant in the commission of a felony, would serve to
exempt the offender from criminal liability but not from civil liability. The said offender is absolved from
criminal liability but not from civil liability because a wrong has indeed been committed. He is only exempted
from criminal liability, reason of that is, the offender acted without voluntariness. There is no voluntariness in
the commission of the crime when any of the elements of voluntariness is absent either criminal intent,
criminal action, or intelligence.
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Either of these elements for voluntariness is absent at the time the offender committed the crime, therefore he
will be exempted from criminal liability but not from civil liability. While in case of justifying circumstance, there
is no crime, there is no criminal, and there is no criminal and civil liability, in case of exempting, there is a wrong,
a crime, but there is no criminal because he acted without voluntariness, hence, there is no criminal liability but
there is civil liability because a wrong, a violation of the law had been done.
Insofar as mitigating circumstances are concerned, just like justifying circumstances, it is both an admission
and avoidance on the part of the accused. The moment the accused invokes any of the exempting
circumstances under Article 12, he in effect admits the acts alleged in the information but he is trying to save
himself from responsibility by saying that he should be exempted, he acted without voluntariness.
IMBECILE
An imbecile person is one who is already advanced in age, but he has only the mental capacity of a child. An
imbecile person has no lucid interval. Imbecility is at all times exempting unlike insanity.
INSANITY
Refers to the total mental aberration of the mind. Because of the total mental aberration of the mind, this
person cannot distinguish right from wrong and would not know the consequence of his acts. For insanity to
exempt the offender from criminal liability, it must occur immediately prior to or at the time of the commission
of the crime. Even if the offender invokes insanity, if it is proven that he acted during lucid interval, still, he can
be criminally liable.
Based on the Civil Code, the law presumes that every man is sane. It is the law itself that presumes every man,
all men, to be sane, all men to be of sound mind. Therefore, otherwise stated, the law presumes that all acts
done by a person are voluntary, and it is improper to say that he did the said acts unconsciously. Therefore, any
person/offender who claims the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt that he was insane immediately prior to or at the time of the commission of the crime.
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the crime. He is deprived
of discernment to understand right from wrong.
PEOPLE vs. PILEN, G.R. No. 254875. February 13, 2023 [J. HERNANDO CASE, BEYOND CUT-OFF DATE]
Q: X engaged in a shooting spree. Nagwala! He kept on shooting everyone. X was charged with two counts of
murder and two counts of frustrated murder for engaging in a shooting spree. In his defense, X claimed
insanity and moved for an acquittal. To prove insanity, X testified in open court that he was on his way to his
brother's house when he was called by Y to join their drinking spree. While he was having this drinking spree
with Y and his group, he was forced by Y and his peers to take a substance. Later, it was identified to be a
dangerous drug. According to X, after taking this dangerous drug, he fell from his seat and lost
consciousness. When he woke up, he was already inside the prison cell. In order to prove X inside at the time
of the commission of the crime, the defense presented only X. The defense didn't bother to present a doctor
to corroborate X's testimony on the effects of the drug. to corroborate X testimony on the effects of the
terrorist. Will insanity exempt him from criminal liability?
A: NO, insanity will not exempt X from criminal liability.
In the case of People vs. Pilen, the Supreme Court said, the accused's claim of insanity is self-serving,
unsubstantiated, and wanting in material terms. First, according to the Supreme Court, an accused's mental
condition is under scrutiny. An accused, who is claiming to be mentally disabled cannot competently testify on
his state of insanity. An insane person would have no understanding or recollection of his action and behavioral
patterns. Second, SC said, there was no doctor and/or expert witness presented by the defense to testify on the
mental state of the accused from the medical stand. Supreme Court said although medical expert testimony
are not indispensable, they however helped the court to ascertain whether the behavior of the accused arose
from a mental disease. Based on the facts of the case, since a doctor was not presented, there was no
evidence to show the connection of the said drugs and accused's alleged mental condition. There was no
evidence that said dangerous drugs is the cause of the accused's violent acts. Hence, insanity has to fail as an
exempting circumstance.
MINORITY
Under Section 6 of R.A. 9344 as amended by R.A. 10630, a child in conflict with the law:
1.
15 years or under at the time of the commission of the crime, shall be totally exempt from the criminal
liability regardless of discernment; and
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2.
Above 15 but below 18 years of age shall be exempt from criminal liability unless he acted with
discernment. When he acted with discernment, he shall be prosecuted in court.
The moment the child in conflict with law is 15 or below, regardless of discernment, he is totally exempted from
criminal liability. If the child in conflict of the law is above 15 but below 18 and he acted without discernment,
he is exempted from criminal liability. However, if the child in conflict of law is above 15 but below 18, and he
acted with discernment, then he shall be prosecuted in court.
Q: While the cousin of X was going home, late at night, X forcibly grabbed his cousin, X covered her mouth,
brought her down and then thereafter raped her. After the rape, X killed the cousin. Bruises all over the
cousin's body was found the following day. X learned that he was one of the suspects. The moment X learned
that he was one of the suspects, X left the place and went to another province. He changed his name and
used an alias to prevent detection. X at the time of the commission of the crime was 17 years old. What case
should be filed against X?
A: X should be charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide under Article 266-B of the RPC
as amended. X killed his cousin by reason or on occasion of rape. Although X was only 17 at the time of the
crime, X acted with discernment.
In the case of People v. Madali, Infra the Supreme Court defined discernment as the mental capacity of a minor
to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. In this case, based on the facts, X acted with
discernment in carrying out the crime. First, X perpetrated the crime in a dark and isolated place. Second, X
knowing that he has been tagged as a suspect, he evaded authorities by fleeing to another town, concealing his
identity using an alias. Third, the victim of the rape, the cousin, was raped by means of force. And this is
revealed by the bruises, the contusions all over the girl's body. Therefore, X although 17 years old committed
the crime with an understanding of the gravity and consequences of his acts. Hence, he shall be prosecuted in
court.
MADALI vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 180380, August 4, 2009
In this case, there is an act of discernment when the minor knows the consequences and circumstances of his
act. Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.
Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances.
Q: What if due to a protracted trial, the case against Y was terminated when Y was already 20 years old. So he
is already an adult at the time of the promulgation of the judgment. What is the duty of the court?
A: The duty of the court is still to suspend the sentence without need of application. Section 38, last sentence
of R.A. 9344 further states that suspension of sentence shall be applied even if the juvenile is already 18 years
of age or more at the time of the promulgation of the judgment. Therefore, even if Y is already an adult, 20
years old, at the time of the promulgation of the judgment, still, he is entitled to a suspended sentence without
need of application as expressly required and ordered by the last sentence of Section 38 of R.A. 9344.
Q: What if due to protracted trial, when the judge promulgated the judgment, X, who is 17 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime, was already 22 years old at the time of the promulgation of the judgment?
Should the judge still suspend the sentence to be imposed on X?
A: No more. The court shall render the judgment of conviction. However, the penalty to be imposed shall
consider the PMC of minority based on Art. 68 (2) of the RPC. As such, it shall be lowered by 1 degree.
Likewise, X shall be entitled to Section 52 of RA 9344 that is in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution,
he shall serve his sentence in agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised, and controlled by the Bureau of Correction in coordination with DSWD. The trial court
can no longer place X under suspended sentence because as provided for under Section 40 of RA 9344, the
suspended sentence can be given or extended only until the CICL reaches the maximum age of 21 years old.
Here, at the time of promulgation of judgment, X is already 22 years old.
ACCIDENT
Elements of Accident
1.
2.
3.
4.
That the offender is performing a lawful act;
He is performing the lawful act with due care;
He caused an injury by mere accident;
There was no fault, no intent on the part of the said offender.
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Q: X went to the house of Y. X dared Y and challenged him to come out. This compelled Z who heard the
challenge to intervene. Z went to X and tried to pacify him. However, instead of being pacified, X attacked Z.
When X attacked Z, this caused Y to go out of the house. Seeing that X was carrying a revolver, Y tried to [get]
the said revolver from X and so the both of them grappled with each other for the control of the said gun. At
that point, the revolver fired twice. X was hit and died. Can Y interpose the exempting circumstance of
accident?
A: NO. Y cannot interpose the exempting circumstance of accident. Since the revolver fired twice, it cannot be
said that the firing was merely accidental. The second element of accident, that the offender must perform the
lawful act with due care; and the fourth element that the injury caused was without fault on the part of the
offender, are absent. Both the second and the fourth element are absent. The revolver firing twice, cannot be
attributed to the unintentional pulling of the hammer of the gun during the forceful grapple, or wrestle for the
control of the gun. Therefore, accident will not lie in favor of the accused.
PEOPLE vs. REYES, G.R. No. L-33154 February 27, 1976
A revolver is not prone to accidental firing if it were simply being handed over to the deceased as appellant
claims because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure was exerted on
the trigger in the process of allegedly handing it over If it were uncooked, then considerable pressure had to be
applied on the trigger to fire the revolver. Either way, the shooting of the deceased must have been intentional
because pressure on the trigger is necessary to make the gun fire, cocked or uncocked.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Mitigating circumstances are those circumstances which, if present or attended in the commission of a felony
would serve to lower the imposable penalty because there is a diminution of the offender’s voluntariness in the
commission of the crime. In exempting circumstances, there is totally no voluntariness in the commission of
the crime.
Therefore, exempting circumstances frees the offender from criminal liability. In case of mitigating
circumstances, there is only a diminution on the voluntariness of the offender in the commission of the crime. It
will not exempt the offender from criminal liability but it will definitely lower the imposable penalty on the part
of the said offender in case of conviction.
KINDS OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Ordinary mitigating circumstances; and
Ordinary mitigating circumstances are those which may be offset by generic aggravating circumstances. If not
offset, its effect is to lower the imposable penalty to the minimum period of the penalty prescribed by law.
2. Privileged mitigating circumstances
Privileged mitigating circumstances are those circumstances which cannot be offset by any aggravating
circumstance. Privileged mitigating circumstances would mean the lowering of the penalty by one to two
degrees. The penalty will be lowered not by period but by degrees.
PRAETER INTENTIONEM
Elements of Praeter Intentionem
1. That a felony has been committed; and
2. That there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the offender and the resulting felony.
SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR THREAT
Elements of Sufficient Provocation or Threat
1. That the provocation must be sufficient;
2. The said provocation must originate from the offended party; and 3. The provocation must be immediate to
the commission of the crime by the person provoked.
NOTE: Based on the third element, the law requires that the provocation must be immediate to the commission
of the crime by the accused or the person provoked. The word “immediate” here does not allow a lapse of time
– right after the victim provoked the accused, the accused committed this wrongful act against the said victim.
No lapse of time in between the provocation and the commission of the crime by the accused.
Q: X and Y were having a drinking spree with their co-workers. While X and Y were having a drinking spree
with their co-workers, Y started bullying X. X answered back and confronted Y. A heated argument ensued
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between the both of them. Thereafter, they are now fighting. A fist fight ensued. While X and Y were
exchanging fist blows against one another, X landed a strong punch on the right jaw of Y. Y lost
consciousness. While Y was brought to the hospital, he died, days thereafter. X is now being prosecuted for
homicide. What circumstances may X claim?
A: X may claim the mitigating circumstances of praetor intentionem, that the offender has no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed, and the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation.
First, as to praeter intentionem, X has no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. All the
elements of praeter intention are present: 1) a felony of homicide has been committed, and 2) there is a notable
disparity between the means employed by X, punching the jaw of Y during a fist fight, and the resulting felony
which is homicide. No one could have foreseen that death would result out of one punch on the cheek.
Therefore, praeter intentionem is present.
Likewise, X may claim the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation. All the elements are present; 1) Y's
act of bullying X was an improper act sufficient to steer X into a fight, 2) the provocation originated from the
victim Y, and 3) Y's provocation was immediate to the commission of the crime by X. All the elements of
sufficient provocation are present.
Hence, X can claim the MC of praeter intentionem and sufficient provocation
Q: X came from a fiesta. Going home, X was passing by the house of Y. X picked up stones on the ground, and
then threw the stones at the house of Y. The stones hit the roof and the door of the house of Y. Y was mad!
"Who was throwing stones at my house?" Y got out of the house. Y chased X, and then thereafter, Y hacked X
three times at the back. Y is now being prosecuted for the crime of frustrated homicide. Y argued that he
merely acted in self-defense. Is there self-defense or at least incomplete self-defense? If there is none, what
mitigating circumstances may be considered in favor of Y?
A: There is neither self-defense nor incomplete self-defense. There is neither the justifying circumstance of
self-defense nor the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, because it is the element of unlawful
aggression that is absent.
X's act of merely throwing stones at the house of Y will not amount to unlawful aggression. X's act of throwing
stones at the house of Y hitting merely the roof and the door of the house and Y did not put peril on the life and
limb of Y. Therefore, it does not amount to unlawful aggression. Since unlawful aggression is the element that
is absent, there is neither self defense nor incomplete self-defense.
However, X act of hurling stones, according to the case of Miranda vs. People, may be regarded as sufficient
provocation. Although X's act of hurling stones at the house of Y cannot be considered as unlawful aggression,
such act was vexatious, improper, and enough to excite or stir the accused into anger and to commit the crime.
Therefore, Y may claim the MC of sufficient provocation.
IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
Elements of Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense
1. There be a grave offense to the one committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree; and
2. The said act or grave offense must be the proximate cause of the commission of the crime.
PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
Elements of Passion or Obfuscation
1. There be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation on the part of the
accused; and
2. The act that produced the passion and obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time during which the offender might have recovered his normal
equanimity.
Q: X arrived home. X found Y raping his sister. Upon seeing X, Y ran away. But X took his Bolo. X ran after Y
and X hacked Y. Charged with a crime of homicide, X claimed he merely acted in defense of a relative,
particularly in defense of his sister's son. Is X defense meritorious? If not, can X claim the benefit of any
mitigating circumstance?
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A: X's defense has no merit. The justying circumstance of defense of a relative is not present, because at the
time X hacked Y, Y was already running away after raping the sister. The first element of defense of a relative's
unlawful aggression is already absent because it has already ceased to exist.
However, X may claim the mitigating circumstances of immediate vindication (IV) of a grave offense and
sudden impulse of passion and obfuscation (P&O). All the elements of IV are present: 1) Y's act of raping X's
sister was a grave offense, and 2) X's act of killing Y was done in IV of the said grave offense.
X may also claim sudden impulse of P&O. All the elements are present: 1) Y's act of raping X's sister was an
unlawful act that produced P&O on the part of X, and 2) X's act of killing Y was done immediately after the rape.
Hence, it was not far removed from the commission of the act of rape by considerable length of time during
which the offender might have recovered his normal equanimity. Hence, there is also the sudden impulse of
passion and obfuscation.
Q: Since both MCs are present, should the judge consider both mitigating circumstances in favor of acts?
A: NO, see People vs. Pagal, Infra
PEOPLE v. PAGAL, G.R. No. L-32040 | 25 October 1977 and PEOPLE vs. IGNAS, G.R. Nos. 140514-15 |
September 30, 2003
As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People v. Pagal, if sufficient provocation, immediate vindication of
a grave offense, and sudden impulse of passion and obfuscation are all present in the commission of a crime,
or if any two of them are present, like immediate vindication of a grave offense and sudden impulse of passion
and obfuscation, Supreme Court said, they should be treated only as one mitigating circumstance if they arose
from the same facts and circumstances. So, they shall be considered only as one mitigating circumstance in
the computation of penalty, not as two mitigating circumstances.
Q: The judge convicted the accused of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide (RwH). Can the
judge consider the MC of sudden P&O as claimed by the accused?
A: NO. See People vs. Pagal
PEOPLE v. PAGAL, Supra
Passion or obfuscation cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance in a crime that was planned and
calmly meditated upon before its actual execution. Pagal and Torcelino planned and meditated the said act of
robbery with homicide before actually doing it. Therefore, SC said it cannot be said that there was passion or
obfuscation.
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND VOLUNTARY PLEA OF GUILT
Elements of Voluntary Surrender
1. The offender has not been actually arrested;
2. He surrendered to a person in authority or his agent; and
3. The said surrender is voluntary in nature.
NOTE: Surrender is said to be voluntary in nature when it is done spontaneously and unconditionally. The
Supreme Court has said that there must be the element of spontaneity in the act of surrendering. The said
offender either felt remorse and he wanted to confess his guilty or he wanted to save the government the time,
efforts and expenses that they would incur if they looked for him in order to arrest him.
Q: X and Y, husband and wife, were quarreling. In the course of the said quarrel, X stabbed his wife on the
chest. The neighbors called the police. When the police arrived, they found X sitting at a door, crying. X
voluntarily went with the police. X was brought to the police station for questioning. There was no resistance,
no struggle on the part of X. Thereafter, X was charged with a criminal parricide. X claimed voluntary
surrender as a mitigating circumstance. Should the judge consider voluntary surrender in favor of X?
A: NO. The judge should not consider voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance in favor of X. The
essence of voluntary surrender based on the third element is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give
himself up, to submit himself to the authorities, either because he acknowledges guilt or he wishes to save the
authorities from the trouble and expenses that they may incur if they search and capture him.
Based on the facts, there was no showing of spontaneity on the part of X because he wasn't the one who called
for the police authorities. It was the neighbors. Although X did not resist, although X did not put up any struggle
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when the police officers brought him to the police station for questioning, such lack of resistance does not
equate to voluntary surrender.
PEOPLE v. SABALBERINO, G.R. No 241088 | 03 June 2019
SC said that the voluntariness of one’s surrender should denote a positive act and not a mere compliant or
submissive behavior in the presence of public authorities.
VOLUNTARY PLEA OF GUILT
Elements of Voluntary Plea of Guilt
1. The plea of guilt must be done spontaneously & unconditionally;
2. The plea of guilt must be done in open court; and
3. The plea of guilt must be done before the presentation of evidence of the prosecution.
ARTICLE 14. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Aggravating circumstances are those circumstances, which if present or attendant in the commission of a
felony, would serve to increase the imposable penalty without, however, going beyond the maximum penalty
prescribed by law. Therefore, no matter how many aggravating circumstances have attended the commission
of the crime, the Court cannot impose a penalty more than or beyond the maximum penalty prescribed by law –
that is the limit. The different kinds of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 are as follows:
1) Generic Aggravating Circumstances;
Generic Aggravating Circumstances are those which apply to all kinds of crimes. Whatever be the crime, this
generic aggravating circumstance may be considered.
2) Specific Aggravating Circumstances;
Apply only to certain or particular crimes.
Example: By express provision of the law, Paragraph 16 of Article 14, treachery can be considered only in
crimes against persons.
3) Inherent Aggravating Circumstances;
Inherent Aggravating Circumstances are those which are considered as elements in the commission of the
crime. Hence, their presence would no longer increase the imposable penalty because they are already
considered absorbed. They are considered as inherent elements in the commission of the crime.
4) Special Aggravating Circumstances;
Those which are present in the commission of the crime would mean the imposition of the maximum penalty
prescribed by law. Therefore, it cannot be offset by any mitigating circumstance. The moment a special
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, automatically, the penalty to be imposed is
the maximum penalty prescribed by law. It cannot be offset by any mitigating circumstance.
5) Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances.
Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances are those which change the nature of the crime to bring about a higher
crime, a more serious crime with a higher penalty, or even without changing the nature of the crime, it brings
about the imposition of a higher penalty.
Q: Are justifying, exempting and mitigating circumstances alleged in the information just like aggravating
circumstances?
A: NO. JC, EC and MC are never alleged in the information because these are matters of defenses on the part of
the accused. It is the accused that has the burden of proving JC, EC or MC because it is in his favor. It is within
his defense. What you allege in the information, which is filed by the Office of the Public Prosecutor, are the
elements of the crime and the ACs, because its effect is to increase the imposable penalty. Therefore, the
accused must be given the opportunity to rebut it. These elements and ACs alleged in the information must be
proven by the state beyond reasonable doubt, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused.
DISREGARD OF RANK, AGE, OR SEX, OR DWELLING OF THE OFFENDED PARTY, IF THE LATTER HAS NOT
GIVEN PROVOCATION
There are four aggravating circumstances:
1. Disregard of rank;
2. Disregard of age;
3. Disregard of sex; and
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4.
Crimes committed in the dwelling of the offended party.
DISREGARD OF RANK
There is disregard of rank when the offender deliberately disrespected and insulted the high social standing of
the victim in society in the commission of the crime.
DISREGARD OF AGE
There is disregard of age when the offender, in committing the crime, deliberately insulted, disrespected, either
the minor or senior age of the victim in the commission of the crime.
DISREGARD OF SEX
There is disregard of sex when the offender, in the commission of the crime, deliberately insulted the state of
womanhood of the victim.
CRIMES COMMITTED IN THE DWELLING OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
Dwelling refers to any building which is used for rest or comfort by any person. Dwelling is considered as an
aggravating circumstance if the offender committed a crime against victim when the victim is inside his
dwelling.
TREACHERY
There is treachery when the following elements are present: 1. That the offender deliberately and consciously
adopted the ways, means, and methods employed by him in the execution of the crime. 2. By reason of the said
ways, means, and methods, the victim was not able to put up any defense. (At the time of the attack, the
Q: A is a stay out helper in the house of X. A connived with his friends B and C to rob the house. When X and
his wife went out, A allowed his two friend to enter the house and together they axed the lock of every closed
cabinets and they ransacked the house. They took all the cash, all the jewelries, all other valuables that they
could find inside the house. When they were about to leave, they heard the car of X coming. Upon hearing this,
the three friends went to hiding. A hid behind the door. B hid under the sofa. C hid at the back of the cabinet.
The moment X and Y entered their house, A, B and C came out from hiding and axed both X and Y to death. At
the time, X and Y were both 70 years old. A, B and C are now being prosecuted for the special complex from a
robbery with homicide (RwH). Are the aggravating circumstances of disregard of rank and age, dwelling and
treachery present?
A: The aggravating circumstances of disregard of rank and age is not present. The aggravating circumstances
of disregard of rank and age can be taken into account only in Crimes Against Persons those under Title 8 and
in Crimes Against Honor those under Title 13 when the commission of the crime has the intent to insult and
disrespect the center of our age.
RwH is a crime against property and not a crime against person. Homicide is merely an incident of the robbery
because robbery is the main purpose. Hence, disregard of rank and age cannot be considered in the special
context of RwH.
Dwelling is present as an aggravating circumstance because the crime was committed in the privacy of X and
Y's dwelling. Dwelling is not inherent in the special complex crime of RwH, hence, it should be appreciated as
an AC because the author of the crime [would not] have committed the heinous crime without having to violate
the domicile of the victim.
The aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. RwH is classified as a crime against property.
Nevertheless, treachery may be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in this crime if the victim of
the homicide is killed treacherously. Based on the facts, A, B, and C deliberately and consciously adopted the
manner of killing X and Y by hiding first before the actual assault. Hence, they render the said victims totally
without defense. However, in a special context of RwH, the aggravating circumstance is appreciated only in the
crime of homicide or the act of killing but not as to the robbery, therefore it is only considered as a GMC, the
presence of which will merit the imposition of the higher penalty.
Q: X, Y, and Z were security guards on duty at Century Glass Center. After they ate their dinner, they heard
knocks at the gate. When X opened the gate, W was there. W was a fellow security guard. X inquired from W
what he was doing there. W said he wanted to inquire if he could already report for duty. X told W that he can
inquire from the operations manager. X allowed W to get in the premises. While inside, W told X that Z had
been saying bad things about X. X cautioned W to keep quiet because Z was just inside. However, Z overheard
the conversation between X and W and so Z went to W and inquired from W what he was saying. At that
moment, W started cursing at Z. W was accusing Z of being the reason why he lost his job as a security guard.
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A heated exchange / argument ensued between W and Z. X tried to pacify the two by leading and pulling W
out of the premises. However, W continued to shout and curse at Z, and Z also shouted against W. Thereafter,
W drew his caliber 38 gun, pulled the trigger and shot Z on the neck. When Z dropped on the head, W
approached him and proceeded to shoot him on the head. W is now being prosecuted for murder qualified by
treachery. Is W liable as charged?
A: W is not liable as charge. W is liable only for the crime of homicide because the act of killing was not
attended by treachery. It is settled that "chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of
the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of
opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack."
In this case, W had a heated altercation with Z before he lost his patience and he shot Z. W shot Z because he
got fed up and he was carried away by his anger arising from their confrontation. When Z slumped on the
ground, after having been shot in the neck, W still moved closer and thereafter he shot Z on the head.
Based on this, W's acts were the result of a sudden impulse a spur-of-the-moment decision due to the said
previous heated altercation between him and the victim, there is no showing that it was planned and deliberate
action. Therefore, the first element of treachery is absent. There is no showing that W consciously employed a
particular mode of attack in order to facilitate the killing of the victim without risking. Hence, W can be
convicted only of homicide.
PEOPLE v. ALEGRE, G.R. No. 254381; February 14, 2022 [J. HERNANDO CASE]
Jurisprudence provides that "chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the
moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of
opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack." Stated otherwise, there can
be no treachery when the attack is preceded by a heated exchange of words between the accused and the
victim, or when the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former.
Based on the attendant facts, Alegre’s acts were more of a result of a sudden impulse or a spur of the moment
decision due to his previous heated altercation with the victim, rather than a planned and deliberate action.
There is no showing that Alegre employed a particular mode of attack in order to facilitate the killing without
any risk to himself. It appears that Alegre shot Pascua because he got fed up and was carried away by the
anger arising from his confrontation with the deceased
Q: Is the killing of a sleeping victim attended with treachery?
A: YES. See People vs. Dela Peña, Infra
PEOPLE v. DELA PEÑA, G.R. No. 186541 | 12 February 2012
FACTS: The son of the victim was on his way to their nipa hut when he saw Dela Peña enter the nipa hut where
his father was sleeping. The victim was then lying face down when Dela Peña stabbed him at the back with a
bolo. Dela Peña claimed self-defense and his brother-in-law, Olipio (victim) was the unlawful aggressor when
the latter pulled out his bolo and thrust the same towards him. Then they wrestled for the possession of the
bolo to which Dela Peña was able to get hold of, then stabbed the victim. Prosecuted for murder, qualified by
treachery, and aggravated by relationship.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that treachery attends the killing whenever the accused attacks the victim
while the victim is fast asleep and unable to defend himself. A sleeping victim is not in a position to defend
himself, to take flight, or to avoid assault. Therefore, the fact that the attack was done by the accused when the
victim was fast asleep, this will ensure that the crime will be successfully executed without any risk to the
attacker or the accused. Killing a sleeping victim will always be qualified by treachery.
PEOPLE V. MORENO Y TAZON, G.R. NO. 191759; MARCH 2, 2020
Appellant's sudden attack on Mijares while asleep in his own home amply demonstrates treachery in the
commission of the crime. Mijares had no inkling of the impending attack that night; or any peril to his person as
he felt secured in his home. Mijares was not able to put up an effective defense. Although he kicked and
pushed the appellant out of their room, this did not negate the presence of treachery. Treachery must still be
appreciated even if the victim was able to retaliate as a result of his reflexes, so long as he did not have the
opportunity to repel the initial assault. Further, the SC found that the appellant consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods or form of attack in order to ensure the execution of the crime. stabbed
Mijares several times so that he would not be a risk to himself. He lodged a bladed weapon on the victim's
chest and back. Indeed, the attack on Mijares was treacherous thereby qualifying the killing to murder.
NOTE: What matters is the initial assault even if he was able to retaliate as a result of reflexes.
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Q: Can evident premeditation (EP) be appreciated in the special complex crime of RwH?
A: YES. If there is EP to kill the victim, aside from stealing, EP is considered as a GMC. EP may only be a GMC if
it is proved that the plan is not only to rob but also to kill.
Q: X is a public school teacher. X went to the market to buy some food. On her way home, she boarded a
jeepney. Among the passengers in the jeepney was Y who is an ex-convict who served sentence for frustrated
homicide and Y has been courting X. The jeep stopped at the station and all passengers alighted. It was
6:30PM. X had to walk one kilometer in order to reach home from the station. After X had walked some
distance, Y who was walking beside X, suddenly pulled out a dagger and pointed it to X. Y told X, "Do not
shout or I will kill you." Thereafter, Y placed his arm on the neck of X and the dagger was pointed at the chest
of X. Y then dragged X, and brought her in a creek near a coconut tree, without any houses. While pointing the
said knife, Y ordered X to stand up and then thereafter, he bent her body downwards with her hands and knees
resting on the ground. In that position, Y placed himself behind her and then thereafter inserted his penis into
her vagina in the dog's way of sexual intercourse. Accused is now being prosecuted for the crime of rape. The
information alleged the following aggravating circumstances:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Abuse of superior strength.
Night time.
Uninhabited place.
Ignominy.
Reiteración
If you are the judge, will you consider these aggravating circumstances alleged in the information for rape?
A:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Abuse of superior strength cannot be considered. Abuse of superior strength will not be considered
because abuse of superior strength is inherent in the crime of rape hence it is absorbed in the element
of force. Hence, it can no longer be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Nighttime will not be considered because based on the facts, there is no showing that Y deliberately
sought the cover of darkness in order to consummate the crime, to facilitate the commission of the
crime. It just so happened that when the jeepney stopped, it was 6.30PM. Therefore, nighttime cannot
be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
An uninhabited place is present. Based on the facts, the accused dragged the victim at the point of
dagger towards a creek near a coconut tree, wherein there were no houses. This was done by him in
order to attain his purpose, without any interference, in order to consummate the crimeI. It is without
any interference, to ensure its commission. Therefore, uninhabited place as an AC can be considered.
Ignominy can be considered because the accused used not only the missionary position, that is, male
superior, female inferior. In this case, the accused raped the victim in a dog style position. In the same
position as dogs do --entry from behind.
Q: But what if the accused countered that, based on studies of experts, this dog-style position in sexual
intercourse is not novel, and it is often resorted to by couples in their act of copulation. Will such defense
merit the appreciation of ignominy?
A: SC said NO. According to the Supreme Court, that is only true if the sexual act is performed by consenting
partners, but not when it is an act of rape done, the sexual sexual intercourse being done by means of force,
threat, or intimidation.
PEOPLE vs. SAYLAN, G.R. No. L-36941 June 29, 1984
There was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male supenor female
inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind.
5.
The last aggravating circumstance alleged is reiteration. There is no reiteracion because the former
crime for which Y has been convicted, frustrated homicide, and for which he has served sentence,
carries a lighter penalty than that of rape. Frustrated homicide is only penalized by prision mayor. Rape
is penalized by reclusion perpetua. Therefore, reiteration cannot be considered against the accused.
DIFFERENT FORMS OF HABITUALITY*
1. Recidivism;
2. Habituality;
3. Habitual delinquency;
4. Quasi-recidivism.
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RECIDIVISM
1.
2.
3.
4.
REITERACION /
HABITUALITY
That the offender is 1.
on trial for one crime;
At the time of the 2.
said trial, he has
been
previously
convicted by final
judgment of another
crime;
Both the first crime
and
the
second
crime are embraced
in the same title of
the RPC; and
The offender is also
convicted of the new 3.
crime for which he is
on trial.
4.
The offender is on
trial for one crime;
At the time of the
said trial, he has
previously
served
sentence
for
an
offense to which the
law
attaches
an
equal
or
greater
penalty or for two or
more
crimes
to
which
the
law
attaches
lighter
penalties;
He is also convicted
of the new crime for
which he is on trial;
and
The crimes are not
embraced in the
same title of the
Revised Penal Code.
(Jurisprudential)
HABITUAL
DELINQUENCY
QUASI-RECIDIVISM
A person shall be
deemed to be habitual
delinquent, is within a
period of ten years from
the date of his release or
last conviction of the
crimes
of
serious
physical injuries, less
serious physical injuries,
robbery, theft, estafa,
falsification, he is found
guilty of any of said
crimes a third time or
oftener.
Under Article 160, a
person is said to be a
quasi-recidivist if after
having been convicted by
a final judgment, he shall
commit a felony before
serving out his sentence
or while service of
sentence. The maximum
period shall be imposed.
FRETSeL
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Serious
physical
injuries;
Less serious physical
injuries;
Robbery;
Theft;
Estafa or
Falsification --
Recidivism requires at Under
the
second
least two (2) convictions element there are two
–
situations;
1. The first conviction 1. If it is only one crime
for the first crime
it is necessary that
committed
is
a
the said crime must
conviction by final
carry a penalty equal
judgment;
to or greater than the
2. The
second
second crime;
conviction is that for 2. If there are two
which the court will
crimes for which he
consider
the
had been previously
aggravating
punished,
it
is
circumstance
of
necessary that they
recidivism.
carry
a
lighter
penalties than the
new crime for which
he is convicted.
1.
General Aggravating Circumstance
Extraordinary AC
2.
3.
4.
The
crime
is 1. The first crime may
specified should be
be any crime.
serious
physical 2. The second crime
injuries, less serious
must be a felony.
physical
injuries,
robbery, theft, estafa; NOTE: It cannot be offset
There should be at by
any
mitigating
least
three circumstances.
convictions;
Each
convictions
must come within
ten year from date of
release
or
last
conviction of the
previous crime;
Special AC
* See Golden Notes - Criminal Law, Page 117 for complete table comparison
NOTE: Extraordinary Aggravating Circumstance
If recidivism and reiteracion are both generic aggravating circumstances, habitual delinquency under Art. 62 is
an extraordinary aggravating circumstance because its effect is the imposition of an additional penalty. If the
offender is found to be a habitual delinquent, aside from the penalty prescribed by law for the crime that he has
committed, an additional penalty shall be imposed on him for being a habitual delinquent. The limitation is that
– if you add the penalty for the crime that he has committed, and the additional penalty for being a habitual
delinquent, they should not exceed thirty years as provided for under Art. 62. So, habitual delinquency is an
extraordinary aggravating circumstance.
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Q: X was convicted of rape and granted absolute pardon by the president. Five years after, X is convicted of
homicide. Is X a recidivist?
A: YES, he is a recidivist. All the elements are present: 1) X is on trial for homicide, 2) During the said trial, he
has been previously convicted of rape, 3) both rape and homicide are under Title 8, crimes against persons, and
4) He was also convicted of the crime of homicide.
The grant that he was granted pardon by the president, excuses him only form service of sentence but it does
not erase the effects of the crime. Hence, it does not erase the fact that he was a convicted felon for the crime
of rape. Therefore, he is a recidivist.
Q: What if X was convicted of malicious mischief? He was sentenced by the court to suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor, maximum of six months. Since his penalty is within the probationable penalty, X filed an
application for probation. The judge granted X's application for probation. After the termination of probation,
X committed slight physical injuries. X is convicted of slight physical injuries. Can reiteración be considered
against him?
A: NO, reiteración cannot be considered against him because the second element is absent. The first element
requires that the offender is on trial for one crime. He is on trial for slight physical injuries. Second element. He
has previously served sentence for offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or
more crimes to which the law attaches lighter penalty. The second element is absent. X did not serve sentence
on the first crime of malicious mischief because X applied for probation and the said probation was granted by
the court.
MORENO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550 | 10 August 2006
Moreno should not be disqualified. The Supreme Court ruled that probation is not equivalent to service of
sentence. In this case, under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, it is expressly provided that he cannot
run for any local position within two (2) years after serving sentence. Here, he has filed for probation, therefore,
he did not serve sentence. The phrase “within two (2) years after serving sentence” is not applicable insofar as
Moreno is concerned because the effect of probation is to suspend the execution of the sentence. Therefore,
he never served sentence the moment he applied and was granted probation.
Q: After trial, X was found to be both a recidivist and a habitual delinquent. Can the trial judge consider both
the circumstances against X?
A: YES, See People vs. Melendrez, Infra
PEOPLE VS. MELENDREZ, G.R. NO. L-39913, DECEMBER 19, 1933
As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People v. Melendrez, if the offender is both a recidivist and a
habitual delinquent, both can be considered against him because they have different effects in the commission
of the crime. For being a recidivist, if recidivism is not upset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance, then the
penalty for simple robbery shall be in its maximum period. For being a habitual delinquent, the court shall
impose an additional penalty on X, provided: if you add the penalty for simple robbery and the additional penalty
for being a habitual delinquent, they must not exceed thirty (30) years.
NOTE: The aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account in imposing the principal
penalty in its corresponding degree, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant is also sentenced to suffer an
additional penalty as a habitual delinquent.
Q: X was charged with homicide. During the trial, evidence showed that based on the medical certificates
presented, X had sustained injuries in 10 previous occasions when he engaged in fisticuffs with different
persons. Evidence also showed that X was also confined at the National Mental Institution for mental ailment
diagnosed [with] homicidal and suicidal instincts. During his second confinement at the mental institution, X
escaped. Upon his conviction for the crime of homicide, the public prosecutor objected to the application of
the indeterminate sentence law, arguing that the accused, X, is a habitual delinquent and an escapee from the
mental institution, therefore, the ISLAW cannot be applied to him. If you are the judge on the said case, how
will you rule on the objections raised by the public prosecutor.
A: If I were the judge, the objection must be overruled.
First, X is not a habitual delinquent. Habitual delinquency, an extraordinary aggravating circumstance, can be
validly invoked only if it is alleged in the information and proven during trial. In this case, there is no evidence
showing based on the facts that X has been convicted within 10 years from last conviction or release of the
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three crimes of serious physical injuries, less physical injuries, robbery, theft, and estafa or falsification
(FRETSeL).
Second, X, although an escapee from the mental institution will not disqualify him from availing the ISLAW.
What Section 2 of the ISLAW disqualifies are those offenders who escape from confinement or evaded the
service of their sentence. Confinement and evasion of service of sentence presupposes imprisonment by
conviction of final judgment, not being held in a mental institution.
Q: X is an officer at the National Penitentiary. One morning, X was conducting an inmate movement rounds at
the Bilibid, when suddenly X was attacked with a bladed weapon by Y. Y is an inmate serving life
imprisonment for carnapping wherein he killed the car owner. After stabbing X, Y, wanting to escape, took the
keys from X and then he ran as fast as he could hoping to escape but he was arrested. X was brought to the
hospital but X died. Is Y a quasi-recidivist?
A: YES. Y is a quasi-recidivist. Y committed the felonies of qualified direct assault with murder and attempted
evasion of service of sentence while serving his sentence for the crime of carnapping. A quasi-recidivst is one
who after having been convicted by final judgment, shall commit a felony while service his sentence. In this
case, Y committed a felony while serving sentence for carnapping. Therefore, he is a quasi-recidivist.
Q: X shot and killed Y with an unlicensed firearm. The police officers filed two cases against X, one for
homicide, another for illegal possession of firearm under RA 10951. These complaints were filed before the
office of the public prosecutor. The defense counsel, in the counter-affidavit argued, that there should only be
one charge to be filed against X -- the complex crime of Homicide with Illegal Possession of Firearms
because the use of that licensed firearm was a necessary means to commit homicide. If you are the public
prosecutor, how will you resolve the case?
A: If I am the public prosecutor, I will file against X an information for homicide with the special aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm. Under Section 29(1) of RA 10951, the use of a loose firearm
when inherent in the commission of the crime punishable either the RPC or SPLs shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. Jurisprudence says it is a special aggravating circumstance. Therefore, the two
complaints filed by the police as well as the contention of the defense counsel are erroneous because the use
of the unlicensed firearm was inherent in X's act of killing Y. Hence, it is a special aggravating circumstance to
the crime of homicide. The information must be only for one and that is homicide with the special aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm.
WHO ARE LIABLE IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME
PRINCIPALS
Principals may be of three kinds:
1. Principal by direct participation;
A principal by direct participation is one who directly executes the crime.
2. Principal by inducement or induction; and
A principal by inducement or induction is one who directly force or induce others to commit the crime.
3. Principal by indispensable cooperation.
A principal by indispensable cooperation is one who cooperates in the commission of the crime by another act
without which the crime would not have been accomplished.
ACCOMPLICE
Elements to be considered as Accomplice
For one to be liable as an accomplice, the following elements must be present:
1. First, that there exists a community of design;
2. Second, that the offender performs acts previous or simultaneous to the commission of the crime;
3. Lastly, there is a direct relation between the act of the principal and those attributed to an accomplice.
ACCESSORIES
Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated
therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following
manners:
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1.
2.
3.
By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery.
By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known
PEOPLE v. DULAY, G.R. No. 193854 | 24 September 2012
FACTS: Private complainant AAA was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's sister introduced
the appellant to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter, appellant convinced AAA to accompany her at a
wake at GI San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Before going to the said wake, they went to a casino to look for
appellant's boyfriend, but since he was not there, they went to Sto. Niño at Don Galo. However, appellant's
boyfriend was also not there. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to ask for some
fish, they saw appellant's boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, appellant and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the
Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, appellant suddenly
pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money
to appellant and heard "Speed" tell appellant to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and
tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant's help when she saw the latter peeping
into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape, "Speed" and appellant told
AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her.
RULING: In this case, Dulay was charged as a principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape. The
Supreme Court said no, he is not a principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape. The reasoning
given by the Supreme Court is that the said girl may be brought to Speed (the one who raped her), not
necessarily by Dulay but by any person.
The Supreme Court ruled that even if another person brought the girl to Speed, or even if the girl herself
presented herself to Speed, she will still be raped. Therefore, the Supreme Court said the act done by Dulay is
not indispensable to consummate the act of raping the said girl. The Supreme Court held Dulay liable for
violation of Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 because she acted as a procurer of a child prostitute, or a pimp.
Q: X committed the crime of murder. His father, Y, was the chief of police of their city. Chief of police Y had
knowledge of X's commission of the crime of murder. The chief of police Y concealed his son in order to be
able to evade arrest and prosecution. Nevertheless, X was still discovered, arrested, and prosecuted. If you
were the public prosecutor assigned in the case, would you indict Chief of Police Y as an accessory to the
crime of murder?
A: NO. If I am the public prosecutor, I will not indict Y as an accessory to the crime of murder. Although Y, being
a chief of police, took advantage of his position and of his public position in concealing his son who has
committed murder, he is exempted from criminal liability under Article 20 because of relationship. X and Y are
related to each other as ascendant-descendant. Hence, relationship exempts the said father from criminal
liability as an accessory under Article 20 of the RPC.
I will however, as a public prosecutor, indict Chief of Police Y for violation of PD 1829 or Obstruction of Justice
because his act of concealing, harboring the act of his son, frustrates, impedes and hampers the prosecution of
X and the investigation against him.
Hence, I will indict Y of violation of PD 1829.
SUBSIDIARY PENALTY
Subsidiary penalty is the penalty imposed on an offender in case fine is included in his penalty and he happens
to be insolvent to pay the fine imposed by the court. Subsidiary penalty is the penalty in lieu of payment of fine.
Therefore, before an offender can be made to suffer subsidiary penalty, it is first and foremost necessary that:
1. He is sentenced with a fine;
2. The said subsidiary penalty must be expressly stated in the judgment of the court that in case of his
insolvency to pay the fine, he shall suffer subsidiary penalty.
RATE
The rate is one day of imprisonment is equal to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at
the time of rendition of judgment by the trial court.
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Q: X was charged, X was convicted and X was sentenced with a penalty of prison correctional. The judge
imposed upon X payment of civil liability and damages to the private offended party. The judgment also
states that in case of X's insolvency, he shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment. The CA affirmed in toto the said
RTC's judgment. Is the court of appeals correct?
A: The court of appeals is not correct. The CA should have rebutted the RTC's pronouncement as to the
subsidiary imprisonment of X in case of insolvency. In this case, any failure of X to make good his liabilities for
civil indemnity, his liabilities for damages, could not give rise to subsidiary imprisonment. Because the law as
amended by RA 10159, clearly provides that subsidiary penalty and imprisonment is only allowed in cases
when a convict due to his insolvency is unable to pay the fine. SP can only be availed by a person who, by
reason of his insolvency is unable to satisfy the penalty of fine.
In this case, based on the facts, X was not meted with the penalty of fine, only imprisonment of prision
correctional. His penalty consists purely of prison sentence imprisonment. The award of civil indemnity, moral
damages or any other kind of damages are not penalties. They are not fine. Hence, subsidiary penalty cannot
be imposed on acts in case of insolvency to pay the civil liability, to pay the damages.
COMPLEX CRIMES
COMPOUND CRIME
There is a compound crime when a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies.
Elements of a Compound Crime
1. The offender performs a single act;
2. The single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies.
PEOPLE vs. NELMIDA
The basis of a compound crime is singularity of act, the singularity of impulse. Therefore, it is necessary for a
compound crime to arise that the offender performs only one act, a single act, and the said single act produces
two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the said case, the Supreme Court said, it is the singularity of act
that is the basis, singularity of impulse is not written in the law.
PEOPLE vs. NELMIDA, Supra
FACTS: Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, together with his security escorts composed of some
members of the Philippine Army, Philippine National Police (PNP) and civilian aides went home on board the
yellow pick-up service vehicle. Upon the arrival of the pick-up of the Mayor, Nelmida and other accused opened
fire and rained bullets on the vehicle using high- powered firearms. Immediately after the ambush, Nelmida
went to the house of Samuel’s aunt to get their bags. On the occasion of the ambush, 2 security escorts died,
while the others suffered injuries.
RULING: Complex crime is not applicable in the case as the killing and the wounding of the victims were not the
result of a single act, but of several acts of the appellant. The killing and wounding of the victims were not the
result of a single discharge of firearms by the accused. They opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle and
the victims sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of their bodies. It can be said that more than one bullet
had hit the victims and more than one gunman fired at the vehicle. The victims sustained gunshot wounds in
different parts of their bodies. Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming
each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a
complex crime.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (ISLAW)
The Indeterminate Sentence Law modified the imposition of penalties under the RPC and under special penal
laws. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law courts are mandated to provide for the maximum term of the
sentence and a minimum term of the sentence. What is the purpose? So that the moment the offender has
already served the minimum term of the sentence, he becomes eligible for parole. He need not serve the entire
sentence behind bars. He can be immediately released the moment he has served the minimum term of the
sentence.
Q: C is currently detained at the Makati City Jail for violation of RA 9165. When his wife went to visit him, the
wife was caught attempting to smuggle shabu by placing it inside her compact face powder. The wife was
charged for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The penalty for illegal possession of dangerous drugs
under Section 11 of RA 9165 is imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years and a fine ranging from
Php.300,000 pesos to Php.400,000. After trial, the said woman was sentenced by the RTC to suffer the
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penalty of imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day and to pay a fine of Php. 300,000. Is the imposed penalty on
the accused correct?
A: The penalty imposed on the accused is not correct. The indeterminate sentence applies even to violation of
special penal law. The penalty imposed-- 12 years and one day -- is not correct because it is a straight penalty.
The indeterminate sentence law requires the imposition of an indeterminate sentence even in cases of violation
of special penal law. Since it is a violation of special penal law, R.A. 9165, the correct penalty should be an
indeterminate sentence whose minimum shall not be less than 12 years and whose maximum shall not be
more than 20 years.
A: ISLAW applies even to violations of SPLs
ISLAW does not apply to all offenders. Under Section 2 of Act 4103, as amended, the following persons are
disqualified to be given an indeterminate sentence. They are:
1. Those convicted of crimes punished by death penalty, life-imprisonment, and reclusion perpertua (akin
to life-imprisonment; People v. Enriquez);
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy, or proposal to commit treason;
3. Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage;
4. Those convicted of piracy;
5. Those who are habitual delinquents;
6. Those who have escaped from confinement or evaded their sentence;
7. Those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the
terms of the said pardon;
8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year.
Q: The accused was charged in court, and the crime charge was less serious physical injuries. Under Article
265, the penalty for less serious physical injuries is arresto mayor. Arresto mayor is imprisonment of one
month and one day two, six months. The side accused was found to have voluntarily surrendered. If the court
will appreciate the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, what penalty should the court impose on
X applying ISLAW?
A: According to Article 64 of the RPC, the penalty to be imposed should be Arresto Mayor (AM) in its minimum
period -- a straight penalty. It is AM because of the presence of the MC of voluntary surrender. It is a straight
penalty because the ISLAW does not apply. The maximum does not exceed one year. It is one of those
disqualified to be given an indeterminate sentence under Act 4103 as amended.
MODES OF EXTINGUISHING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Death;
Service of sentence;
Amnesty;
Absolute pardon;
Prescription of crime;
Prescription of penalty; and
Subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended party.
DEATH
Death extinguishes criminal liability at any stage of the proceedings — during trial, before conviction, after
conviction — because the moment the offender dies, there is no body to serve the personal penalty.
Death extinguishes civil liability if the offender dies before conviction of final judgment. The moment he dies
before conviction by final judgment, his civil liability is totally extinguished. If the offender dies after conviction
by final judgment, his civil liability survives. The private complainant can recover the civil liability from the
administrator of the estate of the deceased convict.
The civil liability extinguished the moment the offender dies before conviction by final judgment is civil liability
ex delicto in senso strictiore. It is the civil liability arising from and based solely on the crime committed. Even if
the convict dies before conviction by final judgment, his civil liability survives if the said civil liability arises from
other sources of obligations, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts.
Q: X raped Y in a secluded area and so X was convicted by the RTC of the crime of rape. Unsatisfied, X
appealed the judgment of condition. While the case was on appeal, X succumbed to death due to
complications brought about by COVID-19 virus. Y was uncertain of the effect of X's death on X's criminal
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liability. And so Y consulted her counsel, Attorney Z. Attorney Z assured Y that only the criminal liability of X
was extinguished by his death. Is Attorney Z correct?
A: Attorney Z is not correct. Since X died while his case was pending appeal, both his criminal liability and civil
liability are totally extinguished. Under Article 89 of the RPC, that extinguishes criminal liability as well as civil
liability if the offender dies before conviction by a final judgment. The only exception is when the civil liability
arises from other sources of obligations such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delict. In that case,
the counsel Atty. Z was wrong.
PROBATION
Notable amendment under RA 10707
Under PD 968 as amended by RA 10707, probation is a disposition under which a convict may apply for
probation. In so far as probation is concerned, Section 4 of PD 968 has already been amended by RA 10707.
The important amended is that under this amendatory law, when a judgment of conviction imposing a
non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a
probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation based on the modified decision by
the appellate court before it becomes final and executory.
GR: No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from
the judgment of conviction because probation bars appeal and vice versa.
XPN: When the judgment of conviction imposed upon the accused a non-probationable penalty of more than
6-years, and upon appeal, his judgment was modified by the appellate court imposing upon him a probationable
penalty, the new amendatory law or RA 10707 allows the said defendeant to apply for probation based on the
modified decision of the said appellate court.
PROBATION
The Probation Law, P.D. 968, has been amended by R.A. 10707. So, R.A. 10707 is the new probation law.
Probation is a disposition under which a person, after having been convicted and sentenced, is released subject
to conditions imposed by the Court and under the supervision of a probation officer.
Q: The judge W convicted X of attempted rape. Judge W sentenced X with a maximum penalty of prisión
mayor. X appealed the judgment of conviction to the court of appeals. X question his conviction and X
claimed that he should only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness. The court of appeals granted the plea of X
and found X liable only for acts of lasciviousness. Hence, the original penalty of prision mayor was now
reduced to prision correctional, within the probationable penalty. May X apply for probation?
A: Yes. X may still apply for probation. Under Section 4 of PD 968 as amended by RA 10707, when a judgment
of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified
through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation based
on the modified decision before such decision becomes final and executory.
Q: While X was on probation, X was arrested and charged for violation of Section 11 and Section 12 of RA
9165, illegal possession of shabu and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia. X is presently detained at the
Pasay City Jail. The chief probation and parole officer of Pasay City filed a motion to the judge to revoke the
probation granted on X on the ground that X has been apprehended twice for drug possession while he was
undergoing probation. It was further alleged that X was considered as a recidivist whose commission of other
offenses while on probation was a serious violation of the terms of probation. If you were the judge, how will
you rule on the said motion?
A: If I were the judge, the motion to revoke the probation is granted. Although X cannot be considered as a
recidivist because he has not been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the
same title of the RPC, X's commission of other offenses while on probation constituted a violation of the terms
of probation.
NOTE: Probation is not a matter of right, it is a mere privilege. Not all persons can avail of the benefit of
probation. Under Section 9 of P.D. 968 as amended by R.A. 10707, the following cannot avail of the benefit of
probation:
1.
Those whose maximum term of imprisonment is more than 6 years;
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NOTE: The moment the penalty imposed on the offender is more than 6 years (6 years and 1 day), the offender
can no longer apply for probation.
2.
3.
4.
Those who have been convicted of subversion and crimes against national security;
Those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment
of more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or a fine of more than one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00); and
Those who have already availed the benefit of probation because can only be availed of once.
Q: X was convicted by the MTC of attempted homicide. X applied for probation. His application for probation
was granted. Sometime thereafter, after the termination of X's probation, X was having a drinking spree with
his friends. X became drunk. When X became drunk, he caused disturbance commotion in their
neighborhood. Hence, X was charged and convicted of alarms and scandals under Article 154. The judge
sentenced X with arresto menor, 1 to 30 days. Can X apply for community services in lieu of imprisonment
even if he has already undergone probation for a previous crime?
A: YES. Under the SC Administrative Matter where the SC sets the guidelines in imposing Community Service in
lieu of imprisonment, as provided for under RA 11362, the Community Service Act, it is provided that where the
impossible penalty for the crime committed by the accused is only arresto menor or arresto mayor, the said
accused has three options within 15 calendar days to choose either 1) file an appeal 2) apply for probation; or
3) apply that the penalty be served by rendering community service in the place where the crime was
committed.
Under the SC Administrative Matter, in relation to RA 11362, it is provided that an accused who has applied and
was granted probation in a previous case is not disqualified to apply for Community Service in a subsequent
case.
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CRIMINAL LAW: BOOK TWO
ART 125. ARBITRARY DETENTION
ASTORGA VS. PEOPLE, GR NO. 154130, 1 OCTOBER 2003
FACTS: (DENR) conducted intelligence gathering and forest protection operations. During the operation, the
team sent by the DENR saw several boats being constructed. Thus, they proceeded to the site of the boat
construction where they met petitioner Mayor Benito Astorga. When the team tried to explain the purpose of
their mission to Mayor Astorga, the latter got mad and ordered someone to fetch reinforcements. 45 minutes
later, a banca arrived with 10 armed men who circled around the team and pointed guns at them. When the
team tried to contact people from the DENR through a handheld radio, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed the radio
and said “It’s better if you have no radio so that your office would not know your whereabouts and so that you
cannot ask for help.” Thereafter, the team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be
served dinner. The team was only allowed to leave at 2:00 am. Complainants filed a criminal complaint for
arbitrary detention against Mayor Astorga and his men.
SC: In this case, when you say “detention”, it is necessary that the offended party must be detained,
incarcerated. However, the Supreme Court said, in lieu of actual restraint on the person of the said offended
party, on the liberty of the said party, arbitrary detention would only apply if there is fear on the part of the said
offended party; if there was fear imposed by the accused on the part of the said offended party. In this case, SC
said there was none. The DENR officers said that they could go around the public place; they were unafraid.
Since they lack fear, it cannot be said that the act is arbitrary detention. Hence, in the second resolution, the
Supreme Court, after convicting Mayor Astorga, acquitted him.
Three kinds of Arbitrary Detention:
1. Arbitrary Detention by detaining a person without legal grounds under Article 124.
2. Arbitrary Detention by failing to deliver the detained person to the proper judicial authorities within 12,
18, or 36 hours under Article 125.
3. Arbitrary Detention by delaying the release of prisoners despite the judicial or executive order to do so
under Article 126.
Elements of Arbitrary Detention under Article 124
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee;
2. That he arrests or detains another; and
3. That the said arrest or detention is without legal grounds.
Elements of Arbitrary Detention under Article 125
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee;
2. That he arrests and detains another;
3. That the said arrest and detention is based on legal grounds; and
4. That he failed to deliver the said person detained to the proper judicial authorities
a. Within 12 hours for crimes punishable by light penalties or their equivalent
b. Within 18 hours for crimes punishable by corrective penalties or their equivalent; and
c. Within 36 hours for crimes punishable by death or afflictive penalties or their equivalent.
CALLEJA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 252578, 7 December 2021
Q: X was suspected by the police for developing and manufacturing nuclear chemical weapons. Since this is
an act punished under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the police officers suspicious of X, arrested him. After arrest, X
was interrogated, X was booked. After interrogation and booking, X was placed behind bars. A complaint for
the violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act was only filed against X 14 days from the time of his arrest. The
counsel of X immediately filed a case of arbitrary detention under Article 125 against the arresting police
officers for failing to deliver X to the proper judicial authorities within the prescribed period of 36 hours. The
police officers countered that they cannot be a liable under Article 125 of the RPC because under the
Anti-Terrorism Act, they can detain a person within 14 days counted from the time of his arrest. Are the police
officers liable under Art. 125 of the RPC?
A: Yes, the police officers are liable under Art. 125 of the RPC for failing to deliver X to the proper judicial
authorities within 36 hours, the period prescribed under Art. 125. Under Section 29 of the Anti-Terrorism Act,
the law provides that any law enforcement agent or military personnel who, note, having been authorized in
writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council, having been authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC), has
taken custody of a person suspected of committing any of the anti-terror act defined under the Act shall,
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without incurring any criminal liability for delaying the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities, deliver the said person to the proper judicial authorities within 14 calendar days, counted from the
time the suspected person has been apprehended, arrested and detained.
In the case of Calleja v. Executive Secretary 2021, the Supreme Court ruled that the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA)
does not amend Article 125 of the RPC. Rather, Section 29 supplements Article 125 of the RPC by providing an
exceptional rule with specific application only in cases of the following:
1. There exist a probable cause to believe that the crime committed is among those punished under the
ATA; and
2. There must be a written authorization coming from the Anti-Terrorism Council.
If these two requisites are present, then the arresting peace officer, must observe the period provided for under
Article 125. Further, the SC said, Article 125 of the RPC is the general rule. It also applies in case of the ATA
related cases. Section 29 of the said law would only apply in exceptional cases, that is when the requisites
enumerated above are present.
In this case, there was none. Therefore, the police officers can be held criminally liable for the crime of violation
of Art. 125 of the RPC or arbitrary detention by failing to deliver a detained person to the proper judicial
authorities within 36 hours.
Elements of Delaying Release
1. The offender is a public officer or employee;
2. There is an order, either a judicial order or an executive order for the release of a prisoner; 3. The said
offender unduly delays either
a. the release of the said prisoner;
b. the service of notice of such order to the prisoner; or
c. any proceedings upon a petition for the release of such person
ARTICLE 128. VIOLATION OF DOMICILE
Elements of Violation of Domicile
1.
2.
3.
Offender is a public officer or employee;
He was not authorized by a judicial order to enter the dwelling and/or make a search therein for papers
or other effects; and
He either:
a.
b.
c.
Enters the dwelling of another against the will of the latter; or
Searching for papers or other effects found therein without the consent of the owner; or
After having surreptitiously entered the dwelling, being discovered and asked to leave, he
refuses to leave.
Q: X is a police officer patrolling the area. While police officer X was patrolling the area, he noticed the open
door in the residence of Y. Police Officer X entered the house of Y, upon entering, no one was present in the
living room. Police Officer X, curious of what was inside the house, began opening several drawers and
cabinets in the living room inside the house of Y. In one of the cabinets that police officer X opened, he found
a transparent bag containing white crystalline substance which he suspected to be shabu. X opened the bag,
[tasted] the substance and concluded that indeed it was shabu. And so police officer X immediately left the
house of Y, went to the PNP station and told his superior what he discovered. Thereafter, X went to court and
applied for search warrant, in order to search the house of Y. During the said application for search warrant, X
testified that he had entered the house because of an open door and that he had spotted the transparent box
containing white crystalline substance on top of a table. Because of this, the judge believed and the judge
issued a warrant, a search warrant. Thereafter the house of Y was searched. The shabu was seized from the
house of Y and by reason thereof Y was arrested. What crime/s is/are committed by Police Officer X?
A: First, Police Officer X is liable for violation of domicile because he conducted an unconsented search of the
house of Y. Although, Police Officer X's initial entry may not be against the law because the door was open, the
search of the said house falls within the second mode of violation of domicile. In case of violation of domicile,
under Article 128, there are three acts punished: 1) by entering the house of another against the will of the
latter, 2) by searching papers and effects found therein without the previous consent of the owner, or 3) after
having surreptitiously entered the dwelling of another, being discovered and ordered to leave, but he refuses to.
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In this case, the 2nd act was committed. He was not armed with a search warrant when he entered the place
and he searched without getting the previous consent of the owner. Hence, he is liable for violation of domicile
under Art. 128, the second act.
Police officer X is also liable for the crimes of Perjury and Violation of Art. 129, by maliciously obtaining a
search warrant. When X applied for a search warrant, X testified that he entered the place because he saw the
door open and he saw the shabu on top of the table. He perjured himself when he stated that the shabu was
out in open on top of the table because in truth he was already searching and opening a drawer when he found
the said inside the bag. Therefore, he is liable under Article 129 for maliciously obtaining a search warrant
because he lied in order to secure such warrant. Likewise, he is liable for perjury. He perjured himself in order to
obtain the said search warrant. Therefore, he is also liable under Article 183.
All told, PO X can be liable for three crimes: 1) Violation of domicile under Art. 128, 2) maliciously obtaining a
search warrant under Art. 129; and 3) Perjury under Art. 183.
All these three cases can be filed separately and distinctly against police officer X because under Article 129,
the law provides that the liability under Article 129 is in addition to any other liability arising from any other
crime committed by the said police officer.
NOTE: The liability under Art. 129 is in addition to any other crime committed by the police officer.
ARTICLE 130: SEARCHING DOMICILE WITHOUT WITNESSES
Elements of Searching Domicile without Witnesses
1. Offender is a public officer or employee;
2. He is armed with a search warrant legally procured;
3. He searches the domicile, papers, or other belongings of any person; and
4. The owner or any member of his family or two witnesses residing in the same locality are not present.
Hierarchy of witnesses
1. Owner
2. Any member of his family
3. Two witnesses residing in the same locality
Q: Police Officer X was armed with a search warrant issued by the RTC judge. Police officer X went to the
house of Y and served the search warrant legally procured. The moment police officer X reached the house of
Y, upon seeing Y, police officer X immediately placed handcuffs on Y. Thereafter, they searched the room of Y,
the entire house, in the presence of the barangay captain whom they brought along. Y, at the time of the
search, was just left standing near the door, being guarded by other police officers. Police officer X found the
plastic sachet of shabu, which is the subject of the search inside the house of Y. Is Police Officer X liable of
any crime? What about the drugs found and seized by the police? Are they admissible in evidence against Y?
A: Police Officer X is liable. Police Officer X is liable under Article 130 of the RPC. Police officer X's procedure in
the conduct of the search violates Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and such act is punishable under
Article 130 of the RPC. Under Article 130 of the RPC, it only in the presence of the lawful occupant of the house
or any member of his family can the search be done. And it is only in their absence that the search is required
to be witnessed by two persons residing in the same locality. In this case, the same was not followed. The
police officers did not have the discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for the witnesses prescribed
by law.
In this case, while the search was ongoing, the owner of the house was not allowed to witness it. He was
placed with handcuffs standing at the door. Therefore, the said police officer will be liable for violation of Article
130 of the RPC for failing to comply with the rules provided for under Section 8 Rule 136 of the ROC.
PEOPLE VS. DEL CASTILLO, G.R. NO. 238339, 07 AUG. 2019
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the
time of the warrantless arrest.
It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time
of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized
drug. Here, the absence of witnesses during seizure and marking casts reasonable doubt on the actual origin
and identity of the drugs introduced in evidence as those allegedly seized from accused-appellant. Ultimately,
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this same absence casts reasonable doubt on accused-appellant's guilt for the offenses with which he is
charged. (People v. Castillo,)
ART. 133: OFFENDING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
An act is said to be notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the faithful when a person ridicules or
makes light of anything constituting a religious dogma; works or scoffs at anything devoted to religious
ceremonies; plays with or damages or destroys any object of veneration by the faithful.
Elements of Offending the Religious Feelings
1. Committed by a public officer or employee or a private individual.
2. That the acts must be notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.
3. The said offender performs acts:
a. In a place devoted to religious worship, or
b. During the celebration of any religious ceremony.
CELDRAN v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 220127 | 21 March 2018
FACTS: While Brother Edgar Tria Tirona was reading a passage from the Bible during the celebration of the
second anniversary of the May They Be One Campaign around 3:00 PM, petitioner entered the Manila Cathedral
clad in a black suit and a hat. Petitioner went to the center of the aisle, in front of the altar and suddenly brought
out a placard emblazoned with the word “DAMASO.” Commotion ensued when petitioner started shouting while
inside the church saying “Bishops, stop involving yourself in politics,” disrupting and showing disrespect to an
otherwise solemn celebration.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Celdran is guilty of Offending the Religious Feelings.
RULING: The elements of offending the religious feelings are:
1.
2.
That the acts complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship, or during the
celebration of any religious ceremony;
That the acts be notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.
First element was present because it was committed by petitioner Celdran while there was a religious
ceremony inside the Manila Cathedral, which is a place devoted to religious worship. The celebration during
that day were (1) the May They be the One Campaign and Hand Written Bible launching, which coincided with
the feast of St. Jerome.
“Acts” as used in Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code may come in the form of words, overt behavior, deeds
or anything knowingly performed by a person - symbolic or otherwise. Celdran is said to have dressed in black
suit and hat, walked through the middle aisle in front of the Manila Cathedral altar and displayed a placard with
the word “DAMASO” and blurted out “Don’t meddle in politics” while being dragged outside.
The acts of petitioner were meant to mock, insult, and ridicule those clergy whose beliefs and principles were
diametrically opposed to his own, thus satisfying the second element.
ARTICLE 133. OFFENDING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
Q: Father X is an exorcist priest. He was charged with the violation of Art. 133, offending religious feelings
filed by former Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The former justice is a marian devotee. The charge for the
violation of Art. 133 is that allegedly, Father X, during an online program; the National Conference on
Exorcism, explained the Vatican ruling on the 1948 apparition of the Our Lady of Mediatrix in Lipa Batangas.
Father X told his congregation that the said apparition of the Our Lady of Mediatrix in Lipa was devoid of any
supernatural intervention. By stating the same, the former justice felt offended. She is a devotee of the Virgin
Mary. She is a Marian devotee. The said former justice believed that Father X maligned the image of the Our
Lady of Mediatrix. Hence, she filed a case of violation of Article 133, offending religious feelings. Are all the
elements present?
A: First element, the offender is a private person or a public officer or employee. In this case, the offender is a
private person. Second element, that the acts must be notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The
second element is absent. The act of the said priest is stating what the Vatican stated, that this apparition is
devoid of anything supernatural, cannot be said that it is offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The said
statement did not mock did not ridicule the dogma, the ritual of the Catholic religion. The said statement did
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not cause damage on the object of veneration of the Catholic religion. The second element is absent. Likewise,
the third element is absent. The said act was stated by Father X neither in a place which is devoted for religious
worship, nor it is done during a religious ceremony. A congregation of exorcist priests cannot be considered as
a religious ceremony.
Therefore, the said case should be dismissed because only the 1st element is present.
UPDATE: Quezon City Judge ordered the Quezon City Public Prosecutor to amend the information. Because the
judge saw that the case has no cause of action. Nothing in Article 133 has been violated. Otherwise, the case
will be dismissed.
Q: X is a drag queen. In one of X's public performances, X dressed himself in the costume of the Black
Nazarene. While he was in this costume of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo, he and his audience was singing
the Ama Namin or the Lord's Prayer. A video of this was seen on social media. Many Catholics including those
of other religions, like the Muslims, got offended because of the drag queen's act of mocking Jesus Christ.
Jesus is an object of veneration for both the Catholics and the Muslims. To the Catholics, Jesus Christ is the
Son of God. To the Muslims, Jesus Christ is considered as one of the mightiest prophets. Therefore, both
Catholics and Muslims consider this act of X, the drag queen, a blasphemous act. A complaint for violation of
Art. 133, offending religious feelings was filed against X in the office of the prosecutor. If you are the public
prosecutor, will you indict X as charged?
A: NO. If I am the public prosecutor, I will not indict X as charged. Although the 1st and 2nd elements of Art. 133
is present, the third element is absent. The said act, which is considered as notorious offending to the feelings
of the faithful is not done in a place devoted to a religious worship or during a religious ceremony. The act was
done in a drag queen show inside a gay club. Hence, the 3rd element being absent, violation of Art. 133 will not
lie against the accused.
However, as the public prosecutor, I will indict him under Article 201(b) of the RPC which punishes any person
in theaters, fairs, cinematography, or any other place shall exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or
shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows,
whether live or in film, including those which offend any race, or religion.
Therefore, I will dismiss the complaint for violation of Art. 133 and I will indict X for violation of Art. 201(b).
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
ARTICLE 134. REBELLION OR INSURRECTION
ARTICLE 134-A. COUP D’ETAT
THEORY OF ABSORPTION IN REBELLION OR COUP D’ETAT
There is a theory of absorption in rebellion or coup d’etat, also otherwise known as the political offense
doctrine.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense,
or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty." Any ordinary act assumes a different
nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion,
the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its
mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone. (Ocampo v. Abando, Infra)
The so-called theory of absorption in crimes of rebellion or in crimes of coup d’etat provides that if common
crimes are committed incident to or in furtherance of the crime of rebellion or coup d’etat, these common
crimes will simply be absorbed by the said crime of rebellion or coup d’etat. Common crimes like murder,
homicide, physical injuries, burning of houses or arson – if these are committed in furtherance of, incident to, or
in connection with the act of rebellion or in connection with the act of coup d’etat, they will not constitute a
separate and distinct charge. They will simply be absorbed by the crime of rebellion or coup d’etat under the
so-called theory of absorption in rebellion and coup d’etat.
OCAMPO v. ABANDO, G.R. No. 176830 | 11 February 2014
Q: Should these 15 counts of murder be dismissed as they are simply absorbed by the crime of rebellion
being faced by Ocampo, et al.?
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court, in the said case, said that under the political offense doctrine, common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense of rebellion or the political offense of coup d’etat are divested
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of their character as "common" crimes and they assume the political complexion of the main crime which is
rebellion or coup d’etat. These common crimes cannot be punished separately from the principal offense,
neither can they be complexed. According to the Supreme Court, the moment these killings are committed in
furtherance of rebellion, then the killing will not be homicide or murder – they will simply be absorbed by the
crime of rebellion under the political offense doctrine because they are merely ingredients in the commission of
the crime of rebellion.
The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against petitioners prior to a determination
by the trial court that the murders were committed in furtherance of rebellion. [W]hen the political offense
doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act
of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act to be conclusively
demonstrated.
ART 148: DIRECT ASSAULT
Two Kinds of Direct Assault:
1. Without public uprising, by employing FORCE or INTIMIDATION for the attainment of any of the
purposes of rebellion and sedition.
2. Without public uprising, by ATTACKING, by EMPLOYING FORCE, or by SERIOUSLY INTIMIDATING or
SERIOUSLY RESISTING any person in authority or any of his agents, while in the performance of official
duties, or on the occasion of such performance.
Elements of the First Form of Direct Assault
1. The offender employs force or intimidation;
2. The aim of the offender is to attain any of the purposes of the crime of rebellion or any of the objects
of the crime of sedition; and
3. There is no public uprising.
Elements of the Second Form of Direct Assault
1. The offender
a) Makes an attack;
b) Employs force;
c) Makes a serious intimidation; or
d) Makes a serious resistance;
2. The assault is against a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority;
3. At the time of assault, the person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of his official
functions or the assault was on the occasion of such performance of official functions;
4. The offender knows him to be a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and
5. There is no public uprising.
COMPLEX CRIME OF DIRECT ASSAULT
Whenever direct assault is committed and a felony resulted, (e.g. the person in authority or agent died, or
suffered injury, or sustained fatal wounds but survived because of immediate medical intervention), always
complex direct assault with the resulting felony.
Thus:
1. Direct Assault with Murder;
2. Direct Assault with Homicide;
3. Direct Assault with Frustrated Murder;
4. Direct Assault with Attempted Homicide;
5. Direct Assault with Serious Physical Injuries;
6. Direct Assault with Less Serious Physical Injuries.
NOTE: However, if the resulting felony is only a light felony, like slight physical injuries, do not complex it with
direct assault.
Q: Police officers X and Y were as the security escorts of Mayor Z. They were with the mayor at the second
floor of the City Hall. The mayor at the time was solemnizing marriages. When the said mass wedding
ceremony ended at 10 AM, the mayor together with his security escorts, police officer X and Y proceeded to
the mayor's office. On their way to the Mayor's office, PO X took notice of W who had been following them. W
was there during the wedding, during the mass, wedding ceremony and now when they were already
proceeding to the Mayor's office, W was still there following them. PO X turned to W to question him when
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suddenly, W fired, killing the said Mayor and PO X. Police officer Y was wounded, but he survived. W was
immediately arrested by the police authorities. What crime or crimes were committed by W?
A: W committed the following crimes: Two counts of the complex crime of Qualified Direct Assault with Murder
for the death of Mayor Z and Police Officer X and one count of the complex crime of Qualified Direct Assault
with Attempted Murder for the wounding of Police Officer Y.
All the elements of Direct Assault under Article 148 are present: 1) W made an attack on Mayor Z and Police
Officer X and Y by firing at them, 2) Mayor Z is a person in authority, while Police Officers X and Y are agents of
the PIA, 3) At the time of the assault, Mayor Z and the POs are in the performance of their duties. Mayor Z, after
solemnizing marriages, was on his way to the mayor's office while police officers X and Y were serving as
security escorts of the mayor, 4) W knew the said victims as the mayor and police officer because the attack
happened inside the city hall, 5) there was no public uprising.
The crime of direct assault is qualified because W made use of a weapon. W made use of a gun. Direct assault
is complexed with murder and attempted murder because of the manner of committing the crime showed that
it was done with treachery. Obviously, it was planned by the said offender, leaving the victims without means to
defend themselves.
Hence, the said accused will be liable for two counts of qualified direct assault with murder and one count of
qualified direct assault with attempted murder.
DELA PEÑA v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 227041 | 3 March 2021
FACTS: It was already late at night. There were persons having drinking spree, and these persons were loud.
They were singing and talking loudly. The people in the area were complaining – they could not sleep because
of these people. One of the neighbors therein was Barangay Tanod Carlos. The people told him, “Barangay
Tanod pagsabihan mo naman ‘yan oh, ang ingay ingay nila, hindi kami makatulog dito sa ating barangay
pagsabihan mo naman gabing gabi na.”
Because of that, Barangay Tanod Carlos came out of his house, went to these men, and told them, “Pare,
tumigil na tayo diyan, magsiuwi na tayo. Maraming di makatulog naiingayan sa inyo. Magsiuwi na tayo.”
However, instead of obeying the said Barangay Tanod, the said men boxed him on his jaw, and hit him with a
piece of wood. Thereafter, police officers arrived, and the said men were arrested.
The Barangay Tanod filed a case of direct assault against one of these men. The accused charged in court was
Dela Peña because he was the one who boxed him and hit with a piece of wood. The Barangay Tanod filed a
case of direct assault under Art. 148, direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
The defense raised by Dela Peña was, “No, he was a barangay, tanod, he cannot be considered as an agent of a
person in authority at the time of that particular moment because it was already nighttime. Gabing gabing na,
hindi na siya duty, off duty na po siya.” That was the defense raised by the said accused.
ISSUE: Is the said accused liable of direct assault?
RULING: The Supreme Court said, yes. The said accused is liable of direct assault. In this case of Dela Peña v.
People, the Supreme Court said, the said victim (barangay tanod) is an agent of a person in authority pursuant
to the Local Government Code under Sec. 388.
A barangay tanod is an agent of a person in authority. The said barangay tanod was boxed on his jaw, he was
hit with a piece of wood, and the accused knew him to be a barangay tanod. Hence, there was direct assault.
Supreme Court said there is no merit on the argument raised by the accused that he was already a private
person at the time of the assault because it was already midnight, it was past the hours of his duty.
Supreme Court said that a barangay tanod, just like a police officer has the duty to maintain peace and order in
his community on a daily basis, regardless of the time of day. Therefore, it is the duty of a police officer or a
barangay tanod to maintain peace and order in the community, in the vicinity, in the locality on a daily basis,
regardless of the time of day even if it is already midnight. Hence, the assault on him is an assault on an agent
of a person in authority.
ARTICLE 151. RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE
PEOPLE v. MALLARI, G.R. No. 224679 | 12 February 2020
FACTS: There was a commotion in a billiard hall and the police officers responded. The police officers tried to
arrest the women who were involved in the said commotion. There was this one woman by the name of Mallari
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and the said woman refused to be brought to the PNP station. She grabbed the shirt of one of the police
officers, Police Officer Navarro, slapped him in the face and thereafter kicked his legs a number of times.
Because of this, Police Officer Navarro filed a case against Mallari for Direct Assault against an agent of person
of authority. Mallari was convicted up to the Court of Appeals.
RULING: Mallari is NOT liable for Direct Assault against an agent of person of authority under Article 148.
Rather, Mallari is liable under Article 151 Resistance and Serious Disobedience. The Supreme Court said that
when the person being arrested by the police resists or uses force that is not dangerous, grave, or severe, the
crime is not Direct Assault under Article 148.
The proper charge is Resistance and Disobedience of an agent of person in authority under Article 151. To be
considered as Direct Assault, the laying of hands or the use of physical force on an agent of person in authority
must be serious in nature. In this case, the said accused grabbed the shirt of the said police officer, slapped his
face, and kicked his legs several times. These acts and resistance were not serious in nature to be considered
as Direct Assault. Hence, the Supreme Court downgraded the conviction only to violation of Article 151
Resistance and Serious Disobedience.
Q: Traffic Enforcers X and Y stopped W. W, upon alighting from the car, immediately pointed and aimed a gun
at Police Officers X and Y. Thereafter, X and Y could not do anything after being pointed a gun a number of
times. Nobody was able to leave. W was later on arrested. W was charged with direct assault against an agent
of person in authority under Article 148. Is the Senate accused liable for violation of Article 148?
A: The said offender is liable for violation of Article 148 direct assault against an agent of personal authority,
even if the act done by him is that of pointing and aiming a gun at the traffic enforcers. See People vs. Pablo,
Infra
PEOPLE vs. PABLO, G.R. No. 231267, February 13, 2023, [J. HERNANDO CASE, BEYOND CUT-OFF DATE]
The act of pointing and aiming a gun may not be as forceful as described in Mallari, but the same is serious
enough even to an agent of persons in authority. Prudence dictates that one cannot simply pull out a gun and
aim towards a person in a heat of argument or altercation. If taken lightly and not meted with stringent
consequences, it would leave a negative impression and cause great danger and at the expense of public order
and peace.
In sum, Pablo's acts amounted to Direct Assault of an agent of persons in authority, in its second form, as
defined and penalized under Art. 148 of the RPC.
ART. 155. ALARMS and SCANDALS
Q: It was Friday evening. The plaza was full of people. X went to the plaza and fired shots in the air
indiscriminately. The people in the plaza were disturbed and they ran away. X was charged with alarms and
scandals under Article 155. Is the charge correct? If not, what is the proper charge against X?
A: NO, the charge is not correct. Art. 155 has been amended by RA 11926. The new law has excluded the word
"firearms." Hence, the first offender now under Art. 155(1) is any person who within any town or public place,
shall discharge any rocket, firecracker, or other explosives calculated to cause alarm and danger. The word
firearm has already been deleted. Therefore, discharging a firearm in a public place, even to cause alarm and
danger, is no longer punished under Article 155. The word firearm has been deleted. It no longer amounts to
alarms and scandals.
X should be charged with violation of Article 254, Illegal Discharge of Firearms. RA 11926, aside from amending
Article 155, Alarms and Scandals, also amended the felony of Illegal Discharge of Firearms under Article 254.
Based on this amendment, illegal discharge of firearms can be committed by any person who shoots at another
with any firearm, provided there was no intent to kill. Likewise, it is committed by any person who willfully and
indiscriminately discharges any firearm or any other device which can functionally be used as a firearm. These
are now punished under Article 254, Illegal Discharge of Firearms. Therefore, the word firearm has been deleted
in alarms and scandals under Article 154.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
FALSIFICATION (ARTICLES 170, 171, 172)
Four Kinds of Documents which may be the Subject of Falsification
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1.
2.
3.
4.
Public Document – one prepared and executed by a competent public official or a notary public with all
the solemnities required by law;
Official Document – a document issued by a public official in the exercise of his official function;
Commercial Document – a document defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or any other
commercial mercantile law; and
Private Document – a document, deed, or instrument, executed by private persons without the
intervention of a competent public official or notary public, by which document any agreement or
disposition is proved, evidenced, or set forth.
NOTE: Public document: no need to prove damage. Meanwhile, for a private document, absent proof of
damage, falsification will not arise.
Q: It is Monday and the Vice Mayor presided over the said session. The Vice Mayor is the presiding officer of
the Sanggunian under the local government code. Thereafter, after the said session, there was this minutes of
the meeting of the said Sangguniang Bayan. The vice mayor went to two councilors and asked these two
councilors to please sign the minutes. These 2 counselors immediately signed the minutes without anymore
reading it. Later, however, they discovered that there was something inserted in the said minutes of the
Sangguniang Bayan session. It was made to appear that the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, that the
councilors, deliberated on a resolution that gave the Mayor the authority to enter into a contract with a
company with regards to a certain leader. But this did not happen during the said section. This was
discovered by the said two councilors. A case of falsification of public document under Article 171, 2nd Act,
has been filed against the said vice mayor. Is the said Vice Mayor liable as charged?
A: In case of falsification of a public document under Article 171, 2nd Act, the elements are 1) the offender is a
public officer/employee or notary public, 2) the said employee takes advantage of his public position 3) the
offender falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in an act or proceedings
when they did not in fact so participate, 4) that such persons did not participate in the said proceeding. These
are the elements of falsification of public document under Article 171, Second Act, by causing it to appear that
persons have participated in an act of proceedings when they did in fact so participate. See Partisala vs.
People, Infra
PEOPLE VS. PARTISALA, G.R. Nos. 245931-32; April 25, 2022
In this case, all the elements of falsification of public documents are present. Partisala, as the Vice Mayor, took
advantage of his position to falsify the Minutes of the SB to make it appear that the SB deliberated on the
issuance of the subject. This was substantiated by the testimony of some SB members that they did not
deliberate on the issuance of the resolutions and that the Minutes contained insertions not deliberated upon.
Further, the refusal of some SB members to sign the falsified minutes sufficiently proved that the minutes did
not reflect the true and actual proceedings of the session. Additionally, there is no need to present the alleged
true copy of the Minutes to be held liable under Art. 171. Partisala himself admitted that he took part in
executing Exhibit "8" and even signed it.
The records show that Partisala deliberately acted with manifest partiality and bad faith when he, as the
presiding officer of the SB, falsified Exhibit “8". As a result, Mondejar was given authority to enter into a MOA
with IBC which was grossly disadvantageous to the government since it give IBC unwarranted benefits,
advantages, or preferences by getting the surplus supply of sand and gravel extracted from the river despite not
having the necessary permit in violation of Sec. 138 of the Local Government Code (LGC) which provides that
the permit to extract sand, gravel, and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial
governor, by virtue of an ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Hence, Partisala is guilty of falsification of public documents under Art. 171 of the RPC and of committing
corrupt practices of public officials under Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.
GALEOS v. PEOPLE, 642 SCRA 485 | 09 February 2011
The Supreme Court convicted Galeos of falsification of public document, ruling that, since Galeos answered ‘no’
in the question raised in the SALN whether or not he has a relative in the government service within the fourth
degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts because the truth is that he
was related to Mayor Ong at the same he was the municipal mayor, and he was a relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity of Galeos since they are first cousins.
Another issue raised in this case is regarding the answer of Galeos in his 1994 SALN in the question: Are you
related to anyone in the government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity? Galeos left the answer
box empty or blank; he did not answer it. The Supreme Court held that he was also liable for falsification.
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Insofar as his 1994 SALN is concerned, he left in blank the boxes to the same question which is deemed as
falsification. It was further ruled that one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his information, of
his personal data sheet, if he withholds material facts which would have affected the approval of his
appointment or promotion in the government. Had he put a check therein, he would not have been admitted to
government service. By leaving it blank, he tried to withhold a valuable information which led to his admission.
Therefore, he is guilty of falsification because of his nondisclosure of such relationship to the Mayor within the
fourth degree of consanguinity.
DOF vs. OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 238660, February 03, 2021
Q: The Department of Finance conducted a lifestyle check on X. X is a security guard at the Bureau of
Customs. The Department of Finance found that X failed to declare in his SALN, four of the seven real
properties registered his name. Because of that X is charged with falsification of public documents under
Article 171, Paragraph 4, by making untrue statements in a narration of false. Is the charge correct?
A: No. The charge for falsification of public document by making untrue statements in a narration of false
under Article 171, Paragraph 4, is an erroneous charge.
Under Article 171, Paragraph 4, the elements of falsification by making untrue statements in a narration of facts
are 1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public. 2) the offender takes advantage of his
official position, 3) that he commits the fourth act of falsification, that is, by making untrue statements in
innervation of facts.
The elements of the fourth act of falsification, making untrue statements in narration of facts are 1) that the
offender makes in a public document untrue statements in innervation of facts, 2) that he has a legal obligation
to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him and 3) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false. These
are the elements of the fourth act of falsification
In this case, the 2nd element of falsification: that the offender takes advantage of his official position, is absent.
Supreme Court said, the accused security guard did not have the duty to make or prepare or otherwise
intervene in the preparation of the said SALN. Neither was it his duty to have the official custody of the SALN.
The 2nd element requires that the offender has the duty to make, prepare or intervene in the preparation of the
said document or he has the official custody of the document falsified. In this case, the Supreme Court said, a
security guard does not have the duty to prepare, make or intervene in the preparation of the SALN. Further, the
SC said the preparation of SALN is not his special duty. It is not based on rank, or salary grade.
Being a mere security guard, he does not have the custody of said SALN, therefore, the 2nd element of the
crime being absent, the charge for violation of Art. 171 cannot lie.
Elements of Falsification by Public Officer, Employee, Notary Public, or Ecclesiastic Minister
1. The offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
2. The said offender has taken advantage of his official position/function;
3. The said offender falsifies a document by committing any of the following modes stated therein:
xxx d. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
4. If the offender is an ecclesiastical minister, the document falsified may affect the civil status of persons.
The offender is said to have taken advantage of his
public position or public office when:
1. He has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document; or
2. He has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.
Q: Governor X, after investigation, was found to have edited a copy of a provincial ordinance. When the
said ordinance was transmitted by the Sanggunian to the governor, the ordinance states that it is to
create a position of provincial administrator provided, the mandatory 5% salary increase will be
implemented. However, the copy of the ordinance as approved andsigned by the governor provided
that the position of the administrator shall be created regardless of the implementation of the 5% salary
increase. What crime is committed by the said governor?
A: The governor is liable for falsification of public document under Article 171, Paragraph 6, by making an
alteration or intercalation in a genuine document that changes its meaning. The genuine copy of the document
transmitted to the governor has been altered. The sanggunian in its ordinance wanted the creation of said
position to be dependent on the implementation of the however, the governor altered it and made it appear that
the creation of said new position is independent from the said salary increase. Therefore, the governor is liable
for falsification under Article 171, Paragraph 6 -- that is, by making an alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document that changes its meaning.
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f. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
ART. 177. USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS
Under Art. 177, there are two acts, or two kinds of usurpation –
1. Usurpation of Public Authority; and
2. Usurpation of Official Functions.
RUZOL v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. Nos. 186739-960 | 17 April 2013
FACTS: Mayor Ruzol issued 221 permits providing for the transport of logs within his jurisdiction. The DENR
learned about this. And so, the officers of the DENR filed against Mayor Ruzol a violation of Art. 177. The DENR
said that such act of issuing permit is exclusive within the power of the DENR – it cannot be performed by the
mayor. And so, they said that when Mayor Ruzol issued these 221 permits, according to the officers of the
DENR, he becomes liable for violation of Art. 177. Mayor Ruzol was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. When the
case reached the Supreme Court, Mayor Ruzol’s defense was that he acted in good faith. According to Mayor
Ruzol, he issued the said permits in order to prevent, to regulate the transport of logs within his jurisdiction, to
prevent illegal logging within his jurisdiction and to monitor illegal logging within his jurisdiction. According to
him, he acted in good faith.
HELD: The Supreme Court said it is settled in jurisprudence that in case of usurpation under Art. 177, good faith
is a defense. Since Mayor Ruzol acted in good faith, he has no criminal mind – his intention was to monitor,
regulate and ensure that there will be no illegal logging in his jurisdiction. The Supreme Court said, without
criminal mind, without mens rea, his actus reus will not work alone. There must be both mens rea and actus
reus, because – according to the Supreme Court – it is a felony.
CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS
NOTE: No drugs, no crime
XPN: DE LIMA vs. GUERRERO, October 10, 2017, G.R. No. 229781: In the case of trading, there is no need to
present the dangerous drugs in court. The case will prosper even if there is no corpus edict, even if there is no
dangerous
A: Attempted illegal transportation of illegal dangerous drugs.
ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
Elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
1.
2.
The buyer and the seller are clearly identified. Who is the buyer? Police officer X, he was designated as
the poseur buyer. Who is the seller? W, the drug peddler.
The corpus delicti and the price must be established.
NOTE: In every prosecution for dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti is the drugs itself. In this
case, four plastic sachets of shabu, and the price, P1000.
3.
The said corpus delicti must be handed by the said seller to the said poseur.
In this case, the seller gave four plastic sachets of shabu to police officer X. All the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs are present, therefore the said accused, W, shall be liable for illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Supreme Court said, in illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the sale is already consummated the moment there is
this exchange of dangerous drugs and money. Since it is sale, it is necessary that money, the price must be
established because it is illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
Elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
1. That the offender is found in possession of any article or item, which identified to be dangerous
Drugs;
NOTE: When you say possession, it is not only actual or physical possession, it also includes constructive
possession. The moment the dangerous drugs is in the place under the control and custody of the said
offender, it is indeed constructive possession.
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2. He is not authorized by law to possess the same;
3. He freely and consciously possesses the said dangerous drugs.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD, GR NOS. 157870, 158633, 161658, NOVEMBER
3, 2008
The provision of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing for students (Section 36[b]) are constitutional as
long as they are random and suspicionless. This is because schools and their administrators stand in loco
parentis with respect to their students, and schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
admission that are fair and non-discriminatory.
The provision requiring mandatory drug testing for officers and employees of public and private offices (Section
36[d]) are also justifiable. The privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is reduced. A degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize
illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual’s privacy interest under the premises.
PEOPLE vs. SULLANO, G.R. No. 228373, March 12, 2018
Although it is constitutional, the Supreme Court held in People v. Sullano that those found positive for use of
Dangerous Drugs based on mandatory random suspicion less drug testing cannot be prosecuted for violation
of Section 15. The first paragraph states that a person apprehended or arrested found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be penalized. The phrase is a person apprehended or arrested found positive for use of
dangerous drugs. Therefore, the Supreme Court said, the word person immediately follows apprehended or
arrested. Hence, only those apprehended or arrested and thereafter subjected to drug testing and found
positive can be charged with violation of Section 15. Therefore, they cannot be charged with violation of
Section 15, R.A. No. 9165.
SC: An analysis of the construction of the sentence yields no other conclusion. Section 15 is unambiguous: the
phrase "apprehended or arrested" immediately follows "a person," thus qualifying the subject person. It
necessarily follows that only apprehended or arrested persons found to be positive for use of any dangerous
drug may be prosecuted under the provision. Xxx The Court recognized that only apprehended or arrested
persons for the specified offenses fall within the provisions of the law and the Court already narrowly
interpreted the terms of the statute, as it should be. Section 15 is thus already limited in scope and coverage.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE
The Chain of Custody Rule is the duly recognized marking of the dangerous drugs from the time of its seizure
to the time it is brought to the crime lab for testing, to the time it is given to the custodian for safekeeping to the
time it is presented to the court as evidence, to the time it is given to the PDEA for destruction. The purpose is
to ensure that there is no change, alteration, or contamination of the dangerous drugs. That the dangerous drug
seized and confiscated from the accused would be the very same dangerous drug tested at the forensic crime
lab and would be the very same dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the said accused.
Therefore, any person having temporary custody of the dangerous drugs must place their signature and the
time wherein they were in custody of the said dangerous drugs on the plastic sachet.
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
There is malfeasance when a public officer performs in his official function an act prohibited by law.
There is misfeasance when a public officer performs an official act in a manner not in accordance with what
the law provides.
There is nonfeasance when a public officer knowingly and willfully refrains, refuses or omits to do an act which
the law or his office requires him to do.
ARTICLE 210. DIRECT BRIBERY
Elements of Direct Bribery
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The offender commits any of the following acts –
a.
b.
By agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of an offer, promise, gift or present,
an act constituting a crime in connection with the performance of his official duties; or
By accepting any gift or present in consideration for the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime in connection with the performance of his official duties; or
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c.
By agreeing to refrain or by refraining from doing an act which it is his official duty to do, in
consideration of an offer, promise, gift or present.
NOTE: The giver of the bribe falls under Art. 212 - Corruption of Public Officers
VILLANUEVA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 218652; February 23, 2022
Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable
for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019. (J. HERNANDO CASE)
MERENCILLO v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 142369 | 13 April 2007
FACTS: Merencillo, the BIR officer, was charged with two crimes. He was charged with violation of Section 3(b)
of RA 3019 and the crime of direct bribery. He asked P 20,000.00 in exchange for the issuance of the Certificate
Authorizing Registration (CAR). In course of the entrapment operation, Merencillo was caught in the act of
receiving the said P 20,000.00.
Merencillo’s Defense: He cannot be charged with both crimes. He will be placed in double jeopardy. Is this
argument meritorious?
SC: NO. Merencillo’s argument that charging him with the crimes of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 and
direct bribery will place him in double jeopardy has no merit.
First, Supreme Court said, Section 3 of RA 3019 is clear in its beginning statement: “In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.”
Therefore, violations of Section 3 of RA 3019 will always be in addition to any acts or omissions that a public
officer is already being penalized by existing law. Hence, Supreme Court said and note, double jeopardy will not
arise if a person is charged simultaneously or successively of violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the RPC.
Second, the two have different elements. Therefore, double jeopardy will not arise. Whereas in case of Section
3(b) of RA 3019, a mere request or demand of any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit is enough to
constitute a violation of the law. In case of direct bribery, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of any gift
or present is required to constitute direct bribery.
Third, they differ in the ambit or scope. The scope of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to
contracts or transactions involving monetary considerations where the public officer has the authority to
intervene under the law. Whereas in case of direct bribery, it has a wider, bigger, and more general in scope. It
includes performance of an act constituting a crime, execution of an unjust act which does not constitute, and
agreeing to refrain or by refraining from doing an act which it is his official duty to do. With this, the Supreme
Court held Merencillo liable for the two crimes.
Elements of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
1. That a public officer is performing official, administrative, or judicial functions;
2. That he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
3. He caused undue injury to any party including the government, or he gave a private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference.
There are three (3) modes of committing violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
1. By manifest partiality;
2. By evident bad faith; or
3. By gross inexcusable negligence.
NOTE: These are merely modalities as shown by the use of “or”
ARTICLE 217. MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS AND PROPERTY
Elements of malversation under Art. 2017
1. Offender be a public officer;
2. He had custody or control of funds by reason of the duties of his office;
3. Those funds and property were public funds and property for which he was accountable; and
4. He appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through his abandonment or negligence, he
permitted another person to take them.
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Q: Is demand an element under Art. 217?
A: NO. Demand is not an element. Under Art. 217, if demand is made to an accountable public officer of funds
and property and the same is not forthcoming, the law creates a prima facie presumption that the public officer
has malversed the public funds and property.
VENEZUELA v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 205693 | 14 February 2018, Reyes, Jr J.
FACTS: Valenzuela was the mayor of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. A team of auditors conducted an investigation
on the account of Costes, then municipal treasurer. It was discovered that a shortage of hp 2,872,808.00 on the
joint accounts of Costes and Venezuela. Consequently, three demand letters were issued against Valenzuela
ordering him to liquidate his cash advances. Venezuela sent an explanation letter acknowledging his
accountability for the cash advances amounting to Php 943,200.00, while denying the remainder of the cash
advances.
An information was filed accusing Villanueva of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. During the trial, it
was found that the receipts submitted by Venezuela purportedly evidencing his payment of the unliquidated
cash advances did not really reflect the payments claimed, as they were issued to different persons, in different
amounts and for different amounts.
The Sandiganbayan convicted Venezuela. It acknowledged that Venezuela made a partial refund of his
liabilities, thereby reducing his unliquidated cash advances to Php. 2,572,808.00. It considered such refund as a
mitigating circumstance akin to voluntary surrender.
ISSUE: Is Venezuela guilty of malversation of public funds?
SC: In the case of Mayor Venezuela v. People, the Supreme Court said that demand merely raises a prima facie
presumption that the missing cash have been put to personal use by the public officer. Mayor Venezuela’s
failure or inability to return the shortage upon demand created a prima facie presumption that the funds were
used by him for his personal purposes.
Therefore, the purpose of demand is to create a prima facie presumption, but the Supreme Court said that
demand is not in itself nor indispensable to constitute malversation because malversation is consummated
from the very moment the accountable public officer appropriates the public funds and fails to satisfactorily
explain his inability to produce the public funds that he has received.
TORRES v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 175074 | 31 August 2011 Peralta, J.
As ruled by the Court in the case of Torres v. People, the dolo (deliberate intent) or culpa (negligence) are
merely the modalities in the commission of the crime of malversation. But whether malversation is committed
through dolo or culpa, the same act of malversation is punished by law and they have the same penalties
prescribed under the law. Therefore, even if the crime charged is malversation through dolo or deliberate intent,
if the evidence presented only establishes malversation through culpa or negligence, the judge can very well
convict him of malversation through culpa or negligence.
The Supreme Court in this case ruled that malversation through culpa or negligence is necessarily included in
malversation through dolo or deliberate intent. The accused cannot argue that he has been denied of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him even if the crime charged is malversation through dolo or deliberate
intent. He can be convicted of malversation through culpa or negligence if that is what the evidence has
established. The accused is not deprived of the nature and cause of the accusation against him because the
dolo or the culpa are merely modalities in the commission of the crime.
YSIDORO v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 192330 | 14 November 2012 ABAD, J.
Good faith is not a defense in technical malversation. Criminal intent is not an element of technical
malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a
particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited
act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission
based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by
the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated.
Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
NOTE: However, the Supreme Court recognized that Mayor Ysidoro’s offense was not grave. It imposed upon
Mayor Ysidoro only a penalty of fine and no imprisonment because the offense is not grave warranting a mere
fine as penalty.
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REMINDER: Make sure that the facts of the case mentions that the public funds have already been earmarked
or appropriated.
ABDULLA v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 150129 | 6 April 2005
The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have
been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and
Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials
of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the P40,000 released by the DBM for salary differentials, for
the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held
guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating
said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined
in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.
In the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the finds allegedly technically malversed, the use of the
funds for another public purpose will not bring about a conviction for violation of Art. 220—technical
malversation.
ARTICLE 226. REMOVAL, CONCEALMENT OR DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
Elements of Removal, Concealment, or Destruction of Documents
1. Offender is a public officer;
2. He removes, destroys, or conceals documents or papers;
3. Said documents or papers should have been entrusted to such public officer by reason of his office;
4. Damage, whether serious or not, to a third party or to the public interest should have been caused.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
ARTICLE 246. PARRICIDE
Elements of Parricide
1. That a person is killed;
2. That the deceased is killed by the accused;
3.That the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, legitimate other
descendant, legitimate other ascendant, or legitimate spouse of the accused.
ART. 248 MURDER
Elements of Murder
1. A person kills another;
2. The said act of killing is attended by any of the following qualifying circumstances.
a. When the act of killing is done with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the
aid of armed men, employing means to weaken the defense, or employing means or persons
to insure or afford impunity;
b. When the act of killing is done in consideration of price, reward, or promise;
c. When the act of killing is done by means of fire, inundation, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment, or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of
motor vehicles, or by any other means involving great waste and ruin.
d. When the act of killing is done on occasion of any calamities enumerated in paragraph c
above, or on occasion of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic,
or any other public calamities.
e. When the act of killing is done with evident premeditation; or
f. When the act of killing is done with cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
suffering of the victim or by outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
ART 247. DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Elements of Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted under Exceptional Circumstances
1. That a legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or his daughter, the latter under 18
years of age and living with him, in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person;
2. That the said legally married spouse he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of
them any serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter;
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3.
That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or that he or she has
not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
NOTE: Two stages for Art. 247 to apply
1. Surprises his spouse or daughter
2. Kills or inflicts injuries while in the ACTUAL act or IMMEDIATELY thereafter
PEOPLE v. ABARCA G.R. No. 1234 | 12 February 1950
In this case, the Supreme Court held that Article 247 is NOT a felony or a crime. It is an ABSOLUTORY cause. It
is a matter of defense on the part of the accused to prove that the moment he committed the act of killing, the
moment he did the act of inflicting serious physical injuries, upon any or both of his wife/husband or the lover
of either, Article 247 applies. Thus, the penalty would only be destierro. In the case of People v. Abarca, the
Supreme Court even stated that the said destierro cannot be considered as a penalty.
It is an act of protection given by the State to the said offender from any retaliation coming from the relatives or
members of the family. You do not file a case for violation of Article 247 because it is a matter of defense, if
proven, it will absolve the accused of the proper penalty prescribed by law for the crime, Reclusion Perpetua to
Death, Reclusion Temporal, rather it would only be Destierro.
ARTICLE 255. INFANTICIDE
Infanticide is committed when the person killed is a child less than three (3) days old or less than 72 hours. In
case of infanticide, it is the age of the victim that is controlling. The victim must be less than three (3) days old
or 72 hours.
The offender can be any person. He can be a relative, a parent, a stranger to the said child. Whoever he is, the
moment the victim is less than three (3) days old or 72 hours, the crime committed is infanticide.
If it is the woman herself who kills her child less than three (3) days old or 72 hours because she wanted to
conceal her dishonor, such concealment of dishonor is a privileged mitigating circumstance which will lower
the imposable penalty.
ARTICLE 256. INTENTIONAL ABORTION
Elements of Intentional Abortion
1. There is a pregnant woman;
2. Violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages be administered, or that the accused otherwise acts upon
such pregnant woman.
3. As a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages upon her, or any other act of the accused, the
fetus dies, either in the womb of after having been expelled therefrom.
4. The abortion is intended.
ARTICLE 257. UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
Elements of Unintentional Abortion
1. There is a pregnant woman;
2. Violence is used upon such pregnant women without intending an abortion;
3. The violence is intentionally exerted; and
4. As a result of the violence, the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.
NOTE: There is NO crime of ATTEMPTED unintentional abortion because the intent to kill is on the pregnant
woman.
REMINDER:
Intentional - the intent is to kill the fetus
Unintentional - no intent against the fetus. The intent is the woman who happens to be pregnant
PHYSICAL INJURIES
There are three kinds of Physical Injuries:
1. Serious physical injuries
2. Less serious physical injuries
3. Slight physical injuries
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Deformity
The moment by reason of the physical injuries inflicted to the victim, he became deformed or suffered
deformity, you do not determine the healing period. The healing period becomes immaterial, what matters is
that it causes deformity on the victim. Regardless of the healing period, the moment the said physical injuries
inflicted causes deformity to the victim, it is immediately serious physical injuries.
RUEGO vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 226745, May 03, 2021
The said court ruled that the said case should not have reached the Supreme Court since it is only a case of
serious physical injuries. However, the said case gave the court the opportunity to revisit a long- time obsolete
doctrine that the moment that it is the two front teeth that have been lost, it is immediately serious physical
injuries. According to the Supreme Court, in determining whether or not the loss of a tooth is serious physical
injuries, there must be a fact or determination during the trial that the loss of the said tooth resulted in a visible
deformity.
ARTICLE 266-A. RAPE
GR: The moment that the victim is 16 years old, it is automatically qualified rape.
XPN: When the difference in age between the parties is not more than three (3) years and the sexual
act is proven to be consensual, non-abusive, and non-exploitative.
XPN to XPN: Victim is under 13 years old
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES ARISING FROM RAPE
Under Art. 266-B, there are special complex crimes that arise in the crime of rape –
1.
2.
When by reason or on occasion of rape, homicide is committed, there is the special complex crime of
rape with homicide.
When rape is attempted, and a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof, there is the
special complex crime with attempted rape with homicide.
These are the two special complex crimes in rape. It is the law that combines the crimes and the law prescribes
a particular penalty for the combined crimes. The special complex crime of rape with homicide is punished by
death. Whereas, the special complex crime of attempted rape with homicide is punished by reclusion perpetua
to death.
ARTICLE 266-B. RAPE
Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the
rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall become reclusion perpetua to death. When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason
or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion
ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim; xxx
Twin qualifying circumstances:
1. The victim is a minor;
2. The relationship between the victim and the accused
PEOPLE vs. DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 224212; November 27, 2019
In this case, AAA's minority was properly alleged and indisputably proven during trial. Moreover, it was proven
by evidence that De Guzman forced AAA into engaging in sexual congress by using threats and intimidation
and without her consent, in addition to his moral ascendancy over her. Corollorily, it was alleged in the
Informations that De Guzman was AAA's "stepfather." A "stepfather" is the "husband of one's mother by virtue of
a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring. However, during trial, the
prosecution failed to establish this stepparent-stepdaughter relationship between De Guzman and AAA. No
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proof of marriage was presented to establish De Guzman's legal relationship with BBB. In other words, De
Guzman cannot be considered as the stepfather of AAA as alleged in the Informations.
On the contrary, records show that De Guzman was actually the common-law spouse of BBB as he was not
legally married to her. Since De Guzman's relationship with AAA as alleged in the Informations was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, De Guzman cannot be convicted of Qualified Rape, only Simple Statutory Rape and
Simple Rape. Stated differently, "the crime is only simple rape, although the State successfully proves the
common-law relationship, where the information does not properly allege the qualifying circumstance of
relationship between the accused and the female.
Hence, De Gumzan cannot be charged for Qualified Rape pursuant to the qualifying circumstance of
relationship for failure of the prosecution to prove that he is AAA’s step parent.
Q: X is 22 years old. He was sitting on a bench at Luneta Park, a public place. While X was there alone, here
comes Y, a 17-year-old sampaguita vendor. Y sat beside X and he offered X her sampaguita. More than that, Y
offered to X herself at the price of P1,000. While Y was talking to X, the police arrived. The police arrested X
and charged X under Sec. 10(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Is X liable as charged?
A: NO, X is not liable as charged. Under Sec. 10(b) of R.A. No. 7610, as amended by R.A. No. 11648, what the
law punishes is any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor sixteen (16) years old or under or
who is ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel, etc. In this case, X is not
liable because, first, the said girl Y was neither kept nor in the company of X. Rather, it was Y who approached
X, who was just sitting at Luneta Park and then talked to X.
Another reason is, Y is neither 16 years old nor 10 years the junior of X. Y is 17 years old and only 5 years
younger than X. Therefore, X cannot be held liable by R.A. No. 7610.
Q: In the same problem, when X, 22 years old, was seated there, Y went to him and offered her sampaguita
and herself. X accepted the offer of Y and brought Y in a motel and had sexual intercourse with her, and
thereafter paid her the price of P1,000, the amount asked by Y. Is X liable under R.A. No. 7610?
A: YES. X is liable under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. All the elements of Sec. (b) are present –
1.
2.
3.
First, X commits the act of sexual intercourse,
Next, the said act was performed with Y who is a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse, and
Lastly, Y is below 18 years old.
In this case, Y is a child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse because she indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct for money, profit, or any other consideration. She was the one who asked for
P1,000, selling her body to X. Therefore, when X gave in, X became criminally liable under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610.
REMINDER: If a problem is given under RA 7610 (Bongalon, Jabalde, Calaoagan v. People), the SC repeatedly
held that the laying of hands when done at the spur of the moment and in anger cannot be considered as child
abuse because there is no intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child.
SC: The Court finds that petitioner inflicted the injuries in the heat of argument. AAA and BBB claim that it was
petitioner's group that first annoyed the former's group; while petitioner claims that it was AAA and BBB's group
that initiated the shouting match. Nevertheless, it is clear that the altercation between AAA, BBB, and petitioner
only occurred when their groups met on the street without any prior confrontation. As observed in the cases of
Bongalon, Jabalde, and Escolano, when the infliction of physical injuries against a minor is done at the spur of
the moment, it is imperative for the prosecution to prove a specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the
intrinsic worth of the child; otherwise, the accused cannot be convicted under Sec. 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610.
Q: X is 14 years old. X had a misunderstanding with her mother. Medyo napagalitan ng nanay. So, she ran
from home. X stayed in the house of her friend. While X was staying, living in the house of her friend, X met Y.
Y asked X, “You are beautiful. Do you want to earn money? You can earn easy money by having sexual
intercourse with customers. I can find customers for you. You can have money if you will allow me to find a
customer for you.” Since X was in need of money, X agreed. The next day, Y went back to X and told the latter
that he already found a customer for her. X dressed up and thereafter, Y brought X to the said customer. X had
sexual intercourse with the said customer and thereafter, the said customer gave X P2,000.00. The moment X
accepted the P2,000.00 from the customer, X gave the share of Y P600.00. What crime is committed by Y?
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A: In the case of Brozoto v. People, G.R. No. 233420, April 28, 2021, the Supreme Court said, Y committed two
crimes – Qualified Trafficking in Persons under R.A. No. 9208, as amended and Violation of Section 5(a) of R.A.
No. 7610.
Y is liable for Qualified Trafficking in Persons under R.A. No. 9208, as amended because the gravamen of the
crime of trafficking is the act of recruiting or using, with or without consent, a fellow human being for purposes
of sexual exploitation. In this case, Y recruited X for the purpose of prostitution and it is qualified because X is a
minor.
Y is also liable for violation of Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 7610 because Y acted as a procurer of a child prostitute.
Y exploited X in prostitution when he procured and found a customer to engage in a sexual intercourse with X
for a fee and for which Y was given a share in the amount of P600.00. Therefore, the said accused is liable for
two crimes.
PEOPLE V. BELINA BAWALAN Y MOLINA, G.R. No. 232358; May 12, 2021
FACTS: Accused-appellants conspired and by means of fraud and deceit facilitated child prostitution by
procuring AAA, where she was made to work as a prostitute. Police Officer 1 Orlando F. Intoy (PO1 Intoy), a
poseur-customer, availed the services of Bawalan in exchange for money which eventually led to the
apprehension of accused-appellants.
RULING: The elements of the offense of trafficking in persons were sufficiently established. First, AAA
categorically stated that Bawalan instructed her to go with PO1 Intoy, who was then acting as a
poseur-customer, after Bawalan received money from the latter. AAA further stated it was not the first time she
was sexually exploited by accused-appellants. According to her, it would happen often, whenever their family
had nothing to eat. AAA also stated that in the previous incidents, she would be taken to the cemetery and
motel, was videotaped naked, and had sexual intercourse with her customers. Evidently, accused-appellants
took advantage of her vulnerability when she was made to engage in sexual activities with customers in
exchange for money. Taking into consideration the circumstances on how AAA was sexually exploited, all three
accused-appellants conspired and acted together in perpetrating the crime. While the prosecution failed to
prove the victim's minority due to the absence of her birth certificate, it however established that the crime was
committed by a group of three persons, and by an ascendant and a person exercising authority over the victim.
Hence, for facilitating child prostitution against AAA, the accused-appellants Belina Bawalan y Molina, BBB, and
CCC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons and should be penalized per RA 9208.
CADAJAS V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 247348, NOVEMBER 16, 2021
Q: X is 24 years old while Y is 14 years old. Y has a crush on X, the 24-year-old man. X learned that this girl
has a crush on him. So, he began sending her messages on Facebook Messenger. Then X courted Y. Y
answered X and they become lovers/sweethearts The relationship between X and Y was discovered by the
mother. The mother disapproved because her daughter was too young. The mother hot very mad of this
relationship and told her daughter to stop seeing the said man. The mother has the habit of looking at the
social media account of her daughter. Until one time the mother read the conversation between her daughter
and X. The said man was coaching Y to send him photos of her breasts and vagina to which Y did. When X
asked her to undress herself and to take photos of her breasts and vagina, Y did and sent these photos to X.
When the mother discovered these, X was charged with violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 and Child
Pornography in relation to R.A. No. 10175 or the Cybercrime Act. Is X liable as charged?
A: In this case, the RTC acquitted Cadajas for violation of R.A. No. 7610 but convicted him of Child Pornography
in relation the Anti-Cyber Crime Act. The Supreme Court convicted Cadajas as charged. SC said, based on the
photographs and conversations in the Facebook Messenger account, it was evident that Cadajas obtained
these photos from the girl by inducing the girl to send her these photos of her private parts.
The photos and conversations in the FB Messenger account were obtained and used as evidence against
Cadajas. These, according to the SC, cannot be considered as fruit of the poisonous tree because fruits of the
poisonous tree will only apply if the persons who obtained it are police officers or agents of the State. Here,
they were obtained by the mother. Hence, SC said, Cadajas’ right to privacy has not been violated.
The photos were obtained because Cadajas himself gave his password to his girlfriend Y. Considering that he
was the one who gave the password to his girlfriend, his act in effect, Cadajas’ authorized the girl to access the
same. Therefore, he waived his right to privacy.
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Supreme Court said, he is liable for Child Pornography defined and penalized under R.A. No. 9775, as amended
because child pornography is classified as a crime mala in se and not mala prohibita. The intent of Cadajas to
abuse the girl and engage in child pornography by inducing her to exhibit her breast and vagina is evident. SC
said, Cadajas, being 24 years old, is one with mental maturity and should have known that it is not only illegal
but inherently wrong for the minor to show him her private parts. Therefore, Cadajas is liable for violation of the
Child Pornography Act.
Since the same was done through the use of a computer system, the penalty for Child Pornography shall be
one degree higher if it is in relation to the Anti Cyber Crime Act. And since the penalty for Child Pornography
under R.A. No. 9775 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period and a fine of P1 Million – P2 Million, the
penalty to be imposed on Cadajas would be the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
NOTE: It is always a degree higher if it is done through the computer system.
GARCIA vs. DRILON, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013 and JACINTO vs. FOUTS G.R. No. 250627. December 7,
2022 [BEYOND CUT-OFF DATE]
Q: Can lesbians be the subject of RA 9262?
A: Yes, VAWC can be filed even against the female partner of the said accused. R.A. 9262 applies equally to all
women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
SC: VAWC may likewise be committed ‘against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship.’ Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word ‘person’ who has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. The Court also clarified that, contrary to Jacinto’s
position, the foregoing pronouncement by the Court in Garcia v. Drilon is not a mere obiter dictum, as the
discussion on the applicability of the Anti-VAWC Act to lesbian relationships was a resolution of the issue in
Garcia of whether or not the Anti-VAWC Act was discriminatory for supposedly singling out husbands or
fathers.
RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON, acting on behalf of minor RHUBY SIBAL KNUTSON, petitioner, v. HON. ELISA R.
SARMIENTO-FLORES, G.R. No. 239215, July 12, 2022 [BEYOND CUT-OFF DATE]
Fathers may apply for protection orders for their children
Fathers can apply for remedies under the law on behalf of the abused children. Thus ruled the Supreme Court
En Banc in an 18-page Decision penned by Justice Mario V. Lopez, granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by
Randy Michael Knutson on behalf of his minor daughter. The petition challenged the ruling of the Taguig City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) which had dismissed Knutson’s petition under Republic Act 9262, or the VAWC Act,
for the issuance of Temporary and Protection Orders against Rosalina Knutson (Rosalina), the mother of his
daughter.
MELGAR V. PEOPLE, En Banc; AND REYES V. PEOPLE AND the VARIANCE DOCTRINE [ABANDONED BY
ACHARON CASE]
If H is not liable under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, can he be held liable under Section 5(e) for Economic
Abuse?
SC: The Supreme Court applied the variance doctrine that an accused can be convicted of Section 5(e) instead
of Section 5(i) as long as the denial or deprivation of financial support by the accused has been established by
the prosecution. According to the Supreme Court, Section 5(e) specifically penalizes the deprivation of financial
support by itself even in the absence of psychological violence. So, in these two cases of Melgar v. People and
Reyes v. People, the SC said, Section 5(e) is necessarily included in Section 5(i) when it comes to denial of
support.
Therefore, if the husband cannot be convicted under Section 5(i), then he can be convicted under Section 5(e)
based on the variance doctrine. Supreme Court, however said that, these decision in Melgar v. People and
Reyes v. People, has already been abandoned by the Supreme Court in the case of Acharon v. People. In the
case of Acharon and Calingasan, the SC clarified that Section 5(e) and Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 penalized
two distinct crimes. Section 5(i) punishes the willful infliction of psychological violence upon the woman and
her child by denying them the financial support legally due them. On the other hand, Section 5(e) penalizes the
deprivation of financial support for the purpose of controlling or restricting the woman of her child’s movement
or conduct. Therefore, Section 5(i) and Section 5(e) punishes different acts. Hence, the variance doctrine
cannot and will not apply. In this case, the SC again acquitted Calingasan.
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CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
Elements of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
1. The offender is a private individual;
2. He kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner depriving him of his liberty;
3. The said kidnapping or detention is without legal ground; and
4. The said kidnapping or detention is attended by any of the following circumstances –
a.
b.
c.
d.
when the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted for more than 3 days;
if it is committed by simulating public authority;
if any serious physical injuries have been inflicted on the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him have been made; or
if the person kidnapped or detained is a female, a public officer, or a minor.
Q: Can a public officer commit the crime?
A: YES. In the case of People v. Borja, the SC said yes. A public officer who detains a person for the purpose of
extorting ransom cannot be said to be acting in an official capacity. Public officials may be prosecuted under
Article 267 of the RPC Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention if they act in their private capacity. The offender
is a private person or a public officer acting in his private capacity.
PEOPLE v. DIONALDO G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014 Perlas Bernabe J:
The Supreme Court said that the proper nomenclature of the crime is Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.
The purpose was to extort ransom, and the victim was killed. If the victim is a woman, the proper nomenclature
is Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention for Ransom with Homicide. It is not necessary that ransom be paid
or that ransom be communicated, because it suffices that the purpose of the kidnapping is to extort ransom
from the victim or any member of his family.
Q: The accused kidnapped three children and their yaya. The purpose of the accused was to extort ransom
from the family—the parents of the three children. Upon payment of the ransom, the children were released.
However, the accused was arrested. The accused was charged with the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention for Ransom in one information. Is the charge correct?
A: NO. The charge is wrong. The proper charge should be four counts of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention for Ransom. The victims were three children and their yaya. It was ransom because the purpose of
the accused was to extort ransom from the parents of the victims. It must be four counts because there are
four victims of the kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom.
PEOPLE V. ARANETA G.R. No. 250980, March 15, 2022 INTING, J.:
The Supreme Court said that the proper charges should be four counts of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention for Ransom.
ARTICLE 282. GRAVE THREATS
Essence of Threat
The essence of grave threats or light threats is intimidation, a future harm or future wrong. It is not immediate,
but in the future. This is why under Art. 282, grave threats can be committed not only personally but also in
writing or through a middleman/third person.
NOTE: In this crime, the threat is made for an event that will happen in the future. It is already in the
consummated stage if it reached the knowledge of the victim.
ARTICLE 287. LIGHT COERCIONS
MADERAZO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 165065 SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 CALLEJO, SR.
Q: X was renting a stall in the public market. She failed to pay the rent. At the time, Mayor Maderazo went to
the public market. Verutiao was not there. Mayor made inspection, and he saw X’s stall. Since Verutiao, based
on the mayor’s list, has not yet paid rentals, Mayor Maderazo ordered the said stall of Verutiao to be
padlocked. He and his body guards left.
Thereafter, Mayor Maderazo returned with his bodyguards and ordered the body guards to re-open the stall of
Verutiao that they had already padlocked. After opening it, the mayor told his bodyguards to bring all of its
contents to the police station. When Verutiao learned about this, she was very mad. What crime is committed
by Mayor Maderazo?
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A: The SC said that Mayor Maderazo is liable for unjust vexation, a form of light coercion under Art. 287. The
SC said that although Verutiao was not in her stall, unjust vexation was still committed because she was
embarrassed, annoyed, irritated, and disturbed when she learned of the acts done by the Mayor. Mayor
Maderazo had no right, without judicial intervention or order, to oust Verutiao from her stall and had all her
merchandise be transported and placed to the police station. In doing so, the said woman suffered damages
because she lost her merchandise. The mayor, no matter how high his position was, had no right to take the law
into his hands and deprive the woman of possession of her stall.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
Q: Police Officer X alighted from the bus. The moment he alighted, he was approached by three men – A, B,
and C. The three men declared a hold-up, a robbery. Thereafter, one of the men, B, immediately snatched and
took away the bag of Police Officer X. To defend himself, police officer X informed, told the truth to A, B, and C
according to policer officer X “Police ako”. So police officer X informed A, B, and C, that he is a police officer.
Nevertheless, A, B, and C did not sign. The statement of police officer X that he is a police officer did not stop
A, B, and C, and A, B, and C and then thereafter they tried to stab police officer X. However police officer X
was able to evade the thrust. Thereafter, B and C both of them punched and kicked police officer X. Police
officer X wanting to defend himself, took out his service pistol and fired at the feet of A, B and C, because of
that A, B, and C.
A, B, and C quickly fled pagbabarilin yung paa nila di naman pinataaman yung ground pinatama dun sa paa. A,
B, and C quickly fled. In fleeing, in getting out of the scene, A, B, and C left their knives and the bag of police
officer X that they are taking, so naiwan yung bag. A case of robbery was filed against A, B, and C and they
were charged of as as conspirators for the crime of robbery. When they were prosecuted for robbery, A, B, and
C argued that they cannot be liable for robbery they should be acquitted because the element of robbery is
animus lucrandi or intent to gain is absent. According to them, they failed to take the bag, they left the bag,
therefore it shows there is no intent to gain, there is no animus lucrandi. Is the defense meritorious? or/are A,
B, and C liable as conspirators for the crime of robbery?
A: A, B, and C are liable as conspirators for the crime of robbery. All elements of robbery are present. First, there
is unlawful taking of the bag of police officer X. The bag belongs to officer X, obviously the act of taking was
done with intent to gain, and the taking was done by them, because they were able to complete the act of taking
because they punched him and one even thrust a knife at him.
The argument raised by the three accused has no merit. The moment A, B, and, C unlawfully took the bag of
police officer X the moment they had already taken the said bag, the crime of robbery is already consummated,
and it is immaterial that X for the said police officer was able to subsequently recover the bag forcibly taken
from him when the three robbers fled in fear and they dropped the bag. The said circumstance that they left the
bag out of fear does not preclude the presence of intent to gain/animus lucrandi. The said animus
lucrandi/intent to gain is presumed from the forceful taking of the bag. Therefore, they are liable for the crime
of robbery. There are two kinds of robbery, robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, intimidation
of any person under Article 294, and the other is one robbery by use of force upon things.
ARTICLE 294. ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF PERSONS; PENALTIES
Robbery with Homicide
When by reason or an occasion of robbery, the crime of homicide is committed, we have the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide. In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, the original criminal
design of the offenders to commit robbery, and the said act of killing may take place before, during, or after the
commission of robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human.
For as long as the original criminal intent is to rob, the homicide or killing may take place before, during, or after
the robbery. It is immaterial that death supervene by mere accident because the use of the word homicide is in
its generic sense. Homicide includes all kinds of killing, murder, parricide, even accidental death.
The use of the word homicide is in its generic sense. It is also immaterial if the victim of the homicide is one of
the robbers. The felony would still be robbery with homicide. Insofar as the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide is concerned, the principle behind the special complex of robbery with homicide would apply
also to the special complex of robbery with rape, robbery with intentional mutilation, robbery with arson,
robbery with serious physical injuries, for as long as the original criminal intent of the offender is to rob, the
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rape, the intentional mutilation, the arson, the infliction of serious physical injuries may be committed
immediately prior to, during, or after the commission, for as long as the original criminal intent was to rob.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. OGELIO NATINDIM, G.R. No. 201867; November 4, 2020
FACTS: At around 9PM, Judith, her husband Pepito, and their children were having dinner when they heard
noises outside their house. Pepito looked out the window to ascertain the noise outside when Edimar shot him
on his head which knocked him to the floor. Somebody then shouted and warned that they would massacre
Judith and her children if they did not go down. Overwhelmed by fear, they went downstairs. Thereafter, Jimmy
took Pepito's air gun and FM radio while Rogelio took the bolo after hacking the body of Pepito. Subsequently,
Edimar shouted "Attack!" thereby giving the other appellants the signal to ransack the other valuables of the
spouses Gunayan.
RULING: The accused were properly convicted of the crime of Robbery.
A conviction for Robbery with Homicide requires that Robbery is the main purpose and objective of the
malefactors and the killing is merely incidental to the Robbery. If, originally, the malefactors did not
comprehend Robbery, but Robbery follows the Homicide either as an afterthought or merely as an incident of
the Homicide, then the malefactor is guilty of two separate crimes, that of Homicide or Murder and Robbery,
and not of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
In this case, the original intention of the appellants was to kill Pepito to exact revenge from Pepito for
assaulting appellant Gerry. In fact, appellant Edimar immediately shot Pepito on his head when the latter
looked out from his window to ascertain the people outside his house. This shows that the appellants did not
intend to commit Robbery at the outset. Nonetheless, Robbery was committed incidentally by the appellants
when they took Pepito’s air gun, FM Radio, bolo, goat, two pigs, a fighting cock and a hen without the consent
and at gunpoint and with use of bolos against Judith and her children.
Therefore, the appellants are guilty of Murder under Article 248 and Robbery under Article 294(5) of the RPC.
PEOPLE vs. CASABUENA, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020
The Supreme Court said that the law provides, under Article 294, any person guilty of robbery with the use of
violence against or intimidation OF ANY PERSON shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when
by reason or on occasion of the said robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed. The Supreme
Court said that the use of the phrase “any person” is all-inclusive, including any one of the robbers themselves.
Therefore, it is immaterial who is killed. Whether a robber himself is one of those killed, still, it is the special
complex of crime of robbery with homicide because of the all-inclusive phrase “any person”.
ARTICLE 297. ATTEMPTED AND FRUSTRATED ROBBERY COMMITTED UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the person
guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua,
unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.
NOTE: It is necessary that they are guilty in both the frustrated robbery and homicide.
NAPOLIS VS. CA, G.R. No. L-28865 February 28, 1972
Q:A, B, C & D, all armed,entered the house of E by breaking the doorknob in front of the house. Once inside, A
told D to get out of the house to serve as lookout. A, B, & C started ransacking the house. After A, B, & C were
almost done ransacking the house, E, the owner of the house, arrived. When A saw E, the owner of the house,
A punched him. Thereafter, they left. The owner of the house suffered slight physical injuries. What crime(s)
is/are committed by A, B, C, & D?
A: A, B, C, & D, are liable for the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by a band and under Article
299, complex with robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under Article 294, paragraph 5. In
the case of Napolis v. C.A., which is cited by the Supreme Court in the case of Fransdilla v. People, the Supreme
Court said that you have to complex Article 294, paragraph 5, with Article 299, if both elements of the crimes
are present.
In the problem given, A, B, C, and D were all armed, and they entered the house of E by breaking the doorknob at
the front door, and then they took valuables. This is robbery by use of force upon things under Article 299.
However, after they ransacked the house, when the owner arrived, one of the robbers, A, inflicted slight physical
injuries on the owner of the house. That act constituted simple robbery under Article 294, paragraph 5.
Therefore, you complex it.
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When the elements of both provisions of Article 294, paragraph 5, simple robbery, and Article 299, robbery by
use of force upon things is present, the crime is a complex crime, which calls for the imposition of the penalty
for the most serious offense in its maximum period, and that is violation of Article 299.
As a rule, Article 294 is graver, more serious than Article 299 because in Article 294, there is killing/homicide,
intentional mutilation, arson, serious physical injuries, except in paragraph 5. Paragraph 5, it is only through
intimidation and slight or less serious physical injuries, it is known as simple robbery.
Article 294, as a rule, absorbs Article 299. However, not if what accompanies Article 299 is only simple robbery.
Because if what accompanies Article 299 is only simple robbery, Article 299 has a graver penalty of reclusion
temporal. Therefore, in order to impose on the accused the graver penalty, the most serious offense, the penalty
for the most serious offense, Supreme Court said, you have to complex, simple robbery, Article 294 paragraph
5, with, Article 299, robbery by use of force upon things.
NOTE: This will only apply if the Robbery is with force upon things in an inhabited house and the other is Simple
Robbery. If it is Robbery with Homicide, then you cannot complex it.
DEL ROSARIO v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 235739 | 22 July 22 2019
Q: X flagged down a jeepney and boarded the same. X sat next to a woman who was wearing a necklace. The
moment the jeepney stopped at the red light, X grabbed the necklace of the woman and thereafter jumped out
of the jeepney. X was arrested and was charged with the crime of Simple Robbery under Article 294 (5) - If
violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery is carried to a degree clearly unnecessary
for the commission of the crime. Is X liable as charged?
A: In the case of Del Rosario v. People, the Supreme Court said NO. The Supreme Court said that the
distinguishing element between Robbery and Theft is the use of violence or intimidation as a means of taking a
person’s property. If it is present, the crime is Robbery. If it is absent, the crime is Theft.
In this case the accused grabbed the necklace of the woman. The Supreme Court said that the fact the
necklace was grabbed and the fact that the information filed against the accused stated that the necklace was
grabbed does not automatically mean that force attended the act of taking.
The Supreme Court said, “grabbed” means to take or seize by a sudden motion or grasp, to take hastily. It
does not suggest of violence or physical force in the act of taking. It only refers to the suddenness of the act
of taking or suddenness of the act of seizing. But it cannot be equated with employment of violence or force.
Therefore, absent any showing that the said victim sustained less serious or slight physical injuries, then it will
only be the kind of Theft and not Simple Robbery under Article 294 (5).
Q: In the same problem, X grabbed necklace and because of the force, Y suffered slight physical injuries.
What will now be the crime?
A: It will be simple robbery. In the case of Ablaza v. People, the Court clarified that for the requisite of violence
to obtain in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious physical injuries or slight
physical injuries in the occasion of the robbery.
ARTICLE 308. THEFT
THEFT IS LIKEWISE COMMITTED BY:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to
the owner thereof;
2. 2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make
use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
3. 3. Any person who shall enter the fenced or enclosed estate or field of another where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and, without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the
same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or any other forest or farm products.
PANTE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 218969; January 18, 2021
A "finder" under Article 308, par. 2(1) of the RPC is not only limited to the actual finder of the lost property since
the gist of the offense is the furtive taking and misappropriation of the property found. The rationale for the
"finder in law" is to protect the owner of the lost property in the event the lost property is transferred from one
individual to another and to prevent the "finder in law" from escaping liability by claiming that he was not the
actual finder thereof but was merely entrusted custody thereof by someone who had no intention to appropriate
the same. Receiving lost property from the finder, who had no intent to steal, with the felonious intent to
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appropriate it to his [or her] own use, escapes punishment. In such case, whether or not the person taking the
money is guilty of [theft] must be determined on the same principles which govern in the case of the actual
finder."
Instead of returning the money, Pante convinced his co-accused minors not to return the money and to divide it
among themselves. At that moment, Pante placed himself precisely in the situation as if he was the actual
finder. Though not the actual finder, there is no dispute that Pante knew for a fact that his two co-accused
minors did not own the subject money. He knew for a fact that his co-accused minor merely found the money
along the road while the latter was delivering bread. Otherwise stated, petitioner was a "finder in law," if not in
fact; and his act in appropriating the money was of precisely of the same character as if it had been originally
found by him. Having obtained possession of Word's lost money, Pante had the opportunity and the obligation
to return the lost property to its rightful owner or to the local authorities, but he unjustifiably refrained from
doing so.
Pante’s defense: He did not return the property because he did not know who the owner is.
SC: The RPC does not require that the thief must know the owner of the lost property. This is precisely why the
subject penal provision gave the finder the option to return the lost property not only to the owner thereof but
also to the local authorities. As such, his criminal intent to commandeer the money found was altogether clear
at that point. (J. HERNANDO CASE)
ARTICLE 315. SWINDLING OR ESTAFA AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 10591
ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION OR CONVERSION
Elements of Article 315 (1)(b)
1. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same;
2. That there be misappropriation or conversion of the said money, goods, or personal property by the
person who received it;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion resulted to the prejudice of the offended party.
4. That there be demand for the return of the said money, good, or personal property
NOTE:
As to the first element, for Estafa to arise under Article 315 (1)(b) it is necessary that when the offended party
gave the said money, goods, or personal property to the offender, and when the offender received the said
money, goods, or personal property from the offended party, what was received by him and what was delivered
by him was not only the physical or material possession of the said property but both the physical and material
possession and juridical possession of the said property.
Juridical Possession is a possession in the concept of an owner. If only the actual or material possession is
transferred to him, upon receipt of the said money, goods, or other personal property and the same is
misappropriated by him, the crime committed is Theft or Qualified Theft and NOT Estafa.
For Estafa to arise it is necessary that both physical or material possession and juridical possession has been
received by the offender upon receipt of the money, goods, or other personal property.
Q: X was the principal in an elementary school. He was asked by the head of school, aside from being the
principal, to receive the matriculation fees paid by the students. He was entrusted to receive these
matriculation fees. Thus, the parents were paying to the said principal. Thereafter, the principal failed to go to
work. When he failed to go the work, the management of the school tried to conduct an audit on the money
that he has received and it was discovered that he did not remit to the school all the matriculation fees that he
received and collected from the parents and the students. Although the said offender is obligated and
instructed to forward all payments to the school, he failed to do so and went on leave of absence. Because of
that, he was charged with the crime of Estafa under Article 315-1(b). Is the charge correct?
A: NO, the charge is wrong. The proper charge should be is Qualified Theft. It is not estafa under Article
315-1(b). In this case, X aside from being principal, was merely designated as the temporary custodian of the
said school matriculation fees. What was given to X was only the physical and material possession of the said
school matriculation fees. He was the one who collected the said fees and he was obligated to remit it to the
school authorities. Therefore, being the temporary custodian, what he acquires is only the physical or material
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possession of the said unremitted funds and not the juridical possession of the said unremitted funds. Hence,
the crime committed is not Estafa, the crime committed is Qualified Theft.
SPOUSES ISIDRO DULAY III V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 215132; September 1, 2021
FACTS: Petitioners presented a photocopy of TCT registered in the names of Isidro and Virginia Dulay covering
the subject property to the Spouses Isabelo and Hilaria Dulos. When Spouses Dulos inquired why a different
name was indicated in the title, the latter explained that she and Virginia are one and the same person.
Consequently, the spouses Dulos confirmed their interest to purchase the subject property. When the spouses
Dulos' monthly payments reached the total amount of ₱707,000.00 without receiving the promised title or a
copy thereof from petitioners, they made further inquiries on the subject property and learned that the
registered owners indicated in the TCT are different persons from petitioners.
Petitioners asserted that the title remained under reconstitution and has yet to be transferred in their names
which thus precluded them from handing over title to the complainants, and petitioner Isidro Dulay is the lawful
owner of the subject property. Petitioners insisted that the spouses Dulos knew that the title was still not in
petitioners' names when they initially paid the downpayment of ₱150,000.00, expressly agreeing to wait for
petitioners' processing of the transfer of titles. Furthermore, petitioners contended that the trial court is without
jurisdiction over the offense charged in the Information which actually falls under Article 316, paragraph 1 of
the RPC carrying a lower penalty. Petitioners prayed for either the dismissal of the case or the imposition of a
lower penalty for the lesser offense under Article 316 (1) of the RPC.
ISSUE: Are petitioners guilty of estafa when private complainants were aware that the subject property was not
in their names at the time of the transaction?
RULING: YES, petitioners are guilty of estafa by means of deceit. The petitioners are not the owners of the
subject property yet they brazenly sold the property to Sps. Dulos.
All the elements are present in this case. First, petitioners made false presence and fraudulent
misrepresentations to complainants: (1) that they owned the subject property which there could sell; (2) that
they are processing the reconstitution of the title; (3) that they are the Isidro and Virginia Dulay; and (4) that
Virginia and Elena are one and the same person. It must be noted that reconstitution of title is the re-issuance
of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It presupposes that petitioners
are the registered owner of the subject property.
The remaining elements of the offense are likewise present. Petitioners’ false pretense of ownership which
could transfer valid title to the subject property, was committed prior to and simultaneous with the commission
of the fraud. Private complainants’ reliance on this false pretense induced and impelled them to purchase the
subject property and pay the total amount of ₱707,000. Petitioners were aware of the falsity of their
representation to complainants that they are the registered owners Isidro and Virginia Dulay indicated in the
title. This is precisely the crux of their deceit.
Defenses of Sps. Dulay:
1. The buyers must have conducted due diligence necessary to know the real owner of the property.
2. If they are liable, they must be liable only of Other forms of Swindling
SC:
1.
2.
NO. It has no effect on the liability of Sps. Dulay because estafa by means of deceit has already been
consummated the moment they received the payment for the property.
NO. Art. 316, par. 1 covers a specific situation where the offended exercises or executes, as part of the
false representation, some act of dominion or ownership over the property to the damage and
prejudice of the real owner of the thing. On the other hand, this circumstance need not be present for a
crime to be committed under Art. 315, par. 2 (a). In the case at bar, the evidence does not disclose that
the appellant had exercised certain acts of ownership or dominion beyond his mere pointing of the
property to the offender party and his claim that he was the owner thereof. This is, therefore, a proper
case for the application of Art. 315, par. 2 (a). (People vs. Suratos, C.A., 62 O.G. 1963)
Here, petitioners did not exercise acts of dominion or ownership over the property other than their false
pretense and claim that they owned it. Petitioners proffered a nominal claim of ownership by showing
a copy of TCT No. T-2135 and pretending to be the same persons indicated therein as registered,
owners of the subject property. The fraudulent acts of petitioners in pretending to own the real
property and selling it is not equivalent to an exercise of an act of dominion or ownership which
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damaged and prejudiced the real owner of the thing, Carmencita, the daughter of Isidro and Virginia
Dulay.
Thus, petitioners are guilty of estafa by means of deceit.
Elements of Estafa by Means of Deceit as defined under Article 315 (2)(a) of the RPC:
1. That there must be false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent ct or fraudulent means, that
is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; and
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
ARTICLE 320. DESTRUCTIVE ARSON
Arson is the malicious destruction of the property by means of fire.
TWO KINDS OF ARSON:
1. Destructive arson; or
2. Simple Arson under PD 1613.
NOTE: The classification of Arson into destructive and simple arson is based on the character and location of
the property burned regardless of the value of the property. Whatever the kind of arson, there are two general
elements of arson.
General Elements of Arson:
1. Corpus delicti, which is a fire by reason of criminal agency.
2. The identity of the accused as the one responsible for the fire.
PEOPLE v. MALNGAN, G.R. No. 170470 | 26 September 2006
The Supreme Court said there is no complex crime of arson with homicide even if in the course of burning the
house, property, dwelling, building of another, someone is killed. The reason given by the Supreme Court is that
Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to destructive arson, and PD 1613, with respect to simple
arson, provide only one penalty for the commission of arson whether considered as destructive or simple when
death results. According to the Supreme Court, arson is itself the end and death is simply a consequence.
Therefore, there is no complex crime of arson with homicide.
PEOPLE v. SORIA, G.R. No. 248372 | 27 August 2020
When the house was burned and a helper who was sleeping inside was burned to death, the accused is liable
for arson with homicide. But he did not state the reason why it is arson with homicide. He just stated in the end
the accused is liable for arson with homicide but there is no explanation why it is arson with homicide. So I will
still stay in the En Banc case of People vs. Malngan that the crime committed is arson, only that the penalty is
increased, the said death is simply absorbed, the effect is only to increase the imposable penalty.
REMINDER: HOW TO ANSWER A BAR QUESTION RELATED TO DEATH RESULTING FROM ARSON?
You can cite People vs. Malngan, People vs. Soria or J. Hernando’s case People vs. Mae Al-Saad, G.R. No.
242414, March 15, 2021
MANOLITA GONZALES vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. and Date 181409 February 11, 2010
The Supreme Court said that it is settled that the coverage of Art. 332 is strictly and exclusively limited to the
felonies stated therein – theft, swindling, and malicious mischief. It does NOT apply if these crimes are
complexed with another crime such as in this case, estafa through falsification of public document.
ARTICLE 349. BIGAMY
TWO WAYS OF COMMITTING
1. A legally married spouse contracts a second or subsequent marriage with another without the first
marriage being legally dissolved.
2. When the said legally married spouse contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the absent
spouse has been presumed dead.
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Q: X and Y are married. It was a happy marriage for five (5) years until the said wife discovered that his
husband was having an affair. Not only that, she realized that the said husband is already married to another
woman, Z. After finding evidence as to the fact of marriage between Y and Z, the wife filed a case for bigamy
against the said husband. In the said case of bigamy against the said husband, the husband said that he
cannot be held liable for bigamy. According to the husband, the first marriage was null and void. According to
the husband, his marriage with X is null and void because of want of marriage license. If you were the judge
and the defense of the accused was that he was able to prove that the marriage was null and void, should you
convict or acquit the said accused?
A: If you were the judge, you should render a judgment of acquittal based on the case of Pulido v. People.
In the case of Pulido v. People, en banc, the Supreme Court declared that proof that the first marriage is a void
ab initio marriage is a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for bigamy even without obtaining a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. There is no need to present or to prove in said court that the said
first marriage has been legally dissolved. Provided, the said accused can prove that the said first marriage is
void ab initio.
Q: Would your answer be the same, would you acquit the accused, would you apply the Pulido ruling if the
marriage was said to be null and void by reason of psychological incapacity?
A: NO. In the case of Tenebro v. CA, en banc, the Supreme Court said that subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the Philippine penal laws are concerned. Therefore, an individual who conducts a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the declaration that the said marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
ARTICLE 353. LIBEL
Elements of Libel
1. There must be a defamatory imputation of a crime, vice, or defect, whether real or imaginary;
2. The said imputation must be malicious;
3. There must be publicity of the said defamatory imputation; and
4. The victim must be identified.
Q: X sent a defamatory letter to Y. Y said, “My goodness! This letter contains many malicious imputations
against me.” Y was very mad. He then filed a case of libel against X. During the prosecution for libel, to show
proof of the malicious imputations in the said letter, Y presented a machine copy of the said letter. Y did not
present the original copy of the said letter. Can there be conviction for libel?
A: NO. The best evidence rule (now original document rule) is necessary in the crime of libel. Proof of the letter
is necessary to bring about a conviction for libel based on the best evidence rule. The said rule requires that the
original letter where the said libelous statements are stated must be presented as evidence in court.
Photocopies are not acceptable.
MAGLASANG v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 248616 | 12 January 2021
In this case, the Supreme Court said that the best evidence rule, now the original document rule, applies in
cases of libel. The purpose is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought before the court to
protect any misleading inferences resulting from intentional or unintentional introduction of certain portions of
a larger set of writings. Mere photocopies will not suffice to bring about a conviction of a crime of libel. It is
necessary that one must present the said original copy of the letter allegedly containing the malicious
statements.
CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012
Under Sec. 4(c) of R.A. 10175 or the Anti-Cybercrime Law, cyber libel or online libel is the unlawful or prohibited
acts of libel as defined under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer
system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.
DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE G.R. No. 203335 | 18 February 2014
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The Supreme Court ruled that online libel is constitutional only with respect to the original author of the post;
however, it is void with respect to others who simply received it, reacted to it, or liked it. Therefore, all those who
received, reacted to it, or liked or even shared it, are not liable.
Q: What is the prescriptive period for Online Libel?
A: Relying on Disini vs. SOJ, the prescriptive period will be 1 year and that "cyberlibel is actually NOT a new
crime since Art. 353, in relation to Art. 355, RPC, already punishes it. The Online Libel definition under
Sec.4(c)(4), RA 10175, merely affirms that online defamation constitutes 'SIMILAR MEANS' for committing
libel."
However, there is a recent decision of the SC.
PENALOSA VS. OCAMPO, G.R. NO. 230299. APRIL 26, 2023 [BEYOND CUT-OFF DATE]
The SC ruled that Libel under Art. 355, RPC, EXCLUDES online libel, based on 2 grounds:
1.
2.
The phrase "similar means" under Art. 355 could not have included "online defamation" under the
statutory construction rule of “noscitur a sociis.” In Art. 355, the associated words are: writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibitions,& cinematographic
exhibitions, clearly EXCLUDING "computer systems or other similar means which may be derived in the
future.
If it is true that Art. 355 includes libel made thru the computer systems, then Congress had no need to
legislate Online Libel under Sec.4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act - RA 10175, otherwise, it will
be superfluous.
Based on this latest jurisprudence, the prescriptive period then for cyberlibel is 15 years because under Art.
90, RPC, the prescriptive period for crimes punishable by AFFLICTIVE PENALTIES (which includes PRISION
MAYOR, the prescribed maximum penalty for Online Libel) is 15 years.
Cyber-squatting – The acquisition of a domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy
reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is: (2019 BAR)
QUASI-OFFENSES
Q: X attended a party. He was now on his way home. While X was driving recklessly along the highway, his
Toyota Hiace hit a Chevrolet car which entered the intersection. As a result, Y who was driving the Chevrolet
car sustained serious physical injuries, while his three friends, A, B, and C, suffered slight physical injuries.
The car was damaged and the amount of damages was 150,000 pesos. What is the proper charge against X?
A: Based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Morales v. People en banc affirming Ivler v. Modesto, the
proper charge against X is reckless imprudence resulting in multiple physical injuries and damage to property
due to the serious physical injuries sustained by Y and the slight physical injuries sustained by his friends, A, B,
and C, as well as the damage to the car.
The Ivler doctrine which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Morales states that Art. 48 on the complexity of
crimes does not apply to quasi-offenses such as reckless imprudence. There shall be no splitting of charges
under Art. 365. Only one information shall be filed regardless of number or severity of the consequences of the
imprudent or negligent act.
IVLER v. MODESTO, G.R. No. 172716 | 17 November 2010
FACTS: Jason Ivler committed a hit-and-run against another car. The husband in the other car died, but the wife
survived, sustaining only slight physical injuries. Ivler then was arrested by the police. After investigation, two
cases were filed against him: 1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries sustained by the wife;
and 2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property because of the death of the husband
and the total damage caused on the car.
Since the wife is alive, the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is only for inquest
purposes. As such, there is no need for preliminary investigation. On that very day, the case for reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was filed before the MeTC. The other case on the reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property requires preliminary investigation because the
husband died and there was a need to assess the value of the damages to the car. Ivler was then at the fiscal’s
office for, more or less, 60 days.
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Meanwhile, the case for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries filed before the MeTC was set
for arraignment. During arraignment, Ivler, as per the advice of his counsel, pleaded guilty. Thereafter, the judge
convicted him as charged.
After a month or two, here comes the other case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property filed before the same court against Ivler. The counsel of Ivler filed a motion to quash on the ground of
double jeopardy. According to him, double jeopardy arises because Ivler has already been prosecuted and
convicted for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. Therefore, he can no longer
be prosecuted and convicted of another crime arising from the very same reckless imprudence; otherwise,
double jeopardy arises. The said motion to quash was denied by the lower court and it went up to the Supreme
Court.
HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the case. It is settled in jurisprudence that reckless imprudence, simple
imprudence, and simple negligence are crimes by themselves; they are not merely means of committing a
felony. Here, since Ivler has already been convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries,
he can no longer be prosecuted and convicted of another crime arising from the very same reckless
imprudence; otherwise, the double jeopardy rule will be violated. You cannot prosecute another person for two
crimes based on the same imprudence, negligence. Both must be combined in the reckless imprudence case
END OF PRE-WEEK LECTURE
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