Overall Strategy The group's by and large technique was a blend of a Wide Taken a toll Pioneer and a Wide Differentiator by keeping up a nearness in all the markets. Our center on mechanization begun from round 1, which driven us to become beat entertainer in terms of commitment edge. We begun to contribute intensely on HR modules from circular 3 itself. We begun to contribute intensely on TQM modules from circular 5 itself, with tall canter on R&D cycle time, request and openness. We propelled tall conclusion item in R1, which came into advertise in R2; we moreover propelled item in moo conclusion fragment in R5 which came into showcase in R6. We too moved a moo conclusion item into execution fragment which made a difference us get rank 1 in productivity. We contributed in computerization and R&D hand in hand, which made a difference with commitment conjointly cut down the changed date for presentation. Plan Our goal was to minimize manufacturing costs in order to increase contribution; as a result, we achieved the highest contribution margin of 48.8%. Ploy Our first goal was to reduce our long-term debt in order to lower interest costs and increase profitability. After Round four, when bespoke modules were introduced, we shifted our approach and began making significant investments in automation, TQM, and HR. As a result, in R5 long-term debt increased. We improved the performance of our product, Apple, from low end to high end, which enabled us to make almost $5000 million in profit in the end. LOW END SEGMENT 1. The low-end segment holds 40% of the industry's total demand, making it crucial. 2. Initially, our strategy focused on good pricing for profits despite low market share, shifting to competitive pricing for increased profits. 3. Given the 7-year age and 24% importance of the low-end, we maintained product coordinates and pre-emptively adjusted for Rounds 7 and 8 to outperform competitors. 4. Exiting a non-profitable size segment in Round 6 for a new low-end product, Bindaas, due to only 7 competitors, turned out to be beneficial. 5. By maximizing prices in response to the demand-supply gap in the final round, we significantly boosted profits, marking a pivotal success. HIGH END 1. Price competition was minimal in this segment, with its importance at only 9%. 2. Despite low sales potential and just 10% industry share, this segment had high profit potential due to the low importance of price. 3. We launched our inaugural product, "Best," in round 2, based on the segment's profit potential. 4. High drift rates hindered products from aligning with the ideal market spot. 5. Increased marketing costs and competitive pressure led to lower sales, making the segment less profitable than anticipated. 6. While initially planning to exit our old product, we decided against it to maintain market share and avoid ceding to competitors. PERFORMANCE SEGMENT 1. This segment focused heavily on "performance" and "size" (43%) and less on "price" (19%), making it not very price competitive. 2. Lack of profits initially in this segment was due to low automation and absence of TQM, but it became profitable over time. 3. Our strategy was to keep a competitive share in this segment, accepting minor losses and gains, to prevent it from being profitable for other industry players. SIZE SEGMENT 1. Emphasizing "performance" and "size" (43%) with minimal focus on "price" (9%), this segment lacked price competitiveness. 2. Demand for this industry segment was the lowest among others. 3. Our strategy aimed to keep a competitive share in this segment, tolerating small losses and profits to deter profitability for competitors. 4. Initial marginal profits and losses turned to a $3.291 million loss in round 5 due to low TQM investment, prompting our exit from the segment. 5. With 284 units of inventory remaining in round 5, we sold it to fund a new product, "bindaas," in the low-end segment. 6. Exiting proved profitable, yielding a total profit of $3702 million across rounds 6 and 7 from the leftover inventory. OVERVIEW 1. Our overall strategy combined Broad Cost Leader and Broad Differentiator approaches, ensuring our presence across all markets. 2. Focused on winning and maximizing profits from Round 4, we initially avoided heavy investments, planning an aggressive post-Round 4 strategy. 3. A strategic oversight in Round 3, not investing in TQM, led to our products deviating from the ideal spot, significantly harming our market position. 4. In response, we shifted to an aggressive strategy for Rounds 5 and 6, which resulted in profits during Rounds 7 and 8. 5. To counteract the setback from insufficient TQM investment, we introduced new products across segments. 6. We made a calculated gamble by exiting the size segment in Round 6 to enter the less crowded low segment, which proved successful.