Topic in Family Code: Psychological Incapacity
Article number: Article 36 of the Family Code
Dionisio C. Laroco v. Aurora B. Laroco, GR No. 253342, Jun 22, 2022
FACTS: The petitioner filed a petition pursuing the nullity of his marriage with the respondent IN
2014 where she alleged that he met the respondent sometime in 1970 and courted her where is
parents also disapproved of their relationship because of respondent's reputation as a
promiscuous, dishonest, and flirtatious woman. He left respondent and went to Manila to support
her mother, then undergoing cobalt therapy. When he returned to Baguio, the respondent
informed him that she was pregnant and invited him to meet her parents in Lepanto Mines,
Mankayan, Benguet where they eventually got married. While managing the
canteen, respondent continued to go on dates with other men, especially when he was not
around. She also deceived him and embarrassed the family by borrowing money from several
persons without paying them. The petitioner asked a psychiatrist, Dr. Dy, who diagnosed him with
obsessive-compulsive personality disorder (OCD), rooted in his upbringing. Dr. Dy Dr. Dy
concluded that petitioner's psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of his
marriage to respondent and had juridical antecedence from his history. The petitioner argued
that the respondent suffered from Histrionic Personality Disorder, rendering her psychologically
incapacitated. During the trial, witnesses testified about the petitioner's responsible behavior and
the respondent's alleged neglect of their children and financial misconduct. Despite receiving
notice, the respondent did not join in the proceedings. The RTC denied the petition and held that
the marriage subsists and remains. Aggrieved, they appealed to CA which affirmed the decision
of RTC. Hence this petition in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be set aside for being a
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?
RULING: YES. “Psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack
of understanding and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital obligations due to
psychic causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified;
hence, expert opinion is not required.”
“Applying the reconceptualized framework and elements of proof in Tan-Andal to the case at bar,
we at once would find the existence and gravity of the mutual incompatibility and antagonism
between Spouses Laroco. This state of discord and disharmony between them has undermined
the unity and harmony in their family. The acts, behavior, conduct, events, reputation,
character,or circumstances of dysfunctionalities revolve around charges and suspicions of
respondent's adultery and child abuse, and the spouses' long separation in fact. The dysfunctional
acts have led to the children bouncing from one parent to another while they were growing up
and maturing. That these acts, behavior, conduct, events, reputation, character, or circumstances
of dysfunctionalities clearly and convincingly happened cannot be doubted. Neither the State nor
respondent contradicted this narration of petitioner. We believe it to be clearly and convincingly
more probable than not. There is no contradiction. It stands unrebutted. It is also not improbable
or contrary to human experience. All told, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in their
respective decisions. It is not that these courts applied the wrong standards and misanalysed the
case. Possibly, they did not, but they did so under the strictures of the now-abandoned doctrines
on psychological incapacity. No party relied in good faith and reaped benefits under the defunct
doctrine of psychological incapacity. In fact, its application to this case is more in-tune with
remediating the adverse consequences of the old view of psychological incapacity. Wherefore,
new judgment is rendered declaring the marriage between Dionisio C. Laroco and Aurora B.
Laroco VOID from the beginning on the ground of psychological incapacity.”
Topic in Family Code: Rights of an Illegitimate Child
Article number: Article 195 of the Family Code
Amadea Angela K. Aquino V. Rodolfo C. Aquino and Abdulah C. Aquino, G.R. No. 208912/G.R.
No. 209018, December 7, 2021
FACTS: Rodolfo alleged that his father, Miguel T. Aquino (Miguel), died intestate on July 5, 1999,
leaving personal and real properties. The estate of his first wife, Amadea C. Aquino (Amadea),
who had died earlier on September 27, 1977, was already settled in 1978. Miguel was survived
by: (1) Enerie B. Aquino, his second wife; (2) Abdulah C. Aquino (Abdulah) and Rodolfo C.
(Rodolfo) Aquino, his sons with Amadea; and (3) the heirs of Wilfredo C. Aquino, his son with
Amadea who also died earlier. Miguel was also predeceased by another son with Amadea, Arturo
C. Aquino (Arturo). On July 2, 2003, Angela who claims to be arturo’s only child moved that she
be included in the distribution and partition of Miguel's estate which claimed that her
grandfather, Miguel, took care of her mother's expenses during her pregnancy with her. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted her motions and presented that as heir, Angela was deemed
entitled to a share in Miguel's estate. Aggrieved, Rodolfo filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals but was denied. Meanwhile, Abdulah appealed before the Court of
Appeal claiming that Angela failed to prove her filiation. the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision in favor of Abdulah. It was held that Angela failed to prove her filiation in accordance
with Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code. Hence, this petition in the Supreme Court. Hence,
the petition in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Can Angela, an alleged nonmarital child of Miguel’s marital child, inherit from her
grandfather’s estate?
RULING: Yes. “Nonmarital children, or "illegitimate children" as used under Article 165 of the
Family Code, are Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage.” The phrase "outside a
valid marriage" does not necessarily mean an extramarital affair. Parents may choose not to get
married despite having no legal impediment to marry. Intestate succession is based on the
decedent's presumed will.” “We adopt a construction of Article 992 that makes
children, regardless of the circumstances of their births, qualified to inherit from their direct
ascendants—such as their grandparent—by their right of representation. Both marital and
nonmarital children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their
parents and other ascendants. Nonmarital children are removed from their parents and
ascendants to the same degree as marital children. Nonmarital children of marital children are
also removed from their parents and ascendants in the same degree as nonmarital children of
nonmarital children.” “This interpretation of Article 992 is also supported by the Family Code.
Particularly, it is consistent with the provisions of the Family Code on support. Article 195 of the
Family Code identifies the persons who are obliged to support each other. It provides that parent
and their children and the children of the latter, whether legitimate or illegitimate, are obliged to
support each other. The mandatory nature of the support from grandparents to grandchildren,
regardless of status, is intentional. It reflects the evolution of the legal view towards illegitimate
children from the time of the Spanish Civil Code and the Civil Code to the time of the Family
Code.” “To emphasize, this ruling will only apply when the nonmarital child has a right of
representation to their parent's share in her grandparent's legitime. It is silent on collateral
relatives where the nonmarital child may inherit by themself. We are not now ruling on the extent
of the right of a nonmarital child to inherit. Those will be the subject of a proper case and, if so
minded, may also be the subject of more enlightened and informed future legislation.”
Topic in Family Code: Unjust Enrichment
Article number: Article 33 of the Civil Code
PNTC Colleges, Inc. V. Time Realty, Inc. G.R. No. 219698, September 27, 2021
FACTS: PNTC Colleges, Inc. (PNTC) and Time Realty, Inc. (Time Realty) entered into a Contract of
Lease wherein Time Realty leased to PNTC Manila, from 2005 to 2007. While the term of the lease
ended on December 31, 2005, the contract was impliedly renewed monthly after said date. With
the acquiescence of Time Realty, PNTC continued to occupy the premises for an increased rental
rate. Time Realty notified PNTC of its (Time Realty's) intent not to extend the lease on the fourth
floor anymore, for this reason, Time Realty provided PNTC two options: (1) to extend the lease
on the fourth-floor hut only until April 2007; or (2) to transfer to the second floor of the same
building. Sometime in 2007, PNTC commenced the transfer of its operations to its new site in
Intramuros, Manila. However, Time Realty alleged that PNTC did so without settling its
obligations. Time Realty argued that its retention of PNTC's properties as security was in
accordance with Paragraph 23 of the Contract of Lease. PNTC filed a Complaint for Delivery of
Personal Properties with Damages alleging that it suffered serious losses due to Time Realty's
unjustified withholding of its properties valued at P561,360,00. The RTC dismissed the complaint
and found that PNTC has no cause of action against Time Realty. Aggrieved, Time Realty
appealed to the CA which granted the same which did not agree with the RTC's ruling on unjust
enrichment. PNTC asked for a reconsideration48 which the CA denied in a Resolution. PNTC then
filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an unjust enrichment as Time Realty withheld the properties
pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the Contract of Lease
RULING: No. “Contrary to the claim of PNTC and the finding of the RTC, there would he no unjust
enrichment to speak of, as Time Realty withheld the properties pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the
Contract of Lease, a provision which PNTC knowingly agreed to. In other words, Time Realty
retained the said properties as security to compel PNTC to pay and not to unduly enrich itself.
Jurisprudence holds that there is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to
the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. The statutory basis for the
principle of unjust enrichment is Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides that '[e]very person
who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
the same to him. “ “The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 33 requires two conditions:
(1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is
derived at another's expense or damage. There is no unjust enrichment when the person who
will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.” “The circumstances in the instant case do not show
that Time Realty unjustly benefitted from the retention of the properties without valid basis, as
it merely acted in accordance with the lease contract to ensure recovery of what is due to it. If
anything, the so-called "benefit" which Time Realty is "enjoying" by withholding the properties is
the assurance that it would be able to collect from PNTC, Additionally, it cannot be said that Time
Realty is using the said properties as these were being kept in storage pursuant to the lease
contract.” “Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby denied. The assailed Decision and
Resolution dated rendered by the Court of Appeals are hereby affirmed with modification and
that PNTC Colleges, Inc. is ORDERED to pay Time Realty, Inc.”
Topic in Family Code: Violence against Women and Children and Support
Article number: Article 195 of the Family Code
XXX1, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 221370, June 28, 2021
FACTS: An Information was filed against petitioner for violation of Section 5, paragraph (e)(2) of
RA 9262 for the alleged deliberate deprivation of sufficient financial support legally due the
complainant and their child. The prosecution alleged that while living with the petitioner's family,
the complainant did not receive proper medical care during her pregnancy which resulted the
complainant giving birth to their son, who was diagnosed with a medical condition resulting in
delayed development and hearing impairment. The complainant asked the petitioner for financial
help for their child's hearing aid, but he refused, claiming that his salary could only cover his own
expenses. The complainant informed the petitioner about a possible cure for their child's
condition, but he claimed he did not have enough money to support the procedure. The
petitioner only provided support five times before the filing of the case but started giving support
regularly after the filing of the case. The RTC rendered that petitioner is guilty of the violation of
RA9262. Aggrieved, the petitioner went for appeal in CA where it upheld the decision of the RTC.
Hence, the petition in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 5(e)(2) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9262 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
RULING: Yes. Economic abuse is one of the acts of violence punished by RA 9262: "Economic
abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following: 1.) withdrawal of financial support or preventing the
victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in
Article 73 of the Family Code; 2.) deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and
the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3.) destroying household property; 4.) controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely
controlling the conjugal money or properties. Specifically, Sec. 5, par. (e)(2) of RA 9262 penalizes
the deprivation of financial support legally due the woman or child, which is a continuing offense
“As correctly found by the courts a quo, all the elements of a violation of Section 5 (e)(2) of RA
9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) XXX and AAA were married after being pregnant
with BBB; (b) XXX acknowledged BBB as his child; (c) he failed to provide sufficient support for
BBB; (d) he withheld financial support for BBB due to the ire he felt towards his wife; (e) he only
provided financial support after the complaint against him in the Prosecutor's Office was filed.”
“Under Article 195 (4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his child, comprising
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling clothing, medical attendance, education, and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.52 The amount of support shall
be in proportion to the necessity of the recipient and the means of the person obliged to give
support. In the case at bar, XXX deliberately deprived his son BBB of financial support for the
latter's sustenance, clothing, medical, and educational expenses.ℒαwρhi৷ From the moment the
child was born until the case was filed, petitioner was only able to give a total of about P10,000.00
in a span of five years.54 To the mind of this Court, this does not meet the necessity of BBB's
expenses, considering that the child is suffering from Congenital Torch Syndrome, resulting in
delayed development and hearing impairment. This especially holds true since petitioner is
capable of giving support based on his Income Tax Return for the year 2009 when his gross
compensation was P234,565.79.” Wherefore the petition is denied finding petitioner
XXX GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5(e)(2) of Republic Act No. 9262.
Topic in Family Code: Marriage and Custom
Article number: Article 5 of the old Civil code
CRISTITA ANABAN, CRISPINA ANABAN, PUREZA ANABAN, CRESENCIA ANABAN-WALANG, AND
ROSITA ANABAN-BARISTO, VS. BETTY ANABAN-ALFILER, MERCEDES ANABAN, AND MARCELO
ANABAN, G.R. No. 249011, March 15, 2021
FACTS: Pedrito Anaban (Pedrito) and Virginia Erasmo (Virginia) got married in accordance with
the native customs of the Ibaloi Tribe to which they both belonged in 1942. In 1947, however,
the council of tribe elders took notice of Virginia's insanity and based thereon approved the
couple's divorce and allowed Pedrito to remarry. In 1952, Pedrito got married to fellow Ibaloi
Pepang still in accordance with their tribe's customs. Upon Pedrito's death on September 2, 2004,
respondents sued for summary settlement or judicial partition of the intestate estate of their
father Pedrito. Respondents averred that during the marriage of their father Pedrito to their
mother Virginia, Pedrito acquired from his father Pedro Anaban a portion of land. But the new
certificate of title issued to Pedrito reflected that he was married to petitioners' mother Pepang.
Although in truth, his marriage with their mother Virginia was not yet legally dissolved. Thus,
petitioners are actually the illegitimate children of their father Pedrito. Petitioners, on the other
hand, argued that they are the legitimate children of their father Pedrito with their mother
Pepang. Pedrito and respondents' mother Virginia were married in accordance with the Ibaloi
Tribe customs, and their marriage was also dissolved in accordance with Ibaloi tribe customs and
traditions. The MCTC ruled that, first, the marriage between Pedrito and Virginia was validly
dissolved in accordance with the customs of the Ibaloi tribe; and second, petitioners are the
legitimate children of Pedrito who must succeed in equal proportion with respondents. On
appeal, RTC-Branch 10, declared as bigamous the marriage of Pedrito and Pepang and held that
customs and traditions cannot supplant existing laws unless specifically provided under said laws.
The CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence this petition in the supreme court.
ISSUE: Is Pedrito Anaban's divorce from Virginia Erasmo claimed to have been decreed in
accordance with the Ibaloi customs be recognized under our laws?
RULING: No. The divorce, therefore, is contrary to law, hence, cannot be recognized. Thus, in
1947, only two (2) grounds were accepted for divorce, i.e., adultery and concubinage. Neither
was the reason for Pedrito and Virginia's divorce. The Ibaloi council of elders granted the divorce
on grounds of Virginia's alleged insanity. A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which
the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those causes and with those formalities
which the state has by statute prescribed. With respect to the contention that the appellant acted
in good faith in contracting second marriage, believing that she had been validly divorced from
her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact
that one does not know that is act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from
the consequences thereof. As the trial court in Bitdu held, the laws governing marriage and its
incidents are moral in nature and as such they are laws relating to public policy. The habits and
customs of a people, the dogmas and doctrines of a religion cannot be superior to or have
precedence over laws relating to public policy, because as stated above laws relating to marriage
and its incidents are normal in nature and as such, they affect public policy. This holds true even
up to this time. Since there was no legal and valid ground for the divorce of Pedrito and Virginia,
in the eyes of the law, they were still married, and their marriage was not dissolved to permit
Pedrito to remarry. Pedrito's subsequent marriage to petitioners' mother Pepang, therefore, is
void for being bigamous. Verily, the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err when they ruled so
and declared petitioners as Pedrito's illegitimate children.